Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A.
FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744
promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its
Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of
the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss
the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is
made as to costs.

The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court
of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:

On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch
XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same
petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on
the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio,
Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The
will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27)
with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection raised by private
respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of
a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the
testator's property, the will provided:

THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and
money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to
my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing
at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-
deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in
Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely:
Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all
surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to
be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors
(respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the
latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for
the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir
and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was
denied by the trial judge.

After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March
11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No.
591 ACEB

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review
of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was
filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).

On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153).
Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for
petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).

Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):

(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;

(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity
thereof before it is admitted to probate;

(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate.
The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
"compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who
are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs;

(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;

(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that
mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share
in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at
bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.

(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
 (G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore
unconstitutional and ineffectual.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.

Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code
may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory
heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even
if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however,
the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption
by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9).
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and
preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at
least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is
a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora
o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
[1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in
the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no
leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been
provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner
and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the
opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and
devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a
devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an
individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At
the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil
Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law.
However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the
universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing
to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB
must be dismissed.

As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an
oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de
Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308
[1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction
Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave
abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid
grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).

Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the
general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v.
Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate
moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held
that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations.
The Court said:

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that
we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving
spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was
fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court
upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals
with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The
Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge
should have denied its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the
probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra).

In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No.
591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal
capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order
dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters
properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the
case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).

For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress
when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters
were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents
had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of
certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.

Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the
right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not
dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence
of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a
petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and
adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned
decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated
October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I concur in the result on the basic proposition that preterition in this case was by mistake or
inadvertence.

To my mind, an important distinction has to be made as to whether the omission of a forced heir in
the will of a testator is by mistake or inadvertence, or voluntary or intentional. If by mistake or
inadvertence, there is true preterirton and total intestacy results. The reason for this is the "inability
to determine how the testator would have distributed his estate if none of the heirs had been omitted
or forgotten (An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. III, p. 54).

The requisites of preterition are:

1. The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);

2. The ommission is by mistake or thru an oversight.

3. The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will. (111
Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225) (Parenthetical addendum
supplied).

On the other hand, if the omission is intentional, the effect would be a defective disinheritance
covered by Article 918 of the Civil Code in which case the institution of heir is not wholly void but
only insofar as it prejudices the legitime of the person disinherited. Stated otherwise. the nullity is
partial unlike in true preterition where the nullity is total.

Pretention is presumed to be only an involuntary omission; that is, that if the testator
had known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time of the execution of the
will, he would have instituted such heir. On the other hand, if the testator attempts to
disinherit a compulsory heir, the presumption of the law is that he wants such heir to
receive as little as possible from his estate. (III Tolentino, Civil Code, 1973 Edition,
pp. 174-175).

In the case at bar, there seems to have been mistake or in advertence in the omission of the
adopted daughter, hence, my concurrence in the result that total intestacy ensued.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I concur in the result on the basic proposition that preterition in this case was by mistake or
inadvertence.

To my mind, an important distinction has to be made as to whether the omission of a forced heir in
the will of a testator is by mistake or inadvertence, or voluntary or intentional. If by mistake or
inadvertence, there is true preterirton and total intestacy results. The reason for this is the "inability
to determine how the testator would have distributed his estate if none of the heirs had been omitted
or forgotten (An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. III, p. 54).

The requisites of preterition are:

1. The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);

2. The ommission is by mistake or thru an oversight.

3. The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will. (111
Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225) (Parenthetical addendum
supplied).

On the other hand, if the omission is intentional, the effect would be a defective disinheritance
covered by Article 918 of the Civil Code in which case the institution of heir is not wholly void but
only insofar as it prejudices the legitime of the person disinherited. Stated otherwise. the nullity is
partial unlike in true preterition where the nullity is total.

Pretention is presumed to be only an involuntary omission; that is, that if the testator
had known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time of the execution of the
will, he would have instituted such heir. On the other hand, if the testator attempts to
disinherit a compulsory heir, the presumption of the law is that he wants such heir to
receive as little as possible from his estate. (III Tolentino, Civil Code, 1973 Edition,
pp. 174-175).

In the case at bar, there seems to have been mistake or in advertence in the omission of the
adopted daughter, hence, my concurrence in the result that total intestacy ensued.

Footnotes

* Penned by Justice Jose A. R. Melo and concurred in by Justices Milagros A.

German and Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-91-766. April 7, 1993.]

JOSE P. UY and RIZALINA C. UY, Complainants, v. HON. JUDGE TERESITA

DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Respondent.

Romeo M. Mendoza for complainants.

 SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE; FORMAL

INVESTIGATION NOT REQUIRED WHERE CULPABILITY WELL DOCUMENTED. — The
charges against her are clearly meritorious and supported by the records. Hence, there
is no need in fact for Us to conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her
culpability as it is well documented. Her orders and those of the appellate courts display
her open defiance of higher judicial authority. In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88
pending before her sala, respondent Judge committed the following highly irregular and
questionable acts indicative of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct
prejudicial to the public interest, to wit: (a) respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion
of a party the titles of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina Cortes, who were not
parties to the case, to the great prejudice of the latter; (b) respondent Judge issued
two (2) orders which disregarded the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her
disputed Order of 7 June 1989; (c) respondent Judge issued another order authorizing
the sale of the other properties previously titled in the complainant Jose P. Uy; (d)
respondent Judge issued still two (2) more orders approving deeds of sale even after
this Court had already affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order
of 7 June 1989. These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her blatant
disobedience to the lawful orders of superior courts and belie any claim that she
rendered the erroneous orders in good faith as would excuse her from administrative
liability.

2. ID.; ID.; CONDUCT EXPECTED OF JUDGE AS VISIBLE REPRESENTATION OF LAW

AND JUSTICE. — Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible
representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness
to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. The judge should be
studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. To fulfill this mission,
the judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the
judge is already aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying
them, otherwise such omission can never be excused.

3. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO KNOW LAW THAT IS SO ELEMENTARY CONSTITUTES GROSS

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; CASE AT BAR. — Elementary in our statutory law is the
doctrine that when title to land has already been registered and the certificate of title
thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked because the issue on
the validity of the title can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for the
purpose. Corollary to this is the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law. In cancelling the titles of complainants over
their properties on mere motion of a party and without affording them due process,
respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and promote the
administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know
it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

4. ID.; ID.; WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE AND CONTINUED DISREGARD OF JUDGMENT OF

HIGHER COURT AND RESOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT CONSTITUTE GRAVE AND
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT. — The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are
further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the Court of Appeals
annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the titles of
complainants. She was in fact specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet,
despite this Decision, respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer or
alienation to other persons of properties titled in the name of complainants to the
detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court
constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench and the
bar . . . Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March
1991 cannot be condoned. Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in cancelling the titles of complainants.
Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our pronouncement. She issued two
(2) more orders approving the sale to other persons of the remaining properties which
were titled in the name of complainants. We consider this willful disobedience and
continued disregard of Our Resolution as grave and serious misconduct. Indeed,
respondent Judge displayed open defiance to Our authority and utterly failed to show
proper respect for, and due and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court.

5. ID.; ID.; ACT OR OMISSION WHICH WOULD DIMINISH PEOPLE’S FAITH IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE NOT COUNTENANCED BY SUPREME COURT; RATIONALE
THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. — By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to
observe in the performance of her duties that prudence and circumspection which the
law requires for public service. She has made a mockery of the judicial system of which
she is a part and which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any act
or omission which would diminish the faith of the people in the administration of justice.
As Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos articulated, "the power of the judiciary rests upon the
faith of the people and the integrity of the courts. Take this faith away and the moral
influence of the court is gone and popular respect impaired."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED

PERSONS; PROBATE COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP
WHERE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO ESTATE CLAIMED BY ANOTHER
PERSON. — Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions
arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person,
but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administration
proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction. The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle
indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Branch 172, Metro Manila, is charged 1 with gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a complaint filed on 15 November 1991
with the Office of the Court Administrator by the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy,
relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 for settlement of the estate of the late
Ambrocio C. Pingco. chanrobles law library : red

The records show that on 21 November 1988, a certain Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to
be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for settlement of the estate of
Ambrocio C. Pingco. Two (2) days after, or on 23 November 1988, respondent Judge
appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court.

On 27 March 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed an urgent motion stating
that sometime in February 1978 two (2) parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio
C. Pingco and his wife covered by TCT Nos. 7537 and 75101 had been sold to
complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale with the Register of
Deeds of Manila in February 1989. Consequently, counsel requested the court to direct
the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any transaction without the signature of
Herminia Alvos" involving the properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-
15354 to B-15359, TCT Nos. T39565, T-50276, T-52754, T-220168, TCT. Nos. T-7537
and 75101. On 29 March 1989, respondent Judge granted the motion.

On 18 April 1989, upon order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela
reported on the status of the titles to the properties subject of the "freeze order;"
informing the Court that on 3 February 1989, a deed of absolute sale executed by the
spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez dated 9 December 1978 was filed with
the Register of Deeds, describing therein fifteen (15) parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, and B-163276; that, by virtue of the
deed of sale, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants
Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCT No. B-163276 which could not be located
in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City; that TCT Nos. T-50276 and 52754 were still
registered in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez, and, that the status of
TCT Nos. T-39565 and T-220168, which were with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan,
could not yet be determined.

On 5 May 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed with the court an urgent
motion to cancel the titles issued in the name of Jose P. Uy stating that the latter was
able to register the titles in his name in February 1989 through fraud, and the
signatures of the vendors on the deed of sale were forged.

On 7 June 1989, respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of
complainant Jose P. Uy and the reinstatement of the names of the spouses Ambrocio C.
Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of new titles in their name.

On 3 July 1989, complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to
annul the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from implementing the
Order of 7 June 1989, and that respondent Judge be restrained from further proceeding
against him.

Meanwhile, acting on the questioned Order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds
of Valenzuela cancelled the certificates of title of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina
C. Uy and reverted them to Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On 28 September 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and

prohibition of complainants and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent
Judge, and enjoined her from proceeding against complainant Jose P. Uy in the
intestate proceedings thus —

". . . a probate court has no authority to y decide questions of the ownership of

property, real or personal. The only purpose of the examination . . . is to elicit
information or to secure evidence from the persons suspected of having possession or
knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the property of the deceased. If after such examination there is
good reason for believing that the person so examined has property in possession
belonging to the estate, it is the duty of the administrator, by ordinary action, to
recover the same (Alafriz v. Mina, 28 Phil. 137 [1914]; Modesto v. Modesto, 109 Phil.
1066 [1959]; Chanco v. Madrilejo, 12 Phil. 543 [1909])." cralaw virtua1aw library

Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos sought a reconsideration of the ruling of the

Court of Appeals but the same was denied on 15 November 1989.

On 28 December 1989, Alvos then filed with Us a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 91092.

On 6 February 1990, respondent Judge approved a project of partition dated 18 August

1990 submitted by Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos, together with Paz Ramirez
(surviving spouse of Ambrocio C. Pingco) and Alicia Alinsunurin. In the project of
partition, TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352 and B-15354 to B-15359 covering the parcels
of land in Bulacan (which were reverted in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco pursuant to
the Order of 7 June 1989) were adjudicated to the surviving spouse Paz Ramirez
Pingco.

On 16 January 1991, on motion of counsel for the Special Administratrix, respondent

Judge ordered the Registers of Deeds of Valenzuela and Manila to cancel the titles in
the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez and to issue new ones in favor of the
persons mentioned in the approved project of partition.

On 4 February 1991, respondent Judge granted the ex-parte petition of the Special
Administratrix for approval of the deed of absolute sale of the parcels of land covered
by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351, B-15348 and B-15349, and stating therein that as far
as the intestate proceedings were concerned, complainant Jose P. Uy was not a
participant either as heir or oppositor; that the property covered by TCT Nos. B-15350,
B-15351 and B-15348 and B-15349 were part of the intestate estate of the late
Ambrocio C. Pingco over which the trial court had jurisdiction and in whose name said
titles were registered when the proceedings were instituted, that even as the Decision
of the Court of Appeals annulled her Order of 7 June 1989, it did not prevent her from
proceeding with her actions on the properties, neither did it direct the Register of Deeds
of Valenzuela to revert the titles again from Ambrocio C. Pingco to complainant Jose P.
Uy. As a result, instead of complying with the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
respondent Judge directed the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to comply with her own
Order of 16 January 1991 cancelling the titles of the Pingcos and ordering the issuance
of new titles in accordance with the project of partition she obstinately approved.

On 8 March 1991, in G.R. No. 91092, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which annulled and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge. Thus —

"We find no merit in the petition. Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply
provides that a person who is suspected of having in his possession property belonging
to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under oath on the matter.
Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the question of ownership
of such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land
under administration and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of title issued in
favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained through a mere motion in the probate
proceedings over the objection of said vendee over whom the probate court has no
jurisdiction. To recover the property, an independent action against the vendee must be
instituted in the proper court" (citing Tagle, Et. Al. v. Manalo Et. Al., 105 Phil 1124).

On 2 April 1991, respondent Judge, in utter disregard of Our Resolution of March 1991,
granted the ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of the deed of
absolute sale of properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 and B-15346 of the Register
of Deeds of Valenzuela and reiterated the rationale of her questioned Order of 4
February 1991.

On 29 April 1991, undaunted by her reversal by the Court of Appeals and this Court,
and in blatant disobedience to judicial authority, and established precedents and
jurisprudence, respondent Judge again granted an ex-parte petition of the Special
Administratrix for approval of another deed of absolute sale covering three (3) more
parcels of land originally titled in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy, to wit: TCT Nos.
B-15347, B-15355 and B-15356 of the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, reiterating for
the second time the reasons stated in her Orders of 4 February and 2 April 1991.

In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claim that despite the
Decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 September 1989 and the pendency of the
petition for review by way of certiorari before this Court, respondent Judge continued
issuing various orders resulting in the issuance of new titles to the properties in the
name of persons stated in the project of partition, to the damage and prejudice of
complainants. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Complainants further contend that even after this Court had affirmed the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain further
proceedings concerning the ownership of the properties, respondent Judge still, in an
attempt to defeat the proscription imposed by higher judicial authority, issued, orders
approving the sale of the properties to the further prejudice of complainants.

In her comment, respondent Judge alleges that the filing of the complaint against her is
merely to harass her. While she admits that her Order of 7 June 1989 was annulled and
set aside by the Court of Appeals, which annulment was affirmed by this Court, she
argues that no temporary restraining order was issued and that before the Decision of
the Court of Appeals was promulgated her Order of 7 June 1989 was already complied
with by the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela. She further contends that even as she was
prohibited from proceeding against complainants herein, the Court of Appeals did not
order the reversion of the titles to them.

We are far from persuaded by respondent Judge. The charges against her are clearly
meritorious and supported by the records. Hence, there is no need in fact for Us to
conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her culpability 2 as it is well
documented. Her orders and those of the appellate courts display her open defiance of
higher judicial authority.

In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 pending before her sala, respondent Judge
committed the following highly irregular and questionable acts indicative of gross
ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the public interest, to wit: (a)
respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion of a party the titles of complainants Jose P.
Uy and Rizalina Cortes, who were not parties to the case, to the great prejudice of the
latter; (b) respondent Judge issued two (2) orders which disregarded the Decision of
the Court of Appeals annulling her disputed Order of 7 June 1989; 3 (c) respondent
Judge issued another order authorizing the sale of the other properties previously titled
in the complainant Jose P. Uy; 4 (d) respondent Judge issued still two (2) more orders
approving deeds of sale even after this Court had already affirmed the Decision of the
Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989. 5

These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her blatant disobedience to the
lawful orders of superior courts and belie any claim that she rendered the erroneous
orders in good faith as would excuse her from administrative liability.

Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible representation of law and
justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the
judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave
an example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid
even the slightest infraction of the law. 6 To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep
abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. 7 If the judge is already
aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them, otherwise
such omission can never be excused. 8

Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but
claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administration
proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction. 9 The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle
indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules.

Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has already been
registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked because the issue on the validity of the title can only be raised in
an action instituted expressly for the purpose. Corollary to this is the constitutional
mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. In
cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and
without affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to
uphold the law and promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the
law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. 10

The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal
to abide by the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989
which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was in fact specifically
enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite this Decision, respondent Judge
skill authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation to other persons of properties
titled in the name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect
for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the
interest of the public, the bench and the bar. The absence of a temporary restraining
order or an order from the Court of Appeals to revert the titles to complainants is not
sufficient justification for respondent Judge to issue subsequent orders contrary to the
appellate court’s proscription. Certainly, respondent Judge is fully aware that the
necessary consequence of the appellate court’s decision is to put back the complainants
to their former status prior to the issuance of the annulled order. Consequently, the
Order of 7 June 1989 being void and of no effect, the ownership of the properties
subject of the settlement proceedings remains vested in complainants and will continue
to be so until declared void in an appropriate proceeding, not in the intestate
proceedings before respondent Judge. Thus, an order from the appellate court that will
revert the titles to complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from its
decision annulling the questioned cancellation. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March 1991
cannot be condoned. Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in cancelling the titles of complainants.
Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our pronouncement. She issued two
(2) more orders approving the sale to other persons of the remaining properties which
were titled in the name of complainants.

We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution as

grave and serious misconduct. 11 Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open defiance to
Our authority and utterly failed to show proper respect for, and due and needed
cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court. 12

By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the performance
of her duties that prudence and circumspection which the law requires for public
service. She has made a mockery of the judicial system of which she is a part and
which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any act or omission which
would diminish the faith of the people in the administration of justice. 13 As Chief
Justice Jose Abad Santos articulated, "the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of
the people and the integrity of the courts. Take this faith away and the moral influence
of the court is gone and popular respect impaired." cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG guilty of

gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the
judicial service; consequently, she is hereby DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in
any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including
government owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,

Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Campos and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984

PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and HONOR MOSLARES, respondents.

Azucena E. Lozada for petitioner.

Estrella Funelas Iral & Associates and Tomas Trinidad for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on June 30,
1982 in CA-G.R. Nos. 12599-R, 12600-R, and 12601-R entitled "Honor P. Moslares, petitioner v.
Honorable Reynaldo P. Honrado, et al., respondents, was filed as part of the effort to expedite the
final settlement of the estate of the deceased NICOLAI DREPIN.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) making permanent the temporary restraining order issued:

(b) declaring null and void the impugned orders of April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980,
September 30, 1980, and October 20, 1980, for having been issued in grave abuse
of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction, with the September and October orders
having the additional defect of due process violation;

(c) declaring null and void the Deed of Undertaking and Deed of Sale in favor of
respondent Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc., for being mere consequences of
null orders;
 (d) ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the transfer certificates of title
issued to Pio Barreto Realty Development, (TCT Nos. N-50539,
N-50540, N-50541) and to transfer the same to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin with the
annotation that this transfer to the estate is subject to the final decision in Civil Case
No. 41287 of the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila; and

(e) denying the prayer for the exclusion of the three titled lots involved from Special
Proceedings Nos. 7257, 7261, and 7269 of the CFI of Makati Branch Civil Case No.
41287 abovementioned.

The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin were initiated shortly after his death on
July 29, 1972 with the filing of a petition for probate of his holographic will on August 23, 1972.

In this holographic will the late Drepin listed twenty-two (22) persons as his alleged creditors, and
within the six (6) months after publication within which to file claims against the estate, twelve (12)
persons filed their respective claims. The total amount of obligations that may be chargeable against
the Drepin Estate is P1,299,652.66.

The only asset of the testate estate of Drepin consists of three (3) parcels of titled land with an area
of approximately eighty (80) hectares, and another parcel with an area of eighty-one (81) hectares
still pending registration. The estate is saddled with claims of creditors named in the Drepin will and
creditors who have filed their claims within the reglementary period. The only way to pay their claims
is to sell the Drepin lots, so that from the proceeds of the sale, the debts of the estate could be paid,
and any remaining balance distributed to the Drepin heirs.

Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin will, on August 23, 1972, nine (9) offers had
been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM Management Phils., dated
August 15, 1978, through its President Honor P. Moslares. Basis for Moslares' letter proposal is a
deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in his favor on October 9, 1970. It appears
that on said date, the deceased sold 80.3980 hectares of land absolutely and perpetually to Honor
P. Moslares for the sum of P2,600,000.00 with a downpayment of P300,000.00. To secure the
payment of the remaining P2,300,000.00, the latter mortgaged the land to the former. The parties
further agreed not to register the sale yet until P1,300,000.00 shall have been paid to Drepin and
P1,000.000.00 paid to Drepin's creditors.

Subsequently, on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement".
Said agreement listed Drepin as the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated Moslares as
"developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential subdivision. The agreement specified:

(h) That the Developer agrees to reserve the right of the registered Owner of the land
to ask for immediate CASH payment against an "Absolute Deed of Sale " on the said
above mentioned properties, subject of this "Joint Venture Agreement" on the
amount of not less than TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P2,300,000.00) PESOS, after the big loan is granted to the Developer in or about
thirty (30) days to forty-five (45) days from the signing of this Joint Venture
Agreement and the "Special Power of Attorney",

(i) However, if the Owner of the property Mr. Nicolai Drepin not choose to be paid on
this said above mentioned property in CASH of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00) PESOS, this "joint venture agreement is still in full
force and effect, OTHERWISE if full payment of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00) PESOS receipt is acknowledged by the said Mr.
 Nicolai Drepin, the "Joint Venture Agreement" is automatically cancelled and
declared no force and effect.

Before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.

Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings No. 7257, 7261 and 7269 herein respondent
Moslares, on August 15, 1978, informed the Judicial Administrator
Atty. Tomas Trinidad that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the
Special Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with
mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal. The probate court, on August 17,
1978 issued an order approving respondent Moslares' proposal and authorizing administrator
Trinidad to enter into the appropriate agreement. This was reiterated by the court in its order dated
January 9, 1979, with the condition that GM Management Phils. had only up to February 28, 1979 to
comply with its letter-offer dated August 15, 1978 and "failure on their part to comply with the same
within the period specified, the contract with the decedent shall be deemed resolved and ineffective."
Counsel for heir claimant Cornelia Tejano was Revise given up to said date to make and submit a
more beneficial offer. Neither GM Management nor counsel for Tejano was able to perform as
required.

Requests for revision of payment and extension of period within which to pay the balance of
P1,600,000.00 were made by Moslares. Further, he filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion
proposing transfer of the certificate of titles over the land subject of the proceedings so as to enable
him to generate funds to liquidate the payable balance. The same were left unacted upon by the
probate court.

Meanwhile, on September 25,1979, A Deed of Undertaking was entered into by respondent

Moslares and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such deed
provided for the mode of payment which Moslares was to follow as well as the clearing and transfer
of the certificates of title in the name of Moslares. The latter proviso was to enable Moslares to
secure the loan needed to pay for the balance of the purchase price. Postdated checks were issued
by Moslares to cover the amount embraced in said undertaking. Approval of the agreement with
Moslares was strongly urged by the Administrator. No action was taken by the court thereon. At the
hearing of October 19, 1979, Moslares tendered P1,600,000.00 to the Judicial Administrator. This
was opposed by counsel for heir Tejano, Atty. Ramon Encarnacion, on the ground that respondent
Moslares had only until February 28, 1979 within which to pay the same. Attorney Encarnacion
thereupon brought to the attention of the court an offer to buy the properties for P3,000,000.00 by
herein petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. Because of the differing contentions and the
new offer, the probate court ordered the parties to submit memoranda and set a conference on
November 28, 1979 to discuss the new offer.

On November 12, 1979, respondent Moslares submitted his memorandum containing three points to
wit:

l. Actually, Honor P. Moslares is already owner of the Property, subject matter of this
proceedings, and as such, could no longer be the subject matter of this testate
proceedings. The payment made by Honor P. Moslares to the Judicial Administrator
through this Honorable Court on 19 October, 1979, is in compliance with the Contract
entered into between him and the late Nicolai Drepin, in 1970;

2. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9 January, 1979, particularly with
reference to the period, mentioned in No. 1, page 2 of the Order of this Honorable
Court giving Honor P. Moslares up to 28 February, 1979, within which to comply with
 his letter-offer to the Court dated 15 August, 1978, is not yet final, said period having
been extended;

3. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9 January, 1979, particularly No. 2, Page
2 thereof, barred Counsel for Cornelia B. Tejano from making any further offer, his
right to do so having expired on 28 February, 1979.

Thereupon, the probate court judge directed Moslares through the administrator Atty. Trinidad, to
furnish copies of — (1) Deed of Absolute Sale; (2) Special Power of Attorney; and (3) Joint Venture
Agreement. The same were promptly submitted.

On February 28, 1979, March 6, 1980 and April 15, 1980, letters to Judicial Administrator Trinidad
were sent by respondent Moslares seeking further extension of time within which to pay the balance
of his obligation to the estate, and for favorable recommendations to the probate court in his reports
saying: "Help me now, this is ours. We can make money of all this sacrifice we had on the pass
(sic)."

On April 15, 1980, the probate court reiterated its order dated August 17, 1978 authorizing the
Administrator to finalize the sale with GM Management Phils. and giving respondent Moslares ten
(10) days from date to deposit the necessary amount to cover the value of the checks as each
fallsdue. Failure to do so would result in the automatic rescission of the authority to sell to GM
Management Phils. and the Administrator would be permitted to accept other offers in the best
interest of the Estate. This order was the probate court's prompt action on a "Report with Motion for
Cancellation of Order Approving Sale to GM Management, Phils. Honor P. Moslares, if it fails to
make good the April 15, 1980 check "As Token Payment in Good Faith", filed by administrator
Trinidad on the same day, April 15, 1980.

GM Management sought reconsideration and amendment of the Order of April 15, 1980 to conform
to the provisions of the Deed of Undertaking.

On May 23, 1980, administrator Trinidad filed a "Report with Motion to Authorize Administrator to
Screen Offers to Purchase Estate and Others.

On May 31, 1980, respondent Moslares filed another manifestation praying that his pending motions
be acted upon and that the motion of administrator Trinidad be denied for lack of merit.

On June 30, 1980, administrator Trinidad made the following "Observation and Report on the Motion
of Buyer GM Management Phils. for reconsideration" —

2. Two checks, one for P50,000.00 and one for P250,000.00 were deposited on April
28, 1980 after the Order of the Probate Court. BOTH BOUNCED. DAIF (Drawn
against insufficient funds).

3. Another check for P300,000.00 is now held by the Administrator, postdated for
today, June 30, 1980 and Administrator just received, June 29, 1980 a telegram
asking to withhold deposit until after 30 days from amendatory order of the Probate
Court.

xxx xxx xxx

6. The motion of Administrator is reiterated.

On July 2, 1980, the probate court issued the following order:

Finding the Motion of the Administrator well-taken and in the best interests of the
Estate, the administrator is authorized to enter into agreement with any other
interested parties on a first paid first served basis without prejudice to G.M.
Management Philippines to continue with its offer and make good the same in as an
ordinary buyer on the same first paid first served basis.

Respondent Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration of said July 2, 1980 order on the ground
that:

1. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction over the three (3) parcels of land,
consisting of 80.3980 hectares subject matter of the Deed of Sale which the late
Nicolai Drepin, conveyed to Movant Honor P. Moslares. The only right which pertains
to the ESTATE, is the right to demand from Honor P. Moslares, the balance of the
Deed of Sale, which has been fixed by this Honorable Court at ONE MILLION SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P1,600,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency;

2. As of November, 1979, the law that governs between the ESTATE and MOVANT,
Honor P. Moslares, is the DEED OF UNDERTAKING executed by the Administrator
in favor of Movant Honor P. Moslares, pursuant to the authority given by the
Honorable Probate Court to the Administrator contained in the Order dated August
15, 1978, reiterated in the Order dated January 9, 1979, and in the Order dated 15
April 1980; and

3. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction to decree rescission of the

Contract into (sic) between the decedent and Movant Honor P. Moslares on the 9th
day of October, 1970.

This motion for reconsideration was opposed by administrator Trinidad as well as the Tejano heirs
through counsel, arguing that the probate court has jurisdiction to issue the questioned orders
because petitioner submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction and his checks bounced also that the
Deed of Undertaking was validly cancelled as a result of the valid rescission of Trinidad's authority to
sell to petitioner.

On September 30, 1980, the probate court issued an order denying respondent Moslares' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. And on October 10, 1980 administrator Trinidad executed the Deed
of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. transferring the titles to the properties in question in the
name of the latter. The same was duly registered. On October 20, 1980, the probate court approved
the report of administrator Trinidad dated October 16, 1980, with xerox copies of the Deed of Sale in
favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. of the estate of Nicolai Drepin pursuant to respondent court's order
authorizing the sale, and of the approved Deed of Undertaking with the vendee.

An urgent Motion and Manifestation was filed by respondent Moslares on April 8, 1981 praying that
his motion for reconsideration of the orders be already resolved, followed by an Omnibus Motion on
April 27, 1981 to resolve all pending motions and praying that the Deed of Sale and Deed of
Undertaking in favor of Pio Barretto be cancelled. The same remained unacted upon.

On May 18, 1981, respondent filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in Pasig, Metro Manila to determine title and ownership over the Drepin lands.
On June 23, 1981, a petition for certiorari was filed by respondent Moslares before the Court of
Appeals which issued a temporary restraining order. Judgment was rendered by respondent court in
favor of respondent Moslares, the dispositive portion of which has been quoted.

Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on November 12, 1982. Hence, this
petition.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals laid down the two principal issues involved in the case, as
follows: (1) whether or not the respondent judge (Judge R. Honrado) acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude the parcels of land involved from
the testate proceedings of the Drepin estate; and (2) whether or not the respondent judge acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the impugned orders
dated April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980, and October 20, 1980.

We are in full accord with the respondent court's resolution of the first issue, and we quote:

For continually presuming that the three titled lots were part of the Drepin estate and
for refusing to provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, did the respondent
court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion?

We hold that even with such presumption and refusal, the respondent court still acted
within its jurisdiction and not with grave abuse of discretion. After all, the
jurisprudence and rule are both to the effect that the probate court "may"
provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, not "should". The obvious reason
is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the property,
can only be settled in a separate action. Hence, even if respondent court presumed
an the way that the properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's
estate, that would not prevent nor defeat petitioner's remedy in a separate suit.

And We hold that Civil Case No. 41287 is just such a suit instituted to settle the
question of ownership over the lots covered originally by TCTs Nos. 259060, 259061
and 259062, despite the claim for damages, because of the composite effect of the
prayer in the complaint thereof ...

xxx xxx xxx

In effect, We are saying that the question of whether the properties sold by Drepin to
Petitioner should be excluded from the probate proceedings below, can not be
determined with finality by Us in this case, because in this petition We are merely
reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a probate court. Any ruling by the
probate court to include those properties "is only provisional in character and is
without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or
ownership" (Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385). Consequently,
in reviewing the exercise of such limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order an
unqualified and final exclusion of the properties involved, as prayed for; to do so
would expand the probate court's jurisdiction beyond the perimeters set by law and
jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper that this issue be ventilated and finally resolved
in the already instituted Civil Case No. 41287, even as We hold that respondent
court's act of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. In view of this limitation, We need not resolve the issue of whether there
was novation of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, or not.
This same elemental principle, we found occasion to reiterate in the cases of Junquera v.
Borromeo (19 SCRA 656); Borromeo v. Canonoy (19 SCRA 667); Recto v. dela Rosa (75 SCRA
226); Lachenal v. Salas (71 SCRA 202); Bolisay v. Alcid (85 SCRA 213); Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court
of Appeals (91 SCRA 540).

However, from here, the road forks as we disagree with the respondent court's findings on the
second issue.

In his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, respondent Moslares assails the issuance of
the four impugned orders by the probate court on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to
rescind the Deed of Sale with the Mortgage entered into by the deceased during his lifetime, due to
the limited jurisdiction of the probate court merely to settle and liquidate the estates of a decedent
and not to pass upon questions of title to property.

On the other hand, the petitioner argues that in voiding and nullifying the four orders of the probate
court, the Court of Appeals, in effect, would have the former court recognize the alleged ownership
of Mr. Moslares over the three titled Drepin lots involved in this case contrary to its pronouncement
in settling the first issue.

It is to be noted that the last agreement entered into by the deceased prior to his death, that is, the
Joint Venture Agreement listing Drepin as owner of the properties in question, and the surrender to
administrator Trinidad of the certificates of title, had led the probate court to enter or include said
properties in its inventory of the deceased's estate. Thus, provisionally, ownership thereof was
recognized as vested in the estate. Subsequently, in the course of the probate proceedings, the sale
of the properties was found to be necessary to settle the deceased's obligations. It was then that
herein private respondent Moslares submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court in an "Offer to
Buy" said properties, based on his previous agreement with the deceased during the latter's lifetime.

It is noteworthy that contrary to Moslares' assertion of ownership, he had offered to buy the Drepin
lands from the probate court. Surely, this is not conduct ordinarily expected of one who is the owner
of the property. Further, the fact that subsequent to the Deed of Sale, the deceased as buyer and as
absolute owner entered into an agreement with the respondent merely as developer of the lands in
question evidences a change of cause or object as well as a change of relation between the parties.
Moslares' own acts negate his claims in this petition that he had acquired ownership of the
properties. Thus, the transparency of respondent's argument becomes readily apparent.

Having submitted his letter-proposal to the court, the same was approved, allowing Moslares to pay
the balance of the purchase price agreed upon by respondent and the decedent in the amount of
One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00) specifying the time and manner of
payment thereof. Thus, he was given preference and priority over other persons or groups offering to
buy the estate. Having failed to comply with the conditions of payment of the contract, the same was
rescinded by the probate court. Now, respondent questions this rescission which he maintains to be
beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

Estoppel works to preclude respondent from questioning the jurisdiction of the court. By offering to
buy the properties in question, respondent has clearly recognized the jurisdiction of the probate court
to which he had effectively submitted himself. It is well settled that a party is estopped from disputing
the jurisdiction of the court after invoking it himself (Tible v. Aquino, 65 SCRA 207). After voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court (People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278; Capilitan v. dela
Cruz, 55 SCRA 706; Summit Guaranty and Insurance Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 110 SCRA 241;
Tajonera v. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438). A party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by
taking inconsistent positions. Doctrine of estoppel bars a party from trifling with the courts
(Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756).

The merits of the case likewise lead to similar conclusions.

It cannot but be conceded that the limited jurisdiction of a probate court prohibits it from determining
rights to property left by a decedent which depends on the contract (Goodin v. Casselman 200 N.W.
94, 51 N.D. 543). However, actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the
adjudication of rights under the contract entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be
noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property
under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle
against the estate (Rule 89, Revised Rules of Court). Thus, respondent bound himself under an
agreement with the court separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In
rescinding such contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement
which had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the probate
court. Though of limited and special jurisdiction, it cannot be denied, however, that when the law
confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise
such jurisdicton to make it effective (Zuniga v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 740).

We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate will never be settled and
liquidated because even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the Drepin lands, still
the probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective buyers. Under the theory of
respondent, it is insisted that the probate court has no authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy,
notwithstanding the fact that he failed miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. It is
to be remembered that Moslares had already been granted undue leniency by the probate court to
meet his obligations to pay. But, the saga of Moslares' bouncing checks remains. Three reports of
Administrator Trinidad had been submitted as annexes to the petition for certiorari. The report, dated
June 30, 1980 showed that two of Moslares' checks were dishonored, having been drawn against
insufficient funds. The August 18, 1980 report stated that: "All the checks submitted to the probate
court for payment bounced." And in the report dated April 15, 1981, it was further averred by the
administrator that "... believing that the bouncing checks were not intended to defraud the Estate,"
"he refrained from prosecuting Honor P. Moslares criminally under the law on dishonored checks."

It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's contract of sale with decedent that had been
invalidated but rather the administrator's authority to sell to respondent. Although the court
recognized the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, still the same was not being enforced as such but was
used only as basis for the terms and conditions of respondent's agreement with the court. To enforce
the same is truly beyond the scope of the probate court's jurisdiction. The court's actions constitute a
refusal to pass upon the validity of the contract to sell.

Further, the probate court has ample discretion in determining whether conditions of a particular sale
would be beneficial to the estate and this is generally respected by the appellate courts (Court of
First Instance v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 114, Fernandez, et al., v. Montejo, 109 Phil. 701). To
attack the nullity of the order of the probate court to sell property of the deceased, it must be shown
that the contract of sale is null and void (Rafols v. Barba, 119 SCRA 147). The infirmity of the subject
deed of sale is premised on the alleged nullity of the order of the court authorizing the sale. The
validity of said order may not be attacked in a collateral proceeding, the supposed ground for
declaring it void for lack of jurisdiction not being apparent on the face thereof (Rafols v.
Barba, supra). Nevertheless, respondent could have prevented the sale of the Drepin lands. Section
3, Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
 Section 3. Persons interested may prevent such sale, etc., by giving bond. — No
such authority to sell mortgage, or otherwise encumber real or personal estate shall
be granted if any person interested in the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies
within such tune as the court directs; and such bond shall be for the security of the
creditors, as well as of the executor or administrator, and may be prosecuted for the
benefit of either.

provides respondent with the legal means by which he could have forestalled the sale of the Drepin
lands to the petitioner. (Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals, supra) If third persons oppose an
application for leave to sell the property of the decedent, claiming title to the property, the title claim,
cannot be adjudicated by the probate court, but it can hold approval of the sale in abeyance until the
question of ownership shall have been decided in a proper action (Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).
But this, he failed to do. Ergo, we find no reason to disturb the questioned orders of the probate
court.

Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of ownership is proper and
meritorious. Since the probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of
the properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's
titles and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540). Though an order of the
probate court approving the sale of the decedent's property is final, the respondent may file a
complaint in the proper court for the rescission of the sale. (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA
72). Likewise, the initial question of respondent regarding the propriety of including the properties in
question in the inventory of the probate court as he claims ownership thereof may therein be finally
and conclusively settled (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA
202). The respondent has ample protection of his rights for the province of the probate court remains
merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended beyond (Pizarro v. Court of
Appeals, supra).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court), dated June 30, 1982 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The permanent restraining order issued against the trial court is hereby DISMISSED.
The impugned orders of the probate court dated April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980
and October 20, 1980 are accordingly REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

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