Dela Cruz VS.
Delav Cruz titled in the name of the government of
Doctrines
 Friar Lands are not public lands
but are patrimonial property of the
government. Thus, friar lands are
not public lands.
 The intention of the government
in the sale of friar estates is to
sell the friar lands acquired by the
government to actual settlers and
occupants of the same. In case of
death of a holder of a certificate,
which is only an agreement to
sell, it is not the heirs but the
widow who succeeds in the
parcel of land to be sold by the
government. The heirs can only
succeed in the rights of the
deceased holder of a certificate if
no widow survives him. The
widow of a purchaser of friar
estate land is entitled to have
patent issued to her for the lands
purchased upon proper showing
she has completed a payment of
the purchase price, the right to
complete such a purchase being
analogous to the homestead
laws. The widow’s right are
governed by the law in force at
time her husband’s death and are
not affected by her remarriage
Facts: The land in question is known as
Lot No. 671 of the Piedad Estate and
contains an area of 184, 268 square
meters, more or less. Although the
entire Piedad Estate which covered a
wide tract of land in Quezon City was
the Philippines for as early as before
1920, portions of the land were actually
under the claim of ownership by various
persons who were in possession by the
late Policarpio De La Cruz. Upon his
death in 1920, the property passed to
his 3 children – Maximo and Filomeno,
the fathers or grandfathers of the
plaintiff, and Lucia, one of the
defendants. Plaintiff Agustina and
Cesaria De La Cruz as do many of the
plaintiffs, were born in the land in
question. Defendant Lucia De La Cruz
was widowed early and the brothers
Maximo and Filomeno, feeling
compassion for their only sister, left the
administration and management of the
only property left them by their father to
her.
Lucia gave to her brothers during their
lifetime parts of the produce of the land
consisting of rice and money forming
part of the proceeds of other crops
raised therefrom. However, due to the
meagreness of the quantity of riche
which was a ganta or two and the
amount of money which was only 10
pesos given them now and then by
Lucia, plaintiffs never realized the extent
and value of the property left them as
inheritance.
Plaintiffs never having gone beyond the
first and second grade, they are almost
illiterate and belong to the labouring
class.
On the first anniversary of their father’s
death, the plaintiffs and lucia gathered at
the house of their Eleuterio, for prayers
and a little “salo – salo.” Their aunt Lucia
was also there. While in the kitchen
cooking, the plaintiffs asked Lucia about
the partition of the land left them by their
father. At this, her aunt Lucia got mad,
and thrusting a hand of 50 peso bill and
said “This is your share, you have no
more share in the land. I will just feed
your share to the dogs and pigs”
Petitioner filed a case in the court of first
instance of Rizal, Quezon City against
respondent Dela Cruz and Iglesia ni
Kristo for recovery of ownership and
praying for judgement in their favour
It is shown in this case that the plaintiff
and defendants are the compulsory
heirs of Policarpio De La Cruz who left
as his property parcel of land situated in
Quezon City, known as Piedad Estate
that the plaintiff averred that they are the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of
Policarpio De La Cruz and owns pro
indiviso 2/3 of said property; that only
the remaining 1/3 of the property
belongs to defendant Lucia De La Cruz;
that when their father died, plaintiffs
similarly entrusted the care of the
properties due them to Lucia De La
Cruz, that Lucia De La Cruz had been
giving plaintiffs every now and then
shares of the produce and from the
quantity thereof, they thought all along
that the landholdings left by their father
did not amount to much; that upon
information of someone close to
defendant Lucia De La Cruz, plaintiff
was informed and discovered that the
property subject of the complaint was
registered in the name of defendant
Lucia De La Cruz and that Lucia De La
Cruz executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
of Segregated Portion of Registered
Land in favour of defendant Iglesia Ni
Kristo; that plaintiff averred that the sale
to Iglesia Ni Kristo had been attended
with fraud, bad faith and deceit because
Lucia De La Cruz well knew that she did
not own the entire property and Iglesia
Ni Kristo knew that of a pending case
over the subject property because of the
lis pendens annotated in the
corresponding title
Respondent Lucia De La Cruz answered
the complaint and denied the material
allegations of the complaint and alleged
that by way of affirmative defense, that
the property in question was derived by
Dorotea De La Cruz from the
government and it is not part of the
estate of Policapio De La Cruz; that the
plaintiff’s claim does not appear in the
title; that the title to the property was first
issued in 1912 and it had become
indefeasible after a year from issuance;
the plaintiff’s claim is already barred by
laches and the statute of limitations
because since 1941 she had been
asserting ownership over the land
Respondent Iglesia ni Kristo also
answered the complaint and alleged that
it examined the property in the name of
Lucia De La Cruz and after satisfying
itself that it was free from any lien or
incumbrances or claims of other
persons, bought the land covered
thereby, that the price thereof was the
result of an honest – to – goodness
negotiation, freely arrived by the parties.
That the plaintiff has no capacity to sue
the defendant corporation because there
is no privity of contract between them.
TRIAL COURT DECISION – in favour
of the petitioner, annulling the title of
the Iglesia Ni Kristo which was found
to be a purchaser in bad faith and
awarding to the petitioner their
aliquot inheritance shares in the
estate of Policarpio De La Cruz
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION – it
reversed the decision of the RTC on
the ground that legally speaking,
Policarpio De La Cruz never owned
the property and therefore, the
testimonial evidence of the petitioner
could not believe and sustained; that
consequently, no co – ownership
existed; that even if there was, no
trust existed; that laches and
prescription bar petitioners’ claim of
ownership and that Iglesia Ni Kristo
was an innocent purchaser in good
faith
ISSUE: the question of ownership of
Lot 671
HELD: the ruling of the appellate
court that there was no co-ownership
of Lot 671 among the plaintiffs and
Lucia because it was impossible,
factually and legally, for Policarpio to
be the owner, for the entire Piedad
Estate had been since March 12,
1912, registered in the name of the
Philippine government, is correct.
Considering the provisions of the
Friar Land Act that the said Friar
Lands are the private and patriominal
property of the Philippine
government and there being no
evidence as to how Policarpio
acquired ownership over the land, no
document of any kind presented, and
no testimony or proof whatsoever
that Policarpio had ever purchased or
applied with the government, he can
never acquire ownership.
Policarpio De La Cruz may have been
an actual settler or occupant in the
land at the time said lands were
acquired by the government and was
given the preference to lease,
purchase or acquire his holding,
which preference, however is in
disregard of the settlement and
occupation of persons before the
government acquired the land but
absent any showing, proof or
evidence that he applied to purchase
or acquire the holding, Policarpio De
La Cruz acquired no title, right or
interest whatsoever which he could
have transmitted by succession to
his children and heirs.
The admission by respondent Lucia
De La Cruz that she inherited the
property from her father, Policapio De
La Cruz, that Policarpio’s possession
from time immemorial was in concept
of owner; the allegation of the parties
that the government has expressly
recognized the right of Policarpio to
the land in litigation and that even the
trial court and appellate court’s
decision assume such express
recognition by the government to
Policarpio’s claim to the property –
all these are unavailing and no effect
in the face of the precedent – setting
doctrine that the land is private and
patrimonial property of the
government and the specific
provision of the Friar Lands Act that
the actual and bonafide settler should
he desire to purchase the land
occupied by him shall pay to the
government the actual cost thereof,
granting to him 15 years from the
date of purchase in which to pay the
same in equal annual instalments,
should he so desire, paying interest
at the rate of 4% per annum on all
deferred payments. When the cost
thereof shall have been ascertained
which included the cost of surveys,
administration and interest upon the
purchase money, the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands then gives
the said settler and occupant a
certificate setting forth in detail that
the government has agreed to sell
such settler and occupant the
amount of land so held by him, at the
price fixed, and that upon payment
of the final instalment together with
all accrued interest, the government
will convey to such settler or
occupant the land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance
which is then issued and become
effective in the manner provided in
Section 22 of the Land Registration
Act.
The case shows, that there is no
showing of proof or evidence
whatsoever, documentary or
testimonial, that Policarpio De La
Cruz purchased or attempted to
purchase the Lot 671 of the Piedad
Estate.
Iglesia Ni Kristo was an innocent
purchaser in good faith, INC cannot
be faulted in taking care to protect its
interest in acquiring Lot 671. INC did
what a prudent, careful and cautious
vendee would do under the
circumstances. For while indeed two
(2) titles crop up under different
names for the same land, the
purchaser is not necessarily obliged
to be so naïve and innocent and
require the title holder to clear their
rights first before buying the property
he is interested in acquiring.
The Friar Land Act expressly
declares that Friar Lands are not
public lands and their acquisition is
not governed by the provision of the
Public Land Act. The equitable and
beneficial titles to the land is vested
in the buyer of a friar land upon the
payment of the first instalment and
issuance of the sales certificate.
Cruz VS. Secretary of Environment
Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and
Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of
RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations
Respondents Chairperson and
Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) filed their comment to the
petition and defend the constitutionality
of Indigenous Peoples Right Act (IPRA)
and pray its petitioner be dismissed for
lack of merit.
Secretary of the DENR and Secretary of
Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) filed through the Solicitor General
a consolidated comment. The Solicitor
General is of the view that the IPRA is
party unconstitutional on the ground that
it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that petition be granted in part.
NCIP and other indigenous peoples
opposed and said that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray
that the petition for prohibition and
mandamus be dismissed.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
they amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the state’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources, in violation
of the regalia doctrine.
After due deliberation on the petition, the
members of the court voted as follows
 7 (voted to dismiss the petition)
 7 (voted to grant the petition)
As the votes were equally 7 to 7 and the
necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
dismissed.
Notes:
1. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) grants the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples the
ownership and possession of their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands,
and defines the extent of these lands
and domains and the ownership given is
the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its
origin to native title.
2. Indigenous Cultural Communities or
Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of
people or homogenous societies who
have continuously lived as an organized
community on communally bounded and
defined territory. These group of people
have actually occupied, possessed and
utilized their territories under the claim of
ownership since time immemorial.
3. The state, by recognizing the right of
tribal Filipinos to their ancestral lands
and domains, has effectively upheld
their right to live in a cultural distinctly
their own.
4. the right of ownership and possession
of the ICCPs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is held under the indigenous
concept of ownership which maintains
the view that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community
property.
5. There is nothing in IPRA that grants
to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral
domain. The right to negotiate the terms
and conditions over the natural
resources covers only their exploration
which must be for the purpose of
ensuring ecological and environmental
protection of, and conservation
measures in the ancestral domain, it
does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.
6. Ownership over the natural resources
in the ancestral domains remains with
the state and the ICCs/IPs are merely
granted the right to “manage” and
conserve them for future generation.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs rights over
the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship.
7. The limited rights of management and
use must be to contemplate small –
scale utilization of natural resources as
distinguished from large scale utilization.
Separate Opinion of Justice Kapunan
1. the term indigenous traces its origin to
the old latin word “indu” which means
“within” which is also means “native”.
Indigenous refers to that which
originated or has been produced
naturally in a particular land, and has not
been introduced from the outside.
2. In Philippine constitutional law, the
term indigenous peoples pertains to
those groups of Filipinos who have
retained a high degree of continuity from
pre – conquest culture.
3. the term jura regalia refers to royal
rights, or those rights which the King has
by virtue of his prerogative. It is refers
also to a right which the sovereign has
over anything in which a subject has
right of property.
4. the mere fact that Section 3 (a) of
IPRA defines ancestral domains to
include the natural resources, found
therein does not ipso facto convert the
character of such natural resources as
private property of the indigenous
peoples. It merely defines the coverage
of ancestral domains, and describes its
extent.
5. In other words, Section 3 (a) serves
only as a yardstick which points out
what properties are within the ancestral
domains. It does not confer or recognize
any right of ownership over the natural
resources to the indigenous people. Its
purpose is definitional and not
declarative of a right or title.
6. the concept of native title to natural
resources, unlike title to land, has not
been recognized in the Philippines.
Rather, it merely upheld the right of the
indigenous peoples to claim ownership
of minerals under the Philippine Bill of
1902.