Why Peasants Rebel in Peru: The Rise of Sendero Luminoso

WHY PEASANTS REBEL:
The Case of Peru's SenderoLuminoso

By CYNTHIA McCLINTOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
N thisarticleI shall examine theoriginsof a major ruralrevolutionary

movement,Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). An extremistMaoist
organization,Sendero has gained considerablepeasant supportin Peru's
southernhighlands,especiallyin the Ayacucho area. Although peasant
unresthas been endemic in Peru, the scope and intensityof the current
movement are unprecedented.Never before has a Peruvian guerrilla
group ranged over such a wide part of the country,and never before
has such a group threatenedthe order of daily life in the capital.
Why has rural protestrisen to such levels in Peru? In exploringthis
question, I also seek to shed new light,fromthe Peruvian experience,
on the prevailingtheoriesof peasant revolution.'As JackA. Goldstone
has pointed out, scholarshipon revolutionhas been based on very few
cases, and thus a new instance of peasant rebellion is significant.2 To
date, the list of twentieth-century peasant-based revolutionsthat have
been thoroughlystudied withina comparativeperspectiveincludes only
those of Mexico, Russia, China, Algeria, and Vietnam. Among these
Mexico is the only Latin American case.
There are various theoreticalcontroversiesin the scholarshipon peas-
ant revolution; although the single case of Peru cannot definitively
resolve these differences,it does provide new evidence. It may be that,
*Jwould like to thankThe George WashingtonUniversityCommitteeon Research for
funds in supportof this study. I am also gratefulto Luis Deustua and Rodolfo Osores
Ocampo fortheirexcellentresearchassistance.Helpful commentson previousdraftsof the
article were provided by Luis Deustua, Ernest Evans, Abraham F. Lowenthal, Patricio
Marquez, David Scott Palmer, Luis Pasara, and JohnSheahan.
XThe most influentialrecentworks on peasant revolutionare probablyJamesC. Scott,
The Moral Economyof thePeasant:Rebellionand Subsistence in SoutheastAsia (New Haven:
Yale UniversityPress,1976); Samuel L. Popkin,The RationalPeasant:The PoliticalEconomy
of Rural Societyin Vietnam(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1979); JoelS. Migdal,
Peasants,Politicsand Revolution:PressureToward Politicaland Social Change in the Third
World(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, I974); Theda Skocpol, Statesand Social Rev-
olutions(New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, I979); Jeffery M. Paige, AgrarianRevo-
lution: Social Movementsand ExportAgriculture in the Underdeveloped World(New York:
Free Press, I975). Two earlier classics on the topic,not by politicalscientists,are Eric R.
Wolf, Peasant Warsof the TwentiethCentury(New York: Harper & Row, i969) and Bar-
ringtonMoore, Jr.,Social OriginsofDictatorship and Democracy(Boston: Beacon Press,i966).
See Goldstone,"Theories of Revolution:The Third Generation,"WorldPolitics32 (April
i980), 425-53, at 450-5I-
This content downloaded from 129.22.124.102 on Tue, 19 Nov 2013 12:51:28 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PEASANT REBELLION IN PERU 49
because Peru has been studied intensivelysince the i960s, and because
more careful records have been kept in recent times, the data on the
Peruvian experienceseem relativelysolid and comprehensive.
The rise of Sendero Luminoso sheds particular light on two key
controversiesin the literature.3First, how importantis a crisis of sub-
sistenceto peasant revolt?I will argue that,in the Peruvian case, it has
been outstandinglyimportant.Second, what type of agrarian structure
is mostconduciveto revolutionaryactivity?The Ayacucho peasantswho
were mobilized by the ShiningPath guerrillasare predominantlysmall-
holders,and relativelyunintegratedinto the capitalistmarketeconomy.
The Peruvian experiencealso highlightsthe importanceof two factors
in peasant revolution that are generally insufficiently stressed in the
literature.First, if a state plays an active part in agricultural policy
making (as has been common in Latin America in recentdecades) and
a subsistencecrisis occurs, the peasantryis likely to assess the govern-
ment's policies and possiblyblame them.These policies thus become an
importantcomponentof the revolutionaryequation. A second factoris
geopolitics.The area of Ayacucho has two particularlysignificantchar-
acteristics:it is remote,and it has a university.Almost unnoticed,young
university-educated radicals were able to forgea working alliance with
the peasantryin Ayacucho.4
The peasant revolt in Peru is novel in taking place aftera major
agrarianreform.By mostcriteriathisreformis thesecond mostsweeping
in Latin America afterthatof Cuba.5 In otherpeasant movements,the
revolutionarieshave generallydemanded land and/orthe diminutionof
the power of the large landowning class. In Peru, to the contrary,the
agrarianreformbythemilitarygovernment(i968-i980) transferred large
landholdings in Ayacucho to the peasantry.For various reasons, how-
ever, the economic impact of the reformwas minimal in the southern
highlands. By contrast,its political implicationswere considerable; po-
litical space was opened to leftistgroups, and the peasantry became
increasinglypoliticized.
The current Peruvian peasant revolt is also significantbecause its
relativesuccess since i980 contrastssharplywith the failureof the guer-
rilla movement of the i960s. It is unusual that scholars can compare
3Excellent recent overviews of these controversiesare Goldstone (fn. 2) and Theda

Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?"ComparativePolitics14 (April1982), 351-
75.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, PoliticalOrderin ChangingSocieties(New Haven: Yale University
Press, i968) places special analyticalimportanceon thisalliance as a requisiteforsuccessful
revolutionarymovements.
5 See Cynthia McClintock,Peasant Cooperatives and Political Changein Peru (Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress, 198I), 60-63.

50 WORLD POLITICS
two suchmovements in the same countryacrossa meretwentyyears.

The contrast putsintosharpreliefa variety ofconditionsfora successful
peasantrebellion.In termsof organizational Senderois the
strategies,
moreskillfuland shrewdof the two movements. The Peruvianstate,
beleagueredforalmosta decade now, has not yetfoundan effective
responseto Sendero.
One caveathere:thisarticleis aboutthe originsof a revolutionary
groupthathas gainedsignificant peasantsupportand has transformed
dailylifein Peru; it is notabouta revolutionary groupthathas gained
statepower.Nor, in myview, is it likely gain statepower.It varies
to
in thisrespectfrommostpeasantrevolutions thatare usuallycitedin
theliterature.The ShiningPathmovementis also different frommost
of the revolutionary movements thathave in factwon powerin Latin
America.As Cole Blasierand,mostrecently, RobertH. Dix havepointed
out,successfulrevolutionary movements in Latin America-especially
in Bolivia,Cuba, and Nicaragua-have been as much urbanas rural,
combining theefforts ofurbanmoderates, university
students,and peas-
ants,amongothers.6 Senderois notas broadbased; itspopularsupport
is verylimitedamong Peruvians in Lima or otherareas of Peru's coast.7
II. SENDERO LuMINOSO AND ITS PEASANT SUPPORT, I968-I9828
For the mostpart,the individualswho were to be thecore leaders

of SenderoLuminosobecamepolitically activein theearlyi960s at the
University of San Cristobalde Huamangain Ayacucho.Refoundedin
I959 afteralmostthreehundredyears,theuniversity
was theprofessional
6 Dix, "The Varietiesof Revolution,"Comparative PoliticsI 5 (April I983), 28I-94; Blasier,
"Social Revolution: Origins in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba," in Rolando E. Bonachea and
Nelson P. Valdes, eds., Cuba in Revolution(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, I972), i8-5I.
7 In early i984, a surveyby the respectedpublic opinion firmDatum reportedthat,in
Lima and Callao, "the type of governmentconsideredmost adequate for a countrylike
ours" was "a democraticgovernment(in power throughvotes)" for72% of the respondents;
a "socialistgovernment(in powerthroughrevolution)"forI3%; and "a militarygovernment
(in power througha coup)" for9%, witha "don't know/noanswer" responsefrom6%. See
Caretas,No. 787, February20, i984, p. 24. In an informalsurvey(i983) in "Marla" and
"Estrella" (two coastal agrarian cooperativesthat have been a longstandingfocus of my
research),everyone of the40 respondentssaid thatSendero was harmingthe countryrather
than helping it. Asked why,over 90% repliedthat Sendero "only wanted to kill innocent
people," to "destroythings,"or to "destroyPeru." Some added that"theymake theeconomic
crisisworse" or that "theyare enemies of the people."
8 This sectionon Sendero Luminoso owes a greatdeal to the work of David ScottPalmer.
See especiallyhis "From Mao to Mariateguiin Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of
Sendero Luminoso, i963-1983, discussionpointspreparedfordeliveryat the New England
Council of the Latin AmericanStudiesAssociationmeeting,Universityof New Hampshire,
Durham (October 8, i983). Other useful works include Mario Vargas Llosa, "Inquest in
the Andes," New York TimesMagazine, July3I, i983, i8 and ff.;Colin Harding, "Notes
on Sendero Luminoso," Communist Affairs(No. 3, i984), 45-6i; and Cynthia McClintock,

homeofvariousextremely
radicalgroupsuntilI978. The politicaldebate
about the correctroad to revolutionwas intense,and a cause of consid-
erable factionalism.
The Communist Party of Peru, as Sendero Luminoso formallycalls
itself,was founded in i968 by Abimael Guzman. OriginallyfromAre-
quipa, Guzman became a philosophyprofessorin the program of ed-
ucation at the universityin i963. Most of the other leaders of Sendero
at this time were also fromthe coast or fromlarge urban areas.
Sendero's ideology is Gang-of-FourMaoist. Stridentlycriticalof the
currentSoviet and Chinese governmentsas well as of Izquierda Unida
(the coalitionof Marxistpartiesthatparticipatesin Peru's electoralproc-
ess), Sendero is unusually sectarian. There is no evidence of support
fromany foreigngovernment.Sendero is also extremelytaciturnabout
its strategiesand programsforthe future.The group has published only
two very slim documents, which deal primarilywith its view of the
guerrilla struggle.9This view is classicallyMaoist: revolutionis to be
achieved by a prolonged popular war that will firstgather support in
the countrysideand then finallyencircle the cities. Sendero has incor-
poratedsymbolsfromtheIncan insurrectionary traditionintoitsposture.
The movementgrew gradually. During the early i960s, the charis-
matic Guzman held hundreds of political meetingsand discussions at
his home, and attracteda large number of universitystudents.Many of
these studentswere frompeasant families;many were women. In con-
trastto the other revolutionarygroups of the i960s, Shining Path was
committed to intensive,long-termpolitical work in the countryside.
First in universitytrainingprograms,and later on theirown, the Sen-
deristamilitantsactuallylived for long periods in Indian communities.
They learned the Indian language if they did not already know it,
married into the communities-and preached politics.
In May i980, Sendero began terroristactivitiesas a componentof the
thirdstageof theguerrillastruggle.Accordingto officialfigures,Sendero
has been responsibleforabout 6I5 deaths between i980 and I983 (more
than 500 of these in I983) and about 2,500 terrorist attacksduringthe
same period (505 in i980, I,028 in I98I, 778 in I982, and 910 in I983).-'
Sendero has coordinated a great varietyof terroristattacks. Using dy-
"Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas,"Problemsof Communism32 (September-

October i983), I9-34.
9 The more substantialof the two is "Desarrollemos la Guerra de Guerrillas" ["Let us
develop the guerrillawar!"]. It is reprintedin Harding (fn. 8), 50-55.
-Caretas, No. 780 (December 26, i983), I5.

52 WORLD POLITICS
namitestolenfromthemanysmallminesin thesouthern highlandsand
weaponscapturedfromthesecurity forces,theguerrillashave attacked
transportation,
communication, diplomaticem-
and electricalfacilities;
includingevenruralagricultural
bassies;and factories, The
enterprises.
economictollto PerufromSendero'sattacksmayexceedU.S. $i billion
by now."
At the same time,Sendero'smembership and area of activityhave
expanded.12As of i980, estimatesof thenumberof Senderomilitants
rangedbetween200 and 300; theattacksimpressedand attracted other
revolutionarygroups.The largestofthesewas thepeasantorganization
of JulioMezzich,basedin Apurimac.By I983, theofficialestimatesof
thenumberof Senderomilitants rangedbetween5oo and 3,000. At the
same time,however,thegovernment maintainedthatI,439'Senderistas
had been killed in I983 alone.I3 Throughout I983, Sendero was recruiting
intensively,
especiallyat regionalhighlandsuniversities, and it is quite
possiblethatthereal numberof Senderistacadresis above 3,000.
Senderograduallybeganto penetrate a largergeographicalarea.I4Its
earlystrongholds had been communities nearAyacuchoborderingthe
Pampas River;by DecemberI982, when the government decidedtht
thearmyshouldgo to Ayacuchoto head thecounterinsurgency effort,
sevenprovinceswere declaredthe "MilitaryEmergencyZone": Can-
gallo,VictorFajardo,Huamanga,Huanta,and La Mar in Ayacucho;
Andahuaylasin Apurimac;and Angaraesin Huancavelica.As of early
I984, thetotalnumberof provinces in theEmergency Zone is thirteen,
includingall fiveprovincesof Huancavelica,all but the southernmost
Ayacuchoprovince, and twoprovinces ofApurimac(see map).Roughly
I2 percentof Peru's peasantry live in theseprovinces.I5In addition,it
was officiallyestimatedin early I983 thatSenderistacells had been
establishedin thirteenof thecountry's twenty-four departments. After
theonsetof counterinsurgency operationsin Ayacuchoand thedisper-
My estimatefromvarious reportsof damages.
Membershipfiguresare based on Latin AmericanRegionalReports,AndeanGroup (RA-
82-04) (May I4, i982), 5-7; also see, forinstance,KennethFreed, "Pocket of TerrorismStirs
Fear Among PeruvianPeasants,"Los AngelesTimes,February20, i983; JayMallin, "Shining
Path Guerrillas,"Soldierof Fortune(March i983), 52.
13 Caretas (fn. io).
For documentationof the gradual extensionof the MilitaryEmergencyZone, see The
'4
AndeanReport9 (Februaryi983), I3-I4; LatinAmericaWeeklyReport(WR-83-49),December
i6, i983, p. 9; DESCO, ResumenSemanal 7, February24-March i, i984, p. 3; March i6-
23, i984, p. 4. On the number of Senderistacells, see Mallin (fn. I2), 52. On the areas of
i983 and i984 Senderistaactivity,see The AndeanReportio (March i984), 47, and Latin
AmericaWeeklyReport(WR-84-o2), JanuaryI3, i984, p. IO.
'5 Calculation on the basis of i96i figuresforthe "farmlabor force"in Richard Charles
Webb, Government Policy and the Distributionof Income in Peru, i963-1973 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, I977), II9-29.

FIGURE I
PERU'S "MILITARY EMERGENCY ZONE"
(early I984)
E C U A D O R / 0
CLO0M BI A
103 8 4
1TUMHBS, 44 5 4-
/ J 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
bso)
r PIURA /
<(4 0 ~~AMAZON
S
LA~~~b~~tS)A~N MARTIN 0 ) B R A S I L
(5 7?k)
LA Ll1BERTAD
\< (4 8%o) 4 48B\ J 207 )
HUANHUCO I 9%o
\(V%?~~~~~~ CA\
Y
\ 4745t (8(I2%2_)
(2 LIMA
6%'a) ( (O2%1
\ HU^,N~~~~~v~~tt~~~t#
8~832
5 \ \
R 9 {X.^} h { X~~~
9%) >
\ \ ^<Y~tUUF \ APRIMACv 890 3 ,
\ > < < s2 g~~~~~~~PU

O
0
<~~~~~2
~~~7Uf6 6 9
2% )
POBLACION POR DEPARTAMENTOS ARQU4
CENSO DE 1981 WCifrasen miles) ?,

05
(0
Poblacion censada al 12 de julio de 1981 MOUEUA)
14
17'005,2 10 habitantes 108);
Souce:Preideciade la Repuiblica,
Perui98,2(Lima: Presidenciade la Republica,1982)

54 WORLD POLITICS
sionofthetopSenderista leadershipbymid-i983,theguerrillas became

more active-not only in Huancavelica,but in otherareas as well,
intheeasternAndeanfoothills
especially borderingon thejungle,around
the townTingo Maria and the Huallaga Riverin the departments of
San Martinand Huainuco.
How manyof thepeasantsin theEmergency Zone actuallysupport
Sendero?Certainly, notall. As MarioVargasLlosa has pointedout,for
instance,some twentyvillagesin the highestaltitudesof Ayacucho,
inhabitedby a distinctethnicgroupcalled the Iquichanos,have been
hostiletowardthe Senderistas.'6 Their significanceshouldnot be ex-
aggerated,however.Theyare estimated to numberabout20,000 people
outofa populationof503,392 fortheAyacuchodepartment as a whole.'7
Moreover,theparticular configuration of high-altitudecommunities in
oppositionto lowlandscommunities thatVargasLlosa describesis rare.
Mosthighlandscommunities span theentiregamutof ecologicalzones
and takeadvantageoftheproduction at different
possibilities altitudes.'8
In the onlywidelyrespectedstudyof agrarianstructure in Ayacucho
in recentdecades,David ScottPalmerdescribespeasantcommunities
thatfitthiscommonpattern.'s Palmerdepictsconflict amongtheAya-
cuchopeasantcommunities, butdoes notmentiontheIquichanos.
The evidenceavailablefroma varietyof sourcessuggestssubstantial
backingforSenderoamonglargemajoritiesof Ayacuchocitizens.In-
terviewdata havebeenindicative. For example,in mid-i982in thecity
of Ayacucho,Raul Gonzalez asked"all thosewho wantedto converse"
whetheror not theythoughtSenderowas a peasantmovement,and
whetheror not it countedon supportfromthe population;according
to Gonzalez, the responsewas virtually unanimous:"It's a movement
supported bytheyoungest peasants.The olderonesare resignedto their
lot,buttheydo backtheirkids."20In my own discussionsin Huancayo
in early i983, I posed the question to severalpeasant leaders and officials
who were knowledgeableabout the situationin the southernhighlands;
they also replied that substantialmajorities were supportive.2I More
,6 Vargas Llosa (fn. 8), 33, 36, 37.
I7Ibid., 33; Presidenciade la Republica,Peru 1982 (Lima: Presidenciade la Republica,
i982), 523.
,8 This is a virtual axiom in the anthropologicalliteratureon highlands Peru. See, for
example,JohnMurra,FormacionesEcono'micas y Politicasdel MundoAndino[Economic and
politicalstructuresof the Andean world] (Lima: Institutode Estudios Peruanos, I975).
19David Scott Palmer, "Revolution fromAbove":MilitaryGovernment and Popular Partic-
ipationin Peru, 1968-1982, Cornell UniversityLatin AmericanStudiesProgramDissertation
Series,No. 47 (JanuaryI973), see esp. i96-203 and 2i6-28.
20 Gonzalez, "Por los Caminos de Sendero" [Following the paths of Sendero] QueHacer,
No. i9 (October I982), 47.

One of the interviewees,a supporterof the Acci6n Popular partyin i980, had worked
21

recently,an Ayacucho police chief estimated that "8o percent of the

townspeople of Ayacucho sympathizewith Sendero."22
The behavior of Ayacucho citizens suggests widespread support.23
Sendero has called a considerablenumber of strikesin the region, and
they have almost invariablybeen successful.For the funeral of Edith
Lagos (a young Senderistacommanderwho died in mid-i982 in a battle
with police) an estimated30,000 people turnedout-more than forany
otherevent in Ayacucho in years.Handcarved statuettesof Lagos have
sold brisklyin the Ayacucho market.
The poor recordof thegovernment'sintelligencepersonnelis another
indicationof supportforSendero.24The identitiesof manyof the leaders
are still unknown. The whereabouts of leader Guzman are a total
mystery.The securityforceshave arrestedonly one major leader, An-
tonio Diaz Martinez,reportedlynumberthreein Sendero. The primary
factorin thegovernment'sintelligencefailureis likelyto be the peasants'
readiness to protectSenderistas.
Electoraldata in thearea attestto politicalbackingforSendero. Tables
i and 2 compare electoralpatternsin the two primaryEmergencyZone
departments,Ayacucho and Huancavelica, to thosein otherareas. Table
i shows the large Marxist vote throughoutthe southernhighlands; in
1980, the Marxist vote was greater in Ayacucho than in any other
departmentof the countryexcept for two tinymining departmentson
the southernborder.25Table i also shows the inordinatelyhigh rate of
null and blank votingin the EmergencyZone departments,while Table
2 indicatesthe high rateof abstentionin thesezones. The extraordinarily
large null and blank vote may be the bestevidence of Sendero influence
in the region; some citizens may abstain out of fear of retaliationby
Sendero.26
Table 3 shows the resultsof the November i983 municipal elections
in the Ayacucho province of Huamanga. (Elections were not held in
otherprovinces.)The table indicatesmassive disaffectionfromthe elec-
forseveral yearsin Sendero-controlledterritory.

22 The AndeanReport(fn. I4), Vol. IO.
23 Raul Gonzalez, "Las Batallas de Ayacucho" [The battlesof Ayacucho] QueHacer, No.
2I (Februaryi983), I9; Harding (fn. 8), 49; The AndeanReport(fn. I4); and, on the subject
of Edith Lagos's funeral,JonathanCavanagh, "Peru's Army Arrivesin Guerrilla Area,"
Wall StreetJournal,January4, I983.
24A good overviewis in Latin AmericaWeekly Report(WR-84-o2),JanuaryI3, i984, pp.
IO-I I.
25 FernandoTuesta Soldevilla,EleccionesMunicipales:Cifrasy EscenarioPolitico[Municipal
elections:statisticsand politicalcontext](Lima: DESCO, i983), I7I-76. See also Presidencia
de la Republica,Peru 1981 (Lima: Presidenciade la Republica, i98i), ioo-i i8.
26 DESCO, ResumenSemanal 6, November 4-II, i983, p. 5.

56 WORLD POLITICS
TABLE I
THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS VOTE, 1978 AND I98o
(percentages)
Null and Null and
MarxistVote MarxistVote BlankVote BlankVote
I978a May I980a I978b May I980b
EmergencyZone
Departments
Ayacucho 37 27 32 42
Huancavelica 39 22 30 42
OtherSouthern
Highlands
Apurimac 31 13 28 37
Cuzco 39 18 22 30
Puno 41 24 22 26
OtherHighlands
Cajamarca 20 11 28 27
Junin 35 20 16 26
Pasco 53 20 20 22
Nationwide 29 18 16 27
aAs a percentage ofthevalidvote.The I978 electionwas fortheConstituent Assembly;
thei980 electionswerefornationaloffices.
b As a percentage ofall votes.
Sources:For theMarxistvote,FernandoTuestaSoldevilla, EleccionesMunicipales:Cifras
y EscenarioPolitico (Lima: DESCO, i983), I59-70. In i980, "Marxist"partieswerePRT,
UNIR, U1, UDP, and FOCEP; in I978, theywereUDP, PC, PSR and FOCEP. The i980
talliesare forChamberofDeputies,notthePresidency. Other"left"partiesalsocompeted,
butwerenotunequivocally Marxist.
For thenulland blankvotein 1978, EnriqueBernales, CrisisPolitica:SolucionElectoral?
(Lima: DESCO, i980), 90-96; forthenulland blankvotein May i980, Presidenciade la
Republica,Peru 1981 (Lima: Presidenciade la Republica,i98i), IOI-7.
toral processin Huamanga. Of an estimatedII 5,000 people in the prov-

ince, only I3,059, or about I I percent,cast valid votes.27The triumphant
party,PADIN, faredless well than the nulls and the blanks. Moreover,
a vote for PADIN, a party that ran only in Ayacucho and promised
amnestyfor the guerrillas,cannot be considered an explicitlyanti-Sen-
dero vote. (There was no new law-and-orderrightistpartyin Ayacucho
or any other highlands region.)
Although the above data demonstrateconsiderable support for Sen-
dero, some aspects of the recent picture are blurred. Especially after
JanuaryI983, when counterinsurgency operationsbegan in earnestand
27Calculated fromGonzilez (fn. 20), 62; and fromQueHacer, No. 27 (February i984),
34-

TABLE 2
ABSTENTION RATES, 1978 AND I983
(percentageof registeredvoters)
I978 May November November
(for i980 i980 1983
Constituent (National (Municipal (Municipal
Assembly) Elections) Elections) Elections)
Emergency Zone
Departments
Ayacucho 22 27 49 Above 50a
Huancavelica 25 26 48 N.A.
Other Southern
Highlands
Apurimac 26 31 42 N.A.
Cuzco 21 22 41 N.A.
Puno 17 19 35 N.A.
Other Highlands
Cajamarca 28 27 40 N.A.
Junin 19 19 38 N.A.
Pasco 21 25 28 N.A.
Nationwide 16 19 30 38
aFor the provinceof Huamanga only.
Sources:For I978, Mayi980, andNovember
i980, FernandoTuestaSoldevilla,Elecciones
Municipales: Cifrasy EscenarioPolitico (Lima: DESCO, i983), 6i. Abstentionfigurefor
Ayacucho(provinceof Huamanga), fromQueHacer,No. 27 (Februaryi984), 33. Nationwide
figurefromCaretas,No. 789, March5, i984 p. I9.
TABLE 3
THE VOTE IN THE AYACUCHO PROVINCE OF HUAMANGA, NOVEMBER I983
(percentages)
Accion
Abstentiona Null-and-Blank PADIN APRA Popular
Above 50% 56 19 14 11
a Abstentionrate is a percentageof registeredvoters; all other figuresare per-
centagesof total vote.
Source:QueHacer, No. 27 (Februaryi984), 34.
journalists were virtuallybarred from the Ayacucho countryside,the

peasants' attitudescould not be thoroughlyexplored. As we shall see,
it is possible that Sendero's behaviorat this time alienated some sectors
of the peasantry;it is even more possible that the military'sbehavior
did so.

58 WORLD POLITICS
III. THE SUBSISTENCE THREAT IN PERU'S SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS
All scholars of revolutionagree that povertyis a factorin peasant

protestmovements.However, thereare considerabledifferencesin the
emphasis theygive to this variable.
JamesScott has focused most intensivelyon subsistencecrises as the
root elementsin revolutionarymovements.28 Brieflystated,Scott argues
that the peasants' guiding moral principle,the standard by which they
accept or reject the actions of landlords and governmentofficials,is
subsistence.They will considerrebellionwhen theyjudge theirrightto
subsistenceto be seriouslythreatened.
More recently,scholarsof revolutionhave de-emphasized the signif-
icance of povertyand the threatto subsistence.In The Rational Peasant,
Samuel Popkin reviewsScott'sevidence and concludes that"thereis no
clear relationshipbetween subsistencethreat(or decline) and collective
response."29 He argues that a peasant family'sinterpretationof a sub-
sistencecrisischanges as the social and politicalcontextchanges. Theda
Skocpol's view is similar. Like Popkin, she believes that less emphasis
should be given to the socioeconomic circumstancesof the peasants
themselvesand more to the political world around them. She suggests
that "grievances" are more or less a constantof peasant life, and that
even when a group of peasants is unusuallydeprived,theirdeprivation
will be subjectiveand impossibleto document empirically.30
The Peruvian experience provides considerable evidence in support
of Scott's argument.I believe that the data below demonstratean ob-
jective threat to peasant subsistencein Peru probably more serious
than at any time in the twentiethcentury as well as the peasantry's
subjective perceptionof a crisis.Although the correlationbetween the
regions of subsistencecrisis and of peasant protestis not perfect,it is
good.
In most Latin American countries,the socioeconomic gap between
the middle classes and the poor has widened in the last decade, but the
livingstandardof the poor has not declined.3PIn almost all Latin Amer-
ican countries,food consumptionper capita increasedduring the I970s;
the only apparent exceptionswere Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.32
28 Scott (fn. i), esp. I3-26.

29 Popkin (fn. I), 245-
3? Skocpol (fri. I), I IS.
3' See David Felix, "Income Distributionand the Quality of Life in Latin America:
Patterns,Trends,and PolicyImplications,"LatinAmericanResearchReview i8 (No. 2, i983),
3-33.
32World Bank, WorldTables, Vol. I (3d ed.) (Baltimore:The JohnsHopkins University
Press, i983), 552. Data compare food consumptionper capita in i967 and ig80.

Table 4 shows the differencesin the living standard of the southern
highlands and otherareas of the country.As the table indicates,Peru's
southernhighlandsare a regionin a Third-Worldcountrywhere poverty
is at Fourth-World levels. People in the southernhighlands earn little,
die young, are mostlyilliterate,and usually exist withoutbasic human
services.Throughout the southernhighlands,peasant incomesare much
lower than on the coast, and somewhat lower than in the northern
highlands (Cajamarca) or the centralhighlands (Junfnand Pasco).33(In
Cajamarca, where the altitude is lower, the land is more fertile;it is
possible,forexample, to graze a considerablenumber of cows, and the
area is a dairycenter.In Pasco and Junfn, miningand commerceprovide
economic advantages.)
The southernhighlands area is almost exclusivelyargricultural-in
an area ill-suitedto agriculture.Most of the terrainis arid, stony,pre-
cipitous,and windswept. Altitudesoftensurpass I2,000 feet.The land
provides some meager pasture forlivestock,and the peasants can grow
potatoes, but little else. This is the case for all the provinces of the
department; living standards vary little,although Parinachochas, the
southernmostprovince (and the only one that is not now in the Emer-
gency Zone), seems slightlybetteroffthan the other rural provinces.34
Not only are southernhighlands peasants poor relativeto other Pe-
ruvians,but theyhave become poorer in recentyearsthan theywere in
the I950S and i960s. The available evidence,unfortunately rarelybroken
down by department,is reportedin Table 5. The drop in per capita
income is especiallydramatic.Highlands farmincomesare now probably
below $5o a year per capita.35
There is no doubt thatfood consumptionfellin the highlandsduring
the I970s. Table 5 indicates the World Bank estimatesof the decline.
In i980, familiesin the centralsierraconsumed 92 percentof the daily
calorierequirementsspecifiedbytheFAO, while familiesin thenorthern
highlands consumed only 72 percent.36 As the southernhighlands area
33 Geographicaldisparities in incomeare clearlydescribedin Webb (fn.I5), I19-29. Among

the fivesouthernhighlandsdepartments,i96i per capita residentfarmincomes were uni-
formlylow: between3,000 soles and 4,000 soles annuallyin Puno, Huancavelica, Ayacucho,
and Cuzco, risingto 5,800 soles onlyin Apurimac.The correspondingfigureforCajamarca
is 6,400 soles, for Pasco I0,500 soles, and for Junin7,500 soles. More recentdata are not
available.
34 Webb (fn. I5), I38; Carlos Amat y Le6n, La Desigualdad Interioren el Peru [The
inequalitywithinPeru] (Lima: Universidaddel Pacifico,i98i), Appendix.
35 Estimate based on trendsreportedin Table 5, and dollar figuresgiven by JoseMaria
Caballero, Economia Agrariade la SierraPeruana [The agriculturaleconomyof highlands
Peru] (Lima: Institutode Estudios Peruanos, i98i), I07-8.
36 See World Bank, Peru: Major Development PolicyIssuesand Recommendations (Wash-
ington,D.C.: World Bank, I98I), 35.

TABLE 4
REGIONAL INEQUALITIES
Annual
FarmIncome Life
Per Capita Expectancy Adult Without
(thousandsof (Years Illiteracy PotableWate
soles) at Birth) (percentage) (percentage
(i961) (I972) (1972) (1972)
Southern Highlandsa 3.8 44 53 93
Ayacucho 3.3 45 55 93
Northern and Central
Highlandsb 8.1 50 32 86
Coastc 11.2 54 17 67
Lima 30.2 57 6 44
Fourth Worldd N.A. 44 86 91
aAverages forthe fivepoorestsouthernhighlandsdepartments:Ayacucho,
Huancavelica, Cuz
bAverages for the threeexclusivelyhighlandsdepartments:Junin,Pasco, and Cajamarca.
c Averages forthe fivemain coastal departments:Piura,
Lambayeque, La Libertad,Lima, and
dAverages for Mali and Nepal. Figures forotherlow-incomeAsian and Africannations
are s
54.
Figure is for "northernhighlands"only. Exact area is unspecified.
Sources: Farm income per capita fromWebb (fn. I5), 19-29; life expectancy,adult illiterac
Leon (fn. 34), Appendices; populationper physicianfromPresidenciade la Repdblica (fn.
I7), 5
(fn. 36),35-

TABLE 5
VARIOUS INDICATORS OF THE INCREASE IN POVERTY IN THE HIGHLANDS
Per CapitaIncome
as compared to
PopulationDensity I972 = JOOc Per Capita Calorie
per square kilometer (Highlands Consumptiond
(Ayacucho) Farm Families) (Rural Sierra)
1940 8.1a N.A. N.A.
1950 N.A. 106 N.A.
1961 9.3a 106 N.A.
1972 10.3b 100 2,085
1980 12.1b 82 1,971
Sources:a Larsonand Bergman(fn.6i), 301, 334.
b Presidencia de la Repiblica (fn. 25), 463.
c My calculations,forlower-incomeamong highlandsfarmfamilies,fromWebb
(fn. I5), 39, Caballero (fn. 35), 207-8, and World Bank (fn. 36), I55.
d World Bank (fn. 36), 140.
is generallyworse off than the northernhighlands,we may inferthat

calorie intake in the southernhighlands was below 70 percentof daily
requirements.In a studymade by the Peruvian government,daily per
capita intake among lower-class people throughoutthe country was
found to have plummetedfrom1,934 caloriesper capita in I972 to 1,486
in 1979 (a mere 63 percentof FAO requirements).37 Most disturbingof
all are some officialdata for particularlypoor zones in the southern
highlands.As of roughlyi980, individualsin thesezones were apparently
consumingas littleas 420 calories a day.38
The World Bank characterizedthe nutritionalsituation in i980 as
"bad."39By i983, a year in which the Sendero movementgrew consid-
erably, it was even worse. As in a number of the Southeast Asian
subsistencecrisesdescribedbyScott,minimalsubsistenceconditionswere
reduced furtherby natural disasters.Warm ocean currents(El Niflo)
broughtfloodsto Peru's northerncoast and droughtto Peru's southern
highlands.The southeasternhighlandsdepartmentof Puno was the one
mostdevastatedbythedrought;almostall thesouthernhighlandsregion,
however, including Ayacucho, was seriouslyaffected.40 In the country
as a whole, officialsestimatedthat in i983 agriculturalproduction fell
37 JorgeFernindez Baca, "La Producci6nde Alimentosen el Peru" [Food productionin

Peru] QueHacer, No. I7 (June i982), 89-go.
38 Gonzalez (fn. 20), 43. Exact sourcesand names of zones are not given.
39World Bank (fn. 36), 35.
4?See Andean Focus (a publicationof the Ecumenical Committeeon the Andes), No. 2
(November-Decemberi983), and Latin AmericaWeeklyReport(WR-83-23),August26, i983,
P. 9.

62 WORLD POLITICS
by I5 percent,and potatoproductionby almost 20 percent;in the south-

ern highlands,potatoproductioncan be estimatedto have fallenbetween
40 and 50 percent.4'
The Ecumenical Committeeon the Andes described the situationin
the followingterms:
In thesouthernAndes,severedroughtcompletely destroyed theharvest,
forcingpeasantstoconsumesurplusseedintendedforthisyear'splanting.
Starvationis rampantamongsubsistence farmers; tu-
illness,particularly
has spreadalarmingly.
berculosis, The priceof basicfoodstuffsrosedra-
maticallyin regionaland nationalmarkets,affecting the urban poor.
Unemployment increasedin the agricultural
sector(subsistencefarmers
workas paid laborersat harvesttime),forcinghundredsof
traditionally
thousandsto migrateto thecities,as manyas 8,oooa day at one point.
News reports documented casesofpeasantssellingtheirchildrenfor$25.42
Even prior to the natural disasterof i983, peasants were perceiving
a crisis. In Varya, a peasant communityin Huancavelica (a site of my
longstandingresearch),84 percentof 25 respondentssaid in i980 that
the community'sprogressin recentyearshad been "bad."43Varya peas-
ants were also asked, "What have been the achievementsin your com-
munityin recentyears?" Despite the optimisticphraseology,92 percent
of the respondentsreplied,"none."
In early i984, Varya was alleged to be a pro-Senderistacommunity
and was occupied bythesecurityforces.The pessimismofVarya peasants
as well as their possible pro-Senderistasympathyis in contrastto the
more positive views and non-Senderistainclinationsin two other sites
where I asked the same questionsin i980 (one a coastal cooperativeand
the other a prosperous central highlands peasant community).Of 55
respondentsin these areas, only 7 percentsaid that progresshad been
"bad."
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD AGRICULTURE, I968-I982
When southernhighlandspeasantsbegan to realize the threatto their

subsistence,many blamed the governmentfor their plight. Past and
presentgovernmentshave indeed been,at best,obliviousto the problems
4 Latin AmericaWeeklyReport(WR-84-o2), January13, i984, iI; Latin AmericaWeekly

Report(fn. 40); and Latin AmericanRegionalReports,Andean Group (RA-84-o2), March 2,
I 984, 6.
4-AndeanFocus (fn. 40), i. See also Raul Gonzalez, "Desastres!" [Disasters!] QueHacer,
No. 22 (May I983), I8-47-
43 This was an informal,nonrandomapplication,primarilyto men,ofa briefquestionnaire.
For furtherinformationon the nature of these surveysand a descriptionof Varya, see
McClintock (fn. 5), 102-5.

in the southernhighlands.The biases of government policiesto be
described here afflict
virtuallythe entire
highlands region,butthesouth-
ern highlandsarea has been mostaffected, primarily because of the
inferior qualityof itsterrainand itsrelativelack of alternativesources
of income.
The successivegovernments do not,however,bear the sole respon-
sibilityforthe problemsof highlandsagriculture in Peru. The origins
lie in partwithfactorsbeyondthegovernments'
of thedifficulties pur-
view. One such factoris populationgrowth.As bothJackGoldstone
and Eric Wolf have pointedout,demographic growthhas frequently
with
beencorrelated popularprotest.44 That is thecasein Peru:although
overallpopulationgrowthrateshavenotbeenhigherthanin manyother
Latin Americancountries, the demographicpressureon the land has
been more severe.As Table 5 shows,populationdensityin Ayacucho
has increasedby over25 percentsincei96i, and by almost50 percent
since1940. As a result,land is veryscarcein Ayacucho,as it is in other
partsof the highlandsand in Peru as a whole: withonlyone-fifth of
an arablehectareper capita,land is scarcerin Peru thanin any Latin
AmericancountryexceptEl Salvador.45
A secondunderlying factoris theexhaustionof theland,especially
on the hillsides where most peasants live.46(The early Spanish settlers
pushedtheIndianpeoplesout of themorefertilevalleyland.) If steep
lands are not carefullyterracedand cultivated,theyerode. Erosion,
whichhas beena seriousproblemin Perufordecades,has becomeeven
moreprevalentas the socialfabricof peasant-community lifehas un-
raveled,and thesoil-management ofthecommunity
responsibilities have
beenneglected.
If populationincreaseswhile the soil deteriorates,
food production
per capita can be expectedto decline.This is the case in Peru. The
outputofhighlandsfoodstaples,suchas potatoesand corn,has dropped
For example, annual per capita potato productionplum-
precipitously.47
meted from i6i kilograms during 1951-I955 to I kilograms during
197I-1977.
44Wolf (fn. I), 28i; Goldstone (fn. 2), 453.

45Daniel Martinezand ArmandoTealdo, ElAgro PeruanoI970-1g80: Analisisy Perspectivas
[Peruvian agriculture I970-i980: Analysis and perspectives](Lima: CEDEP, i982), 39.
Comprehensivefigureson hectaresper capita by departmentare not available. The partial
data in Caballero (fn. 35, pp. 67 and II7) suggestthat the number of hectaresper capita
does not varya great deal across Peru's highlandsdepartments.
46 For more details,see Caballero (fn. 35), 59-9I.
47 JoseMaria Caballero,Agricultura, ReformaAgraria,y Pobreza Campesina[Agriculture,
agrarian reform,and peasant poverty](Lima: Institutode Estudios Peruanos, i980), 29;
Organizationof AmericanStates,Short-Term EconomicReports:Vol. VII, 1981, Peru (Wash-
ington,DC: OAS), 54. Unfortunately, data are not available by region.

64 WORLD POLITICS
in thePeruvianhighlandscan be alle-
The problemsof agriculture
viated by favorable governmentpolicies. Between i968 and i980, the
militaryregimes,firstunder General Velasco Alvarado (i968-I975) and
then under General Morales Bermudez (I975-i980), set down agricul-
turalpolicies.Some of these,especiallyagrarianreform,were advan-
tageousto thepeasantry on the coast,but generallynot to thatin the
highlands.UnderthecivilianregimeofFernandoBelaundeTerry,elected
in i980, key agricultural
policies-land tenureand termsof trade-
turnedagainstthe peasantryaltogether, bothon the coastand in the
highlands.No government has allocatedsubstantial
publicinvestment
to theprojectsfavoredbyagronomists forthesouthernhighlands.
A. AGRARIAN REFORM
Land has beenan explosiveissuein Peru forcenturies. It has always

been both scarceand unequallydistributed-moreso than in many
Latin Americancountries.48 By some estimates, a mere280 families-
lessthanone-tenth ofone percentofall farmfamilies-ownedbetween
I5 and 30 percent of all land in Peru as of the I950S and earlyi96os
(well overhalfof thecountry's bestarablesoil).49
The Velasco government transformed land tenurein Peru. Large
landowners(hacendados) weredrivenfromthecountryside. Mostoftheir
estates(haciendas)remainedintact, butwererunas cooperatives. Bymost
Peru'sagrarianreform
criteria, of the1970S ranked,withtheexception
of Cuba's, as themostsweepingin Latin America(see Table 6). Still,
onlyaboutone-quarter to one-third ofall farmfamiliesbenefited from
thereform materially.Moreover, sometypesoffarmers benefited a great
deal, and othersonlya little.50
The "bigwinners"werethe120,000-odd ex-hacienda workers, almost
all of whombecamemembersof thenew cooperative enterprises. This
groupcomprisedaboutone-thirdof all reformbeneficiaries, but only
one-tenth of all farmfamilies.The averagevalueof theproperty trans-
ferredto each memberwas approximately 75,000 soles (about$i,900).
In the new cooperatives, livingstandardsimproved,sometimesdra-
48 On land scarcity,see Martinez and Tealdo (fn. 45), 39. In 1961, Peru's Gini index of
land distributionwas the most unequal of any reportedin Charles L. Taylor and Michael
C. Hudson, WorldHandbookof Politicaland Social Indicators(New Haven: Yale University
Press, I972), 267-
49Martinez and Tealdo (fn. 45), I5-i6.
50 Data on the numberof beneficiaries by productionmode and by regionare fromJose
Matos Mar and Jose Manuel Mejia, ReformaAgraria:Logrosy Contradicciones 1969-1979
[Agrarianreform:Achievementsand contradictionsi969-i979] (Lima: Institutode Estudios
Peruanos, i980), 67. Data on land values are providedin JoseMaria Caballero and Elena
Alvarez, AspectosCuantitativos de la ReformaAgraria(1969-1979) [Quantitativeaspects of
the agrarian reform(i969-i979)](Lima: Institutode Estudios Peruanos, i980), 63.

TABLE 6
IMPACT OF VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN AGRARIAN
Arelarge,lucrative Percentageof
tracts
stillownedby Numberof agricultural land Nu
well-capitalized hectares in reformed fa
individuals? expropriated sector be
Peru, 1979 No 8,599,253 35 3
Chile,through
May 1973 Yes 9,517,000 36
Mexico Yes 44,500,000 36 1,
Bolivia,1969a Yes 9,740,681 30 2
Cuba, 1966 No 5,513,700 60 4
aIn contrastto the othercountries,figuresinclude colonization.
Sources: McClintock (fn. 5),
6i and 359, updated with data forPeru fromMatos M
and Tealdo (fn. 45), 20-24; for Chile, World Bank, Land Reformin Latin America:Bo
World Bank StaffWorking Paper No. 275 (April I978), 20-24 and Appendix A, 6. T
amount of arable land in Peru are reporteddistinctively
and are essentiallyunknown,

66 WORLD POLITICS
matically.5PNew schools,new communitycenters,new sportsstadiums,

and new health facilitieswere constructed.Members were no longer
concerned with subsistence,but with secondary-schooleducation for
theirchildrenin the provincialcapital. Agriculturalproductiondid not
decline in the cooperatives.52
Most of the reform'sbeneficiariesdid not become members of co-
operatives; they gained much less from the reform.About one-third
were familiesin "peasant communities"(traditionalhighlands villages,
oftenextantsince the era of the Incas); anotherthirdwere independent
peasantswith small parcelsof land. There were gains: additional pasture
lands, more secure land titles,and, for some three or four hundred
peasant communities,membershipin a complex new enterprisecalled
the SAIS. Overall, however, the material benefitswere small. The av-
erage value of the propertytransferred to peasant communitieswas only
2,000 soles per beneficiary-a mere $50.
Reformbenefitsvaried not only by tenuremode, but also by region.
Coastal familiesgained much more than highland families.Although
the number of beneficiariesin coastal departmentswas similar to the
number in highlandsdepartments,the value of the propertytransferred
to familieswas much smallerin thehighlands(see Table 7). In Ayacucho,
the least-benefitedagrarian zone, 30,000 to 35,ooo familiesgained prop-
TABLE 7
AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFITS BY REGION
COAST HIGHLANDS
ValueperFamily ValueperFamily
AgrarianZonea (So/es)b AgrarianZonea (So/es)b
Lima 162,288 Ayacucho 4,900
Ica 108,580 Cuzco 10,074
Lambayeque 105,317 Huancayo 22,116
Trujillo 53,383 Puno 62,171
Piura 41,231
"Agrarian Zone" is not identicalto "department."AgrarianZones were designatedfor
the applicationof the reform.As a result,data forCajamarca, Pasco, and otherdepartments
are not available.
b The exchange rate was roughly40 soles to the dollar throughI975.
Sources: Ministryof Agriculture(fn. 53), Table i. Calculation divides indemnitiesfor
expropriation(cash plus bonds) by numberof familiesreceivingland, in all structuralmodes
(i.e., cooperativesand "groups,"and peasant communities).
5 See McClintock (fn. 5).

52Cynthia McClintock,"Domestic ReformPolicies and AgriculturalDevelopment," in
F. La Mond Tullis and W. Ladd Hollist,eds.,International
PoliticalEconomyofAgriculture,
(forthcoming, Universityof Nebraska Press).

erty,a numbercomparableto otheragrarianzones,butthevalueof the

property was a mere4,900 solesperfamily(under$I50).53
Why these disparities? The primary reason may be found in the
objectivelimitsto reformstrategiesimposed on the Velasco government
by the dualistic structureof Peruvian agriculture.Most of Peru's agri-
culturalincome and almost all its agriculturalexportsare generated by
the large crop estates on Peru's coast and, to a lesser extent,by the
massive livestockestatesin a few partsof the highlands. If the govern-
menthad dismantledtheseenterprisesand triedto distributetheselands
equally, politicaland economic chaos would have been the likelyresult,
at least in the shortrun.
The currentBelautndeadministrationis opposed to the changes in
land tenureimplementedunder the militarygovernments.The civilian
governmenthas called forprivatepropertyin agriculture,and has begun
to pressure the cooperativesto subdivide the land among their mem-
bers.54To this end, it has used various strategies,such as new legal
regulations,credit restrictions,
dilatorypaymentsby public and private
companies,and extremelyadverse termsof trade foragriculture.These
pressures have weighed heavily upon the cooperativesand, although
members have been reluctant-fearing that they lacked capital and
expertise-as many as half the cooperativessubdivided by late I983.55
Their fearsare realistic;for most, the futurelooks bleak.
B. TERMS OF TRADE
The termsof tradebetweenthecountrysideand thecityare of concern

not only to Peru's "modern" coastal farmers,but also to the great ma-
jorityof highlands peasants. Only a tinypercentageof peasant villages
remains unaffectedby the market economy. By the early I970s, the
overwhelmingmajorityof peasant communities,however remote,mar-
keted at least 25 percentof theircrops and at least 65 percentof their
livestock and dairy products.56As more and more young men were
compelled by economic necessityto migrate to the coast or the upper
53On the numberof beneficiaries in the zone, see Ministryof Agriculture,Estadisticade

la ReformaAgraria(a 31 de Marzo de 1977) [Statisticson the agrarianreform(up to March
3I, I977)] (Lima: Direcci6nGeneral de ReformaAgrariay AsentamientoRural, 1977), Table
3-
54Agrarian Bank and Ministryof Agricultureofficialsin Lima and Trujillo were very
open on these scores in my interviewswith them in January-February i983. See also the
textof the new governmentlaws, especiallythe Ley de Promoci6ny Desarrollo Agrario.
5 Data on subdivisionhave not yetbeen compiled.This estimateis based on discussions
in both the countrysideand Ministryof Agricultureoffices,Februaryand Julyi983, and
on figuresin El Comercio(December i6, i983).
56 Caballero (fn. 35), 228.

68 WORLD POLITICS
junglefortemporary jobs,theirwagescameto represent approximately

25 to 35 percentof theincomeof thehighlandpeasants.5?
The termsof tradeweregenerallyfavorableto thepeasantry under
themilitary government and especiallyunderGeneralVelasco,butthey
have deterioratedmarkedlyunderthecivilianadministration. On-farm
pricesforagricultural goods have fallen,the cost of key agricultural
inputshas risen,and credithas becomescarce.
Table 8 showsthe dramaticchangein agricultural pricepolicyfor
Peru'sfarmers thattookplacebetweenthe I970sand i98os.Underthe
militarygovernments of the 197os, the on-farmpricesformostagri-
culturalproductsroseat ratesthatwereabovetheconsumerpriceindex
(CPI). In i98i and I982, however,on-farmpricesincreasedmuchless
thanthe consumerpriceindex.The priceof thekeyhighlandsstaple,
thepotato,faredespeciallybadlyundertheBelatunde government. The
currentpricesare rock-bottom ones; despitethe relativelygood price
increasesforfarmers1 in the 970s, Peru's producerpriceswere about
IO to 40 percentlowerthanworldmarketpricesformanyitemseven
in I980.58
It is curiousindeedthatthe Belautnde
governmenthas maintained
statecontrolofon-farmpricesforagricultural
productsand keptprices
TABLE 8
ON-FARM PRICES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 1971-I982
I97I-I975 I976-I979 1980 198i-I982
Increasein Consumer
PriceIndex (CPI) 63b 199 59 146
Averageincreasein
on-farmpricesfor
nine keyagricultural
productsa 120 236 53 81
Did on-farmprices
increasemoreor
less thanthe CPI? Much more More Slightlyless Much less
Productsare: potatoes,
a sugarcane,hardcorn,sorghum,
rice,wheat,beans,cotton, and
soya.Data forsugarcaneduringi98i-I982 are notavailable,butfigures
fromUSDA (fn.
62), 36, forwhitesugarsuggest minimalincrease.
bSee McClintock (fn. 5), 357.
Sources:Statistical
Office,
Ministry forproductprices.Consumerprice
of Agriculture,
index data for I973-i980 fromWorld Bank (fn.36), frontmatter;for i98i and i982 from
BusinessLatin America,June2, i982 and March i6, i983.
57Ibid.,229.
58 World Bank (fn. 36), 53.

so low. First,price controlcontradictsthe government'sprofessedcom-
mitmentto the freemarket.Second, theusual justificationforartificially
loweringthe pricesof agriculturalproductsdoes not apply; low on-farm
prices have not translatedinto low consumer prices. On the contrary,
food prices have skyrocketedin real terms.59
Fertilizerpolicyand creditpolicyare two otherterms-of-trade policies
thathave affectedPeru's peasantryadverselyin recentyears-especially
the more modern coastal farmerswho are most likely to use fertilizer
and credit,but also approximatelyio percentof highlandsfarmers.6? In
the earlyand mid-I970s, fertilizerpriceswere low and various measures
were taken to facilitatethe use of fertilizer;prices began to rise by the
late I970s, and in I982 theywere increasingat almost twice the rate of
inflation.Trends have been similarin the cost and availabilityof credit.
Real credit availabilityincreased until I975 and then declined, with a
record fall of I5 percent in I982. In real terms, interestrates have
generallybeen low, but in the early i980s the peasantryperceived them
as being high because of the low price levels for agriculturalproducts.
Throughout these years,only meager amounts of credit have been al-
located to the highlands,and especiallylittleto Ayacucho.6'
Yet another trade policy that has hurtmany Peruvian farmersis the
importliberalizationprogramof the Bela unde government.AfterI980,
tariffswere reduced on all kinds of food imports,frommeat to apples.
Although i98i was an excellent year agriculturally,total agricultural
importsincreased by approximatelyi8 percent.62
C. PUBLIC INVESTMENT
The decline in fertileterrainper capita has not gone unnoticed by

agronomists.With a surprisingdegree of consensus,agronomistsrec-
ommend thatPeru's top prioritiesforagriculturalinvestmentshould be
59Between Julyi980 and December i982, the purchasingpower of the minimum wage
fell 27% relativeto the cost of a basic foodbasketfora familyof five.See QueHacer, No.
2I (February,i983), II.
60 For furtherdiscussionand documentationof the trendsin these policies,see Cynthia
McClintock,"GovernmentPolicy,Rural Poverty,and Peasant Protestin Peru: The Origins
oftheSenderoLuminoso Rebellion,"paperpreparedfordeliveryat the i983 Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association(Chicago, Septemberi983), Tables 5-6. The
figurefor the percentageof highlandsfarmersaffectedby these policies is fromMartinez
and Tealdo (fn. 45), I04.
Ayacucho is the home of 5.3% of the rural population,accordingto Magli S. Larson
6,
and Arlene G. Bergman,Social Stratification in Peru (Berkeley: Instituteof International
Studies, Universityof California,i969), 303. Yet, Ayacucho receivedless than 2% of the
AgrarianBank's annual creditbetween I975 and i982, accordingto the Bank's own data-
and only I.I% in 198I-I982.
62 USDA (United States Departmentof Agriculture),Attache'Report(Lima: Report No.
PE-30IO, I983), 34-

70 WORLD POLITICS
therehabilitationof salinecoastallandsand theconstructionof small-
scale irrigation
systems in thehighlands.63Althoughconsiderablesums
have beenallocatedforagricultural investment,
theseprojectshave un-
fortunately notbeen priorities.
Publicagriculturalinvestmentincreased duringtheI970s,
considerably
bothin termsof real amountsand as a percentageof totalpublicin-
vestment.64For example,theincreasein realamountsbetweenthei968-
I970 biennium and the I974-I976 biennium was approximately40 per-
cent.In theearlyi98os, publicagricultural investmenttendedto level
off.
There is widespreadagreement thatfundswerenotinvestedwisely.
The military governments as wellas theBelatundegovernment allocated
at least half the totalagriculturalinvestment budgetto threehigh-
technology coastalirrigation Majes,Tinajones,and Chira-Piura.65
projects:
AlthoughMajes is especiallyexpensivein termsof thecostper family
benefited (see Table 9), almost$6oo millionhas beenspenton it-$39I
millionduringthe I970S and $i84 millionin i980 and 1981.66 Despite
theexpenditure, noteventhefirst stageoftheprojecthasbeencompleted.
Whyhas so muchmoneybeenspenton Majes and otherextravagant
irrigationsystems, and noton programssuchas Rehaticand Meristhat
are favoredbyagronomists?67 Manyofficials ofthemilitarygovernment
say thatthe purposeof Majes was not primarily but had
agricultural,
to do withnationaldefense, giventheproximity oftheprojectto Peru's
borderwithChile. Militaryofficials also pointout thatMajes did not
seem so expensiveat inception.For theirpart,Belatundegovernment
officialsmaintainthat,sinceMajes is underway,it cannotbe stopped;
contractshave been signed and expectationsraised. These expecta-
tionsare not the full story,however:international engineeringand
63 Documents fromand discussionswithemployeesof the World Bank, the United States
Departmentof Agriculture,and the Peruvian Ministryof Agriculture.

64 McClintock (fn. 6o), 6-7.
65 The available figuresare fromdifferent sourcesand may not be comparable.For I970-
I976, the figure is 72%; see Felipe M. Portocarrero,"The Peruvian Public Investment
Programme, i968-I978," Journalof Latin AmericanStudies I4 (No. 2, i982), 433-54. For
I978-i979, the figureis 5I%; see Fernando Eguren, "Politica Agraria vs. Producci6n de
Alimentos" [Agrarian politicsvs. the productionof food] QueHacer, No. 3 (March i980),
4i. For i98i, my calculation is 51%, from the data provided by the National Planning
Institute,"InformeSocioeconomico:Vol. II, Evaluacion del Programade Inversiones"[So-
cioeconomicReport: Vol. II, evaluationof the investmentprogram](Lima: National Plan-
ning Institute,i982), II. In i98i, a fourthlarge irrigationproject (Jequetepeque-Zania),
receivedclose to another io% of totalagriculturalinvestment.
66
"ProyectoMajes," a collectionof data fromthe Central ReserveBank of Peru.
67 For an incisiveanalysisof thisquestion,see The AndeanReport6 (December i980), 22I-
23. See also Michael Painter, "AgriculturalPolicy, Food Production,and Multinational

Corporationsin Peru," Latin AmericanResearchReview i8 (No. 2, i983), 208.

TABLE 9
IRRIGATION PROJECTS: COSTS AND BENEFITS
Percentageof
TotalPublic
InvestmentCostperhectarea Costperfamily
Agricultural
Allocatedto the (thousands of benefited
Projectin 1981 U.S. $) (thousands
of U.S. $)
MajeS 26 27.3 163.7
Chira-Piura 16 3.3 16.5
TinajoneS 8 2.6 10.1
RehatiCb 4.2 1.8 8.6
MeriSc 3.7 1.2 1.3
a Per hectarerehabilitatedor broughtunder cultivationforthe firsttime.
primarilyof excessivelysaline lands.
bCoastal land rehabilitation,
cSmall-scale irrigationprojectsin the highlands.
Sources: For cost data, author's calculationsfromPresidencia de la Repuiblica(fn. 25),
298. For percentageof totalpublic agriculturalinvestment,National Planning Institute(fn.
65), Vol. II, I1-I2.
constructionfirms,which are contractedfor this kind of large-scale,

capital-intensiveproject,benefithandsomelyand lobbyhard forit. Also,
grandiose schemeslike Majes are attractiveto authoritiesfortheirpork-
barrel possibilities.
While fewanalystswould argue thatequityshould be thesole criterion
in public investmentprograms,most would suggestthatit should be at
least one importantconsideration,especially with respect to such pro-
grams as health,education,and housing.Yet, equity concernshave been
minor in public investmentallocations in Peru for many years. Table
io shows that,under the two militarygovernments,Peru's fivesouthern
highlands departmentsdid not receiveshares of public investmentpro-
portionalto theirpopulation.The Belautndegovernmenthas apparently
planned to correctthis pattern.A surprisinglylarge percentageof its
allocations,43 percent,is, however,forelectricity-notthe peasants' top
priority.68
The big winner from Peru's public investmentprograms has been
the military.According to officialfigures,militaryexpendituresalmost
tripledin real termsbetween I97i and I982.69Nonofficialsources now
reportthat an astronomicalone-thirdof all expendituresis being allo-
68Presidenciade la Repiblica (fn. I7), 2i6-28.

69Data for I97I from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, WorldMilitary
Expendituresand Arms TransfersI97I-ig80 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and
DisarmamentAgency,I983), 63. Data for i982 are fromHoy (an Ecuadorean newspaper),
June22, i983), p. I2a, which cites the InternationalInstituteof Peace Studies as its source.

72 WORLD POLITICS
TABLE IO
INEQUITIES IN PUBLIC INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT, I968-I982
Percentage
of
TotalPublic
Percentage
of Investment
Percentage
of TotalPublic Planned
Population Investment,i968-8Oa for i982a
Ayacucho 3.0 0.6 1
Huancavelica 2.0 3.6 9
Apurimac 1.9 0.3 1
Cuzco 4.9 2.2 7
Puno 5.2 N.A. 3
Total Minimumof
(Five Departments) 17.0 6.7 21
Percentageof total public investmentto all departments.
Sources: Population figuresfrom Presidencia de la Republica (fn. 17), frontmatter.
Investmentfiguresfor i982 calculated fromPresidencia de la Repiblica (fn. I7), 2I5-28.
Investment figuresfori968-i980 fromQueHacer, No. i9 (Octoberi982), 6i. QueHacer's
source is the Prime Minister'sOffice,i982.
cated to the militaryin i983 and i984, in an arms-purchaseprogram

that is estimatedat an eventual total cost of almost $4 billion.70
The biases of governmentpolicies have been quite apparent to the
peasantry.Table I I shows thatin the mid-I970s theVelasco government
was generallyperceived as helping the peasantry"more or less" while
the currentBelaunde governmentis almost unanimouslycondemned as
not helping at all. My informalsurveysof the early i98os record that
peasants complained vehementlyabout the government'spolicies. For
example:
There'sno help fromthegovernment. On thecontrary,everythingcosts
more.Livinghas justbecomeimpossibleand everydayit'smoredifficult,
especiallywhenyouhave kids and dependsolelyon yourland. (Q i98i,
Patca,#13).
Here,they'vealwaysforgottenus. There'sno help.Exactlytheopposite-
thecostofeverythinghas risentoomuch,and that'snotthewayto help.
They'rekillingthepoor people.(Q i983, Marla,#I).
V. PERUVIAN AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND PEASANT REVOLT
One of the sharpestcontroversiesin the literatureon peasant revo-

lution concernsthe typeof agrarian structurethat is most conducive to
rebellion. The two central questions debated are: (I) which group is
70Latin AmericaWeeklyReport(WR-83-40), October I4, i983, pp. I-2.

TABLE II
PEASANT SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
(percentages)
Don't
Government Government know/No
Government helpsmore does not answer!
Sitea N helps or less help Other
Rachuis,1975 27 4 56 37 4
Rachuis,1981 17 0 6 94 0
Estrellaand
Maria, 1974 150 11 35 30 25
Estrellaand
Maria, 1983 40 0 0 95 5
aRachuis is a highlandspeasant communityin Junin;Estrella and Marla are two coastal
cooperatives.See McClintock (fn. 5).
Sources: For Estrella and Marla in 1974, author's random sample survey; otherwise,
nonrandominformalquestionnaires.See McClintock(fn. 5), 85-93.
more disposed to insurrection-landless rural wage earners or peasant

smallholders,and (2) whetherthepeasantswhose livesare mostdisrupted
by the intrusionof capitalismare the most inclined to rebel. In general,
Jeffery Paige has taken one side in the argument,JamesScott and Eric
Wolf the other; Theda Skocpol has suggested that the entire issue is
almost irrelevant.7'
Paige perceiveslandless rural wage earners as most likely to be rev-
olutionaries.He argues that hired laborers,working on farms under
more-or-lessuniformcontracts,are able to make common cause against
landlords. Moreover, they risk no significantassets in a rebellion. In
contrast,peasant smallholdersare wracked by conflictamong themselves
over land and water rights,and cannot unite. They are averse to risks
to theirproperty,and many are dependent upon large landowners for
marketingor other services.
Scott and Wolf take the opposite view. Scott maintains that small-
holders,more likelyto be livingin isolated,cohesivevillages,retainfirm
precapitalistvalues that spur them to tenacious resistance.Wolf points
out thatlandless wage laborersare closelysupervisedby theiremployers
and are thus unable to mobilize politically.In Wolfs view, peasant
revolutionaryaction depends on freedomfromrepressionby local au-
thorities,and this freedom is more likely to obtain in smallholding
villages,especiallyinaccessibleones.
Theda Skocpol stands with Wolf on the importanceof peasant au-
7' Paige (fn. I), esp. 42-45; Scott(fn.i), and JamesC. Scott,"Hegemonyand thePeasantry,"
Politicsand Society7 (No. 3, I977), 267-96; Wolf (fn. i); Skocpol (fn. I), 353-60.

74 WORLD POLITICS
tonomyto revolutionary action.She contends,however,thatthe signif-
icance of agrarianstructureas a variablehas been exaggerated.In her
view,landlesswage earnersand smallholdersmay bothbecome rebels;
the politicalcontextis the paramountvariable.
The theses of Scott and especiallyof Wolf are supportedby the
Peruvian experience.As Table I2 shows, in the conflictedsouthern
highlandsdepartments thepopulationconsistspredominantly ofpeasant
smallholders.The percentageof rurallaborersis muchlower herethan
in thecentralhighlandsor on thecoast.As Paige predicts,the southern
highlandssmallholdersdo competewith each other; as of I97I, 7I
percentof Ayacucho's communitieswere engaged in boundarydis-
putes-one of the highestpercentagesin the country.72 Still,these ri-
valriesapparentlydid not impede Sendero'srise.
Paige's argumentcannotbe completelydiscarded,however.Sendero
Luminosogrew in the Ayacuchoregiononlyafterthe militarygovern-
ment'sagrarianreform,whichoustedlarge landholdersfromthe area
and dramaticallyreducedofficialpoliticalcontrol.Accordingly, one of
Paige's keyassumptions-thatthelandlordservesas an impedimentto
therevoltof thesmallholder-is absentin thePeruviancase. Moreover,
manyofPeru'srurallaborerswereno longermerelywage earners.They
TABLE I2
RURAL SOCIAL GROUPS BY REGION, 196I
(percentages)
in
Agriculturalists Rural Middle
theEconomically Peasant and Upper Rural
ActivePopulation,i972 Smallholders
Middle ClassesLaborers
Southern
Highlands
Ayacucho 73 71 11 15
Huancavelica 70 68 12 18
Apurimac 77 72 9 16
Cuzco 61 62 11 26
Puno 66 66 15 18
CentralHighlands
Junin 46 52 10 36
Pasco 49 36 11 48
Northern
Highlands
Cajamarca 75 N.A.a N.A.a N.A.a
Coast N.A. 41 11 48
a The datain the sourceforCajamarcaareclearly
in error.
Sources:For agriculturalists
in the economically
activepopulation,Caballero(fn.35), II7; for
othergroups,Larson and Bergman(fn.6i), 378.
72 Palmer(fn. I9), I98.

had becomemembersofcooperative receivingsharesof the
enterprises,
profits;theexploitative hacendados weregone. As Skocpolimplies,the
controversy about peasanttypeand revolutionary inclinationsmay be
too narrowlyand too rigidlyframed.
A seconddebatein theliterature concernsthe impingement of cap-
italismon traditional peasantsocieties.The argumentsare oftenquite
nuanced and cannotbe fullydescribedhere. Paige affirmsthat the
development of large-scale,
capital-intensiveagricultural exportenter-
prisesstimulates ruralclassconflictand protest.Migdal contendsthat,
as a prerequisite forrevolution,peasantsmustencounteran economic
crisis,oftentheresultofincreasedexploitation byauthorities. They will
thenseektosurmount thecrisisbyincreasedparticipation in themarket,
onlytofindthatthemarketnetworks arecorrupt and theirparticipation
in it unprofitable.73
Wolfargues,at a moregenerallevel,thatthespread
of capitalismentailsmajorsocialand economicdislocation.He citesa
varietyof changes,frompeasants'loss of secureland titlesto the rise
of new elites.
In Peru,globaleconomicforcesand capitalismseemto have played
a less directrolethananyof theabovetheorists would have predicted.
It was not in thearea of capital-intensiveexportagriculture on Peru's
coastthatthe revolutionary impulsewas fostered.74 Also, as Table I2
shows,it is not in theconflicted southernhighlandsbut ratherin the
centralhighlandsthatmanypeasantshaveleftagriculture foremploy-
ment in commerce,the services,and manufacturing (Junifn),and in
mining(Pasco).75 The resulthas notbeento stirpoliticalradicalism, but
to enhanceruralincomes.76
Throughoutthe highlands,peasantagricultureremainspredomi-
nantlyat a traditional
subsistence level.Therearesomelarge,capitalistic
livestockand wool enterprises, mainlyin Pasco, Junin,and Puno, but
therelationship betweentheseenterprises and thepeasantcommunities
did notchangeradicallyduringthe I970s. The majorquestionmarkis
therecentcoca boom.The production ofcoca hasincreaseddramatically
in theAndeanfoothills. Senderomaintainsa modusvivendiwithsome
coca growersand traffickers, probablyexactingtaxesfromthem.The
regionthatSenderohas penetrated mostrecently, aroundTingo Maria
and theHuallaga River,is primecoca-growing territory.
Overall,no significant new encroachments on thelivesof thehigh-
73 Migdal(fn.I), 229-37.
74 The contrastbetween the capital-intensiveexportagricultureof Peru's coast and the
subsistenceagricultureof the highlandsis elaboratedin Paige (fn. I), I24-2I1.
75 Caballero (fn. 35), II7, providesexact figures.
76 Webb (fn. I5), I8-43. See Tables I and 2 forthe votingtallies in these departments.

76 WORLD POLITICS
lands peasantrywere apparentduring the I970s. Landlords leftthe area
rather than escalate their demands. The state was largely guilty of
inaction, not action. Foreigners were prohibited from landholding in
Peru during this period. Agroindustrygrew somewhat primarilyin
the wheat, milk, and poultryindustries but this growth did not im-
pinge substantiallyon the agricultureof the southernhighlands.77
The effectof world capitalist forces upon the Peruvian peasantry
seems to have been an indirectone. These forces have not dislocated
agriculture itself,but they may have influencedgovernmentpolicies
toward agriculture.Some examples have already been cited: the agri-
cultural investmentprogram was probablymisled by internationaleco-
nomic interests,and the militarybudget may have been bloated as a
resultof the fanningof the Peruvian military'straditionalrivalrywith
Chile by the internationalarms industries.There are other examples.
The ready availabilityof wheat importsfromthe United States under
Public Law 480 (Food forPeace) may have been a factorin the military
governments'neglect of the problem of declining production of food
staplesin thehighlands.78Also, the Belaunde governmentwants to retain
the support of the internationalprivateand public banks as well as of
the InternationalMonetaryFund. Quite possiblyprompted by the eco-
nomic orthodoxyof these organizations,it implemented some of the
recentpolicies that hurt the peasantry,such as higher interestrates for
agriculturalloans, the withdrawal of subsidies for fertilizers,and the
reductionof importtariffs on manyagriculturalitems.The recentUnited
States coca eradicationprogramforthe Upper Huallaga valleyprobably
alienated many peasants in this area.
So far, I have distinguishedeconomic and structuralconditions in
Peru's southernhighlands from those in other regions of the country.
Ayacucho has not stood out particularlyamong the southernhighlands
departments.Why did Ayacucho rather than one of the four other
southernhighlands departmentsbecome Sendero's home base?
Here geopoliticscomes into play. Ayacucho is the only one of the five
southernhighlandsdepartmentsthatis inaccessible,withouta main road
fromthe coast,79and has a nationallyrecognized university.So The Sen-
dero Luminoso experiencesuggeststhatit is importantto put these two
factorstogether.Traditionally,theyhave not been. Scott,Wolf, Skocpol,
77Michael Painter, "The Political Economy of Food Production in Peru," Studies in

ComparativeInternational Developmenti8 (Winter i983), 34-52, is somewhat more critical
of the role of foreignagriculturalinterestsin Peru.
78Ibid., 39-42.
79SouthAmerica:Map of Continent(KummerlyFrey).
80A list of Peru's recognizeduniversitiesis provided in Presidenciade la Republica (fn.
17), 532.

and othershave indicated (althoughnot veryemphatically)the advan-

tages of geographic inaccessibilityfor the securityof nascent revolu-
tionarymovements,but they have not discussed the possible role of
universitystudentsin inaccessibleareas. Huntington,on the otherhand,
emphasizes the importanceof an alliance betweenintellectualsand peas-
ants, but does not examine the location of this alliance. Students at
remote,"provincial" universitiesare differentfrom their counterparts
in the capital or othermajor cities.First,theyare more likelyto be from
peasant families,and thus more able to mix with the peasantry.Second,
theydo not have the prestigiousqualificationsor the numerouscontacts
thatstudentsat the more prominentuniversitiesdo, and thus have even
fewer chances than the latterof professionalemploymentupon grad-
uation if the economy turns down- as it did in Peru afterthe mid-
I970s.
VI. POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE PERUVIAN HIGHLANDS, I968-I982
Sendero Luminoso is not Peru's firstradical peasant movement.It is,

however, the firstmovement that has effectivelyallied revolutionary
activistsand peasantsin variousprovinces.In comparisonwiththe i96os
movements,Sendero has been shrewderand more dedicated. The Sen-
deristascarefullyincreased peasants' material gains and reduced their
risks,along the lines of the organizationalimperativesspecifiedby Pop-
kin and by Migdal.8' The comparisonof the two guerrillamovements
also points to the dramatic changes in the Peruvian polityduring the
1970s. As a resultof the militarygovernment'sagrarian reform,tradi-
tional political elites left the rural highlands,and thus the repressive
capacityof the state was reduced. As Skocpol points out, this is a key
factorin the success of revolutionarymovements.52 At the same time,
in the patternmost explicitlydescribedby Migdal, various new groups
soughtto mobilize thepeasantryamid considerableofficialrevolutionary
rhetoric.83One of these groups was Sendero.
A. PERU S GUERRILLAS OF THE i960S84
Peru's revolutionaryactivistsof the early i96os were naive and im-

patient.Generallyof middle- to upper-classorigin,and fromthe cities,
8] Popkin (fn. i), 252-66; Migdal (fn. i), 226-56.
82Skocpol (fn. I , I I 5 - I 7.
Migdal (fn. I), I93-225.
83
For overviewsof the i960s Peruvianguerrillamovements,see RichardGott,Guerrilla

84
Movements in Latin America(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, I971), 307-393; David Chaplin,

"Peru's PostponedRevolution,"WorldPolitics20 (April i968), 393-420; Howard Handelman,
Strugglein theAndes(Austin: Universityof Texas Press, I975); and Wesley W. Craig, Jr.,
"Peru: The Peasant Movementof La Convenci6n,"in Henry A. Landsberger,ed., Latin
AmericanPeasantMovements(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, i969), 274-96.

78 WORLD POLITICS
these guerrillashad been persuaded by the example of the I959 Cuban
revolution that they could mobilize the Andean peasantry relatively
quickly and easily.Between i96i and i965, various revolutionarieswere
active in differentparts of Peru's centraland southernmountains and
jungle fringe. Some most prominentlyHugo Blanco-worked to
strengthenpeasant unions and to spur invasionsofhaciendalands; others
engaged in guerrilla warfare. In neithercircumstancewere the revo-
lutionariesable to gain the peasants' trustor to organize effectivemove-
ments.
Hugo Blanco was unable to radicalize the peasants successfully.In
the early i96os, land reformwas an attractivealternativeto revolution.
The Peruvian peasants' primarygoal was to pressurethe newly elected,
professedlyreformistBelaiunde governmentto institutean ambitious
land reformprogram.In cases where peasants invaded estates,theydid
so in order to attempttheir own reform,de facto style,not to spark
bloodyconflagration. Hugo Blanco was graduallyperceivedas too radical
by the bulk of his peasant union.
The guerrilla fighterswere almost totallyunsuccessfulin recruiting
highlands peasants to theircause. They did not prepare for a struggle.
Nor did theyestablisha politicalbase, or weigh the risks.In particular,
theyoverlooked the differencesbetween the Cuban sierramaestraand
the Peruvian highlands.The Peruvian mountainsare quite bare. So the
roving,undisguised, unprotectedguerrilla bands were readily spotted
by the aerial surveillanceof the authorities.When the guerrillassought
refuge in the jungle, they were even more quickly detected,as their
physicalappearance was radicallydifferentfromthatof the jungle peo-
ples. Among theirfew recruitswere a number of jungle Indians, some
of whom proved disloyal, defectingand informingon the guerrilla
leaders. The militarydefeatedthe guerrillasin about two years; several
thousand people were arrestedand about fivehundred were killed.85
B. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PERU S AGRARIAN REFORM
The guerrillamovementof the early i96os did affectthe subsequent

course of events in Peru. In particular,it spurred the militaryto carry
out the agrarian reformprogram. Although agrarian reformbrought
few economic changes for most of Peru's highlands peasantry,the po-
litical changes were dramatic.
First,politicalauthoritiesvirtuallyabsentedthemselvesfromthe more
85 There are no official

statistics.
My figuresare estimatesbased on interviewswithvarious
individuals who were familiarwith the region at the time, including General Edgardo
Marcado Jarrin,a leader in the militarygovernment.

remotehighlandsregions.In the i96os, thehacendados'professionalstaff

had closelymonitoredthe politicalactivitieson the estatesand often
contiguousareasas well,prohibitingaccessto would-bepeasantorgan-
In sharpcontrast
izers.86 to theMexicanand mostotherLatinAmerican
reformist and revolutionarygovernments,theVelascoregimefailedto
in the countryside;
establishnew politicalinstitutions no new set of
assumedthetraditional
politicalauthorities roleof theha-
intelligence
cienda staff.
Whydid themilitary government failin thisimportant task?87Not
forlack of effort:in mid-I97I, withgreatfanfare, the "social mobili-
zation"agency,SINAMOS, was launched.In manyrespects, SINAMOS
was to havefulfilledthetraditional roleofthepro-government political
party;yet,it survivedforonlya fewyears.The reasonsforthefailure
of themilitarygovernment's politicalplanare variousand complexand
cannotbe fullydescribedhere.Briefly, thegovernment was wrackedby
ideologicaldifferences among top officers, some of whom soughta
evenMarxist,
progressive, socialdemocracy forPeru,whileotherssought
a staunchlyanti-Communist, corporatist regime.Since the Peruvian
militarywas on poortermswithmostcivilianpoliticalleaders,patterns
of collaborationwereuneven.These differences in elitepoliticalcircles
werereflected in ideologicaland organizational confusion at thegrass-
roots,includingAyacucho.88 President Velasco,whomighthaveresolved
thesedifferences,fellill in earlyI973 and was notup to thenumerous
challengesbeforehim. Perhapsmostimportant, by I976 Peru was in
the midstof a grave economiccrisis,and resourceswere no longer
availableforpoliticalorganizations, especiallythosein thecountryside.
While thegovernment did not succeedin mobilizingthe peasantry,
otherpoliticalgroupswereable to operatemoreeffectively in thehigh-
lands.Untilabout I976, thepoliticalclimatewas progressive, withthe
government professing itsrevolutionary character.Two peasantorgan-
izationswereactivein thehighlands:thegovernment-sponsored CNA
(NationalAgrarian Confederation) and the Marxist CCP (Peruvian Peas-
ant Confederation).
BoththeCNA and theCCP becamelargeand vigorousduringthe
The CNA claimedto haveabout23 percentof Peru'speasants,
g970s.89
86 See especiallyJulioCotler, "Traditional Haciendas and Communitiesin a Context of
Political Mobilizationin Peru," in RodolfoStavenhagen,ed., AgrarianProblemsand Peasant

Movementsin Latin America(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor,I970), 533-58.
87 On the politicalproblemsof the Velasco regime,see, among other volumes, Cynthia
McClintockand Abraham F. Lowenthal,The PeruvianExperiment Reconsidered
(Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress, i983), 209-346.
88
Palmer (fn. I9), I80-228.
89 On the CNA, see McClintock (fn. 5), 259-84. On the CCP, see Howard Handelman,

80 WORLD POLITICS
and roughly i9 percentof Ayacucho's, as members. These figuresare
almost certainlyexaggerated,but the CNA did raise the peasants' con-
cerns in officialand nonofficialcircles. At numerous meetings,CNA
leadersdemanded accelerationof theagrarianreform,admissionof more
temporaryworkers to cooperativemembership,higher prices for agri-
cultural products,and other steps.
The Marxist CCP, which was founded in I947, greatlyincreased its
ranks and activitiesduring the I970s. Membershipfiguresare not avail-
able. We do know, however,that the CCP played a key role in peasant
mobilizations in Piura, and--especially relevanthere- in the land in-
vasions in the Andahuaylas province of Apurimac that is now under
Senderista influence.
Southern highlands peasants gradually became more politicized and
more radical. In the early i960s, the Marxist parties had been minute;
they did not win more than 6.5 percent of the vote in any southern
highlandsdepartmentin eitherthe i962 or the i963 election.90As dem-
onstratedin Table i, the Marxistvote in the I978 ConstituentAssembly
election had reached almost 40 percentin several southern highlands
departments.The table also indicates,however, that the Marxist vote
declined between I978 and i980. Although the decline reflectedpri-
marilya strongpreferenceforAccion Popular over APRA in a contest
essentiallybetween these two parties, some voters were disillusioned
with the Marxistparties.9'The lefthad been relativelyineffectualin the
ConstituentAssembly,and it was badly factionalized.To many citizens,
the left seemed just another group of ambitious and quarrelsome pol-
iticians,wastingtheirtime on partisaninfightinginstead of taking con-
crete steps to help the disadvantaged.
In short,by the early i980s peasants had become more politicized
than they had been a decade earlier. They were prepared to examine
their lot critically.As we have seen, they tended to identifythe gov-
ernmentas a major culprit.At the same time, the conventionalalter-
natives to the currentadministrationhad been exhausted. Highlands
peasants had pinned theirhopes firston land reform,only to find that
the reformbarely benefitedthem materially;then,theyhad hoped the
Marxist parties and the new democratic governmentwould improve
"Peasants,Landlords and Bureaucrats:The Politicsof AgrarianReformin Peru," American

Universities Field StaffReports,No. i (i98i). CNA membershipfiguresare from CNA,
"CNA: InformacionBa'sica" [CNA: Basic information] mimeo.(Lima: SINAMOS, I975), 4.
soLarson and Bergman (fn. 6i), 382-83.
91Sandra L. Woy-Hazleton, "The Returnof Partisan Politics in Peru," in Stephen M.
Gorman,ed., Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politicsof Transformation
(Boulder,Colo.: West-
view, i982), 50-56.

theirlot,onlyto see theirsituationworsen.Some peasantswere thus
readyto listento theappealsof SenderoLuminoso.
C. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITIES OF SENDERO LUMINOSO92
In tailoringits strategiesto the peasants'concernsabout personal

securityand economicsurvival,Senderohas been a muchmorecalcu-
latingguerrillaorganizationthanits predecessors. The movementhas
reducedits risksin variousways.Most Senderistamilitants are indig-
enousto theregionand thusdo notstandout physically fromthe rest
ofthepopulation.Also,members'identities concealed.All
are carefully
membersuse aliases,and duringterrorist theyaremaskedwith
activities
largewoolenhoods.Few Senderistas knowmorethanfourothers:each
guerrillacellhas a maximumoffivemembers;one is theleader,joining
thecommittee at thenexthigherlevel.
Senderohas also reducedrisksto the peasantryby restricting the
presenceof governmental authoritiesin theAyacuchoregion.As early
as the I970s, officialswho soughtto enterSenderistaterritory were
shot.93Since i980, Senderohas targeted civilianauthorities
assiduously.
Between i980 and August i983, eighteen civilian officialswere assas-
sinated,and manymorewoundedor threatened.94 As a result,virtually
noneare leftin thearea.
Senderohas providedsignificant to itssupporters.
benefits Of course,
it promiseda betterlife.But the movementhas also takenaction-
violentaction-to benefitthepeasantsmaterially.Afterblacklistingrel-
ativelywell-to-do
landowners,shopkeepers, and either
and intermediaries,
killingthemor causingthemto flee,Senderodistributed theirproperty
amongvillagers, and cancelleddebtsto them.To recruits, Senderohas
offeredbasicsubsistence(probablypossibleas a result Sendero'seco-
of
nomic levies on the drug trade).Sendero'sterrorist actionsare also
apparently perceivedas daringby some Senderorecruits, a dispropor-
tionatenumberof whomare mereadolescents.
Since Januaryi983, with the onset of the government's counter-
insurgency thepoliticalcost-benefit
offensive, equationhasblurredsome-
what.95Sympathy forSenderohas becomemuchmoredangerous.The
tollofthestrugglehasmounted.Byearlyi984, thegovernment admitted
thatabout3,500 peoplehad beenkilled;I,500 "disappeared";and 4,000
had been arrested.Althoughthegovernment reportsmostof thedead
See the works cited in fn. 8.
92
Palmer (fn. I9), 3.

93
94 DESCO, ResumenSemanal 6, August I9-25, i983, p. 3.
95 See The Andean Report io (March and May i984), 46-53 and 85-87, respectively.For
victimtolls,see especiallyLatin AmericanRegionalReports,Andean Group (fn. 4i), 6.

82 WORLD POLITICS
as Senderistamilitants,it is known thatvillages consideredsympathetic
to Sendero were raided and even bombed; AmnestyInternationaland
otherindependentobserversbelievethatmostof the dead were civilians.
Sendero's own actions during this period may have alienated the
peasants. It has been reportedthat Sendero became more ruthlessand
wanton in its attacks,and thatthe guerrillastriedto reduce agricultural
productionand to stop weekly markets.Probablymost important,Sen-
dero was unable to protectits peasant allies from counterinsurgency
offensives;when Ayacucho's pro-Senderistavillages were assaulted, the
guerrillaleaders fledelsewhere.At the same time,Sendero's ranks have
become less disciplined and coordinated,and may even have been in-
filtratedby "pseudo-Sendero" criminals.
Yet, it does not appear thatthe securityforceswon many peasants to
their side during i983.96As we have seen, the subsistencecrisis in the
southernhighlands was worseningat this time, and peasants were es-
pecially angry at the government.Moreover, the behavior of Peru's
securityforcesin Ayacucho, like the behavior of most militariesamid
such conflicts,was generallyreportedto be poor. The counterinsurgency
personnelwere regardedbymanyas arbitrary, brutal,and corrupt.While
the securityforcesdid attractsome peasants to theirside-most clearly,
the Iquichanos-economic inducementswere rumored to be of consid-
erable importanceto the peasants' decisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
As we have seen,variousfactorshave been importantto theemergence

of Sendero Luminoso in Peru. The sine-qua-nonelement has been the
subsistencecrisis in the country'ssouthernhighlands during the early
i980s. The strongcorrelationbetweenthe regionswhere therehas been
a threatto subsistenceand Senderistastrongholdsprovidesnew evidence
for the argumentsof James Scott in the scholarlycontroversyon the
significanceof hunger to peasant revolt.
The Sendero case also providesnew evidence relevantto the contro-
versies about the type of agrarian structurethat is most conducive to
peasant movements.Rural smallholderswho are not particularlyactive
in themarketeconomyor nonagriculturalnetworkshave been Sendero's
primarypeasant base. In addition, the Ayacucho area is especially ad-
vantageous to revolutionariesbecause it is relativelyinaccessible and
96See The AndeanReport(fn.95); also, on aerial bombing,see DESCO, ResumenSemanal
6, December 23-29, i983, p. 3; on material inducementsto Iquichano villages,see Philip
Bennett,"Ayachucho's Quiet War," The Lima Times,February4, 1983.

becauseithasa university (manyofwhosestudents arecurrently destined
forunemployment).
Senderoemergedin Peruaftera sweepingagrarianreform, and this
factis one of themoststriking aspectsof thePeruvianexperience. The
criticalfaultof thereformwas thatit did littleforPeru'spoorerhigh-
landspeasantry, and especiallythepeasantry ofAyacucho.The dualism
of Peruvianand otherLatin Americanagrarianstructures-whichis
muchmorepronouncednow thanit was some fifty yearsago-is an
almostinsurmountable obstacleto theimplementation of a trulyegal-
itarianagrarianreform.97 On theotherhand,thereform did helplarge
numbersof Peru'scoastalpeasants;theirrelativeprosperity and confi-
dencein thepoliticalprocessare probably keyfactors in theiropposition
to Sendero.
Althoughthe agrarianreformdid not significantly improvethe lot
of the highlandspeasants,it set the stagefortheirpoliticization and
radicalization.The militarygovernment had promised evenmorestrongly
thanpreviousadministrations thatitwouldprovidehelp;whenit failed
to do so, intensedisillusionment was thepredictable result.In contrast
tothatofmostotherLatinAmericangovernments, thePeruvianmilitary
was toouncertain and dividedon thequestionofa correctpoliticalplan
to consolidateits own institutions in the highlands-institutions that
mighthave notedand mediatedtherisingpeasantunrest.
The importance of the subsistence crisisto the southernhighlands
peasantmovement suggests thatmorefavorable policiesmightwellhave
beenthegovernment's bestapproachto thepeasant'sdiscontent. In fact,
thereis considerableconsensusamong analystsof Peru that certain
policiescould make a real difference to the highlandspeasantry.If
government policiescan be a factorin exacerbating peasantpoverty(as
has been the case in recentyearsforthe highlandsof Peru),theycan
also be a factorin ameliorating it.
In the Third-Worldcountriesof Latin America,successfulrevolu-
tionarymovementshave been broad-basedand ideologicallytolerant.
Senderois notsucha movement. It is unlikelythatSenderowillattract
Peru'scoastalpeasantsand urbancitizens,mostof whomhaveattained
Third-Worldstandardsof living.It is thusalso unlikelythatSendero
will actuallygain power.
In Peru'sFourth-World regionssuchas Ayacucho,however,where
97This point is elaborated for Peru and other Latin American countriesin Alain de
Janvry,TheAgrarianQuestionand Reformism in LatinAmerica(Baltimore:The JohnsHopkins
UniversityPress, 198I).

84 WORLD POLITICS
the peasants'rage and despairare intense,Senderoor similargroups

could maintainhigh levelsof violenceformanyyears.Peru's future
politicalcoursemay followthatof Colombia: a government that is
civilian,butnotverydemocraticin thefullsenseoftheterm,confronting
virtually constantrevolutionary
and criminalviolence.


Why Peasants Rebel in Peru: The Rise of Sendero Luminoso

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Why Peasants Rebel in Peru: The Rise of Sendero Luminoso

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WHY PEASANTS REBEL:

The Case of Peru's SenderoLuminoso

N thisarticleI shall examine theoriginsof a major ruralrevolutionary

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3Excellent recent overviews of these controversiesare Goldstone (fn. 2) and Theda

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two suchmovements in the same countryacrossa meretwentyyears.

II. SENDERO LuMINOSO AND ITS PEASANT SUPPORT, I968-I9828

For the mostpart,the individualswho were to be thecore leaders

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"Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas,"Problemsof Communism32 (September-

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\< (4 8%o) 4 48B\ J 207 )

\ \ ^<Y~tUUF \ APRIMACv 890 3 ,

\ > < < s2 g~~~~~~~PU

CENSO DE 1981 WCifrasen miles) ?,

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sionofthetopSenderista leadershipbymid-i983,theguerrillas became

No. i9 (October I982), 47.

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recently,an Ayacucho police chief estimated that "8o percent of the

forseveral yearsin Sendero-controlledterritory.

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toral processin Huamanga. Of an estimatedII 5,000 people in the prov-

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journalists were virtuallybarred from the Ayacucho countryside,the

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III. THE SUBSISTENCE THREAT IN PERU'S SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS

All scholars of revolutionagree that povertyis a factorin peasant

28 Scott (fn. i), esp. I3-26.

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33 Geographicaldisparities in incomeare clearlydescribedin Webb (fn.I5), I19-29. Among

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is generallyworse off than the northernhighlands,we may inferthat

37 JorgeFernindez Baca, "La Producci6nde Alimentosen el Peru" [Food productionin

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by I5 percent,and potatoproductionby almost 20 percent;in the south-

IV. GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD AGRICULTURE, I968-I982

When southernhighlandspeasantsbegan to realize the threatto their

4 Latin AmericaWeeklyReport(WR-84-o2), January13, i984, iI; Latin AmericaWeekly

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44Wolf (fn. I), 28i; Goldstone (fn. 2), 453.

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Land has beenan explosiveissuein Peru forcenturies. It has always

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matically.5PNew schools,new communitycenters,new sportsstadiums,

5 See McClintock (fn. 5).

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erty,a numbercomparableto otheragrarianzones,butthevalueof the

The termsof tradebetweenthecountrysideand thecityare of concern

53On the numberof beneficiaries in the zone, see Ministryof Agriculture,Estadisticade

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junglefortemporary jobs,theirwagescameto represent approximately

I97I-I975 I976-I979 1980 198i-I982

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The decline in fertileterrainper capita has not gone unnoticed by

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63 Documents fromand discussionswithemployeesof the World Bank, the United States

Departmentof Agriculture,and the Peruvian Ministryof Agriculture.