92.Vda de Yohanon vs WCC, 78 SCRA 348, G.R. No. L-43641.

August 26, 1977

-The burden of proof lies on the party who invokes intoxication to defeat the right to compensation. It is not
enough to prove that the employee drank intoxicating liquor, it must be further shown that the employee was
extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of
hard liquor and still remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. Intoxication which does not
incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of
compensation.
-petition for review which affirmed decision dismissing claim of petitioner because failed to prove death arose
out of employment. Deceased is a conductor of bus. While he was loading cargo on top of bus, he fell and skull
suffered fracture and died. Claim denied because attended with notorious negligence and drunkenness. SC held
that even is it was shown he had alcohol, employer had burden proof that employee is not entitled to
compensation because he was extremely drunk. He who raises drunkenness has burden of proof.

FACTS: Petitioner Encarnacion Vda. de Yohanon is the surviving spouse of the deceased Mayorico Yohanon
who, during his lifetime, was employed as conductor in Bus No. 7 of the Pioneer Bus Lines operated by private
respondent Jose Baleña. On October 31, 1974, the widow of the deceased, petitioner herein, filed a death
compensation claim alleging that the deceased, while arranging the cargoes on top of the passenger bus as its
conductor, fell to the cemented pavement, suffered a fractured skull, and as a consequence, died.

ISSUE: WON husband’s death arose out of his employment. (YES)

RULING: The admission of private respondent’s witnesses that there were already passengers in the bus and
cargoes loaded on the top of the bus (p. 3, rec.), gave credence to petitioner’s contention that the deceased
was on top of the bus receiving, loading, and arranging the cargoes when he fell from the bus to the concrete
pavement. The deceased was therefore in the actual performance of his duty as a bus conductor when he
suffered from a fractured skull resulting in his death.

Moreover, apart from the testimony of one Pedro Jundarino that he and the deceased had a drinking spree and
that they both proceeded to the bug drunk, no other evidence was adduced by private respondent to show that
the deceased was extremely or very drunk at the time of the incident, and that being drunk, was then
absolutely incapable of maintaining his balance and equanimity so that he was exposed to the danger of falling
from atop the bus. Even if it could be shown that a person drank intoxicating liquor, still it is incumbent upon
the person invoking drunkenness as a defense to show that the said person was extremely drunk. This is so
because a person may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still remain
sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. "Thus, intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee from
following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation, although the intoxication may
be a contributory cause of his injury. It must be shown that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the
death or injury and the burden of proof lies on him who raises drunkenness as a defense" 

PRIVATE RESPONDENT JOSE BALEÑA IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY.

93. Amedo vs. Rio y Oblaberrieta, G.R. L-6870, May 24, 1954
-Notorious negligence signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. It is more
than simple negligence or contributory negligence. It is more than carelessness or lack of foresight. It is failure
to observe any or slight care or gross negligence. In this case, a seaman who jumped into the sea to retrieve a
two-peso bill, as a result of which he was drowned, was held to be notoriously negligent.
-Seaman jumped off the ship to retrieve P2 bill. He drowned. He was notoriously negligent-not compensable
because of his own doing.

Facts:
On May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30 o’clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of
his employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant’s M/S “Pilar II”, which was
anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by
the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned.

Plaintiff’s claim is admittedly predicated upon Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.
Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or the
result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.

Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent
of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the
laborer who had the accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same.

Pursuant to these provisions — in so far as pertinent to the case at bar — three conditions are essential to hold an
employer liable to compensate his employee for a personal injury sustained by him from an accident, namely: (1)
the accident must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in the course of the employment; and (3) it
must not be caused by the “notorious negligence” of the employee.

Issue:
Whether or not, Filomeno Managuit acted with notorious negligence and will bar his estate’s claim for damages.

Ruling:
Irrespective of whether or not the accident in question arose out of, or took place in the course of the
employment, was it caused by his “notorious negligence”? The phrase “notorious negligence” has been held to be
tantamount to “gross negligence”, which, in turn, has been defined as follows:

Gross negligence is define to be the want of even slight care and diligence.

It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang,
Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise “even slight care and diligence,” that he displayed a “reckless disregard of
the safety” of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences” of his
carelessness and that he was “indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury.

94. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. WCC, G.R. No. L-37896, July 22, 1981
-Disobedience to rules, orders, and/or prohibition does not per se constitute notorious negligence, if no
intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life.
-employee talking with another officer on board a cargo vessel while waiting on the cargo. They wanted to
drink because it was a cold night. Officer gave him pocket size rum. But it was not alcohol, it was oil of winter
green (efficasent oil). He died due to poisoning. His claim was denied because death was not in the course of
employment. He was notoriously negligent. 3 requirements to be compensable- his death is compensable

FACTS: The deceased, Pantaleon Hayson, was employed by the respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation as a Gang Boss or capataz. On
February 16, 1970 at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, the deceased was on duty on board the M/V President Aguinaldo. While he and his other
co-workers were waiting for the cargoes, the 3rd Officer of the M/V President Aguinaldo approached them. Since there was a party on board the
boat at that time and since it was a cold night, the deceased asked for something to drink from the 3rd Officer. So, the 3rd Officer later gave them a
half-filled bottle of pocket-size Tanduay Rhum. The group then took turns in drinking from the said bottle with the deceased taking the first drink.
They later found out that the contents of the said bottle was not liquor but oil of wintergreen. At around 4:40 AM the next day, Pantaleon died due
to poisoning.

The Referee ruled that the death of Pantaleon Hayson arose out of and in the course of his employment as capataz and ordered Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation to pay compensation and burial expenses.

Herein petitioner filed a motion a motion for reconsideration of the Referee’s decision raising as sole ground the allegation that Pantaleon Hayson
was notoriously negligent, hence, his death is not Compensable under Section 4 of Act 3428, as amended. 
ISSUE: Whether the claim for compensation benefit on account of Pantaleon Hayson’s demise due to accidental poisoning when he mistook oil of
wintergreen for Tanduay Rhum falls within the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

RULING: Pantaleon was not notoriously negligent.

In the case at bar, it was established that the deceased was not a heavy drinker and at the time they asked something to drink from the 3 rd Officer of
the boat, the deceased or his companions were not shown to have drunk any liquor or anything that could have affected the mental state of the
deceased at the time he asked a drink from the said Officer. Nor was it shown that previous to the incident, the deceased was so despondent that
there was an intention on his part to end his life. All that they did in asking for a drink from the Officer is what ordinary persons would do under the
circumstances.

In the nature of their job, occasional drinking is quite ordinary and does not in any way violate standard rules and regulations, unless of course the
same is done to the extent of causing drunkenness. Being not a drinker as he was, the deceased could not be expected to know the different tastes of
wines. That what he drank contained oil of wintergreen made no difference to him because as stated, he was not a drinker and could not have
distinguished the taste of the kind of wine, so much so, that when his companions tasted the wine later, and told him that it contained oil of
wintergreen, he even bragged that it was stateside, an act which projected his innocence. And even if he drank after he was told that the bottle
contained oil of wintergreen, still the same could not constitute notorious negligence on his part, because there was no showing that he admitted
knowledge that the contents of the bottle was oil of wintergreen, nor was there a warning made by his companions that drinking the same could be
fatal to him.

To constitute notorious negligence, it must be shown that the act of the deceased entirely wants in care as to raise a presumption that he was
conscious of the probable consequences of his carelessness and indifferent to the danger of injury to himself and other persons. It must be
equivalent to the doing of an intentional wrong.

In the case of Paez v. WCC, the court defined notorious negligence as something more than mere or simple negligence, or contributory negligence;
it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety.

Acts reasonably necessary to health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands,
or protecting himself from excessive cold, are incidental to the employment and injuries sustained in the performance of such acts are compensable
as arising out of and in the course of the employment.

95.Paez vs. WCC, G.R. L-18438, March 30, 1963

FACTS: Paez and his wife were engaged in the business of buying palay for the King Tong Seng Ricemill of Victoria, Tarlac,
with the latter supplying the capital of P1,000.00 to P2,000.00. Paez had been buying palay in Isabela, thus, he employed two
truck drivers and two truck helpers. In bringing the palay purchased by his agents to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac, the same had to be
ferried in bancas across the Magat River in Aurora, Isabela, towards the other bank, which is Cabatuan; from Cabatuan side to
Guimba, the palay were hauled by truck which was regularly driven by Valentin Lagman.

On August 1, 1953, Lagman engaged the services of Marciano Barawid to substitute him in undertaking the trip to Isabela, with
the understanding that he (Barawid), was to receive his (Lagman's) pay during the latter's absence. Instead of awaiting the
palay on the Cabatuan side, Barawid crossed the Magat River and joined Apolonio on the Aurora side in hauling the palay. After
having collected all the palay on the Aurora side, Apolonio and Barawid reached the river's bank at about 9:00 o'clock in the
evening, and both helped in loading three (3) bancas. Apolonio advised Barawid not to ride the third banca because same was
already fully loaded, but to take another to Guimba. While in the midst of the Magat River, the banca capsized and sunk, and
Barawid was drowned.

The respondent Court found that petitioner was in a sense engaged in the transportation of goods (palay), by charging freight
from other persons who loaded their palay in his trucks, thereby definitely classifying the business of the petitioner as
hazardous. Petitioner contends that the respondent WCC erred in finding that the death of Barawid arose out of and in the
course of employment.

ISSUE: whether the deceased was guilty of notorious negligence. (NO)

RULING: Petitioner's answer to the complaint for compensation, does not allege notorious negligence in his defense. That
defense should be proven by the party invoking it. Notorious negligence is something more than mere or simple negligence, or
contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety.

In the case at bar, there is no showing at all that deceased Barawid had deliberately disregarded his safety; no intention was
attributed to him to end his life or that he wantonly courted death. The deceased wanted to return home as it was getting late,
and even helped in the loading and unloading of the palay to the banca and truck, to finish the work that day. It is claimed that
the deceased wanted to return home, because he was to drive the new truck of his brother-in-law, and he was in such a hurry
that he unheeded the suggestion of his companion not to embark any more, as it was dark and the banca was fully loaded.

Still, the disregard of the warning cannot be considered as a notorious negligence. Disobedience to rules, orders and/or
prohibition, does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life. And if
in the case at bar, there was any negligence at all, the same cannot be considered notorious or evident. The deceased did not
act with the full knowledge of the existence of a danger that ordinary prudence would counsel him to avoid such a case. That a
banca loaded with palay and 3 persons, at night time, would sink if one person more was added to its weight, constituted merely
a miscalculation on the part of such person, if he thought it would be safe for him to embark, the alleged overloading
notwithstanding Barawid's promptness in accomplishing his duties, to enable him to attend his personal interest thereafter,
cannot be a valid reason to deny him the right to be compensated. The petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

96.Gueverra vs. Germancia Cacho Hermanos, G.R. No. 39493, July 22, 1933
-An employee who inadvertently placed his left hand on a paper cutting machine which he thought at the time
was not working and as a result of which, four of his fingers were cut, is not guilty of notorious negligence
because the employee acted in a manner in which anyone might have acted under similar conditions.
-not guilty of notorious negligence. He acted in a casual manner.

97. Mabuhay Shipping Services vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 94167, Jan. 21, 1991
-In this case, the seaman who, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck and committed unlawful aggression against
another, so that in his own defense, the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the
circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his life directly
attributable to him, and therefore, not compensable.

98. Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino, G.R. No. L-43674

-The employee or his heirs cannot avail of compensation benefits and at the same time sue for damages. The
employee or his heirs must choose on whether to avail of the limited compensation under the Employees’
Compensation Law or sue for higher damages under the Civil Code. But once the choice has been made, the
employee or his heirs can no longer opt for the other remedy.

Right to Self-Organization

99. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, G.R. No. L-25246, Sept., 12, 1974
-Right of employees to self-organization carries with it the right: (1) to abstain from joining a union.
-Iglesia ni Cristo not allowed to join unions but company has closed shop. Victoriano resigned as member of
union so company wanted him to resign. Employer is only complying with his commitment with CBA. Amended
in RA 3350- while employee is not precluded in making closed shop agreement, but it will not cover religious
sect prohibiting them from doing do. SC held that RA 3350 is constitutional. The equal protection of the clause
allows classification- substantial distinction. Victoriano is not dismissed.

Facts: Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory. As such, he was a member of herein
respondent Elizalde Rope Workers Union, pursuant to a closed shop provision in the collective bargaining
agreement that membership in the union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees.

The law does not preclude such agreements, but an exception came about upon enactment of RA 3350 which
provides: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization”.

Being a member of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, Victoriano is prohibited from affiliating with any labor
organization. He hence resigned from the union. The union in turn asked the company to dismiss Victoriano
from service. The union assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350, contending that it infringes on the
fundamental right to form lawful association guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional for infringing the right to association
Held: No. RA 3350 merely excludes application and coverage of the agreement to employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. They, hence, cannot be
compelled to join labor unions despite such agreements.

They may not be refused employment or dismissed on the sole account of not being members of the union.
These religious sects members are not in fact prohibited but are actually given the liberty to affiliate or not, with
labor unions. The law does not coerce them. Neither may the employer or the union.

It may not be amiss to point out that free exercise of religion is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must yield to the former.

100. CENECO vs. Sec. of Labor, G.R. No. 94045, Sept. 13, 1991
-Ceneco entered into union with Ceneco Union. Ceneco denied request to form CBA because other members
are members of Electric Cooperative. Owner can’t bargain with own self (co-owner). WON member who
withdrew can join labor union- Labor Arbiter ordered election of employees to join union or no union. Right to
join includes the right not to join the same. SC held to have certification election to determine choice of
employees.

Facts:
CENECO entered into a collective bargaining agreement with CURE, a labor union representing its rank-and-file employees, providing for a term of three
years. CURE proposed that negotiations be conducted for a new collective bargaining agreement. This was denied by CENECO on the ground that, under
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union.

Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE members approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that ‘tall union members
shall withdraw, retract, or recall the union members’ membership from CENECO in order to avail of the full benefits under the existing CBA, and the supposed
benefits that the union may avail of under the renewed CBA. However, CENECO denied the withdrawal from membership. This prompted CURE to file a
petition for direct recognition or for certification election which was supported by 72% of the 388 rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit of CENECO.

The med-arbiter granted the petition for certification election and directed the holding of a certification election between CURE and No Union.

Issue:
WON the employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for
a CBA proposed by the latter.

Held: YES

Article I, Section 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of CENECO provides that "any member may withdraw from membership upon compliance
with such uniform terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe." The same section provides... “that upon withdrawal, the member is merely required to
surrender his membership certificate and he is to be refunded his membership fee less any obligation that he has with the cooperative.”

Hence, there is no just cause for petitioner's denial of the withdrawal from membership of its employees who are also members of the union. In addition,
membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis.  Withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily.  The right to join an organization necessarily
includes the equivalent right to not to join the same.

The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE,
the resignation of the member-employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed
policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees’ right to form and
join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.

Dispositive: The med-arbiter is ordered to conduct a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of CENECO with CURE and No Union as the
choices therein.

101. Batangas I Electric Cooperative Union vs Romeo A. Young, 167 scra 136, GR L-62386.
November 9, 1988
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
2. On June 1, 1981, the Batangas-I Electric Cooperative Union (hereinafter referred to as UNION) filed with the Regional Office No.
IV-A, Ministry of Labor and Employment (now Department of Labor and Employment), at San Pablo City, a petition for certification
election.
3. The UNION alleged, inter alia, that it is a legitimate labor organization; that the Batangas-I Electric Cooperative Inc. BATELEC has
150 employees, more or less; that the UNION desires to represent the regular rank and file employees of BATELEC for purposes of
collective bargaining; that there is no other union existing in BATELEC except the UNION; that there is no certified collective
bargaining agreement in the said cooperative; and that there has been no certification election conducted in BATELEC during the last
twelve (12) months preceding the filing of the petition.
4. On August 20, 1981, Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap issued a resolution (pp. 21-23, Rollo) which gave due course to the petition and
ordered the holding of a certification election. On August 31, 1981, BATELEC filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 24-30, Rollo) of
the Med-Arbiter's resolution contending, inter alia, that there was a legal impediment to the holding of a certification election
considering that the formation of a union in a cooperative is illegal and invalid, the officers and members of the union being the
owners thereof. This motion was treated as an appeal from the Med-Arbiter's resolution of August 20, 1981
5. On November 27, 1981, a resolution (pp. 38-40, Rollo) was issued by Romeo A. Young, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor
Relations, granting the appeal and revoking the Med-Arbiter's order mandating the holding of a certification election.

ISSUE: whether or not employees of an electric cooperative who are at the same time members of the cooperative, may be allowed
to form or join a labor union in the electric cooperative for purposes of collective bargaining.

RULING: No. A cursory analysis of Section 35, Presidential Decree 269, as amended, readily shows that employees of an electric
cooperative who are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join a labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining.

In the first instance, a cooperative is established primarily for the mutual aid and protection of the members thereof. It was never
intended to operate like an ordinary company or corporation. A cooperative is a non-profit organization, so that if ever there are
gains, income or benefits derived therefrom, the same are equally divided among its members. For all legal intents and purposes,
therefore, members of a cooperative are part-owners thereof.

In the instant case, petitioner strongly contended that they are not co-owners of the cooperative because the only benefits that they
derive therefrom are in the form of electrical services and that they never exercise the attributes of ownership recognized under
Article 428 of the New Civil Code. We do not concur. The fact that these employees/members enjoy free electrical services which are
not available to non-members is a clear indication that these employees are co-owners of the cooperative. Petitioner must be
reminded that benefits from cooperative accruing to co-owners may not come only in the form of monetary benefits but also in the
form of services.

DISPOSITIVE: BATANGAS-I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC won. The petition is DISMISSED and the challenged decision dated
November 27, 1981 of respondent Romeo A. Young, OIC of the Bureau of Labor Relations is AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE: “employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join unions for
purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.”

102. Airtime Specialists vs. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 80612-16, Dec. 29, 1989
-Right of employees to self-organization carries with it the right: (2) to choose which union he would join.
-Respondent union filed with DOLE for certification election because wants to be certified by employer as
bargaining agent. More than majority disaffiliated with respondent union and joined another. SC held that it is
imperative to conduct certification election because the best forum to determine choice of employees and there
is pressure to withdraw is in certification election itself.

FACTS: Respondent SAMA-ASIA filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment two separate petitions for
direct certification and/or certification election on behalf of the regular rank-and-file employees of the
petitioners Airtime Specialists and Absolute Sound, Inc. The other respondent PMA also filed with the same
office, on the same day, similar separate petitions in behalf of the regular rank and file employees of
petitioners Country-Wealth Development, Ad Planner and Marketing Counsellors and Atlas Resources.

Petitioners filed their position paper with motion to dismiss on the following grounds — disaffiliation of the rank
and file employees, ineligibility of some signatories because they had less than one (1) year of service resulting
in the non-compliance with the 30% requirement.

A certification election is hereby ordered conducted among the rank and file employees of the Airtime
Specialists. The parties are: (1) Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia (SAMA-ASIA) FFW Chapter &
Pinagbuklod ng mga Manggagawa sa Ataco (PMA-FFW); and (2) No union.

ISSUE: WON public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when they considered (a) employees with
less than one year of service and (b) probationary employees as qualified participants in the certification
election process. (NO)
RULING: A perusal of Art. 258 of the Labor Code as amended reveals that compliance with the 30%
requirement (now 20%) makes it mandatory upon the Bureau of Labor Relations to order the holding of a
certification election in order to determine the exclusive-bargaining agent of the employees. Parenthetically,
where the petition is supported by less than 30% (now 20%) the Bureau of Labor Relations has discretion
whether or not to order the holding of certification election depending on the circumstances of the case. The
CIR enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to insure a fair and free choice of
bargaining representatives by employees, and having exercised its sound discretion, this Court cannot
interfere. (Arguelles v. Young, 153 SCRA 690).

In a certification election, all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote.
This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining
covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all
employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their
employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to
"all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the
"bargaining unit."

Petitioner argue at length that more than a majority of the signatories to the petitions for certification election
"have disaffiliated from the two private respondent unions (PMA-FFW and SAMA-ASIA-FFW) and have joined
another union (ADLO)." Petitioners then contend that, with the mass disaffiliation, the petition for certification
would fall short of the 20% consent requirement of the Labor Code.

Even assuming the fact of such disaffiliation and even assuming further that the 20% requirement is not
reached, this will not defeat the petition for certification election. On the contrary, it becomes more imperative
to conduct one. The alleged disaffiliation from the petitioning unions (PMA-FFW and SAMA-ASIA-FFW) in favor
of the ADLO-KMU raised a genuine representation issue which can best be tested in a certification election. 

The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization which they desire to join. The
exercise of such right would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to
choose in a certification election, which is not a litigation, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary
character, the bargaining unit to represent them (NAMAWUMIF v. Estrella, 87 SCRA 84). The holding of a
certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented (ATU v. Noriel, 89 SCRA 264). The
petition is DISMISSED, the assailed orders of public respondents are AFFIRMED.

103. Pagkakaisa vs. Enriquez, G.R. L-12999, July 29, 1960

-Right of employees to self-organization carries with it the right: (3) to cancel his membership with the union.
-Pagkakaisa prepared check of authorization but others are revoking authorization. CBA provides that it is
allowed but others are already revoking. Company refused to honor it and withheld collections already made.
SC held that members may leave union anytime and separation from union cannot affect CBA but authorization
to deduct is good only if they remain union members. Employer has right to withdraw.

FACTS: While still affiliated with the Federacion del Trabajo de Filipinas, Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel
Brewery at Mga Kasañgay, a duly registered labor union, secured a collective bargaining agreement with respondent San
Miguel Brewery, Inc. Later, it seceded from the Federacion and affiliated itself to PAFLU. Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) prepared a
check-off authorization form, effective for a period of one year or until the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement,
whichever came later, without any specification as to the amount to be deducted.

The forms were distributed among all the employees within the 17 plants of the Company. Some of the employees refused to
sign the authorization form while others signed the same. When Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) presented the form to the Company, the
latter refused to entertain the same, claiming that the irrevocability clause contained therein was illegal and unenforceable.
Meanwhile, many of those who originally signed the check-off authorization, numbering about 500, notified the Company in
writing that they were revoking their authorization. Those employees who refused to sign the check-off authorization, as well as
those who revoked their authorization, formed the respondent union, Nagkakaisa (FTF).
Because the Company refused to honor the check-off authorization and withheld some collections already made pursuant
thereto, the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) filed against the Company petition for declaratory relief with CIR to determine the right of
Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) to compel the company to make the deductions. CIR held that "the effectivity of check-off provisions in
collective bargaining agreements execution of said agreements should be no less than one year from the time of the execution
of said agreements, or beyond the termination of the latter, whichever occurs the sooner." Upon receipt of the order, the
Company advised each of the employees who had revoked their authorization that it would comply with the said order to
disregard the revocation submitted. Because of the insistence of the Company in making the deductions, Nagkakaisa (FTF),
filed a petition against the Company and the Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) for a writ of permanent injunction with the CFI.

ISSUE: WON Company could make deductions of said dues and assessments from their wages (NO)

RULING: Even assuming for a moment that the irrevocability of the authorization signed by the respondents-laborers and the
employees for check-off within a period of one year is valid, a point which we do not now decide, it seems that said
authorization to deduct from their pay and wages was good only as long as they remained members of the union Pagkakaisa
(PAFLU), because as such members, they were supposed to pay dues and assessments to the Union. However, the moment
that they separated from and left that union and joined another labor organization, then they were no longer obliged to pay said
dues and assessments; naturally, there would no longer be any reason or occasion for the Company to continue making
deductions.

It would appear that a member of a labor union may leave and cancel his membership at any time. When a laborer or employee
joins a labor union, he does not make any commitment or assume an undertaking to continue his membership therein for any
fixed period of time, much less indefinitely. In this respect, he is a free agent. It may be that his separation from the union will
not and could not affect any bargaining agreement entered into by the union and management while he was a member of said
union, as to working conditions, ages, privileges, etc.; but as to his right to separate from a labor union and join another, it
seems there can be no question. In the present case, since there was a rule or practice of petitioner Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) that
those members of the union who refused to sign the authorization for check-off and, naturally, those who signed the
authorization but later cancelled or revoked the same, were considered automatically expelled from the union. So, petitioners
even assuming that they did not of their own volition leave the petitioner Pagkakaisa (PAFLU) to join respondent union
Nagkakaisa (FTF), as they did, they automatically ceased to be members of the former. And being no longer members, they
were not obliged to continue paying dues and assessment, and as a result, the Company could no longer make deductions of
said dues and assessments from their wages.

104. BASA vs. FOITAF, G.R. No. L-27113, Nov. 19, 1974
-union clause that they remain in good standing but they are Iglesia ni Cristo. Right to abstain, resign, and choose cannot be
exercised if parties agree to union security agreement.

FACTS: Plaintiffs-appellees Sabina Basa, Bonifacio Basa, Bonifacio Cabalhin and Primitivo Gallardo, who are members of "Iglesia ni
Cristo", have been employed with the defendant company, La Dicha La Paz y Buen Viaje Cigar and Cigarette Factory, since 1949,
1952, 1960 and 1957, respectively, and were therefore employees of that company on April 21, 1961, when the collective bargaining
contract between the company and the defendant union, Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de
Filipinas (FOITAF) was executed. This agreement provided for a union shop clause which provides that: “All workers and laborers
who are members of the FOITAF shall remain and maintain their membership in good standing in the Union as a condition of their
continued employment with the Company. New workers whom the Management may employ shall, as a condition of continued
employment with the company, become members of the FOITAF after 60 working days of continuous employment.”

The plaintiffs-appellees were members in good standing of the labor union until August 28, 1964, when they formally resigned from
the Union, invoking their constitutional right to freedom of religion, the free exercise of which exempts them from being compelled
to join any labor organization, when such is contrary to their religious beliefs and convictions, as provided by Republic Act No.3350,
which became a law on June 18, 1961. The plaintiffs-appellees, the Union, through its president Severino Tabalno, gave them fifteen
(15) days from receipt of said letter to reconsider their resignation, otherwise it would ask the Company to enforce the above-
quoted union shop agreement. Thereafter, the Company, through its president Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., formally gave the plaintiffs-
appellees time within which to re-affiliate with the Union on pain of dismissal.

Instead of reconsidering their resignation, the plaintiffs-appellees filed the present action for injunction alleging, among others, that
(1) they have a right to remain in their employment, which is properly within the meaning of constitutional guarantees,2 for they
cannot be legally dismissed by defendant Company for failing to maintain their membership in the defendant Union, being old
employees of the former; 3 (2) their resignation from the labor Union is but an exercise of their right to freedom of religion
guaranteed by the Constitution, which guarantee is implemented by Republic Act No. 3350; and (3) being no longer members of the
labor Union, they were no longer obliged to pay said dues and assessments through payroll deductions; 4 Plaintiffs-appellees,
therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered (1) to enjoin immediately ex-parte the defendants from dismissing plaintiffs from their
employment, and from collecting union dues and assessments through payroll deduction from plaintiffs' earned wages; (2) to order
defendants to reimburse, jointly and severally, all union dues and assessments collected from plaintiffs since their resignation from
defendant Union and to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees of P900.00 and costs. Both the defendants filed their
respective answers. The Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Quezon City, decided in favor of plaintiffs, thus this appeal.

ISSUES: Whether Republic Act No. 3350: (A.) Abridges the freedom to form associations not contrary to law; (B.) Impairs the
obligations of contracts; (C.) Discriminates in favor of members of the religious sects prohibiting the affiliation in labor unions; (D.)
Infringes on the constitutional bar against a law respecting an establishment of religion or a religious test for the exercise of civil and
political rights; (E.) Denies equal protection of the laws; and (F.) Impairs the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford
protection to labor.

RULING: The court found the appeal to be without merit. House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, was
enacted into law with the explicit purpose of safeguarding and maintaining inviolate the religious freedom of all individuals.

A. Abridges the freedom to form associations not contrary to law. Recently, in Benjamin Victoriano Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et
al., a unanimous Court sustained the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first,
liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association. The right to join a union includes the right to
abstain from joining any union. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and
guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in
the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any
association.

Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees
belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception
provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious
sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It
still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions.

B. Impairs the obligations of contracts. The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The
prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. It is not to be read with literal
exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. The State continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All
contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made in
reference to the possible exercise of that power. This has special application to contracts regulating relations between capital and
labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common
good.

There is no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be
measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing
the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the
means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the
scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power.

The purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350 was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the
general welfare by; preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, confirming thereby their natural statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only
means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is
legitimate.

The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which
the individual needs protection, power collective labor directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. When
the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs
protection — the collective bargaining relationship.

The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to
the former.

C. Discriminates in favor of members of the religious sects prohibiting the affiliation in labor unions. The religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good. If the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the
state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden.

It has been held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be
said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution. The purpose of Republic
Act No. 3350 is secular, wordly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular
purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be
dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements.

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective
bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent
economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State,
the Act also promotes the well-being of society. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The
"establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that
religious exercise be preferentially aided.

To compel persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt,
rather than help, labor unions. Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers, for
religious objections have contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.

D. Infringes on the constitutional bar against a law respecting an establishment of religion or a religious test for the exercise of civil
and political rights. The contention is not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect
that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or
withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation
from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act — to
exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.

E. Denies equal protection of the laws. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the state. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with
a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial,
not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees.
Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is based on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not
mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain
rules of human conduct and the justification of certain acts. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests
on substantial distinctions.

F. Impairs the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford protection to labor/social justice. Social justice is intended to
promote the welfare of all the people. Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those
who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of
livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly
benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby. Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the
members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security in their
employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also
advances the proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join labor unions, for it
exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop agreements, and equalizes, in so far
as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose religion does not
prohibit said membership.

Social justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal
or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily
premised on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity, and this is
precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal
opportunity for work.

Plaintiffs-appellees cannot, therefore, be summarily dismissed from their employment in the defendant Company as a result of their
resignation from the appellant notwithstanding the existence of a union shop clause in the labor union collective bargaining
agreement, the Court found no error in the trial court's order, requiring both the company and defendant-appellant labor Union to
reimburse all union dues and assessments collected from plaintiffs-appellees from the date of their resignations as members of the
Union until the date of the last collection. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-
appellant.

105. Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division vs. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 82914, June 20, 1988
-Although the Iglesia ni Cristo religion forbids its members from forming or joining a labor union, said members are not legally
barred from joining a union or forming their own union.
-Labor Arbiter ordered certification election because they have 2 unions and can choose no union. TUPAZ is the sole bargaining
agent and will expire. Within expiration period, Iglesia registered as separate union. SC held that ruling in Victoriano not force Iglesia
to join unions but does not bar the members to form own union. Can have certification election because it is the best forum to
determine the choice of employees and majority status of contending unions.

106. Reyes vs. Trajano. G.R. No. 84433, June 2, 1992

-However, the right to abstain from joining a union as well as the right to resign from the union or to choose which union to join,
cannot be exercised when the union and the employer have agreed on a union security arrangement. They can even vote in a
certification election, as long as they are covered by the collective bargaining unit.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

107. Great Pacific Life Employees Union vs. Great Pacific Life, G.R. No. 1267171, Feb. 11, 1999
-The term “unfair labor practice” does not refer to every unfair act or decision of an employer.
-entered into CBA but before its expiration, parties submitted their proposals for renewal but had deadlock. Union filed notice of
strike and they did. Company required the striking employees to explain why they should not be dismissed for illegal acts (blocking
entrance and exit of company premises & illegal search). Strikers were dismissed but still continues to lead the strike. They filed
illegal dismissal. SC held that the dismissal was justified. To recall members is a management prerogative as long as not exercised
with malice, vindictive.

108. Allied Banking vs CA, et. al., G.R. No. 144412. Nov. 18, 2003
-ULP refers only to those acts listed in Arts. 259 and 260 of the Labor Code.
-Bankers have rotational basis. Some were transferred to other branches. To exempt him from transfer would create favoritism.
WON there is unfair labor practice in the dismissal by Allied Banking of Galanida. (if NLRC correctly ruled that there is unfair labor
practice). There is no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor
practices relate only to violations of "the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization" and are limited to the
acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code, none of which applies to the present case. There is no evidence that Galanida took
part in forming a union, or even that a union existed in Allied Bank.

109. GSWU-NAFLU vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 165757, Oct. 17, 2006
-company closes because of anti-union stances. Petitioner failed to support claim of ULP because these acts defined in Art. 248 &
261 & CBA. However, company only gave notice in bulletin board. Law requires 2 notices in accordance with Art 283 LC. They did not
inform workers of their termination before 1 month of its effectivity. Service of termination must be made individually. Termination
is valid but have procedural defect (due process)

110. Agabon vs. NLRC, GR No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004

-employer should indemnify employee in nominal damages due to procedural due process defect.

111. PEU vs. Phil. Global Communications, G.R. No. 144315, July 17, 2006
-Unfair labor practices are acts that violate the right of employees to self-organization. Without this element of “self-organization,”
the acts, no matter how unfair, cannot be considered as unfair labor practices.
-while negotiation for CBA, union filed notice of strike so company stopped negotiation. While negotiation in NCMB, others were
striking and set up pickets at main entrance. Labor Arbiter ordered them to cease and desist. SC held that ULP refers to acts in
violation of workers’ right to self-organize. No ULP in this case. Strike was premature and illegal. Art 164 (a)- prohibited to declare a
strike during negotiation for grounds of the same ground. Valid ground for dismissal.

112. Bisig Ng Manggagawa vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 151309, Oct. 15, 2008
-employees were being transferred to another branch. They claim it was ULP and declared a strike. The free will of management to
achieve its purpose will not be denied. It is a management prerogative to regulate all aspects of employment including transferring
and reassigning employees from one area of operation to another to meet demands of business is not illegal. But when transfer is
not reasonable, amounts to ULP because paralyze union ineffective. SC held mere transferring will not paralyze union and did not
violate right to self-organization.

113. Phil.Am Emroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers Union, G.R. No. L-20143, Jan, 27, 1069
-An employer does not commit ULP if it closes a department due to continued losses, even if it results in the termination of union
members. The reason is because the motive for the closure has nothing to do with the right to self-organization.
-company not guilty of ULP because its closure is not discrimination but due to unreasonable losses

114. Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo Enterprises, G.R. No. L-38258, Nov. 19, 1982
-An employer does not commit ULP if it exacts a promise from the strikers who are returning to work, not to destroy company
property or commit acts of reprisal against union members who did not join the strike. The reason is because it has nothing to do
with self-organization because the employer’s act was intended to ensure peace and order in the company premises.

115. Fortich vs. CIR, 93 SCRA 1

-In this case, the employer dismissed the plant superintendent because he organized a union composed of workers under his
supervision. The plant superintendent filed a complaint for ULP in the ground that his dismissal was motivated by his active
participation in the formation of a union. The SC held that no ULP was committed, because the plant superintendent cannot lawfully
organize a labor union composed of employees under his supervision.
 116. Sterling Products vs. Sol, G.R. No. L-19187, Geb. 28, 1963
-ULP can be committed only against an employee who exercises his right to self-organization. It cannot be committed against an
employee who is not connected with any labor organization. Neither can it be committed against an employee who has not
attempted to join a labor organization. Nor can it be committed against an employee who has not assisted or contributed to the
formation of a labor organization.
-Sol not connected with union so no ULP. No right of self-organization violated.

117. Phil. Engineering Corporation vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-27880, Sept. 30, 1971
-To prove the administrative aspect of ULP, all that is required is substantial evidence, which may be direct or circumstantial.
-wanted to have new CBA but did not prosper because always deferred. CIR dismissed ULP because evidence is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. SC held that it is not under RPC so not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It requires only substantial evidence.

118. SCBEU-NUBE vs. Confessor, G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004

FACTS: Before the commencement of the negotiation for the new CBA between the bank and the Union, the Union, through Divina
Gracia, suggested to the Bank’s HR Manager and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be
excluded from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno (head of the negotiating team for the bank) suggested
to Divina Gracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the
Union was affiliated, be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof.

There was deadlock in the negotiations. Both parties alleged ULP. Bank alleged that the Union violated its no strike- no lockout
clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering that the filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the Union officers
should be dismissed. Union alleged unfair labor practice when the bank allegedly interfered with the Union’s choice of negotiator. It
argued that, Diokno’s suggestion that the negotiation be limited as a “family affair” was tantamount to suggesting that Federation
President Jose Umali, Jr. be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. It further argued that, damage or injury to the public
interest need not be present in order for unfair labor practice to prosper. The Union also contended that the Bank merely went
through the motions of collective bargaining without the intent to reach an agreement

ISSUE:
1.) WON there was interference
2.) WON the bank committed “surface bargaining”

RULING:
1.) NONE
Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the
right to collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to
exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act
to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees,
ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed.

In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim .
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from
the Union’s negotiating panel.

The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-
union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise
of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was undertaken
previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracia’s suggestion that the bank lawyers be
excluded from its negotiating panel.

The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Union’s negotiating
panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the
Union on June 15, 1993.
It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the
economic provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve
personalities. As the public respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial situations
may be colored with unintended meanings. Such is what appears to have happened in this case.

2.) NO.
Surface bargaining is defined as “going through the motions of negotiating” without any legal intent to reach an agreement.”
The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain; hence, committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface
bargaining. It alleged that the Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of reaching an agreement , as
evident in the Bank’s counter-proposals. It explained that of the 34 economic provisions it made, the Bank only made 6 economic
counterproposals. Further, as borne by the minutes of the meetings, the Bank, after indicating the economic provisions it had
rejected, accepted, retained or were open for discussion, refused to make a list of items it agreed to include in the economic
package.

The minutes of meetings from March 12, 1993 to June 15, 1993 do not show that the Bank had any intention of violating its duty to
bargain with the Union. Records show that after the Union sent its proposal to the Bank on February 17, 1993, the latter replied with
a list of its counter-proposals on February 24, 1993. Thereafter, meetings were set for the settlement of their differences. The
minutes of the meetings show that both the Bank and the Union exchanged economic and non-economic proposals and counter-
proposals.

The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show
that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union. Admittedly, the
parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain “does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.”

Hence, the parties’ failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.

NOTE: (on the allegation of the bank’s refusal to give certain information) The Union, did not, as the Labor Code requires, send a
written request for the issuance of a copy of the data about the Bank’s rank and file employees. Moreover, as alleged by the Union,
the fact that the Bank made use of the aforesaid guestimates, amounts to a validation of the data it had used in its presentation.

Issue: W/N the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice against the Bank arising from the latters alleged
interference with its choice of negotiator; surface bargaining; making bad faith non-economic proposals; and refusal to furnish the
Union with copies of the relevant data

Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the
right to collective bargaining.

Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of
negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on
the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in
connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed

In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from
the Unions negotiating panel.

It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the
economic provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve
personalities. As the public respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial situations
may be colored with unintended meanings. Such is what appears to have happened in this case.

119. Tanglaw ng Paggawa vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-24498, Sept. 21, 1968
-Substantial evidence may be direct or circumstantial.

FACTS: A complaint was filed by the petitioner labor union, Tanglaw Ng Paggawa, against the respondent company, Red V Coconut
Products, for unfair labor practice in having caused a depletion in the membership of the union by refusing to comply with the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement involving vacation leave and night differential pay.

On October 1961, the petitioner union and the respondent company entered into a collective bargaining agreement. The
complainant union demanded payment of vacation leave for employees but the company refused.

Unable to bring management around to its own interpretation of the disputed provisions of the bargaining contract, the union
brought charges of unfair labor practice against the employer company, accusing the latter of refusing in bad faith to comply with
the collective contract on vacation leave and night differential pay, leading to a wave of resignations from the union that reduced its
membership.

The Industrial Court found no sufficient evidence "to show that the non-enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement was the
reason for the resignation of a few members of complainant Union," and "that it is very apparent in the face of the agreement that
the company acted in good faith when they entered into the said agreement". With regard to the night shift differential claims, the
court concluded that, there being no unfair labor practice on the part of the company, the question was reduced to one of
interpretation and enforcement of the bargaining agreement which should be settled by the regular courts, and as previously stated,
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the conduct of the employer was discriminatory and intended to prejudice the union by aiming to reduce its
membership?

RULING: The Industrial Court answered the question in the negative, and this finding finds substantial support in the record. The only
direct evidence on the point is the testimony of the union vice-president, Pedro Barba, which is not only naturally biased but hearsay
in its nature, since the reasons for the resignation of the union members could only be known to him from what the former
revealed. As the letters of resignation submitted in support of the union's allegations did not make any reference to the bargaining
agreement, and were, moreover, dated after the unfair practice charges had been filed in the Court of Industrial Relations, the court
a quo was justified in refusing to credit Barba's testimony for lack of corroboration.

Unfair labor practice being in the nature of a criminal offense, the same must be clearly proved, by direct or circumstantial evidence,
and cannot be merely presumed from the fact of the members' resignations. Not only this: the employer must be shown to have
designed its conduct to produce such resignations, and of this no evidence is produced, or referred to, in the appellant's own briefs .
Not only did the Court of Industrial Relations declare that there was no evidence of discrimination since the company enforced its
interpretation of the vacation leave and shift differential "to all its employees irrespective of union affiliation", but it also found that
the vacation leave provision was enforced by the company from January 1, 1961, despite the stipulation that the contract providing
the same was to be effective only as of August 15, 1961. The Industrial Court found this retroactive enforcement as negativing the
company's bad faith, and we find no reason to hold this view to be unjustified or improper.

120. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Bandolino vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 125195, July 17, 1997
-The complainant has the burden of proving an ULP charge.

FACTS: Petitioners are former employees of private respondent Bandolino Shoe Corporation and members of petitioner union,
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Bandolino-LMLC. Private respondents German Alcantara, Aida Alcantara, and Mimi Alcantara are the
owners and officers of Bandolino Shoe Corporation.

Petitioners Marcial Franco, Johnny Florencio, and Romeo Reyes were directed to take a two-week leave because of a strike at the
Shoemart, Bandolino's biggest customer. Apparently, the strike adversely affected private respondents' business. Petitioners were
told by management that should the circumstances improve, they would be recalled to work after two weeks.

Petitioner Marcial Franco and his wife were called to the personnel manager's office and told that Ligaya Franco had been dismissed.
Marcial Franco pleaded with German Alcantara not to terminate his wife from employment, but his entreaties were rejected,
allegedly because of his refusal to divulge the names of the organizers and members of the petitioner union. Three otherrelatives,
namely Emma Brozo, Adoracion Brozo, and Aurea Bonon, were subsequently dismissed.
The other petitioners were likewise informed by the personnel manager of the termination of their employment and asked to turn in
their identification cards. The petitioners tried to return to work after two weeks on but they were refused entry into the company
premises. The management refused to allow them to return to work allegedly to prevent any untoward incident between the
petitioner union and the Bandolino Shoes Independent Labor Union.

The labor arbiter issued a return-to-work order to the private respondents based on the private respondents' claim that they had
not dismissed petitioners. But petitioners were not allowed to work by private respondents.

The Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of petitioners. He found that petitioners had been illegally dismissed because of their
union activities and that private respondents had committed unfair labor practice. Although private respondents claimed to have
merely placed petitioners on "rotation" because of the Shoermart strike, the labor arbiter found that even after the end of the
strike, petitioners were still not allowed to return to work. Referring to private respondents' position paper, the labor arbiter found
that private respondents had imposed illegal conditions on petitioners’ reinstatement by requiring them to forego their intended
strike, withdraw their petition for certification election, and instead recognize the existing union. On the basis and noting that during
the hearings private respondents' counsel subjected the petitioners to a barrage of questioning regarding their union activities, the
labor arbiter concluded that private respondents were guilty of unfair labor practice for having restrained the petitioners' exercise of
the right to self-organization.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an unfair labor practice.

RULING: YES. There was interference in right of self-organization even though union was registered. (ART. 259)

Even disregarding evidence of the illegal conditions imposed by private respondents for petitioners' return to work, there was
substantial evidence remaining in the record to sustain the labor arbiter's decision that private respondents were guilty of ULP .
There was evidence to the effect that Marcial Franco had been asked to disclose the names of the members of the union and that
the management had shown interest in the unionizing activities of the petitioners. This evidence has remained unchallenged. What
is more, it appears that only alleged members of the petitioner union were put on "rotation". The labor arbiter's observation during
the hearing that the private respondents had shown hostility towards petitioners for their union activities is a determination of fact
which is based on the totality of private respondents' conduct, indicating anti-union bias. Nor is it disputed that private respondent
opposed petitioners' petition for certification election when this matter should be the sole concern of the workers. Private
respondents' interest belies their claim that they were not aware of petitioners' organizational and union activities prior to the
union's registration. An employer may be guilty of ULP in interfering with the right to self-organization even before the union has
been registered.

Test of interference is whether employer engaged in conduct which would reasonably tend to hinder free exercise of employee’s
right to self-organization; obstruct movement of union to organize.