Baluyut vs. Pano, et. al.

G.R. NO. L-42088, May 7, 1976

Facts:
Sotero Baluyut executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed
to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of
his estate. The remaining three-fourths were bequeathed to his collateral relatives named
Irene, Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and
Benjamin, all surnamed Miranda. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino
is not mentioned in that will. Alfredo Baluyot, filed in the CFI of Quezon City a verified
petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his
widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the
decedent’s estate.
Lopez argued and showed proof that the widow was declared an Incompetent by
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
The probate court instituted Mrs. Baluyut as the administrator of the estate, the
lower court ratiocinated that as the surviving spouse she has the preferential right to be
appointed as administratrix.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
appointed Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix

Ruling:
Yes. While the probate court correctly assumed that the surviving spouse enjoys
preference in the granting of letters of administration, it does not follow that she should be
named administrator without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to
discharge that trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain
person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not
automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing should be held
in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor
when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit
for that position. It was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the
suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to
prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition.

Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

Facts:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors'
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2)
minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, and by his
children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes
Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
Teresita Cuenco Gonzales.
On 5 March 1964, respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration, alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila
on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he
left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court
issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice
be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication
thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
Respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, opposing
probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in
view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp.
Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
The Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."

Issues:
1. Whether or not the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the
testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly
its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's
express wish in his testament
2. Whether or not the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings

Ruling:
1. Yes. The appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting
aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last
will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish. Under Rule 73, "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other 194 courts." Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition
for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that
the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the
petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court
which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

2. No. the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring
to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to
have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition
since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of
the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu
court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of
venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction
over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and
assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the
Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City
court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to
have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary
disposition.

Ventura, et. al vs. Ventura

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

Facts:
Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura while Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are
also the brother and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other hand, appellees Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano the paternity of appellees was denied by the deceased in his will.
Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the
appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was
named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix
of his estate. On October 22, 1963, Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura filed a motion
to remove the executrix Maria Ventura on the following grounds: (1) that she is grossly
incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of
the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no
harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her
accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the Court of December 12, 1963. Hence, the
probate court removed Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate and in
her place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are appointed joint administratrix of the
estate upon filing by each of them of a bond of P 7,000.00.

Issue:
Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, if no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as
the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve."
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana
Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel
Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the
statute of distribution to the decedents. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred." As
decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura.

Guevara vs. Guevara

G.R. No. L-48840, 29 December 1943

Facts:
On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will, apparently with all the
formalities of the law. On September 27, 1933, he died. His last will and testament,
however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration
proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Ever since the death of
Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed
the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various
portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it
probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as
his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the
inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the
will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by
the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both
the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for probate of the will of Victorino L. Guevara is barred
by the statute of limitations

Ruling:
No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. Under section 1 of Rule 74, in
relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire
to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court
for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the
provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. In holding the statute of
limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the court below failed to notice that its
doctrine was destructive of the right of testamentary disposition and violative of the
owner’s right to control his property within the legal limits.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the
present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the
existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded,
nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of
the will to present it to the court for probate.
 Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the
authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the
estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the
court, first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or
personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because
the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the
substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against
public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru
the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to
each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will
presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more
than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an
ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.

In Re Pilapil
G.R. No. L-47931, 27 June 1941

Facts:
Father Eleuterio Pilapil, being priest of the parish of Mualboal of the Province of
Cebu, died in the city of that name on 6 December 1935. Absence of any submitted his will
after his death, at least until early February 1939, his brother Calixto Pilapil promoted the
6th of such month and year, the record of intestacy No. 399 to ask fuesenombrado manager
of the relict goods. Received test the request submitted to elindicado end prior publication
of notices presritos by law, and hearing the court prior to the quecomparecieron to oppose
it, among which were the same appeal and Simeona Pilapil, the Court granted it,
immediately afterwards naming him administrator of the Intestate. Within a few days, or
the March 4, 1939, the respondent promoted in turn file No. 407 previously has been
mentioned, to call for the legalization as a testament of the late P. Eleuterio Pilapil, of
Exhibit A that is doubled to carbon Exhibit C.

Issue:
Whether or not probate is necessary in the present case.

Ruling:
Exhibits A and C cannot be legalized because they were not prepared or were signed
in accordance with the law, saying that their pages are not numbered with letters; and
because in its clause Witnessing is not expressed that they were signed by the three
attesting witnesses, in the presence of the testator, suffice to call attention to the fact that
the bottom of the first page is in letters note that says clearly: " Go to the 2nd page "; and
the fact that, at the bottom of the second page, there is this other note: "Go to the 3rd page";
and suffice also draw attention to the first two lines of said third page is the last, where, to
complete the provision that is contained in the last paragraph of the previous page, or
second.
The purpose of the law to establish the formalities authenticity required, is
undoubtedly ensure and guarantee their authenticity against bad faith and fraud, to
prevent those who have no right to succeed the testator will happen and win-win with the
legalization of same. Has fulfilled that purpose in the case that has been talked about
because, in the same body of the will and in the same page where the clause Witnessing
appears, that is the third, expresses the will consists of three pages and that each one of the
first two leads in part the note in letters, and partly and second pages of it. These Facts
clearly excluded all fear, suspicion, or any hint of doubt that has replaced some of its pages
with another. 199

Dorotheo vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108581, 8 December 1999

Facts:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will
and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion to Declare
the Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion.

Issue:
Whether or not a will a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executor still be given effect

Ruling:
No. Under the law, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will
and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the
testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime
or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts
had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void.
Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which
will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but
that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge
before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be re-evaluated.
In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly
held by the trial court. The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that
petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate
children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be
noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be
distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to
implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the
intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of
successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate
distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law
considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of
his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature
and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution
of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and
intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of
the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its
intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of
succession. 200

Nufable vs. Nufable

G.R. No. 126950, 02 July 1999

Facts:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at Poblacion, Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental, consisting of 948 square meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965
and was survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all
surnamed Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due publication
and hearing, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued an Order
dated March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last will and testament executed by the
deceased Edras Nufable. However, one of the heirs, Angel actually mortgaged the entire
property to DBP two months prior to the settlement which property was eventually
foreclosed. Thereafter, Nelson, son of the mortgagors, purchased said property from DBP.
The other heirs now filed for the annulment of sale in favor of Nelson. The Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting one-fourth of the property to Nelson and
the other three-fourths to the other heirs. Petitioners filed this present petition contending
that the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Edras Nufable did not determine the
ownership of the land in question as against third parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent
probate are pertinent and material to the question of the right of ownership of petitioner
Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in question from, and as acquired property of, the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
Ruling:
No, the Last Will and Testament of Edras and its subsequent probate do not affect
the title of Nelson. At the time when the entire property was mortgaged, the other heirs of
Edras had already acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so because
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Accordingly, for the purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether
the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable was admitted or that the Settlement
of Estate was approved. It is to be noted that the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable
specifically referred to the subject property in stating that "the land situated in the
Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this must remain in
common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers and sisters to
construct a house therein." It was therefor the will of the decedent that the subject
property should undivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty (20) years
pursuant to Article 870 of the Civil Code.
Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject property to DBP
on March 15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire property. Angel's right over
the subject property was limited only to 1/4 pro indivisoshare. As co-owner of the subject
property, Angel's right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be
allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-
owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. Hence, The Court
of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio Nufable "had no right to mortgage the
subject property in its entirety. His right to encumber said property was limited only to 1/4
pro indiviso share of the property in question."

Gallanosa, et al. vs. Arcangel

G.R. No. L-29300, 21 June 1978

Facts:
Florentino Hitosis executed a will in Bicol dialect in 1938. He died on 1939. He is
survived only by his brother. Thereafter, a petition for probate of his will was filed. He
bequeathed his ½ share of the conjugal property to his second wife, Tecla, and should Tecla
predecease him, as was the case, it would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and
Corazon Grecia. He likewise bequeathed his separate properties to his protégé. The probate
was opposed by his brother, nephews and nieces. Subsequently, the will was admitted for
probate. Thereafter the testamentary heirs submitted a project partition wherein the
properties therein were distributed in accordance with the testator’s will. The same was
approved by the judge. However, the heirs of Florentino’s deceased brothers and sisters
instituted an action for recovery of the land alleging that they have been in continuous
possession of the same. As the basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa
spouses, through fraud, caused the simulation of the document purporting it to be the last
will and testament of Florentino.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of
the will to recover the parcel of land subject of legacy therein.

Ruling:
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the “annulment” of a will. In
order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity
of the will. That means that the testator was of sound mind at the time when he executed
the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence; that the will
was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is
genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the
finality of the allowance of a will the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be
raised anymore. It was held in Austria vs. Ventenilla that “under section 625 of Act No. 190,
the only time given to parties who are displeased with the order admitting to probate a
will, for an appeal is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding
whether or not an order admitting a will or probate will be opened for fraud, after the time
allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal has taken from an order probating a
will, the heirs cannot, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions
relating to its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
as to the testamentary capacity of the testator.”

Palacios vs. Palacios

G.R.No. L-12207, 24 December 1959

Facts:
Juan Palacio executed his last will and testament and availing himself of the
provisions of the new Civil Code, he filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a
petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children
Antonio Palacio and Andrea Palacio. Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the probate of
the will alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she
was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her legitimate.
After the presentation of petitioner’s evidence relative to the essential requisites
and formalities provided by the Law for the validity of a will, the court issued an order
admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing of the
opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and after proper hearing concerning
this incident, the court issued another order declaring opposition to be the natural child of
petitioner and annulling the will in so far as it impairs her legitimate.

Issue:
 Whether or not the opposition to the intrinsic validity of the will is proper.

Ruling:
No. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law,
much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged
natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised
here but in a separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in the present case,
is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the effects
thereof after his death.
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator it
does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should
he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before
he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the
testator’s death would be in order.
It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling
the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground
that, as it has found, she is an acknowledged natural daughter of the testator. This is an
extraneous matter which should be threshed out in a separate action. 204

Sanchez, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108947 -29, September 1997

Facts:
Private respondent, Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child spouses Juan C. Sanchez and
Maria Villafranca while the other private respondents are the legitimate children of
respondent Rosalia. Petitioners are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Following
the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, Rosalia a petition for letters of administration
over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, who was at the time in state of
senility.
In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and
fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod;
and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The
trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the said sales must be subject to
collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of
sale and determined with finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof. In doing
so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court.

Issue:
 Whether or not a petition for certiorari is, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to
correct orders of a probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively
passing upon title to the properties subject of such deeds.

Ruling:
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its
assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings
involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve
questions of title only provisionally. It is hornbook doctrine that “in a special proceeding
for the probate of a will; the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with
equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.” Jurisprudence teaches: “[A]
probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.”
Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered
its decision in disregard of the parties' compromise agreement. Such disregard, on the
ground that the compromise agreement "was nor approved by the court," is tantamount to
"an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation and within the bounds of law.” Thus, the Court held that the questioned
decision and resolutions of the trial court may be challenged through a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. At the very least, this case is a clear
exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal because the
trial court's decision and resolutions were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, which
may thus be challenged or attacked at any time. "A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is
no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation.

Rivera vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. Nos. 75005-06, 15 February 1990

Facts:
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of the town of Mabalacat named
Venancio Rivera died. Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio’s
estate. It was opposed by Adelaido Rivera who denied that Jose was the son of the
decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in
fact left two holographic wills. Adelaido filed a petition for probate of the two holographic
wills this was opposed by Jose. Adelaido was later on appointed special administrator.
After trial, Jose was found not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera
who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was
married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had 7 children including Adelaido. The holographic
will was also admitted to probate.

Issue:
Whether or not the holographic wills are valid.

Ruling:
Yes. The respondent court considered them valid because it was found them to have
been written, dated, signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the 3 witnesses required under
Article 811 because the authenticity of the will had not been in questioned. The existence
and therefore the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera.
Jose opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido and claimed that they
were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied
Art. 811 of the Civil Code, provided as follows: in the probate of a holographic will it shall
be necessary that at least 1 witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will contested, at least 3 witnesses shall be required. The flaw in this
argument is that as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased
Venancio whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality
to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the
3 witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio who authenticated the wills as having
been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

Teotico vs. Del Val, et al.

G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965

Facts:
Maria Mortera died in 1955. She left a will, duly acknowledged before a notary
public and witnesses. The will stated that she freely executed the will with sound mind,
good health. Among the many legacies and devisees made in the will was one P20,000.00 to
Rene Teodico, husband of her niece Josefina Mortera. She also instituted Josefina as her
sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in
the will. Vicente Teodico filed a petition for probate of will before the CFI and a hearing was
set. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testator, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, deceaseed
brother of testator, filed an opposition of the will alleging that:
1. said will was not executed as required by law;
2. testator was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of the
execution;
3. the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor
had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, however, allowed the oppositor to
intervene as the adopted child of Francisca. She amended her opposition, alleging the
additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because he
was the physician who took care of testator during her last illness. Petitioner Teotico,
together with Josefina, filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision on the nullity of
the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico, while the oppositor filed a motion for reconsideration
on the decision decreeing the probate of the will. Both motions were denied. Both
appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate court erred passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by
the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Ruling:
Yes. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions
among which the following may be cited: "Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of
the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only
purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law."
The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the
law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being
vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points
remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will
was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition
to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of
a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in
the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid."
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo
declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside
as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement
should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of
the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other
pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the
deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
Gan vs. Yap
G.R. No. L-12190, 30 August 1958

Facts:
It was stipulated that Felicidad AltoYap died of heart failure on November 20, 1951,
leaving properties in Pulitan, Bulacan and in the City of Manila. Fausto E. Gan, the petitioner
and appellant herein, filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly
executed by the deceased on March 17, 1952. In order to justify his claim, he tired to
establish the contents and due execution of the will by the statements in open court of
Felisa Enguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte, and Rosario Gan Jimenez, who testified
that they have witnessed the execution of the will in question as the same has been read to
them when they happen to visit the deceased when she was still at the UST Hospital. The
petitioner, however, failed to present in court a copy of the alleged holographic will. On the
other hand, her surviving spouse, Ildefonso Yap, the opposite and appellee herein, asserted
that the deceased had not left any will nor executed a testament during her lifetime.
The Court of First Instance rendered a decision refusing to probate the alleged will
and thereafter denied the motion for reconsideration submitted thereto.

Issue:
Whether or not a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses
who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

Ruling:
NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium
of proof. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic
will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct”
proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. It was held that in the probate of holographic will a copy
thereof must be duly presented in court in order to determine that the will has been
written and duly authenticated by the testator. Therefore, the failure to present a copy
thereof will classify the same as lost or destroyed. The court then held that the execution
and the contents of the lost or destroyed holographic may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect as the law regards the document as a
material proof of authenticity. 210

Rodelas vs. Aranza

G.R. No. L-58509, 7 December 1982
Facts:
This is a consolidated petition filed by Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla
Treyes, Expidite Bonilla Frias, and Ephralm Bonilla, the oppositors and appelles herein,
opposing the petition filed by Marcela Rodelas, the petitioner and appellant herein, for the
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla and the issuance of letters of
testamentary in her favor. The latter presented in court an alleged copy of the said
holographic will. The probate court ordered the dismissal of appellant’s petition for the
allowance of the holographic will of deceased Ricardo B. Bonilla on the ground that the
alleged photostatic copy of the will which was presented for probate, cannot stand in lieu of
the lost original, for the law regards the document itself as the material proof of the
authenticity of the said will.

Issue:
Whether or not a holographic will that was lost or cannot be found be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.

Ruling:
Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court
with the standard writings of the testator.
The court held that if a holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other
copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in the said will as it is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
However, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. Evidently, the
photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.

Codoy vs. Calugay

G.R. No. L-123486, 12 August 1999

Facts:
 On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo, Eufemia Patigas, devisees
and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Señ o Vda. De Ramonal, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased,
who died on January 16, 1990. On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel
Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will
was a forgery and that the same is illegible. This gives an impression that a “third hand” of
an interested party other than the “true hand” of Matilde Señ o Vda. De Ramonal executed
the holographic will. Respondent presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary
evidence. However, the lower court denied probate of the will for insufficiency of evidence
and lack of merits.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the
holographic will of Matilde Señ o Vda. De Ramonal.

Ruling:
Yes. The law provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic
will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator. Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The Court
ruled that “shall” in a statue commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is consistent
with the idea of discretion and the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a
statue is mandatory.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified
explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the case of
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified
the record of said case before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the
signature appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased.
The Court cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the
will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three
witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The will was
found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who
kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed
that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the
deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the
handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her
lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay
when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which
contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a
handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of
the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes,
retracing and erasures on the will. Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated
August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for
pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are
different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is
no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. The Court, therefore, cannot be
certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

Rodriguez vs. De Borja

G.R. No. L-21993, 21 June 1966

Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition against the court
of first instance of Bulacan for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss in especial
proceeding No. 1331 which said court is alleged to have taken cognizance of it without
jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that the court has no jurisdiction to try the case due to the
pendency of another action for for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Celestino Rodriguez in the court of First Instance of Rizal namely Special Proceedings no
3907. They contend that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00
a.m. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Bulacan at
11:00 a.m. an the same date, the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Vda. De Borja vs. Jan. The
respondents, on the other hand, take the stand that the CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction
over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the clerk of court on March 4, 1963 and
that the case in this court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12,
1963.

Issue:
Whether or not the CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate
proceedings?

Ruling:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto
of the will of the late father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963 even if no petition for its allowance
was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio,
have taken steps to fix the time and place of proving the will and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Accordingly, the use of the disjunctive in the words “when a will is delivered to or a
petition for the allowance of may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent’s
testament even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the CFI of Bulacan ahead of any
other that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts even if
it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. The
disposition presupposes that 2 or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of them, only one could be of proper venue yet the rule grants
precedence to that court whose jurisdiction is first invoked without taking venue into
account.

Vda. De Precilla vs. Narciso

G.R. No.L-27200, 18 August 1972

Facts:
A motion for reconsideration/new trial was filed by petitioner – appeal praying that
the decision of the court promulgated on April 30, 1970 disallowing the purported will of
the deceased Gliceria A. Del Rosario be reconsidered and set aside and the judgment of the
trial court admitting the same to probate be affirmed or in the alternative, that before
finally resolving the said issue of the probate of said purported will , this case be remanded
to the court a quo in order that further evidence be admitted relative to the factual question
of whether or not the said deceased could have read the said document on December 29,
1960, the date of the alleged execution of her eyes then.
One of the ground alleged in the support of the present motion was the testimony of Dr.
Jesus V. Tamesis upon which the disallowance of the will was based, has no probative value
because: (a.) it is permissive upon a grave factual error; (b.) such testimony is contradicted
by his own clinical record; and (c.) it is glaringly superficial and evasive.

Issue:
Whether or not the deceased could have read and prepared the will executed on
December 29, 1960.

Ruling:
The very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the
supposed testator has willed that his estate be distributed in the manner therein provided,
and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect
independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby. No will may be probated unless
the court is convinced of its authenticity and due execution on the basis of the evidence
before it, it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied
legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession
will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether or
not it will be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in
his estate. In probate cases, the courts should disregard the ordinary rules of procedure
and of evidence to the end that nothing less than the evidence of which the matter is
susceptible should be inquired to be presented to it before a document purport to be
legalized as a will is to be probated or to be denied probate. Whenever the court has
reasonable doubt as the material facts concerning the proper execution of a will, it should
take the initiative of requiring the parties to take the appropriate step to erase such doubt.
Unlike in adversary proceedings wherein the rule is that the party whose favor the
evidence preponderates should be awarded the palm of victory, probate proceedings are
instituted that the state may see to it that a testator's will, if duly executed, may be
legalized, and the courts, as agents of the state, should not stop short of being fully
convincing that there has been or has not been compliance with the requirements of the
formalities required by law in the execution of the testament, so much so that if the
opposing parties, for any reason, should leave material evidence presented or unclarified,
and from the circumstances, the court has reason to believe that better evidence exists, the
court should try to remedy the situation by calling for more complete and clearer evidence;
and so it is that when it appears to the appellate court that the evidence is incomplete or
insufficient to either establish or disprove any essential fact in an appealed probate
proceeding, it is not only within its authority, but more of an obligation on its part to return
the case for further proceedings, that the evidence may be completed and in order that the
court may be provided with adequate and concrete basis for deciding the issues of
authenticity and due execution of the will before it with as much degree of certainty as all
the attendant circumstances will permit.
Thus, in the case at bar, the alternative motion for new trial of appellee is not based
on the ground of newly discovered evidence within the contemplation of Section 1 of Rule
53, for, aside from what has just been said of the nature of probate proceedings and the
duties of the courts in relation to the evidence of the parties therein, Section 3 of Rule 51
expressly and definitely empowers this Court to order a new trial for reasons other than
newly discovered evidence, such as when the court feels that the reception of additional
evidence on some points is needed in order to clear doubts engendered by the evidence
already in the record. Indeed, when We consider again the nature of probate proceedings
and the imperativeness of attaining the most approximate certainly possible in
determining the authenticity and due execution of a purported testament, this power of the
court to order, upon its own motion, the reception of additional evidence becomes even
more handy and appropriate. Thus the Court ordered to remand this case to the court a quo
in order that the parties may present additional evidence, more definite, unequivocal and
convincing on said point in controversy. 216

Gallanosa. Vs. Arcangel

G.R. No. L-29300, 21 June 1978

Facts:
Florentino Hitosis executed a will in Bicol dialect in 1938. He died on 1939. He is
survived only by his brother. Thereafter, a petition for probate of his will was filed. He
bequeathed his ½ share of the conjugal property to his second wife, Tecla, and should Tecla
predecease him, as was the case, it would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and
Corazon Grecia. He likewise bequeathed his separate properties to his protégé. The probate
was opposed by his brother, nephews and nieces. Subsequently, the will was admitted for
probate. Thereafter the testamentary heirs submitted a project partition wherein the
properties therein were distributed in accordance with the testator’s will. The same was
approved by the judge. However, the heirs of Florentino’s deceased brothers and sisters
instituted an action for recovery of the land alleging that they have been in continuous
possession of the same. As the basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa
spouses, through fraud, caused the simulation of the document purporting it to be the last
will and testament of Florentino.

Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of
the will to recover the parcel of land subject of legacy therein.

Ruling:
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the “annulment” of a will. In
order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity
of the will. That means that the testator was of sound mind at the time when he executed
the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence; that the will
was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is
genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these Facts cannot again be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the
finality of the allowance of a will the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be
raised anymore. It was held in Austria vs. Ventenilla that “under section 625 of Act No. 190,
the only time given to parties who are displeased with the order admitting to probate a
will, for an appeal is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding
whether or not an order admitting a will or probate will be opened for fraud, after the time
allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal has taken from an order probating a
will, the heirs cannot, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions
relating to its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
as to the testamentary capacity of the testator.” 217

Cuyugan vs. Baron

G.R. No. L-41947, 29 December 1936

Facts:
That on the date of the execution of said will, that is to say, on December 17, 1932,
the said testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and was of sound and disposing
mind, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence, and was in every
respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.The amended oppositions of Guillermo
Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in
substance first, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was
mentally and physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her
signature and alleged consent to the said will was obtained by imposition and undue
influence of the said Vivencio Cuyugan and fraudulent confabulation between him and the
attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures
thereto.

Issue:
Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with law to be admitted for
probate.

Ruling:
An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with
the formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the
burden of the evidence passes to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible
evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity
at the time or that the document was not the free and voluntary expression of the alleged
testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law. The finding that the will was
executed under undue influence or by the fraud of another presupposes testamentary
capacity. The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will
subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change
in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue
influence, has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary
capacity. It has no application, moreover, where from the day of execution until the death of
the testator his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the
will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that
he had not executed the will in question.

Coso vs. Deza

G.R. No. 16763, 22 December 1921

Facts:
The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the
testator with Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred
Spanish duros by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the
testator in Barcelna when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. It was shown
that the testator, a married man became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain and that
he had illicit relations with her for many years. She followed him when he returned to the
Philippines and in close communication until death of the latter. There is no doubt that she
exercised some influence over him.
Issue:
Whether or not the influence exercised by Rosario Lopez was of such character as to
vitiate the will.
Ruling:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a
will; to have that effect the influence must be undue; to be sufficient to avoid a will, the
influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the
testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another, rather than
his own. Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to
the execution of the will. While the same amount of influence may become undue when
exercised by one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact
that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a
will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testator’s free agency.
While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it
does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy
his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. He was an
intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well
have been actuated only by a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare
of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for her
sacrifices she had made for him. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence
and does not invalidate a will. 219

Institution of Heirs
Belen vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-14474, 31 October 1960

Facts:
When Benigno Diaz died, his will together with the codicil he executed, giving a
legacy to Filomena Diaz, were admitted to probate. The proceedings were closed in 1950
and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee bank.
Subsequently, Filomena Diaz died, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros , married with
seven legitimate children and Onesima, single. The latter filed a petition contending that
the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be
divided equally only between herself and Milagros, to the exclusion of the seven legitimate
children of the latter. The court denied the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the property shall be divided equally only between the legitimate
children to the exclusion of the grandchildren.

Ruling:
No. Under Article 846 of the Civil Code, “heirs instituted without designation of
shares shall inherit in equal parts.” The meaning of the word ‘descendants’, when used in a
will or deed to designate a class to take property passing by the will or deed, has been
frequently considered and decided that it means all persons descending lineally from
another, to the remotest degree and includes persons so descended, even though their
parents are living and that such descendants take per capita and not per stirpes.
We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to
apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees,
intended all members therof to succeed per capita, in consonance with Artcile 846. So that
the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving
children and grandchildren.

Nable Jose vs. Uson

G. R. NO. 8927, 10 March 1914

Facts:
The codicil to the will of Filomena Uson provided that all the property belonging to
her as conjugal property shall be the property of her husband; that in case the same exists
at her husband’s death, her sisters and nieces named shall succeed her husband as heirs.
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that
portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive at the time the
will was made; that the property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to
the number of sisters; that each living sister should take one-sixth, and the children of each
deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each one- sixth to be divided among said
children equally.

Issue:
Whether or not the property shall be divided equally between the living sisters and
the children of the deceased sisters.

Ruling:
Yes. It was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her
sisters and nieces. The testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and
identifies each one of her heir’s then living, or each one of the persons whom she desires
shall succeed her husband in the property. Among those mentioned specifically are the
nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters.
Each one stands out as the other under exactly the same conditions. Moreover, in the last
clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take under her will
by name “so that they may take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and
relatives.” The last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which, it seems to us, taken
together with the last clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the intention
of the testatrix.

Austria vs. Reyes

G.R. No. L-23079, 27 February 1970

Facts:
Basilia Austria vda. De Cruz filed with the Court if First Instance of Rizal a petition
for probate, ante mortem of her last will and testament. However, the probate was opposed
by petitioners: Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria Benta, Laura Austria Mozo and others-
nephews and nieces of Basilia Austria. Their opposition was dismissed by the CFI and the
probate was allowed. The trial court decided that as per provisions in the will, the estate
shall pass on to Basilia’s adopted children, namely: Perfecto, Isagani, Alberto and Luz all
surnamed Cruz, as declared assumed and legally adopted children of Basilia Austria vda. De
Cruz. After two years from the probate of the will, Basilia died, and Perfecto was appointed
as executor. Petitioners Ruben and the others filed an Intervention to Partition, contending
that they are the nearest of kin to the decedent, that Perfecto Cruz and siblings were not
adopted in accordance with law, thus, they are mere strangers and without right to succeed
as heirs.The trial court allowed the intervention, and for the meantime, the authenticity of
the adoption papers was debated upon.

Issue:
Whether or not the institution of heirs made by Basilia in her will is based on false
cause, thus should be annulled.

Ruling:
No, the institution is valid and is not based on false cause. Under Article 850 of the
Civil Code, it provides for the Annulment of a Will based on a false cause: cause for
institution of heirs must be stated in the will; cause must be shown to be false; it appears in
the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known
of the falsity of the cause.
It can be inferred from the Will of Basilia that when she instituted her heirs, she was
possessed of testamentary capacity and the will was free from falsification, fraud, trickery
or undue influence. Also, in her will, she does not specifically state the cause of her
institution. Therefore, in the absence of proof that there exists false cause in the institution
of heirs, testacy must be favored from intestacy, and the will must be given full express.

Barrios vs. Enriquez

G.R. No. L-29789, 22 December 1928

Facts:
 Jose Macrohon Tiahua included his adulterous son in his will, bequeathing upon him
a part of the estate, together with his nine legitimate children. The institution was opposed
by Eduarda Enriquez, surviving spouse of Jose Macrohon Tiahua and their children. The
provision in the will reads as follows:” After all my debts, obligations, and funeral expenses
have been paid, I hereby bequeath and devise all my property, real, personal, and mixed, as
follows, to wit:
"One-half (1/2) pro indiviso of my whole estate to my wife Eduarda Enriquez, and
the other half (1/2) in equal parts pro indiviso to each of my children, including Fernando
Quintas and Julia Quintas, son and daughter, respectively, of my deceased daughter,
Gregoria Macrohon, who shall receive the portion corresponding to the share of my said
daughter, that is, 1/44 for each of the two."
Included among the children mentioned by the testator in said will, and to whom he
gave the one-half of the property corresponding to him from the conjugal partnership, is
the herein appellant Ignacio Macrohon, his adulterous son. Dividing this half, that is ten-
twentieth parts (10/20), among his nine legitimate children and his adulterous son, Ignacio
Macrohon, into equal parts, each of them will be entitled to one-twentieth of the whole
estate.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua have a right to dispose of a
part of his estate by will in favor of his adulterous son;
2. Whether or not the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua infringed the limitations
prescribed by the law in putting his adulterous son Ignacio Macrohon on the same footing
as his legitimate children by giving him a share equal to that of each of the latter

Ruling:
As to the first issue, YES, the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua had a right to dispose
of the free third of his estate. It is true that Article 845 of the Civil Code provides that
"illegitimate children who have not the status of natural children shall be entitled to
support only," and therefore cannot demand anything more of those bound by law to
support them, it does not prohibit said illegitimate children from receiving, nor their
parents from giving them, something more than support, so long as the legitimate children
are not prejudiced. If the law permits a testator to dispose of the free third of his hereditary
estate in favor of a stranger (Article 808 of the Civil Code), there is no legal, moral or social
reason to prevent him from making over that third to his illegitimate son who has not the
status of a natural son. On the contrary, by reason of blood, the son, although illegitimate,
has a preferential right over a stranger unless by his behaviour he has become unworthy of
such consideration.
The second issue is answered in the negative. The deceased did not infringe upon
the rights of his legitimate descendants. According to Article 808 of the Civil Code, the
legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of two-thirds of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother, the latter being allowed to dispose of one of said two
parts in order to give it as betterment to their legitimate children or descendants.
 In the present case the testator has not disposed of any of the two parts forming the
legitime in order to give it as betterment to any of his children, and the said legitime
therefore remains intact, and according to Article 806 of the same Code, is by the law
reserved for the forced heirs and the testator cannot dispose of it in any other way.Hence,
the nine legitimate children are entitled to two-thirds of said half, or two-sixths of the
whole, which, divided equally among them would give to each, two fifty fourths or one
twenty-seventh of the whole estate. When Jose Macrohon Tiahua, therefore, provided in his
will that the one-half of the conjugal property belonging to him was to be divided equally
among his nine legitimate children and one adulterous son, each to receive one-twentieth
part, he did not go beyond the limits provided by law for such cases, because, one-
twentieth for each of his legitimate children is more than each of his legitimate children
should receive as his legitime, which only amounts to one twenty-seventh. In other words,
since Jose Macrohon Tiahua could dispose of the free third of his hereditary estate in favor
of his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon, and as he only gave a part of said free third to the
latter, he did not infringe any legal prohibition and his testamentary disposition to this
effect is valid and effective. 224

Gabriel vs. Mateo

G.R. No. L-26545, 16 December 1927

Facts:
Florencia Mateo executed her last will and testament on two used sheets of paper. It
was signed by her and three attesting witnesses. In the body of the will, she bequeathed all
her properties to her instituted heir, Tomasa Mateo, a niece. Nothing was instituted for her
only sister, Rita Mateo and to her other nephews and nieces. Accordingly, Rita Mateo
opposed the probate of the will, interposing that the testator was affectionate to all her
nieces and nephews during her lifetime, and that she, Rita Mateo, was in good terms with
her sister, thus must be instituted in the will.

Issue:
Whether or not the testator was absolutely free in making all those provisions in
favor of Tomasa Mateo, and nothing for her sister, nephews and nieces.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that there is nothing strange in the wishes of the
testator not to leave anything for her sister. It is reasonable that the entirety of her estate
was left to Tomasa since according to evidence, Tomasa was taken by the testator when the
former was only three years old and had never been separated from her ever since. In
addition, as can be inferred, Florencia Mateo has no compulsory heirs; thus, she is free to
dispose of her property. Collateral relatives are merely intestate heirs.

Dizon-rivera vs. Dizon

GR No L-24561, 30 June 1970

Facts:
The testator, Agripina J. Valdez died in Angeles, Pampanga and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon,
Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon, Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. The deceased testator left a will
written in Pampango dialect. In her will she named her compulsory heirs with seven other
legitimate grandchildren as her beneficiaries, amounting to P1, 801,960.00. She divided,
distributed and disposed of all her properties. The last will and testament was admitted to
probate, and Marina Dizon was appointed executor. She filed the project of partition;
however, oppositors Tomas Dizon and the others filed a counter-project of partition.The
lower court approved the partition filed by Marina Dizon.

Issue:
Whether or not the testator is correct in her distribution of properties to her
compulsory heirs and grandchildren.

Ruling:
Yes, the institution and partition made by the testator is correct. The testator
expressly provided for in her will that her property be divided in accordance with her
dispositions, where she specified each real property in her estate and designated the
particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom
she bequeathed the same. Such was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and
authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that “ Should a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.”

Morales vs. Olondriz

G.R. No. 198994, February 03, 2016

Facts:
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003. Believing that the decedent died
intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñ as RTC for the partition of
the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator on July 4, 2003. On
July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that
the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and
for hex appointment as special administratrix.
 Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate
son of the decedent.

Issue:
Whether or not there was no preterition because Francisco received a house and lot
inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.

Ruling:
Yes. The decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line.
Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his preterition. Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in
the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain
valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any
devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in
total intestacy.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that
Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the decedent.
However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to
present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable
conclusion that there was preterition. 227

Seangio vs. Reyes

G.R. Nos. 140371-72, 27 November 2006

Facts:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia,
all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very
healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general
power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control
and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified
public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced
by the proceedings for the probate of the will.

Issue:
Whether or not there was preterition.
Ruling:
Yes. A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng
Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat
are Alfredo and Virginia. The other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code
thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854
does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line. It was, in the Courts
opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with
the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his
other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia,
in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. 228

J.L.T. Agro, Inc. vs. Balansag

G.R. No. 141882, 11 March 2005

Facts:
During his lifetime, Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted marriage twice. First,
with Antonia Baena and second, with Milagros Donio Teves. In the first marriage, he had
two children. In the second marriage, he had four children. There was a property Lot No. 63
which was originally registered under the names of Julian and Antonia (TCT 5203) forming
part of their conjugal partnership. After Antonia died, Lot No. 63 was among the properties
involved in an action for partition. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement
which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. The Agreement showed
that a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa was to be owned in common by
Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage which would remain undivided
during his lifetime. The two children were given other properties. Lot No. 63 was retained
by Don Julian.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement provided that the properties now
selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milgrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves
and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural
children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimate children
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. Subsequently, Don Julian, Emilio
and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor
of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument which constituted a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of JLT Agro. On 14 April 1974,
Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, JLT Agro, Inc. sought the
registration of the subject lot in its name. A court issued an order canceling OCT No. 5203
in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the same
date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name of JLT Agro. Since then, JLT Agro has been
paying taxes assessed on the subject lot. Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had
immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise
Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio
Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. Lot No. 63 was sold to Antonio Balansag and Hilaria
Cadayday. After the death of Don Julian, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate where Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros and her
two children, Maria and Jose. Unaware that Lot No. 63 has been registered under the name
of JLT Agro, Inc., Antonio and Hilaria tried to register the deed of sale, but failed. They filed
a complaint to declare the title of JLT Agro, Inc. void which was dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not future legitime be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the
death of the owner of a property without resulting to preterition

Ruling:
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only
upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere
expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the
prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute
of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time non-existent and might
never exist. At the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in
favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over
the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his
death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her
children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the
compromise agreement.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the
omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as
father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor
assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in
the direct line from inheritance. Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to
was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved
Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior
to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime.
Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit
from Don Julian upon his death; the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs
from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it
is unfounded.
Acain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987

Facts:
Constantitno, herein petitioner, filed for probate of the will of his deceased brother
Nemesio and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary on the premise
that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will bequeathing all his shares from the conjugal
property to his brother Segundo Acain. However, since Segundo predeceased Nemesio, the
former’s children are claiming to be heir, with Constantino as the petitioner. The spouse
and adopted child of the decedent opposed the probate of will because of preterition. RTC
dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was dismissed

Issue:
Whether or not there was preterition of “compulsory heirs in the direct line” thus
their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs.

Ruling:
Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not
mentioned there in, or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the
direct line. However, the same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption
has not been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and
devisees having been provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left
by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.

Neri vs. Akutin

G.R. No. L-47799, 13 June 1941

Facts:
 Agripino Neri contracted two marriages wherein he had by his first marriage six
children named: Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his
second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children named: Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta,
Estela Maria, and Emma. Her daughter in the first marriage, Getulia, died a little less than
eight years before the death of Agripino, and was survived by seven children named
Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. Clause 8 in a will left by
Agripino was invoked by petitioners, wherein the testator made the statement that the
children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his property excluding
what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that contrary to what the
testator had declared in his will [that all his children by the first and second marriages are
intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements
introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership, which
should belong to Ignacia Akutin] but with the modification that the will was valid with
respect to the two-thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of. It ruled that there
is no preterition but disinheritance in this case.

Issue:
Whether or not there exists preterition with respect to the children by the first
marriage of the decedent.

Ruling:
Yes, there is preterition. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In the
instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were
not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It
is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the
purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.
Preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession
except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not
inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil Code), In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments
have been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided,
according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and where no express provision
therefore is made in the will, the law would presume that the testator had no intention to
that effect. In the will subject of this case, no express betterment is made in favor of the
children by the first marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf
consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is accorded the
heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage
have already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as
may be clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his property equally
among all his children.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid
G.R. No. L-23445, 23 June 1966

Facts:
Remedios Nuguid filed a petition for the allowance a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario Nuguid, her sibling, on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her
demise. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother
of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. They
anchored their opposition on the ground that by the institution of petitioner Remedios
Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence
the institution is void.

Issue:
Whether or not the parents of the decedent were preterited?

Ruling:
Yes. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And the will completely omits both of them, receiving nothing by
the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
The will consisting of one sentence, institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir
— nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. The nullity of
the will is complete; Rosario Nuguid died intestate. However, the petitioner insists that the
compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive legitimes, but that the
institution of her as the universal heir is not invalidated, although such inheritance would
only have to be reduced. Such contention is not well-taken. With reference to Article 814,
which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that
the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies.
Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property undetermined. Legacy refers
to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. Again, institution of heirs
cannot be taken as legacy.

Maninang vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. NO. L-57848, 19 June 1982

Facts:
 Soledad Maninang, petitioner herein, filed for probate the holographic will of the
decedent Clemencia Aseneta who died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. Said will
left all her property to the petitioner and contained a provision stating: “I do not consider
Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.” Meanwhile,
respondent Bernardo Aseneta “Nonoy”, the adopted son mentioned in the will, claims to be
the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. He filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and
void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy
should ensue.

Issue:
Whether or not the adopted son was preterited or disinherited.

Ruling:
No. There is no preterition but there is valid disinheritance in the present case.
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the
omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are
not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law.
Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntary".
Moreover, the effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. This
annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in
the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same
Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it
may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition. Otherwise stated, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the
estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

Aznar vs. Duncan

G.R. No. L-24365, June 30, 1966

Facts:
 Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the state of
California but was domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death.
He executed his last will and testament in Manila in 1951, which in substance provided for
the partition of his estate by payment of P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia who he
claimed was not in any way related to him, while the rest of the estate will be transferred
Maria Lucy Christensen, who he claimed was his only daughter.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia
insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen based on a prior Supreme Court decision on the matter. It was
claimed that the Philippine law should govern the estate of the deceased and that the
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one half of the estate of the deceased.

Issue:
Whether or not the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions of the will of the
deceased should be governed by the laws of the Philippines

Ruling:
Yes. Art. 16 of the Civil code of the Philippines provides that the amount of
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
The decision of the lower court sustained the contention of the executor that under
the California Probate Court, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands
that we should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the laws of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16
of the Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express
mandate thereof and as above explained.
We therefore find that the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
Solano vs. CA
G.R. No. l-41971, 29 November 1983

Facts:
 Bienvenido and Emetria Garcia, claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton
Solano, filed an action for recognition against him where the latter in his Answer, denied
paternity. During the pendency of the case, Solano died. Petitioner Zonia Solano was
ordered substituted for the decedent as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will
and Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death. Zonia entered her formal
appearance as a substitute defendant claiming additionally that she was the sole heir of her
father, Solano, and asking that she be allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the
probated will with the least interference from the Garcias.
The Garcias, private respondents herein, filed their Reply to Zonia’s Appearance
Supplemental Cause of Action impugning the recognition of Zonia as an acknowledged
natural child with the prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous child
of the decedent.
The trial court also declared that the Garcias are the illegitimate children of Dr.
Solano.

Issue:
Whether or not the institution of Zonia as sole heir by Solano null and void as there
was preterition of the other heirs

Ruling:
Yes. The Garcias and Zonia were in the same category as illegitimate children; that
Zonia’s acknowledgment as a natural child in a notarial document executed by Solano and
Trinidad Tuagnon was erroneous because at the time of her birth in 1941, Solano was still
married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did
not have the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of Zonia’s conception. That
being the compulsory heirs, the Garcias were in fact, preterited from Solano’s Last Will and
Testament; and that as a result of said preterition, the institution of Zonia as sole heir by
Solano is null and void under Article 854 of the Civil Code.
As provided in the provision, the disposition in the Will giving the usufruct in favor
of Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of
the Civil Code, and it should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious.
Contrary to the conclusions of the court holding that the entire Will is void and
intestacy ensues, the preterition of the Garcias should annul the institution of Zonia as heir
only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid
subject to that limitation. It is plain that the intention of the testator was to favor Zonia
with certain portions of his property, which, under the law, he had a right to dispose of by
Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the
property that the testator could freely dispose of. Since the legitime of the illegitimate
children consists of ½ of the hereditary estate, the Garcias and Zonia each have a right to
participate therein in the proportion of 1/3 each. Zonia’s hereditary share will, therefore be
½ + 1/3 of ½ or 4/6 of the estate, while the Garcias will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of ½
or 1/6 of the value of the estate. 237
Substitution of Heirs
In Petition For Probate of Last Will And Testament of Basilio Santiago
G.R. No. 179859, August 9, 2010

Facts:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages—the first to Bibiana Lopez,
the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife
bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila,
Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. Basilio and his second
wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and
petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago. Basilio and his third wife bore three children,
Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.1
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second
marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a petition for the probate of Basilio’s will. The will was
admitted to probate and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN,
IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay
ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa
kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa
aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may
tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.

Issue:
Whether or not inclusion of the house and lot in Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044,
should be included among those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs

Ruling:
Yes. It is clear from Basilio’s will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be
transferred in petitioners’ names for administration purposes only, and that the property
be owned by the heirs in common, thus:
e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at
ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi
upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak
sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na
mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang ito’y
walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang magnanais sa
aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga
lunsod x x x x33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
But the condition set by the decedent on the property’s indivisibility is subject to a
statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate court,
viz: For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]’s contention, is to go
against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code,
which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for
twenty (20) years x x x x

Orendain vs. Trusteeship of the Estate

G.R. No. 168660, June 30, 2009

Facts:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doñ a Margarita Rodriguez, died without issues in
Manila, leaving a last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate by virtue of the
order of the CFI Manila and said court approved the project of partition presented by the
executor of Doñ a Margarita Rodriguez’s will. As provided in her will Doñ a Margarita
Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the
income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.After
almost 40 years later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion
Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to dissolve the
trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than
twenty years, in violation of the the law.

Issue:
Whether or not the trusteeship over the properties left by DOÑ A MARGARITA
RODRIGUEZ can be dissolved .

Ruling:
Yes. The will of the decedent provides for the creation of a perpetual trust for the
administration of her properties and the income accruing therefrom, for specified
beneficiaries. The trust, only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned should be
upheld however after 20 years the trust must be dissolved. Petitioners were correct in
moving for the dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year period,but they are not
necessarily declared as intestate heirs of the decedent. The last will and testament of the
decedent did not institute heirs to inherit the properties under the void clause.Hence the
case is remanded to the lower court for the determination of the heirship of the intestate
heirs of the decedent where petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs of the decedent,
should establish their status.

Perez vs. Garchitorena

G.R. No. L-31703, February 13, 1930

Facts:
P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name, with the La Urbana in Manila, as the
final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is
said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the
defendant Mariano Garchitorena.The la atter held a judgement for P7,872.23 for due
execution against the husband of Ana Maria, Joaquin Perez Alcantara hence the deposited
amount in La Urbana was attached. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary
injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The
defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the
dissolution of the injunction.The court held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the
plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final
writ of injunction.

Issue:
Whether or not the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, or a fideicommissary
substitution.

Ruling:
There is a fideicommissary substitution. All the elements of this kind of substitution
are present.
At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff
was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the
will.
An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third
person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which
provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving
children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of
leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of
the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in
case she should die after the testatrix.
A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as
such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
As a consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress
instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the
moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which
is on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does
not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin
Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.
 The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano
Garchitorena.

Crisologo vs. Singson

G.R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962

Facts:
The spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo commenced an action
for partition against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel
St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the
improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that
Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino
owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dñ a. Leona
Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made
demands for the partition of said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus
compelling them to bring action. It is admitted that Dñ a. Leona Singson, who died single on
January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On
July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted to probate in Special
Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in G.R. No. 3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were
her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and
Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.Defendant appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the testamentary disposition provided for what is called
substitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria.

Ruling:
The last will of the deceased Dñ a. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion
vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be
effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after
that of the testatrix.The substitution of heirs provided for in the will is not expressly made
of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that
appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property
bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix.
As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens
before or after that of the testatrix — her share shall belong to the brothers of the
testatrix.The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Aranas vs. Aranas

G.R. No. L-56249, May 29, 1987

Facts:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19,
1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to
probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated
that as a reward to his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services he is
allowed to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until
Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the administration
shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's death,
his sons will have the power to select one among themselves.

Issue:
Whether or not the institution of Vicente Aranas is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. Vicente Aranas was intended as a usufructuary by the Testator and has the right
to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal
enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of
Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as
there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal. Likewise his designation as
administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it
does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted
that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from
the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct
of which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked
ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the
designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire
and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services
rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden.

Ramirez vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982

Facts:
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in
Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator
provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only
his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en
pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free
portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda)
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the
first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over
real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates
Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of
the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and
the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to them
Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case.

Ruling:
Yes. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the
estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's
legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he
could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever.
(Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The
court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio"
as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to
have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run
counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her
legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

Facts:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil contained the following provisions:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the
lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants,
shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative
of Belleza.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint against the
above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. CA reversed RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should
there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private
respondent?

Ruling:

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the
heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for
the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first
heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.  In the case under consideration,
the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due
to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not
fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here. In a fideicommissary
substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the
same later to the second heir.  In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir
the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the
testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or
his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that
the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is
likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir
and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS

Vda. De Villanueva vs. Juico

G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962

Facts:
 On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales,
executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his
wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the
other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor. The 12th clause of the will provided,
however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof (institution of heirs) would be deemed annulled
from the moment he bore any child with Doñ a Fausta Nepomuceno. Don Nicolas Villaflor
died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doñ a Fausta Nepomuceno.
The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding for the settlement of
her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In
due course of administration, she submitted a project of partition, As the project of
partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doñ a Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the
ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue
also of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. On May 1, 1956,
Doñ a Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and without
having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor
instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta
Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff
became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the
late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's
position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never
remarried.

Issue:

Is Leonor Villaflor Vda. De Villanueva declared entitled to the ownership and fruits
of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of
Doñ a Fausta Nepomuceno?

Ruling:

Yes. The plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his
testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition that if the widow
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the
widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did
not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion
mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y
posesion" instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva").
The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular
properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her
lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted
universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6).
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary
legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the
event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras
viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership).
In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as
section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from
the date of the death of Doñ a Fausta Nepomuceno.
Miciano vs. Brimo
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Facts:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the
partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish
laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the
receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts
into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or
article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.

Issue:

Is the condition to apply laws of the Philippines to probate of deceased’s will valid?

Ruling:
 No. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not
respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of
the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law
of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten,
and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being
contrary to law.All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to
the testator's national law.
Santos vs. Buenaventura
G.R. No. L-22797 September 22, 1966

Facts:

On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition for the probate of the last will
allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.  The
nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda
Santos, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned in
the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased.
Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed an opposition to the probate of
said will. Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the
will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was
exerted upon the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of
Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima
was mentally incapable of making a will.
The court below issued an order allowing the probate of the will. After the order had
become final and executory, Flora Blas on February 27, 1958, filed a petition praying for
the delivery to her of a fishpond as a specific devise in her favor under Item No. 3, Clause
No. 6, of the will. To this petition, inspite of apparent understanding, Rosalina Santos filed
an opposition predicated on the ground that said specific devise in favor of Flora was
forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs, pursuant to a provision of the will that
should any of the heirs, devisees or legatees contest or oppose its probate, the latter shall
lose his or her right to receive any inheritance or benefit under it, which shall be forfeited
in favor of the other heirs, devisees and legatees. The court sustained the theory that the
"no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will was valid and had the effect of depriving Flora
of her devise in view of her previous opposition to its probate, which it held not justified
under the circumstances. Accordingly, it denied the motion for delivery of the specific
devise, declaring the same forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs.

Issue:

Was the "no contest and forfeiture" clause violated in this case?

Ruling:

No. Above all, after realizing her mistake in contesting the will — a mistake committed in
good faith because grounded on strong doubts — she withdrew her opposition and joined the
appellee in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must not now be penalized for
rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been
admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably short period, and the disposition of her property
can now be effected. It should be pointed out that, contrary to the translation accorded to
Paragraph Fourteen of the will, the testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or opposition to its
probate, but a contest or opposition to the probate of the will and the carrying out of its
provisions. This is so because the questioned clause speaks of "pagpapatibay at pag-
bibigay-bisa" instead of "pagpapatibay o pag-bibigay-bisa." This furnishes a significant
index into the intention of the testatrix, namely, that she was more concerned in insuring
the carrying out of her testamentary provisions than in precluding any contest or
opposition to it. By the withdrawal of the contest which appellant brought in good faith, no
prejudice has been done into the intention of the testatrix. The dispositions of her will can
now be safely carried out.
From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations impaired the
true intention of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will.
Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the
speedy probation of the will. Since the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it
precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's evidence. Through said
withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions of her properties
under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's actuations subserved
rather than violated the testatrix's intention.
Morente vs. Dela Santa
G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

Facts:

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband,
Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not
marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any
portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining
thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is
located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the
death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the
proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in CFI in which
she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him
above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband.
In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision,
that the husband having married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his
life and that at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix,
and one-third thereof could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the
will by the court below is not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of
marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor
proven that any children have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix. 

Issue:

Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is
contained in the first clauses of the will?

Ruling:

No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made
conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in
certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower.

It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not
leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain
building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of
these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the
legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does
leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the
will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly
said that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if
one event does happen the disposition of the property contained in the first clause of the
will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property
shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.

There being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second
marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will.
Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

Facts:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil contained the following provisions:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the
lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants,
shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative
of Belleza.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint against the
above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. CA reversed RTC’s decision.

Issue:

Is Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions applicable because what
the testatrix intended was a substitution?

Ruling:
 Yes. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is
known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a
modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator
upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to
be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the
mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that
the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is
likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir
and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an

obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly
appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.

COLLATION

Arellano vs. Pascual

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

Facts:
 Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P.
Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N.
Pascual. The controversy centers on a parcel of land located in Teresa Village, Makati,
which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of
which donation respondents assailed, “may be considered as an advance legitime” of
petitioner. The probate court found the donation valid hence said property is subject to
collation. The CA sustained the probate court’s ruling that the property donated to
petitioner is subject to collation.

Issue:

Is the property donated to petitioner subject to collation?

Ruling:

No. Collation is defined as a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the

value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate and the return
to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his
lifetime to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to
determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be
reduced. Considering that the decedent left no primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs and was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives
and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime no collation should take place. The decedent
not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to
donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid is deemed as donation made
to a “stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of the estate.
There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to
collation. Hence the decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among
his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code.
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

Facts:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibañ ez entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was
intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural
AllPurpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC .
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,
this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase
price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with
accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Sometime in
February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981,
testate proceedings commenced.
On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings,
the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañ ez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence.
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to
the tractor respectively taken by them.
Meanwhile, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by
and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank. When Edmund defaulted in his payments, Union Bank, started demanding payment
from Florence.

Issues:

1) Is the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs valid?

2) Is the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent binding?

Ruling:

1) In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs
until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of
a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of a will.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañ ez, left a
holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
 (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later
after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left
by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will,
and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject
tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid.
The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said
tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction
over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them
in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with
jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in
executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest
the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In
the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the
only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending
before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were.
Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves
the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and
creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.

2) No. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto
"have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-
described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp."29
The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that
each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It
was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.

Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000
Facts:

Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete had five children, Natividad, Romeo, Jose,
Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. who are the petitioners, while the
estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. Aurea
died in 1970 while Maximino, Sr. died in 1980. During their marriage, Nazareno, Sr. and
Aurea acquired properties.
After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First
Instance. Romeo was appointed administrator of his father’s estate. In the course of the
intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of
sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds
involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the
consent of Aurea, to Natividad. He then filed for action for the nullity of such sale. He
presented evidence to show that the spouses never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad
and that the latter was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He likewise
presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution executed by the spouses and duly signed
by all of their children, except Hose, who was then abroad, but represented by their
mother, Aurea. Romeo testified that, although the deed of sale executed by his parents in
heir favor stated that the sale was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount
for the supposed sale.

Issue:

Are lots 10 and 11 belonging to Jose subject to collation?

Ruling:

Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots
to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of
Natividad because the latter was the only “female and the only unmarried member of the
family.” She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she
herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter
returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449
of the Civil Code states: There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person
but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is
either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof. There being an implied trust, the
lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which
states: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Imperial vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112483. October 8, 1999

Facts:

Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land
which he sold for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, Eloy Imperial. Petitioner and
private respondents admit that despite the contract’s designation as one of “Absolute Sale”,
the transaction was in fact a donation.
Two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said
Deed of Sale on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner into signing the said
document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement. Pending
execution of judgment based on the compromise agreement, Leoncio died, leaving two
heirs – the petitioner herein, who is the acknowledged natural son, and the adopted son,
Victor Imperial. Victor died single and he was survived only by his natural father, Ricardo
Villalon, who also died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa,
respondents in this case. Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of documents,
reconveyance and recovery of possession seeking the nullification of the deed of absolute
sale affecting the subject lot.
The lower court disposed of the case by adjudicating that the sale was indeed a
donation and that the same is inoofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor because
when Leoncio died, he left no property other than the 32,837 sq.m. lot. Considering that the
property donated is 32,837 sq.m., one half of that becomes free portion of Leoncio which
could be absorbed in the donation to defendant. The other half is where the legitime of the
adopted son Victior has to be taken.

Issue:

Should the legitime of Victor be computed based on the area of the donated
property?

Ruling:

No. The rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share
due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net
estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2)
the value of all donations subject to collation would be added to it.
 Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property
itself, which is brought to collation. Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for
legitime does not amount to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of
Appeals that what is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of
the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real
alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or
any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. Consequently, even
when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor's
legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the property
donated on grounds of prescription and laches [it took private respondents 24 257 years
since the death of Leoncio to initiate the present case].
Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an immovable, what may be
received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature, class and
quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or
marketable securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of
such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction. However, as
mentioned, the Court grants the petition on grounds of prescription and laches.
Zaragosa vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000

Facts:

Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the
Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four
children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9,
1964, he died without a will and was survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a
complaint against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her
inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims
that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She
further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among
his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by
way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots
no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of
her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the
Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance
was executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and the
allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged
distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still
registered in their father's name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable
consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the
cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she became an
American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their father
during his lifetime.
RTC found that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among his three
children by deeds of sales; that the conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his
plan to distribute his properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he
intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent. CA found that Lots 871 and 943
were inheritance share of private respondent.

Issue:

Is the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which include
Lots 871 and 943, valid?

Ruling:

Yes. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as
long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime
of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that
it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.

Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for
delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The
petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new
proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of
their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter
vivos.

 Private respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of inheritance share,
was in effect questioning the validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of
petitioner and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latter's
name. Although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the conveyance of
Lot 943 in favor of petitioners, since according to it, private respondent did not question
the genuineness of the signature of the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was elevated
to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of
marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis--vis signatures found in
earlier documents. Could this be done?  No. The petition is a collateral attack. It is not
allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of
spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud
are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an
incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida,
and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Esrellita purchased a parcel of land from Rafael for P135,000,
which she later sold to Amelia Lim and Maria Chiu for P3.4M. In the same year, Estrellita
bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land and a car using the proceeds of the prior
sale. The balance of which was deposited in a bank. On June 30, 1991, Estrellita and her
daughters were killed. The NBI conducted investigations and found that Estrellita died
ahead of her daughters. Thus, petitioner survived his daughters who died later than their
mother, Estrellita.
Petitioner executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents which
provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between
petitioner and The Parañ aque property and the car and were also given to petitioner with
Rafael and Salud waiving all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs" in
the said properties. On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael’s estate, Teresita
instituted an intestate estate proceedings with the RTC of Caloocan, listing as heirs, Salud,
Ramon, Ricardo, the decedent’s wife Zenaida and children of Antonio. Ramon, however
filed an opposition dated March 24, 1993, praying that the property sold by Estrellita
should be collated because the sale between Rafael and Estrellita was actually a donation
and not a sale.

Issue:

Should the Paranaque property be subject to collation?

Ruling:

No. The records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory
stage. There is nothing to prove that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired
to warrant collation. Pursuant to Article 1035, it is the duty of the plaintiffs to prove that
the donations received by Estrellita were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the
legitime of hereditary portion to which they are entitled. The probate court's order of
collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with
Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's
estate. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is
not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs.
Therefore, collation of the Parañ aque property is improper for collation covers only
properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs
which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañ aque property. For even if
collation would be proper, it is not the Paranaque property that is to be collated, but should
have been the same property given by the decedent to the heir during his lifetime, which in
this case is the Valenzuela property.
DISINHERITANCE

Seangio vs. Reyes

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006

Facts:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the
RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the
petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia
giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in
the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the
administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4)
Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will,
petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise
reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98–
90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1)
generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the
extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the
extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a
decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs

The RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
Issue:

Was there a valid disinheritance?

Ruling:

Yes. The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed

Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the
reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same
must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document,
the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code/
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs
in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s
last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did
not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that
the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory.
Lahom vs. Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003

Facts:

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without
children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and
Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring
him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and
support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs.
Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a
petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made
all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In
keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin
Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption. In her petition, she averred
that despite the pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname to
Lahom to the frustrations of the spouses. In all the dealings and activities he is Jose Melvin
Sibulo. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone, has yearned for the care and
show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to
Naga to see her once a year. Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right
of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. To this Melvin moved for the dismissal of the
petition contending that the petitioner had no cause of action. Petitioner asseverated, by
way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply.
Issue:

Can the adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, for a valid
reason, cause the forfeiture of inheritance?

Ruling:

Yes. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had
already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the
Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that
the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not
fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be
acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has
often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally
innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is
governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of
an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it
has been exercised.

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential
right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn
out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to
live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the
legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by
law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may
freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Baritua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990

Facts:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido
Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur,
figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned
and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his
passenger died and the tricycle was damaged.  No criminal case arising from the incident
was ever instituted.
 Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement
of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance
Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity), Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia
executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI,
releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from
the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which
the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which
she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal,
against the petitioners.
About one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979,
the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. In
their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased
son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private
respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of
their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the
tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the
victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and
settled their obligations with the long estranged wife of their late son.

Issue:

Are the petitioners still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount
of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners
and the victim's compulsory heirs?

Ruling:

Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment.

There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the
accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not
Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom
payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has
been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the
successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment.
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of
heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child,
the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory
heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow
of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been
estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief
and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents
loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the
expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims
against the estate of their deceased son.  These money claims are not the liabilities of the
petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial
settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and
heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she
executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.

Pecson vs. Mediavillo

G.R. No. 7890 September 29, 1914
Facts:

It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910,
the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the
legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the
deceased, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing
the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, found that the will had been
signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition on
the 17th day of September, 1910.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso
Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following:
1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the
deceased Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator, Florencio Pecson, and
therefore the first mentioned is and the second was a grandchild of the latter.
2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her
grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she
failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was
due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from
which she now suffers in periodical attacks.
By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of the will is
unfounded, the undersigned prays the court to annul the said clause and to make the
testator's died without succession, but is represented now by his father, Basiliso
Mediavillo), participants in the estate left by their grandfather; and, finally, that the court
grant such other relief as it may deem just and equitable.

Issue:

Was Rosario validly disinherited by her grandfather?

Ruling:

No. Disinheritance of a lawful heir can only be made for one of the causes expressly
fixed by law. Such disinheritance can only be effected by a will in which shall be mentioned
the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance.
Article 850 of the Civil Code provides that the reason for the disinheritance shall be
established by the heirs of the testator. In other words, if the person disinherited shall deny
the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he may be permitted to support his
allegations by proof. The courts may inquire into the justice of disinheritance, and if they
find that the disinheritance was without cause, that part of the will may be pronounced null
and void.
Taking into consideration of the tender years of Rosario and the fact that she very
soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, the Court reached the conclusion that
she was not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in
the year 1894 or 1895. Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct line,
surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for that reason Basilio cannot inherit that
share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living.
Maninang vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

Facts:

On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital
at age 81. She left a holographic will in which she disposed all of her properties to Dra.
Soledad Maninang. In the said will, she did not acknowledge Bernardo or Nonoy as her
adopted. The probate of the will was opposed by herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta,
claiming to be the adopted son and therefore the sole heir of the decedent. He further
instituted an Intestate Case and move for the dismissal of the Testate Case on the ground
that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was
preterited and, therefore intestacy should ensue. The motion was granted by the lower
court from which petitioner appealed claiming that the courts inquiry should be limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will and that respondent Bernardo was not preterited
but effectively disinherited.

Issue:

Was private respondent, under the terms of the decedent’s will, preterited or
disinherited?

Ruling:
 Yes. The Supreme Court found that the Court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the
omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs either because they are not mentioned or
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Disinheritance in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs
of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. Disinheritance is always
voluntary, preterition is presumed to be involuntary. Preterition results in the total
annulment of the institution of heirs unless there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in favor of devises or legacies. In disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

LEGACIES AND DEVISES

Robles vs. Santiago

G.R. No. L-10111 August 31, 1960

Facts:
Benigno Diaz Y Heredia, in his will, created a trust estate out of the properties not
otherwise disposed of. After the death of his wife, Diaz caused the preparation of a codicil.
The testator died and his will and codicil were accordingly probated. The Bank of the
Philippine Islands was appointed Trustee of the trust created by the testator in the will and
the codicil, for the purpose of paying the monthly and yearly legacies of the legatees named
therein. The trustee then petitioned the court, with the consent of all the legatees, for
authority to sell all the properties and liquidate the estate. This petition was granted. The
property located at Rosario, Binondo, Manila was sold to legatee Isabel Manahan de
Santiago.
Legatees Soledad Robles and her children filed a motion praying that the trustee be
ordered to deliver to them, in accordance with the will, 90% of the rentals collected from
the property in Rosario; which the trustee refused to deliver contending that upon
authorization of the court of the sale of the properties, the trusteeship ceased already and
the rentals collected thereafter not only from the Rosario property but also from all the
other properties of the estate, constitute the mass of the residuary estate to be distributed
among the legatees in accordance with the terms of the codicil, that is, only 30% and not
90% to the heirs of Domingo Legarda. The motion was granted by the court and directed
the trustee to deliver to Soledad Robles and her children, their shares in rentals.

Issue:
Can the legatees-appellees still demand their share of the rentals?
Ruling:
Yes. Where the testator intended the enjoyment by the legatees of their respective
legacies for the entire duration of the trust estate, the legacies should be viewed as one
whole, continuing obligation, to be carried out by the trustee. The fact that the rentals on
the property are to be delivered monthly, did not make each delivery a separate, distinct
prestation, or render the obligation divisible, for to treat it as such would destroy or alter
the essence of the legacy. 
The trust in the case at bar was created to carry out the dispositions made in the
will, principally the payment of the legacies. The codicil provides that after the lapse of ten
or fifteen years from the date of the testator’s death, the properties may be sold upon
agreement of all the legatees, and the proceeds of the sale, after deducting certain amounts,
are to be distributed in the manner indicated therein. The approval by the court of the
petition to sell did not, therefore, automatically terminate the trusteeship, nor did it
constitute full accomplishment of the trust. It was only after the actual sale of the
properties and the distribution of the proceeds directed by the testator, that the trust could
be considered as accomplished and terminated. Consequently, the legatees are entitled to
their share of the rentals during the liquidation of the trusteeship. 

Debuque vs. Climaco

G.R. No. L-30634 August 27, 1980

Facts:

On June 22, 1962, Rosendo Javelona, Sr. died intestate and left set of heirs. The first
consisting of his widow and their seven legitimates children and the second set consisting
of his illegitimate children.
To avoid a protracted and expensive court litigation, the parties entered into an
amicable settlement compromise agreement whereby they agreed that the first set of heirs
will receive 71.66% of the decedent’s net estate which shall be equally divided among
them, while the second set of heirs will receive 28.38% of the net estate, likewise to be
equally divided among them. This was in accordance with the amended project of partition
drawn by the judicial administrator and the second set of heirs and approved by
respondent Judge. Brenda Javelona Debuque, the youngest legitimate heir, appealed the
order after her emancipation by virtue of her marriage to lawyer Jorge Debuque; the
former had acquired most of the interest of the other legitime. She prayed that the
remaining balance belonging to the estate be proportionately divided between the first and
second set of heirs, alleging that because the total balance exceeds the remaining cash
deposit of the estate, payment to the two sets of heirs should be proportionately reduced.

Issue:

Who should be liable for the estate’s losses due to the amounts they have taken and
have not restored to the estate?

Ruling:

When the parties entered into an amicable settlement-compromise agreement, they

made the agreement as between the two sets. Upon approval and finality of said
agreement, the two sets will again become co-owners of their respective shares as among
themselves. Legitimate heirs will be co-owners in equal shares of the 71.66% portion of the
estate, while the illegitimate heirs will be co-owners of their 28.38% portion until partition.
Meanwhile, they are governed by the pertinent laws of co-ownership and succession.
The members of the first set are solidarily liable for the estate’s losses due to the
amounts they have taken and have not restored to the estate, pursuant to Article 927 of the
New Civil Code. This solidary liability should be understood to cover not only negligence
but also fraud and delay.
Although the Code Commission says that this Article is for the protection of devisees
and legatees, it may be applied in relation to Article 1087 of the Civil Code.
Certainly, the share in the P12,604.31 profit realized from the sale of the decedent's
1/3 interest in Hacienda Anangui represents income of the estate.

Vera vs. Navarro

G.R. No. L-27745 October 18, 1977

Facts:

It appears that one Elsie M. Gaches died on March 9, 1966 without a child. The deceased,
however, left a last will and testament in which she made the following relevant disposition of her
estate, to wit:
3. After payment of my just debts and funeral expenses I intact that the balance of my
property, both real and personal in the Philippines, he distributed as follows: ñé+.£ªwph!1
'a) to my driver, PACITO TROCIO — Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
b) to my lavandero, VICENTE JERODIAS — One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00);
c) to my gardener, CRISANTO SALIPOT, JR. — Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00);
d) the balance of my estate in the Philippines shall then be divided in half; One-half (1/2) to
be given to CAMILO ERIBAL and the other half to MISS MAGDALENA ABANTO;
e) to MISS CONSUELO L. TAN — My office table and chair now in the library of my house,
and one of the carpets in my house to be selected by her;
4. All my property in the United States consisting of furs, jewelry and stocks I leave to my
sister BESS LAUER widow, and at present a resident of San Francisco, California.
On March 11, 1966, the herein respondent Judge Bienvenido filed a petition for the
probate of the aforesaid will. On the other hand, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
filed with the probate court a claim of taxes particularly estate tax, inheritance tax, and
income tax. The voluntary heirs mentioned in the will were held responsible for all taxes of
any nature which may be due the government.

Issue:

Are the heirs required to pay the inheritance tax before the probate court may
authorize the delivery of the hereditary share pertaining to each of them?

Ruling:

Under the provisions of Rule 90, Section 1, the distribution of the ascendants assets
may only be ordered under the following three circumstances namely, (1) when the
inheritance tax, among others, is paid, (2) when a sufficient bond is given to meet the
payment of the inheritance tax and all the other obligation of the nature enumerated
therein, or (3) when the payment of said tax and all the other obligations mentioned in the
said rule has been provided for. None of these three cases insofar as the satisfaction of the
inheritance due from the estate is concerned were present when the questioned orders
were issued in the case at bar; likewise, the record is bereft of any evidence that sufficient
bond has been filed to meet the outstanding obligation.

The inheritance tax imposed by Section 86 shall, in the absence of contrary

disposition by the predecessor, be charged to the account of each beneficiary, in proportion
to the value of the benefit received, and in accordance with the scale fixed for the class or
group to which is pertains: Provided, That in cases where the heirs divide extra-judicially
the property left to them by their predecessor or otherwise convey, sell, transfer, mortgage,
or encumber the same without being the estate or inheritance taxes within the period
prescribed in the preceding subsections (a) and (b), they shall be solidarity liable for the
payment of the said taxes to the extent of the estate they have received.
Santos vs. Buenaventura
G.R. No. L-22797 September 22, 1966

Facts:

On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition for the probate of the last will
allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.
The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces.
Rosalinda Santos, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees
— mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the
deceased.
Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed an opposition to the probate of said will.
Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was
not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon
the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was
secured through fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was
mentally incapable of making a will.
The court below issued an order allowing the probate of the will. After the order had
become final and executory, Flora Blas on February 27, 1958, filed a petition praying for
the delivery to her of a fishpond as a specific devise in her favor under Item No. 3, Clause
No. 6, of the will. To this petition, inspite of apparent understanding, Rosalina Santos filed
an opposition predicated on the ground that said specific devise in favor of Flora was
forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs, pursuant to a provision of the will that
should any of the heirs, devisees or legatees contest or oppose its probate, the latter shall
lose his or her right to receive any inheritance or benefit under it, which shall be forfeited
in favor of the other heirs, devisees and legatees. The court sustained the theory that the
"no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will was valid and had the effect of depriving Flora
of her devise in view of her previous opposition to its probate, which it held not justified
under the circumstances. Accordingly, it denied the motion for delivery of the specific
devise, declaring the same forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs.

Issue:

Was the "no contest and forfeiture" clause violated in this case?
Ruling:

No. Above all, after realizing her mistake in contesting the will — a mistake
committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts — she withdrew her
opposition and joined the appellee in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She
must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix
had been fulfilled, her will had been admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably
short period, and the disposition of her property can now be effected. It should be pointed
out that, contrary to the translation accorded to Paragraph Fourteen of the will, the
testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or opposition to its probate, but a contest or opposition
to the probate of the will and the carrying out of its provisions. This is so because the
questioned clause speaks of "pagpapatibay at pag-bibigay-bisa" instead of
"pagpapatibay o pag-bibigay-bisa." This furnishes a significant index into the intention of
the testatrix, namely, that she was more concerned in insuring the carrying out of her
testamentary provisions than in precluding any contest or opposition to it. By the
withdrawal of the contest which appellant brought in good faith, no prejudice has been
done into the intention of the testatrix. The dispositions of her will can now be safely
carried out.
From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations impaired the true
intention of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will.
Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the
speedy probation of the will. Since the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it
precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's evidence. Through said
withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions of her properties
under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's actuations subserved
rather than violated the testatrix's intention.
Fernandez vs. Dimagiba
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967

Facts:

On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the CFI a
petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed
on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the
deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio
Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all
surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the
probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the
testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of
conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the
proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by the Supreme
Court.
The CFI found that the will genuinely executed but deferred deciding on the issue of
estoppel and revocation until such time that the opportunity is presented. Oppositors
Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the
issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved but were denied. The CA later
ruled that the case had become final and executor due to failure to appeal.

Issue:

Was the 1930 will of Benedicta Reyes impliedly revoked?

Ruling:

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in
favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of
whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or
its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no
such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked
by the oppositorsappellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts
of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath
or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself,
but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can
preclude probate of the revoked testament.

As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure
from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered
doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were
executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of
Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme
Court inReyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July
31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of
the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property
to her legatee, the testatrix 272 merely intended to comply in advance with what she had
ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation
being an exception, in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Belen vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-14474 October 31, 1960
Facts:

Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros
Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen,
single. On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings No.
9226, contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the
codicil should now be divided (equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de
Olaguera, as the surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other words, of
the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera. According to appellant, the
term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean
descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz. In the present
case, they are her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding the
seven grandchildren of said legatee.

Issue:

Do the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all living descendant
(children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the descendants
nearest in degree?

Ruling:

Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the
relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore
divided equally between her and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of
the latter's sons and daughters, grand children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz.
As authority in support of her thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines): A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives
shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. The argument fails to note
that this article is specifically limited in its application to the case where the beneficiaries
are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that
the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives
closest to him. But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest)
obviously does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the
legatee) and noot of the testator.
There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer
to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for
each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the
legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere
substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by analogy? There are various reasons
against this. The most important one is that under this article, as recognized by the
principal commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives
and right of representation does not operate. The result would be that by applying to the
descendants of Filorema Diaz the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance
would be limited to her children, or anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren
altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who, in the selfsame clause 10
of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian" and of "los
hijos de Domingo Legarda," as well as of "descendientes legitimos" of the other legates, to
us indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not
synonymous terms.
The Supreme Court concluded that in the absence of other indications of contrary
intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class
or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance
with article 846. The original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her
surviving children and grandchidren.
LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION

RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION

Bagunu vs. Piedad

G.R. No. 140975 December 8, 2000

Facts:

On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene

in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the
Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court.  Asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the
finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora
Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including
an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and
creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the
administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise
her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the
thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding
merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule
41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving
nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90
of the Court.

Issue:
 Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside
respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated, does the rule of
proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives?

Ruling:

Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent

is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while
petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the
decedent. The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within
the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are
sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants,
secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews
and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews
and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the
degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil
Code gives direction. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late
Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab
intestato to the estate of the decedent.

The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code

"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers
or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason
of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth
degree of relationship in the collateral line." - invoked by petitioner do not at all support
her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the
line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of
relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal
uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half
blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the
decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority
in succession to a fifth-degree relative.
Pascual vs. Pascual
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

Facts:

On October 12, 1973, Don Andres Pascual died intestate without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. Petitioners Olivia and
Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in
Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial Court, presided over by
Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which resolved to deny
this motion reiterating their hereditary rights. Their motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals, but like the ruling of CA,
their motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. In this petition for review on
certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article
992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized (and
acknowledged) natural children as their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior
marriage when such children were under conception.

Issue:

Can Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased?

Ruling:

NO.

Petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, there exists a barrier
or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestado between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child.
The interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is
also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children and the term
“illegitimate” refers to both natural and spurious. It may be said that the law may be harsh
but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

Leonardo vs. CA
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

Facts:

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942
was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero
Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo
died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of Sotero, filed a complaint
seeking to: 1) Be declared one of the lawful heirs of deceased Francisca, entitled to ½ share
in the estate of the deceased jointly with defendant Maria; 2) Have the estate of Francisca
partitioned between him and Maria.
Respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties
and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation.
The trial court held in favor of petitioner. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court
decision and dismissed the complaint.

Issue:

Does petitioner have legal right to inherit by representation to Francisca’s estate?

Ruling:

No.
To determine petitioner’s successional rights to the decedent’s estate, his filiation
must first be ascertained. Petitioner failed to prove his filiation; the name of the child
described in the birth certificate presented as evidence, is not that of the plaintiff but a
certain “Alfredo Leonardo” who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and
Soccoro Timbol. Other than his bare allegations, plaintiff did not submit any durable
evidence showing that “Alfredo Leonardo” mentioned in the birth certificate is no other
than he himself.
Even if it is true that petitioner is a child of Sotero, he still cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca considering that
he was born outside of wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged
putative father and mother were not yet married; and his alleged father’s first marriage
was still subsisting. As such, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca.

Sayson vs. CA
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
Facts:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had
married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson,
who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of
the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful
descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time
for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against
the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the
Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they
raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children
and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled
to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents. The Lower
Court declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit
from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. Both cases were appealed to the Court
of Appeals, where they were consolidated. The appellate court affirmed that Delia, et al. are
entitled to the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. However, Delia and
Edmundo are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson.

Issue:

Are Delia and Edmundo disqualified to inherit from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson?

Ruling:

Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo,
as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
 Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among
his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties
is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision
for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not
include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between
only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives
of either party.
In sum, the Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as
the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel
Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their
parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that
only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents'
intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.
Teotico vs. Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

Facts:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of
Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she
executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. Among the legacies made in
the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina
Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses
and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate
children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all
the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana
del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria)
and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was
not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to
execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or
influence of fear.

Issue:

Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative,
would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?

Ruling:

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest
in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she
is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in
Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only
if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that
oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother
of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does
not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera
and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited
by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father.
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary
or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.
Landayan vs. Bacani
G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982

Facts:

In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens
Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948.
On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of
Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled "Extra-
Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the
properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said
document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.
Petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all surnamed LANDAYAN (the rest of
the petitioners being their respective spouses), alleged that they are the legitimate children
of Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the only child of Teodoro Abenojar
with his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar contracted a
second marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private respondent Maxima
Andrada, he did not have any offspring in any of the said second and third marriages. They
aver that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma
Abenojar. They accordingly pray that they be declared as among the legal heirs of the
deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to share in his estate.

Issue:

Is the dismissal of the case valid?

Ruling:

No.

The Supreme Court found the dismissal of the action filed by the petitioners to be
erroneous. Although the principles relied upon by the respondent Judge are legally correct,
he had unqualifiedly assumed the extra-judicial partition to be merely a voidable contract
and not a void one. The case requires an inquiry into the legal status of private respondent
Severino Abenojar, particularly as to whether he may be considered as a "legal heir" of
Teodoro Abenojar and as such entitled to participate in an extra-judicial partition of the
estate of said deceased.
As stated above, petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of
Teodoro Abenojar, he being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the
mother of petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter in first marriage
of Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal
succession from Teodoro Abenojar in view of the express provision of Article 992 of the
Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar
depends on the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma
Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his
right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even
claims that he is the sole legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners
Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no
legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of
Teodoro Abenojar.
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino
Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar. The right of representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is
disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of Ms father.
(Art. 992, Civil Code). On this supposition, the subject deed of extra- judicial partition is one
that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being
partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code, reading as follows:
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person.
It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not seek
the nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the same
deprived them of their shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar;
Should it be proved, therefore, that Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar, the portion of the deed of extra-judicial partition adjudicating certain properties
of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed inexistent and void from the beginning in
accordance with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil Code. By the express provision
of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of the same
does not prescribe.

Vda. De Crisologo vs. CA

G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985

Facts:

The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership,
annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of
preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought
the annulment of four deeds of sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a
residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin.
The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in
quintessence or in substance the following:
'That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano
Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao
who was married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and
1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs; That Lutgarda
Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any will inestate
succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to
her (Lutgarda Capiao were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were
legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extra- judicial
partition).

Issue:
Can the plaintiffs inherit from Lutsgarda Capiao, the original owner of the properties
in question?

Ruling:

On certain occasions, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal outside the
period prescribed by law in the interest of justice. Emphatic in the decisions cited by the
petitioner are strong considerations of substantial justice. The present case does not
warrant such liberality because the decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported
by the records. It is clear from the records that the petitioners cannot inherit the properties
in question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on the legitimate line of
Julia Capiao they cannot inherit from tier illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao
predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda Capiao As explained by Manresa, whom the private
respondents cited:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives
and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not
recognize it. In this Article 943 is based upon the reality of the Facts and upon the
presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child;
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of
sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in
life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. (7 Manresa, 3rd ed., p. 110).
Bicomong vs. Almanza
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
Facts:

Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 Of this marriage
there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio
Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. On June 3, 1885,
Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were born two
children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra
Glorioso also died. Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 leaving the plaintiff Francisca
Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 survived by the
plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died on
July 1, 1945. Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad
Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952
leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the
second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before
the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her
husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father
Geronimo Almanza.
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which
she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. After the death of Maura
Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of
the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for
the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta
Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of
Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the
plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza
acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she
died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the
possession and administration of the same to the defendants.

Issue:

What Civil Code provisions are applicable in the case at bar?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New
Civil Code are applicable to the admitted Facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:
 Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with
brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double
that of the latter.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half-blood shall succeed per capita
or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the
full blood.

In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an
issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by
the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten
(10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half-blood in accordance with the
provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31,
I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the
deceased."

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the
nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to
whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole
blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half-blood. The only
difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article
1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full
blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half-blood.

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa
Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half-blood
citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not
true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
Salao vs. Salao
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976

Facts:

This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran,

Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and prescription.
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao
died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin
Salao.
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel
Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was
administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May
22, 1919. The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children,
Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his
deceased father, Patricio.
To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share
valued at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao was given the
biggest fishpond with an area of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of
6,989 square meters and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels
of land had an aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive
share. So in the deed of partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of
P5,365.75. That arrangement, which was obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of
the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina
Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT
No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare
fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No.
540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of Bataan.
The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.
 Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the
fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary
evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that
joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited
from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran
fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of
lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as,
shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs.

Issue:

Was the Calunuran fishpond held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao?

Ruling:

Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that
there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Purely
parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral
partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin
Salao is legally untenable.
It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already in force
when the action herein was instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable: parol evidence
cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.
Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust.
The trial court's firm conclusion that there was no community of property during the
lifetime of Valentina; Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants' documentary
evidence. The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands supposedly inherited
from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention that the Calunuran fishpond
was held in trust for Valentin Salao.
There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on
the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There
was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of
Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy
the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond " being held in
trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the
reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the
donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two
fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional
rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her
nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia
died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani).
Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the
estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of
the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil
Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the
plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).

Abellano-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo

G.R. No. L-19382             August 31, 1965

Facts:

Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown.
More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she
was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing
her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in
the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court. The deceased Melodia
Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by
collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two
classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate
of said Melodia Ferraris.
Issue:

Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is
survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who
predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the
decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds
of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and
then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her
contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per
stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly
by Article 975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

In case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals
(aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other
collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers
and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-
vis the other collaterals.
Therefore, under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing
and qualified to succeed.
Order of Intestate Succession

Rivera vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. 189697 June 27, 2012

Facts:

This case is about a courts adjudication of non-issues and the authority of the
administrator to examine and secure evidence from persons having knowledge of
properties allegedly belonging to the decedents estate.
Spouses Adolfo Ramirez and Rosita Rivera have acquired during their lifetime the
Sta. Teresita General Hospital and other properties. In September 1990 and December
1993, Rosita and Adolfo died, respectively. Petitioner Eleuterio Rivera, Rosita’s nephew,
was appointed by the RTC as administrator of Rosita’s estate. Subsequently, in his capacity
as such, he filed a motion with the court to compel the examination and production of
documents relating to properties believed to be part of Rosita’s estate, foremost of which
was the Sta. Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez (Robert) had been
managing. Robert claimed, together with Raymond Ramirez (Raymond) and Lydia Ramirez
(Lydia), that they were children of Adolfo by another woman. Robert opposed the issuance
of the subpoena.
 The RTC granted the administrator’s motion and ordered Roert to bring to the court
the documents relating to the operations of the hospital property. The case was elevated to
the Court of Appeals, which annulled the orders of the RTC. Essentially, the CA held that
Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives were not her heirs since she had an adopted
child in Raymond and that, consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to request
production of the hospital’s documents or to institute the petition for the settlement of her
estate.

Issue:
Does Eleuterio have standing to request production of the hospital’s documents or
to institute the petition for the settlement of Rosita’s estate considering the presence of an
adopted child?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the CA erred in passing upon the issue regarding
the late Rosita’s supposed judicial adoption of Raymond as her child and the consequent
absence of right on the part of Eleuterio, et. al. to file a petition for the settlement of Rosita’s
estate. Firstly, the issue was neither considered nor passed upon by the RTC in a direct
challenge to the claim of Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives that they have the
right to inherit from her. The relevant issue before the RTC was only whether or not the
duly appointed administrator of Rosita’s estate had the right to the production and
examination of the documents believed to be in Robert’s possession. Thus, the CA gravely
abused its discretion in adjudicating such issues and denying Eleuterio and his relatives
their right to be heard on them.
Manungas vs. Loreto
G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011

Facts:

Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children.
Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila on August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas died
intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was
survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino. There she stated that there were no other legal and compulsory heirs of
Florentino except herself, Avila and Ramon Manugas whom she acknowledged as the
natural son of Florentino. Avila’s widow executed a waiver of rights and participation
renouncing her rights over the property of her husband in favor of Engracia. Consequently,
a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate of Florentino distributing
the properties to Engracia and Ramon. Through Parreñ o, Engracia instituted a civil case
against the Spouses Diosdado Salinas Manugas(Diosdado) and Milagros Pacifico for illegal
detainer and damages. MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia due to the
failure of Diosdado to file an answer.8. After sometime, Diosdado instituted a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over Engracia’s Estate in his favor before the RTC
of Tagum.

Issue:

Is the CA correct in ruling that the RTC erred in appointing Diosdado as the special
administrator of Engracia Manungas estate?

Ruling:

In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila
Parreo as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention
that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record
shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in
preserving the latters estate. On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial
guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is
interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so
she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedents estate. Hence, the
Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as special
administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its
power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia
Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the
subject of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds
distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the
termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an
illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not
entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the
estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him
as its special administrator. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998
Facts:

On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother,
Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the CFI. In their petition, petitioners claimed that they were
the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no
descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners
amended their petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only
administered by the latter, the true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June
16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate
estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the
lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021.  On July 7, 1972, private respondents
Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion
to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings No.
86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law
wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and
that during these period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado
and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of
Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores
Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of
collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing
the existence of said three children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate
of Ricardo Abad.
RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue:

The Court of Appeals erred and trial court graved erred in holding that respondents
are the acknowledged natural children of deceased Ricardo De Mesa Abad.

Ruling:

 It is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by the
quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private
respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of
Ricardo Abad. With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of
Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The
applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate
children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.

As to petitioners claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually
belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled
that the evidence presented by private respondents proved that said properties in truth
belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled
to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to
examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case. In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention
being that they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo
Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
Manuel vs. Ferrer
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

Facts:

The property involved in this case is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who
died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling,
initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair
with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years
passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the
bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an
area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594
was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land,
covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later
bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of
their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent
Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2)
portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February
1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

Issue:

Who can inherit under the law?

Ruling:

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the

rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family
and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral
line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand,
although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is
predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on
testamentary dispositions.

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other
cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had 
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; that
the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate
child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate
of the legitimate grandparent;  that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no
part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation to, any
other part as to produce a harmonious whole.
Ramirez vs. Bautista
G.R. No. L-5075 December 1, 1909

Facts:

The subject of this complaint is two fish ponds, left by Moises Ramirez on his
demise, and subsequently illegally sold. This action was brought for the purpose of having
the sale declared to be void, to secure the recovery of possession of the fish ponds, their
restitution to the administrator of the estate of the deceased owner, and indemnity for
damages.
Moises Ramirez, who died intestate in February, 1900, was married twice. By the
first marriage he had five children, named Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia;
by the second marriage three, to wit, Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio, of whom Isabel alone
survives. At the time of his death he left two fish ponds in the sitio of Tagalag, in the
municipality of Polo, Province of Bulacan, the specific details of which are described and
admitted in the case. The two wives are also dead.
The children of the first marriage, Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia,
sold the two fish ponds on the 28th of November, 1901, to Simeon Bautista and Raymundo
Duran for the sum of 1,100 pesos. The only surviving child of the second marriage, Isabel,
was not a party to said sale, hence the suit now filed by the administrator of the intestate
estate to have the sale declared null and void and the fish ponds restored to the intestate
estate of Moises Ramirez.
The two purchasers proved their purchase by two documents, one of which was a
private and other a notarial one executed for the purpose. When summoned to answer the
complaint they requested that the vendors be cited also, but the latter although so
summoned did not appear at trial.

Issue:

Is the sale of the thirteen-sixteenths of the two parcels of land in question, and as to
three-sixteenths thereof valid?

Ruling:

The claim of the appellants is entirely legal that thirteen-sixteenths should be

apportioned among the children of the first marriage — to wit, eight as their own, already
inherited from their mother, Apolinaria Guillermo, and five subsequently inherited from
their deceased father, Moises Ramirez — and three-sixteenths should be the share of the
three children of the second marriage, which accrued to Isabel Ramirez.
Therefore, in the succession of Moises Ramirez that is now opened the whole of these
fractional parts cannot be included, but only the eight which actually constitute his share in
the community of property maintained by him with his children of the first marriage, Rosa,
Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia, since the death of his first wife.
The above children of the first marriage, upon the death of Moises Ramirez, continued the
aforesaid community of property with their three half sisters and brother, Cirila, Isabel, and
Serapio; that is to say, now with Isabel, their share being thirteen-sixteenths, and that of
Isabel three sixteenths.
If Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia Ramirez could lawfully alienate
their respective shares in the joint ownership of the two parcels of land sold to the
defendants, Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran, it is evident that the sale of thirteen-
sixteenths of the said two lands could not be void; the sale of the three-sixteenths which
belonged to Isabel alone is illegal, as alleged in the third assignment of error.
Therefore, the sale described in the public instrument of the 29th of November, 1901, of
the thirteen-sixteenths which belonged to the vendors is valid, and that of the three-
sixteenths which pertain to Isabel, who neither by herself nor by means of another took
part in said sale is null.
Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran succeed to the vendors and are subrogated thereto
in the joint ownership of the two fish ponds sold; their shares are the same that were
owned by the vendors, that is, thirteen-sixteenths.
The whole of the two fish ponds cannot pertain to the intestate estate of Moises
Ramirez, but merely the half that belonged to him and which at his death became a part of
his intestate estate.
Intestate succession cannot disturb the lawful holder in his possession of property,
which it is thought should constitute a part of the hereditary property. Only in the event of
a division of the common property, or upon dissolution of the community of property now
existing between the purchasers, Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran, on the one hand
and Isabel Ramirez on the other, can the fruits, rents, or benefits received, and the part
thereof, as well as of the expenses, corresponding to the coowner Isabel Ramirez in
maintaining the community, be considered, as well as of the rights and actions that may
pertain to the purchasers as against the vendors (who have taken no part in these
proceedings), by reason of the total consideration paid for the two properties, and other
obligations which may have arisen because of the sale.
The present cause of action and the complaint based thereon being limited to the
recovery of the two properties in question, and the restitution of the possession thereof to
the administrator of the intestate estate of Moises Ramirez, in consequence of the latter's
hereditary succession, it is evident that neither recovery of possession nor the restitution
asked for can be granted, as the defendants are the legitimate proprietors and possessors
in joint ownership of the greater portion of the common property claimed.
Santillon vs. Miranda
G.R. No. L-19281             June 30, 1965

Facts:

On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage,
Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and
the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the
properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which
Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by
virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties
enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of
the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if
administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner
was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda
was appointed administratrix of the estate.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should
control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession
involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction,
the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."

Issue:

How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only
survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?

Ruling:

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession;
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the
case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his
father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888
thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the
law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur
with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled
to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate
succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.
 Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at
least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be
premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not
apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be
applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair
because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892),
she would get 1/2 in intestate.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or
widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So,
the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her
only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or
widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow
or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the
second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situation.
Pisuena vs. Heirs of Unating
G.R. No. 132803. August 31, 1999

Facts:

The present case is rooted in an action for recovery of (1) possession and ownership
of a parcel of land, as well as (2) a sum of money and damages. Before the RTC of Roxas City
on May 15, 1989, this case was originally filed against herein petitioner, Jessie Pisuea, by
herein respondents, the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar represented by Salvador
Upod and Dolores Bautista.
The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan,
Capiz, located at Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of Capiz, is a registered
land in the name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. Petra Unating died on October
1, 1948 while Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. The spouses had two [legitimate]
children, namely Felix Villar and Catalina Villar. Felix Villar died on October 24, 1962, while
Catalina Villar died on February 21, 1967. For the purpose of this case, Felix Villar is
represented by Dolores Villar Bautista, the eldest of his four children while Catalina Villar is
represented by Salvador Villar Upod, the eldest of her three (3) children, all as plaintiffs
[herein respondents]. Defendant herein petitioner, Jessie Pisueñ a, is the son-in-law of
Agustin Navarra who was once a municipal mayor of the Municipality of Ivisan. Agustin
Navarra died on October 30, 1958.
Plaintiffs contend that during the lifetime of the registered owners, Petra Unating
and Aquilino Villar, they enjoyed the absolute ownership and possession of Lot No. 1201.
However, sometime in 1950 (after the death of Petra Unating on October 1, 1948) Aquilino
Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten (10) years with Agustin Navarra
involving the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four (4) hectares.
On the other hand, defendant counters that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix
Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra on February 2, 1949. The contract in Spanish
captioned “ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA” to evidence such sale was duly notarized by
Jose Villagracia, Notary Public, and was entered in his Notarial Register.

Issue:

Is the disputed land paraphernal or conjugal?

Ruling:

The finding of the cadastral court that Petra Unating inherited the lot in question
from her mother cannot be dismissed as an obiter, which is an observation made by the
court not necessary to the decision rendered. The conclusion of the cadastral court was
found in the dispositive portion of its Decision, and it was material to the nature of Petra
Unatings ownership of the lot. Furthermore, it was based on the evidence presented by the
parties and considered by the said court. In any event, it must be pointed out that the
Decision became final a long time ago, and a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding, or
any other in rem proceeding for that matter, is binding and conclusive upon the whole
world.Therefore, the lot in dispute can properly be considered as a paraphernal property of
Petra Unating.
Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal. However, this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral courts
specific finding, reached in adversarial proceedings, that the lot was inherited by Petra
Unating from her mother. Noteworthy is the fact that the parties do not assail the validity of
the cadastral court’s Decision. The 1980 reconstitution of the title to the lot in the name of
Petra Unating, 40 years old, married to Aquilino Villar, Filipino and resident of Ivisan,
Capiz, having inherited said lot from her mother Margarita Argamaso x x x was notice to
the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that it belonged to Petra as her
paraphernal property. Thus, the words married to were merely descriptive of Petra
Unatings status at the time the lot was awarded and registered in her name.
As already shown, the disputed lot was paraphernal. Since Petra Unating did not
leave any other property, will or debt upon her demise in 1948, the property in question
was thus inherited by her children, Felix and Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino
Villar. The two children were entitled to two-thirds of their mothers estate, while the
husband was entitled to the remaining one-third. By virtue of the Deed of Sale they
executed, Felix and Catalina effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949,
their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, they could not have
disposed of their fathers share in the same property at the time, as they were not yet its
owners. At the most, being the only children, they had an inchoate interest in their fathers
share.
When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third share in the
disputed property, Felix and Catalinas inchoate interest in it was actualized, because
succession vested in them the title to their fathers share and, consequently, to the entire
lot.  Thus, although Felix and Catalina Villar were not yet the owners of the remaining one-
third of the disputed lot when they sold it to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, they
became its owners upon their father’s death on January 14, 1953. Pursuant to Article 1434,
the title to the lot passed to Augustin Navarra.