G.R. No.

L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI;
AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated
February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding
notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:

Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the
age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate
children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob,
Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his
mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria
Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that
she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and
(c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par.
IV).

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years
old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my
properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She
devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the
will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of
the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties
which he had received from the testatrix.

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr.
dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that
he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument
captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he
manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in
her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which
he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in
the manner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of
Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition
and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special
administrator of the decedent's estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the
grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the
conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine
lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that
motion. The lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.

In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the
lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated
September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and
requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to
be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or
allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be
withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of
the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated
October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to
creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy
be declared.

The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to
creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys.
Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the
petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the
issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974.
The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to
creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of
petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.

Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15,
1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground
that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to
the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by
Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they
terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the probate of
the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their
mother's will was "very sacred" to them.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower court
denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of
its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA
449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho
vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). 1äwphï1.ñët

But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and
in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its
order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal
estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code).
"Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if
they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering
with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to
law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143,
Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs
during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash
is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial,
or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this
article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not
assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)

The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her
husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign
the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to
require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only
for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her
husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal
partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a
donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil
Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A
portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at
least his legitime should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the
partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes.
The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the
meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his
renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased
wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will
without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall only
pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the
will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing
belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to
him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will,
afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the
conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of
by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal
estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.

The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir her
sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory
heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of
the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents
annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total
intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët

In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce
intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary
rights. .

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in
its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is
intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will.
Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).

As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima
facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner
therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given
effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs.
Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).

To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is
preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes
precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the
principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that
sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs.
Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).

As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the
dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any
disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors although
no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a
special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been
appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting
letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having
money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly
contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a special
administrator.

It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the estate
and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).

We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch clerk of
court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the
suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent's
estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his
administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court
employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the
administration of a decedent's estate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside and its
order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is
directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion.
Costs, against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72             November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,
ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.

The facts of the cases are as follows:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian
ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage
and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a
certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings
take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa
akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng
lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3

(signed)

Segundo Seangio

Nilagdaan sa harap namin

(signed)

Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)

Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi

(signed)

ikatlong saksi

On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396
were consolidated.4

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily
on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which
would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred
from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority
of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs.6

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he
other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the
widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir
in the direct line.

As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100
(1987)] has made its position clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void … would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility.
The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity
of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring
supplied).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.

Petitioners contend that:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE
76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR
INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED
THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID
ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;

II

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO

RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE
FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE
WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
 III

RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE

INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned
may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be
published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general
circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator
Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with
the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;

Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically
and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate
case; and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and
will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.

The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and
written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did
not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention

of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In
effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents,
taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and
that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under
Article 919 of the Civil Code:

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
 (2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such
child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. 11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and
was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14

With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did
not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name
of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal
heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.1âwphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to
dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. 17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to
reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo
Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of
the aforesaid testate proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.