9. FRANCISCO VS GONZALESGR 177667 09.17.

08
FACTS

 
Coz of a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,Cleodualdo and Michele have voluntarily agreed toset forth
their obligations, rights and responsibilitieson matters relating to their children's support,custody,
visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains in a compromiseagreement.
Ownership of the conjugal property consisting of ahouse and lot covered by Transfer Certificate in
thename of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married toMichele U. Francisco shall be transferred by way of a
deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, asco-owners, when they reach nineteen (19) andeighteen
(18) years old.
Respondent ordered Michele and her partnerMatrai to vacate the premises leased to them andto pay
back rentals, unpaid telephone bill, andattorney's fees.
Real property donated to Cleodia and Ceamanthawere used as payment.
CA DECISION: Michele's obligation was not provento be a personal debt, it must be inferred that it
isconjugal and redounded to the benefit of thefamily, and hence, the property may be heldanswerable
for it.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal property of the formers pouses may be held accountable?

RATIO:

NO. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties

unquestionably belonging to the judgmentdebtor alone, in the present case to thosebelonging to
Michele and Matrai.*Cleodualdo and Michele married prior to theaffectivity of the FC thus their
property relations aregoverned by the Civil Code on conjugal partnershipof gains.

A wife may bind the conjugal partnership onlywhen she-purchases things necessary for the support
of the family- when she borrows money for that purposeupon her husband's failure to deliver
theneeded sum-when administration of the conjugalpartnership is transferred to the wife by thecourts
or by the husband-or when the wife gives moderate donations forcharity.
 
In this case as the liability incurred by Michelearose from a judgment rendered in an unlawfuldetainer
case against her and her partnerMatrai. Michele, who was then already livingseparately from
Cleodualdo rented the house inLanka Drive for her and Matrai's own benefit. Infact, when they entered
into the leaseagreement, Michele and Matrai purportedthemselves to be husband and wife.

Both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived theirtitle to and ownership of the house and lot inTaal St. in
favor of petitioners. The propertyshould not have been levied and sold atexecution sale, for lack of legal
basis

10. MALLILIN vs. CASTRO

G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000

FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo was alleged to be both married and with children but
separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. 
They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner
was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer.  They likewise
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name.  Due to
irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner demanded his share from respondent in
the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in
her name.  Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because
they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-
ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment.  Trial court dismissed the
former and granted the latter.

ISSUE:
Can petitioner validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of the
respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together?
HELD:
Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.  Hence,
there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other. When
CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to
prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied.  Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends
may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of
Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.

The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

11. AGAPAY vs. PALANG

276 SCRA 341

FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol.  A few months after the
wedding, he left to work in Hawaii.  They had 1 child Herminia Palang. Miguel returned twice but he
stayed with his brother, not his wife and child. It was found that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted
to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. In 1973, 63 year-old Miguel contracted second marriage with 19 year-old
Erlinda Agapay. Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land, with the TCT issued in
their names and a house and lot with the TCT issued in Erlinda’s name. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation
produced a son Kristopher. Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement to settle a case filed by the latter. They agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted an action for recovery the rice land and the house and lot both purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with Erlinda.

ISSUE:
Does Carlina have the right to recover the properties acquired during Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation?

HELD:
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was void because the marriage with Carlina
was subsisting and unaffected by the de facto separation. Article 148 of the Family Code provides that
for cases of cohabitation when parties are not capacitated to marry each other, the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Erlinda failed to prove that
she actually contributed money to buy the rice land. Consequently, the rice land should revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.

 As to the house and lot, testimonies reveal that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase and directed that Erlinda’s name be placed as the vendee. This too should revert to
the conjugal partnership.
 As to Kristopher Palang’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s estate
should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the
purpose.

3. HONTIVEROS vs. RTC

GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros who is the brother of Augusto, and Teodora Ayson.  The petitioners
alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from
the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied
that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single.  They also
denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land.  On the contrary, according to
the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to
petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not
verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE:
 
Can the court validly dismiss the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as
stated in Article 151?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria
Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase
“members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood.  Religious relationship and relationship
by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction.  Teodora and Maria as spouses of the
Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

4. MANACOP vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow
located in Quezon City.  The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The
latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against the house of the former.  Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop
Construction President, the petitioner.  The latter insists that the attached property is a family home
having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153
of the Family Code.  Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988.

Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is
therefore not exempt form attachment. The petition was dismissed by SC.

5. Patricio VS. Dario - G.R. NO. 170829

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among
the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building. Thereafter,
petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the
subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property
hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78. Private
respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely,
his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.
ISSUE:
W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing
therein.
 
HELD:
No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1)
the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the
obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first
upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next
nearer relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now
establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

6.

7. Arriola vs Arriola
G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008

Facts:

The RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714
(84191) left by Fidel S. Arriola to his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola in equal shares of one-third each. John Nabor Arriola proposed to sell it though public auction.
Vilma and Anthony Ronald Arriola initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be
allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CA
granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot including the house built on it.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion.

Issue: 

Whether or not the house built inside the land is considered part of partition.

Held:

No. Under Article 153 the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. According
to Article 159 the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and
the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

1. Concepcion vs CA G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion  and  private  respondent  Ma.  Theresa Almontewere married in 1989.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed
a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9
years before he married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage
was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting
when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared
Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that
Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimatechild of Mario and
not petitioner Gerardo.

RULING:
Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
void ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time
Jose Gerardo was conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of
private respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child because such
right is strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage
of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The petition was denied.

2. BENITEZ-BADUA vs. CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna.
Isabel died in 1982 while her husband died in1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a complaint for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew, herein private
respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since
childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted.
The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her
certificate of live birth where the spouses’ name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that
said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of
Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be
the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir
of the spouses.
Thus the present case…

ISSUE:
Would the petitioner’s certificate of live birth suffice to establish her legitimacy.

HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child
the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child’s birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole
heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and ascendants”. In executing such deed,
Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared that he
was the petitioner’s father.

3. DE JESUS vs. DE JESUS

G.R. No. 142877, 2 October 2001

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964.  It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de
Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus.  Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12
March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and
some real property.  It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a
complaint on 01 July 1993 for “Partition with Inventory and Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.  The trial
court denied, due to lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can impugn their own legitimacy.

HELD:
Petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents.  The certificates of live birth would also
identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. The law established the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus which the
law does not allow. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife.  Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of the decedent, cannot be
aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being
the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.

4. Rivero v CAGr no. 141273

Facts:
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint againstdefendants for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. Duringtrial, Mary Jane Dy-
Chiao De Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff whereby she is
acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and pay petitioner P6M as a share
in the estate of their deceased father. RTC Granted the compromisedagrrement.Meanwhile, the
Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed for annulment
of  judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss. CA directedMary
Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle. In her reply,
shequestion assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be thesubject
of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did notrecognize the
validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners wereexploring the possibility of
modifying their extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the defendants, hence a petition.

Issue: W/N the compromise regarding filiation is valid?

Held: NO. The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane isnull and
void.Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of  persons
shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationshipthat must be
judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. Itcannot be left to the
will or agreement of the parties.Such recognition by Mary Jane , however, is ineffectual, because under
the law, therecognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister
or relative

5. Herrera vs Alba G.R. No. 148220

In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for
the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armi’s allegations. In
the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to
establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera
questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread
acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is
unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the
 prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive
ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other
hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court
provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data:

1. how the samples were collected,

2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
6. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

The above test is derived from the Daubert Test  which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.)  The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts
before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:

1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested,

2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the
DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological
father.   However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100%  ) does not
immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not
automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological
father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can be brought
down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is  less than 99.9%  probability that the alleged father is the
biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against self-
incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no “testimonial compulsion” in the
getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.