Slide 1

Acts which do not constitute an effective interruption of possession.

• Mere notice of adverse claim did not constitute an effective interruption of possession –
Azardon-Crisologo v. Ranon, GR. No. 171068
• The acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens
Certificate of title in one’s name cannot defeat another’s right of ownership acquired
through acquisitive prescription. – Tanyag v. Gabriel, GR. No. 175763
• Only in cases file before the courts may judicial summons be issued, and, thus, interrupt
possession.
DISCUSSION:
Arzadon-Crisologo v. Ranon
FACTS:
Ranon and her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession
and ownership over the subject property since 1962, and had religiously paid the
taxes thereon. They had built a house on the subject property where she and her
family had resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when her family was already residing in
Metro Manila, fire razed and destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they continued to
visit the subject property, as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon. However, later
on, her daughter, Zosie Rañon, discovered that the subject property was already in the
name of the spouses Montemayor which was purportedly issued in their favor by
virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the spouses Montemayor
executed themselves. The Affidavit was alleged to have created a cloud of doubt over Rañon’s
title and ownership over the subject property. The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged
that they acquired the subject lot by purchase from Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo
Arzadon who are the heirs of its previous owners for a consideration of P100,000.00. They
averred that there existed no liens or encumbrances on the subject property in favor of
Agrifina Rañon; and that no person, other than they and the spouses Montemayor, has an
interest in the property as owner or otherwise.
ISSUES:
(1)W/N the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by the petitioners constitute an effective
interruption since 1962 of respondents possession of the subject property; and
(2)W/N the respondents had acquired ownership over the subject property through
uninterrupted and adverse possession for 30 years, without need of title or of good faith
RULING:
Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil
interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received
judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which
was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not
effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by respondents of the subject property for a period of more than 30 years in
repudiation of petitioners’ ownership had been established. During such length of time,
respondents had exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, and paid taxes in their
name. Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia
of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.As is
well known, the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by
the tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership.Possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before it can be said that he is in possession. (Ramos v. Dir. Of Lands) Nothing was done
by petitioners to claim possession over the subject property from the time their predecessors-in-
interest had lost possession of the property due to their deaths. Plainly, petitioners slept
on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jurasubveniunt. The law comes to the
succor only to aid thevigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.Respondents occupied
without interruption the subject property in the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring
ownership via extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

Tanyag v. Gabriel
Facts:
The subject of controversy is two adjacent parcel of land located at Ruhale, Barangay Calzada,
Municipality of Taguig.
Petitioners claimed that the first parcel of land was owned by someone named Benita Gabriel as
part of inheritance. Petitioners then took possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due
on the land and declared the same for tax purposes in the name of Bien venido’swife, Araceli C.
Tanyag.
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag
under Deed of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of
said property and declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners claimed to have continuously,
publicly, notoriously, and adversely occupied both Lots 1and 2 through their caretaker Juana
Quinones; they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land
Petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that respondents never occupied the 1 st property and
fraudulently caused the inclusion of 2nd property in a tax declarion. Respondents asserted that
petitioners have no cause of action against them for they have not established their ownership
over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondent’s name.
Issue:
WON the petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription
Ruling:
NO. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through
the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in theconcept of
an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional.
Petitioner’s adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 which tax declaration cancelled
TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. Tax receipts and declaration are prima facie proofs of
ownership or possession of property for which such taxes have been paid. Petitioner has also let
their caretaker plant vegetable and put up pig farm on the land.
It was only in 1979 that respondent began to assert a claim over the property by securing
a tax declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel. These acts of respondents effectively interrupt the
possession of petitioners for purposes of prescription. Civil interruption takes place with the
service of JUDICIAL SUMMONS to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of
Adverse Claim.
For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons.
None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in
1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents’
possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption. The execution of the
Notice ofAdverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity.
What existed was merely a notice.
There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no
action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial
summon was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of
the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which
produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were
not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive
prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse
Claim
The court uphold petitioners’ right as owner only with respect to Lot 1 consisting of 686
square meters. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of sale
from the original declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan. Respondents asserted that the 147
square meters covered by the tax declarations of Dinguinbayan being claimed by petitioners is
not the same lot included
Slide 2:
Application of Section 14(2) as synthesized in the Case of Malabanan
• There must be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth. (Article 422 of the Civil Code)
• Such declaration shall be in the form of law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law.
• Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begun.
DISCUSSION:
1. Prescription under Civil Code is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domains become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
2. Without express declaration, the property remains property of public dominion and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription.

Slide 3
Acquisition of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of Accession or Accretion
under Section 14(3).
1. Ownership of abandoned river beds by right of accession.
• Article 461 of the Civil Code and its requisites.
RIVER BEDS which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of
the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new
course in proportion to the area lost. The owners of the lands adjoining the old
bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which
value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
As illustrated in the book.
A and B owns land on opposite side of a river. The river changed its course,
passing through the land of C.
 Who owns the abandoned river bed? C, to compensate him for his loss.
Now suppose that the two owners, C and D, lost portion of their lands. Who owns
the river bed? C and D, in proportion to the area lost.
2.Ownership by right of accretion along river banks
• Article 457 of the Civil Code,
• Three requisites before an accretion is said to have taken place.
ACCRETION – the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects
of the current of the water.
Article 457 provides that the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
to the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
waters,
Three requisites before an accretion is said to have taken place:
1. that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible
2. that it be made through the effects of the current of water;
3. that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
If it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and cause
by accretion and erosion.
Accretion which the banks of river may gradually receive from the effect of the current
becomes the property of the owners of the bank.
3. Accretion along the banks of creeks, streams, and lakes.
Alluvial deposits along the banks of creeks, streams and lakes do not form part of the
public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which
it may have been added.
a. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature
There must be evident to prove that the addition to the property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the river.
A riparian owner then does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special
works expressly intended to bring about accretion.
Hence, private persons cannot reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the
public domain without proper permission from the government.
b. Accretion does not automatically become registered land.
To bring an area formed by accretion under the Torrens system, there must be an
application for registration filed for the purpose.
 c. Where alluvial increments is not registered, it may be acquired by third persons
through PRESCRIPTION.
In order that the accretion may be protected by the rule on imprescriptibility, it is
necessary that the same be brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
In an instance that the adjoining land owner does not cause the registration of the
increment to his property, the same may be acquired by third persons.
d. Alluvial formation long the seashore forms part of the public domain.
In contrast to accretion, the alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the
public domain and therefore not open to acquisition by adverse possession by
private persons.
It is outside the commerce of men , unless declared by either the executive or the
legislative department.
e. Case of City Mayor of Paranaque City v. Ebio
DOCTRINE: the adjoining property must be register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be the subject to acquisition.
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D. EBIO
AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS

FACTS:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in
Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was
an accretion of Cut-cut creek.

Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great
grandfather, Jose Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively
occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring
possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida.
Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the
construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his
rights over the land in favor of Ebio.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez
passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of
Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said
barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately
opposed and the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from
the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted
on the said lot.
 On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days,or be
physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply asserting their claim
over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.

Issue: WON the state may build on the land in question.

Ruling:
NO. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from thealluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case,
the law that governs ownership over the accretedportion is Article 84 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil
Code.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The
only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must
register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired
byprescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been,there can be
no prescription against the State regarding property of publicdomain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription asagainst the State. Hence, while
it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation ofsediments along its banks does not form part
of the public domain by clearprovision of law.

3. Dried-up river beds.

Dried up river belongs to the state as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

The reason behind is that, drying up river is not accretion. By law, accretion belongs to
the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of river where it forms.

Acquisition of Ownership in any other manner provided for by law under Section 14 (4)
1. Registration under the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act.
Ancestral lands must be agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming.
Individual members of the cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned
ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors in interests, have been
 in continuous possession and occupation of the same in concept of owner since time
immemorial preceding the approval of the Act shall have been the option to secure tile to
their ancestral lands.
2. Registration of foreshore and offshore areas through “special patents”
Special patent is a form of land grant whereby the government, by an act of Congress or
executive order, conveys land in full ownership to the grantee withour regard to is
classification.
The republic may grant the beneficial use of its real property to an agency or
instrumentality of the national government but the government remains the owner of the
real property. Hence, these are still public, not private lands.
3. Reservation for a specific public purpose by Presidential Proclamation.
Reservation for a specific public purpose by Presidential Proclamation
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can
be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of
public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are
usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving
certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously
avquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right
of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or
appropriate, are void
Mindanao Medical Center v. Court of Appeals