134. Heirs of G. Bofill v. CA, G.R. No. 107930, October 7, 1994, Bellosillo, J.

Doctrine: Possession is not a definitive proof of ownership nor is non-possession inconsistent

therewith.

Facts: An action for declaration of ownership over Lot No. 2954-A of the Panay Cadastre in
Panay, Capiz, was filed by petitioners against the Sps. Enrique and Flordeliza Begalan and Sps.
Jose and Bernardita Catalan. The heirs of Manuel Barredo claimed also to be the owners of the
lot in litigation. They filed a complaint in intervention against the petitioners heirs of Manuel
Bofill. On 12 August 1988, the trial court rendered a decision declaring petitioner the owners of
the lot in question and entitled to the possession thereof, ordering respondents as defendants
therein to vacate the premises, and to pay petitioners. The Trial Court ruled that the claim of the
plaintiff-intervenors and defendants over this land was a mere exchange of collateral(s) from Lot
526 to Lot 2954-A for a loan of P450.00 obtained by Manuel Bofill. The said loan having been
paid one year thereafter, said deed of exchange as collateral for said loan was rendered without
legal force and effect, hence no entry in the title covering the lot was made regarding said loan,
nor was the title in the name of Manuel Bofill transferred to anybody else up to the present time.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the
lower court.

Issue: Is there a transfer of ownership from petitioner to respondent when they exchange of
lots?

Ruling: No. The exchange of lots as used in the Casugot can refer to exchange of ownership,
of possession, of collaterals, or of any other attribute of ownership. Exchange of lands does not
necessarily refer to exchange of ownership. Besides, possession is not a definitive proof of
ownership, nor is non-possession inconsistent therewith. Hence, the claim that Barriatos was
the possessor of Lot 2954-A is not incompatible with Bofill's claim of ownership.

143. Republic v. Diaz, G.R. No. L- 36486, August 6, 1979, Melencio-Herrera, J.

Doctrine: A lessee who continues to stay on the premises after the expiration of the lease
contract is deemed a usurper, as such he become possessor in bad faith.

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines owns a parcel of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva
Ecija. The land was donated by Crisostomo to the Republic as it was stated in his last will. The
then Attorney General represented the Government was the administrator of the properties
consisting of commercial and residential lots as well as agricultural lands, however, the Auditor
General ruled that the properties should properly be administered by the Bureau of Lands. The
administration of Crisostomo Estate was then transferred to the Bureau of Lands.
On March 31, 1955, the then Director of Lands, Zoilo Castrillo, entered into a contract of
lease with defendant Heraclio D. Diaz over Lot No. 1467 of the Santa Rosa Cadastre. Portions
of Lot No. 1467 were cultivated by thirteen "helpers-tenants" of defendant. The tenants of Lot
No. 1467, other landless farmers in the area and the Barrio Council of San Gregorio, Santa
Rosa, Nueva Ecija, had filed various petitions to allow them and other farmers of the barrio to
lease Lot No. 1467 directly from the Government. Before the expiration of his lease contract,
defendant gave notice that he was exercising his option to renew the lease contract for another
period of ten (10) years, and at the same time requested that he be given written permission to
assign his leasehold rights over said lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines as an
additional guaranty for payment of a loan intended for the purchase of farm implements.
The Governor of the Land Authority, Hon. Benjamin M. Gozon, sent a reply-letter to
defendant informing the latter that the Office could not agree to the latter's exercise of his
alleged option to renew the contract of lease over Lot No. 1467. The Governor of the Land
Authority, Hon. Conrado F. Estrella, requested defendant to vacate the premises. On February
21, 1969, the Governor of the Land Authority entered into agricultural lease contracts with the
actual occupants of Lot No. 1467. On January 20, 1970, the Office of the Solicitor General
lodged a Complaint for recovery of possession against defendant in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner. On July 31, 1970,
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case involves
only a pure question of law that is, the interpretation of the pertinent laws relative to the contract
of lease executed by the Director of Lands in favor of defendant.

Issue: Did the defendant become a usurper?

Ruling: Yes. It is obvious that the period of the lease contract, even as renewed, has hardly
expired on March 31, 1975. Since defendant is still occupying the subject premises it will have
to be held that defendant's occupancy thereof no longer finds any legal basis. He is a usurper
and he has no right to legitimately continue in the use and enjoyment of the premises. He has
become a possessor in bad faith. If the lessee continues enjoying the thing after the expiration
of the contract, over the lessor's objection, the former shall be subject to the responsibilities of a
possessor in bad faith.

152. Santiago v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-31919, March 24, 1930, J. Ostrand

Doctrine: In these circumstances, the defendant must suffer the consequences of her
lawlessness whether she is a part owner of the property or not.

Facts: After the death of Juan Dizon, a petition for the appointment of a special administrator
was filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The petition was opposed by Marta Dizon but
her opposition was overruled and Vicente Santiago, was appointed special administrator.
Santiago took possession of the property left by the deceased, including the house. Marta Dizon
entered the house and made it her abode, against the will of the plaintiff. Three days later,
Cristina Cruz, the herein defendant, also made the house her home on the invitation of Marta
Dizon and remained there notwithstanding the objections of the plaintiff. Santiago and other
persons living in the house were insulted and to prevent such action he placed padlocks on
most of the doors in the house. Santiago was authorized by the Court to employ deputy sheriffs
at his own expense. Marta Dizon died, but Cristina Cruz still insisted on living in the house. The
plaintiff brought the present action against her for forcible entry and detainer. The justice of the
peace rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and absolved her from the complaint. Upon
appeal to the Court of First Instance, that court rendered a judgment ordering the defendant to
vacate the premises.

Issue: Does Marta have the right over the property.

Ruling: No. Santiago held possession of the house before Marta Dizon and the defendant took
possession. They acquired such possession by force and against the will of the plaintiff, taking
the law in their own hands. In these circumstances, the defendant must suffer the
consequences of her lawlessness whether she is a part owner of the property or not. The fact
that she was invited by Marta Dizon is immaterial; Marta had no greater right than the
defendant.

161. Moralidad v. Pernes, G.R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006, J. Garcia

Doctrine: The owner of the property imposed as condition for the continuation of the usufruct
over the property by his kins that they should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in
harmony, and avoid bickering. There was a continuing animosity among the kins, hence, is a
ground for termination of the usufruct. The deterioration of the relations of the kins to an almost
irretrievable level is a good reason for the termination of the usufruct.

Facts: A parcel of land located in Davao City and registered in the name of petitioner Mercedes
Moralidad was the subject property in this case. Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for
the purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the
property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner
made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986. Following her
retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the respondents’ on the
house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their relations turned sour
because members of the Pernes family were impervious to her suggestions and attempts to
change certain practices concerning matters of health and sanitation within their compound.
Due to the worsening relation between petitioner and respondent, petitioner filed with the MTCC
of Davao City an unlawful detainer suit against the respondent spouses. In their defense, the
respondents alleged having entered the property in question, building their house thereon and
maintaining the same as their residence with petitioner’s full knowledge and express consent.
The MTCC declared that the respondent spouses, although builders in good faith vis-à-vis the
house they built on her property, cannot invoke their bona fides as a valid excuse for not
complying with the demand to vacate. Dissatisfied, the respondent spouses appealed to the
RTC of Davao City. The RTC reversed that of the MTCC, holding that respondents’ possession
of the property in question was not, as ruled by the latter court, by mere tolerance of the
petitioner but rather by her express consent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.

Issue: Is the usufruct estinguished?

Ruling: Yes.
Under Article 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of
any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title
creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. In the document it states "[T]hat anyone
of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided,
however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). In fine, the
occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or
the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition
which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts
and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by
the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely,
the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents’ own evidence
before the MTCC indicated that the relations between the parties "have deteriorated to almost
an irretrievable level." There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner to file complaints
before the local barangay lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant
complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully and
harmoniously with the Pernes family and vice versa. Thus, the Court rules that the continuing
animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she
was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to
consider the usufruct as having been terminated.