10.

PAJARILLO VS IAC

FACTS:

The mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who had a brother named Felipe Balane and
a sister named Perfecta Balane de Cordero. Perfecta died in 1945 leaving inter alia a registered
tract of land consisting of about 28 hectares in the barrio of Luctol, Municipality of Macalelon in
Quezon Province. In 1946, Juana and Felipe, as the only brother and sister respectively and
forced heirs of Perfecta, executed a public instrument entitled "Extra-judicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero."

In the agreement, Juana and Felipe, in consideration of love and affection agreed in
carrying out the antemortem wish of Pefecta by donating to private respondent SALUD
SUTEXIO DE MATIAS (only niece) the 28-hectare land Perfecta owned. It also conditioned that
SALUD must assume the P1,000 obligation or debt of Perfecta’s estate with the Philippine
National Bank. It was also stated therein that SALUD accepted the said donation and expressed
her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of Juana and Felipe.

Later, SALUD executed a public instrument accepting the donation made by

Felipe and Juana. Therein, she expressed her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of Juana
and Felipe. One of the witnesses, who signed in this document was petitioner EUFEMIA
PAJARILLO.

These instruments were never registered nor was title transferred in SALUD's name
although she said she immediately took possession of the land. Meantime, intestate
proceedings were instituted on the estate of Perfecta and the said land was among those
included in the inventory of the properties belonging to the decedent. SALUD interposed no
objection to its inclusion nor did she oppose its subsequent adjudication to her mother Juana in
the project of partition.

It was not clear if the land was ever registered in Juana's name. However, there is
evidence that Juana confirmed the earlier donation of the land to SALUD but requested that she
be allowed to possess the same and enjoy its fruits, until her death. It has also not been
controverted that Salud paid the P1,000.00 loan for which the land was mortgaged.

In 1951, acceding to this request, she transferred the possession of the land to her
mother, who was then staying with petitioner CLAUDIO SUTERIO, SR. and his family. During
the period they were occupying the land, CLAUDIO paid the realty taxes thereon. In 1956,
Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to CLAUDIO for the declared
consideration of P12,000.00. In 1958, Claudio had the land registered in as name and was
issued a TCT.

CLAUDIO died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. In 1965, private respondents spouses
SALUD and PEDRO MATIAS filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the
ground that the deed of sale in favor of CLAUDIO was fictitious and its registration in his name
was null and void.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement was really a donation since the donor of the
property who was Perfecta, as she was already deceased, could no longer bestow the intended
gift and that Felipe and Juana could not have made the donation either because they were not
moved by the same sentiments Perfecta had for her niece SALUD.

HELD:

YES, it was a donation. The argument appeared to be too much nit picking, if not
sophistry. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of
the property in question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased and
for whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they chose to respect Perfecta's wishes and carry
out her intentions by donating the land to SALUD, there was no legal impediment to their doing
so. In fact, that was not only the legal but also the moral thing to do.

There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply disregarded their sister's
sentiments and decided not to donate the property to SALUD, keeping the same for themselves.
The fact that they did not do this speaks well indeed of their integrity and their loyalty as well to
their deceased sister. The extrajudicial settlement also reflected their own affection for SALUD
which constituted the valid consideration for their own act of liberality. Notably, in her
acceptance of the donation, SALUD referred to the donors Felipe and Juana, and not Perfecta.
11. MAGLASANG VS CABATINGAN

FACTS:

Conchita Cabatingan executed deed of donation over a house and lot in favor of his
brother. Also, she executed 4 other deeds of donation in favor of the petitioners. The deeds
provided that it shall take effect upon the donor’s death. Conchita died. Respondents filed an
action to annul the 4 deeds on the ground that it is void for failure to comply with the formalities
of a will.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed is a donation mortis causa.

HELD:

Yes, it is. The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners
prior to Conchita’s death.

Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of
wills and testaments.

Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary public, they were not executed in the
manner provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil Code, thus it is void.
12. GANUELAS VS CAWED

FACTS:

On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a Revocation of Donationpurporting to set aside

the Deed of Donation.More than a month later, Celestina died without issue and any surviving
ascendants and siblings.After Celestinas death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the
donated properties with the private respondents Leocadia Flores, et al. (Flores et.al.), nieces of
Celestina.In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the deed of donation, Ursulina
secured the corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the donated properties and since
then, she refused to give Flores et.al. any share in the produce of the properties despite
repeated demands.Flores et.al. were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of
San Fernando, La Union a complaint against Ursulina et.al.

The deed of donation executed by Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of
acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte;The
donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil
Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, hence, it was void. Thus prayed that
Ursulina be ordered to return to them as intestate heirs the possession and ownership of the
properties and for the cancellation of the tax declarations secured in the name of Ursulina, the
partition of the properties among the intestate heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by Ursulina
of an accounting of all the fruits of the properties since 1982 and for her to return or pay the
value of their shares. Ursulina et.al. The donation in favor of Ursulina was inter vivosas
contemplated under article 729 of the Civil Code, hence, the deed did not have to comply with
the requirements for the execution of a valid will; The revocation of donation is null and void as
the ground mentioned is not among those provided by law to be the basis; and at any rate, the
revocation could only be legally enforced upon filing of the appropriate complaint in court within
the prescriptive period provided by law, which period had, at the time the complaint was filed,
already lapsed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject properties are donations inter vivos from Celestina to
Ursulina

HELD:

No. The properties are to be considered donations mortis causa.

The donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect is an explicit
indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa.

The absence of a reservation clause in the deed implied that Celestina retained complete
dominion over her properties (donation mortis causa). The lack of witnesses acknowledgement
of the will before the notary public rendered the entire document VOID.The attesting witnesses
failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus violating Article 806 of the civil
code which provides:
Art. 806.Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testatorand the
witnesses.The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the clerk of court. RTC, SC AFFIRMED: The subsequent execution by Celestina of
the revocation of donation showed that the donor intended the revocability of the donation ad
nutum, thus sustaining its finding that the conveyance was mortis causa.

To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love
and affection is erroneous.That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the
donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining
whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an
identical motivation. In other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis
causa. RELEVANT PROVISIONS Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of
the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules
established in the Title on Succession.

Art. 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the
donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after the donors death, this shall be a
donation inter vivos.The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of the donation,
shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides otherwise.
13. SPOUSES GESTOPA VS CA

FACTS:

Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of 6 parcels of unregistered lands. They
executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, in favor of private respondent MERCEDES
DANLAG-PILAPIL. The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2 while the second deed pertained to
parcel 3. The third deed pertained to parcel 4. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights
of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell,
mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.

In 1973, the Danlags, executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned
parcels of land plus two other parcels, respectively, again in favor of MERCEDES. This
contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlags shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land
during their lifetime, and that (2) the MERCEDES cannot sell or dispose of the land during the
lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and approval. MERCEDES caused the
transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.

In 1979 and 1979, respectively, the Danlags sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners spouses
AGRIPINO and ISABEL GESTOPA. Later, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation
recovering the 6 parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.

On appeal by MERCEDES to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the decision of
the trial court. It held that the deed of donation dated 1973 be not revoked and that the deed of
revocation be null and void. It declared MERCEDES as the absolute and exclusive owner of the
6 parcels of land specified in the deed of donation inter vivos. It then declared the sale by Diego
to the GESTOPAs as null and void. It further ordered reconveyance of the parcels of land to
MERCEDES.

Hence, this appeal by the Gestopas. They argued that the donor, Diego, did not only reserve
the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also prohibited the donee, MERCEDES, from
selling or disposing the land without the consent and approval of the Danlags. This then implied
that the donor still had control and ownership over the donated properties. Hence, the donation
was post mortem.

ISSUES

1. Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa.

HELD:

(1) The donation was intervivos.

Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of
whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of
the deed. In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read
together.
The deed of donation dated 1973 showed that Diego donated the properties out of love and
affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of
lifetime usufruct indicated that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the
properties. Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance
with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the 6 parcels of land.
Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is
inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa,
being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime.

The right to dispose of the properties then, belonged to the donee, MERCEDES. The donor's
right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests.

The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real
intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution. Prior
to the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed 3 donations
mortis causa. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the 4 lots
already donated mortis causa.