5.

Conjugal Partnership of Gains (CPG) (Article 116)

 
1. Beumer vs. Amores (G.R. No. 195670 Dec 3, 2012)

FACTS: Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros
Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the former’s psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership dated December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage. In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1
and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage.

During trial, petitioner testified that the properties were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with
the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay
for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.

For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her personal funds, in
particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware.

On February 28, 2007, the RTC dissolved the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her
paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.

The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out by Willem from the
conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.

The two houses are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during their
marital union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units. Petitioner and respondent
are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of partition on the two houses aforementioned.

On appeal, petitioner insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and that
they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus,
he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the
other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife.

CA affirmed. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in
the Philippines." Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement.

ISSUE: W/N the foreigner Beumer can seek reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land in the petition for
separation of his properties and his wife’s on the ground that he bought the parcels using his own disability fund

HELD: No. In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller, the Court had already denied a
claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner (Helmut Muller) against his
former Filipina spouse. It held petitioner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has
done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real
source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously
executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase the properties he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as
petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all.

Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a
case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on
unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.

Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an
accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the
subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of
Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all
times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the
plaintiff."

Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners
applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on the
properties which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the
prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.

2. Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, [December 8, 1999], 377 PHIL 919-933)
@ III. Fam Code (Arts 26-39)

3. Heirs of Hagoriles v. Hernaez, G.R. No. 199628, [April 20, 2016], 785 PHIL 491-505)

DOCTRINES:
a. The landholder’s obligation to provide home lots to his tenants continues for so long as the tenancy relations exist and has not
yet been severed.
b. The determination of tenant's entitlement to homelot belongs to the DARAB
c. No execution of the judicial compromise may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the
litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision and the resolution of the CA which affirmed with
modification the decision of the DARAB declaring the respondents, who were found bona fide tenants of their respective
landholdings, to be entitled to the continuous peaceful possession of their home lots.

FACTS: Herein respondents filed a complaint to Maintain Status Quo before the PARAD and claimed that, as far back as 1967, they
have been tenant-tillers and actual occupants of the subject parcels of land. The lands, which were administered by Milagros
Ramos, belonged to different owners. Apart from their respective areas of tillage, the respondents claimed to be in possession of
individual home lots situated on separate parcels of land.

In 1990, the late Exequiel Hagoriles bought a portion of Lot No. 2047 from the original landowners Amparo and Timoteo.
Subsequently, Exequiel successfully caused the ejectment of respondent Marcelino Amar from his home lot. This prompted the
other respondents to file with the PARAD a complaint against Exequiel and Amparo to refrain from disturbing them in their
peaceful possession of their home lots.

In their answers to the complaint, Exequiel and Amparo denied the existence of tenancy relations between themselves and the
respondents. Thus, they contended that since the respondents are not tenants, they were not entitled to home lots.
The PARAD partly dismissed the respondents’ complaint for lack of evidence to support the existence of tenancy- specifically on the
element of sharing of harvests. However, the PARAD did not dismiss the complaint with respect to respondents Milagros
Villanueva, Virginia Dagohoy and Crisanto Canja who were found to be lawful tenants of their respective, thus entitled to homelots

The DARAB affirmed the PARAD’s ruling with respect to respondents Villanueva, Dagohoy and Canja, but reversed the PARAD’s
ruling as to respondents Romeo Hernaez, Felix Castillo, Gaudencio Arnaez, Teofilo Arnaez, Benjamin Costoy, Virgilio Canja, Nena
Bayog, Venancio Semilon, Gaudencio Villanueva, Erwin Villanueva, and Marcelino Amar.

Significantly, the DARAB declared all the respondents to be bona fide tenants of their respective landholdings. It discovered that
EPs were soon to be issued to the rest of the respondents, which meant that these respondents had already been properly
identified as tenant-beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

The CA agreed with the DARAB in finding the respondents to be bona fide tenants of their respective landholdings, but disagreed
with the DARAB’s "restrictive interpretation" of the latter’s jurisdiction to decide on the issue of whether the respondents were
entitled to remain in their home lots.

ISSUES:
a. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE HOMELOTS CONSTRUCTED SEPARATE FROM THEIR AREA OF TILLAGE.
b. WHETHER THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT HAS FORCE AND EFFECT IN LAW

RULING:
a. Only those respondents who are Timoteo’s and whose home lots are located within Timoteo’s portion of Lot No. 2047 can be
guaranteed to the peaceful possession of their home lots. The issue should be referred to the DARAB for proper determination.

The petitioners argue that the CA erred in awarding home lots to the respondents and in ordering them to maintain the
respondents’ peaceful possession of these home lots. Notably, the petitioners point out that in 2004, the parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement that could have put an end to the present case if not for the failure of the respondents’ counsel to affix her
signature to the document. Under the Compromise Agreement, the petitioners offered to sell and the respondents agreed to buy in
installments, portions of Lot No. 2047 that corresponded to the respondents’ respective home lots. This agreement, however, was
not submitted for the court’s approval due to the absence of respondents’ counsel’s signature.

The obligation to provide home lots to agricultural lessees or tenants rests upon the landholder. Section 26(a) of R.A. No. 1199 or
the "Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines," as amended by R.A. No. 2263.

In this case, the subject home lots were designated on a parcel of land separate from the farmlands cultivated by the respondents.
Title to such parcel of land, i.e., Lot No. 2047, was originally registered under the name of Engracia Ramos, the wife of Timoteo.15
Lot No. 2047 was not Timoteo’s property.

The property relations of spouses Timoteo and Engracia Ramos were governed by the old Civil Code 16 that prescribed the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.17 Under Article 148 of the old Civil Code, the spouses retain exclusive ownership of property they brought to
the marriage as his or her own; they acquired, during the marriage, by lucrative title; they acquired by right of redemption or by
exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses; and property they purchased with the exclusive money of
the wife or the husband.18

Considering that Lot No. 2047 was originally registered under Engracia's name, it is presumed that said lot is paraphernal, not
conjugal, property. Paraphernal property is property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires
during the marriage in accordance with Article 148 (old Civil Code). 19 The wife retains ownership of paraphernal property.

Given the limited information in the records, we cannot definitely rule on the rights of all the respondents to their home lots. There
is need to delineate the portion of Lot No. 2047 belonging to Timoteo Sr., if there is still any, and determine whether the
respondents’ home lots fall within Timoteo’s share of the lot. Only those respondents who are Timoteo’s tenants (namely: Milagros
Villanueva, Teofilo Hernaez, Crisanto Canja, Nena Bayog, Virginia Dagohoy, Venancio Semilon, Gaudencio Villanueva, and Marcelino
Amar23) and whose home lots are located within Timoteo’s portion of Lot No. 2047 can be guaranteed to the peaceful possession
of their home lots.
For the other respondents who are not tenants of Timoteo, and those who are Timoteo’s tenants but whose home lots do not fall
within Timoteo’s share of Lot No. 2047, their continuous possession of their home lots cannot be guaranteed. We reiterate that it is
the landholder who, among the coowners of Lot No. 2047 is Timoteo, Sr., is obligated by law to provide his tenants home lots
within his land. The petitioners are not transferees of Timoteo Sr. but are transferees of Amparo who is not a landholder of the
respondents; thus, the petitioners may not be compelled to maintain the home lots located within their acquired portion of Lot No.
2047.

At best, the issue on the respondents’ entitlement to their home lots should be referred to the DARAB for proper determination.
The CA was correct in holding that jurisdiction over this matter is with the DARAB, not with the Office of the DAR Secretary, because
it involves an agrarian dispute. Jurisdiction over agrarian disputes lies with the DARAB.

In the event that the respondents are found not to be entitled to possess their present home lots, they can demand from their
landholders to designate another location as their home lot. The landholder’s obligation to provide home lots to his tenants
continues for so long as the tenancy relations exist and has not yet been severed.

b. The compromise agreement has no effect.

With respect to the parties’ alleged Compromise Agreement, we rule that this "agreement" has no effect to the resolution of the
present case.

Parties to a suit may enter into a compromise agreement to avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A
compromise agreement intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is a judicial compromise, which has the force and
effect of a judgment of the court. However, no execution of the compromise agreement may be issued unless the agreement
receives the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed.

FALLO WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the present petition for review on certiorari and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision and
resolution of CA.
 
5.1 Exclusive Property of Each Spouse
5.2 Conjugal Partnership Property
5.3 Charges Upon and Obligations of CPG (Article 121-122)
 
1. Aguete vs. PNB (G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011)

FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for annulment against PNB before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00 from PNB and as security, a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land with TCT. No. T-9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and an extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. After the lapse of a year, the property was
consolidated and registered in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the mortgage constituted on the land which is part of
their conjugal property, contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the proceedings. She interposed in her
defense that the signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the
benefit of the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction
mentioned, may ask the court for an annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by PNB, Court of Appeals reversed this
ruling and found for PNB, stating that forgery was concluded without adequate proof. It also found that the loan was used
in the expansion of the family business.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in declaring, without basis, that the loan contracted by Ros with PNB redounded to the
benefit of his family, aside from the fact that such had not been raised by respondent in its appeal.
RULING: No. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The subject property is thus considered
part of the conjugal partnership of gains. It was acquired during Ros and Aguete’s marriage. They were married on 16
January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968. The property was mortgaged on 23 October 1974.
PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB of the subject property. The husband cannot
alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband
do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract.
Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the
conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
Ros’ application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of
garlic & virginia tobacco." Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which
he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. Where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the
debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
2. Pana vs. Heirs of Juanito (G.R. No. 164201 Dec 10, 2012)

FACTS: In its Decision dated 9 July 1997, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City convicted Melecia
Pana (“Melecia”) of murder and ordered her to pay each of the heirs of the victims civil indemnity and damages. When
the said Decision became final and executory, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, which resulted in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Melecia and her husband, Efren Pana (“Efren”).
Efren and Melecia moved to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia, and that their marriage falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that
they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.
The RTC denied their motion and ruled that it was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and
Melecia. In support of the said ruling, the RTC applied the Family Code retroactively.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction
of Melecia's civil liability in the murder case.
RULING: The Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to change the property relation of spouses who were
married prior to its enactment in 1988.
Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent
any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be
modified except before the celebration of that marriage, pursuant to Article 76 of the Family Code which states that “in
order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the
marriage”. Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or
conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally
separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) judicial separation of property had been had on
the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d)
there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary
dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in the case of
Efren and Melecia. Moreover, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the
husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or industry in the
common fund. This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate
properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil
Code into absolute community of property in 1988when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or
vested rights to such separate properties. The conjugal properties of spouses can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of the civil liability of one of the spouses. However, the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnership
of gains supersede those under the Civil Code, pursuant to Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:"x x the provisions of this
Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256."Consequently, the Supreme Court referred to the Family Code
provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil
liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Article 122 of the Family Code provides that the payment of personal
debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the
support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article121 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should
be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid
for the purpose above-mentioned. In this case, Efren did not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own. Thus, the civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her maybe enforced against
their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
Finally, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on one of the spouses, out of the
partnership assets even before these are liquidated. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that “at the
time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes
above-mentioned.
 
5.4 Administration of CPG (Article 124)
 
a. Flores v Lindo (G.R. No. 183984 April 13, 2011)

FACTS: Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Petitioner Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 and secured it
with a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered property in the name of Edna and her husband, co-
respondent Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his
attorney-in-fact.
She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Flores therefore
filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage with damages. The RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial
foreclosure as the Deed was without consent and authority of Edna’s husband. The Deed was executed on October 31,
1995, while the Special Power of Attorney was executed by Enrico only on November 4, 1995. Accordingly, the mortgage
is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code. The RTC, however, ruled that petitioner may still recover the loan
through a personal action against Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction over the said personal action which should be filed
where plaintiff or defendant resides.
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. The respondents alleged that Enrico was not a party to the
loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s signature. They also prayed for the dismissal of the case on
grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping. The RTC ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights,
claims or demands which, though growing out of the same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action.
The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted that petitioner allowed the earlier decision of the RTC to become
final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely
relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules
and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the loan.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are void
(2) Whether there remains an available remedy for petitioner
HELD:
(1) NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the
Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special
Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November
1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding
contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
(2) YES. In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and
not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a
collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt. In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that
respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” The principle of
unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at the expense of another. The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to
prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. The principle is
applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully
paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a
defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93.
Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled
that he should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action
that petitioner might have against Edna.
Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she
questioned the validity of the Deed.
 
5.5 Dissolution of CPG
5.6 Liquidation of CPG Assets and Liabilities (Article 129-130)
 
1. Cornelia Matabuena Vs. Petronila Cervantes (38 SCRA 284) GR L-28771, March 31, 1971

FACTS: In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a property to his common-law spouse, Petronila Cervantes. In March 1962,
Felix and Petronila got married. After five months, Felix died intestate, survived by Petronila and Cornelia, Felix's sister.
Subsequently, Cornelia, being the only sister and the nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a case to recover the
property which was donated Petronila on the ground that under Art.133 of the Civil Code, “every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void."

The trial court ruled that the case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time Felix and
Petronila were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.

ISSUE: Does the ban on donation between spouses during the marriage apply to common-law relationships?

RULING: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to
prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no
reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.

However, the lack validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila does not necessarily mean that the Cornelia
will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Petronila were legitimated
by marriage. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

2. Quiao vs. Quiao (G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012)

FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC
rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita
and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the
children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children
because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months
from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to
define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not
have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102.
He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines
net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is
applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.

3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net
profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.

RULING:

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership
of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is
founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for
legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of
his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the
marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties.
And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their
respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate
properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation½share
decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code,
“the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her
own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is
nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again,
lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal
partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
3. Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. v Servacio and Go (G.R. No. 157537, Sep 7, 2011)

FACTS: Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr. (Married to Marta Go)
who purchased the said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property
to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio
refused to heed their demand; hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner
was that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void
pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to
the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any
rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property
that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.

The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of
Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the
way up to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.

RULING: The appeal lacks merit.

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal property after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon
Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership,
could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s
share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose
of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-
owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article 105 of the Family Code,
supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing
owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of
her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.

4. Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38287 (Resolution), [October 23, 1981], 195 PHIL 174-
190

FACTS: Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw, had sex with Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March 1967.
Because of the affair, she and her husband allegedly separated. On October 30, 1967, she gave birth to a baby boy named
Rolando Macadangdang. Elizabeth filed with the CFI a recognition and support against Antonio. The lower court
dismissed the complaint, applying the provisions of Articles 255 and 256 of the Civil Code. CA reversed the decision and
declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio. CA denied Vicente's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of Elizabeth and Crispin.
2) Whether or not Elizabeth may institute an action that would bastardized her child without giving her husband, the
legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

RULING:

SC held that CA made judgement based on misapprehension of facts and the its finding of facts contradicted by evidence
on record.

Under the Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of Elizabeth and Crispin.
Rolando was born only 7 months after the incident took place, and also 7 months after their alleged separation. The birth
of Rolando came more than 180 days following the celebration of said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged
separation between the spouses. The fact that the child was born in the rented house, normally delivered, and raised
normally by the yaya, according to the testimony of the yaya Patrocinia Avila. If he was otherwise born prematurely, he
would have needed to be placed under special care, attended by a physician.

The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days
of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or
refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:

1. Impotence of the husband;

2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.

Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Hence, good morals and public policy require that a
mother should not be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for
herself.
The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of either parent, nor Merely
upon evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or about the time the wife
became pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having any intercourse with his wife, the child was still presumed
legitimate.

With respect to Article 257, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the
presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband.

At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is
the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved.

It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the point would be unseemly and scandalous, not
only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it may have on the child, who is in no
fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby.

It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her
reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all — her own son. For this Court to allow,
much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on
society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and
then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This
would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.

5. Heirs of Spouses Go, Sr. v. Servacio, G.R. No. 157537, [September 7, 2011], 672 PHIL 447-460)

FACTS: Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go)
who purchased the said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property
to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio
refused to heed their demand; hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner
was that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void
pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to
the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any
rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property
that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of
Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the
way up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
HELD: The appeal lacks merit.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of the conjugal property after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon
Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership,
could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s
share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose
of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-
owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article 105 of the Family Code,
supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing
owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of
her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.
 
5.7 Separation of Property and Administration of One Spouse during Marriage

5.7a
a. Sy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127263, [April 12, 2000], 386 PHIL 760-771)
 
Facts: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah
Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were
in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father’s residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on
May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father.

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later
amended to a petition for separation of property. The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the
custody of their children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him when she started spanking their son
when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation was granted by repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for the first time that there was no
marriage license during their marriage.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner Filipina and private respondent Fernando is void from the beginning for lack of
marriage license at the time of the ceremony. (YES)
2. Whether or not Fernando Sy is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its
absolute nullity. (MOOT)

Held: The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent. The
pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license.
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows
that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever
resided in Carmona.

The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code,
those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, are void  ab initio. This is clearly applicable in
this case.

On the other hand, the issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the Court. It is mooted by
the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage
was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner and private respondent is hereby declared
void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.

6. Regime of Separation of Property

7. Property Regime of Unions without Marriage (Article 147-148)

1. Virginia Ocampo v Deogracio Ocampo (G.R. No. 198908, Aug. 3, 2015)

FACTS: On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio
Ocampo as null and void from the beginning under Article 36 of the Family Code (on the ground of psychological
incapacity).

On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties.
Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued and the trial court rendered the
assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

Issue: Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and
psychological perversity.

Ruling: The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage but without the benefit of marriage or whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.
Article 147 states that their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on CO-OWNERSHIP.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of Article 147,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.

Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both
of the spouses." Since as a rule, even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take[s] care of the
household while the husband indulges in lucrative and gainful activities is entitled to a share in the same proportion the
husband is, to the property or properties acquired by the marriage.

Petitioner's claim that the seed money was provided by her mother and had it not been for that the properties could not
have been acquired. The Court is not prone to believe because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but
petitioner's self-serving allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful husband,
as well as family man were made but the testimonies adduced failed to fully convince the Court that respondent should be
punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his indiscretion.

2. Ventura v Spouses Paulino (G.R. No. 202932 Oct 23, 2013)

FACTS: Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes married on June 9, 1980. Both were previously married. Esteban's marriage
was dissolved by his first wife's death in 1960, with whom he had a daughter, Evangeline Abuda. Soccoro's first marriage
to Crispin Roxas in 1952, however, was not dissolved and was still subsisting at the time of her marriage with Esteban.
Socorro also had a son from her first marriage, the father of Edilberto U. Ventura Jr. (Socorro is Edilberto Jr.'s
grandmother).

In 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas
property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father's behalf sometime in 1970. 4 The
Vitas property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to "Esteban
Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."|||
Esteban also operated small businesses on a property on Delpan St., Tondo, Manila. On September 6, 1997, Esteban sold
the Vitas and Delpan properties to his daughter, Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda. Esteban and Socorro died in
1997 and 1999, respectively.

In 2000, Leonora Urquila (Ediberto's mother) discovered the sales made by Esteban in favor of Evangeline and her
husband. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-
Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Esteban's signature on the deeds of sale
was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorro's prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent
marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the
properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.

The RTC denied Edilberto's petition. The CA sustained the RTC's decision.

Issue: Whether or not Edilberto is entitled to the sold properties by virtue of Socorro's marriage to Esteban.

Ruling: NO, for two reasons:

1. Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision: Art 148.In cases of cohabitation
[wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. Applying the foregoing
provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties' actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by
Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months
after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro
Torres."
The title shows that the Vitas property was owned by Esteban alone as he acquired it in 1968 before his marriage with
Socorro even if the certificate of title was issued after the marriage as registration under the Torrens system merely
confirms and does not vest title . The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status and does
not indicate that Esteban co-owned the property with Socorro.

2. Edilberto claims that Esteban's actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not sufficiently proven
since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.

Edilberto's claim cannot be sustained. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property was acquired
prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property
was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a
donation, which requires the debtor's consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan property would be
owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.

During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On
the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro's alleged monetary contributions.

3. Soledad L. Lavadia v Heirs of Juan Luces Luna (G.R.No. 171914, July 23, 2015)

FACTS: Atty. Juan Luces Luna, married Eugenia Luna (first wife) in a civil ceremony in 1947 and later solemnized the
marriage in a church in 1948. During their marriage, they had 7 children.
Almost 2 decades of being married, they agreed to live apart and dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property. In 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree on his marriage with Eugenia in the Court of First Instance in Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic.
On the same date he contracted another marriage with Soledad Lavadia. Thereafter, they returned to the Philippines. In
1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with his partners called LUPISCON.
They bought a condominium unit in Makati City for their law firm, with Atty. Luna’s share being 46/100 later becoming
38/100. After LUPISCON dissolved in 1992, Luna’s share was stipulated to be 25/100.
Later, Atty. Luna and Atty. De La Cruz established a new law firm which lasted until Luna’s death in 1997. Gregorio Z.
Luna (Luna’s son with his first wife) took over Luna’s share in the condo, which he leased out to Atty. De La Cruz,
Luna’s law books, and other equipment.
Soledad filed a complaint for the 25/100 pro indiviso share & other equipment taken by Gregorio Luna.
Soledad claims that she is the co-owner because of her marriage with Atty. Luna and that the Heirs of Luna did not give
her the share of the properties.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC ruled that the 25/100 share of the condo was acquired through Atty. Luna’s sole industry,
that the plaintiff had no right as owner of the condominium, and that the Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of 4 certain
law books.
Both Parties appealed to the CA. Soledad states that the RTC erred in many aspects of their decisions. The respondents
stated that the lower court erred in their decision for Soledad to acquire the books.
On November 11, 2005, The CA promulgated its assailed modified decision which stated that Eugenia was the legitimate
wife of Atty. Luna until his death in 1997 and that the divorce decree he obtained in the Dominican Republic was invalid.
The modified ruling was comprised of the same decisions except that this time, the books were adjudged to be acquired by
the heirs of Luna. In 2006, The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Soledad states that Atty. Luna and Eugenia’s conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated, the Dominican
Republic’s decision on the divorce decree was valid, she had proof of actual contributions to the share of the condo, and
that she was entitled to the ownership of the law books.
Issue/s:
a) Whether or not the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Luna had validly dissolved the first marriage
b) Whether the second marriage entitled Soledad to any rights in property
Holding:
a) No. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death Atty. Luna’s first marriage with
Eugenia was solemnized in 1947 and that law in force at the time was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
Nationality Rule, which was also followed by the Civil Code. Philippine Laws relating to family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.
This governed the marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia, being Filipinos until the death of Luna in 1997, which terminated
their marriage. The divorce decree obtained from the Dominican Republic was not valid under the Philippine Constitution.
b) No. The Agreement of Separation of Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval Article 119 of the Civil
Code states that marriage settlements may allow future spouses to agree upon absolute or relative community of property.
But without marriage settlements or that the same is void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this code shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
In this case, the conjugal partnership of gains is terminated upon the death of either spouse, pursuant to Article 175. The
Conjugal Partnerships of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage or until the former’s
death.
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void. Properties acquired during their marriage were governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states that all marriages outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine Law.
Atty. Luna and Soledad’s marriage being void ab initio by virtue of being bigamous entitles that their properties shared
together falls under the Rules on Co-ownership, pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. Being void of any proof of
actual contributions to declare any rights to property, Soledad’s mere allegations of co-ownership would warrant no relief
in her favor.
8. Property Regime of Common Law Marriages
 
FAMILY
 
1. Family and Family Home (Article 152-162)

1. Fortaleza vs. Lapitan (G.R. No. 178288, Aug. 15, 2012 678 SCRA 469)

FACTS: Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from Sps. Rolando and Amparo Lapitan in the amount of
P1.2M subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, Sps. Fortaleza executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their
residential house & lot in Barrio Anos, Los Baños, Laguna. When Sps. Fortaleza failed to pay their indebtedness including
interests and penalties, the creditors Lapitan applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City.

At the auction sale, the creditor’s son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders at the amount of
P2.5M. They were then issued a Certificate of Sale registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City and annotated
at the back of the TCT. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
Spouses Raul and Rona Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and caused the cancellation of the
TCT held by Sps. Fortaleza and the registration of the subject property in their names under a new TCT. Despite the
foregoing, Sps. Fortaleza refused the Sps. Lapitan’s formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the property.

Sps. Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession with RTC, Br35 of Calamva City, alleging
that as new registered owners of the subject property, they were entitled to its possession. Sps. Fortaleza questioned the
validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors
bloated the principal amount by the imposition of exorbitant interest.

RTC: Ordered issuance of a writ of possession  ministerial duty of the court since the redemption period had expired &
a new title had already been issued in the name of Sps. Lapitan

Sps. Fortaleza’s MR: Subject property is their family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale. MR denied.

CA: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed RTC Ruling.

ISSUE: W/N the subject property is a family home exempt from forced sale.

RULING: No. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3)
of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution.” In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28,
1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel of
record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the
Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of
Appeals:

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence
and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set
up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from
later claiming the exemption.

Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year
period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property.

The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an
actual and simultaneous tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse from the
registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have
waived or abandoned their right of redemption. Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the
original owner of the property, we cannot apply the privilege of liberality to accommodate the Sps. Fortaleza due to their
negligence or omission to exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.

2. De Mesa v Acero (G.R. No. 185064, Jan. 16, 2012)

FACTS: Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purchased a parcel of land located in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a
loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and
house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored
because the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to
pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay
Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property.

The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito
Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and
Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC
also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the
complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity
of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject property is
a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon
for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case.

HELD: YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution. In general, the family home is exempt from
execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter.

RATIO: For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming
such privilege.

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as
follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be
constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in
order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically
deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married.
There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners
were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, Spouses
De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time
it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from
execution.

3. Eulogio v Bell (G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015)

FACTS: Respondent spouses Paterno and Rogelia Bell executed a contract of sale of their residential house and lot with
petitioner spouses Enrico and Natividad Eulogio.
However, they and their children filed a complaint for annulment of the contract of sale and quieting of title.
RTC granted the said complaint. However, the trial court ordered them to pay spouses Eulogio P1M plus interest. Both
appealed to CA, but decision was affirmed.
RTC issued a writ of execution, wherein the said property was levied on execution. Spouses Bell filed an MR to lift the
writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family home. However, RTC eventually denied the MR, since the
Spouses Eulogio invoked Article 160, and appointed a Board of Appraisers. Spouses Bell appealed before CA, which
granted the petition of Spouses Bell.
ISSUE: W/N the family home of the Spouses Bell may be sold on execution under Article 160, FC? NO, respondent’s
family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160.
RULING:
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts:
(1) there was an increase in its actual value;
(2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family
home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and
(3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its
beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain:
(a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and
(b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.
In case the improvements exceed the limit, only the amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under
Articles 155 and 160.
In the instant case, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family home, and that its
value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Please see Bullet Point No. 2 in the Notes re: Res
Judicata.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by petitioners. The sole
evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null,
and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage.
Notwithstanding petitioners’ right to enforce the trial court’s money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction
at the expense of respondents’ rights over their family home.
 
2. Paternity and Filiation (Articles 163-182)
 
1. Legitimate Children
2. Proof of Filiation
3. Illegitimate Children
4. Legitimated Children
 
2.1.1 Perla v Baring (G.R. No. 172471, Nov. 12, 2012)

Facts: A complaint for abandonment and support was filed by herein respondent Mirasol Baring together with her son, Randy Perla allegedly the
son of Antonio Perla. It is Randy’s birth certificate that was presented as evidence to support the claim which was later denied by petitioner that
such information has discrepancies and not signed by him. Such was neither signed by Antonio. 

Issue: Whether or not illegitimate filiation was established.

Held: No. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows:

Article 172.  The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 
(1)  The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or 
(2)  An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. 

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: 

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 
x x x x 
Article 175.  Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. 
xxxx

Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father.  However, said certificate has no probative value to
establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.    It is settled that “a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate.”   We also cannot lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda.   Aside from Antonio’s
denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present
Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained discrepancies in
Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation.  
Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand.

Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation.   That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio “Papa”
and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him
during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be considered as indications of Randy’s open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1).  “To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.  Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not
only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.”  Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot be considered
as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child.  To emphasize, “the father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist.”  Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy
as his son.  Neither can Antonio’s paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy.  To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have
been done due to charity or some other reasons. 

2.1.2 Rodolfo S. Aguilar v Edna G. Siasat (G.R. No. 200169, Jan 28, 2015)

FACTS: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on
August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein subject
properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and
Bacolod (the subject titles).
Petitioner filed a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. The complaint alleged
that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the subject
titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed
affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22,
1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,
which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two missing owner’s
duplicate copies of the subject titles.

To prove filiation, petitioner presented, among other documents, Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1
(Exhibit G) dated October 10, 1957, a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his
employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March
5, 1945, is his son and dependent. The RTC and CA essentially ruled against petitioner, and ruled that he failed to present
sufficient evidence that establish his filiation with the deceased spouses Aguilar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not taking into consideration petitioner’s Exhibit G (SSS Form E-1, was acknowledged
and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document
that satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the Family Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner
with his father, Alfredo Aguilar (YES)

RULING: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.

It was erroneous for the CA to treat Exhibit G as mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.

2.1.3 Virginia Ocampo v Deogracio Ocampo (G.R. No. 198908, Aug 3, 2015)

FACTS: Petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo
(Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court. The trial court rendered a Decision declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio
as null and void from the beginning under Article 36 (psychological incapacity) of the Family Code. (The status of their children,
however, shall remain legitimate and their custody is hereby awarded to the petitioner).

The trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a
hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said properties.

Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced evidence in
support of their respective stand. The trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court> Deogracio filed a Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of Appeal> the
trial court denied the aforesaid motion to deny and/or dismiss the notice of appeal for lack of merit. Deogracio filed a Motion for
Reconsideration > the trial court denied anew the motion the Court of Appeals denied Virginia's appeal

ISSUES: W/N respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of badfaith and
psychological perversity.

HELD/ RATIO: YES

Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage the presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.

(Art. 105 of FC explicitly mandates that the FC shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the FC without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.)
The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of
the Family Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code.

The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void.

(Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a Void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the... property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.)

They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts.

Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed
to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.

Likewise, we note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject properties during the subsistence
of their marriage. The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article
116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are
registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.

(The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of
one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the
name of one or both of the spouses.)

2.1.4 Jesse U. Lucas v Jesus S. Lucas (G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011)

FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to
Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. On one occasion,
Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen's workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the
two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner's father was not stated in petitioner's certificate of
live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. Respondent was not served with a copy of the
petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation.

Unaware of the issuance of the Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment.He manifested inter alia that:(1) he did
not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be
served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of summons and
making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the
confidentiality of the subject matter.

After learning of the Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondent averred that the petition was not in due
form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner's father. Moreover, jurisprudence
is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.

The RTC, acting on respondent's motion for reconsideration, issued an Order dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based
on the case of Herrera v. Alba, there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have
to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father
and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of
paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results.

The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him.
Respondent's special appearance could not be considered as voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person.

The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to
abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE: Is the petition to establish illegitimate filiation proper?

HELD: The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires
the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact
is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause
of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent,
however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioner's personal knowledge. Such
matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his
evidence.

Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-a -vis the motion for DNA testing since
no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the
latter has just set the said case for hearing.

At any rate, the CA's view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves
the Court's attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the
courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the
holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in
ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits.
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The
court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of
evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing. GRANTED. 
2.1.5 Grande v Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, Feb. 18, 2014)

FACTS: Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived together as husband and wife,
although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born. The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.
Respondent soon filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with Prayer to take
Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, and Correction/Change of Surname of Minors before the RTC. Petitioner on the
other hand, speculated that Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, may not be invoked by
a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not the father has a right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation. (NO)

RULING: Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code. It is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation
is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use
the surname of the father.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring.
Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not .
It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The
use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate
children.

2.1.6 Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524, [December 29, 1998], 360 PHIL 932-947

FACTS: On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Son of the petitioner) and Isabel Cojuangco (CojuangcoSuntay) were
married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao and out of this marriage, four children were born namely Margarita Guadalupe,
Isabel Aguinaldo, and Emilio Aguinaldo.

However, after four years of marriage, their relationship soured when Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case of parricide
against Emilio. Emilio was acquitted but in response, he filed a complaint for legal separation which was granted by the Court
of First Instance (CFI). The CFI held that the fact that Emilio was sufferring from the mental illness of schizophrenia rendered
him psychological incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of marriage thus, the CFI rendered the marriage null and
void.

Emilio died before his mother and when Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died, Cojuangco-Suntay filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate.
Federico Suntay (Petitioner), husband of Cristina, opposed the motion and argued that Cojuangco-Suntay’s children with
Emilio were illegitimate as a result of their marriage being declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the children of Cojuangco-Suntay and Emilio are illegitimate (NO)

RULING: The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to
the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special
contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from
being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called
natural children by legal fiction.

Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that the
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is null and void and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from
its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage is illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80,
81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a
marriage may be annulled.

3. Adoption
 
3.1 Domestic Adoption Act (R.A. 8552)
 
3.1.1 In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, [March 31,
2005], 494 PHIL 515-528)

FACTS: Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is the biological child of Honorato B. Catindig and Gemma Astorga Garcia out of wed-
lock. Due to the demise of Gemma, Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child and prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig,"
his surname. The trial court granted the petition and pronounced Stephanie as the child of Honorato and shall be known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Later, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. The trial court, however, denied the same
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father. (YES)

RULING: As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 11 of
the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use
The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides
that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname (Garcia) as her middle name
will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother
and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother's surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence,
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

3.1.2 In re Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, [May 21, 2009], 606 PHIL 82-94

Facts: Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo registered the
children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000,
Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen. 

Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years
old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband, Michael and Olario gave their
consent to the adoption.

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since Monina had
remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.

Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is
not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in  this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is
not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

Issues: 

1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

2. Whether the adoption should be granted considering that the alien spouse consented to the adoption

3. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the
age of majority.

Held:

1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not present in the case at bar. (Section 7, Article III of RA 8552)

The use of the word “shall” means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Since
the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

2. No. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been
living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is
allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during
the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to
Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

3. Petitioner’s contention is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not
affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age —
emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible
for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents;
and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.

3.1.3 In re Bulayo, G.R. No. 205752, [October 1, 2019]

FACTS: Spouses Mary Jane Kimura, a Filipino National, and Yuichiro Kimura, a Japanese National, got married. Prior to such
marriage, Mary Jane gave birth to her son Jan Aurel. However, she was not married to her son’s biological father, Jun Baldoza,
making Jan Aurel her illegitimate child. Her last communication with her son’s father was when she was 4 months pregnant.
Petitioners herein, filed a joint petition for adoption of Jan Aurel seeking to have him declared as their legitimate son, enjoying the
rights and observing the duties of an adopted child as provided by law. Petitioners presented the Department of Social Welfare and
Development Minor’s case study and home study report, which recommended approval for the petition.

Petitioners presented the following documents to support their petition: (1) marriage contract of petitioners; (2) permanent
registration in Japan of Petitioner Yuichiro; (3) medical certificates; (4) neuro-psychological reports for the petitioners; (5)
certificates of attendance in adoption orientation conducted by DSWS; (6) NBI Clearance; (7) police clearance; (8) Prosecutor’s
clearance; (9) court clearances; (10) ITR of yuichiro; and (11) Certificate of employment of Yuichiro.

RTC denied the petition for adoption because Yuichiro, being a Japanese citizen, did not comply with the requirements laid down
under Sec. 7 of RA 8552 and Sec. 7 of Admin Matter No. 02-6-02-SC. RTC observed that Yuichiro was not exempt from the residency
and certification requirements under RA 8552, because Jan Aurel is a illegitimate child of co-petitioner Mary Jane Kimura.

ISSUE: Whether an Illegitimate child is within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity in contemplation of Sec. 7(b)(iii) of RA
8552 or Domestic Adoption Law

RULING: YES. The abovementioned provision of RA 8552 should extend and apply even to illegitimate children.

Petitioners are exempt from the requirements of residency and certification since Jan Aurel was a relative by consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree of Mary Jane.

A relative is either a “kinsman” or “ a person connected with another by blood or affinity”.

An illegitimate child is a relative within the first civil degree of consanguinity of his biological mother. Illegitimate child belongs to
the direct maternal lineage, which is never uncertain, and which is not as remote as the nephew and niece.

The legislative intent, in the Domestic Adoption Law, is to ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her
parents and be provided with love, care, understanding, and security towards the full and harmonious development of personality.
Domestic Adoption law intended to include Jan Aurel, the biological child of Mary Jane, in the term “relatives” under the provisions
of the law because he was a relative within the first civil degree. Finding otherwise would engender a situation where the alien
adopter would be able to undergo a speedy and less expensive adoption process by being able to adopt his Filipino spouse’s
nephew or niece instead of the Filipino spouse’s own child.

Also, if the legislators intended that only legitimate children were contemplated under the provisions of the law, then Congress
should have expressly provided for such provision. Congress did so in the provisions by including the term “legitimate” to describe
the children contemplated by that clause. The provision covers both legitimate and illegitimate relatives as long as they were within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
3.1.4 Bartolome v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 192531, [November 12, 2014])

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as beneficiary

FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under
the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the
vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the
latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary
beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the
parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological
parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that
there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if
the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy,  insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on
rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological
parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies
the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee,
who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of
their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the
right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in
the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise
during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.

3.2 Inter-Country Adoption Law (R.A. 8043)

 
1. Domestic Adoption vs. Inter-Country Adoption
 
a. Spouses Park v. Liwanag, G.R. No. 248035 (Resolution), [November 27, 2019]

FACTS: Petitioners Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee (petitioners) are American citizens residing in the Philippines,
particularly in Makati City. They are the petitioners in the Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor "Mayca Alegado"
a.k.a. "Innah A1egado" (Innah) before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioners have been residing in the Philippines since 2007 (in the
case of petitioner Park) and since 2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee). They have been gainfully employed in the Philippines for
almost the same length of time that they have been residing in the country. respondent Judge found that since petitioners are both
foreigners, then the Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor Innah presented a proper case of inter-country
adoption, instead of considering said petition as being appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Thus, pursuant
to Section 32 of the Rule on Adoption and Section 30 of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations on InterCountry
Adoption, the trial court directed the transmittal of a copy of the petition and its annexes to the Inter-Country Adoption Board
(ICAB) for appropriate action. CA denied their petition for certiorari. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
referring the Petition for Adoption to the ICAB since the Petition was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998

RULING: Yes.
We note that petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing and have been gainfully employed in the Philippines
since the year 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park) and since 2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee), and are thus living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption
Act.

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under the Domestic
Adoption Act in order for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to take cognizance thereof.

Furthermore, we also take cognizance of the agreement entered into between the Supreme Court and the ICAB regarding the
treatment of foreigners who reside in the Philippines and who file a petition for adoption through the courts. Thus, said agreement
which is incorporated in the DSWD' s Memorandum dated June 1, 2018, Re: Domestic Adoption by Foreigners Habitually Residing in
the Philippines, reads:

This is to share with you the agreements between the Supreme Court and the Inter-country Adoption Board (ICAB), relative to
cases of foreign adoptive families who are habitually or permanently residing in the Philippines.

The Supreme Court en banc in OCA Circular 213-2017 states that foreigners who have filed an application for adoption with the
assistance and approval of the DSWD MUST attach the following to their petition to the courts: A Certification Declaring a Child as
Legally Available for Adoption (CDCLAA); Home Study Report to be prepared by an ICAB accredited Foreign Adoption Agency, if not
possible/available, a Certification regarding the same should be executed by the Central Authority or Embassy of the receiving
country.
A Certification regarding the alien's legal capacity to adopt and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted child. If not possible, a Certification should be executed by the Central Authority or Embassy of the
receiving country.

This implies that these foreigners should still secure a certification from their Foreign Adoption Agencies and/or Embassies that
since they are not residents in their countries and habitually residing in the Philippines, the said agencies could not issue the
documents required by the domestic courts in support to their Petitions filed for domestic adoption. If ever their cases will be
endorsed to ICAB by the courts, ICAB will file a manifestation on this matter so that the domestic adoption could be pursued.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even if the instant adoption proceeding would be referred to the ICAB, as what the RTC did, there is still a high probability
that the ICAB will file a manifestation so that the domestic adoption before the trial court could be pursued, considering the
circumstances of the case. Consequently, the referral to the ICAB would only cause a delay in the adoption proceedings, a matter
that would be clearly prejudicial to the interest of the adoptee and the petitioners.

We hold that since the case properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the child that the instant
case be speedily disposed by continuing the proceedings in the trial court for the determination of whether petitioners are indeed
qualified to adopt the child, instead of inappropriately referring the instant domestic adoption case to the ICAB where the
proceedings may have to start anew and might be referred back to the trial court for the continuation of the domestic adoption
proceedings. Settled is the rule that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of the child is of paramount interest. The Supreme Court's
pronouncement in In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is instructive:

Liberal Construction of Adoption. Statutes In Favor Of Adoption— It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted
child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the
law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
authorized by some way of interpreting the law." (Citations omitted)

Accordingly, We find that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 which
the appropriate Family Court or RTC can properly take cognizance of.
 
3.3 Rescission of Adoption
 
a. Lahom v. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, [July 14, 2003], 453 PHIL 987-999)

FACTS: A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted
the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and
that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law
the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to
file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972.
When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the
Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.
RULING: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was
months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By
then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had
come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of
that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not
naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the
state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
4.  Support (Articles 194-208 NCC)

1. Lim Lua vs. Lua (G.R. No. 175279, June 5, 2013)

FACTS: On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC.

In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of Php500,000 as
monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here
and abroad. After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the time
plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also granted support
pendente lite of P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7months that lapsed). Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for
herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and
well- being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as
monthly support pendente lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and
beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent. The Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. His second motion also having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.

CA nullified RTC’s ruling and changed the amount to P115,000.00. The appellate court said that the trial court should not
have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two
cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books,
which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well, and thus ordered
the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two children. It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to
support their children. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in arrears
owing to petitioner and her children.

RULING: The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to
give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation,
in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable
marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendent lite prior to the
rendition of the judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the
merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and
amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record establish the facts.

In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was determined after due
hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced
on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite of Php115,000.000 ordered by the CA was intended primarily
for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other
household expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and medicine.

As to financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence, education,
transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his.

The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent. Since the amount of
the monthly support pendent lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its
sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
The amounts already extended to the two children; being a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
 
2. Calderon, Ma. Carminia v Roxas, Jose Antonio & CA (G.R. No.185595, Jan. 9, 2013)

FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on December
4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s application for support pendente lite. Respondent filed a
Motion to Reduce Support. The trial court rendered its Decision declaring null and void the marriage, awarding the
custody of the parties’ minor children to their mother, ordering the respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide support to
the children, and dissolving the community property or conjugal partnership property of the parties. Petitioner
through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal from the Orders.

ISSUE: Was it a proper petition to assail the order of support pendent lite?

RULING: The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests,
were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are
therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of
petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal
assets. The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which may be availed of at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order. On March
4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional
orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal
separation. These include orders for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure,
protection and administration of common property. Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the
interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support which was
granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which was denied. Provisional remedies are writs and processes
available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights
and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are
provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are
ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The subject orders on
the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

3. Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, [March 18, 2004], 469 PHIL 852-868)

FACTS: The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by
Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition
that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not
then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he
frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties; said agreement was
approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long
been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation
rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and
pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua and
respondent Jose Lam null and void for being bigamous by nature. The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Office
of the Civil Registrar General are hereby ordered to cancel the marriage between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam celebrated
on January 13, 1984 by Hon. Guillermo L. Loja of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.
Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount
of P20,000.00.
On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof but only insofar as the decision awarded monthly
support to his son in the amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there was already a provision for support of the child as
embodied in the decision dated February 28, 1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute
P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child, to wit:
Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to their son. In the best interest of the
child, the Second Party shall retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be exercised through
mutual arrangements.
It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Party and the Second Party shall initially
contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively for the
benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed and administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic
accounting, until the son reaches majority age.
Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund had even amounted to P500,000.00.
ISSUE: Is the compromise agreement a bar to order support for the child?
RULING: In Advincula v. Advincula, 12 we held that another action for support could be filed again by the same
plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. We
further held in said case that: Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver.
It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana, as approved by the
Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The provision for a common
fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had
been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always
subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support. 
5.  Parental Authority

1. Uy. Vs. Spouses Lacsamana (G.R. No. 206220, Aug. 19, 2015)

FACTS: Petitioner Luis Uy filed with RTC Batangas a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages
against respondents Petra Rosca, and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza. Uy alleged that he was the lawful
husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until
1973 when they separated (because of Uy’s alleged affair). Uy and Rosca had eight children. Subject of this case is a piece
of residential land evidenced by a Deed of Sale from the Spouses Manuel. The property, together with the house Rosca
built was then subsequently sold to Spouses Lacsamana. Uy alleges, among others, that the property that is part of the sale
of Rosca to Sps. Lacsamana was void for failure to obtain his marital consent, the property being conjugal in nature. Uy
then filed a complaint praying that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca in favor of Sps. Lacsamana be declared null and
void with respect to his rights, interest, ownership and damages. Rosca however contends that since the property in
question was registered in Rosca's name, such circumstance indicated that the property belonged to Rosca, as her
paraphernal property from her paraphernal funds and that she was never married to Uy. Upon Uy’s death his two
daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez and Shirley Uy Macaraig substituted him in the case. Years later, Rosca also died. Earlier,
respondent Jose Lacsamana died on 20 March 1991. Meanwhile, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena
through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent
in this case.

RTC held that there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca and the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the house
and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana was valid; it was then affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana,
is valid.

RULING: Yes, the sale is valid. The main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome
by other evidence. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant
Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally
married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married.
He, however, dismally failed to do so. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their
property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were
not incapacitated from getting married.

The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the
contrary. The court agree with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is
not co-owned but is paraphernal.

2. Go Bangayan vs. Bangayan (G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013)

FACTS: In September 1973, Benjamin married Azucena. In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally. In
December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s
marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy
and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a nonexistent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court
on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin to Sally was valid and existing. (NO)

RULING: The Court sees no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at
the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and
that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.

In relation to the above ruling, the marriage of petitioner and respondent was not bigamous. For bigamy to exist, the second
or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this
case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In
short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community
of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his
or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally
which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial
court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective
spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin 27 with the descriptive title "married
to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 28 with the descriptive title
"married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

3. Becket vs. Sarmiento (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan 30, 2013)

FACTS: This case arose from a complaint filed by Geoffrey Beckett charging Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr. of RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 24, with gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty allegedly committed in relation to
Sp. Proc. No. 18182-CEB, entitled Geoffrey Beckett v. Eltesa Densing Beckett, while pending before that court. Beckett, an
Australian national, was previously married to Eltesa, a Filipina. Out of the marriage was born on June 29, 2001, Geoffrey Beckett,
Jr. (Geoffrey, Jr.). Beckett alleged that their union was, from the start, far from ideal. In fact, according to him, they eventually
separated and, worse still, they sued each other. In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation of RA 7610, followed by a
suit for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Both cases ended in the sala of respondent Judge. For his part, Beckett
commenced criminal charges against Eltesa, one of which was for adultery. Respondent judge rendered judgment based on a
compromise agreement in which Eltesa and Beckett agreed and undertook, among others, to cause the dismissal of all pending civil
and criminal cases each may have filed against the other. They categorically agreed too that Beckett shall have full and permanent
custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old, subject to the visitorial rights of Eltesa.

Thereafter, Beckett left for Australia, taking Geoffrey, Jr. with him. As with his three other children from previous relationships, so
Beckett alleged, he cared and provided well for Geoffrey, Jr. Moreover, as agreed upon, they would come and see Eltesa in Cebu
every Christmas. In 2007, Beckett obtained a divorce from Eltesa in Australia. This notwithstanding, the yearly Christmas visits
continued. In the 2010 visit, Beckett consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return
the child on January 9, 2011. January 9 came and went but Geoffrey, Jr. remained with Eltesa, prompting Beckett to file a petition
against Eltesa for violation of RA 7610. The petition was again raffled to the sala of Judge Sarmiento. And because Geoffrey
remained in the meantime in the custody of Eltesa, Beckett later applied in Sp. Proc. No. 18182-CEB for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. Beckett further relates that, during the March 1, 2011 conference on the application for habeas corpus, Geoffrey,
Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying, not wanting to let go of Eltesa
and acting as though, he, the father, was a total stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, dated
March 1, 2011, directing inter alia the following: (1) Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett; and (2) Beckett to bring the child in the
pre-trial conference. Beckett sought the immediate implementation of the said March 1, 2011 Order. But instead of enforcing said
order and/or waiting for Becketts comment, Judge Sarmiento, in open court, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody
over Geoffrey, Jr. and at the same time directing the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a social
case study on the child. Several hearings on the case were postponed because of the belated submission by the DSWD of the case
study report requested by respondent judge.

It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Beckett has instituted the instant complaint, arguing that respondent judge is liable
for (1) gross ignorance of the law for granting Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey Jr.; and (2) partiality by committing acts of
serious misconduct and irregularities in the performance of official duties, such as but not limited to allowing one Helen Sy, a close
friend of Eltesa, to enter his chambers before the March 15, 2011 hearing, his habit of conversing with Eltesa in the local dialect and
for adjourning a hearing while he was conferring with his counsel in private. Beckett predicates his charge of dereliction and neglect
of duty on respondents alleged failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration of the March 15, 2011 order giving provisional
custody of his child to his mother.

The OCA regards the complaint meritorious insofar as the charges for gross ignorance of the law is concerned given that
respondent judge issued his March 15, 2011 Order granting provisional custody in favor of Eltesa despite the existence of the
judicial compromise. The OCA, thus, recommended that respondent judge be adjudged liable for gross ignorance of the law and
fined with stern warning.

ISSUE: W/N not respondent Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: No, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant against him for the reason that absent
a finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise, the preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall
be respected. Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard
the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued
amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to
jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of custody, to
borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals," is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted." And as
aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and
unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the
agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody
of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.

Now to another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under
seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if
already over 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected, unless
the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals, We held that in custody cases, the foremost
consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected in no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child which provides that "in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration."

Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not, to reiterate, permanent. In Espiritu,
We ruled that:

x x x The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character
change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted x x x. To be sure, the welfare, the best
interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian.
xxx

4. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870, [March 29, 1996], 325 PHIL 1014-1027

Facts: Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse.  After six miscarriages, two
operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in
the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant.  Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not
employed.

On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.  After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S.  She alleged
that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets.   However, her husband stayed behind to
take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby.   According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in
the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working.  She was supposed to come back
immediately after winding up her affairs there.

When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms.   They had quarrels.
Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray
wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession.   He maintained that it would not be difficult
to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.

Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her.

The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.

Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the boy’s father
would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.
Issue: Who should have rightful custody of a child?

Held: Nerissa. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99,
Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:

“SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately
and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought
before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may
be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to
choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the
child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x.  No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.” (Italics supplied)

The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.  The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its  reason in the basic need of a
child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child
to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have
been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment
and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable
disease.

It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. In
fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: “In all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample
means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son.   Quite a number of
working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management
principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from
being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by
housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother. 

Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis
and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his child.