Ong vs. Ong; GR. No.

153206; 23 October 2006

William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San
Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton.

On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation, alleging that William is
physically abusing her and of grounds of gross abusive conduct.

Lucita claims that she and William quarreled almost every day. William slaps her, kicks her,
pulls her hair and even shouting"putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga”; William would also scold
and beat the children. One day, Lucita protested the decision of William of allowing Kingston to
go to Bacolod, then Lucita demanded him to bring their son back, then a voilent quarrel ensued
where Willia, hit her in the stomach and pointed a gun at him and told her to leave the house.

Lucita then filed a petition for decree of legal separation in which the Regional trial court and
Court of Appeals approved, William then filed an appeal for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of William shall be a valid ground for Lucita for applying a
decree of legal separation.

RULING: The SC denied the petition of William. William himself admitted that there was no day
that he did not quarrel with his wife, thus, the gross abusive conduct was proven by Lucita by
testimony of his sister in which William is physically abusing Lucita and is displaying violence to
their children. As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation,
the Court has no reason but grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
Almacen vs Baltazar; GR No. 10028, 23 May 1958

Hipolita Almacen and Teodoro Baltazar were legally married. Hipolita committed adultery with
one named Jose Navarro who was the cousin of his husband, however it was alleged that that
prior to the infidelity of the wife, Teodoro himself has not been loyal to her, he having been
once confined at the hospital suffering from venereal disease.

The spouses have been separared and Teodoro lived maritally with another woman.

However, there has been a reconciliation between them or at least a condonation by defendant
as he was sending Hipolita money for support, and that they were in pari delicto. And hence,
the trial court held that the husband shall support his wife since he also has been unfaithful to
her.

In the case, the appellant contends that because of his wife’s adulterous act that he shall be
exempt from his obligation to give support.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses in pari delicto shall require the husband to support his wife
as he had been unfaithful to the latter.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the defendant be pay his wire a monthly support of 50
pesos.

In the present case, the defendant is still bound to support his wife, firstly, because they were
both guilty of infidelity and before the filing of the action they had a reconciliation or, at least,
defendant had pardoned plaintiff's unfaithfulness. There is the general principle that when two
persons acted in bad faith, they should be considered as having acted in good faith, which
principle may be applied to the instant case to the effect that plaintiff and defendant being in
pari delicto, the latter cannot claim the adultery of the former as defense to evade the
obligation to give her support.
People vs Schneckenburger; 73 Phil 413

FACTS:

On 1926, Rodolfo married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena and after 7 years they
agreed to live separately from each other. On 1935, they executed document—agreement,
which states that both parties agree to live apart from each other and not intervine to each
other’s life, and in complete freedom of action.

That both appearing parties agree to live apart from each other for the rest of their lives and
commit, and oblige reciprocally, not to interfere or intervene or intermingle under any
circumstances in their public or private life, with each other, each remaining of the grantors in
complete freedom of action in any act and all concept

Rodolfo, without leaving the Philippines secured a divorce decree from civil court Chihuahua
Mexico and contracted another marriage with co-accused Julia Medel in Malabon. Then, the
complainant herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and another for
concubinage.

The accused was held guilty of bigamy and concubinage then filed a the plea of double
jeopardy and the case was initially dismissed. The court held that bigamy for which he was
convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court below are two distinct
offenses in law and in fact as well as in the mode of their prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement between Rodolfo and Elena is a consent that makes the
acts of Rodolfo justified and cannot be prosecuted?

RULING: The Supreme Court held the accused be aquitted.  The document executed by and
between the accused and the complaint in which they agreed to be seperated from each other
and is free of their acts constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage.
There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit
acts of the other.
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.  They had several children
who are not living with plaintiff.  In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.  Having found out,
he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. 
Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than
Arcalas. 

When the wife finished her studies, she left the plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. Then, the plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson
Orzame.  He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant
manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. When the
wife was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the
legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame.
Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment according to the court of
appeals and that Jose has condonation or consent to the adulterious acts of his wife

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Serafina constitutes the confession of judgment and
that the failure of husband to look for his wife constitutes condonation.

HELD:

Serafina’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of
evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession but is considered as the
evidence presented by the plaintiff.  Thus, the court held that that plaintiff's failure actively to
search for defendant is not a consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It was not his
duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio on August 1953. 

They were married had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children
until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.  They acquired properties during their marriage. 
Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. 
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order
that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. 

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.  Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence.  However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular acciden. 

Her counsel duly notified the court of her death.  Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for
legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
year period and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. 

Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. 

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
terminate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is terminated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights
are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.