Com - Shares of Heir - Digests

G.R. No.
L-45262 July 23, 1990

RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special Administrator,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D.
PASCUAL,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and
involve similar issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on
November 18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of
his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes;
(2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3)
Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual
Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special
Proceedings in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the administration
of his estate. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some
properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto
to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966
executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are
included in the estate of Dr. Pascual and therefore should be excluded from the
inventory. On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the
inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula. In the meantime, Ursula
Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of
Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes. Benjamin Reyes, private
respondent in filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of
title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 115164. The two cases
were consolidated. The then Court of First Instance, Branch 8 rendered a joint
decision declaring that TCT in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void. Parungao
appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was,
however, affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The Intermediate Appellate
Court issued a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation in the present is to be considered Donation
Inter vivos or Donation Mortis causa.
HELD:
DONATION INTER VIVOS.
It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the
determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As
early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court
ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis
causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the
provisions stated in such deed.
In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481
[1954]) this Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter vivos and
"mortis causa" in this wise:
Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post
mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should
reveal any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal v.
Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista v.
Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the
so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was
executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and
affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee
to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee
was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards
the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other
provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give
naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of
the deed of donation.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued on January 5, 1977 is hereby LIFTED; and
2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This DENIAL is
FINAL.
________________
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO
and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters
Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and
Miguel N. Pascual.
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters
of Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
respondents alleged, that a parcel of land located in Teresa Village, Makati, which
was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of
which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of
petitioner.
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner which
respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be
considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as
probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the
donation. The Court of Appeals sustained the probate court’s ruling that the
property donated to petitioner is subject to collation bearing in mind that in
intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division. Thus, the
property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to
collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent.
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate
court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of
stocks owned by the decedent which have not been included in the inventory
submitted by the administrator."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.
Whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties.
HELD:
NO.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part
of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved
it for compulsory heirs.
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and
exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary
compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the
absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary
compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together
with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and
the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime,
he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that
it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the
free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.
YES.
The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-
siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the
collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate
of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.Let the records of the case be
REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court,
which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of
determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide
whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
________________
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO,
JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document
entitled "DonationMortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and
Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son,
Zoilo) covering the spouses’ lot and the house in Pandacan, Manila, in equal
shares. Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the
equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only
two persons. The named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation
on the face of the document. Guadalupe died. A few months later, Leopoldo, the
donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject
property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972. In 1998 Jarabini
filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis
causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Asuncion opposed the
petition, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in
the property to her.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the
donors’ intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees during
the donors’ lifetime, given its irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC,
Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property was
void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed the registration of the
property in the name of the donees in equal shares. On Asuncion’s appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the latter rendered a decision reversing that of the RTC. The CA
held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate of the deed of
donation mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in
Asuncion’s favor. The CA further held that, since no proceeding exists for the
allowance of what Jarabini claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC
erred in deciding the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that the donation,
being one given mortis causa, did not comply with the requirements of a notarial
will, rendering the same void. Following the CA’s denial of Jarabini’s motion for
reconsideration, she filed the present petition with this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion, Emiliano,
and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a
donation inter vivos.
HELD:
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is
not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter
vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis
causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where
"revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the
following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.12 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the
donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation
inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation
Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse."
The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso
that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.
Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.As Justice J. B.
L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida,16 in case of doubt, the conveyance should be
deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately
operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected
from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The
acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.17
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos,
Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to
Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign.
He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed December 23, 2008
Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549,
and REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.
G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA
M. CAÑETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD
namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD,
RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and
ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C. NAVADA,
respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother,
petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for
House and Lot." On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died. Upon learning of the
existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue, an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of
Donations and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation.
Respondents allege that petitioners through their sinister machinations and
strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused
the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for
failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of
wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.
Petitioners deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan
freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments.
The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and therefore
the four (4) deeds in question are null and void for failure to comply with the
requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills and testaments.
Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quo's decision to
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donations are mortis causa or inter vivos.
HELD:
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the
donee while the donor is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of
mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
and
transferee.13
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by
the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass
proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but
that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the
donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses,
uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa under the
terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to
express her profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR."
x x x
"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this Deed of Donation
mortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 106755 February 1, 2002
APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FLORENTINO LUMUBOS, DOMINGO COMIA, TEODORA CARAMPOT,
ERNESTO APOLO, SEGUNDA SUMPELO, MAMERTO SUMPELO and RICARDO SUMPELO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario Austria,
Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo, and one
of herein respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in a Japanese
concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II. On December 17, 1975, Basilisa
executed a document designated as "Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala (Donation)". On
February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house
and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00). As the result of the registration of that sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT
No. T-10434 was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of petitioner Apolinaria
Austria-Magat. Herein respondents, representing their deceased mother Consolacion
Austria, all surnamed Sumpelo, representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria,
and Florentino Lumubos filed before the Regional Trial Court Civil Case against the
petitioner for annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and for
reconveyance and damages. The trial court dismissed Civil Case because the donation
is a donation mortis causa pursuant to Article 728 of the New Civil Code inasmuch
as the same expressly provides that it would take effect upon the death of the
donor; that the provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the
donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa which must comply with the
formalities of a will; and that inasmuch as the donation did not follow the
formalities pertaining to wills, the same is void and produced no effect
whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said property was valid since she
remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirm the appellate court’s decision.
It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends
on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the
execution of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals,11 this Court enumerated the
characteristics of a donation mortis causa, to wit:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
transferee.
Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of the
donation in the case at bar. In Cuevas v. Cuevas, we ruled that when the deed of
donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated
(thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter
vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while
he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivosdespite an express provision that
the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while
he is alive.
Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation,the Court finds and so
hold that in the case at bar the donation is inter vivos. The express
irrevocability of the same ("hindi na mababawi") is the distinctive standard that
identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. The other provisions therein
which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable
character of the subject donation. According to the petitioner, the provisions
which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and
that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same, are
proofs that the donation is mortis causa. We disagree. The said provisions should
be harmonized with its express irrevocability.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the
acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is
a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations
inter vivos. On the other hand, donations mortis causa, being in the form of a
will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donor’s lifetime.18
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated June 30, 1989 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954
HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on June 27,
1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife
Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint charged that Domingo Bonsato then
already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of
donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato,
respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land, both donations having
been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that
the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The
defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations
made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services
rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely
without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and
prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000. After
trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision finding that the deeds of
donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without
pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any
condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor;
but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired
during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations
were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land
described therein. On appeal, Court of Appeals, rendered judgment holding the
aforesaid donations to be null and void, because they were donations mortis
causaand were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and
ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the
properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donations are Mortis Causa or Inter Vivos.
HELD:
Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-
established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away
from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both
donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations
mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as
an independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor
partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the
rules established for testamentary successions.
The Court insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that
the term "donations mortis causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name
to designate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of
donations.
Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem
in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal
any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs.
Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautistavs.
Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation executed by
the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime,
the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva el
donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueño"), a reservation that would be
unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most
significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the
donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not
lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New
Civil Code, Art. 828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after
the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective" (que despues
de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said
expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus
taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the donation
will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated
property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the
donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such
reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the
donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court
of First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against respondents.
B.TRANSMISSION/ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH
G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31,
respondents.
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS:
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera
several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.
The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. By virtue of Republic Act
No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July
31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
757. NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case. The records
show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother
of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased
her mother and left heirs. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. On
August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita
Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only
remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also
claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera. The Deed of
Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960,
allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then
Court of First Instance of Laguna. A Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning
the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null and
void. In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made
by Francisca Herrera, holding that: on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed
a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and
interest over the lots in question in favor of the protestee. Private respondent
Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. Feeling aggrieved by the decision
of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent
Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of
the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for
"Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals in a Decision reversed and held
that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction." The case
was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca
Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an
assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take
effect upon death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in arguing that assuming that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the NHA. That, "insofar as [the] NHA is
concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by
Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to
purchase the same before it."
HELD:
NO.
The Supreme Court is not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document commences
at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y
bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the
person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until
they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which
provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original
applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27,
1971. The NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to
the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial
applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the
estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed
properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the
property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in
the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be
able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by
operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon
Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor
revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties—Margarita Herrera
and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay
became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of
law. The Court did not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the
probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it
devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the
death of the instrument maker.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil
Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004
Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners,
vs.
Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario
Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita
is his wife. On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an
ejectment suit against the children. Respondents alleged that they were the owners
of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); that by
way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March
1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business;
and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of
P500 per week. Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease
agreement. They claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their
residence and business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near
one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the
problems of the family. They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot
the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children.
Thus, they contended that the lot covered had been allotted to Ismael as advance
inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly
given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation
of respondents’ house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lots were allotted to petitioners as part of their
inheritance and given in consideration for past debts.
HELD:
NO.
The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is
vested only upon the latters’ demise. Indisputably, rights of succession are
transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent. Assuming that there was
an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained with respondents.
Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons in the future is not
inconsistent with the owners’ taking back possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient. Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits,
petitioners offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish claim of
inheritance "allocation." Petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through
a dation in payment, Lot T-78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for
respondents’ debts. The evidence presented by petitioners related only to the
alleged indebtedness of the parents arising from the latter’s purported purchases
and advances. There was no sufficient proof that respondents had entered into a
contract of dation to settle the alleged debt. Petitioners even stated that there
was a disagreement in the accounting of the purported debt, a fact that disproves a
meeting of the minds with the parents.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS.
G.R. No. L-24098 November 18, 1967

BUENAVENTURA BELAMALA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO POLINAR, administrator, oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in Criminal Case No. 1922 filed
before the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL, against the same Mauricio Polinar
above mentioned and against other accused, for Frustrated Murder. The administrator
Marcelino Polinar is one of the legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio
Polinar now deceased. On May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder was
filed in the Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol against said Mauricio Polinar,
et al, and when said case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision thereof, convicting the said
Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him to pay
to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of
P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral
damages. The accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed to the Court of Appeals
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. While the appeal of said
Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and that there
was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of
Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals in said Criminal Case No. 1922, has
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, in toto, and said
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958; but said
Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956. The Court a quo, overruling the
contention of the Administrator-appellant that the death of the accused prior to
final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the
offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, admitted the
claim against the estate in the amount of P2,025.80 with legal interest from the
date claim was filed (30 July 1959) until paid. Not satisfied with the ruling, the
Administrator has appealed, insisting on his theory in the Court below.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability has been extinguished.
HELD:
NO.
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view
of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386)
that became operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out
by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for
damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages
was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action, still, since
both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of
the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. Such claim in
no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that imposes the obligation to
indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter acquired their
decedents obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil
Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108
ultimately becomes an obligation of the offender's estate. Furthermore, it does not
appear that the award of the trial Court was based on evidence submitted to it;
apparently it relied merely on the findings in the criminal case, as embodied in
decisions that never became final because the accused died during the pendency of
said case.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby reversed and set aside, but without
prejudice to the action of appellee Belamala against the Administrator of the
Estate of Mauricio Polinar.
C.OBJECT OF SUCCESSION
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
HILADO, J.:
FACTS:
The Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered
its decision in case of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal,
whereby said commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public
interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by
authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half
(2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O.
Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission,
therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the
provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of
public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain
and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-
1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said
plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail.
Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the
latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in
subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to
be in contravention of law. If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no
question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application before the
commission to its final conclusion. If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime
secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he died,
if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of
special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and
the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal
representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to
acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply
with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's
undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public
convenience — the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — was
under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability
to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain
such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its
objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is
no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration
just given.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the
Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as
amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the
power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates
of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the
United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock
companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the
further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such
entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United
States.
HELD:
YES.
The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical
person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of
course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those
rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his
death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before
the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of
said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue
from the opposite course.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one
example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights
guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term
"person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the
intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural,
persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among
these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of
the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate
for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is,
his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was
the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary
showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino
citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the
certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
WHEREFORE, decision affirmed, without costs.
G.R. No. L-28067 March 10, 1928
BASILIA ARAYATA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FLORENTINO JOYA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of
lease to six lots of the friar lands at Santa Crus de Malabon, municipality of
Tanza, Province of Cavite. Cecilio Joya married the herein plaintiff, Basilia
Arayata. When the Insular Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued
his lease in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902
and Act No. 1120 of the Philippine Commission. While married to the herein
plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing, on
installments, from the Government. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had
Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro
Tiongco transferred his right to said lots to Cecilio Joya by donation. These
transfers were approved by the Director of Lands and noted in the proper registry
book. Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot to Florentino Joya consideration of
the sum of P2,000 said conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and
registered in the proper registry book. On May 11, 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his
right to lot to Marcelina Joya and Francisco Joya in consideration of the sum of
P450, conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in
the proper registry book. On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya executed a will devising
lot to Florentino Joya, Pablo Joya, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor, brothers
Agustin and Pedro Joya, Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla, and Marcelina and
Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed the
payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the
lots in question except one, are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy
their products. On May 10, 1920 some lots were transferred to Florentino Joya as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Cecilio Joya.
On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, his executor, the herein defendant Florentino
Joya, presented said will for probate to the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
which was probated after the proper proceedings. In the course of the testamentary
proceedings, the executor Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of
partition by the legatees, which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of
the herein plaintiff's opposition, who alleged that her signature had been obtained
by fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the herein plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the possession and the
products of the friar lands acquired by the Insular Government, which, by virtue of
the law, pass exclusively to the surviving spouse upon compliance of the legal
requirements,
HELD:
YES.
While a deceased heirs or legatees acquire the ownership of the property given them
in the will and may taken possession of their respective portions upon the death of
their predecessor, yet upon the appointment of an administrator, the latter, by
virtue of his appointment, acquires a right to the possession of the property of
estate, subject to the orders of the court, unless he consents to the heirs
continuing in possession thereof. But such consent does not, however, relieve the
administrator of all responsibility for the management of the same and its fruits;
because until the judicial partition is made, said property continues to belong to
the testamentary estate. (Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Fernandez vs. Tria,
22 Phil., 603.)
Being a matter of law, the defendants-appellants cannot plead ignorance of the fact
that until a judicial partition of the property left by Cecilio Joya is made, said
property belongs to the lather's estate and it together with its products, is
subject to the payment of the testator's debts, if any. Only after judicial
partition has been made do they acquire the title to their respective legacies, if
the latter are valid. (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil.,
895.) We have seen that the legacies given by Cecilio Joya to the defendants were
void. If the lands, which are the subject matter of said legacies and which are in
the possession of the defendants, still belong to Cecilio Joya's estate, because no
judicial partition has as yet been made of the property he left, which is subject,
together with its fruits, to the payment of his debts, said defendants cannot
invoke the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to possession in good faith
insofar as the fruits are concerned; because even when the legacies are valid they
acquired only when the latter judicially assigned to them in the final partition,
and because, while said lands are under administration, the administrator is
obliged to render an account of his management of the same and the products
thereof.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified, and it is
ordered that Feliciano and Pablo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla, Delfin and Felicisima
Blancaflor return lots Nos. 1031, 1086, 1153, and 2352 to the plaintiff-appellant,
Basilia Arayata, together with their products, or the latter's equivalent in cash
from the year 1920 until their restitution, deducting the necessary expenses of
cultivation, preservation, and production. Without any special pronouncement as to
costs, it is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO
YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein
private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who
died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are
children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. It is
not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case. Aniceto left his
children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she
could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of
around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of
Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino
and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the
outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to
peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after
liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced
therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and
Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title covering Lot 773-A. TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a
portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered
under OCT No. 8804. The bigger portion of Lot 773 was also registered in the name
of Fortunato D. Santiago. Said transfer certificate of title also contains a
certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No.
8804. Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in
consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos.
T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name.
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the
administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special
Proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion
requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. By virtue of a court order
granting said motion, on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said
lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165
and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo
Alvarez. Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her
brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda.
de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the
"return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that
an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the
complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting,
the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that
defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of
attorney's fees. During the pendency in court of said case, Alvarez sold Lots 773-
A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. Meanwhile, Jesus
Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by
their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the
therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or
otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the
above-entitled case."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are correct in their contention that the liability
arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his
estate, after his death.
HELD:
NO.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this
jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir
is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the
legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present
claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is
of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved
into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the
hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts
of the estate. It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to
the extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and
considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the
deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private
respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE
DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
BUENA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose
estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings. Private
respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations
formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real
properties covered under the Torrens system. On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died
intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her
nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint petition for the administration
of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of
the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and
motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. The
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the private respondents' twin motions.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private
respondent corporations themselves. Petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim
during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are
the private respondents in the instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be
included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
HELD:
NO.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that
of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a
corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective
mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the
protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily,
they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly
separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. The corporate mask
may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but
the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist,
where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified
thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly
all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for
disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which
nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 145736 March 4, 2009

ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, in her capacity as (a)
Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A. Llenado and (b) Judicial Guardian of the
Minor children of Orlando A. Llenado, and (c) in her Own behalf as the Surviving
Spouse and Legal Heir of Orlando A. Llenado, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO LLENADO, JORGE LLENADO, FELIZA GALLARDO VDA. DE LLENADO and REGISTER OF
DEEDS of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila, Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land denominated as Lot 249-D-1
(subject lot) consisting of 1,554 square meters located in Barrio Malinta,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and registered in the names of Eduardo Llenado (Eduardo)
and Jorge Llenado (Jorge) under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-1689.4
The subject lot once formed part of Lot 249-D owned by and registered in the name
of their father, Cornelio Llenado (Cornelio), under TCT No. T-16810.
On December 2, 1975, Cornelio leased Lot 249-D-1 to his nephew, Romeo Llenado
(Romeo), for a period of five years, renewable for another five years at the option
of Cornelio. On March 31, 1978, Cornelio, Romeo and the latter’s cousin Orlando
Llenado (Orlando) executed an Agreement whereby Romeo assigned all his rights to
Orlando over the unexpired portion of the aforesaid lease contract. The parties
further agreed that Orlando shall have the option to renew the lease contract for
another three years commencing from December 3, 1980, up to December 2, 1983,
renewable for another four years or up to December 2, 1987, and that "during the
period that [this agreement] is enforced, the x x x property cannot be sold,
transferred, alienated or conveyed in whatever manner to any third party." Shortly
thereafter or on June 24, 1978, Cornelio and Orlando entered into a Supplementary
Agreement amending the March 31, 1978 Agreement. Under the Supplementary Agreement,
Orlando was given an additional option to renew the lease contract for an aggregate
period of 10 years at five-year intervals, that is, from December 3, 1987 to
December 2, 1992 and from December 3, 1992 to December 2, 1997. The said provision
was inserted in order to comply with the requirements of Mobil Philippines, Inc.
for the operation of a gasoline station which was subsequently built on the subject
lot. Upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda Llenado
(Wenifreda), took over the operation of the gasoline station. Meanwhile, on January
29, 1987, Cornelio sold Lot 249-D to his children, namely, Eduardo, Jorge, Virginia
and Cornelio, Jr., through a deed of sale, denominated as "Kasulatan sa Ganap Na
Bilihan,"7 for the sum of P160,000.00. As stated earlier, the subject lot, which
forms part of Lot 249-D, was sold to Eduardo and Jorge, and titled in their names
under TCT No. V-1689. Several months thereafter or on September 7, 1987, Cornelio
passed away. Sometime in 1993, Eduardo informed Wenifreda of his desire to take
over the subject lot. However, the latter refused to vacate the premises despite
repeated demands. Thus, on September 24, 1993, Eduardo filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila
against Wenifreda.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to his sons, respondents
Eduardo and Jorge, is invalid for (1) violating the prohibitory clause in the lease
agreement between Cornelio, as lessor-owner, and Orlando, as lessee; and (2)
contravening the right of first refusal of Orlando over the subject lot.
HELD:
NO.
It is not disputed that the lease agreement contained an option to renew and a
prohibition on the sale of the subject lot in favor of third persons while the
lease is in force. Petitioner claims that when Cornelio sold the subject lot to
respondents Eduardo and Jorge the lease was in full force and effect, thus, the
sale violated the prohibitory clause rendering it invalid. In resolving this issue,
it is necessary to determine whether the lease agreement was in force at the time
of the subject sale and, if it was in force, whether the violation of the
prohibitory clause invalidated the sale.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations
therein are not transmissible by their nature, by stipulation or by provision of
law. A contract of lease is, therefore, generally transmissible to the heirs of the
lessor or lessee. It involves a property right and, as such, the death of a party
does not excuse non-performance of the contract. The rights and obligations pass to
the heirs of the deceased and the heir of the deceased lessor is bound to respect
the period of the lease. The same principle applies to the option to renew the
lease. As a general rule, covenants to renew a lease are not personal but will run
with the land. Consequently, the successors-in-interest of the lessee are entitled
to the benefits, while that of the lessor are burdened with the duties and
obligations, which said covenants conferred and imposed on the original parties.
The foregoing principles apply with greater force in this case because the parties
expressly stipulated in the March 31, 1978 Agreement that Romeo, as lessee, shall
transfer all his rights and interests under the lease contract with option to renew
"in favor of the party of the Third Part (Orlando), the latter’s heirs, successors
and assigns" indicating the clear intent to allow the transmissibility of all the
rights and interests of Orlando under the lease contract unto his heirs, successors
or assigns. Accordingly, the rights and obligations under the lease contract with
option to renew were transmitted from Orlando to his heirs upon his death on
November 7, 1983.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 118248 April 5, 2000
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA,
DISTRICT III, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 16, 1988, petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy
with Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or
lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be exercised within a
period of two years counted from the signing of the Contract. In turn, petitioner
undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration for the reservation of its
option. Within the two-year period, petitioner shall serve formal written notice
upon the lessor Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option. The
contract also provided that in case petitioner chose to lease the property, it may
take actual possession of the premises. In such an event, the lease shall be for a
period of six years, renewable for another six years, and the monthly rental fee
shall be P15,000.00 for the first six years and P18,000.00 for the next six years,
in case of renewal. Petitioner regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by
the Contract to Encarnacion until her death in January 1990. Thereafter, petitioner
coursed its payment to private respondent Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of
Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments. Meanwhile, on
January 10, 1990, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the
properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent
Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 and issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in the name of Victor Bartolome.
Petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was exercising
its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for
the month of March. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to
surrender possession of the property to petitioner. Petitioner thus opened Savings
Account No. 1-04-02558-I-1 with the China Banking Corporation, Cubao Branch, in the
name of Victor Bartolome and deposited therein the P15,000.00 rental fee for March
as well as P6,000.00 reservation fees for the months of February and March.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Victor
and the Register of Deeds. Petitioner prayed for the surrender and delivery of
possession of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender
of title for registration and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the payment
of P500,000.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P300,000.00 as attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late
Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it
binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise.
HELD:
NO.
The general rule is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom
are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision
making the rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible. More
importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their nature,
transmissible.
It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract
terminates upon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a
character that it may be performed by the promissor's personal representative.
Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well performed by others are
discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is
of such a character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the
contract, by its terms, shows that performance by others was contemplated, death
does not terminate the contract or excuse nonperformance. 11
In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion
Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver
possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of
its option to lease the same may very well be performed by her heir Victor.
As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself and his
heirs." In 1952, it was ruled that if the predecessor was duty-bound to reconvey
land to another, and at his death the reconveyance had not been made, the heirs can
be compelled to execute the proper deed for reconveyance. This was grounded upon
the principle that heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction
entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the
property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. It is futile for
Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear
provision of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion,
there is privity of interest between him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds
to what rights his mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also
valid and binding as against him.
In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease, which
is a property right. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
contract which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder
pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is
not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest
in the subject matter of the contract.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 121940 December 4, 2001
JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO MENEZ, JR., respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to a
certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an area of 168
square meters located in Rosario, Pasig City and denominated as Lot 13, Block 7,
Pcs-5816 of the Government Service and Insurance System Low Cost Housing Project
(GSIS-LCHP). The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. 2 On February 19,
1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep.
Sometime in 1979, for being suspected as a subversive, an Arrest, Search and
Seizure Order (ASSO) was issued against private respondent. Military men ransacked
his house in Cainta, Rizal. Upon learning that he was wanted by the military, he
voluntarily surrendered and was detained for two (2) years. When released, another
order for his re-arrest was issued so he hid in Mindanao for another four (4) years
or until March 1984. In December of 1990, he discovered that the subject TCT was
missing. He consulted a lawyer but the latter did not act immediately on the
matter. Upon consulting a new counsel, an Affidavit of Loss5 was filed with the
Register of Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy6 of TCT No. 436465 was issued.
Private respondent also declared the property for tax purposes and obtained a
certification thereof from the Assessor's Officer. Private respondent sent notices
to the registered owner at her address appearing in the title and in the Deed of
Sale. And, with his counsel, he searched for the ,registered owner in Metro Manila
and Rizal and as far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog City, Tacloban City, and in Eastern
and Northern Samar. However, their search proved futile. On July 8, 1992 private
respondent filed a petition docketed as LRC Case No. R-4659 with the RTC, Branch
154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
436465 to replace the lost one. To show he was the owner of the contested lot, he
showed the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "D". The petition was set for hearing and
the court's order dated July 10, 1992 was published once in Malaya, a nationally
circulated newspaper in the Philippines. On September 18, 1992, there being no
opposition, Menez presented his evidence ex-parte. The trial court granted his
petition. On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a
copy of the abovecited decision. He-claimed this was the first time he became aware
of the case of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died
sometime in 1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant of the property and the
heir of Macaria, he filed his "Motion to Reopen Reconstitution Proceedings''11 on
October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an order denying said motion.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which, as earlier stated, was
denied in its decision of May 19, 1995. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but
it was denied in a resolution dated September 11, 1995.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent's allegation that failure to send notice to
petitioner who is the actual possessor of the disputed lot is fatal to the present
case.
HELD:
NO.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree"
is decisive. It provides:
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. — In case of loss
or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall
be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the
province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If
a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person
applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for :the registration of any
instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed
by the registered owner or other person it interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court
may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate
certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in
place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to
like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded
as such for all purposes of this decree.
Here, petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property based on the
memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the back of the title. His claim, that he
is an heir (nephew) of the original owner of the lot covered by the disputed lot
and the present occupant thereof is not annotated in the said memorandum of
encumbrances. Neither was his claim entered on the Certificate of Titles in the
name of their original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the time
of the filing or pendency of LRC Case No. R-4659. Clearly, petitioner is not
entitled to notice.
Noteworthy is the fact that there was compliance by private respondent of the RTC's
order of publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. This is
sufficient notice of the petition to the public at large.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent court is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Philippines International Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA,
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and
PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA.
DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/ public
officers acting for and in their behalf, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and FLAG, assail
not only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated
July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the August 11, 1997 order of the intestate
court nullifying the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock made by
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, in their personal capacities and without court
approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without
securing court approval have appropriated as their own personal property the
properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other
claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without court approval, have
distributed the asset of the estate among themselves and proceeded to dispose the
same to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the Estate
Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no legal
justification for this action by the heirs. There being no legal justification,
petitioner has no basis for demanding that public respondent [the intestate court]
approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose
Ortañez in favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
Parties to the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 are not the only heirs
claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez. The records of
this caseshow that as early as March 3, 1981 an Opposition to the Application for
Issuance of Letters of Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural
children of Dr. Juvencio P.Ortañez with LigayaNovicio. This claim by the
acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez is admittedly known to the
parties to the Memorandum of Agreement before they executed the same. This much was
admitted by petitioner’s counsel during the oral argument.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction in nullifying the sale of stocks by the
petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his mother [Juliana Ortañez] of the Philinterlife
shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez.
2. Whether or not an heir has the right to dispose of the decedent’s property
pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court.
HELD:
1. NO.
Public respondent can never be faulted for not approving the subsequent
sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his mother [Juliana Ortañez] of the
Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez.
It is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all
surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially
partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that
there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of
the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties
by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid,
the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without
court approval, was likewise void.
2. NO.
Whileitistruethatan heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the
property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.However, an heir can only
alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of
the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is,
after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been
given their shares.This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided
share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case,
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and
1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they
could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate
court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the
estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without
court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the
validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case ofGodoy vs.
Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an
administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to
the purchaser.
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA
UNGOS, petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA,
NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P.
ORFINADA, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City
leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City,Dagupan City
and KalookanCity. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he
married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso “Clyde” P. Orfinada, Nancy P.
Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso
Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour and their children. They are petitioner TeodoraRiofero, who became a part
of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the
subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners
Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995,
petitioner TeodoraRioferio and her children executed anExtrajudicial Settlement
of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the
estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry
of Deeds in Dagupanissued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in
favor of petitioners TeodoraRioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto
Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners
were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by
executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial
settlement.
Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and
Other Related Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of
Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense
that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement
pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of TeodoraRoofers
and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the
decedent had managed to register them in his name. Petitioners also raised the
affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but
rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator.
HELD:
YES.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.”
The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights
and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of
law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still
bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation.
II. WILLS
A. CONCEPT AND NATURE OF WILLS
G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENACOSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix AlejaBelleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that
Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria
MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil.
In the said Codicil, testatrix AlejaBelleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to
the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and
they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the codicils should be given effect.
HELD:
YES.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned
unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an
obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena
CoscolluelaBelleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did
not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it
imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy
of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator.
In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will,
as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances
under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in
all its parts must be adopted.
A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of
his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner
in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of
the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA
GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE,petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites
Agape, EstebanaGalolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No.
112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes.
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament
declaring
“xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion “Oning” R. Reyes the following
properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries,
coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own
in common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog,
Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan,
Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan,
all in the province of Misamis Oriental.”.
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of
the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals.
Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the
allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that
Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of her
cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed the trial
court’s decision admitting the will for probate but the modification that paragraph
II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in declaring that the contested
testamentary disposition in the will is valid.
HELD:
No.
TheCourtofAppealsdidnoterrindeclaringthatthesaidtestamentarydispositionsare
valid.As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court
merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the
formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It
does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the
will’s provisions.The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration
thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are,
however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined
as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will
may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.The intrinsic validity
of a will may be passed upon because “practical considerations” demanded it as when
there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful
legality.Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined,
the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the
will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the
said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2)
whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether
or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court
was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes
was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The
propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already
involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired
upon by the probate court.
In this case, there is a presumption of marriage wherein the testator himself
declared in his will that Asuncion is his wife. Moreover, in the elegant language
of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said-
“A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially
the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the
court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the
will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument
known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and
the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator’s having meant just what he said.”
(Santosvs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TESTAMENTARY ACT
G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904

ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant.
WILLARD, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant contested the validity of the will of Doña Juana Moreno upon the ground
that although the attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed
the will in the presence of three witnesses who also each signed in each presence,
the will was not actually written by the testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary that a will be written by the testator herself.
HELD:
No.
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written
by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express
direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either
that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by
someone in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work
of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this
case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testatrix is of
no consequence.
G.R. No. L-2071 September 19, 1950
Testate estate of Isabel V. Florendo, deceased. TIRSO DACANAY, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
PEDRO V. FLORENDO, ET AL., oppositor-appellees.
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a special proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of La Union
to probate a joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses Isabel V. Florendo
and Tirso Dacanay on October 20, 1940. Isabel V. Florendo having died, her
surviving spouse Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate said joint and reciprocal
will, which provides in substance that whoever of the spouses, joint testators,
shall survive the other, shall inherit all the properties of the latter, with an
agreement as to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties in case of
his or her demise.
The relatives of the deceased Isabel V. Florendo opposed the probate of said will
on various statutory grounds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said joint and reciprocal will may be probated in view of
article 669 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
No.
The prohibition of article 669 of the Civil Code is directed against the
execution of a joint will, or the expression by two or more testators of their
wills in a single document and by one act, rather than against mutual or reciprocal
wills, which may be separately executed.
Article 669 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
ART. 669. Two or more persons cannot make a will conjointly or in the same
instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person.
The reason for this provision, especially as regards husband and wife, is that when
a will is made jointly or in the same instrument, the spouse who is more
aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate the
terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he
or she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal,
either one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or
desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of the will whereby the whole
property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be
tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:
On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and GervasiaRebaca, executed a
joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our
two parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with all improvements
thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since
childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being
married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the testators is yet living, he
or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands aforementioned", the said
two parcels of land being covered by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated
in sitioBucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu. Bernabedela
Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by
said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after
due publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard the
evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in Special Proceedings No. 499. Upon
the death of GervasiaRebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate
of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952,
being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of Cebu,
but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot
to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed on March 30,
1954.
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament
null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the
Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the
Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals
reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of
probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint will executed is valid.
HELD:
No.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate,
entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe
de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite
the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint
wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a
third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate
court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did
not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its
final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the
probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil.
938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and sound practice
demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicaeut finis set litium (Dy
Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).
The SupremeCourtaddedthat the probate decree in 1939 could only affect the
share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the
disposition of the share of the wife, GervasiaRebaca, who was then still alive, and
over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it
remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during
the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of
the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo,
since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded,
the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one
prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased
GervasiaRebaca in the properties in question.
Therefore, the undivided interest of GervasiaRebaca should pass upon her death to
her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some
other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir
intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common
usage could not make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them,
because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the
contrary may prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7,
Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).
C. RULES IN INTERPRETATION OF WILLS
G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA
GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE,petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites
Agape, EstebanaGalolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No.
112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes.
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament
declaring
“xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion “Oning” R. Reyes the following
properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries,
coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own
in common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog,
Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan,
Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan,
all in the province of Misamis Oriental.”.
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of
the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals.
Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the
allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that
Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of her
cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed the trial
court’s decision admitting the will for probate but the modification that paragraph
II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in declaring that the contested
testamentary disposition in the will is valid.
HELD:
No.
TheCourtofAppealsdidnoterrindeclaringthatthesaidtestamentarydispositionsare
valid.As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court
merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the
formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It
does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the
will’s provisions.The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration
thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are,
however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined
as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will
may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.The intrinsic validity
of a will may be passed upon because “practical considerations” demanded it as when
there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful
legality.Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined,
the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate
of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in
the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2)
whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether
or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court
was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes
was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The
propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already
involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired
upon by the probate court.
In this case, there is a presumption of marriage wherein the testator himself
declared in his will that Asuncion is his wife. Moreover, in the elegant language
of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said-
“A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially
the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the
court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the
will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument
known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and
the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator’s having meant just what he said.”
(Santosvs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
D. GOVERNING LAW
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011

PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILLOF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITHPRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENTOF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS,Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last
will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio
C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in
the Philippines and in the U.S..
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of
Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition
for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator
of her estate.
However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that
Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she
executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be
probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed
under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of
such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of
the estate.
The RTC issued an order:(a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio,
the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of
Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA),arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals held that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,
subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the
documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed
out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate
and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from
reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate
is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision,
Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
where it was executed.
HELD:
No.
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the
province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such
estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or
legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at
any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will
must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d)
the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not
been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at
the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and
probated in the country of its execution.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA,
represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña FlorentinaRella, both of Ligao, Albay, together
with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua
thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and AmparoAlsua de Buenviaje, entered
into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial over the then
present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Florentina.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Florentina, also known as Doña Tinay
separately executed their respective holographic willsthe provisions of which were
in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25,
1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other
to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal
assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime among their four living
children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in the
event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half
thereof would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided
equally among the four children.
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic
will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions as the
above will of his wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;aTinay filed before the Court of
First Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their
respective holographic wills.
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;aTinay executed their mutual and
reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins.
Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the
properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed
to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of
November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and
Doñ;aTinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs
under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and reciprocally
bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well as in all properties
which might be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or
he be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him
or her, would be divided equally among the four children. It was also declared in
both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse
was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all
the properties reserved for themselves.
On the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a separate but similar
codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above codicil of his wife.
Also on the same day of August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay both
filed their respective supplemental petitions for the probate of their respective
codicils in the probate proceedings earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their
respective holographic wills and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to
probate.
Upon the death of Doña Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to
serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959.
Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he took his oath of
office and performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic
will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he
instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with their corresponding
descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft
a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses on
November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will and testament of
Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had three essential features: (a) it
expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus'
holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it
provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living
children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and
that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his estate among the
children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain
specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be
subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to
Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Doña Tinay had
been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for
approval a deed of partition executed on December 19, 1959 and which essentially
confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the holographic will and codicil
of Doña Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved the partition of 1959 and on
January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the proceedings on the estate of Doña
Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in
the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of
Don Jesus Alsua.Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru
his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus
was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of the alleged
will; (b) that the will was executed under duress or influence of fear or threats;
or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
main beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with them, or the
signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not
executed according to the formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged
will subject of probate contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon
by him, his deceased spouse, Doña Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo,
Amparo and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also
contravened Don Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956,
respectively, essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949
which had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the
partition of the estate of DoñaTinay in December, 1959.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not estoppel is applicable in probate proceedings.
2. Whether the respondent court erred in not allowing the probate of the last will
and testament of Don Jesus Alsua..
HELD:
1. No.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings. probate
proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the rile of
estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy.
Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see that
testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to
law. The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of the
right of any living person, but to determine whether or not the decedent has
performed the acts specified by the pertinent statutes, which are the essential
prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of devolution of his property on
death. There is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a proponent to
attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and frequently does
receive no personal benefit from the performance of the act. One of the most
fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to
effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with the public interest, the
devolutionary wishes of a deceased person.
2. YES.
The respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus
dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the
extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions thereof
and hence could not revoke his participation therein by the simple expedience of
making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is an error because
the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a
partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future
inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific
properties to the heirs made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25,
1949, contained specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule
that there was substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos under
the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could have been no valid
donation to the children of the other half reserved as the free portion of Don
Jesus and Doña Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to be divided equally among
the children for the simple reason that the property or properties were not
specifically described in the public instrument, an essential requirement under
Article 633 which provides as follows:
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be
made by public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described and in the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee
expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public
writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the
donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice
thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the
spouses which may be disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would
like in regards to his or her share in such portion, unencumbered by the provision
enjoining the last surviving spouse to give equally to the children what belongs
or-would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and
Doña Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of only
one-half of their combined properties which must be charged against their legitime
and cannot anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half remained entirely
at the free disposal of the spouses with regards to their respective shares.
Upon the death of Doña Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free
portion was distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated January 25,
1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the
distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic win and codicil,
independently of the holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on
the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both wills and
codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on joint
wills (Art. 818) and secondly because upon the death of Doñ;aTinay, only her estate
was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and
codicil of Doña Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that Doña Tinay
expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her
free portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her holographic will, mention
of her children as heirs was made.
G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before
the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at
the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the
liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he
discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous
relationshipwithhis brother. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce,
which granted. Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente; they lived together for 25 years
and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters
administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal,
the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they
have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry.
2. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD:
1. YES.
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid
according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by
Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as
a matter of comity.
2. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination
of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity” since he was a foreigner.
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan,
respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York,
containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not
known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have
predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted
their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate
probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in

Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York
law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law
should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and
sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate
proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and
that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could
present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued
an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed in the
Philippines.
HELD:
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens,
will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision
of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in
which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have
been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of
the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in
theforeign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to
probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court,
and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them.
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very

glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn
Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or
formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will
shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented
for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard
to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original
will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice
by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim,
are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section
4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of
the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint
probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and
sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings
pertinent to the probate proceedings.
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines,
died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and
personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province,
China, and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely,
Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr.
and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim
Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacanand after hearing letters of administration were issued to
ApolonioSuntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed
administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will
and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the
loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof
and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An
appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court
held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will
and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further
proceedings. In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was
issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting
witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for
continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and
dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After
liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of
his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by
the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated
in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, SilvinoSuntay filed a
petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed
in the Philippines on November 1929 or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien,
China, on 4 January 1931.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will of the deceased be allowed in the Philippines.
HELD:
No.
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy,
China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such
country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance
in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed
with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person
interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place
for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines,
the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the
Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be attached a copy of
the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the
same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must
be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must
also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China
in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on
these points.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district
court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting
witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy
does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in
probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating
or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation
of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for
in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties
must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested
parties residing in the Philippines.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China,does not purport to
probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view
thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done
in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated
transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of
a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and
recorded by a competent court of this country.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he
resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a
legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel
for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California
law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to
the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the
national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled
to anything under California law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said
in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law
which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for
Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the
Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the successional rights
under Philippine law only.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before
he died, he had made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other,
disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate
children were not given anything. Texas has no conflicts rule (rule of Private
International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas Law,
there are no compulsory heirs and therefore, no legitimes. The illegitimate
children opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of the
legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply).
ISSUE:
Whether or not they are entitled to their legitimes?
HELD:
Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes for under Texas law which
we must apply (because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no
legitimes.
The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar
v. Christensen Garcia, L- 6759, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domiciliary of another. In the present case, the decedent was BOTH a national and a
domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even assuming that Texas has
a conflicts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence however of proof as to the
conflicts of law rule in Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.
(Lim v. Collector, 36 Phil. 427; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500).
The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art.
1039) should be disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect provides
that our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is
WRONG, firstly, because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 are special provisions while
Art. 17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly, because Congress
deleted the phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article” when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change, the second paragraph of
Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been its purpose
to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself, which must
be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It
is, therefore, evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. (4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that
the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it will NOT ALTER the law, for as this Court ruled in
Miciano v. Brimo, 60 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner’s will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law
and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law, in this
regard, cannot be ignored.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitionervs. HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN,
respondent
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (Husband and Wife) provided mutually in their
respective will a provision wherein they would give all their estate to the
surviving spouse, and upon the death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of what
has been inherited by the surviving spouse from the earlier deceased spouse would
be bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of the later deceased. Mrs. Hodges died
first. Mr. Hodges was appointed special administrator and later executor of the
will. No liquidation was made. Upon death of Mr. Hodges, Magno was appointed
Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate and was initially also Mr. Hodges’ estate but
PCIB took over. Probate proceedings for both estated initiated, the two
administrators (PCIB and Magno) differed in the alleged share of Mrs. Hodges in
their conjugal partnership property that she could have bequeathed to her heirs.
PCIB alleged that the estate left by Mrs. Hodges is less than ½ of her share in the
conjugal estate (apply Philippine law), notwithstanding Art. 16 of our Civil Code
which mandates the application of Texas Law, Mr. Hodges being a citizen of Texas.
Magno, on the other hand, alleged that Texas Law applicable, wherein no system of
legitime provided so estate of Mrs. Hodges could not be less than her share or
should be more than ½.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB, should be applied and not Texas
Law?
HELD:
NO.Texas Law applies but it is yet to be proven. Elementary is the rule that
foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any
other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare
exceptional instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of
the court, such as when they are well and generally known, or they have been
actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned
claim otherwise.
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question
of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate
court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time).
E.TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, petitioner vs.
JOSEFINA VALMONTE, respondent
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the
United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came
home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200
Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister
CiriacaValmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his
arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28
years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5,
1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October
8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and
consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on
August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a
part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by
the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The
second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation
clause and again on the left hand margin.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the
testator’s will, testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the
testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law
office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the
testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the
notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare
it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and
locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed
date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to
come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his
witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and
every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood.
He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the
testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been
executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August
9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15,
1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also
testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable
at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid will?
HELD:
NO. We are not convinced. Fraud “is a trick, secret device, false statement, or
pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that
the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document
which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the
deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for
the fraud, he would not have made.”
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise
shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of
fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of
petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the
due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not
sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more
than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner
and her family, who were the ones who had taken “the cudgels of taking care of [the
testator] in his twilight years.”
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, “because the law does not
even require that a [notarial] will x xx be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion.” More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as
by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of
the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must
acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA
that “the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and
attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and
the instrumental witnesses.”
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a “grand conspiracy” in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent
stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of
the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due
execution.Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any
showing of ill motives.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify
accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and
even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was
sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated
earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appelle vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, et al., defendants-appellants
TRENT, J.:
FACTS:
The record shows that the testator, PioquintoPaguio, for some fourteen of fifteen
years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of
his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that
he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head
fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right
hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he
was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
PioquintoPaguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items
relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered
to Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify
that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to
attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if
they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with
an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus
written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the
testator and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator;
that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four
subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the
testator and each other.
One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the
will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he
indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting
witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of
his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he
(the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio,
testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state
whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for
his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that
he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and
he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that
the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder.
He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the
execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the
necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this
mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the
testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was
in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person
who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was
supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony
Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and
consequences of the decease from which the testator had suffered; he read in
support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In
answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify
to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
ISSUE:
Was the will duly made?
HELD:
YES. We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way
strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the
fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted
with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was
greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition
of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can be no doubt
that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite
evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his
life. However, we can not include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental
capacity to dispose of his property by will.
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well
established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane
by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is
therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper
evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and
authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that
mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue
in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order
to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the
number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both
medical and legal, are universal in statement that the question of mental capacity
is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of
mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the
last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days
to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the
statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the
conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental
capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of
the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He
seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he
was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied
a period several hours and that the testator was present during all this time,
taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is
perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same
is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-24665 October 13, 1926

ESTATE OF THE DECEASED ISIDRA ABQUILAN. ATANASIO ABQUILAN, petitioner-appellant vs.
FELICIANA ABQUILAN, opponent-appelle
STREET, J.:
FACTS:
This court refused to legalize an instrument purporting to be the last will and
testament of IsidraAbquilan, the deceased. It appears that the deceased left no
forced heirs, and her only heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother,
AtanasioAbquilan, the proponent of the will, and Feliciana Abquilan, a sister, who
is the opponent.
The denial was based on the finding of the trial court that the document propounded
as the will of the deceased is apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the
deceased to the supposed will are forgeries, and that the instrument in question
was not executed by the deceased. He therefore denied probate, and the proponent
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the purported last will and testament was executed by the deceased.
HELD:
NO. A clear preponderance of the evidence shows that on November 6, 1924, the date
when the will purports to have been executed, the supposed testatrix was not in a
condition such as to enable her to have participated in the act, she being in fact
at that time suffering from paralysis to celebralhemorrhage in such degree as
completely to discapacitate her for intelligent participation in the act of making
a will. A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as signed in two places
to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures leads to the conclusion
that the signatures to the supposed will were made by some other person.
Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely
demonstrate in our opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the date
attributed to the questioned document, and that, instead an attempt was made on the
night of that day to fabricate another will, which failed of completion because of
the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to the making of a will in which the
testatrix took no part. The instrument before us was undoubtedly fabricated later,
probably on November 7, at a time when the condition of the deceased was such as to
make rational participation on her part in the act of making a will impossible.
G.R. NO. 4445 September 18, 1909

CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appelle vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-apellants
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
The court admitted to probate a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow,
Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by the
appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased, and who would be entitled
to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears
that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.
The appellants alleged that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish
the execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the
will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and
mentally incapable of making a will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased was of sound mind and memory at the time of the
execution of his last will and testament?
HELD:
YES. That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion
fully established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore
positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It
is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely
ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent
attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the
paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this
evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a
lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses
as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear
recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of
land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the
person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires
touching the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary
capacity.
But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heir in
the ascending or ascending line; that a bitter family quarrel had separated him
from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator
because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano church; and that this
quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them
lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his
funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of
his property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who
themselves are grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound
mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in anywise
corroborates contestants’ allegation that the will never was executed.
G.R. No. L-24569 February 26, 1926
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant vs. MARGARITA
LOPEZ, opponent-appelle
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas Rodriquez, who was 76 years of age and was
in feeble health for a long time, made his will where he made his cousin Vicente
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as the only and universal heir of his
properties. The probate of the will was opposed by Margarita Lopez, cousin and
nearest relative of the deceased. The ground cited for the opposition was that the
testator lacked mental capacity, she claimed that at time of the execution of the
supposed will, the deceased was suffering from senile dementia and was under
guardianship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator was mentally capacitated during the execution of the
will?
HELD:
YES. The deceased testator had mental capacity to make his will during its
execution. The Supreme Court held that at the time of the making of the will, the
testator may be of old age, may have been physically decrepit, may have been week
of intellect, have suffered a loss of memory, had a guardian over his person and
property and may have been eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason
and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention, and to summon his
enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention which the law terms “testamentary
capacity.”
G.R. No. L-39033 November 13, 1933

IN RE WILL OF THE LATE MATEA ABELLA. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO, applicant-appelle vs.
MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
Testatrix MateaAbella of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, went to San Fernando, La Union
accompanied by her niece, to consult a physician. While in San Fernando, she stayed
in a convent under the charge of Father Cordero. After two consultations with the
physician, it was found out that Matea was suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of
the stomach.
Thereafter, Matea talked to Atty. Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make
a will. She was then interviewed by the lawyer twice on separate days in the
presence of four persons at the convent where she was staying. During the
interview, the testatrix even directed her niece to bring her the documents in her
trunk which she delivered to Atty. Reinoso.
After the will has been drafted in Ilocano, MacarioCalug, one of of the witnesses,
read the same to her and she approved. The will was then copied clean and was again
read to her and she expresses her approval thereof but inasmuch as it was rather
late at night, she did not care to sign the same suggesting that it be postponed to
the following day, April 29, 1932, which was done in the presence of each and every
one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other persons, including Father
Cordero. After the signing, Atty. Reinoso delivered the original copies of the will
to the testatrix.
On July 3,1932, Matea died of senile debility at the age of 88 years. Thereafter, a
petition for probate of Matea’s will was filed. The petition was opposed by
MarcianaAbella, one of the grounds cited was that the testator lacked testamentary
capacity since the she was 88 years old and was suffering from senile debility at
the time she executed her will.
The probate court admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MateaAbella possessed the mental capacity at the time she executed
her will?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court believed that based on the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will of the deceased showed that the testatrix was not so
physically weak, nor so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she
could not, with full understanding thereof, dispose of her properties and make a
will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor deafness, nor poor memory is by
itself sufficient to incapacitate a person from making his will. The mere fact that
in her will MateaAbella disposed of properties, which she had already donated to
other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of mental insanity. At most, it
constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of the
irrevocability of certain donations.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE,
respondents
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
On 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Dona FlorentinaRalla, together with all
their children entered into a duly notarized agreement over the then present and
existing properties of the spouses.
On 1955, the spouses separately executed their respective holographic wills, the
provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial
partition of November, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the
institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other
half already to be partitioned as part of the legitime of the four living children.
On 1959, Dona Florentina died. About 2 weeks after the death of his wife, Don Jesus
executed a new will, thereby revoking and canceling his previous holographic will
which he made on 1955 and also its codicil. On 1962, Don Jesus died. Petitioner
herein Alsua-Betts, as the executrix named in the will filed a petition for the
probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua. Oppositions thereto were filed by his
children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned will was executed in accordance with the requisites
prescribed by law pertaining to the soundness of mind of the testator during
execution of his will?
HELD:
YES. Don Jesus was of sound mind at the time of the execution of his will. Between
the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity and
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or
imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person from making
a will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know
what he is about to do and how and to whom he is disposing his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be
unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held
that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall
actually be insane or of unsound mind.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix,
petitioner-appelle vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ,
legatees, oppositors-appellants
ABAD-SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in
Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the
testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was
appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of
the estate as follows:
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows:
the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to
the widow 'en plenodominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or
"free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nudapropriedad."
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's
usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to
the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez,
with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and
Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of
the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5,
Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of
the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow
Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this
property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in
its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed
to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case.
HELD:
YES. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of
the estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired
his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only
survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled
to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,
condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question
and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor
of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third
of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of
the estate "en plenodominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is
given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To
give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention
for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor
Wanda.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution
in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
G. R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988

HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
A petition was filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22,
1981 seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late HerminiaMontinola
executed on January 28, 1980. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and
childless on March 29, 1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of
her real properties to specified persons.
On April 29, 1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an
urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. With the conformity of all
the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court appointed
private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.
On June 29, 1981, MatildeMontinolaSanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of
the deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to
Probate of Will, 7 alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely
written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated
or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties
to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person
and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will; and that the will
failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate.
The court admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator was of sound mind at the time of the execution of her
last will and testament?
HELD:
YES. The fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11)
of her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that
the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall
pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate successor.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than
compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the
Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact
that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue
influence. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament,
otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The exercise of improper
pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was
actually exercised.
Finally, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the observation of the respondent
court- There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will.
The most authentic proof that deceased had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the Will, is the Will itself which according to a report of one of the
two expert witnesses reveals the existence of significant handwriting
characteristics such as spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could not be
achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound mind/or
under undue influence or improper pressure when she executed the Will.
F. FORMS OF WILLS
GR. No. 13431 November 12, 1919

IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appelle vs. ANASTACIA
ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants
AVANCEÑA, J.:
FACTS:
The will of Ana Abangan executed on July, 1916 was duly probated. The opponents
appealed. The document consists of two (2) sheets, the first of which contains all
of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban
(in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The
following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by
the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left
margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these
omissions, according to appellants’ contention, are defects whereby the probate of
the will should have been denied. Further, appellants alleged records do not show
that the testatrix knew the dialect which the will is written.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the
first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the
bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix)
and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause
duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these
sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor
numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are
defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the
opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the formal requisites
prescribed by law?
HELD:
YES. In requiring that each and every page of the will should also be signed on the
left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act
no. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object
(referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said
sheets, thereby changing the testator’s disposition. But when these dispositions
are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin on the left
margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature
on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will
written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator
and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object
of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But when
all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of
the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although
unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
As to the allegation that the testatrix did not know the dialect in which the will
is written, the circumstances appearing in the will itself that the same was
executed in the city of Cebu, and the dialect in the locality where the testatrix
was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume
that she knew this dialect in which the will is written.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first
of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by
the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and
to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
G.R. No. L-28946 January 16, 1929
IN RE ESTATE OF PIRASO, deceased. SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant vs. SALMING
PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Benguet,
denying the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso.The will
was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know thus the
proponent-appellant contends that the will is not valid for it was not written in a
dialect understood by the testator. The proponent-appellant further contends that
the will should have been in the Ilocano dialect, the dialect that is known to the
testator.
The proponent-appellant assigns the following as alleged errors of the lower court:
1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have been drawn
up in the Ilocano dialect.
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano dialect well
enough to understand a will drawn up in said dialect.
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.
The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the judgment which
reads as follows:
The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although
imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of
the opinion that his will should have been written in that dialect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will herein is valid?
HELD:
NO. The fact that the will was written in English which the supposed testator
Piraso did not know, is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear
and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a
Spaniard or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil
Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
known by the testator," etc.
Moreover, the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan
vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know
the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the
contrary, can not be applied in this case because, in the instant case, not only is
it not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio where the deceased
Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the record contains positive
proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorot dialect, with a
smattering of Ilocano.
G.R. No. L-19079 January 15, 1923
PRIMITIVO GONZALES Y LAUREL, applicant-appelle vs.
JOVITO LAUREL Y TAPIA, opponent-appellant
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Batangas allowed the probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased Maria Tapia. Jovita Laurel now appeals to this court from
that ruling of the court below, alleging, among others, that court erred: 1. In
holding that the supposed will of the deceased Maria Tapia was executed with the
solemnities prescribed by the law, notwithstanding that there was no proof of the
dialect known by the said deceased; 2. In not holding that the signatures of Maria
Tapia appearing in the will had been obtained through deceit, surprise, fraud, and
in an illegal and improper manner
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid for being written in a dialect not known to the
testator?
Whether or not the testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in executing
and signing the will?
RULING:
YES. The deceased Maria Tapia was a resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog
region, where said deceased had real properties for several years. She requested
Modesto Castillo to draw her will in Tagalog. From the record taken as a whole, a
presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect, which
presumption is now conclusive for not having been overthrown nor rebutted.
YES. With respect to the second issue, the preponderance of evidence
established that the will was executed and signed by Maria Tapia voluntarily and
with full knowledge, without fraud, deceit, surprise, or undue influence or
machinations of anybody, she being then mentally capacitated and free.
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981

NENITA DE VERA SUROZ, complainant vs. JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondents
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Mauro Suroza and his wife Marcelina Salvador reared a boy named Agapito who used
the surname Suroza. Agapito got married to Nenita and begot a child named Lilia.
Agapito became disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian when he
was declared an incompetent.
Meanwhile, a couple entrusted their child Marilyn to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently
a girl friend of Agapito). The child was later delivered to MarcelinaSuroza who
brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. She
stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito. Marcelina supposedly
executed a notarial will when she was 73 years old. That will which is in English
was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all
her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Upon learning of the existence of a testamentary proceeding for the settlement of
Marcelina's estate, Nenita and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed a
motion to set aside the order ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son
Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that
Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the
decedent's granddaughter. In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already
apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he
issued an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted
heiress.
In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza
reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not
appear before the notary and because it is written in English which is not known to
her.
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised"
by Nenita.
ISSUE:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to
probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a
language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will
because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as
admitted by the notary himself?
HELD:
YES. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was
written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could
have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will,
it was stated that English was a language "understood and known" to the testatrix.
But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the
will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and,
therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the
Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the
testator.
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the
anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in
instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to
her supposed father who was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted
by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the
notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally
conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained
whether the will was validly executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be
inexcusable.
G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner, vs.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray died in 1943. Both died
without legitimate children. Respondent Abaja filed a petition for the probate of
the last will and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary
heirs his natural children EulogioAbaja and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of
Eulogio.
NicanorCaponong opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he
died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it,
should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and
attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the
testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the
alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo,
Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and
Carmela Tronco also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces
and grandchildren of Abada and Toray. The RTC admitted to probate the will of
Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order
allowing the probate of Toray’s will became final and executory. Caponong-Noble
further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the
testator signed the will and it’s every page in the presence of three witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the
attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that f Abada’s will has an attestation clause. While the
attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of
the will shows that three witnesses signed it. An attestation clause is made for
the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. The Court applied the
liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly show four
signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude
that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the
witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for
presentation of evidence aliunde.
With respect to the allegation that the attestation clause does not expressly state
the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its
pages in the presence of the testator and of each other, the Court has ruled that
precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable.
However, it is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be
deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January
2001 in CA- G.R. CV No. 47644.
G. NOTARIAL WILLS
G.R. No. L-5149 March 22, 1910
GREGORIO MACAPINLAC, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO ALIMURONG, opponent-appellant.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
Facts:
Simplicia de los Santos having died on June 19, 1907, her surviving
husband, Gregorio Macapinlac, submitted her will to the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for probate. Macario Alimurong, a nephew of the deceased, opposed the
proceedings and requested that "the will of the deceased, Doña Simplicia de los
Santos, be declared null and void for either of the two reasons" which he
expresses, and which are:
(1) Because the will was not executed and signed by the witnesses in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure now in force.
(2) Because it was executed under duress and undue and illegal influence on the
part of the persons benefited thereby or of a person acting in their interests.
the trial court declared the following facts to be proven:
(1) That at 6 o' clock on the evening of June 17, 1907, Simplicia de los Santos,
who was sick but in full possession of all her faculties, executed her will, which
is the document attached to the record, Exhibit No. 1 of the petitioner.
(2) That after the execution of such will on Monday, the testatrix died early on
the morning of the following Wednesday.
(3) That, as a preliminary act, a rough copy of the said will was made up, which
rough copy was read to the testatrix, and the latter ordered an additional clause
to be added thereto, in connection with a legacy that she desired to make in favor
of some of her old servants who and rendered good service.
(4) That, after the rough copy was amended by the addition of the above-mentioned
clause, a clear copy thereof was made up and was again read to the testatrix, who
approved it in all of its parts, and as she was unable to sign, she requested
Amando de Ocampo to sign for her and the latter wrote the following words with his
own hand. "At the request of the testatrix D.a Simplicia de los Santos, I signed —
Amando de Ocampo." Immediately afterwards and also in the presence of the same
testatrux and of each other, the witnesses Jose Juico, Gabino Panopio, Eusebio
dayao, Juan Angeles, Jose Torres, Alejo San Pedro, and Gregorio Sangil signed at
the bottom of the will.
In view of the said facts—the lower court concludes—the will executed by Simplicia
de los Santos must be admitted to probate. The provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings are fully complied with.
The will bears the name of the testatrix written by Amando de Ocampo in her
presence and by her express direction, and has been witnessed and signed by more
than three trustworthy witnesses, in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other.
Issue:
whether or not the will was signed in accordance with the law
held:
no. inasmuch as the law requires that when a person signs in place of the testator
he should write the name of the latter in the will as the signature; this was not
done by Amando de Ocampo in the will in question, as he did not sign it with the
name of testatrix.
It is shown by the evidence that the will was wholly written in the handwriting of
the subscribing witness, Gregorio Sangil, and at the foot thereof. it is claimed
that the form of signing for the testatrix "At the request of the testatrix Da.
Simplicio de los Santos, I signed: Amando de Ocampo," is not in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
Wherefore, The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. 2586 January 19, 1906
TOMAS GUISON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MARIA CONCEPCION, respondent-appellee.
Teodoro
WILLARD, J.:
Facts:
Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on January 3, 1904. the witness
Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the testatrix on the will, wrote
his own. Probate of the will was refused in the court below on the ground that the
name of the testatrix was not signed thereto, and the petitioner has appealed.
Issue: can the will be admitted for probate?
Held:
No. It will be seen that the witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the
name of the testatrix on the will, wrote his own. As such, it cannot be admitted
for probate on the ground that the name of the testatrix was not signed thereto.
Wherefore, The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days judgment
should be entered in accordance herewith and the case remanded to the court below
for execution.
G.R. No. L-9150 March 31, 1915
MARIANO LEAÑO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ARCADIO LEAÑO, objector-appellee.
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
Cristina Valdes, deceased, placed her costs against her name, attached by some
other person to the instrument offered for probate which purports to be her last
will and testament, in the presence of three witnesses whose names are attached to
the attesting clause, and that they attested and subscribed the instrument in her
presence and in the presence of each other.
Issue: whether or not the placing of a cross opposite her name at the construction
of the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure?
Held: yes. the placing of the cross opposite her name at the construction of the
instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that except where wills are signed by
some other person than the testator in the manner and from herein indicated, a
valid will must be signed by the testator. The right of a testator to sign his will
by mark, executed animo testandi has been uniformly sustained by the courts of last
resort of the United States in construing statutory provisions prescribing the mode
of execution of wills in language identical with, or substantially similar to that
found in section 618 of our code, which was taken from section 2349 of the Code of
Vermont. that the evidence of record satisfactorily establishes the execution of
that instrument as and for her last will and testament in the manner and form
prescribed by law.
Wherefore, The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be reversed,
without costs in this instance, and the record remanded to the court below, where
judgment will be entered admitting the instrument in question to probate in
accordance with the prayer of the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951

In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
Facts:
1. The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado dated Jan 1943. The
said will was written in Ilocano dialect.
2. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the
name of the testator followed below by 'A ruego del testador' and the name of
Florentino Javier. In effect, it was signed by another although under the express
direction of the testator. This fact however was not recited in the attestation
clause. Mercado also affixed a cross on the will.
3. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was reversed by the
Court of Appeals on the ground that the attestation failed to recite the facts
surrounding the signing of the testator and the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid
HELD:
NO
the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that Antero
or the testator caused Atty. Javier to write the former's name under his express
direction as required by Sec. 618 of the Civil Procedure. Finally, on the cross
affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held that it is not prepared to
liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons- the cross does
not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a valid
signature.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner.
So ordered.
G.R. No. 6845 September 1, 1914

YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS:
August, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented
a petition in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the
will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to probate, as the last will and
testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died in
the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Together with the petition was
the will, signed by deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and
Timoteo Paez. During the hearing, Timoteo Paez and Pablo Agustin declared that
they knew the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that she had died on the 11th day of
August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament;
that he was present at the time of the execution of the same; that he had signed
the will as a witness; that Aselmo Zacarias and Severo Tabora had also signed said
will as witnesses and that they had signed the will in the presence of the
deceased; that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed the will voluntarily; and
in their judgment, she was in the possession of her faculties; that there were no
threats or intimidation used to induce her to sign the will; that she signed it
voluntarily. It was ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong be allowed and admitted to probate. From the record it appears that no
further proceedings were had until the 28th of February, 1910, when Yap Ca Kuan and
Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in
the matters of the sail will and desired to intervene asked that a guardian ad
litem be appointed to represented them in the cause. The court appointed guardian
ad litem of said parties, Gabriel La O, appeared in court and presented a motion in
which he alleged, in substance:
XXX
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to sickness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in declaring that the testator had clear
knowledge and knew what she was doing at the time of signing the will.
HELD:
NO. Article 800 of the Civil Code states that: “The law presumes that every person
is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that
the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the
person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or
less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a
lucid interval.”We find the same conflict in the declarations of the witnesses
which we found with reference to the undue influence. While the testimony of Dr.
Papa is very strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong,
yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before
the execution of the will in question (Exhibit A). Several witnesses testified that
at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind
and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten
or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a
preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she
signed this will. In view of the conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and the
finding of the lower court, we do not feel justified in reversing his conclusions
upon that question. Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a
preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely
and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all of her faculties, the will
dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A).
Therefore the judgment of the lower court admitting said will to probate is hereby
affirmed with costs.
G.R. No. L-30289 March 26, 1929
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants.
OSTRAND, J.:
Facts:
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala,
a niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November,
1926, leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through
her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the
deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been
executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix
of the estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31,
1927, and made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the
deceased, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was
in possession.
On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver
to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the
property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de
Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in
her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de
Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and
Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the
ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment
would simplify the proceedings.
Issue: 1 whether or not the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the
thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and
2. whether or not the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the
witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph
of the body of the will.
Held:
1.The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this court in the
case of the Estate of Maria Salva, G. R. No. 26881.”the testatrix placed her thumb-
mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the law says that the will
shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by
the customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The
construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a
signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting.
A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by
the testator's mark.”
2. As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the
testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was
affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is
sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It
maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that,
standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken
in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and
sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to
the authenticity of the document.
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the
fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated
in the attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that
clause.
Wherefore, In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are
hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993

TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO,
OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA,
MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-
Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his
heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate
of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, already in
the twilight years of his life executed a last will and testament before three
attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It
was declared therein that, among other things that the testator was leaving by way
of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to specific persons, all
of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a
petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and testament but the
scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his
petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the
legatees named in the will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the
testator’s estate but due to his death, he was succeeded by William Cabrera, who
was appointed by RTC which is already the probate court.
PETITIONERS: The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testator’s will on the
ground that it was not executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since
the testator was already in a poor state of health such that he could not have
possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise contend that the will is null and
void because its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to
specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and
all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
RESPONDENTS: The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was of sound and
disposing mind and in good health when he executed his will. Further, they also
contend that the witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is
fatally defective such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
2. Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance
pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code.
Held:
1. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the
attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and
to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record
of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses;
it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities
required by law has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a
clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will,
should state:
1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the
will and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and
subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
“Attestation” and “subscription” differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein
assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking is
the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
2. The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought
to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect
in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the
form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application
of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil
Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would
not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and
attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not apply where
the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed
each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the
attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article
805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is
precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible
way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an
implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the
signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent
court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to
forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition for the Probate of
the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special Proceeding
No. 3965-R (In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active
case and thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the estate of the said
decedent.
G.R. No. L-9089 January 5, 1915
In re the state of the deceased SOTERA BARRIENTOS. SAMUEL PERRY, petitioner,
respondent-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE ELIO, petitioner, respondent-appellee.
ARAULLO, J.:
Facts:
Upon the deceased of Sotera Barrientos, a resident of the municipality of
Mambajao, Province of Misamis, 68 years of age, the wife of Samuel Perry in her
third marriage, in the said municipality on August 31, 1912, two documents were
presented in the Court of First Instance of the said province, each of which,
according to those who respectively presented them, was the last will and testament
of the said deceased.
The first document was filed on September 4, 1912, that is, four days after the
death of the testatrix, by Vicente Elio, son of her first husband, and her brother-
in-law; and the second on December 20 of the same year, 1912, by Samuel Perry, her
surviving husband. Perry opposed probate of the first document, and Elio, in turn,
that of the second. By agreement of both parties the two petitions were heard
jointly, in order that the evidence introduced to support the one might be used to
impeach the other. Likewise the court, on February 1, 1913, made one single order
in both cases, whereby, after giving due weight to the evidence introduced and
setting forth the findings of fact and of law that he deemed pertinent with respect
to each of the said petitions and to the documents to which they respectively
referred, he held that the said two wills were true and authentic, but that the one
executed on September 21, 1910, had been revoked by the one subsequently executed
on August 26, 1912. He therefore denied the probate of the first, that is, of the
one executed in favor of Samuel Perry, and ordered that the second will, in favor
of the other petitioner, Vicente Elio, be probated as the last will and testament
of the said Sotera Barrientos, disallowing with costs the claim of the respondent
Perry.
Issue: is the will valid?
Held: in order that a will may be deemed valid, that is executed by one person and
signed by another on account of the testator’s inability to sign, the law requires
(sec. 618, Code Civ. Proc.) that it shall have been signed under the express
direction or by the express order of the testator. In the present case, as we have
already seen, when Elio and his companions took the said document to the house of
Sotera Barrientos, there to be executed as her will, it already contained a
statement in the paragraph preceding the space reserved for the signatures of the
testatrix and the witnesses, to the effect that, as the testatrix was unable to
sign the will by reason of her advanced age and her debility, she authorized and
begged Santos Matayabas to do so at her request. There is no proof whatever that
Vicente Elio was instructed by Sotera Barrientos to have that statement inserted in
the said document, when, as he testified, the drafting and preparation of the
instrument was commended to him. It is evident, therefore, that it was all merely
the idea and purpose of Elio himself.
For the foregoing reasons, and taking account of the fact that Samuel Perry, the
widower of the deceased Sotera Barrientos, has also requested the probate of the
document presented by him, under date of September 21, 1910, as being the last will
and testament of the decedent — a will the legality and due execution of which were
recognized by the lower court in the order appealed from, notwithstanding which it
was not admitted to probate for the reason that it was held to have been revoked by
the other later document presented by Vicente Elio as the will of the said decedent
— we revoke the order appealed from and deny the petition for the probate of the
aforementioned document dated August 26, 1912, presented by Vicente Elio as the
last will and testament of the said decedent, Sotera Barrientos; without special
finding as to costs. In view of this decision, the lower court will proceed as the
law requires with regard to the petition made by Samuel Perry for the probate of
the document presented by him dated September 21, 1910, as the last will and
testament of the said decedent. So ordered.
G.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906

GERMAN JABONETA,Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.,Defendants-
Appellees.
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
On the 26th day of December, 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed under the following
circumstances the document in question, which has been presented for probate as his
will.
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered
that the document in question be written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto
Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as his will.
They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present
when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his
request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses.
Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in
the presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment
Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was
leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in
position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo
Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana
signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto
Jalbuena.
Issue: whether or not the will is a dmitted for probate?
Held:
yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his
hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with
the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact
there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was
affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and
that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being
written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had
assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same
room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the
document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation
to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his
eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his
doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before
he finally left the room.
The principles on which these cases rest and the tests of presence as between the
testator and the witnesses are equally applicable in determining whether the
witnesses signed the instrument in the presence of each other, as required by the
statute, and applying them to the facts proven in these proceedings we are of
opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the instrument were
complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on the
ground stated in the ruling appealed from.
Wherefore, The judgment of the trial court is reversed, without especial
condemnation of costs, and after twenty days the record will be returned to the
court from whence it came, where the proper orders will be entered in conformance
herewith.
C.A. No. 4 March 21, 1946

In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra. TRINIDAD NEYRA,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE BLANCO, oppositors-
appellants.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. BLANCO, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
DE JOYA, J.:
Facts:
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any
ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of
her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and
her other relatives named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de
Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said will in favor of her only sister
Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy; that when the said will was
brought to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after due
deliberation and consideration, said religious organization declined the bounty
offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation was duly
communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said
religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the
latter decided to make a new will, and for that purpose, about one week before her
death, sent for one Ricardo Sikat, an attorney working in the Law Offices of
Messrs. Feria and LaO, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will;
that Attorney Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, in accordance with the
express instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, merely prepared a draft in the
form of a codicil, marked as Exhibit M, amending said will, dated September 14,
1939, again naming said religious organization, among others, as beneficiary, and
said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of the said religious
organization, for their consideration and acceptance.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and
confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession, after
which she expressed her desire to have a mass celebrated in her house at No. 366
Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy communion, in view of her
condition; that following the request of Encarnacion Neyra,
Issue: whether or not the testator has testamentary capacity when she made the
will?
Held: yes. it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra, at the age of 48, died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart
attack, after an illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has
considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators,
more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction
in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of, and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon
the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute
his property among the objects of his bounty. (Bugnao vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the opponents
to the probate of a will, who stated that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was
held not to affect the full possession of the mental faculties deemed necessary and
sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix
was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's testimony to the
contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or last stage of
tuberculosis.
After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we find it
legally impossible to sustain any of the errors assigned by the appellants. The
judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919

In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
Facts:
1. On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will
executed on July 1916. It is from this decision which the opponent appealed. It is
alleged that the records do not show the testatrix knew the dialect in which the
will was written.
Issue: Whether or not the will was validly probated
Held:
YES. The circumstance appearing on the will itself, that it was executed in Cebu
City and in the dialect of the place where the testarix is a resident is enough to
presume that she knew this dialect in the absence of any proof to the contrary. On
the authority of this case and that of Gonzales v Laurel, it seems that for the
presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that the will must be in a
language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution, and, 2) that the
testator must be a native or resident of the said locality
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 15566 September 14, 1921

EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose
Garcia, objectors-appellants.
STREET, J.:
Facts:
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the
will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez,
the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia.
Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one
of the three attesting witnesses who testified — with details not necessary to be
here specified — that the will was executed with all necessary external
formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing
faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who
wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were
not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.
The will was signed on the right margin.
Issues: whether or not the will is valid despite the fact that the signatures where
on the right margin instead of the left?
Held:
yes. The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In
Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures were placed at the bottom of the
page and not in the margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments and
to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to
any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such
deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment
appealed from will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the
appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa
Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the
evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in
Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an
original and a carbon copy.
2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the
original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in
Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy
but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the
will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other
witnesses in his presence.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his
signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will
RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere
inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that
the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate
may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then
in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can
be probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the
testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the
will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was
regular in all respects.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
G.R. No. L-21151 February 25, 1924
In re will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased.
RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,
HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, legatees-appellants,
vs.
FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Facts:
as a will was propounded by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate. and contested by
Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and Virgilio Rustia, the court of
First Instance of Manila having denied its probate.
The applicant takes this appeal, assigning error to the action of the lower court
in holding the attestation fatally defective and in not finding Act No. 2645 void.
The defects attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to wit:
(a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of the
will.
(b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will.
(c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will.
(d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.
(e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each
other, nor with knowledge on the part of the testator that they were signing his
will.
(f ) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of the
testator.
(g) This clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of the will
and was attached to the will after the death of the testator.
(h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of Exhibit A are not authentic.
Issue: is the attestation clause made in accordance with the formalities required
by law?
Held: yes. In the case at bar the attestation clause in question states that the
requirements prescribed for the will were complied with, and this is enough for it,
as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the requirements prescribed by
the law for it.
The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does not
affect its validity, for, as above stated, the law does not require that it be
signed by the testator.
We find no merit in the assignment of error raising the question as to the validity
of Act No. 2645, which is valid. For the purposes of this decision, it is not
necessary to reason out this conclusion, it being sufficient for the adjudication
of this case to hold the first error assigned by the appellants to have been
demonstrated.
G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir.
Agustin Liboro questioned the validity of the said will based on the following
ground, among others:
1. The first sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters or
in Arabic numerals.
2. That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements.
3. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will.
4. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is known by
Don Sixto Lopez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.
HELD: Yes, the will is valid.
1. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional
numeral words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first
page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents
of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on
the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the
preceding page. Further, the first pages is captioned “Testamento”.
2. The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out
in Liboro’s appelant’s brief are incidents not all of which every one of the
witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in
which they occurred.
3. Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name.
The reason for this was that he was suffering from “partial paralysis.” There is
nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark
as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference.
Both ways are good.
4. There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly
placed in the will that the testator knows the language being used therein. It is a
matter that may be established by proof aliunde.
AMADO
Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitioners vs.

Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as Special Administrator
of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
FACTS:
Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and testament
before three attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a
notary public. It was declare therein that, among other things, that the testator
was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after,
he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and
testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away
before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera,
one of the legatees named in the will, sought his appointment as special
administrator of the testator’s estate but due to his death, he was succeeded by
William Cabreara, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate court. In
the course of the hearing, herein petitioners claiming to be nephews and nieces of
the testator, appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the
testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the
testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have
possibly executed the same; and that the signature of the testator is not genuine.
The probate court rendered a decision that such will is the Last Will and Testament
of Mateo Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites
of the law. Upon appeal to CA, the petitioners asserted that the will in question
is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective
since it fails to specifically state the instrumental witnesses to the will
witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. However, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court ruling and ruling
that the attestation clause in the Last Will substantially complies with Article
805 of the Civil Code. Due to denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,
hence this appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is
fatally defective such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance
pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting
witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the
manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the
facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it
gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities
required by law has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a
clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will,
should state:
The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and
all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and
subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
“Attestation” and “subscription” differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein
assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking, is
the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought
to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect
in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the
form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application
of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil
Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would
not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and
attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not apply where
the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed
each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the
attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article
805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is
precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible
way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an
implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the
signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
Rosario Feliciano VDA. DE RAMOS, et al., petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, Marcelina (Martina) GUERRA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978
FACTS:
Adelaida Nista claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for the
probate of the alleged will and testament as well as codicil of the late Eugenia
Danila. Adelaida prayed that after due notice and hearing, the alleged will and
codicil be probated and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator
of the estate. Buenaventura and Marcelina, both surnamed Guerra, filed an
opposition alleging among others that they are legally adopted children of the late
spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that the purported will and codicil
were procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities required by
law for the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with; that the
late Eugenia Danila had already executed her last will and testament was duly
probated and not revoked or annulled during her lifetime; and that Adelaida is not
competent and qualified to act as administration of the estate. Afterwards, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the lower court.
The petitioners herein filed a motion for leave to intervene as co-petitioners and
filed a reply partly admitting and denying the material allegations in the
opposition to the petition and alleging among other things, that oppositors
repudiated their institution as heirs and executors because they failed to cause
the recording in the Register of Deeds the will and testament in accordance with
the Rules and committed acts of ingratitude when they abandoned the testatrix and
denied her support. Subsequently, the intervenors (petitioners herein) also filed a
motion for new trial and/or re-hearing and/or relief from judgment and to set aside
the judgment based on the compromise agreement and consequently, the oppositors
interposed an opposition to the motion to which the intervenors filed their reply.
The lower court allowed and admitted to intervene the petitioners herein, the
compromise agreement was disapproved except as regards to their lawful rights, and
the original petition and amended opposition to probate of the alleged will and
codicil stand. The lower court also denied the motion for the appointment of a
special administrator filed by the intervenors. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. The lower court then allowed the probate of the
will although two of the instrumental witnesses testified that they did not see the
testatrix sign the will. The oppositors herein appealed to the Court of Appeals set
aside the order of allowing the probate. Hence, this present action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and testament and its accompanying codicil were
executed in accordance with the formalities of the law considering the complicated
circumstances that two (2) of the attesting witnesses testified against their due
execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary.
RULING:
There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince the Supreme Court that the
will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law.
It appears positively and convincingly that the documents were prepared by a lawyer
and the execution of the same was evidently supervised by his associate and before
whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a
will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an
ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. If there should be any stress on the participation of lawyers in the
execution of a will, other than an interested party, it cannot be less than the
exercise of their primary duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of
the law. There is no showing that the lawyers who participated in the execution of
the will had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the presumption of regularity on the questioned documents. There
were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion
of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was
presented to prove their occurrence. There is no question that each and every page
of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the
three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim far from being
deficient were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither it is disputed
that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of
each and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary
Public who was all the time present during the execution.
Agapita N. CRUZ, petitioner vs.

Hon. Judge Guillermo P. VILLASOR and Manuel LUGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973
FACTS:
Agapita Cruz is the surviving spouse of the deceased Valente Cruz. Agapita filed
before the CFI an opposition for the allowance of the will of his late husband
alleging that the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and
undue influence because the said instrument was executed without the testator
having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what
properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not
executed in accordance with law. However, due to unfavorable decision, Agapita
appealed by certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the supposed last will and testament was executed in accordance with
law.
RULING:
Of the three instrumental witnesses, one of them is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the last will and testament in question
was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means
to avow. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he
would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself.
This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article
805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806
which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be that only two
witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the
circumstance, the law would not be duly observed.
Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, petitioner, vs.

Hon. Conrado M. VASQUEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. L-26808, March 28, 1969
FACTS:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried and leaving no descendants, ascendants,
brother or sister thereafter, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. De Precilla, niece of the
deceased petitioned for probate the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria
dated December 1960 and that she be appointed as special administratrix. Various
parties opposed the petition contending that the 1960 will was not intended by
Gliceria to be her true will and that there was a 1956 will executed by Gliceria
were the oppositors were named as legatees. Consequently, Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis an
ophthalmologist testified that Gliceria’s left eye suffered form cataract in 1960
which made her vision mainly for viewing distant object but not for reading prints.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 808 regarding blind testator be followed in the instant case
to make Gliceria’s will valid?
RULING:
For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del
Rosario was like a blind testator and the due execution of her will would have
required observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code.
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by
the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is
blind or incapable of reading the will himself, is to make the provisions of the
will known to the testator, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the
dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the
handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced
by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but
twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the
range of his (the testator’s) other senses.
Brigido Alvarado,
Cesar ALVARADO, petitioner vs.
Hon. Ramon GAVIOLA
G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993
FACTS:
Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled, “Huling Habilin” wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son, Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a
previously executed a holographic will at the time awaiting probate before RTC. As
testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and Cesar, the
testator did not read the final draft of the will, instead, Atty. Rino, as the
lawyer who drafted the document read the same aloud in the presence of the
testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. While the
testator’s will was admitted to probate, a codicil was subsequently executed
changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator’s
eye operation because he was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance
and the revocatory clauses remained and as in the case of the notarial will, the
testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was
Atty. Rino who read it alound in his presence and in the presence of the three
instrumental witnesses and of the notary public. Upon the testator’s death, Atty
Rino as executor filed a petition for probate of the notarial will which was in
turn opposed by Cesar alleging that the will sought to be probated was not executed
and attested as required by law. Upon failure of Cesar to substantiate his
Opposition, a Probate Order was issued from which an appeal was made to IAC stating
that the probate of the deceased’s last will and codicil should have been denied
because the testator was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his
“Huling Habilin” and the codicil thereto was executed;and that since reading
required by Art. 808 was admittedly not complied with. CA concluded that although
Art. 808 was not followed, there was, however, as substantial compliance.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind within the meaning of Article 808 at the
time his “Huling Habilin” and codicil were executed.
If so, whether or not the requirement of double-reading in said Article was
complied with such that whether or not, they were validly executed.
RULING:
Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason
or another, are “incapable of reading their wills. Since the deceased was incapable
of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of
their execution due to his “poor,” “defective,” or “blurred” vision, there can be
no other course but to conclude that he comes within the scope of the term “blind’
as used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so
conformably with his instruction. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed
and entitled to probate, it is essential to ascertain whether or not Art. 808 had
been complied with.
There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the contents of the will and
codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
contrary, with respect to the “Huling Habilin,” the day of the execution was not
the first time that the testator had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the
contents of the draft. Moreover, with four persons following the reading word for
word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on
the typewritten documents. This is especially true considering the fact that the
three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator.
The spirit behind that law was served though the letter was not. Although there
should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order
to insure authenticity of the will, the formal imperfection should be brushed aside
when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account may only
defeat the testator’s will. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose
of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding
the execution of will are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud
and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege.
Abangan v Abangan
Avancena;
Nov 12, 1919
FACTS:
Trial Court admitted Ana Abangan’s probate. The will is described in thefollowing
manner:
First sheet:
Contains all the disposition of the testatrix.
Signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of
Ana Abangan) Signed by three witnesses
Second sheet:
Contains only the attestation clause. Duly signed by the same three witnesses at
the bottom. Was not signed by the testatrix herself Anastacia Abangan (different
person) et al. appealed from this decision. She says that the probate should have
been denied on three grounds: Neither of the sheets were signed on the left margin
by the testatrix and the three witnesses the pages were not numbered by letters It
was written in a dialect that the testatrix did not understand.
Issue: WON the probate should have been admitted.
Ruling: Yes. The trial court was correct in admitting the probate.1. Re: signing on
the left margin- The object of Act 2645, which requires that every sheet should be
signed on the left margin, is only to avoid the substitution of any sheet, thereby
changing the dispositions of the testatrix.- Act 2645 only took into consideration
cases of wills written on several sheets, which did not have to be signed at the
bottom by the testator and the witnesses.- But when the dispositions are duly
written only on one sheet, and signed at the bottom by the testator and the
witnesses, the signatures on the left would be purposeless.- If the signatures at
the bottom already guarantee its authenticity, another signature on the left margin
would be unnecessary.- This interpretation of Act 2645 also applies to the page
containing the attestation clause (the second sheet). Such a signature on the
margin by the witnesses would be a formality not required by the statute.- It is
also not required that the testatrix sign on the attestation clause because the
attestation, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not the
testator since the testator does attest, but executes the will.2. Re: Page
numbering- Act 2645’s object in requiring this was to know whether any sheet of the
will has been removed.- But when all the dispositive parts of the will are written
on one sheet only, the object of the Act 2645 disappears because the removal of
this single sheet although hot numbered, cannot be hidden.
FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO, substituted

by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006, Tinga, J. (Third Division)
Facts:
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the
will is written is fatally
defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps
most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere
jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of
these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects
is just aching for judicial rejection.
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial
will purportedly
executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The
will consisted of
two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the
number of pages
and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said
witnesses affixed
their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda
Castillo opposed
the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will
was not executed and
attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedent’s signature
did not appear on
the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in
accordance with
law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore “the modern tendency in
respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will…with the end in view of giving the testator
more freedom in
expressing his last wishes.” According to the trial court, the declaration at the
end of the will under
the sub-title, “Patunay Ng Mga Saksi,” comprised the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement,
and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also held
that the signing by the
subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing
the attestation
clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially
satisfied the purpose of
identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed
the trial court’s
decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the
attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void
and undeserving of
probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that “the
number of
pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause” is merely
directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as “the substantial compliance
rule.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law and,
hence,
should be admitted to probate
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the
will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the
instrumental witnesses
is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain
an acknowledgment,
but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial
will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE – CIVIL LAW
Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal
requirements of
wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant therefrom is the
requirement that the
attestation state the number of pages of the will. The enactment of the New Civil
Code put in force a
rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the
attestation clause is
concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section 618.
Article 809 of the
Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction
through the
“substantial compliance rule.” However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the
rule “must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page;
whether the subscribing witnesses are
three or the will was notarized...But the total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being
the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.” The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
103554, May 28, 1993,
222 SCRA 781): “the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied
by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal
and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being
assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.”
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the
will was
written remains a fatal flaw, despite Art. 809. This requirement aims at
safeguarding the will against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing
any increase or
decrease in the pages. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this
requirement if the
will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation
in Singson and
Taboada. In this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance
with the
requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the
attestation clause or
anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for
the insertion of the
number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the
instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-
hand margin of the
will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805
particularly segregates the
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the
requisite that the will
be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every
page signify,
among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms
part of the will. On
the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the
statements contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation
clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of
the page containing
the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses’ undertakings in
the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a
wholly different
avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario
ko ngayong
10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” By no manner of
contemplation can these words
be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It might be
possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to the
usual language
thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that
before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not acknowledged
before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – CIVIL LAW
before a notary public. The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is
highlighted by the
fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805 and
entrusted into a
separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement of Art. 806 is that the will
be “acknowledged”,
and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and
the
instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had
executed and subscribed
to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under
pain of perjury,
thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the
execution of spurious
wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides
a further degree of
assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to those
persons he/she had designated in the will.
Guerrero vs Bihis
G.R. No. 174144 April 17, 2007
Facts:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero andrespondent
Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTCQC. Respondent
Bihis
opposed her elder sister’s petition on the following
grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; itsattestation
clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the requirementsof the law; the
signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children
procured the will through undue and improper pressure andinfluence. The trial court
denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of
the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was “acknowledged” bythe
testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix’s residence at No. 40 Kanlaon
Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissionednotary
public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Did the will “acknowledged” by the testatrix and the instrumental witnessesbefore a
notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy therequirement
under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a
notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by thetestator
and the witnesses. This formal requirement is one of theindispensable requisites
for the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial willthat is not acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and theinstrumental witnesses is void and
cannot be accepted for probate.The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial
jurisdiction.
—
The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with
theprovince. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-
extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarialact
beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.Sine Atty. Directo was not a commissioned
notary public for and in QuezonCity, he lacked the authority to take the
acknowledgment of the testratix andthe instrumental witnesses. In the same vain,
the testratix and theinstrumental witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the
will beforehim. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Bu
enaventura’s last will and testament was, in
effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
Taboada v. RosalGutierrez,Jr. (Nov. 5, 1982)Pet: Apolonio Tobadoa, for the probate

of the will of Dorotea PerezRes: Hon. Avelino S. Rosal, Judge CFI Leyte who denied
the probate of the will for want of formality inexecvution.Doctrine: Specific
requirements for a Notarial Will may be liberally construed to prevent the will of
thetestator from being defeated by purely technical considerations. Here, witness
signatures at the marginwas sufficient compliance of the req. for attestation and
subscription by 3credible witnesses.
Facts:1. FILED: Probate of the will of Dorotea Perez, written in the Cebuano-
Visayan Dialect consisting of twopages. Page1: the entire testamentary dispositions
and signed at the end by the testatrix. Thewitnesses signed at the left hand
margin. Page2:Attestation and acknowledgment, signed by thetestatrix at the left
hand margin, signed by the three witnesses at the end.2.
The petitioner complied with the requirement of publication and no opposition was
filed. Hence thecourt commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence which was
accordingly presented.3.
CFI: J.Pamatian
–
DENIED the probate of the will for want of formality in execution. It also
requiredthe petitioners to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their
corresponding addresses sothat they could be properly notified and could intervene
in the summary settlement of the estate.4.
Instead of complying Pet FILED: M for 30day period(extension) to deliberate. And

the 10day periodof submitting the list be held in abeyance.5.
Pet FILED: MR
–
but was not acted upon by J.Pamatian coz he was transferred. And M forAppointment
of a Special Administrator.6.
New CFI J. Rosal (Resp.)

–
DENIED the MR as well as the motion because the pet failed to complywith the order
requiring him to submit the list of intestate heirs.Hence pet filed the present
petition.
Issue: w/n for the validity of a notarial will, does Art 805 NCC, require that BOTH
the testatrix and the3witnesses to sign at THE END of the will and in the presence
of the testatrix and one another?
Decision: No. Liberal Construction, would permit the testatrix to sign at the end
and the witnesses at themargins.1.
Art 805 NCC provides:

Every will, other than a hol,ographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator
himself or by the testator’s name written by sonme other person in his presence,
and by his
express dirextion, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in thepresence of the testator and one another
…
2.
Lower Court’s Stand: Both the testatrix and the witnesses should sign at the end.
Pet. Stand: Art 805 does not make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute
necessity forwitnesses to sign specifically at the end of the will after the
signature of the testatrix.3.
Note that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed differently:
“Attestation” –
witnessing the execution of the will
“Subscription” –
is the signing of the witnesses names upon the same paper for the purpose of
identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator
IN RE WILL OF ANTONIO VERGEL DE DIOS, RAMON J. FERNANDEZ vs. HERMELO VERGEL, et al.
G.r. No. L-2115, February 25, 1924
Facts:
The question in this case is as to the validity of the will of the late Antonio
Vergel de Dios, which was propounded by Ramon Fernandez for probate, and contested
by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and VirgilioRustia, alleging that
the attestation clause was fatally defective since the witnesses did not sign the
attestation clause in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Issue:
Whether or not the signatures of the testator and the paging of the will are also
necessary in the attestation clause
Ruling:
The attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which
the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
This refers to the contents of the text of the attestation, not the requirement or
signatures thereof outside of its text. It does not require that the attestation
clause be signed by the testator or that the page or sheet containing it be
numbered. In the case at bar the attestation clause in question states that the
requirements prescribed for the will were complied with, and this is enough for it,
as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the requirements prescribed by
the law for it. The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not
appear does not affect its validity, for, as above-stated, the law does not require
that it be signed by the testator. Furthermore, although the numbering of the sheet
containing the attestation clause does not appear in the upper part thereof, yet if
that numbering is found in its text, as when it is said therein that
the will consists of three sheets actually uses, correlatively numbered, besides
this one, that is to say, the sheet containing the attestation clause, the
requirement prescribed by the law is substantially complied with, for if the will
consists of three sheets besides the one containing the attestation clause, it is
evident that the latter is the fourth page is to say, that the document consists of
four sheets.
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80
he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but
acknowledged only on 9 August 1983.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister.
According to the notary public who notarized the testator’s will, after the te
stator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the
notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to
prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the
notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9
August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no
longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the
document to appear dirty. Petiti
oner’s argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years
old and was no longer of sound mind. 2. Josefina conspired with the notary public
and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is
allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of
the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the
will. 2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or
trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their
location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the
will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its

disposition becomes irrelevant. 2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false
statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such
character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of
the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain
will which, but for fraud, he would not have made. The party challenging the will
bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution.
The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud. Omission of some relatives does not affect
the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on
the will does not invalidate the document,
“because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by
the notary public and instrumental witnesses.
Canopong- Noble v. Alipio Abaja
Facts:
Abada died sometime in May 1940.[4] His widow Paula Toray (“Toray”) died sometime
in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja (“Alipio”) filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,[5] docketed as SP
No. 070 (313-8668), for the probate of the last will and testament (“will”) of
Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children
Eulogio Abaja (“Eulogio”) and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong (“Caponong”) opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no
will when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really
executed it, should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not
executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will
of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by
Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz,
Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada (“Joel Abada, et al.”), and
Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco (“Levi Tronco, et
al.”), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and
grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will
of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the
order allowing the probate of Toray’s will became final and executory.
s prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar[11] is appointed administrator of the estate

of Paula Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after letters of
administration shall have been issued in his favor and after taking his oath and
filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada
shall continue discharging her duties as such until further orders from this Court.
Issue:
Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the
attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws
Held:
Yes. Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not
indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the
appellate court in applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining the
number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number of
witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,[30] the
Court recognized that there are two divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one
being based on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. In
Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,[31] the basic case on the liberal
construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s
will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It
is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will.
CEFERINO ALDABA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
LUDOVICO ROQUE, opponent-appellant.
Facts:
It appears from the record of the case that on July 9, 1918, Maria Roque y Paraiso,
the widow of Bruno Valenzuela, resident of the barrio of Mambog, municipality of
Malolos, Province of Bulacan, executed her last will and testament in the Tagalog
dialect with the help of Vicente Platon and in the presence of three witnesses who
signed the attestation clause and each of the four pages of the testament. Maria
Roque died on December 3, 1919, and when her will was filed in court for probate,
it was contested by Ludovico Roque on the ground that it had not been prepared nor
executed in conformity with the requirements and solemnities prescribed by law.
After due proceedings had been had, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by its
decision rendered on February 27th of the following year, pronounced the testament
in question valid, and ordered its probate, appointing Ceferino Aldaba as the
administrator of the estate.
Issue:
whether or not the ommission of the numbering of pages render the will invalid
Held:
No. In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause
on another. Neither one of these pages was numbered in any way; and it was held:
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and
the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by
the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on
their margings by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
This means that, according to the particular case, the omission of paging does not
necessarily render the testament invalid.
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on the
upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be place din the lower part,
would the testament be void for his sole reason? We believe not. The law also
provides that the testator and the witnesses must sign the left margin of each of
the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would
this fact also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has already held in
Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145):lävvphì1·né+
It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses
shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is
undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory
requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same
doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court.
Maravilla v. Maravilla
Facts:
ppellant Herminio Maravilla, probate petitioner and husband of the decedent, died
on 16 July 1966, after the case was submitted for decision. Upon motion for
intervention filed by Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and Rose Mary Kohlhaas, this
Supreme Court allowed their intervention on 24 July 1967, upon showing that their
interest as substitute heirs was vested definitely upon the death of Herminio
Maravilla, and that said movants for intervention merely adopt the pleadings and
briefs filed in behalf of the deceased Herminio Maravilla so that the intervention
will not delay the disposition of the case. 2
Appellees Pedro, 3 Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed "Maravilla," who are allegedly
the brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla and oppositors to the
probate, had moved to require the P. C. Laboratory to submit explanations of the
photographs of the will and the signatures thereon previously filed, 4 but this
Court, considering that such explanation would amount to new evidence not heard at
the trial, denied the motion on 3 August 1967. 5
Herminio Maravilla’s petition for probate was opposed by the appellees in an

amended opposition filed in the course of the trial in the court below and admitted
without objection. The opposition alleged the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses did not sign the alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the
presence of each other.
Issue: wether or not there is proper attestation in the will
Held:
Yes. The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "A," which is typewritten in the
Spanish language, purports to have been executed in Manila on the 7th day of
October, 1944; it consists of five (5) pages, including the page on which the
attestation clause was completed. The purported signatures of the testatrix appear
at the logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the other
pages.
Upon the evidence, the trial judge concluded that Mansueto did not actually see
Digna Maravilla sign the will in question, basing such conclusion upon the fact
that while Mansueto positively identified his own signature ("I identify this as my
signature") but not that of the testatrix, his five answers to the questions of
counsel, in reference thereto, being "this must be the signature of Mrs. Digna
Maravilla."cralaw virtua1aw library
In our opinion, the trial court’s conclusion is far fetched, fanciful and
unwarranted. It was but natural that witness Mansueto should be positive about his
own signature, since he was familiar with it. He had to be less positive about
Digna Maravilla’s signature since he could not be closely acquainted with the same:
for aught the record shows, the signing of the will was the only occasion he saw
her sign; he had no opportunity to study her signature before or after the
execution of Exhibit "A." Furthermore, he witnessed Digna’s signing not less than
fourteen years previously. To demand that in identifying Digna’s signature Mansueto
should display a positiveness equal to the certainty shown by him in recognizing
his own, exceeds the bounds of the reasonable. The variation in the expressions
used by the witness is the best evidence that he was being candid and careful, and
it is a clear badge of truthfulness rather than the reverse.
We are satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to the effect that the
testament, Exhibit "A," was duly executed by a qualified testatrix and competent
witnesses, in conformity with the statutory requirements.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of the 1944
will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said testament is hereby
ordered probated. Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to law. Costs against oppositors-appellees.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent
Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of Dy Yieng
Seangio. However, petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition
contending that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general
power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the
most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate; and 4)
Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents.
Thereafter, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed
by the petitioner and reiterating that the probate proceedings should take
precedence over the petition filed by the private respondents because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the intestate proceedings. The
two petitions were then consolidated. Private respondents moved for the dismissal
of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the
Civil Code, of which petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss.
RTC then issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings. Due to
petitioner’s denial of motion for reconsideration, hence this present action.
ISSUES:
* Whether or not the holographic will is valid.
* Such that, whether or not the disinheritance is valid.
RULING:
A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need to
be witnessed.
Secundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It
is written, dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo himself. An intent to dispose
mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In
other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s
intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the
reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For
disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same
must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefore shall be
specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by
Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole,
can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that
the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated, it is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent to take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.
No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A.
FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of
the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died
leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia
Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the
deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez
and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for
probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he
then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.
RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend
from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing
cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was
totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they
were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the
legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because
the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents,
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death. The will stated as follows:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a
certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the
property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34,
residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this
seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the
parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.
The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor
of the parents and declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited
and that they are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of
heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is
reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
ISSUE:
May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still
be valid with respect to the free portion of the will?
RULING:
No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the
Civil Code states that “(T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of
the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.”
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. The will completely
omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were
deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Remedios’ claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the
legitime and that she should thus be considered a devisee or legatee is without
merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must be
expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of
disinheritance as the law also requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the
disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will. Absent that, no
inference of disinheritance may be had.
HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D. ORENDAIN,

Petitioners,[1]
- versus -
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ,

Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a
last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate. At the time of her
death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was
completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes, as
provided in her will. Some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions
contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the properties and the income from
her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.
Thus, the following pertinent items in the will paint the desire of the decedent:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties, after
the necessary deductions for expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a
fund with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual
administration (pangasiwaan sa habang panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to be
divided among, and distributed to the different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to certain
beneficiaries, to be deducted from the fund deposits in the bank mentioned in
Clauses 2 and 3.
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain,
heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent’s
will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had
been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of Articles 867 and 870
of the Civil Code.
The trustees argued that the trust instituted may be perpetual citing the case of
Palad, et al. v. Governor of Quezon Province where the trust holding the two estate
of one Luis Palad was allowed to exist even after the lapse of twenty years.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not a trust may be perpetual.
* Whether or not the named trustees may be considered as heirs to the estate.
RULING:
The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the twenty-year allowable
period, the estate may be disposed of under Article 870 of the New Civil Code,
which regards as void any disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the
estate inalienable for more than 20 years.
The Palad Case is not violative of such provision of the law by the trust
constituted by Luis Palad because the will of the testator does not interdict the
alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income of said
two parcels be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and operation of the
high school.
Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the socialization of the
ownership of property and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which give
rise to agrarian troubles. The trust involved in the Palad case covers only two
lots, which have not been shown to be a large landholding. And the income derived
therefrom is being devoted to a public and social purpose – the education of the
youth of the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a sense socialized.
In the present case, however, there is a different situation as the testatrix
specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were
definitely more than the two (2) properties, unlike in the Palad case. The herein
testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because
the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.
Apparent from the decedent’s last will and testament is the creation of a trust on
a specific set of properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will
can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trust’s designated
beneficiaries to inherit these properties. Therefore, the probate court must admit
the case to determine the properties to be subject to intestate succession as well
as the nearest relative of the deceased that may inherit the said properties under
the perpetual trust.
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA
CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal apetition for probate,ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently
allowedwith the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whomwere
Basilia’s legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming tobe the nearest of
kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had notin fact been adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law,thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent
and withoutany right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that thiscircumstance
should have left the whole estate of Basilia open tointestacy with petitioners
being the compulsory heirs.It is alleged by petitioners that the language used
imply thatBasilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound tobequeath
one-half of her entire estate to the respondents as thelatter's legitime, with the
inference that respondents would nothave instituted the respondents as heirs had
the fact of spuriousadoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from
theuse of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and"sapilitang
mana" (legitime), the impelling reason or cause for theinstitution of the
respondents was the testatrix's belief that underthe law she could not do
otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the CivilCode applies whereby, “the statement of a
false cause for theinstitution of an heir shall be considered as not written,
unless itappears from the will that the testator would not have made
suchinstitution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barringthe petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim evento properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.
HELD:
No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled underarticle 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur: First , the cause for the institution
of heirs must be stated in the will;second , the cause must be shown to be false;
andthird , it mustappear from the face of the will that the testator would not
havemade such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent's
will does not state in a specific or unequivocal mannerthe cause for such
institution of heirs. Absent such we look at otherconsiderations. The decedent’s
disposition of the free portion of herestate, which largely favored the
respondents, compared with therelatively small devise of land which the decedent
left for her bloodrelatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give
therespondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her togive to them.
Excluding the respondents from the inheritance,considering that petitioner nephews
and nieces would succeed tothe bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would
subvert theclear wishes of the decedent. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved
on its side,especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of
thetestator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done inthis case.
Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of thetestator should be allowed to
prevail. Granted that a probate courthas found, by final judgment, that the
decedent possessedtestamentary capacity and her last will was executed free
fromfalsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that givingfull
expression to her will must be in order.
G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, deceased.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Facts:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that
Helen Garcia was a natural child of thedeceased. The Court of First Instance
equally divided the propertiesof the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan
(whom testatorexpressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia.In
the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in thewill thus, the
institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled andthe properties passed to both of
them as if the deceased diedintestate.
issue:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equallydivided or
whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir shouldbe merely reduced to the
extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the
entire estate.
Held:
he inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to coverthe legitime of Helen
Garcia.Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as hisnatural daughter and
limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00.When a testator leaves to a forced heir
a legacy worth less than thelegitime, but without referring to the legatee as an
heir or even asa relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons,
theheir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulledentirely, but
only that the legitime be completed.
[G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005]

J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, petitioner, vs.
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia
Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio).
Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: JosefaTeves Escaño (Josefa) and
Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely:
MariaEvelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino),
Milagros Reyes Teves (MilagrosReyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).The present
controversy involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre,
which was originallyregistered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don
Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the land wasamong the properties involved in
an action for partition and damages. Thereafter, the parties to the case
enteredinto a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the
properties of Don Julian. The property was toremain undivided during the lifetime
of Don Julian. The Compromise Agreement lays down the effect of theeventual death
of Don Julian that in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties now
selected andadjudicated to Don Julian shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife
in second marriage of Don Julian and his four minor children.On 16 November 1972,
Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with
Assumptionof Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year later, Don
Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed aninstrument entitled Supplemental to the
Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Supplemental Deed. Thisinstrument transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Don Julian died
intestate.Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken
possession over the subject lot after theexecution of the Compromise Agreement. In
1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and
Hilaria Cadayday. At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of
absolute sale,respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his
lifetime?
Held:
yes. Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering
Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner,Don Julian remained the owner of the property
since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirsfrom the second
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don
Julian retained theabsolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right
cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her childrenon the ground that it had
already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.The
adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became
automatically operative uponthe approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby
vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 infavor of respondents.
All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may
be theobject of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be
the object of contracts. No contract may beentered into upon future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law. Well-entrenched is the rule thatall
things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the
object of a contract. Theexception is that no contract may be entered into with
respect to future inheritance, and the exception to theexception is the partition
inter vivos referred to in Article 1080. The first paragraph of Article 1080, which
providesthe exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the general rule
on future things, reads: ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall berespected, insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.. . . .The partition inter
vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article
1347. However,considering that it would become legally operative only upon the
death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from thesecond marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a
mereexpectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father.
Being the prospect of a futureacquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate.
It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which itrelated was at the
time nonexistent and might never exist
G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Testator Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his properties by
universal title to his children by his secondmarriage with preterition of his
children by his first marriage.- Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapita, Getulia, Rosario and
Celerina are all Neri’s children by his first marriage. The trial court annulled
the institution of the heirs and declared total intestacy.- The children by the
second marriage filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that:1) there is
no preterition as to the children of the first marriage have received their shares
in the property left by thetestator 2) assuming that there has been a preterition,
the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simplythe
reduction of the bequest made to them. The children by the second marriage anchor
their argument on the concept of ―heir‖ whose A814 definition is deemed repealed by
that of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is maintained that the word "heredero"
under the Civil Code, is notsynonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of Civil
Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter Code is nolonger personally liable
for the debts of the deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code
ISSUES
1. WON there is preterition
2. WON there should be annulment of the institution of the heirs and open the
estate to total intestacy
HELD:
YES, there is preterition-
According to the court’s findings, none of the children by the first marriage
received their respective shares from the
testator’s property
- Even if clause 8 of the will is invoked (said clause states that the children by
his first marriage had already receivedtheir shares in his property excluding what
he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money theyhad
borrowed from him) the Court can rely only on the findings of the trial court that
the inventory indicates that theproperty of Neri has remained intact and that no
portion has been given to the children of the first marriage.- Neri left his
property by universal title to the children by his second marriage and did not
expressly disinherit hischildren by his first marriage but did not leave anything
to them. This fits the case of preterition according to A814, CCwhich provides that
the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be
declared open.2. YES- The word "heir" as used in A814 of the Civil Code may not
have the meaning that it has under the Code of CivilProcedure, but this does
prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in substance the
subject-matter of A814 of the Civil Code.- It may also be true that heirs under
the Code of Civil Procedure may receive the bequest only after payment of debtsleft
by the deceased and not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing
only upon the question as towhen succession becomes effective and can in no way
destroy the fact that succession may still be by universal or special title.- Since
a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of forced
heirs, its nullity as provided in article814 still applies there being nothing
inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil Procedure. The basis for its nullity is
thenature and effect of the bequest and not its possible name under the Code of
Civil Procedure.- In addition, Secs. 755 and 756 of the Code of Civil Procedure
affected A814 and A851 of the Civil Code. But thesesections have been expressly
repealed by Act No. 2141, thus restoring force to A814 and A851
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall
beinherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for
thelast 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his
adoptedson. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent
Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?
HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under
theterms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.Preterition
and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.Preterition consists in the omission in
the testator's will of the forced heirs oranyone of them, either because they are
not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited.Disinheritance is atestamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime fora cause authorized
by law.By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of
thatcontroversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the
trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however,
that from the faceof the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition
is still questionable. TheSpecial Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.
G.R. No. L-8927 March 10, 1914

ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal which involves a question which arises from the interpretation of
the first andsecond clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson.The court
below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that
portionwhich their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive at the
time the will wasmade; that the property should be divided into six equal parts
corresponding to the number ofsisters; that each living sister should take one-
sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each
one- sixth to be divided among said children equally.The appellants asserted that
under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil, theproperty should be
divided equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceasedsisters,
share and share alike, a niece taking the same share that a sister receives. Hence,
thisappeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall
take percapita and in equal parts the property passing under the codicil in this
case.
Held:
Yes. The appellants' contention is well founded.The court finds expressions which
seem to indicate with fair clearness that it was the intention ofthe testatrix to
divide her property equally between her sisters and nieces.Upon looking at the
codicil, it can be observed that: first, that the testatrix, in the first
paragraphthereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires that "my
sisters and nieces, ashereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs; in the second
place, that the testatrix, in thesecond paragraph of the codicil, names and
identifies each one of her heirs then living, in eachone of the persons whom she
desires shall succeed her husband in the property. Among thosementioned specially
are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no
waydifferent from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the
codicil as clearlyas the other and under exactly the same conditions; and in the
third place, the last clause of thesecond paragraph of the codicil, taken together
with the last clause of the first paragraph, isdecisive of the intention of the
testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of thepersons whom she
desires to take under her will be name "so that they must take and enjoy
theproperty in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."We have then in the first
paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall becomethe owners of
her property on the death of her husband, her nieces as well as her sisters. Wehave
also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and
the nieces shalltake and enjoy the property in equal parts. Thus, of the property
passing under the codicil, theliving sisters and the children of the deceased
sisters shall take per capita and in equal parts.
December 22, 1928

G.R. No. 29789
In re estate of Jose Macrohon Tiahua. FRANCISCO BARRIOS, administrator-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDA ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., heirs-appellants.
IGNACIO MACROHON, appellant.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Facts:
surviving spouse of the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua, and the latter's legitimate
children on the one side, and Ignacio Macrohon, his adulterous son, on the other,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, laying down the
following conclusions of law: (1) That an adulterous child may be instituted heir
within the limits provided by law; (2) that in making Ignacio Macrohon an heir
under his will, the testator did not observe the limitations prescribed by law; (3)
that the institution of Ignacio Macrohon as heir under the will ought not to be
declared absolutely void, but he should so share in the inheritance as not to
prejudice the legitimate of the other heirs; (4) that as Exhibit 1 deals with
certain acts contrary to law, such as not presenting the will to the court, and as
some minors took part in it through their guardian without the latter being
authorized by the court to enter into the transaction in their behalf, said exhibit
cannot bind the parties, nor do the admissions made by them therein constitute
estoppel; whereupon it disapproved the scheme of partition presented by the
administrator and ordered him to file another in consonance with the conclusions
therein laid down.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Macrohon Tiahua have a right to dispose of a part of his estate
by will in favor of his adulterous son
Held:
Yes. As to the first question, while it is true that article 845 of the Civil Code
provides that "illegitimate children who have not the status of natural children
shall be entitled to support only," and therefore cannot demand anything more of
those bound by law to support them, it does not prohibit said illegitimate children
from receiving, nor their parents from giving them, something more than support, so
long as the legitimate children are not prejudiced. If the law permits a testator
to dispose of the free third of his hereditary estate in favor of a stranger (art.
808 of the Civil Code), there is no legal, moral or social reason to prevent him
from making over that third to his illlegitimate son who has not the status of a
natural son. On the contrary, by reason of blood, the son, although illegitimate,
has a preferential right over a stranger unless by his behaviour he has become
unworthy of such consideration. For these reasons, we are of opinion and so hold,
that Jose Macrohon Tiahua could dispose of the free third of his estate in favor of
his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon.
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Facts:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association
known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana
Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres
Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano
Garchitorena. And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23
against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the
sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an
attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that
said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria
Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said
judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the
decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction. The
court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as
fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of
injunction.
Issue:
whether or not there is a simple substitution in the Will
Held:
none. Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not
say whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after that of
the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that in making the provisions
contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary
substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of
the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of
the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible." Here
it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the possibility that the
substitution might later be legally declared null for transcending the limits fixed
by article 781 of the Civil Code which prescribed that fideicommissary
substitutions shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond the second degree."
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause
X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's
children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate,
without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary
heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites of fideicommissary
substitution according to our quotation from Manresa inserted above. Lastly, clause
XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a
provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix.
That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die
after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance. The foregoing
leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary
substitution, according to the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present
in the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the
plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate,
according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third
person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X
which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's)
surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of
the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies
intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress
instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die
after the testatrix. 3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress
instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause
XI.
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983

ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S. GARCIA, respondents.
MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano
Meliton died during the pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted him
while asking for the probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the legal
issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the
hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC
declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of
Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the
estate CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution
of sole heir from decedent’s will.
RULING:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will, and
as a result, Sonia’s institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854
“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and
legacies shall be valid…
The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his
property which the testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to
the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of
Sonia’s share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The
usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all together.
G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927

Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
Facts:
The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated February 6,
1923, composed of two used sheets to probate. The will appears to be signed by the
testatrix and three witnesses on the left margin of each of the sheets, by the
testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the three witnesses after the attestation
clause. The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to such probate was filed
by Rita Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by other relatives. The three attesting
witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared that the signature of the
testatrix were written in their presence and that they signed their names in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other. The testatrix from girlhood knew how
to sign her name and did so with her right hand; but as the right side of her body
later became paralyzed, she learned to sign with her left hand and for many years
thereafter, up to the time of her death, she used to sign with that hand. Opponents
allege that Florencia Mateo did not sign this will.
Issue:
whether or not testatrix has the right to choose her heirs in the will
Held:
Yes. there is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the
opponents, or in her having left all of her estate to the only heir instituted in
her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of her nieces. And not only is it not
strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to the evidence of the testatrix
when the former was but 3 years old, and from then on up to the time of her death
had never been separated from her. The opposition presented Doctor Banks as expert.
He testified that the signatures of the testatrix in the will are not genuine. The
petitioner, on the other hand, presented another expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who
affirmed that these signatures are genuine. But, over the testimony of these
experts, we have the categorical and positive declaration of veracious witnesses
who affirm that these signatures were written by the testatrix herself.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and
LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein
executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven
compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960
and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the
above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren,
namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix
divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00
(except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture
valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina

(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have
received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the
appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less
than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective
legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated
the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties
necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched.
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated
February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the
following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of
one-half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to
P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of
the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to
them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to
them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the
properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D.
Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be
proportionally reduced.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proper partition
Held:
in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her
obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in
accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and
seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid
partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph
of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of
compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for
the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title
less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of
the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may
be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,
wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and
assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete
their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant,
Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition
by will more than their respective legitimes.
G.R. No. L-353 August 31, 1946

PACIENCIA DE JESUS, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
IÑIGO S. DAZA, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL., respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
La O and San Jose for respondents.
HILADO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners pray for the writs of certiorari and mandamus whereby they would have
this Court annul the order of the respondent judge dated January 29, 1946, entered
in civil case No. 3174 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in the matter of
the estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus, which order petitioners denominate "a
writ of possession," and command the respondent provincial sheriff of Batangas and
the respondents Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus and Gregorio Leynes to return to said
petitioners the possession of the two parcels of land covered by original
certificates of title Nos. 1292 and 1344, issued by the Register of Deeds of
Batangas and mentioned in their petition.
Among other things, it is alleged in the petition and admitted in the respondents'
answer that petitioners are some of the testamentary heirs of the late Gavino de
Jesus whose estate is the subject matter of the aforesaid special proceeding No.
3174
in connection with this action for legal redemption, respondents in paragraph 4 of
their answer, after admitting the institution of said action for legal redemption,
allege that on March 11, 1946, the Court of First Instance of Batangas issued an
order dismissing the amended and supplemental complaints in said civil case No.
3960 (they attach a copy of the order of dismissal as Appendix 1 of their answer),
but petitioners in their reply aver that within the period prescribed by law they
had perfected an appeal from said order of dismissal.
From what appears in the allegations of the parties, as well as their appendices
and annexes, the said for legal redemption is still pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs can claim Legal Redemption
Held:
Yes. The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, thus commencing, civil case No. 3960 of said
court, carries with it an implied but necessary admission on the part of said
petitioners that the sale to respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus of the shares
of Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga in the oft-repeated estate, particularly, the
two parcels of land in question, was valid. The sale was duly approved by the
probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by the probate court
the purchaser stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the purposes of the
distribution of the estate, and Rule 91, section 1, confers upon such purchaser,
among other rights, the right to demand and recover the share purchased by her not
only from the executor or administrator, but also from any other person having the
same in his possession. It is evident that the probate court, having the custody
and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this
provision within the same estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most
convenient one in which this power and function of the court can be exercised and
performed without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the
inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and litigate an entirely
different action. There can be no question that if the executor or administrator
has the possession of the share to be delivered the probate court would have
jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to deliver that
possession to the person entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or
equitable, for denying the same power to the probate court to be exercised within
the same estate proceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the
possession of "any other person," especially when "such other person" is one of the
heirs themselves who are already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
same estate proceeding.
The probate proceeding over the testate estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus was
a proceeding in rem And by the publication of the notice prescribed by the Rules
and by the fact that petitioners herein were and are among the testamentary heirs
of the decedent, they were and are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas sitting as a probate court when the said court's order
of January 29, 1946, was entered and thereafter. If, even the action for compulsory
recognition of a natural child may be instituted and decided within the proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the ancestor (Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil.,
343, 348), it would be absurd were we to declare now that for the mere object of
ordering the delivery of possession of a portion of the inheritance which has
already been assigned to a certain person within the estate proceeding, the probate
court lacks jurisdiction to make the order within the same proceeding, but should
require the institution of an independent ordinary action.
We, therefore, conclude that, without prejudice to the final result of the legal
redemption case, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, with
costs to petitioners. So ordered.
G.R. No. 109972. April 29, 1996
ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES,
AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES
AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential
lot (identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, located along
Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City). Private respondent,
Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over
the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-
law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos
and the second, following the latter’s death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of
her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild
(by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her
children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo
Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after
Macaria’s death, died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow
Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner
Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of
P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November 1982, it would
appear, however, that the lot was sold for only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained
that the second deed was intended merely to save on the tax on capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City Treasurer’s
Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa of
Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the property. She tendered the
sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept the amount for being
much less than the lot’s current value of P80,000.00. No settlement having been
reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private respondents, on 16 October 1987,
initiated against petitioner an action for “Legal Redemption with Preliminary
Injunction” before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court handed down
its decision holding, in fine, that private respondents’ right to redeem the
property had already lapsed.
Issue:
Whether or not Socorro Rosales can claim for the right of redemption being not a
co-heir
Held:
Yes. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere
relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;[3] however,
Socorro’ s right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship
in Macaria’s estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales,
part of whose estate is a share in his mother’s inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother’s death. When Macaria died on
08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David
Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales
himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the
property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs
pursuant to the law on succession.
“ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the
rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
Article 1001.
“xxx xxx
xxx
“ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”[4]
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales,
thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a
right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
“ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by
purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is
transmitted by onerous title.”
“ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person.
If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay
only a reasonable one.”
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents.
Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors)
to the co-owners[5] required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code –
”ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.”
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private
respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a
day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan
City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court.
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989

FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Third Division,
respondents.
Jose Gaton for petitioners.
Ricardo Q. Castro for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 forpetitioners
to exercise the right to legal redemption had already elapsed and thatthe
requirement of Article 1088 that notice must be in writing is deemed
satisfiedbecause written notice would be superfluous, the purpose of the law having
beenfully served when petitioner Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds
and was for himself, read and understood the contents of the Deeds of Sale.
Issue:
Whether or not there is legal redemption and is there proper notice
HELD:
The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale
assufficient notice of sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496
appliesonly to registered lands and has no application whatsoever to a casewhere
the property involved is unregistered land.If the intention of the law had been to
include verbal notice or nay other meansof information as sufficient to give the
effect of this notice, then there would havebeen no necessity or reasons to specify
in Article 1088 that the saidnotice be made in writing for, under the old law, a
verbal notice or informationwas sufficient. In the interpretation of a related
provision (Article 1623)
Written notice is indispensable actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to
written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale,
its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not
definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative method of notifications
remains exclusive, thought the Code does not prescribed any particular form of
written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption.
G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000

JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES MAESTRADO-LAVIÑA and
CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ninth Division
and JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Facts:
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the rights of the
contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of 57.601 square meters,
however, is still registered in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario
Chaves. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died intestate in 1943 and 1944,
respectively. They were survived by the following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-
Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-
Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated intestate
proceedings[3] in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was appointed
administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the estates was made
and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of partition. Thus, they filed an
action for partition[4] before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. The
court appointed Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6,
1956, the court rendered a decision approving the project of partition. However,
the records of said case are missing and although respondents claimed otherwise,
they failed to present a copy of said decision.
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1) Lot No.
3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of
coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a) Concepcion
Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo Chaves-Roa; and (d) Ramon Chaves,
while (2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, all located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de
Oro City and consisting of an aggregate area of 14 hectares was distributed equally
between petitioners (a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-Abaya. Scmis
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His share
was given to his only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of Salvador’s father. In
1956, the year the partition case was decided and effected, receiver Hernando Roa
delivered the respective shares of said heirs in accordance with the above scheme.
Subsequently, Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his share to
Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to Angel and the other half to
Amparo.
Issue:
Whether or not oral partition can be considered
Held:
Yes. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners’ ownership over said lot was acquired
by reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses’ heirs sometime
before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed
by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the partition of
the decedents’ estate, was not presented by either party thereto. The existence of
the oral partition together with the said quitclaims is the bone of contention in
this case. It appeared, however, that the actual partition of the estate conformed
to the alleged oral partition despite a contrary court order. Despite claims of
private respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly delivered to the petitioners,
nothing was done to rectify it for a period of twenty-seven (27) years from 1983.
Ol-dmiso
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition
entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can make sense out of
the actual partition of the properties of the estate despite claims that a court
order provided otherwise. Prior to the actual partition, petitioners were not in
possession of Lot No. 5872 but for some reason or another, it was delivered to
them. From 1956, the year of the actual partition of the estate of the deceased
Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one among the heirs questioned petitioners’
possession of or ownership over said Lot No. 5872. Hence, we are convinced that
there was indeed an oral agreement of partition among the said heirs and the
distribution of the properties was consistent with such oral agreement. In any
event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify the situation but no such move was
done until 1983.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the
adverse claimant establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the
petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a superior
right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by the
notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extra-judicially by the heirs
themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of deeds. In sum,
the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral partition is
the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of the estate are
identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one among the heirs
disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27) years.
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral
partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of
the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one among
the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27) years.
G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SILVERIO PADA, respondents. ULANDU
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Facts:
ne Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino,
Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of
residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together
with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children,
has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial
partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which
they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while
his other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and
Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter,
Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was
represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was
to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his
daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his
father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right
of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was
the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They
went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the
purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid extrajudicial Partition
Held:
The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily
and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and
agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did
so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive,
unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate
which had not been paid No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges
against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should
not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador
Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years
of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that
allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect.
In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject
property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but
rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St.,
Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe,
Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject
property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too
late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the
1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.
G.R. No. 114151 September 17, 1998

MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and
LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Facts: The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino,
Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the
death of the spouses, the property should have been divided among their children,
however, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with
the procedures.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots
from her brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out,
however, that a third party named Nique, the private respondent in this case, also
purchased portions of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an
action for quieting of title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case)
ruled in favor of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.
Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had
been declared by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of
purchase. The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement between Mauricia and Laurencia.
Issue: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made
Held: Yes.
1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-
owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The
legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino
spouses was upheld in the Quieting of title case which had become final and
executory by Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a
motion for the segregation of the portions of the property that were adjudged in
his favor, he was in effect calling for the partition of the property. However,
under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1)
the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for
partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator
himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis for the
segregation of the property in favor of Nique However, evidence on the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it became
the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to Nique. Mauricia
does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the absence of
notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.
3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
reflected the intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the
property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it
was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that the
document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of
them. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document
to be valid between the parties.
G.R. No. 49286 August 16, 1947

EUSEBIO QUIZON and FLORDELIZA QUIZON, petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CASTILLO, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL., respondents..
PERFECTO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners seek the annulment of two orders of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, issued on July 26 and August 18, 1944.
In the first one, the lower court, acting on a petition for the execution of the
decision in special proceeding No. 3906, intestate of Gregorio Mayo Villapando,
dated October 25,1943, declaring all the parties therein heirs of the deceased and
dividing all the estate into three parts, one to each of the three sets of heirs,
ordered petitioners to deliver one-third of the estate to Josefa Mayo Villapando,
unless they should post a bond in the amount of P2,000 pending the decision of the
Supreme Court on the appeal interposed against the lower court's decision of the
petition. The order issued on August 18, 1944, amended the first one to the effect
that petitioners should deliver two-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo Villapando,
and Amando, Ciriaco, David and Jose Morada, unless they should file a bond in the
amount of P2,000, pending the decision of the Supreme Court.
Ten days before the decision became final, on May 9, Josefa Mayo filed a motion for
execution upon the ground that the appeal bond at P2,000 having been rejected, her
share in the fruits of the estate was left without guarantee. The petition was
filed without notice to petitioners. On May 19, petitioners filed their amended
record on appeal as well as the appeal bond of P60. On May 24, Josefa Mayo filed a
petition, also without notice to petitioners, praying that the hearing on the
amended record on appeal be suspended until after her motion for execution be acted
upon, and the lower court issued an order on the same day, setting for hearing the
motion for execution sometime after June 15. On June 6, petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the order of May 24, upon the ground that the motion for
execution should not have been acted upon as it was filed without notice in
violation of section 2 of Rule 39, besides having been filed during the efficacy of
the resolution of January 14, 1944, issued by the Supreme Court, suspending all
proceedings in the intestate of Gregorio Mayo Villapando, case No. 3906, and that
the amended record on appeal is the only valid pleading then pending and should be
acted upon before anything else.
On July 3, the respondent judge issued an order setting for July 18 the hearings on
the motion for execution, on the amended record on appeal and on the motion for
reconsideration. On July 14, petitioners filed their opposition to the motion for
execution alleging, among other reasons, that the lower court had no power or
authority to order the execution during the time for perfecting the appeal and that
said decision, being declaratory in nature could not be executed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction
Held:
Yes. The facts in this case show that the respondent judge acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when he issued the orders of July 26 and August 18, 1944. Said orders,
purportedly to execute the decision of October 25, 1943, provided for the delivery,
at first, of one-third of the estate to Josefa Mayo and later of two-thirds of the
estate to Josefa Mayo and to the Morada brothers, unless petitioners should file
bond in the amount of P2,000. No law nor legal authority has been mentioned in
respondent's answer in support of said orders and none can be cited. The decision
of October 25, 1943, provided only for the declaration of heirs and of the shares
each set of heirs was entitled to. Nothing was provided in said decision as to the
delivery of shares from one person to another. The orders of July 26, and August
18, provided for the execution of something supposed to be executed by the decision
of October 25, 1943, which in fact is not provided therein.
Besides, it was premature to order the delivery of shares to the heirs, when no
project of partition has as yet been filed and approved.
G.R. No. L-273 March 29, 1947

CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
Plaintiff Cresencia, intervenors Maria & Aquilina; and Pedro and Basilia(not
parties herein) are brothers and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from
their father a parcel of land. An oral partition of the land was allegedly made by
the siblings. The intervenors sold 1800 square meters of the parcel to Zacarias
Andal in consideration of P860. After the sale, the plaintiff attempted to
repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her complaint, dated February 3,
1944, she offered the purchaser P150 as price of repurchase. Such amount was the
supposed price paid for Aquilina and Maria’s shares. But Andal, it is alleged,
refused to part with the property in favor of Cresencia.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint wherein the she alleged
that when the cause was called for trial, she announced in open court that she was
willing to repurchase the lot from Andal and reimburse Andal for his expenses.
Meanwhile, respondent Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for the
amount of 970 pesos.
In their answer, the intervenors alleged that a partition was made after which
everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his/her portion in
the partition. They charged the plaintiff with bad faith for allegedly delaying the
sale in favor of Andal. The court handed down its decision declaring that the
resale of the land in favor of Maria and Aquilina was illegal and in bad faith.
The court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court as well as
Article 1248 of the Civil Code, parole evidence of partition was inadmissible.
Issue:
Whether or not oral evidence for proving a contract of partition is admissible.
Ruling:
Yes.
ORAL PARTITION ENFORCED IN EQUITY WHEN PERFORMED.
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,
courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly
performed.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a
means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the
statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs.
Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts
or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract
but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or
contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the
document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernandez, 45 Phil., 746.)
-SECTION 1 OF RULE 74, NOT CONSTITUTIVE BUT MERELY EVIDENTIAL OF PARTITION.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that the
public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of a contract of partition
or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court
had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition
as between the parties de-pendent on the execution of a public instrument and its
registration. The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last
sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration
is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow
that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of
creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent
for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and
LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein
executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven
compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960
and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the
above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren,
namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix
divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00
(except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture
valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina

(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have
received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the
appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less
than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective
legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated
the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties
necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched.
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated
February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the
following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of
one-half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to
P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of
the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to
them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to
them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the
properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D.
Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be
proportionally reduced.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proper partition
Held:
in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her
obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in
accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and
seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid
partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph
of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of
compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for
the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title
less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of
the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may
be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,
wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and
assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete
their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant,
Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition
by will more than their respective legitimes.
EUGENIO FELICIANO, substituted by his wife CEFERINA DE PALMA- FELICIANO, ANGELINA

DE LEON, representing the heirs of ESTEBAN FELICIANO, TRINIDAD VALIENTE, AND
BASILIA TRINIDAD, represented by her son DOMINADOR T. FELICIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO CANOZA, DELIA FELICIANO, ROSAURO FELICIANO, ELSA FELICIANO AND PONCIANO
FELICIANO, Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
In May 1930, Antonio Feliciano died leaving behind a parcel of land. In 1972, an
extrajudicial settlement was executed by Leona Feliciano, Maria Feliciano, Pedro
Feliciano, and Salina Feliciano. The four declared that they are the only heirs of
Antonio; they did not include the heirs of their dead siblings Esteban and Doroteo
Feliciano. Thereafter, Pedro sold his share to Jacinto Feliciano; Salina sold her
share to Felisa Feliciano; and Leona and Maria sold their share to Pedro Canoza.
Subsequently, Jacinto and Canoza applied for their respective titles covering the
lands they purchased. In November 1977, a free patent was issued to Jacinto. In
February 1979, a free patent was likewise issued to Pedro Canoza.
In October 1993, Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina De Leon (surviving heirs of
Esteban) as well as Trinidad Valiente and Basilia Trinidad (Surviving heirs of
Doroteo) filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement on the ground of fraud by reason of the exclusion of the
other compulsory heirs (Esteban and Doroteo).
The trial court ruled in favor of Eugenio et al but on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court on the ground that Eugenio et al’s action has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by Eugenio et al is barred by prescription.
HELD: Yes. It is undeniable that the extrajudicial settlement executed by Leona

Feliciano, Maria Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, and Salina Feliciano in 1972 to the
exclusion of Esteban and Doroteo’s heirs is attended by fraud. As such, the deed of
extrajudicial settlement can be attacked in action for annulment in court. However,
such action should be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In this
case, the fraud was actually committed in 1972 but it was only deemed discovered in
1977 and 1979. In 1977, because this was the time when a free patent was issued to
Jacinto and in 1979, when a free patent was issued to Canoza. These years are the
reckoning point because the free patents released to Jacinto and Canoza served as
constructive notices to Eugenio et al and to the whole world. And so, when Eugenio
et al filed their complaint in 1993, the complaint was already filed out of time
(16 years late in case of Jacinto; and 14 years in case of Canoza).
CELESTINO BALUS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 168970
Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. On January 3,1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he
owns, as asecurity for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del
Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction held for
that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More
than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed
aDefinite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, anew title was issued in
the name of the Bank.On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a
specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square
meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties
admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to
the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents
bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of
Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favour of respondents. Subsequently, a
TCT was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued
possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had
already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the
disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the
same to them. The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the
respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of
the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the
respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank. Aggrieved by the Decision of the
RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA ruled that when
petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
new titlein the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership by him andrespondents over the subject property
persisted even afterthe lot was purchased by the Bank and title theretotransferred
to its name, and even after it was eventuallybought back by the respondents from
the Bank.
Held:
The court is not persuaded. At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no
dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by
petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in
1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted bythe trial
court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued
in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired.
There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before
Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence,there is no question that the Bank acquired
exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to
a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition,
the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost
ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the
time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate
to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents
never inherited the subject lot from their father. Furthermore, petitioner's
contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-
ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having
the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner
and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in
common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting
in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to
enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In other
words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective
which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000

REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents.
LEX
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals,
basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property subject matter of the
litigation to respondents. The case and the factual setting found by the Court of
Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made by the trial court.
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned
several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog
Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682.
Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later
on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children -- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado
Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado.
Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind
as his own sole heirs herein respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two
children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog
property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner
Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing
children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire
property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter.
On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in
question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93). Jjä sc
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property
on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering
his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a
deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through
a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in
favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the property
inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and
registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to
the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue
influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner
Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed
fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added
that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial
settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.
Finally, petitioners asseverated at the assailed instruments, although executed on
23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the
three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had
already died. ScÓ jj
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and
adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed
property.
Issue:
Whether or not there can be a partition shall be rescinded
Held:
No. When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal
property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs
--- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and
Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the
decedent,[1] remained under a co-ownership regime[2] among the heirs until
partition.[3] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale,
an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.[4]
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto,
respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which
consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution
of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed. Sjä cj
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial
court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo,
has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting
of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado
employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the
parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are
vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither
have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of
exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property
to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the
deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is
also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could
have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of
their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance
alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial
act[5] and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all third
persons.[6] Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and
binding. Supremeä
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed
of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of
preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not
justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The
relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on
Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
H. WITNESSES TO WILLS
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973

AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
ESGUERRA , J. :
FACTS :
Of the three instrumental witnesses namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr.
Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at
the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged. As the third witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues
that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to
acknowledge the will. On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B.
Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will, following the reasoning of the
trial court, maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal
requirement of having at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary public
acted as one of them .
ISSUE :
Whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") was
executed in accordance with law .
HELD
NO .
We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and
testament in question was not executed in accordance with law .To allow the notary
public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses,
would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which
would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least
three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the
testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public
to acknowledge the will.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") is declared
not valid and hereby set aside.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
GUERRERO , J. :
FACTS:
On June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased
Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and
executrix.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in
Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or
barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel.The will itself provides
that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal
in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid
from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in
specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her
brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina
(herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline,
Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago.
To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by
the testatrix as "akingmahalnapamangkinnaakingpinalaki, inalagaan at
minahalnakatulad ng isangtunaynaanak" and named as universal heir and executor,
were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to
be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and
legacies as aforementioned.
ISSUE :
Did the respondent Court abuse its discretion and/or acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of
the trial court.
HELD :
NO .
We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of
the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament
of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental
witnesses, namely, MatildeOrobia, CelsoGimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and
credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent
Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely
upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the
said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years
of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No.L-8774. November 26, 1956

EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON and PILAR PEREZ-NABLE, Petitioners-Appellees, vs. ENRIQUE
TANCHUCO, FAUSTINO GOMEZ, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS :
Mariano Molo and Juana Juan was a couple possessed of much worldly wealth,
but unfortunately, not blessed with children. To fill the void in their marital
life, they took into their home and custody two baby girls, raising them from
infancy, treating them as their own daughters, sending them to school, and later to
the best and exclusive centers of higher learning, until they both graduated, one
in pharmacy, and the other in law. These two fortunate girls, now grown up women
and married, are Emiliana Perez-Molo-Peckson, a niece of Juana, and Pilar Perez-
Nable a half sister of Emiliana.
Mariano Molo died in January, 1941, and by will bequeathed all his estate to
his wife. Juana, his widow, died on May 28, 1950, leaving no forced heirs but only
collateral, — children and grandchildren of her sisters. She left considerable
property worth around a million pesos or more, and to dispose of the same, she was
supposed to have executed on May 11, 1948, about two years before her death, a
document purporting to be her last will and testament, wherein she bequeathed the
bulk of her property to her two foster children, Emiliana and Pilar. These two
foster daughters, as Petitioners, presented the document for probate in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal.
ISSUE :
Was the probate court correct in rulint that the instrument in question was
the last will and testament of Juana ?
HELD :
YES .
We have carefully gone over the evidence of the record, and we are convinced
that the great preponderance thereof is in favor of the probate of the will .
While the written opposition to the probate of said will consists of a litany
of supposed abuses, force and undue influence exercised on the testatrix, yet the
evidence shows that these supposed abuses, force and undue influence consist only
of failure on the part of the deceased to invite the Oppositors in all the parties
held in her house through the alleged influence of Mrs. Nable, of paying more
attention, care, and extending more kindness to the Petitioners than to the
Oppositors .
Neither do we find anything unusual or extraordinary in the testatrix giving
practically all her property to her foster daughters, to the exclusion of her other
relatives.
Oppositors-Appellants in their printed memorandum contend that, two of the
attesting witnesses to the will in question, namely, Miss Navarro and Miss
Canicosa, who were employed as pharmacist and salesgirl, respectively, in the
drugstore of Pilar Perez-Nable, one of beneficiaries in the will, may not be
considered credible witnesses for the reason that as such employees, they would
naturally testify in favor of their employer. The relation of employer and
employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a will, does not disqualify one
to be a witness to a will.
In view of the foregoing, finding no reversible error in the decision

appealed from the same is hereby affirmed. No costs.
I. HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
III REVOCATION OF WILLS

IV REPUBLICATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS
V PROBATE OF WILLS
VI INSTITUTION OF HEIR
VII PRETERITION
VIII SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
IX DISPOSITION WITH CONDITIONS OR TERMS
X LEGITIME
1. CONCEPT
2. INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO LEGITIME
3. COMPULSARY HEIR
4. SHARES/LEGITIMES
G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988

VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA, MARIA FRIANEZA VERGARA,
BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA BONIFACIA FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely,
DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and DECIDERIA, all surnamed
FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf
and as Guardian ad litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN, all
surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the
Calasiao Bijon Factory assail the decision dated October 25, 1984 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055), which
affirmed the trial court's decision finding that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is
not the off-spring, hence, not a legal heir of the late Esperanza Cabatbat.
The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841),
praying for the partition of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died
without issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was her interest in the
business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the possession of
Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza and
Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her
sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the
children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint, the
private respondents alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza,
but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who
sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption
proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza Cabatbat
were: 1) the absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the
hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the
latter was born; 2) the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the
files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the
years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly born; 3) certification dated March
9, 1977, of the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, that his office has no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat alleged
to have been born on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4) certification
dated June 16, 1977 of Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in
the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were
listed as her guardians only, not as her parents; 5) testimony of Amparo Reside
that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21,1948 to watch a cousin
who delivered a child there and that she became acquianted with a patient named
Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew up to be
known as Violeta Cabatbat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil Code should be
considered?
HELD:
No. Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-
taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of
a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not
the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is
affirmed, but with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion
thereof, by excluding the widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. de
Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating
with their children and the surviving sisters of the deceased in the one-fourth
share of the estate pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a
will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary
Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the
P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina
Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the
said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise
instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of
the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of
Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by
law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene

in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in
the property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor.
Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no
such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it
did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any
portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir
of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were
true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father
and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as
expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not
of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir

in the probate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that
the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the
rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were
her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one
of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She
prayed that said will be admitted to PROBATE http://cdncache1-
a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png and that letter of administration be
issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the PROBATE http://cdncache1-
a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png of the will on the ground that by the
institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that
in consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of
one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case
of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion
that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as
the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
HELD:
Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic
will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether,
the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective
disinheritance.Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving
any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by
law”.Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal
heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific
legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void.
And intestate succession ensues.
G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY
VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
It is petition assailing the RTC’s reinstatement order on the formerly dismissed
filed action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between the petitioner and
respondents father. Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, were married
on June 14, 1962, begotten seven children. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio
married another woman named Lolita Enrico on August 26, 2004. Six months later,
Eulogio passed away. Respondents filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage between Petitioner and the respondent’s late father on two grounds: 1.
that the marriage lacks the requisite of MARRIAGE LICENSE https://cdncache1-
a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png , and; 2. the lack of marriage ceremony
due to respondent’s father serious illness that made its performance impossible.
Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34 of the family code arguing her
exemption from getting marriagelicense. She sought then the dismissal of the
respondent’s filed action by citing the AM-02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, par.(a) Rule of the
family code.
Pursuant to “AM-02-11-10-SC” embodied the rule on declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages RTC dismissed the respondents
filed action. Respondents filed motion forreconsideration invoking the ruling in
the case of Niñal v. Bayadog, holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the
standing to assail a voidable marriage even after death of one of the spouses. RTC
granted the motionand issued an order for reinstatement of the case. Petitioner
filed motion for reconsideration but denied, thereby petitioner assailed a petition
directly to Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.)Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after
the death of Eulogio.
2.) Whether which of the two rule “AM 02-11-10-SC” or “Niñal v. Bayadog” shall
govern the instant case
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED. Respondent/heirs have NO legal standing to assail the validity
of the second marriage after the death of their father; because the rule on “AM 02-
11-10-SC” shall govern the said petition, under the Family Code of the Philippines.
Particularly Sec 2, par. (a) Provides that a petition for Declaration of
AbsoluteNullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.Question: Why the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC should govern this case not the held
decision on Niñal v. Bayadog casewhereas the two cases expressed a common cause of
issue?Here the court resolved that; in Niñal v. Bayadog case the heirs were allowed
to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s second marriage
even after their father’s death because the impugned marriage there was solemnized
prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Unlike in this case Enrico v Heirs of
Medinaceli wheresame holding cannot be applied because the marriage here was
celebrated in 2004 where the Family Code is already effective and under family code
is embodied the rule on “AM 02-11-10-SC” where this rule shall governpetitions for
the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages.
Nonetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied; that the heirs
have still remedy to protect their successional rights not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding forthe
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to
Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4,
1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.4Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of
America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of
marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since
Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan
City7 against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as
petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on
the merits ensued.
ISSUE:
whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial
court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary,
if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity
of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for its proper disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married
inthe Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23,
1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the
respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children.
On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to
whowill be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case
held thatthe divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country.
Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the
light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad
are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid according to their national
law. The petitioner herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954.
Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she
obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary
estatewas ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo.
Blandina and thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988
partial reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto
Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir
for her marriage to Arturo was declared voidsince it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal
to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
(2)Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as
surviving spouse of Arturo.
HELD:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita
at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here
sinceshe was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid
in theircountry’s national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the
primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate
court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida
and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights
of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A.
TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and
alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The
complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was
then filed alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on
August 3, 1988 shall have a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect in
so far as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the
vested rights of respondents to have her case be decided under Article 285 of the
Civil Code. It is a well settled reception that laws shall have a retroactive
effect unless it would impair vested rights. Therefore, the Family Code in this
case cannot be given a retroactive effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by

their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and
MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP.,
FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August
1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie
A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the
latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline
and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real
property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners
filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of
the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and
Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to
dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September
1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before
the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and
ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It
ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the
trial considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to
have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.1âwphi1.nêt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several
other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to
compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of
decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief
once petitioners would have been able the establish their status as such heirs. It
was contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to
likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could
only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately,
dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
improper.1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a
special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
Issue:
Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting
from him.
Ruling:
No. in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly
done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,13 or in
exceptional instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of
a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be
rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be
validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138,
Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their
mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
Facts:
1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei
(a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they
are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The
minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse,
filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts
hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration.
The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of
non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.
3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of
a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational
assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the
estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental
motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors
hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the
petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards
RULING:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must
necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the
court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been
authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the
private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have yet to
prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be
inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the
petitioner, the latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the
claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters
administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to
the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included. As held
in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one
complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's
motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA CRISTOBAL SIKAT,
Petitioners,
vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO
CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the
deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the
legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia
Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina
and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal
resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of
535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had
executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its
title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case
between them and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a
Complaint 2 for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by
petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso
shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of the
Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of
TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued in the individual
names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject property in accordance
with the law of succession and the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or
compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, 3 Anselmo, 4 and the late Socorro 5 were presented. In the
case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification 6
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939,
1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
Issue:
(1) whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal;
(2) whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the
subject property executed by the private respondents;
(3) whether or not petitioners’ right to question the Deed of Partition had
prescribed; and
Held:
1. the baptismal certificates of Elisa, 15 Anselmo, 16 and the late Socorro
17 were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary
evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she
produced a certification 18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years
1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary
wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that
petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as
being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of
witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the
status as a legitimate child. 19
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present
any proof to refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of filiation to
Buenaventura Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are,
indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
2. the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is
composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura
Cristobal’s estate. The partition of the subject property by the private
respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded
therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by private
respondents among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the transfer
and registration of the subject property in the names of private respondents only
in 1994 when she was offered by private respondent Eufrocina to choose between a
portion of the subject property or money, as one of the children of private
respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject property. 21 This
led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of the subject property. She
learned afterwards that the title to the subject property had been transferred to
the names of private respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion
of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal. The
Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal who
were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject property. Since
petitioners were not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition,
which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late
Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not binding on
them.
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the
right of petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then
proceed to divide the subject property between petitioners and private respondents,
as the rule on succession prescribes.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding
upon petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution
thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No.
165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is
ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and
appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized
heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS
as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181132 June 5, 2009

HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA PANGILINAN
MARAMAG, Petitioners,
vs.
EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN
MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
(1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag
(Loreto), while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman
Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter,
thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from
Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular)4 and Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation (Grepalife);5 (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the
legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released
to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and (4)
petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied
first.
In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners
alleged, among others, that part of the insurance proceeds had already been
released in favor of Odessa, while the rest of the proceeds are to be released in
favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, both minors, upon the appointment of their
legal guardian. Petitioners also prayed for the total amount of P320,000.00 as
actual litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
In answer,6 Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife
and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that
they filed their claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that
when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her
as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessa’s
share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl
Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of guardianship. Insular
alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as
it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto
revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her in
Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as inofficious the
shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement of
Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been
determined. Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance
policies designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to
Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
In its own answer7 with compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not
designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa,
Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for
insurance due to a misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on
December 10, 1936 and, thus, not more than 65 years old when he signed it in
September 2001; that the case was premature, there being no claim filed by the
legitimate family of Loreto; and that the law on succession does not apply where
the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were not known to
petitioners, summons by publication was resorted to. Still, the illegitimate family
of Loreto failed to file their answer. Hence, the trial court, upon motion of
petitioners, declared them in default in its Order dated May 7, 2004.
Issue: WON the TC erred in granting the motion to dismiss?
Held:
The petition should be denied.
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the
petition failed to state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g),
of the Rules of Court, which reads –
SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds:
x x x x
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although
petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as
beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis
of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his
murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance
policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are
entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that
pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code,19 Eva’s share in the proceeds should
be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto.
Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto’s
illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of
Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999
ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA
VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON
and ESTHER VILLALON, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel
of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of
the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00
to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over
the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private
respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of "Absolute
Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint
for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177,
in the then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by
petitioner herein into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was
resolved through a compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance of
Albay on November 3, 1961 3, under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality
and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner
agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to
deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In
case of Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be
withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died,
leaving only two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural
son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted
in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who moved for
execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly
granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without
issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a
portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo
died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for
annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata,
by virtue of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case,
Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on grounds
of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that
petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the
latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said
property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their
natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
Issue:
Whether or not that the donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
Held:
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal
share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken:
(1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the
property itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the
donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor's
legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the
property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an immovable,
what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the
same nature, class and quality; 25 (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent
value of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; 26 or (3) in the
absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of such other property as may
be necessary, to be sold in public auction.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 31976,
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646,
is reversed and set aside. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006

ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN DE RIVERA, TEOFILA RIVERA and
CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA* represented by MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, ANGELINA
VILLANUEVA, VICTORIANO DE LUNA, CABANATUAN CITY RURAL BANK, INC. and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners- half brothers, half sister and children of the half brother of the
deceased, Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are the Heirs of Villanueva, represented by
Melchor. They were allowed to be substitute for Villanueva upon his death. The
remaining respondents are Angelina and her husband Victorino, are allegedly the
daughter and son-in-law of the late Villanueva. From 1927 until 1980, Gonzales
cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was
married to Amanda Musngi who died in 1963. In the course of their cohabitation,
they acquired several properties including the properties contested in this case.
Gonzales died without a will. In 1980, Villanueva and Angelina executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of
Gonzales’ estate comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In this
document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the
estate to Angelina. Later on, the Petitioners filed a case for partition of
Gonzales’ estate and annulment of titles and damages with the RTC of Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija.
RTC- 2 Findings:
1. Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and
2. Respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her
sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners
Petitioners appealed to the CA and the latter affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the
decedent Gonzales
Held:
No.
According to the assailed decision, “the birth certificate clearly discloses that
Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina proof that respondent Angelina was
Gonzales’ Illegitimate child. It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely
a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive
evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties.
Following the logic of Benitez v. CA, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in
SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her
birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua v. CA that are
simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina
submitted birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be
children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been
born after their alleged parents had lived together childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case
which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales'
daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged
mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of
menopause21 at the time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been
married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childless
with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales.
Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the
extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was
invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51449 are reversed and set aside, and a new one
entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial partition with sale and REMANDING the
case to the court of origin for the determination and identification of Pacita
Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged
executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati
City, filed a petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos
alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole
legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his
will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and
that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will2 was annexed to the
petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61
issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and
Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of
Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator.
Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and
the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated
executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with
Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This
was granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in
support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow
his intervention.3
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61 has lost
jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
Held:
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the
court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.9
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The
cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions,
courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator
under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate
of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's death shall
govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be
necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the
lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the
allowance of his will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE
LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Facts:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died
[Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their
seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and
three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the
heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito
F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her
sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to
herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda.
As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her
other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein
she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of
the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in
all).
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six
surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in
the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix,
filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the
ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by
Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the
administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Issue:
whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties
by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen
grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons.
Held:
No.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo
vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if
the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena
Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs.
Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from
the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis
causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservoir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
XIII LEGAL SUCCESSION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,
respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts:
that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City,
died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two
(2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an
estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial
court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated
June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the
deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox
Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4,
1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together
with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Issue:
is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
Held:
No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely,
those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own
right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or
by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The
relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right
of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of
a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any
provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own
right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to
the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous
exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate
heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-
in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner.
vs.
PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to
intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate
Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the
estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order
of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad
contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including
an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the
heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and
withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion,
prompting petitioners to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought
the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only
involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court
by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and
consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
ISSUE:
Is the right of representation apply in the case?
HELD:
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in
degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the
extent that the right of representation can apply.
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by
operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of
a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into
the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from
the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never
in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may
only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent
when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within
the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who
are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children
and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly,
the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral
relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring
with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962,
aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of
relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil
Code gives direction.
"Article 966. xxx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is
made ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is
to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his
uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth."
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H.
Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an
intestato to the estate of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48140 May 4, 1942
SINFOROSO PASCUAL, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PONCIANO S. PASCUAL, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood
brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses, Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr.,
a brother of the full blood of the deceased, Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of
the half blood of the deceased, Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual,
brother of the full blood of the deceased, Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a
brother of the half blood of the deceased. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the
surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No.
7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p.
47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to
the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp.
99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to
the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood
brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the
oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT,
ISSUE:
whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
HELD:
NO. Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for
the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. respondent
IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father
Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the
decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to
whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the
negative.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE,
INC.,respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two
(2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son
of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in
1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the
late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money
and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be
declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-
half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private
respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca
Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria
Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said
properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting
shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive
ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an
illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the
other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties
are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
ISSUE:
Is there right of representation in the case at bar?
HELD:
NONE. even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo,
still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married,
and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At
most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this
petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-
REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO,
JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May
15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His
wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the
possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be
their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana
C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed
estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time
for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants
asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his
parents' estate by right of representation.
ISSUE:
Is there right of representation?
HELD:
Yes. as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she is
entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived,
which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created
by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does
not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted
children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel
Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate
of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however,
in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of
her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the
adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a
will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary
Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the
P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina
Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the
said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise
instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of
the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of
Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by
law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene

in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in
the property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor.
Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no
such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it
did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any
portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir
of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were
true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father
and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as
expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not
of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir

in the probate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that
the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the
rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982
MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.
VASQUEZ, J.:
FACTS:
In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all
covered by Torrens Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20,
1948.
On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of
Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled
"Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves
the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in
said document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro
Abenojar.
On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan presided over by the respondent Judge seeking a judicial
declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar, and that
private respondents be ordered to surrender the ownership and possession of some of
the properties that they acquired under the deed of extra-judicial settlement
corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said deed of extra-
judicial settlement and the subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of
private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar and Jose Serrano, in consequence
thereof be declared nun and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is right of representation?
HELD:
petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar, he being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the
mother of petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter in first
marriage of Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no
rights of legal succession from Teodoro Abenojar in view of the express provision
of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar
depends on the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of
Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this
assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art.
998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar
inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the
deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro
Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent
Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits and render the corresponding
judgment thereon. The private respondents shall pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985
EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, EUSTAQUIO, VICENTE, ESTELA, CAMILA, MAXIMO, LITO,
FELIX, OMAN, CRISPINA and REY, all surnamed RAMIREZ, TRIUNFO, RUPERTA and CARMEN,
all surnamed PASSILAN, and DOMINGO ROQUE, QUIRINO, MANUELA and ANITA, all surnamed
LABOG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES PLAN and BERNARDO MALLILLIN, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for
ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties,
with writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the
vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering seventeen (17)
parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao in favor of
respondent Mallillin. The latter filed a motion to dismiss which was however denied
for not being indubitable at that stage of the proceedings. The private respondent,
therefore, filed his answer.
After termination of the pre-trial proceedings and during the trial on the merits,
the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church, Rev. Father Roque N. Fidol,
testified on the witness stand. He was duly cross-examined by Atty. Aguirre,
counsel for the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Can the plaintiff inherit from Lutgarda Capiao, the original owner of the
property?
HELD:
NO. The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda Leogarda
is undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not
Taccad, retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao Article 992
of the Civil Code, cited by the movant, the defendant, provides:
Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.'
Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot
inherit from an illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the clear and
unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda
Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao who are the plaintiffs
in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D")
Of this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit
G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas
died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this
second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic
(Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca
Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B)
survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the
plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio
Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952
leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter
of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5)
months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died
leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese)
and her father Geronimo Almanza.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia
Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and
Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by
Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to
Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the
plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's
properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the
properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had
not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs
brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza
acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid.
Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been
effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the
defendants.
ISSUE:
Are the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code
applicable in the case?
HELD:
Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that
Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her
ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral
relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10)
children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the
provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382,
August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased."
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa
Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of
half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on
an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as
indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased
her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and
jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976

BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO ALCURIZA, ARTURO
ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA, the latter two being minors are
represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the Intestate
of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA.
DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as
successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO, together with PABLO P. SALAO,
Administrator, defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon,
Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia.
Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his
only child. Valentin Salao.
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel
Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate
was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized
on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her
three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in
representation of his deceased father, Patricio.
ISSUE:
Is representation present in the case?
HELD:
No. The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any
successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her
nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if
living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together
with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin,
could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the
collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil
Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like
the plaintiffs Alcuriza.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she
transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously
until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for
the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts
are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she
was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening
her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and
which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or
spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo
Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to
be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said
Melodia Ferraris.
ISSUE:
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she
is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a
brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the
children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be
excluded by the latter?
HELD:
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far
distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral
line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending
to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966).
Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy,
nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles,
first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles
1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
It will be seen that brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab
intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only
after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed
the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the
deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the
other collaterals.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby
affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO
CATANIAG,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee
[herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee
[also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American
citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex A-
Complaint), assigning [,] transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights,
titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them
inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
120259 was issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-
appellee [also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-
120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latter's name.
ISSUE:
Is the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son David Rey Guzman
illegal?
HELD:
No. The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of
Appeals, 19 which involves a sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court sad:
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed
only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain"
(II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and
other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations
at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public
lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. 20
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of
the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. 21
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a
qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is
consistent that "if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid."
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a
Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The
objective of the constitutional provision — to keep our land in Filipino hands —
has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42539 October 23, 1936
In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier. SULPICIO RESURRECCION, administrator-
appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
FACTS:
On October 18, 1932, Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her
husband Sulpicio Resurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things, left a
legacy of P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The testatrix died
on January 22, 1933, and her will was probated on March 8th of said year.
On October 12, 1933, the court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died in August,
1930, even before the testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in
his favor revert to the fund of the estate.
Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to
receive the legacy of P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's
resolution ordering the reversion of this amount to the funds of the estate.
The important thing to determine in this appeal is the effect of a legacy made in
favor of a person who was already dead not only before the death of the testatrix
but even before the will was made.
The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or
any part thereof in favor of any person qualified to acquire it (art. 763, Civil
Code). Upon being instituted as legatee by the testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier
lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked
capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the subject of a
right (art. 32, Civil Code). Consequently, his institution as a legatee had
absolutely no legal effect and his heirs are not now entitled to claim the amount
of legacy. They cannot even claim under the principle of representation because
this takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as the legatee died
before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his heirs (art. 766, Civil
Code).
ISSUE:
Should the will be interpreted in the sense that the intention of the
testatrix was to leave the legacy to the heirs of Gil Francisco Javier
HELD:
This court, however, does not find sufficient evidence to establish this
fact. The only witness who testified to this effect was Agustin Javier, Gil's
brother, who alleged that he was in the house of the testatrix in May, 1931, and in
a conversation with her he informed her that their brother Gil had already died,
leaving a widow and children. But against this testimony was presented that of
Sulpicio Resurreccion, the widower of the testatrix, who testified that Agustin
Javier was in his house only once, in April or May, 1930, prior to the death of the
testatrix. According to this, he could not have given to the testatrix the
information about Gil's death which took place some months later, or in August,
1930.lâwphi1.nêt
Furthermore, if the testatrix, in making her will, knew that Gil was already dead
and that he had left children, it cannot be explained why she left the legacy to
Gil and not to his children, if such was her intention, particularly because,
according to the evidence for the appellants, she knew one of said children named
Jose.
Consequently, in either case, whether the testatrix knew that Gil was already dead
or she was ignorant thereof, as she had left the legacy in favor of Gil, there is
no reason to admit that it was, nevertheless, her intention to leave it to his
children.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs to the appellants. So ordered.

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