You are on page 1of 5

BANAT VS COMELEC

Facts:

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a


party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the
2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is


mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would
be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT
also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of
this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity
of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.

Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.


HELD:

The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow


that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained. There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the
votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability
of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get
two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”

Republic v Rosemoor Mining


Facts:

The four (4) petitioners, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble
deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in
discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount
Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.After compliance with
numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in
favor of the herein petitioners."Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was
appointed Minister of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioners’ License No. 33 was cancelled by him through his letter to ROSEMOOR
MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

The trial court ruled that the privilege granted under respondents’ license had already
ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due process clause of the
Constitution. Such right was supposedly violated when the license was cancelled
without notice and hearing. The cancellation was said to be unjustified, because the area
that could be covered by the four separate applications of respondents was 400 hectares.
Finally, according to the RTC, Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation of
the license, was an ex post facto law; as such, it violated Section 3 of Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution.

the CA held that the grant of the quarry license covering 330.3062 hectares to
respondents was authorized by law, because the license was embraced by four (4)
separate applications -- each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the
limitation under Presidential Decree No. 463 -- that a quarry license should cover not
more than 100 hectares in any given province -- was supplanted by Republic Act No.
7942,7 which increased the mining areas allowed under PD 463.

Issue :

W/N the revocation of QLP No. 3 violates the non impairment clause.

Held: It is relevant to state, however, that Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution does not apply retroactively to a "license, concession or lease" granted by
the government under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution on February 2, 1987.17 As noted in Miners Association of the Philippines v.
Factoran Jr., the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission18 emphasized the
intent to apply the said constitutional provision prospectively.

"SECTION 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/ Quarrying Rights. — All valid


and existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending renewal, mineral
production-sharing agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at the date of
effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid, shall not be impaired, and shall be recognized
by the Government: Provided, That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share
in mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act
shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor unless the mining
lessee or contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of
said provisions: Provided, further, That no renewal of mining lease contracts shall be
made after the expiration of its term: Provided, finally, That such leases, production-
sharing agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements shall comply with the
applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

Moreover, granting that respondents’ license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by
the State in the exercise of police power.32 The exercise of such power through
Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State
ownership of all natural resources.33 This Regalian doctrine is an exercise of its
sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and of the patrimony of the
nation, the mineral deposits of which are a valuable asset.34

Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.


As pointed out earlier, respondents’ license is not a contract to which the protection
accorded by the non-impairment clause may extend.35Even if the license were, it is
settled that provisions of existing laws and a reservation of police power are deemed
read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed with public welfare.36 As it is, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.37

We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a
"legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial."38 Its declaration that
QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity39 is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the
cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional
proscription against bills of attainder.

Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law.
There are six recognized instances when a law is considered as such: 1) it criminalizes
and punishes an action that was done before the passing of the law and that was
innocent when it was done; 2) it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when it was committed; 3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is greater
than that imposed by the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; 4) it alters
the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a less or different testimony
than that required by the law at the time of the commission of the offense; 5) it assumes
the regulation of civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a
deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that was considered lawful when
it was done; and 6) it deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he or she become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or an
acquittal or the proclamation of an amnesty.40 Proclamation No. 84 does not fall under
any of the enumerated categories; hence, it is not an ex post facto law.

It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in
nature.41 Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-
Bato national park by canceling respondents’ license, is clearly not penal in character.

You might also like