AMELIA P.

ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed

guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P.
ARELLANO,Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL
PASCUAL, Respondents. Arellano v. Pascual (G.R. No. 189776;
December 15, 2010).

FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as

heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented
by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of

Letters of Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land
(the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by
Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of
which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance
legitime" of petitioner.

Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as

Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.

Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated

property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedents estate, the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in
light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on
to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil
Code which reads:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate

estate.
ISSUE: Is the property donated to petitioner subject to collation? Should
the property of the estate have been ordered equally distributed among the
parties?

HELD: The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a

mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of
donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and
second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property
disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory

heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding
the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no
compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that
part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for compulsory heirs.

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and
(3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have
precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children
and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory
heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The
concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the
primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and
the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing
was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation
to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
"stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among

his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents,
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or

a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
1. DEL ROSARIO VS. FERRER, G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010
DEL ROSARIO VS. FERRER, G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010
FACTS: There was a donation by the spouses to their children and
granddaughter captioned as “Donation Mortis Causa,” stating that it is not
revocable.

DEFECTS: It had no attestation clause, and had only two (2) witnesses.
ACTION OF THE DONEES: The donees accepted the donation.

After the death of one of the donors, the donation was submitted to
probate but the Regional Trial Court made a ruling to the effect that it
should be considered, despite of the caption, a donation inter vivos due to
its irrevocability. The The Court of Appeals, on appeal, ruled it to be one of
mortis causa and since it did not comply with the formalities of a will, it is
void.

ISSUE: Is the CA correct in its ruling?

HELD: No, the CA is not correct. The designation that it is a Donation
Mortis Causa is not controlling. If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, 426 SCRA 263 (2002), it was held
that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of
the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

[1] It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive.

[2] That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
[3] That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.

Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was
immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is
deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s
acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute
owner of the property donated.

MAGLASANG v. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN

G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother,

petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a “Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos
for House and Lot” covering one-half (½) portion of the former’s house and
lot. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed
by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner
Estela C. Maglasang, (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, and (c) petitioner
Merly S. Cabatingan real properties. These deeds of donation contain similar
provisions, to wit: “That for and in consideration of the love and affection of
the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents,
transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described
property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon,
to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically
rescinded and of no further force and effect; x x x”3 (Emphasis Ours)
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed

for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and
Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds
of donation executed on January 14, 1995. Respondents allege, inter alia, that
petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and
taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan’s fragile condition, caused the
execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for
failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of
wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.

Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents’ allegations.

Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were
made by the late Conchita Cabatingan “in consideration of the love and
affection of the donor” for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which
indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan’s death.
In addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case
petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the
nature of the donation as inter vivos.

ISSUE: WON the donation is inter vivos.

NO. In a donation mortis causa, “the right of disposition is not transferred to

the donee while the donor is still alive.”In determining whether a donation is
one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee. In the present case, the nature of the donations as
mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights
to petitioners prior to Cabatingan’s death. The phrase “to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation but
that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves
expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in their Acceptance
and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation.

That the donations were made “in consideration of the love and

affection of the donor” does not qualify the donations as inter vivos
because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same
reason.

The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be

rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in
Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of
a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the
donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for
in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect
during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be
transferred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death,
she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds. Considering
that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of
the nature of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be
executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.The deeds in
question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the
donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under
the above-quoted provisions of law.

Pasco v. Heirs of De Guzman

G.R. No. 165554, July 26, 2010

Petitioners Lazaro and Lauro Pasco obtained a loan from Filomena de

Guzman in the amount of P140,000.00, which was secured by
a chattel mortgage over Lauro’s Isuzu Jeep. Upon Filomena’s death, her heirs
sought to collect the proceeds of the loan from petitioners but to no avail.
Hence, they filed a collection case against petitioners. They authorized
Cresencia, a co-heir, to act as their attorney-in-fact through a Special Power of
Attorney. Petitioners later questioned the authority of Cresencia to represent
her co-heirs because Filomena’s estate had a personality of its own.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Filomena have the capacity to sue for
collection of the proceeds of the loan obtained by petitioners on behalf of the
estate of the deceased

Yes. Unpaid loans are considered assets of the estate of the creditor-decedent.
While it is true that Filomena’s estate has a different juridical personality that
that of the heirs, the latter certainly have an interest in the preservation of the
estate and the recovery of its properties for at the moment of Filomena’s
death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedent’s liabilities.
This is consistent with Article 777 of the Civil Code which provides that “the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the proceeds of the loan should be
released to Filomena’s heirs only upon settlement of her estate because to
allow the release of the funds directly to the heirs
would amount to distribution of the estate, which distribution and delivery
should be made only after, not before, the payment of all debts, charges,
expenses, and taxes of the estate have been paid.

Dela Merced v. Dela Merced

G.R. No. 126707, February 25, 1999

On 23 March 1987, Evarista Dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She
was survived by three sets of heirs: (1) Francisco Dela Merced, her legitimate
brother; (2) Teresita Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of Rosa Dela
Merced, a sister who died in 1943; and the legitimate children of Eugenia Dela
Merced, another sister who died in 1965. Almost a year later or on 19 March
1988, Francisco, Evarista’s brother, died. He was survived by his wife, three
legitimate children and an illegitimate child, private respondent Joselito. The
three sets of heirs of the decedent Evarista executed an
extrajudicial settlement adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each
set with a share of one-third pro-indiviso. Joselito later filed a petition
for Annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Evarista alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the
said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation
to the late Francisco. He thus prayed to be included as one of the beneficiaries,
to share in the one-third pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased
Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco. Petitioners, on the other
hand, alleged the Joselito, being an illegitimate child, is barred from
inheriting from Evarista because of Article 992 of the Civil Code,
which lays down an impassable barrier between legitimate and illegitimate
families.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Article 992 of the Civil Code or the “iron-barrier
rule” is applicable

No. What is involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would
inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited,
but one where an illegitimate child inherits from his father what
the latter already inherited from the deceased sister. Evarista died ahead
of Francisco. Thus, Francisco inherited a portion of the estate of Evarista.
When Francisco died, his heirs inherited his share in the estate of Evarista.
This is consistent with Article 777 of the Civil Code, which provides that “the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. Therefore, Joselito, as an illegitimate child of Francisco, is entitled
to his share in his father’s estate upon the latter’s death and which included
the latter’s share inherited from Evarista.

Emnace v. Court of Appeals and the Estate of Vicente Tabanao

G.R. No. 126334, November 23, 2001

Petitioners Emnace, Tabanao and Divigranacia were partners in a business

known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January 1986, they
decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement
of partition and distribution. Throughout the existence of the partnership, and
even after Tabanao’s death, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao’s heirs any
financial statements. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over the
1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership to the heirs. Private
respondents filed an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of
assets and damages. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and lack of capacity of the
estate of Tabanao to sue. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The
trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in their own
names, in view of the provision of Art. 777 of the CC.

ISSUE: Whether the private respondents have the legal capacity to sue.

YES. petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no
legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or
executrix of his estate. Petitioner’s objection in this regard is misplaced. The
surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix
of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are
complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the
very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership
was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and
rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by
succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person
are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective
hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. A prior settlement
of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or
administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to
sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his
death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent.
From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand
fulfillment of petitioner’s obligations as outlined in
their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore,
had the capacity to sue and seek the court’s intervention to compel petitioner
to fulfill his obligations.

Limjoco v. FRAGRANTE
 G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948

Pedro O. Fragante, A Filipino citizen, applied for certificate of public

convenience to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive
capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and
to sell the ice produced from said plant. However, he died prior to the
approval of his application. Since his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service, the commission, ordered certificate of
public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the
said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal,
and in Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a

“citizen of the Philippines” within the meaning of section 16 of the Public
Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and
categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of
public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity “only to
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and
organized under the laws of the Philippines”, and the further proviso that sixty
per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities
must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Yes. Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in

view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission
the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one
change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its
economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the
service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself.
In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may
be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple
expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.

ARAYATA V. JOYA

G.R. No. L-28067, March 10, 1928

Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right
of lease to six lots of the friar lands. When the Insular
Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease in
accordance with the provisions the law. While married to the herein plaintiff-
appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing, on installments,
from the Government. As the number of lots which a purchaser could acquire
under the law was limited, two were excluded and put up for sale. In order not
to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with
the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said
lots to Cecilio Joya by donation. These transfers were approved by the
Director of Lands and noted in the proper registry book. Cecilio Joya conveyed
his right to Florentino Joya for a cnsideration said conveyance having been
approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper registry book.
Cecilio Joya then conveyed his right Marcelina Joya and Francisco Joya for a
consideration, conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands
and registered in the proper registry book. On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya
executed a will devising lots to Florentino Joya, Pablo Joya, Delfin and
Felicisima Blancaflor, to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, Feliciano and
Asuncion Bobadilla, and Marcelina and Francisca Joya. At the time of his
death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed the payment of the price of the lots
mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the lots in question except 1
lot are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy their products

On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, and on June 9, 1919, his executor, the
herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate to
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which was probated after the proper
proceedings. In March, 1920, in the course of the testamentary proceedings,
the executor Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by
the legatees, which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the
herein plaintiff’s opposition, who alleged that her signature had been obtained
by fraud.

ISSUE: Whether the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands, who has not
fully paid the purchase price may transfer and convey his rights.

In order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar

lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of
transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
for his approval and registration. The law authorizes no other way of
transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. It
provides, however, that in case of the death of said holder, the surviving
spouse shall be entitled to receive the title to the land, upon compliance with
the requirements of the law. If, as it was held in the aforecited case of Jocson
vs. Soriano, the right conferred by Act No. 1120 on the holder of a certificate
of sale of friar lands in similar to that conferred on the holder of a
“homestead,” and if the latter has no right to dispose of said certificate by will
to the prejudice of his surviving spouse and for his children then by analogy,
the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands cannot dispose of his rights to
said lands by will to the prejudice of his widow and children.

The provisions of the Civil Code referring to conjugal property cannot be

applied in this case, as was done by the trial court, because the law regulating
the acquisition, disposition, and transmission of rights to the friar
lands acquired by the Insular Government, lays down rules in conflict with the
aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code; and as the said Code is of
a general character, while Act No. 1120 is a special law, the latter should
prevail.
AGGABAO VS. RTC, G.R. No. 146006, February 23, 2004

G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004.

CORONA, J. THIRD DIVISION
FACTS: Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate of Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez from the very start as in fact these shares were
included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted
by Rafael Ortañez after he and his brother, Jose Ortañez, were
appointed special administrators by the intestate court. The
controversy here actually started when, during the pendency of the
settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, his wife Juliana Ortañez
sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock in favor petitioner FLAG
without the approval of the intestate court. Her son Jose Ortañez
later sold the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares also in favor of
FLAG without the approval of the intestate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not sale of property included in the inventory of
the estate by some of the heirs made during the pendency of the
intestate proceeding without intestate court’s approval may be
declared null and void.
HELD: YES. The rule is clear that (1) any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court,
there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition. Moreover, the intestate court has the
power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul
the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would
be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary
adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul
unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation
of estate property before final adjudication.

TEODORA RIOFERIO vs. CA

G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004
Tinga, J.:
FACTS:
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will and left several personal and real
properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had
seven children who are the herein respondents
The decedent also left his paramour and their children. They were the herein
petitioner Teodora Rioferio and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena, their
children. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the
deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving
the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.
Respondent Alfonso Clyde Orfinada III filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters of
Administration. Respondents also filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission
of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioners filed their ANSWER on the said
Complaint and interposed that the property SUBJECT OF THE CONTESTED DEED OF
EXTR JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not
the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of
the pendency of the administration proceedings. Petitioners filed a Motion to Set
Affirmative Defense for Hearing but was denied by the lower court stating that the
respondents, as heirs are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an
administrator who is yet to be appointed.
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied
prompting them to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and averred that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA ruled against the
petitioners, hence this petition before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the
deceased pending the appointment of an administrator.
HELD:
YES. The Court ruled that pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that
(t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property,
rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may
still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognized two
exceptions, namely:
a) If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
b) When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained
of and is made a party defendant.
Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover the property of
the estate is compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as
where there is an appointed administrator but he is disinclined to bring suit or is one
of the guilty parties himself.
Hence, this case provided for the third exception to the rule that the heirs have no
legal standing to sue for the recovery of the estate during the pendency of
administration proceedings.

RABADILLA VS. CA, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000

FACTS:        

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja

Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner,
Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil
provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to
give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
(25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
dies.  

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to

enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.

ISSUE:

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by
his heirs.
HELD: 

Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations
not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

Manuel Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Julio Vivares

G.R. No. 12099; October 30, 1997
Facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testament. He
bequeathed all his prop to his wife Asuncion (Oning) and his brother Jose. The will
consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three
witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private
respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or
incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a petition for probate of the will.
The recognized natural children of Torcuato with Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape
filed an opposition. The court declared that the will was exec according w/ the forma
prescribed by law. However, it ruled that Asuncion was never married to the deceased
(Hence, dispo made in will is invalid). Julio Vivares filed an appeals before the CA
with the allegation that the oppositos failed to present ay comp. evidence taht
Asuncion was legally married to another person. The CA affirmed the trial court's
decision but with the modification that dispo in favor of Oning was valid.
Ruling:
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on
its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law,
and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The intrinsic
validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the
will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein
the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on
its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically
invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because "practical
considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary
provisions are of doubtful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions
of the will. The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that
Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the
probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which
need not be inquired upon by the probate court.