SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES

Del Rosario vs. Ferrer

FACTS:

 Sps. Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled “Donation Mortis Causa” in
favor of their 2 children and a granddaughter, the petitioner.
 Such donation covers a house and lot.
 In said document, the spouses stipulated therein that “it is our will that this donation mortis causa shall
be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.
 Such deed executed had no attestation clause and was witnessed only by 2 persons.
 After the wife has died, Leopoldo, the surviving spouse executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests over the subject property to his daughter, Asuncion.
 Leopoldo then died thereafter.
 Jarabini, the granddaughter filed a probate proceeding for the will but such petition was opposed by
Asuncion where she invoked her father’s assignment of rights and interest in the property to her.
 The Regional Trial Court made a ruling to the effect that it should be considered, despite of the caption,
a donation inter vivos due to its irrevocability. The Court of Appeals, on appeal, ruled it to be one of
mortis causa and since it did not comply with the formalities of a will, it is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA is correct in declaring such deed a Donation Mortis Causa.

RULING:

No. The CA is incorrect. Such donation is a Donation Inter Vivos and its caption as mortis causa is not
controlling.

The express irrevocability of the donation is the distinctive standard that identifies the document as a
donation inter vivos.

An acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only
for such kind of donation.

Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The
reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s
acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.

Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests over the property to his daughter should
be void as he had no more rights to assign.

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 SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES

Maglasang vs. Heirs of Cabatingan

FACTS:

 Conchiata Cabatingan executed a Deed of Conditional Donation Inter Vivos covering a house and lot in
favor of her brother.
 Aside from that, 4 other deed of donations were executed by Conchita in favor of the petitioners.
 Stipulated in such deeds are provisions which read as follows, “to become effective upon the death of
the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force
and effect;”
 Conchita then died months after executing such deeds.
 The respondents, being the heirs, came to know about these deeds hence they filed for the annulment
and/or declaration of the nullity of deeds of donations and accounting which seeks the annulment of the
4 deeds. They alleged that the petitioners took advantage of Conchita’s fragile conditions.
 The petitioners denied such allegations contending that Conchita freely, knowingly, and voluntarily
executed such will.
 They further insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita
Cabatingan “in consideration of the love and affection of the donor” for the donee, and there is nothing
in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan’s death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donations are donations inter vivos or mortis causa.

RULING:

The donations are Donations Mortis Causa.

A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior
to Cabatingan’s death. The phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during
her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in their Acceptance and
Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation.

Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills
and testaments.

Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary public, they were not executed in the manner
provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil Code, thus it is void.

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 SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES
Austria Magat vs. CA

FACTS:

 Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of 5 children. She executed a Deed of Donation in favor of her
children covering a parcel of land.
 The deed has a stipulation which states that she freely, fully, and voluntarily give irrevocably to her 4
children and to their heirs or successors-in-interest of such property.
 Thereafter, the parties executed another notarized document which prohibits the sale and mortgage of
the property as long as Basilia is still living.
 However, Basilisa executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the petitioner Apolinaria, who happens to be her
daughter.
 Basilia’s children contested such act saying that the donation was inter vivos and that such is
irrevocable.
 However, the trial court disagreed with them stating that it is a donation mortis causa and hence, may
be revoked.
 CA reversed the ruling of RTC stating that such donation was inter vivos and hence irrevocable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such deed is a Donation Inter Vivos.

RULING:

Yes. The Court said that in order to determine whether such deed is a mortis cause or inter vivos, one
must look on the donor’s intent to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.

Upon the examination of the deed, it is stipulated therein that the phrase “hindi na mababawi” definitely
exudes the character of an inter vivos agreement.

In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not necessarily
defeat the inter vivos character of the donation. It even highlights the fact that what remains with the donor is
the right of usufruct and not anymore the naked title of ownership over the property donated.

Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner herein cannot be construed as a valid act of
revocation of donation. A formal case ought to be filed pursuant to Art 764 which speaks of an action bearing a
prescriptive period of 4 years from non compliance with the deed of donation. In this case, the 4 year
prescriptive period does not even apply because none of the terms (if any) were even violated.

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 SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES

Vitug vs. CA (Survivorship Agreement)

FACTS:

 Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the Bank of American
National Trust and Savings Association
 Survivorship Agreement is a contract wherein the parties agree that money in bank account or other
certain properties are theirs in common. However, upon death of any one of the parties, such property
will belong to the surviving party and has an effect of a donation.
 Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed a motion asking
authority to sell certain shares of stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover his advances
to the estate which he claimed were personal funds withdrawn from their savings account.
 Rowena opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the savings account were
conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate. Hence, there should be no reimbursement.
 On the other hand, Romarico insists that the same are his exclusive property acquired through the
survivorship agreement.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a survivorship agreement takes the form of a will.

Whether or not the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not
comply with the formalities of a valid will under Article 805 of the Civil Code. – NO.

RULING:

No. A survivorship agreement is not a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a will.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect
after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no
conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other.

A survivorship agreement takes in the form of an aleatory contract. An aleatory contract is an

agreement whereby parties involved do not have to perform a particular action until a specific event occurs. In
this case, the specific event is death of one spouse. The survivorship agreement is a contract which imposed a
mere obligation with a term--being death. Such contracts are permitted under Article 2012 on aleatory
contracts. When Dolores predeceased her husband, the latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the
funds in the account.

In this case, the monies subject of savings account were in the nature of conjugal funds. There is no
showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal,
having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such
unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills,
donations, and conjugal partnership

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter
has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account of the Bank of America.

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 SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES

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 SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES

Natalia Opulencia vs. CA

FACTS:

 Natalia entered into a contract to sell with Aladin Simundac and Miguel Olivan, the private respondents.
 A complaint for specific performance was filed by the respondents when Natalia failed to comply with
her obligations under the contract.
 Natalia averred that the property subject of the contract to sell forms part of the Estate of her father.
Such property is subject of a petition for probate filed with the Regional Trial Court.
 She said that upon the execution of the contract, the contract was not approved by the probate court
hence she offered to return the money.
 She lodged her defense under Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court where she contends that if the
estate of the deceased person is already subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator
cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract to sell executed by the parties without the approval of the court is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The Contract to Sell is valid.

Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable because the petitioner entered into the contract
to sell as the rightful owner or heir of the subject property and not as an administrator of the estate.

Hereditary rights are vetsed in the heir from the moment of the decedent’s death. Natalia became the
owner of the hereditary share the moment her father died.

Hence, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to sell because she has the
substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

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 SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES

Sps. Aggabao vs. CA

FACTS:

 Dr. Juvencio Ortañez was the owner of the 90% of the subscribed capital stocks of Philippine
International Life Insurance Company.
 When he died, he left behind his legitimate family – his wife and three children.
 He also left behind 5 illegitimate children.
 Rafael Ortanez, one of his legitimate children, filed for a petition of letters of administration on the
intestate of their father..
 However, his illegitimate siblings filed an opposition to Rafael’s petition. They prayed to the court that it
must appoint a special administrator.
 The court then appointed Rafael and Jose Ortanez were appointed joint special administrators of their
father’s estate.
 They submitted an inventory which included among other properties 2,029 shares of stock in the
Phil-Inter-Life.
 Juliana, the wife, claiming that she owns 1,014 shares of stock as her conjugal share, sold her share to
Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), which ownership was consolidated by FLAG for failure to
repurchase the same.
 Jose Ortanez, also acting in his personal capacity, claiming that he owned the parts of the
remaining share as his inheritance share, he sold said shares to FLAG and also failed to
repurchase the same.
 Prior to that, Juliana and her children entered into a memorandum of agreement for the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased, partitioning the estate among themselves.
 Ma. Divina, together with her siblings, who are illegitimate children of the deceased, they filed for a
motion for the appointment of special administrator of the Phil-Inter-Life shares of stock.
 She then filed a motion to declare the memorandum of agreement void ab initio and declare the
extrajudicial settlement partial nullity and the deeds of the sale void ab initio.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the sale of the shares of stock without court approval is valid?
2. Can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale.

RULING:

No. The sale is not valid. It is well settled that the court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent’s estate. No court approval was made for the sale of the shares of stock, thus
invalid.

Yes. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized
sale of estate property. Enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul
unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.

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Tabasondra vs. Sps. Constantino

FACTS:

 The parties in this case were the children of Cornelio from two marriages.
 The respondents were children from first wife.
 The petitioners were children from the second wife.
 Cornelio has two siblings, namely Valentina and Valeriana. Cornelio died in 1991 where he was
succeeded by his two families who then possessed and occupied the property. The two sisters both
died single.
 They all died intestate and without partitioning the property subject in this case.
 In 2002, the plaintiffs filed against the defendants a case whereby the plaintiffs claim that the parcels of
land which are owned in common by the plaintiff and the defendants but the latter does not give them
any share in the fruits thereof.
 The plaintiffs now is asking for the partition of the property but the defendants refused without any valid
reasons.
 Along the case, it was proven that Valentina ans Valeriana alienated their pro-indiviso shares to the
defendants respectively.
 Hence, the Court of Appeals promulgated that the partition and accounting of the property shall only be
with respect to the 33,450.66 sq.m. portion of the property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly ordered the partition and accounting od the estate.

RULING:

Yes. The Court upheld the right of Valentina and Valeriana to thereby alienate .. their pro indiviso
shares to Sebastian and Tarcila even without the knowledge or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the
alienation covered the disposition of only their respective interests in the common property.

As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and Tarcila of their pro indiviso
shares in the three lots, Sebastian and Tarcila became co-owners of the 100,352-square meter property with
Cornelio (later on, with the petitioners who were the successors-in-interest of Cornelio). In effect, Sebastian
and Tarcila were co-owners of two-thirds of the property, with each of them having one-third pro indiviso share
in the three lots, while the remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of Cornelio, namely, Sebastian,
Tarcila and the petitioners.

The court said that the case should be remanded to the court of origin for the purpose of segregating
and identifying the metes and bounds of the partition of the property.

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 SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES

Ining vs. Vega

FACTS:

 Leon Roldan is married to Rafaela Menez.

 They are the owner of the subject land in this case. It is located in Kalibo, Aklan and covered by an
Original Certificate.
 They both died without issue.
 Leon was survived by his Siblings Romana and Gregoria. (they are now both deceased)
 Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson Leonardo Vega. Leonardo is
married to Lourdes. They have children.
 Gregoria was survived by her 6 children. One of which is Antipolo. Antipolo is survived by Teodora, his
daughter. Teodora is married to Lucimo Sr., one of the petitioners.
 In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving
heir, Leonardo filed with the RTC for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages,
against Gregoria’s heirs.
 However, Lucimo is claiming for the absolute ownership of the subject property in this case and he
transferred in his name the tax declaration which covers the property. In defense Lucimo Sr. argued
that a certain Enriquez had bought the property from Leon (Father of Gregoria)
 It is the act of Lucimo which is now tantamount to the repudiation of co-ownership which seems to be at
issue whereas the court decided on…

ISSUE:

Whether or not his acts constitutes a valid repudiation of co-ownership.

If so, whether or not the prescription has ran.

RULING:

No. It was proven that there was no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. of the subject property. The
property then remains to be part of Leon’s estate upon his passing which is then co-owned by the heirs of
Gregoria and Romana.

The acts of Lucimo however, although it was argued that it constitutes an act of repudiation of the co-
ownership, the truth is that HE IS NOT A CO-OWNER OF THE PROPERTY, as he is not an heir of Gregoria.
He is merely a son-in-law of Antipolo being married to his daughter Teodora.

Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, excludes relations
by affinity.

Hence, the prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.

DOCTRINE:

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot
become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-
ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.

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Balus vs. Balus

FACTS:

 The parties to this case are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastian Balus.
 Prior to Rufo’s death, he mortgaged a parcel of land in order to obtain a loan from a bank.
 He failed to pay the loan which eventually led to the foreclosure and auction of the property. The
property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. A new title was issued in the name of the
bank.
 After their father’s death, the parties executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each
of them a specific 1/3 portion of the said property.
 It was stipulated therein that the parties admit of the knowledge of the mortgage and that they intend to
redeem the property.
 Three years later, the respondents bought the property from the bank. A TCT was issued in favor of the
respondents.
 Petitioner however, continued possession of the property prompting the respondents to file for recovery
of possession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the co-ownership by the parties over the subject property persisted even after the lot
was purchased by the Bank.

RULING:

No. Their father has lost ownership of the property during his lifetime hence the subject property does
not form part of his estate. Hence, the parties never inherited the land from their father.

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Dela Merced vs. Dela Merced

FACTS:

 Evarista dela Merced is the owner of 5 parcels of land where she left intestate when she died in 1987.
 She was survived by three sets of heirs
o Francisco, her brother
o Teresita, her niece, the only daughter of her sister who died.
o Legitimate children of Eugenia, another sister who died.
 The three sets of heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement adjudicating 1/3 portion to each of them
pro-indiviso.
 Joselito dela Merced, the private respondent, who is an illegitimate son of Francisco, the brother of
Evarista, filed for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement and he is asking the court of a TRO
because he was fraudulently omitted from the settlement even if the parties are aware of Joselito’s
relation to his father.
 He then prays to be included to the settlement.
 The trial court however ruled against him because it applied Article 992 of the Civil Code which states
that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother, nor vice versa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article is correctly applied in Joselito’s case, thereby barring him from inheriting from
Evarista’s estate.

RULING:

No. Article 992 is inapplicable in this case. Joselito is not inheriting from his relative or from Evarista.
He is inheriting from his father. The one he is inheriting is his father’s share in the estate of Evarista.

Since Evarista died before Francisco, Francisco inherited from the portion of estate of Evarista being
one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco dies, his heirs – the spouse of Francisco, the legitimate
children, as well as Joselito, being an illegitimate child shall inherit Francisco’s share in the estate of Evarista.

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 SUCCESSION RECIT 1 CASES

Coronel vs. CA

FACTS:

 In 1985, Romulo Coronel, et. al, the petitioners, executed a document, “Receipt of Down Payment” in
favor Ramona Alcaraz, the respondent, for the sale of the land that the petitioners inherited from their
father.
 However, the parties could not complete the sale because the TCT of the land was still under the
petitioner’s deceased father.
 The respondent then paid 50,000 pesos to effect the transfer of the title to their names.
 However, the Coronels sold the property to Catalina Mabanag (Catalina). For that reason, the
Coronels rescinded their contract with Alcaraz by depositing the down payment of the latter to
the bank of Ramona Alcaraz.
 But Ramona filed an action for specific performance against the Coronels.

 Respondents alleged that the subject contract was perfected on January 19, 1985. Petitioners opposed
that there could been no perfected contract on that date because they were then not yet the absolute
owners of the inherited property.

 Catalina also filed a notice of adverse claim over the subject property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a perfected sale already even if the petitioners were not yet the absolute
owner of the inherited property at the time of the sale.

RULING:

Yes. The sale was perfected even when they were not yet the absolute owners at the time of the sale.
The rule is that rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Art.
777, NCC).
Petitioners in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent are compulsory heirs who
were called to succession by operation of law. Hence, when their father died, the petitioners stepped into the
shoes of their father insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining
thereto became binding and enforceable upon them.

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Paulmitan vs. CA

FACTS:

 Agatona Paulmitan died in 1953 leaving behind parcels of land in Negros Occidental.
 She has 2 legitimate children, Pascual and Donato.
 Pascual died in the same year as his mom. He is survived by his children, who are the respondents in
this case.
 In 1963, Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship where he extrajudicially adjudicated
unto himself one of the 2 properties left whereas he is claiming that he is the only surviving heir of
Agatona.
 11 years later, he then executed a Deed of Sale over the same property in favor of petitioner Juliana,
his daughter.
 Meanwhile, the second lot/property was forfeited and sold at a public auction because of non-payment
of taxes. It was bought by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental. It was later then redeemed
by Juliana.
 Upon learning of these transactions, the respondents, the children of Pascual, filed a complaint against
the petitioners for the partition of the properties.
 Juliana averred however that she acquired exclusive ownership of the entire property by virtue of the
deed of sale as well as by way of redemption.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Pascual are entitled to his share to his mother’s estate?

RULING:

Yes. They are entitled to their Father’s share.

Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code that "[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent," the right of ownership, not only of Donato but also
of Pascual, over their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of law vested in
them in 1953 when their mother died intestate.

When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him in the
co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided portion of the
property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle
Donato over the disputed decedent estate.

When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was
only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him
upon termination of the co-ownership.

The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did
not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided
share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question with the respondents, her first
cousins.

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Riofero vs. CA

FACTS:

 Alfonso Orfinada, Jr. died intestate where he left several real and personal properties.
 He was survived by his wife and their 7 children, who are the respondents in this case.
 Other than the legal family, Alfonso has left his paramour, Teodora Riofero and their three children,
mourning.
 It was later discovered by Alfonso James and Lourdes, two of the decedent’s legitimate children, that
Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that
accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued three certificates of title in favor of Teodora
Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos.

 Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural
Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the
extrajudicial settlement.

 Later, respondents filed a complaint to annul the extrajudicial settlement of estate and the real estate
mortgage and to cancel the TCT and other related documents issued in favor of the petitioners.

 For their part, petitioners claim that the subject properties originally belonged to Teodora’s parents and
were her advanced inheritance.

 They also claim that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather, the real party-in-interest
is Alfonso’s estate in view of the pendency of administration proceedings. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents have the legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the
deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings. 

RULING:

Yes. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil
Code that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. The
provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.

The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if
the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased, and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, the heirs may still file for the recovery of the property of the
estate if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and when the administrator is alleged
to have participated in the act complained of the he will be made a party defendant. 

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Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragante

FACTS:

 Pedro Fragante applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) for his ice plant business.
 But before his application could be granted, he died.
 Nevertheless, the Public Service Commission granted him the CPC and his intestate estate is now
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
 Such CPC then was issued to the Intestate Estate, thereby authorizing such intestate estate through its
special or judicial administrator, appointed by the court, to maintain and operate the ice plant.
 Angel Limjoco contends that it was an error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of
the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case
then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied
for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

ISSUE:

Whether Fragante’s rights for the certificate of public convenience were extinguished by his death.

RULING:

No. The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and
parcel of the assets of his estate.

The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. The estate of a deceased person is also
considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs.

The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes
of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his
death.

One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service
Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion.

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Rafael Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez

FACTS:

 Vipa Fernandez is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo City.

 Vipa and her husband, Levi Lahaylahay, have 2 children -Grace Joy and Jill Frances.
 In 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy over the subject property.
 Rafael bound himself to pay Vipa 3,000 pesos per month with 10% increase every year thereafter.
 In March 1994, Vipa died intestate. Grace Joy became the de facto administrator of the
estate.
 In June 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. In June 2003, the Estate of Vipa,
through Grace Joy, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC.
 At the time of the filing of the complaint, Rafael's unpaid rents amounted to P271K.
 In Dec. 2005, Levi sold his undivided share in the subject property to Rafael.
 The MTCC ordered Rafael to vacate the premises and to pay the unpaid rentals.
 The RTC reversed the MTCC decision and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer.
 The CA reinstated the MTCC decision.

ISSUES:

Whether Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose his undivided interest even though the conjugal
partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated

RULING:

Yes. On the issue of ownership of Rafael, Levi had the right to freely dispose of his undivided interest.

When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was automatically terminated. Under
Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution due to the death of either
spouse, should be liquidated either in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased or,
in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within one year from the death of the deceased spouse.
Absent any liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property is void.

Rafael bought Levi's one-half share in the subject property in consideration of P500,000.00 as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated December 29, 2005. At that time, the conjugal partnership properties of
Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such disposition, notwithstanding the absence of liquidation of
the conjugal partnership properties, is not necessarily void.

Why is not it void? The Supreme Court said that upon Vipa’s death, the conjugal partnership was
automatically terminated and ½ of the subject property was automatically reserved in favor of the surviving
spouse as his share in the conjugal partnership.

Although Levi became co-owner with his children over the property, he cannot assert any claim to a
specific portion without actual partition of the property. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share,
hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest.

Accordingly, Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the subject property since he is already a co-
owner thereof. But he is bound to pay the unpaid rentals computed by the court therein.

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Arayata vs. Joya

FACTS:

 Basilia Arayata, the plaintiff, is married to Cecilio Joya.

 Cecilio inherited from his parents rights of lease to 6 lots which were part of friar lands in Sta. Cruz,
Cavite.
 When the Insular Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease in
accordance with the provisions the law.
 While married to Basilia, Cecilio purchased the lots he had been leasing, on installments, from the
Government.
 2 of the 6 lots were put up for sale because of the limitation on the number of lots which a purchaser
could acquire.
 Therefore, Cecilip supplied Pedro money for him to buy the 2 lots.
 Subsequently, Pedro transferred the rights to the lots to Cecilio by virtue of Donation.
 In 1919, two lots were conveyed by Cecilio. One to Florentino Joya and the other lot to Marcelina and
Francisco Joya.
 In the same year, Cecilio executed a will devising lots to Florentino Joya, Pablo Joya, Delfin and
Felicisima Blancaflor, to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla, and
Marcelina and Francisca Joya.
 Cecilio died on May 26, 1919; however, by that time, he was unable to complete his payment of the
price of the lots mentioned to the government.
 All the lots in question except one lot are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy their
fruits.
 Florentino Joya, being the executor, he presented the will for probate to the court.
 In the course of the proceedings, Florentino presented an alleged agreement of partition by the
legatees, which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the plaintiff’s opposition, who
alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the legacies given were null and void.

RULING:

Yes. The lands, which are the subject matter of said legacies and which are in the possession of the
defendants, still belong to Cecilio Joya's estate, because no judicial partition has yet been made of the
property which he left, and which is, together with its fruits, subject to the payment of his debts.

Said defendants cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to possession in good
faith insofar as the fruits are concerned because even when the legacies are valid, they acquired them
only when the latter judicially assigned to them in the final partition, and because, while said lands are under
administration, the administrator is obliged to render an account of his management of the same and the
products thereof.

Being part of Cecilio’s estate, the surviving spouse, Basilia, is entitled to the possession and to the
fruits of the subject lot.

Section 16 of Act No. 1120 states that “in the event of the death of a holder of a certificate, prior to the
execution of a deed by the government, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the
certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same.”

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Alvarez vs. IAC

FACTS:

 Aniceto Yanes left a parcel of land which was divided into two lots, intestate.
 He was survived by his children – Rufino, Felipe, and Teodora.
 Rufino died and he was survived by his children who are the respondents in this case.
 Felipe was also survived by Antonio and Rosario Yanes, also respondents.
 Teodora was survived by Jovita Alib.
 When Aniceto dies, he left his children the two lots.
 When the Second World War broke, Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places.
 After the war, his son, Jesus, went back to the property to get their share of the sugar produced. Upon
getting there, he was informed that one Fortunato Santiago, Fuentabella, and Alvarez were in
possession of one of the lots or the Lot 773.
 The said lots were then sold to Fuentabella Jr. and when he died after, he was survived by his spouse
Arsenia where she sold the lots to Rosendo Alvarez wherein a new TCT was issued in favor of Alvarez.
 Two years later, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint for the return of
the ownership and possession of the two lots.
 During the pendency of the proceedings, Rosendo Alvarez sold the lots to Dr. Siason.
 Dr. Siason filed a manifestation stating that he is a buyer in good faith and of value.
 The RTC rendered a decision (which became final and executory) ordering Alvarez to reconvey the
said lots to the heirs of Yanes.
 However, execution of the decision proved unsuccessful since the subject lots can no longer be
reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses. The reason being that Dr. Siason is a purchaser
in good faith, having acquired the property without knowledge of the pendency of the suit.
 Hence, in lieu of the reconveyance, damages will instead have to be paid to the heirs of Yanes.
 The heirs of Alvarez contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made
by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of
his estate, after his death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alvarez’s liability arising from the sale of the lots can be legally transmitted to his heirs.

RULING:

Yes. Since the petitioners are the heirs of Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their
father’s transaction, which then gave rise to the present claim for damages.

Petitioners aver that they did not inherit the property in this case is untenable because by legal fiction,
the monetary equivalent thereof forms part of the mass of their father’s hereditary estate. Hereditary assets are
always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.

It must be made clear, however, that the petitioners are only liable to the extent of the value of their
inheritance.

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Estate of Llenado vs. Llenado

FACTS:

 In 1975, Cornelio, the original landowner, leased a parcel of land, which is the subject of the
controversy, to Romeo Llenado, his nephew.
 In 1978, Romeo assigned all his rights to Orlando Llenado over the unexpired portion of the lease
contract.
 It was then agreed that Orlando shall have the option to renew the lease contract for another 3 years
commencing from December 3, 1980 to December 2, 1983, --- renewable for another 4 years or up to
December 2, 1987 --- and during this period, it was stipulated that “the property cannot be sold,
transferred, alienated, or conveyed in whatever manner to any third party.”
 In June 1978, Cornelio and Orlando entered into a Supplementary Agreement where Orlando was
given an additional option to renew the lease contract for 10 years at 5-year intervals for the operation
of a gasoline station which was subsequently built on the lot.
 But then Orlando died in 1983 where he was succeeded by his wife, Wenifreda, the petitioner, who took
over the operation of the gasoline station.
 In 1987, Cornelio sold the lot in controversy to his children Jorge and Eduardo, and such titles were
transferred months after.
 Cornelio then passed away, months after the sale and transfer.
 Eduardo informed Wenifreda of his desire to take over the subject lot but Wenifreda refused to do so
which then prompted Eduardo to file for a complaint of unlawful detainer before the MTC of Valenzuela
which ordered Wenifreda to vacate the property.
 After Eduardo’s institution of the complaint, Wenifreda filed a complaint for annulment of deed of
conveyance, title and damages against Eduardo, Jorge, and their mother with the Register of Deeds of
Valenzuela. 
 The RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to Wenifreda. However, when the case was
appealed to CA, it reversed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the rights arising from the lease contract are transmissible.
2. Whether or not the sale by Cornelio to his sons of the lot subject of controversy is invalid for violating
the prohibitory clause in the lease agreement between Cornelio and Orlando.
RULING:
1. YES. A contract of lease is transmissible to the heirs of lessor or lessee.
Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that the heirs shall be bound by the contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest except when such rights and obligations are not transmissible by
their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
A contract of lease involves a property right in which a death of a party to the said contract shall
not excuse the non-performance of the contract.
The rights and obligations pass to the heirs of the deceased and the heir of the deceased-lessor
is bound to respect the period of the lease. This principle is applicable to the case of renewal of the
lease contract. The reason is that the covenant to renew a lease contract is not personal but it runs with
the land.
Hence, the successors-in-interest of the lessee shall be entitled to the benefits while the
successors-in-interest of the lessor or the lessor himself shall be burdened with the duties and
obligations imposed by the original parties. Accordingly, the rights and obligations under the lease
contract with option to renew were transmitted from Orlando to his heirs upon his death.

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2. NO. The sale is valid.

In the case of sale of the lot subject of controversy, such is valid because the lease did not
subsist at the time of the sale of the property in January of 1987.
When Orlando, the third party lessee, died on November 7, 1983, the lease contract was set to
expire 26 days later, UNLESS renewed by his heirs for another 4 years. Although the option to renew is
an enforceable right, it must be exercised to be given effect.
The successors-in-interest must have renewed the contract of lease and continue to occupy the
leased property after notifying the lessor to give such effect. This should be exercised first. The election
of the option to renew the lease in this case cannot be inferred from Wenifreda’s continued possession
of the property and operation of the gas station after Orlando’s death and expiration of the lease
contract.
There was no proof from the heirs or successors-in-interest of Orlando or Orlando himself to
have exercised the option to renew the lease. This then resulted to the validity of the sale of the subject
lot by Cornelio to his children Eduardo and Jorge as the prohibitory clause under the lease contract was
no longer in force. 

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