CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Silverio Sr. vs Silverio Jr.

FACTS: The late Beatriz Silverio died intestate in 1987. She was survived by her legal heirs,
namely: Ricardo Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo (son), Edgardo (son), Ricardo Jr. (son), Nelia
(daughter), and Ligaya (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her
estate was filed by the petitioner. The administrator first appointed by the Court was Edgardo,
but the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by the latter was approved and in his stead,
petitioner was appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to
remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between the parties. In the end, the intestate
court issued an Omnibus Order upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to respondent
and removed petitioner as administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions.

In 2006, the court ordered the sale of certain properties belonging to the estate. By virtue of said
order, Silverio, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Citrine Holdings, Inc. and
Monica Ocampo. The sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent with prior
approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order. Subsequently, however, the sale was
annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.

Respondents argued that the intestate court should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the
subject properties to third parties after it itself had authorized their disposal in partial settlement
of the estate, especially so when separate actions assailing the new titles issued to said third
parties were already instituted by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether the intestate court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the sale
of the Cambridge property and Intsia property as null and void

HELD: YES; it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court when it ordered
the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as null and void citing as justification the
decision of the Court of Appeals. To reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent
by the Court of Appeals was declared to be limited only to the portion of the Omnibus Order that
upheld the grant of letters of administration by Silverio, Jr.. and the removal of the petitioner as
administrator and nothing else. While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as
Administrator pursuant to the decision, the SC agreed with the CA that the permanent injunction
issued under the said decision pertain only to the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent, as otherwise the CA
would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale
of the subject properties. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by
the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith
that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus
Order dated October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the
aforesaid sale.

DOCTRINE: The probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized
sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.

San Luis vs San Luis

FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit, out of which six children were born, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, in 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce and a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody was thereafter awarded. Then in
1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis. They had no children but lived together
for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Thereafter, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing in Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage;
that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
that letters of administration be issued to her.

Thereafter, petitioner, one of the children of Felicisimo, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Respondent, on the other hand,
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in Alabang. Further, she presented
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code.

Linda, Rodolfo and petitioner asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this
would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code.
Then, the trial court ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. When the case was raffled to
branch 134, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.

ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid

HELD: YES, the venue was properly laid. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." The Supreme Court
laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile
– of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate: the term
"resides" connotes "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

Here, respondent proved that Felicisimo also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa
from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., Thus, Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed in 1993. At
that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then
seated in Makati City.
Agtarap vs Agtarap

FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on 21 November 1964 without any known debts. During
his lifetime, he contracted two marriages. He was survived by his three grandchildren Joseph,
Gloria, and Teresa from his first marriage; and three children Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes
from the second marriage. Mercedes later died and left her husband Abelardo and daughter
Samantha.

Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements (house and restaurant) in Pasay City. Upon
Joaquin’s marriage to Caridad, both titles were revised to indicate that Joaquin was then married
to Caridad Garcia.

In 1994, Eduardo filed a petition for judicial settlement of the estate of Joaquin and prayed for
his appointment as special administrator of the subject lots before the RTC of Pasay City (RTC).
Joseph and his siblings opposed the petition and alleged that the subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia, and the improvements were built through their
family’s exclusive money.

In 1995, the RTC appointed Eduardo as the administrator of the estate and distributed the
properties, including the subject lots, among all the heirs. It held that since the inheritance taxes
were paid in 1965 and the bulk of the estate property was acquired during the existence of the
second marriage, the subject lots were included in the estate of Joaquin. Joseph filed a motion for
reconsideration and was able to prove that the subject properties belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. The RTC granted the motion.

Aggrieved, Eduardo appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed
the appeal and modified the distribution of the estate to the heirs. In the distribution, the CA also
distributed Mercedes’ share to her surviving heirs Abelardo and Cecilia. Eduardo questioned the
distribution, as Mercedes left a will and its probate was already instituted in a different RTC
branch.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the RTC as intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership issue
involving the subject properties; and (2) Whether the CA erred in distributing Mercedes’ share in
the estate of Joaquin

HELD: (1) YES. The general rule is that the probate court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction that relates only to the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of the
deceased and it does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership. However, it is
also subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience:

1. The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.
2. The probate court is competent to resolve the issue of ownership if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of the third parties are not
impaired.

Verily, its jurisdiction also extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate.

The SC held that the general rule does not apply in this case considering that the parties are all
heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the
ownership issue. Moreover, the determination of whether the subject properties belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia is but collateral to the intestate court’s jurisdiction to
settle the estate of Joaquin.

(2) YES. The probate court exercises special, limited, and exclusive jurisdiction over probate
cases. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.

In this case, the SC held that CA erred in distributing Joaquin’s estate pertinent to the share
allotted to Mercedes, as Mercedes left a will and a separate special proceeding was instituted for
its probate. Prudence dictates that the courts refrain from distributing Mercedes’ share in
Joaquin’s estate.

DOCTRINE: The probate or intestate court is competent to resolve the issue on ownership if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of the
third parties are not impaired.

Suntay III vs Cojuangco-Suntay

FACTS: Cristina died intestate in 1990. She was survived by her spouse Federico, three
legitimate grandchildren Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II, and two illegitimate grandchildren
Nenita and Emilio III. The grandchildren were all fathered by Emilio I who predeceased Cristina.

Isabel, the respondent in this case, and her siblings, were under the custody of their mother upon
their parents’ separation. On the other hand, Emilio III, the petitioner in this case, and his sister
were reared from infancy by Cristina and Federico. They were also adopted by Federico in 1993.

In 1995, Isabel filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of
Cristina before the RTC of Bulacan. Federico opposed the petition, and contended that he should
be appointed administrator as the surviving spouse of Cristina. Federico later nominated Emilio
III to administer the estate on his behalf. Federico died in 2000.

The RTC decided in favor of Federico and appointed Emilio III as the administrator of the estate.
Upon Isabel’s appeal before the CA, however, the CA reversed the decision and appointed Isabel
as administrator.

Upon Emilio III’s appeal before the SC, the SC reversed the decision and appointed Isabel and
Emilio III as co-administrators of Cristina’s estate. In its decision, the SC had given weight to
Emilio III’s interest in the estate considering his relationship with Cristina and Federico. Isabel
filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Emilio III was not the “next of kin” of
Cristina in order to justify his appointment as administrator and that he demonstrated adverse
interests and disloyalty to the prejudice of Cristina’s estate. According to Isabel, Emilio III failed
to include some properties and belatedly filed the inventory of the estate, and his inaction of
Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other heirs (pertaining to Isabel and her siblings) from the list
of heirs.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate must be
upheld

HELD: NO. The general rule in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a decedent
is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. It provides that the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate
but an interest therein greater than any other candidate. As an exception, the appointment of
co-administrators is allowed for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. The
determination of a person’s suitability as an administrator rests in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment.

In the order of preference, the next of kin has been defined as those persons who are entitled
under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s property. The nearest of kin, whose interest in
the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.

Given Isabel’s unassignable interest in the estate as one of Cristina’s legitimate grandchildren
and undoubtedly the nearest next of kin, the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of
Cristina’s estate cannot be a demandable right.

It was found that after Emilio III was appointed as co-administrator of the estate, he did not look
after the welfare of the estate. He was not able to fulfill his responsibility as the administrator of
the estate to make a true and complete inventory. Moreover, the SC observed that it is highly
improbable for Isabel and Emilio III to work as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate due to the
latter’s hostility towards Isabel and her siblings. As it appears detrimental to the estate to uphold
its decision of appointing Emilio III as co-administrator, the SC appointed Isabel as the sole
administrator of the estate of Cristina.

DOCTRINE: The person to be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate must

demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.

The probate court, in the exercise of its own discretion and cannot be a demandable right, may
appoint a co-administrator:

1. To have the benefits of their judgment and to have different interests represented;
2. Where justice and equity demands that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased;
3. Where the estate is large or, from any cause, intricate and perplexing one to settle;
4. To have all the persons satisfied and the representatives work in harmony for the best interests
of the estate; and
5. When a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent
person associated with him in the office.

Lee vs RTC of QC

FACTS: Dr. Ortanez died in 1980, and left behind a wife and eight children. Thereafter, Rafael,
his legitimate child, filed a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Ortanez.
The presiding judge then appointed Rafael and Jose joint special administrators. As ordered by
the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose submitted an inventory of the estate of
their father which included 2,029 shares of stock in Philinterlife, representing 50.725% of the
company’s outstanding capital stock.

In 1989, the decedent’s wife, claiming that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as her
conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of petitioner
Filipino Loan Assistance Group. Juliana, however, failed to repurchase the shares of stock within
the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.

In 1991, Jose, acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,011
Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to
repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG. After one year, FLAG consolidated in its
name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortañez failed to repurchase
the same.

It appears that several years before but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings,
Juliana, Rafael, and Jose entered into an agreement for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of Ortanez, partitioning the estate among themselves.
In 1995, the court granted the motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife
shares of stock filed by the respondents and appointed Enderes special administratrix. Enderes
filed an urgent motion to declare void the memorandum of agreement. She likewise filed a
motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate. Also,
Special Administratrix filed an urgent motion to declare void the deeds of sale of Philinterlife
shares of stock.

The court granted the motion for the annulment of extrajudicial partition of estate and declared
the agreement as partially void insofar as the transfer of the shares of stock are concerned.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the intestate court gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the
ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock was null and void;

(2) Can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale?;

(3) Whether petitioners were deprived of due process

HELD: (1) NO. It is clear that Juliana and her three sons invalidly entered into a memorandum
of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their
knowledge that there were other heirs to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the
intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her
children was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG),
without court approval, was likewise void.

An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art.
533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However,
an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of
the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an
heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.

Juliana and Jose sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled
that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. It is
within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person
by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. It being settled that property under
administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. It is the probate court that
has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale, hence, it is also the court that can declare it
null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated.

Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator
or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.

(2) YES. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary
adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions
to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.

We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory of
the estate because there is no question that the Philinterlife shares of stock were owned by the
decedent. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of the sale made by the decedent’s heirs,
without the required approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners
that the determination of the intestate court was merely provisional and should have been
threshed out in a separate proceeding is incorrect.

(3) NO. In this case, petitioners knew of the pending intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Ortañez’s estate but they never intervened. When the court declared the nullity of the sale, they
did not bother to appeal. And when they were notified of the motion for execution of the Orders
of the intestate court, they ignored the same.

Heirs of Hilario Ruiz vs Edmond Ruiz

FACTS: In 1987, Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,
Edmond, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria, and his three granddaughters, private
respondents Cathryn, Candice and Angeline. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial
cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond executor of his estate. In 1988, Hilario
Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among
Edmond and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. However, Edmond, as
executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will.

Four years after the testator's death, private respondent Maria filed before the RTC Pasig, a
petition for the probate and approval of Hilario’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary
to Edmond. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed
under undue influence. Then in 1992, one of the properties of the estate, which the testator
bequeathed to his grandchildren, was leased out by Edmond to third persons.

Thereafter, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit the rental deposit and payments
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, Edmond turned over
the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for
repair and maintenance expenses on the estate. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of
the will. Consequently, the probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued thereafter.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion
for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of
Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to the grandchildren of the
decedent and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.

The probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes'
motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments
to the decedent's three granddaughters. It also ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession
of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing
of a bond of P50,000.00. Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court ordered the release
of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance
the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.

ISSUE: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the
estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain
heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

HELD: (1) NO. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not
extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was an
error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance
to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

(2) NO. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and estate tax have been paid or before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any
of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations. In this case, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months
from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. It was also too early in the day for the
probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The
probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the
question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.

(3) NO. Petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take
possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses of administration," pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father
is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he
is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he
is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their
veracity, propriety and justness.

Unionbank vs Santibanez
FACTS: In 1980, FCCC and Efraim Santibanez entered into a loan agreement. In 1981, Efraim
died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC
of Iloilo City. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the
estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three tractors. Each of them was
to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them.

Then, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC
and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others,
assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the
latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of
money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence before the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the money claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court

RULING: YES. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with
the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing
of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and
to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.

Garcia-Quiazon vs Belen
FACTS: Eliseo died intestate in 1992. Two years later, Elise, represented by her mother,
Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City. In her
Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity
of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage with Filipito. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise attached to the Petition her
Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to
their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratrix of Eliseo’s estate.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Las Pinas City
and; (2) Whether Elise can be considered as an interested party

RULING: (1) YES. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided in Las
Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

(2) YES. An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent,
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
In this case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced
by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratrix
of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who,
under the law, is entitled to her right after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested
right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

Pilapil vs Heirs of Briones

FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata, while respondents are the heirs of the late
Maximino. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When
Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate. Thereafter,
the court appointed Donata as the administratrix of the estate. Subsequently, the court issued an
Order, awarding ownership of the real properties to Donata.

In 1977, Donata died. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted a petition for the administration
of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed as
administrators. In 1985, Silverio, a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC.
Silverio was also allowed to collect rentals from Maximino’s properties. But then, Gregorio filed
a Motion to Set Aside the Order, claiming that said properties were already under his and his
wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration
for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.

Thus, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint against the heirs of Donata for the partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust,
and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real
properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. After trial, the RTC declared that the
heirs of Maximino were entitled to ½ of the real properties.

ISSUE: (1) Whether an implied trust had been sufficiently established;

(2) Assuming that Donata’s misrepresentation constitutes fraud, are respondents correct in
asserting that their right to recover shares in Maximino’s estate is imprescriptible?

HELD: (1) NO. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Donata committed fraud.
While it is true that since the court was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings
and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate
proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate,
is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application
and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated
in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the
purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the
settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the
petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.

Although Donata may have alleged before the court that she was her husband’s sole heir, it was
not established that she did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court to
conclude that she indeed committed fraud. The intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Maximino’s estate were pending for almost eight years, and it is the burden of the respondents to
establish that their parents or grandparents, Maximino’s surviving siblings, had absolutely no
knowledge of the said proceedings all these years. As established in Ramos v. Ramos, the degree
of proof to establish fraud in a case where the principal actors to the transaction have already
passed away is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(2) NO. It is already settled in jurisprudence that an implied trust is subject to prescription and
laches. While respondents’ right to inheritance was vested upon them at the time of Maximino’s
death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be barred by the
prescription of the action.

Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law, then respondents had 10 years within
which to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s properties. The next
question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned from. The general rule
is that an action for reconveyance of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years
from registration and/or issuance of the title to the property, not only because registration under
the Torrens system is a constructive notice of title, but also because by registering the disputed
properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any other claim
to the same.

Here, Donata was able to register and secure certificates of title over the disputed properties in
her name on 27 June 1960. The respondents filed their Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of the disputed real properties almost 27 years after the registration of the
said properties in the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents’ action for recovery of possession
of the disputed properties had clearly prescribed.

Sabidong vs Solas

FACTS: Complainant charged respondent with grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty,
oppression and abuse of authority. Complainant alleged that respondent purchased Lot 11 despite
knowing that the same was still in litigation, considering that Lot 11 was part of the Hodges
Estate then under settlement proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the subject property was still ‘in litigation’ at the time respondent purchased it

RULING: YES. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation
over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of
litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and
terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of
all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since
there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, had already been
closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage, Lot 11 is
still deemed to be "in litigation".

Aranas vs Mercado
FACTS: Emigdio died intestate. Emigdio owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty and Cebu
Emerson. He assigned his real properties in exchange for stocks in Mervir Realty and sold his
real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty. He died intestate, survived by his second wife,
Teresita and their 5 children, and his children from his first wife, including Thelma Aranas.
Teresita was appointed as administrator. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of
the estate of Emigdio for the approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time
of his death, Emigdio had left no real properties but only personal properties.

Thelma claimed that Emigdio owned properties that were not included in the inventory. The
parties agreed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties
should be included or excluded in the inventory.

ISSUE: Did the RTC have the authority to order the inclusion of the Badian Property in the
inventory in the course of the intestate proceedings of Emigdio?

HELD: YES. The usage of the word all in Section 1, Rule 83 demands the inclusion of all the
real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified
by the phrase ‘which has come into his possession or knowledge’, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession
as the administrator.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties
should be included in the inventory. The CA cannot impose its judgment to supplant that of the
RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the
absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of the estates of deceased
persons, the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has
been a positive abuse of discretion.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but
are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.

The exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio
would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days
prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding
the exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer at
the time. The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens Titles in the name of
Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in
view of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment.

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of
estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In
making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding
policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were
known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn
out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse
of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.

Butiong vs Plazo
FACTS: Pedro Rinoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first
wife, respondents Plazo and Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort, and a family
home and the land on which it stands.

The heirs filed a complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession. Particularly, the complaint alleged: 1) that Pedro died intestate; 2) that respondents,
together with their coheirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a
judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; 3) that the heirs enumerated are the only
known heirs of Pedro; 4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by
Pedro; 5) that Pedro’s estate has no known indebtedness; and 6) that respondents, as rightful
heirs, pray for the partition of the estate in accordance with the laws of intestacy. Petitioner
opposed the motion and maintains that since respondents’ complaint alleged the following causes
of action, the same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition.

ISSUE: Whether the case is an action for settlement of estate

RULING: NO. The petition is for judicial partition. It is true that some of respondents' causes of
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the
nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of
the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.

As can be gleaned from Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the allegations of respondents
in their complaint are mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. That the complaint
alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their
rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.

The general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in
his will or the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond
equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and
the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order established in Section 6 of
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted
Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his
estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without
submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending
obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate
for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled.

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s
contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the
estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to
have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.

That the complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not
mean that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to the estate's
properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent
of their titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone. In fact,
a complete inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings,
especially since the estate has no debts. Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy of partition
is available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings,
dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated.

Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and
recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an
action for partition, as can be seen in cases where courts determine the parties' rights arising from
complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and
recovery of ownership and possession of property.

Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact,
the determination as to the existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination
of whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper. An action for partition,
therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of an estate.

In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia
FACTS: Consuelo was married to Anastacio who passed away in 1985. They had two daughters,
Remedios and Natividad. Remedios predeceased Consuelo and left behind her children, the
Tanchancos). In 1997, Consuelo passed away.
Catalino filed a petition to settle the intestate estate of Consuelo. On the other hand, Natividad
filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that she already filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will
and Testament of Consuelo. As the named executrix in the will, Natividad prayed that letters
testamentary be issued in her favor. The Tanchancos filed an Opposition to Natividad's petition
for probate, alleging that the will's attestation clause did not state the number of pages and that
the will was written in Tagalog, and not the English language usually used by Consuelo in most
of her legal documents. They also pointed out that Consuelo could not have gone to Makati
where the purported will was notarized considering her failing health and the distance of her
residence in Pasay City. Moreover, they alleged that Consuelo's signature was forged.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the will faithfully complied with the formalities required by law
(2) Whether the will should be allowed probate

HELD: (1) YES. An examination of Consuelo’s will shows that it complied with the formalities
required by law, except that the attestation clause failed to indicate the number of pages upon
which the will was written. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the
omission by stating that the will has five pages. Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with
Article 809 of the Civil Code. Mere reading and observation of the will, without resorting to
other extrinsic evidence, yields the conclusion that there are actually five pages even if the said
information was not provided in the attestation clause.
When the number of pages was provided in the acknowledgment portion instead of the
attestation clause, "the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there
should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect
its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.”

(2) YES, the will of Consuelo should be allowed probate as it complied with the formalities
required by the law. The Tanchancos failed to prove that the same was executed through force or
under duress, or that the signature of the testator was procured through fraud.

Iona Leriou vs Longa

FACTS: Respondent-minors Yohanna and Victoria, represented by their mother, Mary Jane,
instituted a special proceeding entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Enrique T. Longa
Petition for Letters of Administration,” with the RTC in Muntinlupa City alleging that Enrique
died intestate, survived by petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen and respondents Yohanna and
Victoria, his legitimate and illegitimate children, respectively; and that Enrique left several
properties with no creditors. The RTC issued an Order appointing Mary Jane as the
administratrix of Enrique’s estate.
The petitioners opposed the appointment, alleging that they were denied due process because
respondents failed to adduce evidence, i.e., Return of Service, to show that petitioners were
furnished with the Petition for Letters Administration and the RTC Order. Petitioners assert that
the e-mails between respondent-administratrix and petitioner Eleptherios, and the stamp
“RECEIVED” of the DFA Records Division, do not prove that they actually received the Petition
and Order. Petitioners contend that, without the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement on
notice to the known heirs of the decedent, all proceedings relative to the Petition are null and
void.

ISSUE: Whether personal notice is a jurisdictional requirement

HELD: NO. The SC explained that it is just a matter of personal convenience. Moreover, it
should be emphasized that a testate or intestate settlement of a deceased’s estate is a proceeding
in rem, such that the publication vests the court with jurisdiction over all persons who are
interested therein.

Here, the Order was published for three consecutive weeks in Balita, a newspaper of general
circulation. By such publication which constitutes notice to the whole world, petitioners are
deemed notified about the intestate proceedings of their father's estate. Thus, even though
petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto
as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.

The Heirs of Montinola-Sanson vs CA

FACTS: Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
the late Herminia Montinola. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless, devised in
her will several of her real properties to specified persons. Private respondent, who was named
executor in the will, filed an urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. With the
conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court appointed
private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate of the deceased.

Thereafter, petitioner, the only surviving sister of the deceased, filed her Opposition to Probate of
Will, alleging that the will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and
the same was falsely dated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to
make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of
the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will; and that the will failed to institute a residual
heir to the remainder of the estate. After a hearing on the merits, the probate court rendered its
decision allowing the probate of the disputed will. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for new
trial. Attached to her motion was the Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson,
petitioner's son, alleging that witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light as
to the ill health of the testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on the latter.
The appellate court denied the motion for new trial of petitioner on the following grounds: (1)
the Affidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that efforts were exerted to locate unnamed
witnesses only after the court's decision was handed down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses would
allegedly shed light on the fact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the undue influence
exerted on her which are merely corroborative or cumulative since these facts were brought to
light during the trial.

ISSUE: Whether the court erred in allowing the subject holographic will to probate

HELD: NO.. The fact that in her holographic will, the testatrix disposed of only eleven of her
real properties does not invalidate the will, nor is it an indication that the testatrix was of
unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased
in intestate succession. Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than
compulsory heirs have been omitted, because it is the testator's right to disregard
non-compulsory heirs. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither
fraud or undue influence. The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue
influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on
mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue
influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. The exercise of improper pressure and
undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.