1.

Case Title:

Valdez v. Republic
GR 180863, September 8, 2009

Facts:

On January 11, 1971, Angelita Valdez married Sofio Polborosa. She gave birth to the spouses' only child,
Nancy. In March 1972, Sofio left their house. Angelita and their child waited for him to return but, finally
they decided to go back to her parents' home in Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio
till in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate executing a document to that effect.
That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn't hear any news of Sofio, his
whereabouts or even if he was alive or not. Angelita married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985, believing
that Sofio was already dead.On March 29, 2007, she filed a Petition seeking the declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

Issue:

Whether or not Sofio can be declared presumptively dead without a court declaration

Ruling:

Yes. the governing law at the time (Articles 83 and 390 of the Civil Code) of the marriage of Angelita to
Sofio and Virgilio, states that, it only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven (7)
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her
former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Doctrine:

Civil Code states that, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed
for the presumption to arise

2.Case Title:
Butiong vs. Plazo
GR No. 187524

Facts:

On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with
his first wife the respondents leaving several properties to them. Thereafter, a complaint for judicial
partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed by the respondents alleging that
they discovered that their co-heirs sold the properties to the petitioners, who were now deceased and duly
represented by their son, without their consent. The respondents also learned of a notice of an extra-
judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this,
they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of
Deeds and filed the said complaint. The petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground
of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. Petitioner Francisco
further contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides that
respondents’ co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million
as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners. The trial court nullified the transfer
of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the Documents of
conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same.
CA affirmed hence, the petition where they alleged that since the Respondents’ complaint alleged causes
of action for settlement of estate under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, therefore it is actually one for
settlement of estate and not of judicial partition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition is for partition or for settlement of estate.

Ruling:

The complaint filed by the respondents was for judicial partition. The court held that it is true that some of
respondents’ causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known
heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit,
the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession. In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and
was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any ending obligations.

Doctrine:

Respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a special
proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned,
judicially or extrajudicially.

3.Case Title:

Salgado Vs. Anson

G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016

Facts:

Luis Anson filed a complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses Salgado)
seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis. Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of
the late Severina de Asis-Anson. They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to
the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30,
1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship. During his marital union with
Severina, they acquired several real properties, because there was no marriage settlement between him
and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge
and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in
favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis
adjudicating herself as Severina’s sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties. Luis claimed that
because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his
inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. The Spouses in defense raised the nullity of the marriage
which took effect prior the effectively of the family code for lack of marriage license. RTC and CA
rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage
license.

Ruling:

No. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license
number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire
to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it
shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification
made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

Doctrine:

The marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for a marriage to be
valid.

4. Case Title:

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-40502 | November 29, 1976

Facts:

Virginia Garcia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba, for a petition moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate of Garcia, who died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa, contending that
the order appointing Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction and prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Fule, and as regular administratrix after due
hearing. While this reconsideration motion was pending, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Fule as
special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground, that her appointment was obtained
through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations and has adverse interest against
the estate. Judge Malvar ruled denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Fule
and that Preciosa had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by
praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate. An omnibus motion was filed
by Preciosa to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order
limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa also asked for
the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf
of Agustina Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was
likewise prayed for. Preciosa and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or
prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Court of Appeals affirmed stating the CFI of Calamba
Laguna has no jurisdiction over the case. Hence, this present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the venue is improperly laid

Held:

Yes. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the merits or the
substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the
constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.

On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the court
with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some
cases, it may be waived or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court states that “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate.

Doctrine:

Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the court with
jurisdiction

5. Case Title:

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons,
residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children
from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.  The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife (widow),
filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said court held
in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate
proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court. Lourdes
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes holding that CFI Cebu had
first acquired jurisdiction.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's
order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings.

HELD:

1.Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon
City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator’s wish. On Venue
and Jurisdiction Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were
otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed
must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts

2.No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon
City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court
must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all
other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down
a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over
the estate.   NOTE (additional info): •Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings
should be by  appeal: Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of   jurisdiction
over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home
and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case except when want of jurisdiction appears
on the record. •When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had improper
venue: the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as
affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again
the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to require
comment. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix
of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights
under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and
effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court every time she has an important matter of the
estate to take up with the probate court.

Doctrine:

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
6. Case Title:

Rodriguez vs. De Borja

G.R. No. L-21993, 21 June 1966

FACTS:

This case involves the alleged will of Fr. Celestino Rodriguez who died on February 12, 1963.

That on March 4,1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 8,1963, Maria
Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged
will but it was later withdrawn.

That on March 12, 1963, petitioners Rodriguez, filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. However, on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan
and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on
March 4, 1963.

Petitioner Rodriguez opposed the probate and contend that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of
Rizal was filed at8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI of
Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja,
G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.

The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on
March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on
March 12, 1963.

Issue:

Whether or not CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

Ruling:

Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of
the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for
proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3,
Rule76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only
takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

Doctrine:
Revised Rules of Court. rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts
7. Case Title:
RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No. L-21993, June 21, 1966

Facts:

Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan
a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before the
court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now
sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the
purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

Issue:

Whether or not the CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

Held:

Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of
the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for
proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3,
Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only
takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

Doctrine:

Under Revised Rules of Court, states that a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to
be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

8. Case Title:

Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegurao vs. Prudencio,

G.R. No. 187942, 7 September 2016

Facts: Felipe Prudencio (Felipe) married twice during his lifetime. With his first wife, Elena Antonio
(Elena), he begot five (5) children, namely: Valentina, Eusebio, Paula, Florentina, and Avelina. With his
second wife, Teodora Abad (Teodora), he had two (2) children namely: Felipe Prudencio, Jr. (Prudencio,
Jr.) and Leonora. During the first of marriage of Felipe, they acquired a 13.0476 hectares parcel of land
located at Baggao, Cagayan (Cagayan lot). When Elena died, Felipe and their children became the co-
owners of the property. Felipe died intestate during his second marriage. Upon his death, Teodora,
Prudencio Jr. and Leonora executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition of the Estate of late Felipe with
Waiver of Rights in favor of Teodora. The partition stated that Felipe and Elena did not have any children
who could inherit the property; hence, Teodora and her children are the only living heirs by operation of
law. Thus, the title to the Cagayan lot was transferred to Teodora’s name. Subsequently, Teodora sold
the Cagayan lot to Spouses Cepeda. In turn, Spouses Cepeda sold the same lot to petitioner Roman
Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao. The respondent filed a complaint for Partition with Reconveyance against
petitioner. They alleged that they are the children and grandchildren of Felipe by his first marriage. They
assert that upon the death of Elena, they became the owners of the Elena’s conjugal share in the
Cagayan lot, while the other half remained with Felipe. Upon the death of Felipe, the respondent also
became owners of Felipe’s conjugal share together with Teodora, Prudencio Jr. and Leonora.
Respondent assert that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful share in the estate of Felipe and
Elena. On the other hand, petitioner averred that it was an innocent purchaser for value. It asserted that it
had no knowledge that other persons had interest on the Cagayan lot. The RTC ruled in favor of
respondent. It ruled that it was impossible for Teodora and her children to not know that Felipe had
children/grandchildren by his first marriage. Therefore, the Extra-Judicial Partition was done in bad faith.
The RTC ruled that Teodora can only sell her share in the property. Upon petition to the CA, it affirmed
the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the partition validly passed ownership of the Cagayan lot to Teodora so that she had the
right to sell the entire lot.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled in the negative. Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil
Code) state that all the children of the deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should
participate in the settlement of his/her estate, to wit: Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
same manner as a legitimate child. Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the
latter by right of representation. Thus, the children of Felipe in his two (2) marriages should be included in
the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition. It is undisputed that respondents-appellees were children of
Felipe by his first marriage. Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora did not deny respondents-appellees'
relation with Felipe. Despite this, however, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora declared in the Extra-
Judicial Partition that they are the only living heirs of Felipe by operation of law. They claimed that Felipe
had no child with his first wife Elena, in effect depriving respondents-appellees of their rightful shares in
the estate of their parents. Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge nor
participation in the Extra-Judicial Partition, the same is a total nullity. It is not binding upon them. The
nullity of the Extra-Judicial Partition does not automatically result in the nullity of the sale between (1)
Teodora and Spouses Cepeda, and that of (2) Spouses Cepeda and petitioner. Teodora may therefore
sell her undivided interest in the Cagayan lot, and such disposition shall affect only her pro indiviso share.
When she sold the entire property to Spouses Cepeda, the latter legally and validly purchased only the
part belonging to Teodora. Petitioner is ordered to reconvey to respondents an area of 74,557.72 square
meters as their pro indiviso share in the Cagayan lot.

Doctrine:

Civil Code of the Philippines, all the children of the deceased shall inherit from him and by implication
should participate in the settlement of his/her estate
9.Case Title

CHING v. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 192828: November 28, 2011

Facts:

Respondents are the heirs of Antonio Ching with his common- law wife, Mercedes Igne. Respondent
Lucina Santos claimed that she was also a common -law wife of Antonio. Respondents averred that
petitioner Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio’s and Lucina’s son when in truth and in fact, he was
adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound.
Police investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect. From the foregoing circumstances and upon
the authority of Article 919 of the New Civil Code, the respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally
disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.

Issue:

Whether or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession?

Ruling:

The Intestate or Probate Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to
the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the
trial court that the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon
Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be contested in a probate court.

Doctrine:

RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of
respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein
are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.