De Luna v.

Abrigo

G.R. No. L-57455 | January 18, 1990, 181 SCRA 150

Medialdea, J.

FACTS:

Prudencio de Luna donated a lot of Cadastral Survey of Lucena to the Luzonian University Foundation,
which was subject to a Deed of Donation Intervivos. The foundation failed to comply with the conditions, and De
Luna revived the donation in favor of the foundation, requiring the foundation to construct a chapel, nursery, and
kindergarten school within five years. The foundation accepted the donation and executed a "Deed of
Segregation," adjudicating the donated area to the foundation.

The heirs of de Luna filed a complaint with the trial court, alleging that the foundation did not comply
with the conditions of the donation. The foundation invoked the defense of prescription of action, but the court
dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-compliance with
any of the conditions must prescribe within four years. In this case, the four-year period for filing the complaint
for revocation began on April 9, 1976, and expired on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was brought on
September 23, 1980, it was already barred by prescription.

ISSUE:

WON the complaint is one for judicial decree of revocation of the donation in question as contemplated
in Article 764 of the New Civil Code and which prescribes in four (4) years and not an action to enforce a written
contract which prescribes in ten (10) years.

RULING:

This case involves a onerous donation subject to construction of a chapel, nursery, and kindergarten
school within five years of the deed of donation. While Article 764 requires actions for revocation within four
years of non-compliance, Article 733 specifically states that onerous donations are governed by contracts.
Therefore, the rules on contracts and general prescription rules are applicable in this case, as they do not apply to
onerous donations, as they are subject to the rules on donations.

Judicial action is generally not necessary for rescission of a contract if it allows automatic revokement
and cancellation for violation of terms and conditions. However, if one party contests or denies the rescission,
judicial intervention is necessary to determine if the rescission was proper. Without judicial intervention, the
extrajudicial resolution remains contestable and subject to judicial invalidation, unless the attack becomes barred
by acquiescence, estoppel, or prescription.

The trial court's decision to bar a complaint under Article 764 was incorrect, as Article 764 does not apply
to onerous donations. The donation, executed on April 9, 1971, required compliance within five years. The
complaint filed on September 23, 1980, was within the ten-year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract
under Article 1144 par. 1, counted from April 9, 1976.
 Reyes v. Mosqueda

G.R. No. L-45262 | July 23, 1990

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

FACTS:

In 1969, Dr. Emilio Pascual donated real property to Ofelia Parungao, a minor, with her mother, Rosario
Duncil, accepting the gift. Ursula Pascual alleged that Pascual executed a Donation mortis causa in her favor in
1966, covering the property. Parungao registered the donation with the Register of Deeds and was issued a title.
In 1976, Ursula executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose, and
Emmanuel Reyes. Benjamin filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the TCT of Parungao and/or
reconveyance of the deed of title. The CFI of Manila declared the TCT null and void, and the Register of Deeds
ordered the title to be cancelled. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 1966 donation was inter vivos, indicating the
property was already transferred to Ursula.

ISSUES:

WON the donation to Ursula was Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa.

RULING:

The donation was a Donation Inter Vivos, not a mortis causa. The title in the deed of donation is not the
sole factor in determining the intent of the donor. The deed's stipulations suggest that the donor was executing a
donation Inter Vivos to Ursula. The transfer of ownership over the properties was immediate and independent of
Dr. Pascual's death. The provision regarding the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence confirms the
donor's intention to give the property to Ursula immediately after the deed's execution. Therefore, the donor could
not have donated the property again in 1969 for Parungao, as the lot was already transferred to Ursula at that time.

Liguez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-11240 | December 18, 1957, 102 Phil. 577

Reyes, J.B.L., J.

FACTS:

The case revolved around a complaint filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the widow and heirs of the
late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land in Davao. The plaintiff claimed to be its legal owner, based on
a deed of donation executed in her favor by Lopez. The defense argued that the donation was null and void due to
the plaintiff's marital relations with Lopez. The Court of Appeals determined that the land originally belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo. The land was assessed in Lopez's name and later in
his widow's, and the deed of donation was never recorded. The Court of Appeals ruled that the deed of donation
was inoperative and null and void because Lopez had no right to donate conjugal property to the plaintiff and the
donation was tainted with illegal cause or consideration, with both the donor and donee involved.
ISSUE:

WON the donation is valid.

RULING:

Lopez would not have conveyed the property if he knew the appellant would refuse to cohabit with him.
Cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation, which was unlawful and tainted the donation itself. The
court interpreted the rule that parties to an illegal contract will not be aided by the law but will be left where it
finds them, barring the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain. The appellant seeks recovery of the
disputed land on the strength of a donation regular on its face. However, the Lopez heirs' plea is not receivable,
as Lopez himself would not be able to set up the plea. The Court of Appeals ruled that Lopez could not donate the
entire property in litigation, prejudiced by his wife Maria Ngo, as the property was conjugal in character and the
husband's right to donate community property is strictly limited by law. Appellees cannot ply the defense of
immorality or illegal causa of the donation.

Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-35648 | March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54

Paras, J.

FACTS:

Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received a disputed lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar,
either as a donation or purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration. The sale occurred while Restituta was
already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. Juan filed for a Torrens Title over the land, which was later
granted to him. A lease agreement was entered into with her husband for 10 years. After the lease expired, Restituta
filed for unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. The case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court, but the
entire case was dismissed due to a barter agreement. Tan Queto constructed a concrete building on the disputed
land without Restituta's objection. Restituta sued Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title, annulment of
the barter, and recovery of the land with damages. The respondent court's decision, later affirmed by the Supreme
court, led to the reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta. This petition
for a motion for reconsideration is filed.

ISSUE:

WON the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents was valid
hence a paraphernal property.

RULING:

The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal, and the oral donation of the lot cannot be a
valid donation intervivos or mortis causa for the formalities of a will. The allegation that the transfer was a
conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in her mother's estate cannot be sustained for the contractual
transmission of future inheritance. The lot was acquired by JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a
consequence of the contract of sale, with P50.00 as the cause or consideration. The lot is therefore conjugal, having
been acquired by the spouses through onerous title.

Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72908 | August 11, 1989, 176 SCRA 340

Cruz, J.

FACTS:

Perfecta Balane de Cordero died in 1945, leaving 28 hectares of land in Quezon Province. Her siblings,
Juana and Felipe, executed a public instrument in 1946, transferring the property to Salud Suterio de Matias,
Perfecta's niece, who assumed an obligation to the Philippine National Bank. The instrument was never registered
or transferred to Salud's name, but she took possession of the land in 1951. In 1951, Salud transferred the land to
her mother Juana, who was staying with her brother Claudio and his family. Claudio paid realty taxes on the land,
and in 1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale, conveying the land to Claudio. Claudio died in 1961, and his
mother in 1963. In 1965, Salud and Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property, claiming
the deed of sale was fictitious and the registration in his name was null and void. Salud claimed no compensation
was paid by Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the
defendants.

ISSUE:

WON the extra-judicial settlement was a donation.

RULING:

Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of the property in
question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased and for whatever reason they saw fit.
Hence, if they choose to respect Perfecta’s wishes and carry out her intentions by donating the land to Salud, there
was no legal impediment to their doing so. There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply
disregarded their sister’s sentiments and decided not to donate the property to Salud. The fact that they did no do
this speaks well of their integrity and their loyalty to their deceased sister. The extra-judicial settlement also
reflects their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid consideration for their own act of liberality.
 Cruz v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-58671 | November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 245

Plana, J.

FACTS:

In 1973, Eduvigis Cruz donated a residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal to her grandnieces, Teresita,
Lydia, and Cecilia, all surnamed De Leon. The property was transferred to their names. In 1974, Cruz adopted a
minor, Cresencia Ocreto, and attempted to revoke the donation. The donee resisted, claiming the property was co-
owned by Cruz and her brother, Maximo Cruz, and that Cruz owns another agricultural land in Barrio Dolores. A
petitioner filed a complaint for revocation, invoking Article 760, par. 3 of the NCC. The trial court reaffirmed the
donation, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed the complaint.

ISSUES:

WON the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation.

RULING:

YES. The National Convention on the Rights of the Child (NCC) allows a donor to sue for the annulment
or reduction of a donation within four years of adoption if it impairs the child's legitime. The burden of proof lies
with the plaintiff-donor, who must establish the required requirements. In the case at hand, the complaint for
annulment does not allege that the donation impairs the child's legitime, nor does it provide evidence of
impairment of legitime. Instead, there is unrebutted evidence that the donor had another piece of land worth
P273,420 in 1977. The legal situation for the petitioner-donor is further complicated by the factual finding that
the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, reducing the donation's
value and making it easier to take from the free disposal of the petitioner.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77425 | June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 300

Regalado, J.

FACTS:

In 1930, Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, covering a parcel of land in Cavite. The deed stipulated that the donee could not dispose
of the property within 100 years, otherwise, it would be null and void. However, on June 30, 1980, the Archbishop
executed a deed of absolute sale for Florencio and Soledad Ignao, for P114,000. The private respondents filed a
complaint for the nullification of the deed of donation, but the petitioners argued that the action was barred by
prescription and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.
ISSUE:

WON the deed of donation in favor of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila may be revoked.

RULING:

NO. The complaint cannot be barred by prescription as the prescriptive period is the 10-year ordinary
prescription, as the deed of donation allows for automatic reversion of property to the original owner in case of
violation. The court has already settled this prescriptive period in the previous case of De Luna v. Abrigo.
However, the action should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The private respondents' cause of action is
based on the petitioner selling the lot during the 50th year of the 100-year prohibitive period. The respondents'
unreasonable prohibitive period is considered null and void under Article 727 of the New Civil Code, but the
donation remains valid and subsisting. The respondents cannot revoke the donation, and the sale of the property
by the petitioner to the Ignao spouses remains valid and legal.

Eduarte v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105944 | February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 391

Francisco, J.

FACTS:

Pedro Calapine, the owner of a 12,199 square meter parcel of land, executed a deed titled "Donation
InterVivos" and ceded half of it to his niece Helen S. Doria. Doria donated 157 square meters to the Calauan
Christian Reformed Church and sold the remaining 700 square meters to the spouses Eduarte. Calapine filed a
complaint against Doria, the church, and the Eduarte spouses, claiming his signature on the donation deed was a
forgery. Calapine prayed for the revocation of the donation and declared the deeds of donation and sale null and
void.

ISSUES:

WON not the petitioners are buyers in bad faith of the donated property.

RULING:

NO. The petitioners purchased the property from Helen Doria, who had already covered it under TCT
No. T- 23205 under her name. Although Helen Doria's title was fraudulently secured, the petitioners' rights cannot
be prejudiced without any evidence of their knowledge or participation in the irregularity. They cannot be required
to look beyond the certificate of title, which appeared valid on its fade without any annotation or notice of private
respondents' adverse claim. Contrary to the respondent Court's conclusion, the petitioners were purchasers in good
faith and for value, buying the property without notice of any other person's right or interest. Helen Doria should
be adjudged liable to private respondents for the resulting damages to the true owner and original plaintiff, Pedro
Calapine, rather than the petitioners, as declared by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals.
 Quilala v. Alcantara

G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, 371 SCRA 311

Ynares – Santiago, J.

FACTS:

On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala made a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of
Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The document consists of two pages: the deed of donation, signed by Catalina
Quilala as the donor, Violeta Quilala as the donee, and two witnesses, and the Acknowledgment, acknowledging
that the donation was her voluntary act. The deed was registered with the Register of Deeds, and TCT No. 17214
was cancelled, and TCT No. 143015 was issued in Violeta Quilala's name. The document serves as a testament to
Catalina Quilala's dedication to her charitable work. In 1983, Catalina Quilala and Violeta Quilala died, and
petitioner Ricky Quilala claimed to be the surviving son of Violeta. Respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes, and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives, executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating the property. On September 13, 1984, respondents
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. The trial court found that the deed was
acknowledged only by Catalina, making the donation null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action, allowing probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and
testament.

ISSUES:

WON the deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance on the part of the donee Violeta Quilala.

RULING:

NO. The second page of a deed of donation, which contains the Acknowledgment, was signed by the
donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right-hand margin.
The requirement is not absolute, but to ensure that each page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties to
avoid falsification of the contract after it has been duly executed. A contracting party affixes their signature on
each page to certify their agreement to everything written thereon at the time of signing. The specification of the
location of the signature is merely directory, and the fact that one party signs on the wrong side of the page does
not invalidate the document. The instrument should be treated in its entirety, and the conveyance should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. The donee signed on the second page, which contains the
Acknowledgment only, and her acceptance, as explicitly stated on the first page of the notarized deed of donation,
was made in a public instrument.
 Hemedes v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 107132 | October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 347

Gonzaga – Reyes, J.

FACTS:

Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima and Enrique D. Hemedes, transferred ownership of a land to his third
wife, Justa Kausapin, with the condition that the property would be reverted to any of his children upon her death
or marriage. In 1960, Justa Kausapin mortgaged the property to R & B Insurance, but the insurance foreclosed
due to unpaid mortgages. In 1971, Justa Kausapin signed a Kasunduan agreement with Enrique D. Hemedes, who
paid realty taxes and was identified as the owner by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office. Hemedes then sold
the property to Dominium Realty Const. Corp., a sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery began
implementing improvements on the property, after R & B insurance informed them of their ownership.

ISSUE:

WON the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes valid.

RULING:

The court dismissed Maxima's petition and affirmed the CA's decision, stating she failed to comply with
Art. 1332 of the civil code and did not execute a deed for the land as security for a loan. The deed was found
spurious, and the original title and mortgage were null and void. Justa Kausapin affirmed the authenticity of the
kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Enrique Hemedes, who is Maxima's dependent for financial support.

Siguan v. Lim

G.R. No. 134685 | November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 725

Davide, Jr., C. J.

FACTS:

In 1991, a Deed of Donation was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City for
Linde, Ingrid, and Neil's children. In 1993, the petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children,
claiming that LIM fraudulently transferred her real property to her children in bad faith and fraud of creditors,
including her. She claimed that LIM conspired with her children to antagonize the Deed of Donation, and that
LIM left no sufficient properties to pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of Siguan and rescinded the
Contract, but the CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

WON the Deed of Donation executed by respondent may be rescinded for being in fraud of her alleged
creditor.
RULING:

Art. 1381 of the Civil Code outlines contracts that can be rescissible, including those undertaken in fraud
of creditors when the creditors cannot collect the claims due them. The action to rescind contracts in fraud of
creditors is known as accion pauliana. To succeed, the plaintiff must have a credit prior to the alienation, the debtor
has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person, the creditor has no other legal
remedy to satisfy his claim, the act being impugned is fraudulent, and the third person who received the property
conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud.

Rescission requires the existence of creditors at the time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this
must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract. Without any prior
existing debt, there can neither be injury nor fraud. In the case of the petitioner, the alleged debt of LIM in favor
of the petitioner was incurred in August 1990, while the deed of donation was purportedly executed on 10 August
1989. The petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she did so, making her action for rescission of the questioned
deed not maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist.

Noceda vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119730 | September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA 504

Gonzaga – Reyes, J.

FACTS:

Celestino Arbizo died in 1956, leaving behind a parcel of land with a total area of 66,530 square meters.
His heirs, Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, extrajudicially divided the land, with Directo
receiving 11,426 square meters, Noceda 13,294 square meters, and Arbizo 41,810 square meters. Directo donated
625 square meters to Noceda, her nephew, and another extrajudicial partition was executed, giving Maria Arbizo
three-fifths of the land. In 1981, Noceda built his house on the land, excluding the donated portion. Directo fenced
the portion and constructed three huts on the land. In 1985, Noceda removed the fence and occupied the huts
without her consent. Directo demanded her vacatement, but Noceda refused. Directo filed a complaint for recovery
of possession and ownership.

ISSUES:

WON the acts of Noceda constitute ingratitude to warrant revocation of the donation.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner Noceda occupied a portion of Lot C donated by Aurora Arbizo-Directo without his
knowledge and consent, committing usurpation and an offense against the property of the donor. This act is
considered an act of ingratitude against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee, but the offense
must be proven in the action for revocation. The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude requires proof of the
donor's knowledge of the fact and the possibility of bringing the action. The petitioner failed to provide competent
proof to prove his allegation. The one-year period for bringing the action is considered to have already been
prescribed.

Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126996, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 552

Gonzaga – Reyes, J.

FACTS:

In 1989, Anatalia de Guzman's heirs filed a complaint for annulment, partition, and damages against
Cesario Velasquez's heirs for refusing to partition the properties of the Spouses Aquino. The plaintiffs claimed
that before Leoncia's death, she told her that the donation and partition documents were not signed by them, and
that Cesario Velasquez and his mother promised to divide the properties equally. After Leoncia's death, the
defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties and refused to partition. The plaintiffs prayed for the
nullity of the documents, order the partition in equal shares, and for the defendants to render an accounting of the
produce of the land from the time they forcibly took possession until partition was effected. The defendants alleged
that they disposed of their properties during the lifetime of spouses Aquino in favor of their predecessors-in-
interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and Anastacia and Jose Velasquez. The trial court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the Donation Intervivos, Deed of Sale, Deed of Donation, and Deed of Sale to
third parties as null and void.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the properties in question.

RULING:

YES. Santiago Meneses failed to prove the nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino
spouses in favor of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman.
However, the petitioners could show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses disposed of four parcels
of land during their lifetime, including the Escritura de donation propter nuptias, Deed of donation inter vivos,
Escritura de Compreventa, and Deed of Conveyance with a consideration of P600. The court reversibly
overlooked the probative value of these notarized documents.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee, and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance
by the donee. The first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez was
accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated into the same deed of
donation. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and
sixth parcels, including a portion of the second parcel, became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919.

The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated
July 14, 1939, in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of the second parcel are also
valid. The best proof of ownership of the land is the certificate of title, which requires more than a bare allegation
to defeat the face value of TCT.

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 110335 | June 18, 2001, 358 SCRA 598

Melo, J.

FACTS:

Ignacio and Marina Gonzales, deceased spouses, owned two agricultural land parcels. Petitioners are
their successors-in-interest, while private respondents are farmers and tenants who have been cultivating the land
since before World War II. Marina died intestate, and Lilia Gonzales was appointed as administratix. Ignacio
Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation for his grandchildren, but was not registered. When Presidential Decree
No. 27 took effect, the landholdings were placed under Operation Land Transfer. Lilia Gonzales filed an
application for retention, requesting their property be excluded from the transfer. Initially denied, it was approved
due to the deed of donation.

ISSUE:

WON the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect,
should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.

RULING:

NO. Article 749 of the Civil Code states that a donation of immovable property must be made in a public
document, specifying the property donated and the value of the charges. Article 709 states that titles of ownership
or rights over immovable property that are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property will not
prejudice third persons. The donation must be contained in a public document, and registration is not necessary
for it to be valid and effective. In the case at bar, the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grand
children, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law, making it not
binding on private respondents who did not participate in the deed or had no actual knowledge of it.

Imperial v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112483 | October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 393

Gonzaga – Reyes, J.

FACTS:

Leoncio Imperial, owner of a 32,837 sq.m. parcel of land in Albay, sold it to his adopted son, petitioner,
for Php 1.00 in 1951. The transaction was considered a donation, but Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment two
years later. The dispute was resolved through a compromise agreement, with Leoncio acknowledging the
petitioner's legality and agreeing to sell a designated 1,000 sq.m. portion of the donated land. Leoncio died, leaving
only two heirs: the petitioner and Victor Imperial. In 1962, Victor was substituted in the complaint for annulment,
which was granted. After 15 years, Victor died, and his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, died, leaving Cesar and
Teresa Villalon as respondents. In 1986, respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the donation, alleging
it impairs Victor Imperial's legitime.

ISSUES:

1. WON the respondents have the right to question the inofficious donation and seek its reduction.
2. WON the 30-year prescriptive period is applicable in the reduction of the inofficious donation.

RULING:

1. YES. At the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already
been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a
party to the compromise agreement. When Victor substituted Leoncio, he was not deemed to have
renounced his legitime. He was therefore not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction. Nor are Victor’s heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so. This is in accordance with
Articles 772 and 1053 of the new Civil Code, to wit:
Article 772. Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the legitime and
their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of the inofficious donation xxx; and
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his
rights shall be transmitted to his heirs.
2. NO. Article 1144 of the New Civil Code mandates actions to reduce inofficious donations within ten
years of the right of action accruing. This applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations
required under Article 771, which impairs the legitime of compulsory heirs. The cause of action to
enforce a legitime accrues upon the donor-decedent's death, as only then can the net estate be ascertained
and legitimes determined. This case took 24 years to initiate, and the action has long prescribed. The case
involved Victor, who died fifteen years after Leoncio's death, and Ricardo Villalon, who died four years
later. Victor did not show interest in contesting the donation of his deceased father.

Republic of the Philippines v. Silim

G.R. No. 140487 | April 2, 2001, 356 SCRA 1

Kapunan, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land to the Bureau of Public Schools
in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. The property was to be exclusively used for school purposes. The District
Supervisor accepted the donation, and a school building was built on the land. However, another school building
was not released due to government requirements. A Deed of Exchange was entered into, allowing the donated lot
to be exchanged with a larger lot owned by the vice-mayor's wife. The school buildings were built on the new
site, and the previous building was dismantled and transferred to the new location. The vice-mayor was surprised
to see a house being built on the donated land.

ISSUES:

1. WON not there was a valid donation despite non-notation of the acceptance in the Deed of Donation,
as required in Article 749.
2. WON the condition on the donation was violated.

RULING:

1. YES. The formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure it is communicated to the donor.
In the case at bar, respondents had knowledge of the construction and existence of a school building on
the donated lot, fulfilling the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be
communicated to the donor.
2. NO. The donation of a lot for a school was not violated even after it was exchanged for another. The
purpose of the donation remained unchanged, and the acquisition of a larger lot allowed for the release
of funds for the construction of a Bagong Lipunan school building, which could not be accommodated
by the donated lot's limited area. The exclusivity of the purpose remained intact.

Gestopa v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111904 | October 5, 2000, 342 SCRA 105

Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Danlag owned six unregistered lands and executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of
which were in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. These deeds reserved the rights of the donors to amend, cancel,
or revoke the donation during their lifetime and to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the
donors' lifetime. Mercedes also executed another deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Mercedes, which
contained conditions that the donors would continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and the
donee would not sell or dispose of the land without their consent and approval.

Spouses Danlag sold two parcels of lots to Spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa and executed a deed of
revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject to the deed of donation inter vivos. Mercedes Pilapil filed
with the Regional Trial Court for quieting of title over the parcels of land and alleged that she accepted the
donation openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties. She also alleged that the
donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and that she had complied with all of them since its perfection.

In opposition, the spouses Gestopa and Danlag argued that the deed of donation was null and void
because it was obtained through machinations and undue influence, leaving the donor, Diego Danlag, without any
property.
ISSUE:

WON the donation is a donation inter vivos or a donation mortis causa.

RULING:

The Court ruled that a donation of mortis causa, in the form of a will, was a donation inter vivos. The
donor's reservation of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred ownership over the donated properties to
Mercedes, and the right to sell belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to
protect his usufructuary interests. The transfer of tax declarations to Mercedes' name implied that the donation
was inter vivos. The court also noted that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of land donated to her.
The granting clause demonstrates that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee, while
the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the
properties. The donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance, indicating that he intended to part with
the six parcels of land. The donee accepted the donation, indicating that the right to dispose of the properties
belonged to the donee. The limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had
passed to the donees, and the donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime.