Harry S. Stonehill, et al. vs. Jose W. Diokno, et al.
and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550             June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J.
BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,  As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES;
JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-
Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and
Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C.
Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1
— hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges 2—
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different
dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the any peace officer,
to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits
of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted
to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter
alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4)
the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed
that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that,
in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested
search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the
documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under
the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested
search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of
the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962,
the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since
the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers
belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized
and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights
have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could
not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose
property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes
had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the
benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any,
was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States  (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged
unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property
was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States,
[1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences
of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962,
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors
from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important
questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in
question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof,
are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the
nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected
upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specificoffense had been alleged
in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications
— without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-
called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with
the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court  (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-
Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was
in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not
be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law
action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in
the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as
may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this
approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this
is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
gainst unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is
true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong
will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had
already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent
decisions on the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions
thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio  (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional
documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable
state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by
it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal
Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties,
so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time
that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable
to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal
officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection
and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the
Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an
essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as
an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf
Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by
Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year
the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule to  "is to deter —to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way —by removing
the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which
the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the
right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due
Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at
the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual
no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement
is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there
is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements
of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The
only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a
probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an
illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures
would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By
agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority
could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing
their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and
91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No.
1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should
be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John
J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records,
papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other
effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of
which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of
federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged
possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and
effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29,
1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that
followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits
or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration,
or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said
petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said
motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated
in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the
views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not
deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the
matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must
be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)
residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in
said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other
effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be,
as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the
writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
It is so ordered.
People of the Philippines vs. Oscar Robles y Moana
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 101335               June 8, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
OSCAR ROBLES Y MOANA, ANTONIO MANAS Y FLAVA,
VICENTE ANTONIO Y HAYA, accused,
OSCAR ROBLES Y MOANA, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated March 30, 1989 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 148, in Criminal Case No. 28829, convicting
appellant Oscar Robles y Moana, together with his co-accused Antonio
Manas y Flava,1 of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay the
heirs of the victims jointly and severally the amount of P30,000.00 as
indemnity.2 Vicente Antonio y Haya, the third accused, remains at large.
Since Manas did not appeal, we are here concerned only with Robles.
The facts, based on the records, are as follows:
On January 30, 1987, at around 1:00 P.M., Patrolmen Rey Cocson, Edgar
Amurao, and C. Tabanera3 were on board a police vehicle patrolling the
vicinity of Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila. The police car came alongside a
taxicab with two male passengers. When the policemen noticed that the
passengers were acting suspiciously and could not look directly at them,
they signalled the taxicab driver to stop for routine inspection. The
policemen asked the names of the passengers. The one seated beside the
driver was identified as Manas, while the one at the back seat was
appellant Robles. The policemen saw two bags on the floor of the back of
the taxicab. When asked whether the bags belonged to them, the two men
initially refused to answer. However, Robles broke down and admitted
that they had robbed the house of one Jose Macalino in Makati. Manas
remained silent. Patrolman Cocson frisked Robles and found a .38 cal.
revolver. Patrolman Tabanera frisked Manas, and recovered a fan knife
(balisong) from him.4
In the bags were shoes, cameras, watches, and assorted items. Robles
admitted taking them from the residence of Jose Macalino. After
apprising them of their constitutional rights, the policemen brought
Robles and Manas to the police headquarters. Since Patrolman Cocson
noticed a bag with the nametag Beth M. Puzon and a telephone
number,5he called up the number and spoke with Beth M. Puzon, a
daughter of Jose Macalino. 6 Subsequently, Robles and Manas were turned
over to the Makati Police Department.7
Detective Ernesto Gatpayat of the Makati Police Station proceeded to the
house of Jose Macalino and found the house ransacked. He discovered
two dead persons inside the house, later identified as Marilou Dalugdugan
and Diego Limato, household helpers of Macalino. Gatpayat recovered a
screwdriver beside the body of Dalugdugan. 8
After apprising Robles and Manas of their constitutional rights and in the
presence of counsel, Patrolman Celso Noriega, Makati Police station
investigator, took down their statements. 9
In his statement Robles, then 29 years old and employed as a tinsmith,
admitted that he participated in the robbery, but not in the killing. He
stated that on the night of January 29, 1987, Manas, Antonio, and one Jun
planned the robbery. The following day, however; Jun stood them up at
the meeting place. Undaunted, Manas and Antonio pushed through with
their plan. Manas knocked at the gate of Macalino's house, which was
opened by Dalugdugan. Manas entered the house followed by Antonio.
Robles stayed at the nearby Shakey's as lookout. After about 10 minutes,
Manas came out and motioned Robles to enter. Robles went inside and
saw Dalugdugan and Limato sprawled dead in the kitchen. Manas
admitted that he killed Dalugdugan, while Antonio killed Limato.
Thereafter, the three men opened the rooms using tools which they found
inside the house. They quickly stashed valuables inside two black bags.
Thereafter, Antonio went his separate way. Robles and Manas carried the
loot and bearded a taxi to Sta. Ana, where Robles had a relative (who was
not home). They were proceeding to Tondo when apprehended by the
police officers.
Manas, then 39 years old, employed as a housepainter in the shop of
Macalino, admitted in his statement that he stabbed Dalugdugan with a
screwdriver to stop her from screaming when she saw Antonio stabbing
Limato. Manas claimed that Robles was with them inside the house, not
waiting at the nearby Shakey's.
On February 5, 1987, the following Information for Robbery with Double
Homicide 10 was filed against Robles and Manas:
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accuses Antonio Mañas y Lava
and Oscar Robes y Moaña of the crime of Robbery with Double
Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of January, 1987 in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, conspiring and confederating with Vicente Antonio Y
Haya @ Ric, who is at large and mutually helping and aiding
with one another with intent of gain and by means of force upon
things and intimidation of persons entered the house of one Jose
Macalino y Manalac and once inside, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away,
the following items to wit:
One (1) Yashita Camer P1,500.00
One (1) Minolta Camera 2,800.00
One (1) Minolta Electronic Flash 800.00
Sanyo Walkman 1,500.00
Radio Transistor 250.00
Micro Cassette 800.00
Handcrafted domino 300.00
Two playing cards 80.00
One Colgate 20.00
Leica Handbook 40.00
Adidas Rubber Shoes 250.00
Seven (7) pcs. Handkerchief 100.00
Walkman Accessories 550.00
Walkman Aiwa 500.00
One (1) Ladies Watch Seiko 800.00
One (1) Casio Watch 350.00
Seiko La Salle 8,500.00
One (1) Citizens Watch 1,500.00
One (1) men's ring white gold with diamond 15,000.00
One (1) Smith & Wesson Rev. 3,500.00
Two (2) Leather Bag 300.00
all in total amount of P29,440.00, belonging to said Jose
Macalino, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in
the aforementioned amount of P29,440.00.
That on said occasion, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and all of them mutually helping and
aiding with one another, while armed with a knife and a screw-
driver and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Diego Limato
and Marilou Dalugdugan hitting them on the vital parts of their
bodies and as a result of which, they sustained fatal injuries
which directly caused their death.
During trial, the Information was amended to include another accused
named Vicente Antonio y Haya @ "Ric," who remains at large to date.
On August 19, 1987, assisted by Atty. Eugenio Macababayao Jr., Robles
and Manas were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Robbery with Double Homicide. 11 The prosecution and defense during a
pre-trial agreed on the following facts. 12
1. The fact and cause of death of Marilou Dalugdugan and Diego
Limato;
2. The existence and genuineness of the Certificate of Post
MortemExamination issued by Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr., as a
result of the examination conducted by him of the late Marilou
Dalugdugan, which certificate was marked in evidence by the
prosecution as Exhibit "A";
3. The existence and genuineness of the Certificate of Post
MortemExamination issued by Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr., as a
result of the examination conducted by him on the late Diego
Limato, which certificate was marked in evidence by the
prosecution as Exhibit "B";
4. The existence, identity and value of the articles alleged to have
been stolen and which are specifically enumerated in the
information filed in the above-entitled case; the fact of
ownership thereof by Jose Macalino; and the recovery thereof
and their subsequent return to the said Jose Macalino;
5. The existence of the Malayang Salaysay signed by Oscar
Robles y Moana, which salaysay was marked in evidence by the
prosecution as Exhibit "C", but the truth of the contents of which
were denied by the accused on the ground that intimidation was
allegedly exerted on him prior to the execution thereof;
6. The existence of the Malayang Salaysay signed by Antonio
Manas y Lava, which salaysay was marked in evidence by the
prosecution as Exhibit "D", but the truth of the contents of which
were denied by the accused on the ground that intimidation was
allegedly exerted on him prior to the execution thereof;
7. The fact that Atty. Eugenio Macababayao assisted the accused
in the course of their investigation by the police, particularly in
the giving by the accused of their statements marked as Exhibit
"C" and "D";
In consequence of the foregoing, the defense agreed that the
prosecution need not present Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. to testify
on the post mortem examinations conducted by him on the
cadavers of the late Marilou Dalugdugan and Diego Limato, and
that Jose Macalino need not testify on the fact of ownership,
existence, and identity of the articles stolen, but only with
respect to the receipt by him of an alleged letter dated May 30,
1987 sent by the accused Antonio Manas y Lava.
With the above stipulations of facts during pre-trial, only the following
witnesses were presented by the prosecution: (1) Det. Ernesto C. Gatpayat,
the policeman who proceeded to the house of Jose Macalino and
discovered the two dead bodies. He also took down the statement of Jose
Macalino. (2) Aida Pascual, Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation, who testified that the blood recovered from the screwdriver
and balisong were type A. The blood type of Dalugdugan was type A, and
Limato, type O. 13 (3) Patrolman Rey Cocson, who was one of the
policemen who flagged down the taxi for routine inspection. He also
identified in court the items recovered from appellant and accused; 14 (4)
Patrolman Celso Noriega, Jr., police investigator at the Makati Police
Station, who took down the statements of appellant and accused, while
they were assisted by counsel, Atty. Eugenio Macababayao, Jr.. 15
For the defense, Robles and Manas testified. Robles denied participating
in either the robbery or the killings. He testified that in the morning of
January 30, 1987, Manas fetched him from his house to repair a car in Del
Pan, Tondo, Manila. However, before they reached their destination, they
were apprehended by policemen who told them that they were the
suspects in a robbery. The policemen brought them to the precinct where
they were interrogated and threatened into making a confession. Robles
denied any knowledge of the two bags found inside the taxi. While he
admitted that he was assisted by Atty. Macababayao during custodial
investigation, he denied executing any statement and claimed he could not
remember signing any document. 16
After trial, on March 30, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision 17finding
conspiracy, and correspondingly sentenced accused as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding
accused OSCAR ROBLES and ANTONIO MANAS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide, both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law.
Further, both accused are hereby ordered to jointly and severally
pay unto the heirs of Diego Limato the amount of P30,000.00 as
indemnity for causing his death, and likewise to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Marilou Dalugdugan the sum of
P30,000.00 as indemnity for causing her death.
Equal Costs against the two (2) accused.
SO ORDERED.
Pending appeal, the records of the stenographic notes containing the
testimonies of Aida Pascual, Manas and Robles were burned. Manas
manifested that he was not appealing the judgment of the trial court.
Hence, only the testimonies of Pascual and Robles were retaken at the
National Bilibid Prison. 18
In his brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting
accused-appellants, 19
I. . . . OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION
BASE[D] ON THE ALLEGED CONFESSIONS MADE BY
THE[M] DESPITE ITS INADMISSIBILITY.
II. . . . BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION THOUGH THE SAME IS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT BOTH ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED.
Appellant argues that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against
him because it was obtained through threats and without the effective
assistance of counsel. He says the only evidence linking him to the
commission of the crime is his presence in the same taxicab as his co-
accused and Antonio. Circumstantial evidence alone, he argues, is
insufficient to sustain his conviction for the complex crime of Robbery
with Homicide.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, prays for the affirmance
of the judgment, except with respect to the indemnity which should be
increased to P50,000.00 per victim. The Solicitor points out that
appellant, together with his co-accused, was duly assisted by counsel de
oficio during custodial investigation, and in fact, the same counsel de
oficio assisted him during trial.
In sum, we find that the issues center on (1) the ADMISSIBILITY of the
extrajudicial confession of the appellant, and (2) the SUFFICIENCY of the
EVIDENCE to convict him beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering appellant's contentions as well as those of the OSG, in the
light of the testimonies and other pieces of evidence submitted and on
record, we now hold that first, the extrajudicial confessions of appellant
and his co-accused are admissible against them. The allegation that they
were not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation is belied by the
records, which clearly show that Atty. Eugenio C. Macababayao Jr. was
present during the entire investigation. Further, the same lawyer acted as
counsel for appellant Robles during trial. 20 Atty. Macababayao did not
dispute that he was present and he assisted the appellant and his co-
accused at the time they executed their confessions. Neither did he deny
his signatures attesting that he was present in the preparation of the
extrajudicial confessions and assisted appellant and his co-accused. As
pointed out by the trial court, appellant Robles never brought to the
attention of his counsel that he was threatened by the policemen into
making his extrajudicial confession. Accused Manas even corrected the
middle initial of his name from "L" to "F" in the preparation of his
extrajudicial confession. 21 Further, the prosecution and defense entered
into a stipulation during pre-trial that —
. . . Atty. Eugenio Macababayao assisted the accused in the
course of their investigation by the police, particularly in the
giving by the accused of their statements marked as Exhibit "C"
(Sworn Statement of Oscar Robles) and "D" (Sworn Statement of
Antonio Manas). 22
Appellant avers that it was just his misfortune that he rode in the same
taxicab with Manas and Antonio. This claim is inconsistent with the
records which show that Antonio was not with them when they were
apprehended at the Del Pan Bridge. According to appellant himself,
Antonio already went his separate way right after the robbery.
Appellant makes a belated attempt to question the validity of his arrest
because of the police's failure to inform him of his Miranda rights at the
time of arrest. Note, however, that any objection involving the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise, said objection is deemed waived. 23The defects
in the arrest, if any, were cured by appellant's voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, when he entered his plea during
arraignment and when he actively participated in the trial, without raising
those defects. 24
Second, we also hold that there is sufficient evidence to convict appellant
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Sec. 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court 25 provides that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to convict (1) when there is more than one
circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the following circumstances prove the culpability of appellant
for the crime charged: (1) He planned the robbery of the house of Mr.
Macalino with accused Manas and Ric. (2) He acted as look-out while
accused Manas and Ric entered the house. (3) He participated in the
looting of the house after the two victims were killed. (4) He left the house
with accused Manas carrying the proceeds of the robbery with them.
The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption
of theft, unless it is proved that the owner of the articles was deprived of
possession by violence or intimidation, in which case, the presumption
becomes one of robbery. 26 In robbery with homicide cases, the
prosecution need only prove these elements: (a) the taking of personal
property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, here
used in its generic sense, is committed. 27 The homicide may precede the
robbery or may occur after the robbery. What is essential is that there is
an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter
be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be
committed at the same time. 28
The rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed
as a consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not
actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide. 29 In this case, appellant tries to
exculpate himself from the homicides by insisting that he did not
participate nor could he have prevented them. However, considering his
established participation in looting the Macalino residence where the
killing of the victims took place during said robbery, his culpability for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide is well grounded and sufficiently
proved.
We note that Section 3 of Rule 133 of the Rules 30 requires that an
extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground
for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus
delicti is the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime
has actually been committed. 31 Applied to a particular offense, it is the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 32 In this
case, aside from the extrajudicial confessions, the police found the stolen
goods, the murder weapons, and the dead bodies, thereby conclusively
establishing the needed corroborating evidence of corpus delicti.
As to the penalty. When more than one person is killed on the occasion of
the robbery, the additional killing should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance to avoid the anomalous situation where, from the standpoint
of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be on the same
level as robbery with multiple killings. 33 At the time of the commission of
the offense on January 30, 1987, the penalty for robbery with homicide
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion perpetua to
death. In view, however, of the subsequent suspension of the death
penalty by the 1987 Constitution, favorable to appellant, 34 the proper
penalty is reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty regardless of the
attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 35 The trial court,
therefore, properly imposed the sentence of reclusion perpetua on
appellant.
But, pursuant to existing jurisprudence, the amount of indemnity should
be increased to P50,000.00 for the death of each of the victims. 36 In
addition, the presence of one aggravating circumstance, which is the
second killing, justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to
Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, which we now award in the amount of
P10,000.00 to the heirs of each of the victims. All the recovered items
from the robbers should be and have been duly restituted to the lawful
owners Jose Macalino and his daughter Beth M. Puzon. 37
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati Branch
148, in Criminal Case No. 28829, convicting appellant OSCAR ROBLES y
MOANA of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE beyond reasonable
doubt and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as to the imposition of the amount of death indemnity
and also the award of exemplary damages. The amount of said indemnity
to be paid to the heirs of each of the victims is increased to P50,000.00,
together with a further award in the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary
damages to be paid to the heirs of each of the victims also. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs. Emiliano Duranan,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 134074-75       January 16, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pale brown
vs.
EMILIANO DURANAN, a.k.a "Kalbo,", accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
220, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a.
"Kalbo," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
of rape and to indemnify private complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara
in the amount of P50,000.00.
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55711 alleged ---
That on or about the 8 th of March 1994, in Quezon City,
Philippines, said accused with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, to wit, by then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously taking advantage of undersigned
complainant, Maria Nympha Lozada y de Lara's
feeblemindedness and thereafter have carnal knowledge with
(sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and without
her consent. Contrary to law2.
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55712 averred ---
That on or about the 7th of March 1994, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, to wit, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously taking (sic) advantage of the
undersigned (sic) feeblemindedness, and thereafter have carnal
knowledge with (sic) the undersigned complainant against her
will and without her consent. Contrary to law 3.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge of
rape against him, whereupon he was tried.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant Nympha
Lozada y de Lara, complainant's mother Virginia de Lara Lozada, and the
attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old at the time of the
incidents in question, is considered to be retarded and finished up to the
sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does household chores for
her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainant's family in the
same apartment in K-6 No. 28 Kamuning St., Quezon City where he
rented a room that he shared with several other people.
The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994. 4 Nympha was
standing by the door of her grandfather's house when accused-appellant
suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged her inside the common
bathroom.5 Complainant said that accused-appellant kissed her and then
removed her shorts and underwear as he held her hands with his other
hand. She did not cry for help because accused-appellant threatened her
that he would get angry if she did. 6 she claimed that accused-appellant
was able to rape her while standing up despite her resistance. 7 After the
incident, complainant was sent out of the bathroom and went directly
home8.
The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8,
1994,9according to complainant. She said she was cleaning the premises of
her family residence when accused-appellant pulled her from her house
and took her to his room. According to complainant, accused-appellant
asked his brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his
brother had left, accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped
her.10Complainant said she was forced to submit to accused-appellant's
lust because of his threats. 11 After the incident, accused-appellant sent her
letters professing love her and telling her how beautiful she was.
Complainant said she tore up the letters after reading them. 12
In another incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked
complainant to let him use their bathroom. However, after being given
permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled her inside the
bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the
door behind them. He only stopped molesting her when he heard
somebody coming.13
Virginia Lozada testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom,
quickly followed by accused-appellant. Virginia noticed that her
daughter's lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her daughter
about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her.
Virginia went to camp Karingal, together with complainant and her other
children, Teresa and Fernando, where they filed affidavits and two
informations. They then took complainant to Camp Crame for
examination.14 Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined complainant,
submitted a report which contained the following findings:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female
areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft. There is injury
noted at the head;
Conusion, mucosa of the lower lip, measuring 1.2 x 0.3
cm, and 1 cm left of the anterior midline.
GENITAL
There is an abundant growth of public hair. Labia
minora are full convex and gaping with the pinkish
brown and congested labia minor presenting in
between. On separating, the same is disclosed an
abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type
hymen with shallow healing laceration at 5 o'clock
position. External vaginal orifice offers strong
resistance to the introduction of the examining index
finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal
canal is narrow with prominent rugosities.
CONCLUSION
Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
Finding are compatible with recent loss of virginity.
Baring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that
the above injury will resolve in 7 to 9 days.
REMARKS
Vaginal and pre-urethral smears are negative for gram-
negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.15
Dr. Cosidon explained that the term "congested" used in reference to the
labia minora meant that there was some inflammation that could have
been caused by friction due to intercourse. 16 Taken together with the
presence of a shallow hymenal laceration, this finding indicates the
possibility of intercourse that caused complainant's loss of virginity within
the last five days. 17
Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court
denied it in its November 17, 1995 order.18 The defense thereafter
presented its witnesses, namely accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan,
accused-appellant's alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig,
and his wife Carlita Duranan.
With respect to the first incident of rape, which allegedly took place in the
afternoon of March 7, 1994, it is contended that accused-appellant could
not have committed such, because his daily schedule was such that he was
not at home at that time. He said that because of his work, he used to
leave the house at 3 a.m. , arrive home at 1 p.m., and leave for work again
at 3 p.m. and arrive home at 6:30 p.m. 19 He also alleged that on March 7,
1994 he left and was with Rico Bariquit throughout the day. 20as to the
second incident of rape, accused-appellant contends that it was impossible
for him to commit rape in his room because there were at least six other
people there at the time(i.e., morning of March 8, 1994) of the alleged
rape.21 He charged that the complaints were filed against him because
complainant's family wanted to evict and his housemates from their
house.22
Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-appellant's
schedule.23 Bariquit claimed that he was always with accused-appellant
and knew where he was all the time. Both witnesses said rape could not
have been committed in aroom where at least five other people were
sleeping.24
Virginia Lozada and complainant denied seeing Rico Bariquit and Carlito
Catubig before the two testified in court. 25
Based on the evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision pn
April 22, 1998, finding the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads: 26
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal two (2)
counts of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
code, as amended by Section 11 of R. A. 7659, and sentences him
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) counts of reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to indemnify the
private complainant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS(P50,000.00).
SO ORDERD.
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant assigns two errors as having been allegedly
Committed by the trail court:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IS "DEPRIVED OF
REASON" DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF TESTIMONY BY A
COMPETENT MEDICAL EXPERT TO THAT EFFECT AND
DESPITE STRONG EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD TO THE
CONTRARY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
ALTERNATIVELY HODING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY
OG RAPING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED WOMAN THROUGH
"FORCE AND INTIMIFATION".
First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape
since the victim's mental age was not proven. He argues that under Art.
335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the
prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the
complainant's mental age to determine if her mental age is under
twelve.27 He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is
apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of
mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.
The contention has no merit.
Rule 130, $50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a
witness for which proper basis is given may be received
in evidence regarding ---
a. the identify of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge;
b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity; and
c. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted.
Discussing this provision of the Rule on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J.
Francisco writes in his treatise:
The mother of an offended party in case of rate, though not a
psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of
the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
….
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to
the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness
has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner,
habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is
required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon
which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is.
As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness
may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another,
when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had
with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact
bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as
the basis for his opinion.28
In the case at bar, Virginia Lozada testified on the mental condition of her
daughter, thus:
Q:       How would you describe your daughter? (sic)
A:       When she was still a child while walking she accidentally
bumped her head and then on she acted quite not normal from
then on we noticed changes because she acted like a child.
Q:       How old is (sic) Nympha Lozada when this happened?
A:       3 to 4 years old.
Q:       At the age of 25, how would you described? (sic)
A:       She still thinks like a child but from her narration or
statement we can see that her declaration are (sic) true or
believable.
Q:       You mean to say that she could be intelligent.
A:       Yes, ma'am. She finished her elementary and I can say she
is quite intelligent.
Q:       So she can somewhat understand what is happening
around us?
A:       Yes, she can understand things around as along as she
would be provided some basis and some reference inorder (sic)
to establish time, places and incident (sic)
Q:       At your house do you still assigned (sic) household
chores(?)
A:       Yes, ma'am.
Q:       Could she relied (sic) upon madam witness?
A:       Yes ma'am.29
To rebut this, accused-appellant points to the mother's statement that
complainant is "quit intelligent." The statement that complainant is "quite
intelligent" must be read in the context of Virginia Lozada's previous
statement that complainant "thinks like a child but from her narration or
statement we can see that her declaration are (sic) true or believable."
Thus, what complainant's mother meant was that complainant, although
she thought like a child, nevertheless could tell others what happened to
her. Indeed, even the trial court admonished the defense counsel not to
use inculpatory questions because complainant might give inculpatory
answer.30 At another stage of the trial court reminded counsel. "The
witness [complainant] is not very intelligent. I think the witness cannot
even distinguish fates."31
Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she was
mentally deficient. The rule that findings of fact of the trial court should
not be disturbed since the trial court is in the best position to determine
the findings of facts32 cannot be more apt than in this case.
Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes
complainant as "coherent" and contends that this is an evaluation of the
mental state of complainant. This contention is totally without basis. The
medico-legal report categorically states that the purpose of the medical
examination is limited to determining whether the complainant had been
sexually abused.33 In order words, the purpose of the examination was to
determine her physical, not her mental, state.
Second. On the alternative, accused-appellant argues that indeed,
complainant could not be a competent witness if she is a retardate. Under
Rule 130, $20, any person who can perceive and make known his/her
perception is qualified to be a witness. In this case, although complainant
is a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-
appellant had done to her and to answer the questions of both the
prosecutor and the defense counsel. This is clear from her testimony, thus:
Q:       Now, you said that you were raped by Emiliano Duranan.
A:       In the bathroom of my Tiya Ineng.
Q:       Where is this bathroom of your Tiay Ineng?
A:       This bathroom is located at an alley, a "pasillo" towards
our house.
Q:       Where is your house, Miss witness?
A:       Our house is located at No. 28, K-6, Kamuning, Quezon
City.
Q:       You said that you were raped inside the bathroom of your
Tiya Ineng. How were you able to get inside that bathroom of
your Tiya Ineng?
A:       I was able to get inside the bathroom of Tiya Ineng
because Emiliano Duranan pulled me inside.
Q:       How did Emiliano Duranna pulled you? (sic)
A:       He pulled me inside the bathroom by holding his arm
against my neck, pulling me towards the bathroom.
…
Q:       When Emiliano Duranan pulled you inside the bathroom,
what happened after that?
A:       He kissed me
           (Witness is gesturing his (sic) hands towards her neck)
           And he had my panty removed.
Q:       Now, you said that when you were inside the bathroom of
your Tiya Ineng, Emiliano Duranan kissed you in (sic) your lips?
A:       Yes, ma'am.
Q:       Aside from kissing you, what did Emiliano do, if any?
A:       Aside from kissing me on my lips and my neck, he
removed my underwear, my panty and he inserted his sex organ
into my sex organ.
Q:       When "Kalbo" inserted his sex organ in your sex organ,
what position were you then?
A:       We were standing.
Q:       Inside the bathroom?
A:       yes, ma'am.
Q:       Nympha, do you know how to tell the days of the week?
A:       No, ma'am.
 Q:       How about the dates?
A:       No, ma'am.
Q:       Do you know what day is today?
A:       Wednesday.
Q:       How about yesterday, what date was that?
A:       Tuesday.
Q:       Do you know what date is today?
COURT:
She knows that today is Wednesday but she doesn't
know the exact date.34
….
Q:       You also testified before that you were rape (sic) by Kalbo
twice, is that correct?
A:       Yes, ma'am.
Q:       When was the second time?
A:       The second time at their house that was Tuesday.
Q:       Is that next day? After the incident in the bathroom?
A:       Yes, Ma'am.
….
Q:       So you said that you were laid down by Kalbo on the floor
and then Kalbo kissed you, where did Kalbo kiss you?
A:       From (sic) my lips.
Q:       After that what did Kalbo do if any?
A:       Proceeded to removed (sic) my panty and inserted his
organ to mine.35

At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify

should have been raised by the defense at the outset. It cannot be raised
for the first in this appeal. It has been held:

A party may waive his objections to the competency of witness

and permit him to testify…[I]f, after such incompetency appears,
there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having
knowledge of the incompetency, the objection will be deemed
waived, whether it is on the ground of want of mental capacity or
for some other reason. If the objection could have been taken
during the trial, a new trial will be refused and the objection will
not be available on writ of error.36

Third. Accused-appellant contends that the absence of injury sustained by

complainant negates the presence of any force and intimidation. This
contention is likewise without merit. The presence or absence of injuries is
not essential in proving rape. What is essential is proof that sexual
intercourse with woman was accomplished without her consent. In this
case, the absence of consent is shown by the fact that complainant is a
mental retardate vulnerable to intimidation by accused-appellant.

Indeed, the degree of force or intimidation required for the act to

constitute rape is relative, and must be viewed in the light of the
complainant's perception and judgement at the time of the commission of
the offense.37 What is vital is that such force or intimidation be sufficient
to consummate the purpose the accused-appellant had in mind. 38 In this
case, due to the complainant's mental retardation, the force or
intimidation required is not very great since it does not take much to force
a child into submission. Indeed, complainant said she submitted to
accused-appellant's demands because she was afraid he would get angry at
her if she refused them. In People v. Rosare,39 it was held that, in the
instances where the victim is so weak in intellect that she is incapable of
rational consent, the applied may be constructive.

In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the

testimony of her mother,40 the trial court's observations during the trial of
her demeanor, behavior, and her intelligence, 41 while the fact of sexual
intercourse is proven by the medico-legal certificate. 42 In addition, the
prosecution proved the presence of force and intimidation, and the court
appreciated such.43 The intimidation, in this case, is constituted by the
threats that accused-appellant made to the complainant, 44 not to mention
the force employed by accused-appellant in placing his arm on the
complainant's neck45 and holding her hands while undressing her. 46

However, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be doubled

because there are two counts of rape. In addition, complainant should also
be awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, or a
total of P100,000.00 in accordance with our rulings. 47

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 220,

Quezon City, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is increased to P100,000.00 and, in
addition, accused-appellant is ordered to pay complaint Nympha Lozada y
de Lara the further sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.