Climate Risk, Perceptions and

Development in El Salvador

E. Lisa F. Schipper

International Water Management Institute Colombo, Sri Lanka

October 2006

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 93

 Climate Risk, Perceptions and
Development in El Salvador

E. Lisa F. Schipper
International Water Management Institute
Colombo, Sri Lanka
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research &
School of Environmental Sciences
University of East Anglia
Norwich NR4 7TJ

Email: e.schipper@uea.ac.uk
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 93
October 2006

Please note that Tyndall working papers are "work in progress". Whilst they are commented on by
Tyndall researchers, they have not been subject to a full peer review.
The accuracy of this work and the conclusions reached are the responsibility of the author(s) alone and
not the Tyndall Centre.

Manuscript has also been submitted to a peer-reviewed journal

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Summary

Development is undermined by disasters originating from natural hazards, but disasters are
often the result of faulty development, as demonstrated by recent events worldwide. The key
to ending this vicious cycle lies in the factors that determine why groups are vulnerable to
hazards. This study examines vulnerability in El Salvador in order to understand how
development can drive a process of vulnerability reduction, and vice versa. The main
challenges in El Salvador have to do with stagnation in the agriculture sector and rural
economy, mistrust in government institutions, dependency, misinterpreted frameworks for
risk management and differing understandings and beliefs. It concludes that a more holistic
and integrated approach is necessary to address these challenges from both above and below.

1 Introduction

Recent studies have stressed the inverse correlation between disasters and development
(DfID, 2005; UNDP, 2004). Development is often undermined by disasters, which are caused
by hazards colliding with highly vulnerable populations, frequently vulnerable because they
lack the ability to protect themselves from the hazards, through lack of rights and access to
resources, and have little real influence over their own state of development (Schipper and
Pelling, 2006). Outcomes at the UN’s 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction
underscored that disasters will affect the least developed most adversely – not in absolute
financial terms, but in relative terms vis-à-vis possessions, livelihoods and the opportunity to
recover and move ahead. Therefore, the key to ending this vicious cycle lies in the factors
that actually determine lack of development to allow societies to be more resilient to hazards
and changes in the hazard dynamics. But addressing these factors presents an enormous
challenge, because they are often profoundly linked with much larger cultural and political
drivers. On closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that to begin to overcome the
compounding impact of disasters on development, it is vital to approach development from a
vulnerability-reduction perspective.

This paper presents a study of rural agrarian communities in eastern El Salvador to examine
their vulnerability to climate change and variability in order to gain an understanding of the
relationship between development and disasters, and what sort of framework is required to
ensure a process of adaptation to hazards and changes in hazard dynamics. The study
explores to what extent development can drive a process of vulnerability reduction, and vice
versa. It indicates that perceptions of risk and vulnerability play a fundamental role in
determining how at risk people in El Salvador actually are. This has significant implications
for the development process, because perceptions can hinder groups and individuals from
embracing poverty reduction strategies. Interestingly, the study also indicates that the factors
that initially may have appeared to be instrumental in determining risk, i.e. the actual climate
hazards, have only a minor role to play in determining the risk. Thus, the integration of
climate risk issues within development should not be cast aside simply under the rubric of
scientific uncertainty regarding future climate change: the role of climate risk in hampering
development must be addressed now, because it is already a major player. Factors
constraining vulnerability reduction and development are clearly related, and frequently
identical. This offers hope for an ability to come closer to alleviating global poverty and
vulnerability to climate change efficiently and effectively, through concerted and integrated
efforts.

The degree to which individuals or societies are able to remain unaffected by climate change
and variability is not based solely on the technologies and knowledge possessed. As found in
El Salvador, the manner in which the impacts of climate variability are experienced is also
determined by a wide range of socio-economic factors that are related to poverty,
employment, ideological beliefs, dependency, institutions and competing knowledges about
management of risks. Other studies have indicated that the extent to which climate variables

2
determine risk is difficult to isolate from the other causes of risk, for example in Bangladesh
(Hutton and Haque, 2004). In El Salvador, however, it appears that climate variability is of
minor importance in determining risk when compared with those factors causing
vulnerability. This is based on the understanding that risk is the product of the interaction
between hazard and vulnerability to that hazard, represented by the conceptual equation Risk
= Hazard + Vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004).

Although climate variability is inherent in the Salvadoran society, this does not guarantee that
the people in question are well-adapted to their environment. Since it is relatively certain that
climate hazards will increase in frequency or magnitude, or both, as a result of climate
change, risk to residents in the case study area can only be reduced if the hazard increase is
more than offset by a reduction in vulnerability to these hazards. It is in choices regarding
their livelihoods where individuals and societies are able to have the greatest affect on their
vulnerability. But the empirical evidence indicates that macro-level causes stand in the way
of individuals being able to make these choices in the case study area. These factors are often
difficult for small communities to influence. These challenges indicate that to pursue
adaptation to climate variability and change, a holistic and inclusive approach must be
employed, whereby features of national governance structures are taken into account. To
promote an adaptation process in El Salvador, it will be necessary to tackle numerous issues,
including regional agricultural trade, as well as issues of perception.

2. Natural Hazards and Perceptions of Risk in El Salvador

El Salvador is one of the most resource-depleted and environmentally damaged countries in

Latin America (Acevedo et al., 1995), as well as the most densely populated. Its high birth
rate and small territory place additional pressure on the environment and natural resources, as
well as on economic and social aspects of life, particularly affecting rural livelihoods. Social
and physical vulnerability to the numerous and frequent natural hazards, including floods,
droughts and hurricanes and associated events such as land-slides, is significant among all
classes of the population (Helfrich, 2001), and consequently Salvadorans face high risk on a
daily basis. Two major events in the last ten years have been catalysts for calls to reduce this
risk: Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and two consecutive earthquakes in 2001. These events
indicated both to citizens and outside observers that El Salvador must take action to reduce
the impacts of hazard exposure in order for economic growth since the 1992 end of the civil
war not to be eradicated. Simultaneously, the message that ‘disasters are not natural’ has
been propagated (Ibarra Turcios and Jarquín, 2000), leading some organizations, including
national and local government bodies, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, NGOs and
research organizations, to shift to a ‘risk management’ strategy in their approach to
supporting development in El Salvador. What this actually implies, however, is not clear.

The empirical analysis in this study shows that interpretation of the concept ‘risk
management’ varies considerably in El Salvador, and even policies to emphasize preventive
measures may not remove the previous misconceptions associated with attributing disasters to
nature, and the subsequent defeatist attitude that is widely evident. Similarly, despite
institutional changes in risk monitoring, which appear to be relatively successful in terms of
communication and awareness-raising, the civil war ending in 1992 left a legacy of political
mistrust over land tenure and other issues, brought high unemployment and contributed to the
marginalization of the agriculture sector. While the agriculture sector is also highly sensitive
to climate variability, field evidence indicates that climate variability is only one of many
factors contributing to its deterioration and continued decline. This is because the root causes
of social vulnerability in El Salvador stem mostly from its current development strategies and
history of political violence, including subordination by US agricultural and military policies.

Even if risk management is integrated institutionally in El Salvador, addressing the root

causes of social vulnerability remains a challenge. In part, this is because a “deep economic

3
cleavage divides Salvadoran society” (Ulloa et al., 2000: 6), which creates inequity not only
in purchasing power but also in terms of access to resources and influence over political
development. Implicit as well as explicit attribution of climate vulnerability to macro-level
development policies of the Government of El Salvador is commonplace, and yet as a result
of the tense political atmosphere in the country, the voices of some sectors of society are
rarely heard. Not surprisingly, they are the ones who are the most vulnerable to natural
hazards. Effective responses to climate hazards by these vulnerable groups in El Salvador are
therefore expected to be conditional upon the extent to which root causes of vulnerability can
be overcome. But this assumes many things about the responses, and cannot be confirmed
without empirical evidence. By looking at examples of whether and how people respond, it is
possible to assess to what extent these responses may be influenced by the macro-level
policies that are also contributing to vulnerability. Ultimately this should provide evidence of
whether and how a process of adaptation to climate change is taking place in El Salvador, and
indicate what sort of challenges may be confronting this process.

Analysis in this paper is based on key informant interviews on the national and local levels
with government representatives, non-governmental activists, researchers and thinkers, local-
level leaders and key figures, as well as extensive open-ended interviews in two communities
in the lower valley of the Lempa river in eastern El Salvador, hereafter referred to as Bajo
Lempa, namely Amando López and Taura. Several informal contacts have also contributed
information, which has primarily been used as background information.

3. Bajo Lempa, El Salvador – Ex-Combatants and Poverty

This land here that we have has cost the blood of so many people and families who
have given their lives so that we could have some land.
- farmer in Amando López, July 2002

Located in the eastern part of El Salvador, the Bajo Lempa is framed by the Pacific coastline
and the highway linking the country’s capital city, San Salvador, with the eastern part of the
country and Honduras. It is characterized by the Lempa river, which divides the area in two.
The highway runs across the only bridge linking these territories. The area is approximately
870 km2 in area (Medina et al., 2002) and is characterized as a low-lying flood plain area.
The population is estimated between 30-40,000 persons residing in almost 90 communities
(Lavell, 2004). The multi-national Lempa river basin extends into Honduras and Guatemala,
as well as El Salvador. The Lempa originates in Guatemala, extending 422 km to the Pacific
Ocean. Until the 1980s, Bajo Lempa consisted mainly of forests interspersed with open
landscape and pasture land (Medina et al., 2002). There are three hydroelectric dams in place
along the upper parts of the river, which sees an elevation shift within El Salvador from
around 360 meters above sea level, down to the Pacific Ocean. i

The roots of the current environmental and social conditions in Bajo Lempa lie deep in the
history of El Salvador. The Bajo Lempa, a flood zone, was sparsely inhabited for agricultural
purposes until the civil war (1980-1992), and is now populated with ex-combatants whose
main livelihood is subsistence agriculture. These ex-combatants from both military and
guerrilla were given land as a result of the peace accords in 1992, but some groups had
actually come to settle in the area before peace had been agreed. In summing up the current
situation, Lavell comments that “ex-combatants are to be found living in poverty in one of the
most potentially productive areas of Central America” (2004: 70).

Few people inhabited Bajo Lempa before the war, due to a high prevalence of dengue fever
and malaria, and hence there were very few records of ‘disasters’. Nevertheless, the area was
referred to as the “breadbasket” of El Salvador until the end of the 1970s because of highly
productive cotton and sugar industries (Cuéllar et al., 2002; Lavell, 2004: 69). During the
civil war, however, the region served as a combat zone and was considered too dangerous so

4
that many inhabitants who had previously been employed by the large farms decided to
evacuate. Many of the large land-holdings had already been broken up by the agrarian reform
of 1980 (Lavell, 2004), and the 1983 constitution which established a ceiling of 245 hectares
on the amount of land owned by an individual (Brockett, 1990). A number of Bajo Lempa
interviewees commented that floods had not occurred in the area before the arrival of the ex-
combatants at the beginning of the 1990s, and they connected this with their suspicion that the
Government of El Salvador instigated the floods in an effort to get the inhabitants to leave
again, however, records show that flood events did actually take place while the large farms
were there ii (Moisa, 1996; Romano, 1996). It appears that during that period, more effective
land management, well maintained drainage systems, and dikes further from the river banks
allowed the Lempa to flood naturally without adversely affecting the crops. Furthermore, one
of the attractions of the area for the farmers previously had been the high fertility of the soils
due to the nutrients brought by floods (Medina et al., 2002; Sudmeier-Rieux et al., 2006)

Although Walker and Jodha note that in general “farmers in agriculturally risky environments
have evolved several measures to deal with production risk” (1986: 18), the inhabitants in
Bajo Lempa have not been exposed to their present conditions for longer than eleven years,
since the earliest settlers came in the end of 1991, and the beginning of 1992. In general, it
appears that the Bajo Lempa inhabitants had not had sufficient experience in the environment
in which they are living, because more than 80% were accustomed to different environmental
conditions for cultivation (Medina et al., 2002). Some people came from urban areas and had
no experience working in agriculture (Lavell, 2004). Those who are not familiar with the
riparian environment rely on the Government of El Salvador and NGOs to control the Lempa
River physically, although the dynamics of the river are such that it floods on a regular basis.
This suggests that the Bajo Lempa inhabitants are in a process of adaptation to the new
conditions, hence presenting an ideal location to study adaptation to change in climate.

4. Responses to Risk

In examining responses to climate risk in Bajo Lempa, it becomes clear that there is high
awareness of the risks posed by both floods and droughts in the region. However, there are
varying levels of interest in taking action to reduce the impacts. The reasons range from
cultural beliefs to dependency issues, and are explored below.

Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of responses to floods and droughts in El Salvador

emerging from the interviews. Similar findings were identified by Lavell (1994) in Costa
Rica, Moisa (1996) in El Salvador and Eakin (2005) in Mexico. Different types of responses
are evident on the individual and community levels. Whereas responses to floods and
droughts appear associated with organization on a community level, on an individual level, a
greater variety of options were identified.

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Table 1. Summary of individual responses
Responses to Climate Risk in Bajo Lempa

Suggested Evident
Storing grains in silos Yes Yes
Building shelves for elevating belongings Yes Yes
Planting a second crop Yes Yes
Planting in summer with an irrigation system Yes Yes
Using an irrigation system in a dry winter Yes Yes
Wait until rains come to plant Yes Yes
Harvest before heavy rains are expected Yes Yes
Change to other crops Yes Yes
Drain land Yes Unknown
Raising houses up (building on raised platforms) Yes Done by outside
organisations
Keep fewer animals, or sell before winter and buy again in summer Yes Yes
Work harder Yes Unknown*
Rely on assistance from family members elsewhere Yes Yes
Working in co-operatives Yes Yes
Abandon the practice of cultivating and look for other business Yes Yes
Migration Yes Limited
Wait for food assistance Yes Yes
* “Harder” Is a relative term and difficult to asses without a comparative study.

Table 2. Summary of community-level responses

Responses to Climate Risk in Bajo Lempa

Suggested Evident
Construction of dikes along river banks Yes Yes
Construction of refuge houses Yes Yes (but only limited
access)
Creation of emergency committees Yes Yes
Creation of other committees and groups to respond collectively Yes Yes
Mistrust of Government of El Salvador Yes Yes
Blame agents outside community for impacts Yes Yes
Anger at CEL (Hydroelectric company) Yes Yes

As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of the individual responses are related to agricultural
practices and individual decisions about how to organize the planting season, including when
to begin sowing seeds. Other responses are clearly related to poverty issues; particularly
migration stands out as it is a common option throughout Salvadoran society, to attempt to
escape poverty and unemployment. Dependency on outside organizations is another way to
respond to uncertain climatic conditions. Eventually, the UN’s World Food Programme
(WFP) will stop providing ‘emergency relief’ to El Salvador, and those dependent on the food
aid will need to find new strategies for food security. The sense of victimization associated
with the relief assistance may also act as a barrier to self-empowerment, constraining peoples’
abilities to identify opportunities for employment and survival. Although an ex-combatant
attitude is evident among the Bajo Lempa inhabitants, which reinforces the view that it is
possible to attain goals through persistence and dedication by violent or non-violent struggle,
frustration over constant risk presented by poverty and floods and droughts immediately
following twelve years of civil war may be sufficient for individuals to feel like victims.

6
Thus, attitudes and motivation appear to play an important role in the process of adapting to
the new climatic conditions.

On the community level, as shown in Table 2, responses include infrastructural adjustments,

organizational elements which build social networks, and attitudinal reactions. To a certain
extent, these responses reflect both preventive and reactive actions. The construction of dikes
and refuge homes is a response to known flood risk, but also a preventive measure taken to
minimize the risk presented by future floods. The organizational elements are designed in the
same mindset. The mistrust, blame and anger are reactions that stem from past experiences,
also during the war. These responses may have implications for future actions, for example
such that inhabitants will not heed advice from government bodies because these are not
considered trustworthy. From the perspective of the inhabitants, such attitudes could be
understood as preventive measures, because it will ensure that they are not taken advantage of
by those they do not trust. Although the sustainability or effectiveness of these responses was
not explicitly evaluated, it is clear that there are strengths and weaknesses associated with
each. In particular the case of the dikes is one where the flaws in its construction must be
recognized, considering that these may impart a false sense of security to the inhabitants that
is maladaptive. It is possible that those locations where the construction is particularly fragile
will collapse if large quantities of water have to be released from the hydropower dams on
short notice. If inhabitants feel confident about the dikes, they will consider cultivating closer
to the dike than previously, and consequently these crops will be affected if the dike does
collapse. Considering that inhabitants in Bajo Lempa are currently learning about the
climatic conditions there, it is clear that some responses will not be sustainable, and may
eventually be abandoned for others.

Thus, the tables demonstrate that responses to climate hazards exist in Bajo Lempa, although
they may not always be sustainable or effective. Apart from not conveying whether the
responses are successful, the data do not either indicate the constraints posed to these
responses and other responses that may have been attempted, but have not transpired.
Throughout the interviews, it was clear that macro-level policies appear to influence the
ability of the rural farmers to respond successfully to the risks associated with floods and
droughts. Coupled with the attitudes and perceptions surrounding risk, an examination of the
constraints becomes an elemental part of the picture. Although the consequences of these
constraints were examined a local level, they primarily play out on a national level.

5. Constraints to Responses

Although there is clearly some capacity at the local level in Bajo Lempa, primarily related to
social networks and organization, conflicting national or regional strategies or policies can
override local decisions and plans. This implies that a locally-driven adaptation process could
be threatened or reversed by events or actions on the national level. One of the most striking
cases is in the agriculture sector throughout El Salvador. In the context of both climate
change and development, agriculture is a key sector, where variability in climate is
transmitted through impacts on food, livelihood, income and nutrition security. Evidence
from Bajo Lempa indicates that farmers are making adjustments to the cultivating season;
however the lack of market for their products and the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States will have consequences for agricultural practices
of the rural farmers as well. As noted already, agricultural vulnerability is determined by
numerous factors but it appears that climate is not the most decisive factor in generating risk
to the inhabitants in Bajo Lempa. Other factors play a greater role in determining the
vulnerability, as can be seen in Table 3. These factors affect the ability of the inhabitants to
carry out adequate responses to climate hazards, including policies and attitudes toward
addressing risks and vulnerability to floods and droughts evidenced in El Salvador. Of
particular significance is how disaster management is defined vis-à-vis risk management, and
the role and impact of assistance agencies, most notably NGOs and international aid

7
organizations, in addressing vulnerability, risk and disaster. Also of interest is the role of
competing knowledges and understandings, most importantly religion, for how individuals
and communities adopt precautionary and adaptive behaviour. Table 3 also indicates that
mistrust in the Government of El Salvador is an important factor when it comes to responding
to floods and droughts.

Table 3. Factors influencing the process of adaptation in El Salvador

Factor Issues Consequences Secondary Impacts

Stagnation in agriculture Emphasis on growth in non- Marginalisation of agriculture Poverty

sector and rural economy agricultural sectors,
CAFTA/FTAA
Directly affected by climate
change
Mistrust in Government Legacy of war
Institutions
Dependency and the NGO Large NGO and donor
sector presence
Government frameworks Emphasis on disaster relief
for risk management rather than precautionary
measures
Differing understandings Religion
and beliefs Awareness and
understanding of climate
change
sector
Loss of livelihoods for rural
subsistence farmers
Migration
Ideological differences
Attachment to land in Bajo
Lempa as “prize” from
fighting
Blame “others”
Lack of sense of
responsibility to take action
No precautionary measures
Risk management confused
with disaster management
Perception of El Salvador as
being in a “permanent state
of emergency”
Religious fatalism regarding
causes of and responses to
floods and droughts.
Lack of understanding of
causes of floods and
droughts
“Double exposure” of
agriculture sector
Increased vulnerability of
inhabitants to impacts of
floods and droughts
Mistrust in weather
forecasts
Mistrust in motivations of
CEL, large multilateral
organisations (IADB)
Feeling of victimisation
“Wait and see” attitude
toward precautionary action
Increased vulnerability in the
long run
Conflicts between disaster
relief and sustainable
development efforts
Lack of unity within
communities for taking
action.
Increased vulnerability to
floods and droughts

This section discusses each of these factors, based on evidence from the community and
national-level interviews, supplemented by scholarly literature and other documents,
including newspaper articles and materials used by Salvadoran non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to campaign against globalization and other government policies. The
outcomes of this study have significant implications for our understanding of the relationship
between risk reduction and development. They indicate the necessity of sustainable
development – i.e. development without major negative impacts on social, environmental and
local economics issues – to be underway in order for an adaptation process to be possible, and
demonstrate the importance of scale in considering how to facilitate adaptation, particularly
between the community and government levels. Furthermore, the outcomes show how
challenging a generic approach to adaptation policy would be, particularly when considering
that factors discussed below are unique to El Salvador and Bajo Lempa, and that each country
will have its own national circumstances.

Agriculture and Rural Economy

As the most significant for the rural livelihoods in El Salvador, agriculture also stands at the
centre of the political conflict of the 1980s. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), climate change will have the greatest impact on the livelihoods of
poor smallholders in the tropics and subtropics (Watson et al., 1998). This includes El
Salvador, and evidence from the study in Bajo Lempa indicates that the most vulnerable
aspects of life along the Lempa river include food security due to the loss of crops during

8
floods and droughts. To this end, various aspects of this sector were found to be of
significance for determining the vulnerability of the rural farmers to climate change. As is
also noted by Eakin (2005) for Mexico, the most effective way for smallholder farmers to
adapt to climate change appears to lie outside the agriculture sector.

Decline of the Agriculture Sector

In an effort to create stronger links with the United States, and generate the conditions
necessary for the 2005 entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA)
and CAFTA, El Salvador shifted its export and economic policies to focus on the service
sector. This has brought the development of the maquilas, foreign-owned textile factories,
creating products that are exported under a duty free policy, mostly to the United States.
Weinberg notes that in maquilas, “strikes are outlawed and foreign corporations can operate
exempt from taxation and minimum wage laws” (1991: 61). While maquila exports have
grown since 1989, traditional exports, which include coffee, cotton, sugar and shrimp, have
decreased both in value, and as a share of total exports (World Bank, 1998). In general, the
agriculture sector has lost out to the maquilas, which are more profitable and provide a
guaranteed, albeit low, salary iii. This section concentrates on the agriculture sector, because it
is still important for the majority of rural Salvadorans, including the inhabitants in Bajo
Lempa. Despite progress in research by institutions such as the National Centre for
Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry Technology (CENTA), Ministry of Agriculture (MAG)
and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), momentum for resurgence of the
agriculture sector is considered necessary to ensure renewed growth and confidence, in turn
affecting the sustainable development of rural populations.

The Social Investment Fund for Local Development in El Salvador (FISDL) highlights the
decline in the agriculture sector as one of three main causes of poverty in El Salvador. As
reasons for this decline, FISDL points to low growth of the agriculture sector, low levels of
productivity due to limited management capacity, reduced access to technology, poor services
and conditions of natural resources, low levels of investment, the poor state of infrastructure,
macroeconomic policies biased against agriculture and rural sectors, and insufficient sectoral
policies. To date, the agriculture sector in El Salvador is diminishing in importance, both
with respect to its importance to the national economy, and to its role in providing food
security for subsistence farmers. The sector suffered severely during the war because little
was invested in agricultural technology or knowledge building during that time (Acevedo et
al., 1995). Conversion to the dollar as the official currency iv also appears to have affected
prices of products and wages of producers, but these outcomes are primarily relevant for
large-scale farmers producing crops for export. The percentage of contribution by the
agriculture and livestock sector to GDP has decreased steadily since 1993. In a report by the
World Bank on rural development in El Salvador, the authors note that “agriculture is the
only sector showing negative growth over the past twenty years (1975-95), and has averaged
the lowest growth during the post-war period (1990-95)” (World Bank, 1998: 2).
Interviewees suggested that the agriculture sector is linked with other sectors with greater
importance to the Salvadoran economy, for example decline of the agriculture sector will
affect industry, as 60% of this is based on agricultural activities.

There are two types of actors in the agriculture sector that are considered here: the rural
smallholders whose activities are mostly for subsistence purposes, and the larger-scale
commercial farmers whose products are mainly exported, and who cultivate 75% of the land
in the country (World Bank, 1998). Although not in direct competition, their situation is
likely to be linked to the same factors, however some issues appear to affect the large-scale
farmers more directly than the smallholders. For instance, large-scale coffee growers have
been affected by the current decline in global coffee prices. Blame for difficulties in the
large-scale agriculture sector in general is often directed at the global coffee price slump.
Other reasons mentioned include El Salvador’s relative disadvantage with respect to its

9
neighbors. Compared with the much larger Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, El Salvador
has less land area available for cultivation. Although Guatemala has permanent and seasonal
agriculture on 16% of its land, and El Salvador 40%, this means that Guatemala cultivates
over 16,000 km2, whereas El Salvador cultivates just over 8,000 km2 (CIA, 2003).
Furthermore, products in the neighboring countries are often cheaper to produce, and in some
cases may be imported into El Salvador, even though Salvadoran farmers are also producing
these. Although it was argued that the agriculture sector in general was suffering, the small-
scale farmer receives the least support in El Salvador. On the community-level, impacts of
adjustments such as migration are felt directly, because this reduces the number of willing
farmers.

Boyce (1995) notes that it was in fact the growth of the coffee sector towards the second half
of the 19th century created the conditions that eventually led to war in El Salvador. He says
that evicting indigenous communities from the property desired for coffee-growing resulted in
what “was among the most inequitable patterns of land distribution in the world” (Boyce,
1995: 2072). In return, the war also had an impact on the sector, as fighting took place mostly
in rural areas, and warfare practices included crop burning. Lack of personal security led to
“abandonment of agricultural production, physical losses and deterioration of infrastructure”
(World Bank, 1998: 2). Recovery after the war was challenging, due also to agricultural
development outside El Salvador in the period from 1980 to 1992, which meant that
“incredible technology, advanced communications, biotechnology” left El Salvador without
“specialization, competitiveness, quality, food security” according to interviewees. Other
detrimental policies include the 1980 agrarian reform, whose effects have been “devastating”,
particularly because a quarter of the high quality land was handed over to collective co-
operatives, despite a lack of market for the products: the Government of El Salvador was
renting warehouses for placing cashews and cardamom production because they were being
produced without any targeted market. Research in the 1970s and 80s pointed to
technological innovation in El Salvador to reduce agricultural risk, such as through the use of
hybrid maize and storage silos by small-scale farmers, but stressed “increasing population
pressure on land, an inactive land market” (Walker and Jodha, 1986: 25).

The agriculture sector is also declining through the elimination and weakening of support
entities, such as extension services. In identifying what would be needed to adapt to climate
change, the lack of access to credit, insufficient technology, promotion, technical assistance
and training to Salvadoran rural farmers pose considerable constraints. Activities such as
biotechnology and technical assistance have been undertaken by various entities in El
Salvador (CENTA, FAO, MAG). However, there are few support organizations to assist
small-scale farmers. Insufficient research is being conducted to provide alternatives and
technologies to the sector. Various support mechanisms have been created, but these have
either been eliminated, or their functions have been reduced or altered, as described below. It
was the view of several interviewees that such mechanisms would be necessary to facilitate a
process of adaptation to the climatic conditions in Bajo Lempa. To this end, interviewees
highlighted the potentially important role of biotechnology for creating flood-resistant maize
types, and the ways in which technical assistance could educate inhabitants about different
cultivating techniques.

Lack of Market for Traditional Products

A number of those interviewed in Bajo Lempa noted the lack of market opportunities for their
products as a reason for their poverty. On the one hand, there is no physical marketplace for
such activities in the Bajo Lempa, and on the other there are no formal arrangements for such
a market. Interviewees said they cultivate only for the purpose of personal consumption,
although a few mentioned that they attempt to sell any surplus products. In order to do this,
either they travel to one of the larger communities in Bajo Lempa, or they wait for someone
to come to the communities to purchase their products directly from them. In both situations,

10
the seller is at a disadvantage because the maize is bought at a low value compared to the
price at which these later are sold. In part, this is due to the ‘middle man’, the individual
whose living is based on purchasing grains cheaply from the producer and selling them for a
higher price to the consumer. However, in times of flood or drought, the inhabitants in Bajo
Lempa who may have lost their crops are forced to purchase the grains at a higher price,
which may sometimes be more inflated due to high demand. Interest in generating
opportunities to sell their products directly to the consumer was expressed. Currently, if rural
families produce enough for them and are not interested in selling the surplus, it is sometimes
distributed to members beyond the immediate family, or in some cases left to rot. The
inequitable market is not only a problem for traditional products, such as maize and beans.
Two key informant interviewees noted that the research carried out on new crops will also fall
victim to this problem, because the new products will not have a market either.

Mistrust in Government Institutions

Although the war ended over ten years ago, lingering tensions are evident from the
ideological conflict between the rural farmers and the elite upper class, and the growing
middle class may also be added to those whose views differ from those of the rural farmers.
Clearly, many of the issues raised in this chapter have their roots in the conflict, or even
earlier, indicating that issues of contention were not sufficiently resolved despite bloodshed.
Of particular relevance is the agriculture sector and issues related to land tenure. The reason
for this could be the protracted peace process, during which fundamental aspects of the
conflict were not settled. In this sense the end of the civil war did not indicate victory for
either side, and may have come about as a result of the end of the Cold War (Boyce, 1995).
Boyce (1995) observes that the 1992 Peace Accords were a result of military stalemate, and
therefore the conflict continues, albeit without violence. In particular, the key issues of land
reform and agriculture were not settled (Acevedo et al., 1995). Fundamental political
differences remain, and appear to be of great significance. Such circumstances may have
implications for national or local efforts to adapt to climate variability and climate change,
particularly efforts that may need co-ordination between local, municipal or national levels.
Examples described below highlight the residual tensions that influence how adaptation to
climate change occurs in El Salvador.

There was a delay in the land distribution process (the PTT) inscribed in the Peace Accords,
which is attributed to lack of political will (Wood and Segovia, 1995). The policy of land
distribution after the war in El Salvador is considered to have been a response to unsatisfied
rural farmers, rather than part of a plan for “agricultural development for the betterment of the
rural people” (Baumeister, 2001: 71). In previous attempts, redistribution of land in El
Salvador had been “bitterly opposed by many owners, and fervently desired by many among
the poor” (Acevedo et al., 1995: 2153), which generated much of the momentum for the war.
Continuing in this vein, the original plans for the PTT only provided for 47,500 beneficiaries,
despite that over 400,000 adults at the time were landless (Acevedo et al., 1995). Because the
“agro-export oligarchy” had traditionally held the largest proportion of the land (Brockett,
1990: 145), this aspect of the Peace Accords was crucial to the continued peace, but clearly
the poor still feel that the Government of El Salvador is regretful of having transferred land to
them. The Bajo Lempa inhabitants continue to hold feelings of resentment against the
Government of El Salvador, intertwined with fears about being expelled from the land.

Part of the frustration expressed in interviews in Bajo Lempa comes from the management of
the dam ‘15 de Septiembre’ by the originally state-owned v hydro-electric company CEL,
which manages four dams along the Lempa. These hydroelectric dams are considered by the
inhabitants of Bajo Lempa to be used to create deliberate floods in order to encourage the
inhabitants to abandon their land. As perceived by one farmer: “if we didn’t have dams, we
wouldn’t have floods”. Romano (1996) claims that the presence of the dams creates
conditions that increase the likelihood of floods downstream, and have high economic and

11
social costs. He notes, however, that on paper the dams are partly justified by their ability to
control floods, but that in reality they contribute to destruction of natural resources vi and are
even unable to fulfill their main task, retaining enough water to generate energy during the
dry season (Romano, 1996). The dams along the Lempa supply approximately a third of El
Salvador’s energy vii, although their sensitivity to drought means that this figure varies
(Romano, 2004). The dam ‘15 de Septiembre’ is the one causing greatest concern to the
inhabitants of Bajo Lempa, as it is the final dam before the river flows into the area, and into
the Pacific Ocean. According to CEL, the capacity for power generation by the ‘15 de
Septiembre’ is 180 MW. In contrast, two dams further upstream only have the capacity to
generate 60 MW and 82 MW, respectively (CEL Website, 2004).

The reduction of subsidies for electricity initiated a campaign aimed at raising attractiveness
of the enterprises for private investment (Romano, 1996). The process of privatization is
taking place in other sectors in El Salvador, most notably those of health and water.
Decentralization of services constitutes a characteristic of the neoliberal political approach,
which is embraced by the ruling political party. To some, this has created inadequate
communication networks, particularly those living in Bajo Lempa. Romano (1996) believes
that there is a correlation between the release of water from ‘15 de Septiembre’ and impacts
of floods in Bajo Lempa, which have taken place despite announcements that the sluice gates
would be opened, due to the lack of trust that the rural farmers have in these announcements.
Because ‘15 de Septiembre’ is affected by the amount of water that is released from the
upstream dams, as well as the quantity of water in tributaries of the Lempa, inflows and
storage capacity volumes can be estimated some time before storage reaches levels which
would rupture the dam. However, these warnings are often sent only a few hours before the
water is released, not leaving much time for Bajo Lempa inhabitants to take action to protect
themselves, their crops or homes. This was the case during hurricane Mitch in 1998, which
caused the largest volume of water thus far released. CEL was ordered to pay 10 million viii
Salvadoran colónes (US$1,142,857) in compensation to three farmers and one organization
for loss of crops and property as a result of the discharge on 31 October 1998 (Grimaldi,
2003). Many inhabitants lost crops, livestock, homes and personal belongings, but only three
individuals were compensated. The president of CEL announced a refusal to pay the
compensation, and the case was decided in late 2004 in favor of CEL (Rivera Bolaños, 2005).
Furthermore, other accused employees have argued that if the water had not been released on
31 October 1998, a much larger amount (380 million m3) of water would eventually have
been released later on (El Diario de Hoy, 2003).

The Bajo Lempa inhabitants believe that CEL is responsible for the floods in the area, and
hence associate CEL with the Government of El Salvador. Described as ‘anti-government’,
Bajo Lempa inhabitants are well known for being vocally critical of the Government of El
Salvador, particularly on certain issues such as assistance during and after emergencies.
Answers to the question “Is politics important in your life?” indicated that the politics of the
war are still very much present in the communities. Out of the 58 interviewees in Bajo
Lempa, half explicitly noted that politics were important in their lives. Many of those who
denied the importance of politics in their lives nevertheless reflected strong political views in
their answers, for example: “No, because they do not try to help the poor”, “The way the
[government] party is running their politics in this region, they are not serving the poor rural
farmer”, “We are being used”, and “Politicians only manipulate us”. Those who answered
affirmatively also noted their frustration toward the governing party: “They promise us things
and don’t deliver”. Another farmer noted that:

When I was in the war my view was that we are poor and have to fight for the poor people -
so we have to tell the Government that we also have rights and the right to a dignified life and
should not be marginalized and should be allowed to be free. Now it is different from war -
we want to work and have our own lives, but we [still] fight for our freedom which we don’t
have.

12
Another indication of the residual tensions is found in the disputes between the inhabitants on
either side of the Lempa River. This conflict is mainly manifest in the disagreements between
the local base organizations. Divisions between the inhabitants on either side of the river is
based on previous membership in different sub-groups of the guerrilla fraction – the Frente
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), all of which were eventually
amalgamated under the FMLN, but political beliefs still differ ix. Lavell characterizes this
conflict as “symbolic of many of the outstanding conflicts in Salvadoran post-war society”
(2004: 70). Differences between the FMLN and the national ruling party create obstacles for
co-operation between local, often FMLN-ruled constituencies, and the national government.

Dependency and the NGO sector

Existence of organizations within communities, in the form of organizational frameworks and

institutions, appears to assure many Salvadorans that capacity is also present. The presence
of institutions and entities appears to indicate the state of being organized, and therefore the
two are closely linked in the responses given. Presence of organizations is considered
equivalent to proof of capacity according to many local-level interviewees in Bajo Lempa.
When asked whether the communities could maintain capacity to respond to droughts and
floods without the presence of the organizations, only two individuals in Bajo Lempa said
yes, and for one this was only the case for responding to floods. This confirms the strongly
held confidence in organizations. Without action or capacity to take action, however, we may
ask how the mere presence of organizations can be useful in responding to floods and
droughts. For Bajo Lempa residents, therefore, the presence of organizations indicates social
capital.

The reasoning behind the trust in organizations in El Salvador is partially based in the history
of the rural farmer mobilizations prior to and during the civil war, but may also have been
reinforced by the multitude of NGOs, donor agencies, and base organizations present
throughout the country during and since the war. During the war, many non-rightist NGOs
were active in supporting the FMLN (Tedesco, 1999). NGOs play an increasingly important
role in the development of many countries. NGOs are now often financed directly through
the multilateral and regional banks (Kaimowitz, 1993). Bilateral and multilateral agencies
often advocate the participation of NGOs, favoring them over government offices as
executing agencies for projects. Tedesco notes that in Latin America, the State remains the
promoter of development, “but is no longer the principal ‘doer’ of development” (1999: 136).

In El Salvador, the work of NGOs has recently been particularly focused in certain
geographical areas and on certain issues, such as the war and disaster recovery. There is a
strong presence of base organizations, international agencies and NGOs in Bajo Lempa, and
has been so for some time (Medina et al., 2002). However, NGOs worldwide have been
criticized for their lack of long-term solutions in times of disaster, as relief interventions have
been found to leave victims more vulnerable than before (Anderson and Woodrow, 1998).
One example of poor planning on behalf of a major bilateral agency in Bajo Lempa is the
construction of 1000 houses in the region after hurricane Mitch. The next time a flood came,
the new homes were inundated because they were built on recessed plots. Anderson and
Woodrow note that “much of so-called ‘development’ actually increases vulnerabilities”
(1998: 11), and say that relief aid may “subvert or undermine” long-term development (1998:
2). This Samaritan’s Dilemma x has been examined widely (Schipper and Pelling, 2005), but
still perseveres regularly. One of the main reasons why short-term relief can increase
vulnerability to hazards is that people become dependent on the relief interventions. This
serves to undermine people’s creativity and incentive to respond to the hazard events,
resulting in a ‘dependency syndrome’.

13
Dependency has been described as “a complex political, economic, and social phenomenon
that serves to block the human development of the majority in certain privilege-dominated
Third World countries where the economies are heavily externally oriented” (Booth and
Walker, 1999: 15). The type of dependency considered here is one created by external
entities, such as NGOs and relief agencies. In the case of Bajo Lempa, although the
intentions of the external agencies may be benign, the secondary effect of such assistance,
which can be spontaneous and temporary depending on circumstances, is that capacity is not
built in a consistent manner, or even at all. Thus, the presence of the organizations in El
Salvador not only negates the need for communities’ own institutions and sense of
responsibility, but it has also followed the neoliberal model where the State moves away from
taking the main lead in development, and as a consequence, NGOs have assumed many
responsibilities for implementing development programmes that were previously the
responsibility of the Government of El Salvador, as noted above. There is insufficient
evidence to indicate whether NGOs are replacing these functions successfully (Bradshaw et
al., 2002), but there are indications that capacity may not be built even within NGOs to
address situations that recur (Wisner, 2001).

In addressing the question of capacity in El Salvador for adapting to climate change, one
therefore has to address the role of the NGOs in supporting, as well as undermining this
capacity. Two aspects are relevant to examine: the extent to which NGOs are filling roles that
should otherwise be held by local entities of stakeholders, and the extent to which donor
response to disasters in El Salvador is creating dependency on external aid. The ultimate
question is whether the assistance that is provided by NGOs and aid agencies hinders long-
term, sustainable adjustment to climate variability. In short, are NGOs and aid agencies
increasing the vulnerability of El Salvador to climate hazards, simply by denying stakeholders
the chance to build their own response and adaptation mechanisms? A key informant noted
problems with one base organization in Bajo Lempa, and said such organizations “keep the
communities dependent on them” by “protecting and isolating the target groups” from other
organizations or projects. This experience came from an attempt to collaborate with this
organization. He stressed that this was “increasing the vulnerability of the people in Bajo
Lempa”. Another informant noted that adaptive capacity in Bajo Lempa exists only in terms
of the organizations working there. Of the inhabitants, she said “they know someone will
help them”. Thus, organizations represent links to external agencies and the chance to receive
help in times of need, but cannot equally be considered to indicate concrete social capital in
the community. Instead, their presence appears to be contributing to breaking down existing
social capital.

The consequences of relief aid responses after hurricane Mitch serve as a useful example to
illustrate the influence of NGOs. According to Wisner (2001), the heavy impacts during the
2001 earthquakes are evidence of the failure of El Salvador to learn lessons about risk after
hurricane Mitch. He says few efforts were given to resettle people who had been displaced by
hurricane Mitch, noting the “highly politicized and controversial nature of land tenure in El
Salvador” (Wisner, 2001: 257). Thus, ‘temporary’ housing built after hurricane Mitch in
1998 had become ‘permanent’ by 2001, simply because no other housing alternatives had
been offered. Because these houses had been built as temporary shelter, they were not
adapted to the seismic conditions in Central America, and collapsed during the 2001
earthquakes (Wisner, 2001). Although NGOs are not entirely to blame for setting up
temporary housing and not ensuring that these were later converted into proper permanent
housing, it is clear that without the involvement of these organizations, there will be little
involvement by the state. On the other hand, the poor quality of the houses placed an
additional risk on their inhabitants, and when the earthquakes came, this had increased risk to
these people. Lavell has also observed that “many schemes implemented [in Bajo Lempa]
post-hurricane Mitch were ecologically, structurally and socially flawed” (2004: 80). His
research in the area confirms that “many local actors in fact identified external actors as a
major ‘hazard’, whilst the incapacity to negotiate and demand adequate solutions was seen to

14
be a major vulnerability in the zone” (Lavell, 2004: 80). Thus, NGO interventions may be
prolonging unsustainable systems by preventing their complete collapse, although this
moment “when nature is going to take its toll” may be necessary for progress. According to
another informant, without NGOs and bilateral and multilateral agencies, El Salvador “would
be 50 years behind what it is today”.

Competing Frameworks for Risk Management

Risk management is now most commonly defined as interventions to reduce the vulnerability
to hazards, given that many hazards cannot be controlled only avoided, and with an
understanding that it is human vulnerability to these hazards that generates risk (Wisner et al,
2004). Recent academic interest in vulnerability has clearly influenced thinking in El
Salvador as well. That disasters are not natural is an agreed understanding among a range of
stakeholders in El Salvador. Nevertheless, disaster management implemented by the
Government of El Salvador and other organizations does not appear to recognize this entirely,
and evidence suggests that a non-integrated approach still exists with respect to disaster relief
and risk management in El Salvador. Disaster management is commonly used to describe the
activities following a disaster, but risk management incorporates preventive actions and looks
at the bigger picture of causes and triggers. Defining risk management as a more integrated,
encompassing and sustainable form of disaster management in El Salvador remains a
challenge, and there appears to be some misinterpretation of the meaning of the concepts
among all levels of stakeholders. Some interviewees viewed disaster relief aid as a form of
adaptation to climate change – which is normally associated with a long-term, sustainable
adjustment to changes, rather than with immediate responses to extreme events. Evidence
from interviews indicates the importance placed on external assistance by both the
Government of El Salvador and the community inhabitants, but reliance on relief as a coping
strategy may be both unsustainable and maladaptive, as addressed above. Key informants
have indicated that, at least in part, lack of preparation for responding to floods and droughts
in El Salvador is based on a belief that taking no action will result in external assistance in the
form of relief aid, and because of this the Government of El Salvador does not have to be
responsible for meeting the costs of reconstruction.

The question of what risk management entails appeared directly and indirectly in numerous
instances during data collection. In particular, there was evidence that the concept was being
misused by the Government of El Salvador, and possibly other agencies that play an
important role in the existing preparedness and response arrangements. It is possible that
conflicts between the National Emergency Committee (COEN) and the National System for
Territorial Studies (SNET) – an entity comprising of meteorology, hydrology, seismology and
risk management units – may be based in competing understandings of risk management.
Defining the concept not only has consequences for planning, but also implicates the question
of what sort of development is taking place in El Salvador. Wisner has noted that “whether
development leads to disaster risk reduction depends on what kind of ‘development’” (2001:
261). This view is echoed in a comment by one key informant: “I don’t have confidence in
[SNET]. What is their objective? If they don’t question [the development model in El
Salvador] then they are not really going to address risk management”. Again, organization
and presence of organizations concerned with risk was stressed also on the national level as a
feature of a “good level of preparation”. Similarly, proof of organization was considered
knowing what to do in the moment of an emergency. For this reason, risk maps were
highlighted, as these are supposed to inform rural people where to go to be exposed to the
least degree of risk, for example in the case of a flood. The idea of a risk map is considered
part of risk management, although some informants noted that no policy is in place for how
these maps are utilized. Risk maps could potentially create a false sense of security in the
most risk prone areas. Clearly, a common understanding of what risk management
encompasses would be helpful in order for policies and efforts to complement each other, and
also be used effectively.

15
According to the definitions on SNET’s Website xi, risk management is defined as “a complex
social process which encourages planning and application of policies, strategies, instruments
and measures oriented at preventing, reducing, predicting and controlling the adverse effects
of dangerous phenomena on humans, goods, services and the environment” and “integrated
actions of risk reduction through preventive activities, mitigation, preparation for
emergencies, and emergency attention and recovery post impact” (SNET Website, 2006).
Note that the latter definition includes post-event activities as well. Disaster is defined as “a
situation or social process triggered by the manifestation of a phenomenon of natural or
technological origin, or provoked by man, causing intense, serious and extended alterations to
normal livelihoods of a community, in combination with high vulnerability”. SNET is aware
of the difference between the traditional philosophy of hazard-center understandings of risk
and the ‘new’ philosophy on risk management focused on vulnerability. They reject the old
view, where risk management is equated with emergency attention. COEN defines hazard as
“latent danger representing the possible manifestation of a phenomenon of natural, socio-
natural or anthropogenic origin that could produce adverse effects on people, production,
infrastructure, goods and services and the environment, within a period of time and in a
particular location. It is…expressed as the probability that an event occurs with certain
intensity, in a specific location, and within a defined timeframe” (COEN Website, 2003).
Because their task includes emergency attention, their understanding of risk management is
that it is disaster management.

Co-ordination and collaboration between bodies with different capacity is considered a form
of risk management also in El Salvador, but some obstacles to such streamlining are evident.
The greatest challenge may be in overcoming the differing emphasis placed on precautionary,
preventive action (SNET), with that on post-event attention (COEN). Among the
interviewees, it was noted that the Government of El Salvador “doesn’t have a strategy [for
risk management], they do emergency response”. Therefore, risk management appears to
have a greater focus on emergency response than on preventive measures and this is reflected
in aid agencies and NGO views as well. As a result, it has been noted that there exists a
“constant state of emergency in the country”. This idea is potentially harmful in that it
reinforces a view of self-victimization that is also apparent on the local level, and indicates a
psychological cause of vulnerability. To consider that such a thing as a permanent state of
emergency exists also reflects ambiguity in the goals of development and vulnerability
reduction.

Differing Understandings and Beliefs

Awareness of Climate Patterns

A general lack of understanding of the relationship between the climate hazards and the
impacts, particularly in the context of vulnerability and poverty, was clear in the interviews in
Bajo Lempa. Awareness-raising is considered part of a solution towards adapting to the
climate variability. A question about the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) climate
pattern was put to the Bajo Lempa inhabitants, in order to understand to what extent the
inhabitants were aware of this climate variability phenomenon. Two sets of questions were
also asked in order to identify their understanding of drought and flood: the causes of these
(“what causes floods/drought in Bajo Lempa?”), and their manifestation in Bajo Lempa
(“what do(es) floods/drought mean in Bajo Lempa?”).

Some individuals in Bajo Lempa indicated that they had heard about El Niño over the radio,
or seen a report on television. Only very few had not heard of El Niño, although the majority
of respondents did not know what El Niño was. A large number said that El Niño was
drought. Some interviewees said it was a form of variability, although mostly by noting that
they were unsure what form El Niño could take: “drought or a hurricane”. Other answers

16
include: hurricane, flood, a storm, climate change, the result of maltreatment of nature and the
disappearance of fish. One interviewee said El Niño was propaganda by the Government of
El Salvador: “They are trying to scare us”.

In answers to the questions “What causes drought?” and “What causes flood?”, a number of
reasons were given, although two predominant causes were identified for each. For drought,
reasons included environmental destruction, deforestation, pollution, and lack of rain. Other
reasons given were: “phenomena”, such as hurricane Mitch, El Niño, God, “nature” and
population growth. A fifth of the respondents said that they were unaware of what causes
droughts in Bajo Lempa. For floods, a greater range of reasons was given, although the
majority of individuals identified the dams as the cause for floods in their communities, or
copious amounts of rain. Other causes identified include: the river, a broken dike, a storm,
“nature”, humans, God, deforestation, lack of drainage systems, lack of care, and
“phenomena”, such as hurricane Mitch. Several interviewees said they did not know what
causes floods.

Religious Faith

Although only a few respondents directly attributed floods and droughts to God, the
importance of religion in motivating response was clear. Related to education and awareness,
as well as the perception of the ‘naturalness’ of disasters, religious faith is another factor that
has implications for motivation to respond to risk in El Salvador. God is seen as a protector
against the impacts of floods and droughts: “If God doesn’t want the water to come over the
dike, it won’t”. Some respondents view God as the cause of droughts, as seen above, and this
is the case for floods as well. Some individuals who held a fatalistic view of the causes of the
climatic events also associate the impacts with a divine power rather than with other causes of
vulnerability: “These are things caused by God…. I think these are signals from God. There
are many other signs, like war, earthquakes”. Ibarra Turcios et al. note a high incidence of
individuals in El Salvador who believe natural hazards and disasters are a product of
“supernatural forces” sent to castigate the people, and are associated with “divine will” and
“diabolical and uncontrollable” powers (2002: 31). From her study of Bajo Lempa, Moisa
concludes that the expressions of fatalism and resignation when faced with floods indicate a
“high level of individual ideological vulnerability” (1996: 28). Religious faith appears to
influence the degree to which individuals take action to respond to climatic events in two
ways: first, individuals may hold that events are ‘sent’ by some force, such as God, and may
not question why impacts occur; and second, individuals may believe that, due to this
‘supernatural force’, precautionary efforts cannot influence the actual events. As expressed
by one farmer: “For droughts we cannot do anything, only God can help us”. Upon
examination, it appears that the decisive factor for motivation to respond to floods and
droughts in the context of religion is whether individuals belong to either the Catholic Church
or the evangelical Protestant Church, where the Catholics are more proactive xii, and the
Protestant evangelicals more fatalistic.

Many of the base organizations that have been working in El Salvador during and since the
war have religious affiliations, primarily Catholic. This stems from the activist role
encouraged through raised social awareness in the Catholic Church in the 1960s (Haggarty,
1988) which taught that suffering was not caused by God, but rather by other factors part of
“the system” (Brockett, 1990: 150). This was influenced by an aim to improve living
conditions of the lower classes, a religious philosophy known as liberation theology xiii, which
encourages social justice, grass-roots clergy, and lay organizations to call for “changes in
social and political structures and encouraged the laity to take an active role in bringing them
about” (Haggarty, 1988). The spreading of the message raised awareness among the
Salvadoran rural farmers and poor about the “unjust nature of the Salvadoran political and
economic system” (Booth and Walker, 1999: 42). As a result, also the “radical Christian
groups” in El Salvador initiated peasant mobilization leading up to the war (Baumeister,

17
2001: 69). In the 1970s, violence by right-wing groups took place against individuals
involved in this Catholic grass-roots work, claiming that “assisting the poor constituted
subversive activity” against the state (Haggarty, 1988). The activist movement became all the
more politicized, and Oscar Romero’s selection as San Salvador’s Archbishop contributed to
this further. Romero’s strong statements to the poor in El Salvador reflected, among other
things, his belief in the Church’s involvement in addressing the plight of the people, and his
dislike for the military and Government of El Salvador tactics..

While the belief that floods and droughts may be caused by God is not exclusive to
evangelicals, the perceptions about whether these are sent to chastise humans or not, and to
what extent the impacts of such events may be influenced appears to be related to religious
groups. Moisa’s (1996) findings support the findings in this study. Fatalism acts as a
constraint, because individuals who believe that precautionary action cannot influence the
impacts of floods and droughts, as they are ‘God’s will’, may not be inclined to take measures
to adapt to these climatic conditions xiv. Evangelicals take this a step further, and believe that
the impacts are also caused by God, so therefore nothing can be done in response, apart from
having greater faith in God. This therefore has implications for community-level organization
and initiatives to address the impacts of floods and droughts. To this end, researchers in the
area found that predominantly evangelical communities more often resisted significant
participation in awareness-raising projects with the purpose of minimizing the impacts of
floods and droughts (cf. Williams and Peterson, 1996). Furthermore, the concept of
organization does not appear to represent the same importance for evangelicals as it appears
to do for Catholics, although some ex-guerrilla combatants may continue to have faith in the
concept of organization, regardless of religion, as this factor was so important during the war.
Some may also have converted religion after the war. It is not clear to what extent the
division of Catholic/Protestant can still be associated with the division guerrilla/military or
Government supporter during the war, although a number of upper-class Salvadorans have
converted to evangelical Protestantism (Haggarty, 1988), and clearly the Catholic Church
remains on the side of the poor. Nonetheless, Gómez notes that churches in El Salvador now
emphasize “quality of life issues” over structural problems in the country (1999: 54), and
focus on issues related to the renewal of Salvadorans’ identity after the war. Despite this shift
in the role of the Catholic Church, the legacy of war implies that the tensions have not been
settled entirely, and religion appears to be another feature of this legacy. Faith could possibly
also been seen as an asset to adaptive capacity, in that it provides a sense of unity among
community members, and offers emotional relief – but such positive effects may not
outweigh negative influences in some cases.

6. Discussion & Conclusions

The issues discussed above have been presented as challenges to effective risk reduction in El
Salvador, which is a prerequisite for a process of adaptation to climate change. This is
because vulnerability reduction – a key component of risk reduction – is also the underlying
requirement in adaptation. The study of Bajo Lempa indicates that there is a strong
correlation between reducing vulnerability and a path of sustainable development. Thus,
major development challenges – such as marginalization of the agriculture sector – also
represent major challenges to risk reduction. To this end, Wisner underscores that one of the
ways to ensure greater disaster preparedness is to initiate national discussions “concerning the
nature and trajectory of ‘development’ in El Salvador” (2001: 265). The discussed factors
represent those that are most apparent and liable to be most important in affecting adaptive
capacity in El Salvador. These factors are unlikely to be unique to El Salvador, and evidence
suggests that similar circumstances can be found in other Latin American countries (Eakin,
2005; Vásquez-León et al., 2003; Liverman, 1999; Lavell, 1994).

In El Salvador, post-war recovery has led to a fracturing of support networks and belief
systems that would otherwise facilitate adaptation. One informant suggested that recurrence

18
of natural hazards will eventually lead people to discover that “the situation needs to be
changed”, implying that losses will eventually elicit adjustments. Similarly, Adger and
Brooks (2003) have observed that while impacts of climate change may increase vulnerability
in the short-term, in the medium to long-term, the incidence of hazards may encourage
adaptation. However, it is questionable to what extent adaptation could be expected in Bajo
Lempa, as the constraining factors identified challenge even simple changes in rural
livelihoods. On the macro-policy level, the Government of El Salvador may need to initiate
policy modifications in order to allow autonomous adaptation to take place, which may
counteract other government policies for economic development, and would therefore not be
desirable. Under this surface of challenging policies appear characteristics that are likely to
contribute capacity to an adaptive process, but these cannot be successful without
accompanying adjustments in policy. At the moment, it appears that many of these strategies
are also associated with related weaknesses that act as hindrances to attaining sustainable
adjustments to environmental circumstances.

Organization as a strength has been examined by others in numerous countries and situations,
particularly in the context of social capital and as a positive feature for adaptation processes
(Berkhout et al., 2004; Pelling, 2003b), but it is appropriate here to question to what extent
organization is truly an asset in El Salvador for responding to climate change and supportive
of adaptive capacity. Links are drawn between the role of social networks and organizations
in contributing to the positive, capacity-enforcing aspect of organization, and their role in
creating and reinforcing dependency on formal structures and outside actors in Bajo Lempa.
A dependency syndrome is suggested also as a constraint to self-motivated action, and can be
related to a lack of responsibility for the impacts of the hazards, including disasters such as
hurricane Mitch, and even the earthquakes of 2001. Added to the general mistrust of the
Government of El Salvador conveyed in many interviews, dependency on organization and
outside assistance and the general lack of preparedness for floods and droughts evokes a sense
of victimization that is evident throughout the local level, but also on the national level. The
identification of certain vulnerable groups as “victims” – by themselves (“self-victimization”)
and by others – could been identified as a “conceptual constraint” to vulnerability reduction
(Bankoff, 2001: 31), but can also be recognized as a consequence of the rising popularity of
the vulnerability approach to development, promoted not only by academics, but also by
policy-makers and development agencies. Use of the concept as a characteristic, as in “I am
vulnerable”, encourages the process of self-victimization among those who feel marginalized
and lack access to opportunities to challenge the forces that determine their vulnerability. The
Bajo Lempa inhabitants’ perceptions of their vulnerability and the risks they are exposed to
also contribute to how risk management is understood. Underpinning such issues are
profound ideological differences, supported by powerful influences that have been present in
El Salvador and elsewhere since the beginning of the twentieth century. This is in turn
coupled with questions about the description of El Salvador as being “in a permanent state of
emergency” noted by at least one interviewee, but implied by many others.

Clearly the sense of victimization in Bajo Lempa can also be linked with the frustration
evident among interviewees regarding being granted land that they consider is deliberately
being flooded by the Government of El Salvador. One of the main characteristics of the
inhabitants of Bajo Lempa is that they are emotionally attached to their land, as a result of the
PTT and the social conflict that remains a legacy of the war. The earliest lands were settled in
1991, before the official land redistribution process took place. As described, the land is
exposed to numerous meteorological and geological hazards, which create risks for the
inhabitants since they are poorly prepared for the impacts of these hazards. Studies have
identified that “transformation in consciousness levels on risk and risk reduction, and a fuller
understanding of risk construction processes” is necessary in Bajo Lempa, specifically
because people are recent migrants and have little experience with tropical lowland
environments and agriculture (Lavell, 2004: 80). The context of newly settled communities is
important when addressing responses to hazards, because the communities in question are not

19
well accustomed to the conditions of the land as a result of not having spent their lives in such
climatic circumstances – this includes the conditions for cultivating, as well as the socio-
cultural aspects of being exposed to risk. Another important feature is that the communities
are made up of individuals from different parts of El Salvador, and some had spent most of
their lives in Honduras. In response to the question of whether the land in Bajo Lempa is
better or worse than in their previous locations, answers reflect that upon settling in Bajo
Lempa the majority of individuals were familiar with more arid land, and not with land prone
to frequent flooding. Because these families are new to the combination of hazards presented
by inhabiting Bajo Lempa, they have not had sufficient time to develop adequate coping
strategies. An examination of their responses indicates attempts at coping, but without
situation-specific knowledge based on experience with living in a flood plain to guide them.
This is characterized as a process of adaptation. To some, this is viewed as an opportunity to
learn and develop in a more sustainable way (Medina et al., 2002). But the questions still
remain germane as to whether it is appropriate for these settlers to inhabit a flood plain at all,
and whether, as options suggested by local NGOs, irrigation systems and flood-resistant crops
are the answer to achieving sustainable livelihoods in Bajo Lempa.

Underlying these proposals is a question about adapting to such extreme conditions,

considering that evidence points to the areas in Bajo Lempa directly along the Lempa River,
where most communities are located, as having been a flood plain at least since the early
1900s. Unlike a crop such as rice, the crops grown in Bajo Lempa are not dependent on
floods, but are instead harmed by them, although floods are also associated with increasing
soil nutrient levels. The appropriateness and feasibility of adaptation and responses in this
situation can be questioned. The appropriateness of adapting to these conditions is relevant to
address from an engineering perspective (i.e. whether it is worth the investment to build
physical structure such as refuge houses) and also from a development perspective (i.e.
whether the Bajo Lempa inhabitants will be sacrificing other aspects of their livelihoods in
order to adapt to the climatic conditions). The feasibility of such adaptation must be
addressed structurally (i.e. physical adjustments to housing and other infrastructure necessary
for livelihoods), but also from a development perspective: to what extent is inhabiting a flood
plain sustainable, particularly when this is not part of the traditional livelihood? Whether it is
desirable would clearly produce different reactions according to who is asked. It appears that
it would be desirable for those living in Bajo Lempa to adapt to climate variability, because
that is the only land to which they have rights. In the interviews, it is clear that other factors
such as employment opportunities and political struggles take greater priority. Seen from the
perspective that vulnerability reduction requires the overcoming of major development
challenges, however, such factors would be included.

Agriculture is sensitive to variations in climate (Bhandari, 2003; Jones and Thornton, 2003;
Watson and Ackermann, 2000; Watson et al., 1998), and has been an important indicator of
climate change for scientists, both natural and social (IPCC, 2001). Two key variables
examined for assessing the impacts of climate change on agriculture are water resources and
food security (Watson et al., 1998), which are also considered key issues in development.
Agriculture is also sensitive to the impacts of globalization, the source of some of the
constraining factors identified in El Salvador. This complex set of forces affecting agriculture
has been described by O’Brien and Leichenko as “double exposure” (2000) and will generate
“double losers” in affected sectors. With respect to Salvadoran subsistence farmers, who
have a small role to play in the regional market, if at all, the concept of “double exposure” is
appropriate, particularly in the context of the looming CAFTA and FTAA. Based on a study
in Mexico, O’Brien and Leichenko have observed that climate change adaptation strategies in
the agriculture sector “may be counteracted or rendered ineffective by outcomes associated
with economic globalization” (2000: 230). Mexico signed the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, and it is generally considered that most small farmers in
Mexico initially lost out as a result (Eakin, 2005; Green, 1999). This example may therefore
have important implications for El Salvador. As the different layers in Table 3 indicate, a

20
process which enables adaptation in the agriculture sector would have to address numerous
issues of different origins, including consequences of regional trade frameworks and lacking
support and extension services. The results of neoliberalism in Latin America include
increased poverty and other social impacts, and the benefits of structural adjustment have yet
to be evidenced. If there are no prospects for growth in the market or subsidization of the
small-scale farmer and no reinforcement of the technical support units, the outlook for this
climate-sensitive sector is not encouraging. The consequences of the absence of such factors
will be amplified by globalization, where the less expensive neighboring countries’ products
will be more affordable to Salvadorans than their own. The difficulty posed by lack of access
to irrigation systems and inappropriate crop types may be worsened by climate change; a
national emphasis on non-farm labor and exports will not simplify access to, or encourage,
better irrigation systems for subsistence farmers. Success in addressing the climate change
impacts before addressing the other factors is therefore uncertain.

These findings raise also questions about the importance of social institutions in determining
adaptive capacity. In the case of Bajo Lempa, social institutions have been defined as
organizations and social networks. Studies in other regions have found that social institutions,
including networks in India and Nepal (Moench and Dixit, 2004) and structures and
organizations influencing resource allocation in Vietnam (Adger, 2000b) play a clear role in
determining the adaptive capacity of vulnerable societies. Informal social networks,
including relationships based on kinship or friendship, have also been observed to play a role
in reducing vulnerability in other Latin American societies, and support policy trends to
increase involvement of local actors in disaster mitigation (Pelling, 2002). As noted by
Adger, however, institutions can both “constrain and facilitate adaptation to social and
environmental change” (2000b: 754). In El Salvador it appears that the role of both informal
and formal institutions, such as community organizations, is primarily a psychological
support. The importance of organizations in reducing vulnerability appears to be based in the
extent to which these institutions are able to build trust among community members, rather
than in practical steps taken to reduce or address risk. While it may be true in El Salvador
that local actors possess the capacity to respond to social structures that expose them to
environmental risk, ideological barriers noted in Table 3 are constraining the capitalization of
this capacity among the people resident in Bajo Lempa, but also in the country in general. As
such, emphasis on building adaptive capacity without these constraints being addressed – and
modified – will not ensure reduction in risk in El Salvador. Furthermore, the existence of
institutions creates awareness resulting in a dependency syndrome that may outweigh any
positive aspects, and in El Salvador this dependency represents a considerable constraint to
reduction of vulnerability.

On a national level, the role of the SNET had not been sufficiently tested at the time of study.
It is possible that the institutional structures that have been built will strengthen the capacity
of all levels, local through national, not only to respond to risks through a more effective early
warning system, but also to prevent risk through dissemination of research results on various
aspects of the hydrology, meteorology and seismology of El Salvador. Again, the question
remains as to whether capacity of institutions will be sufficient for reducing vulnerability to
climate hazards, when more dominant challenges are present in political and social structures.
Adger speaks about institutional adaptation, which he defines as “the net outcome of the
evolution of institutions within the wider social environment along with institutional inertia”
(2000b: 738). He notes that not only individuals, but also institutions will need to adapt, in
this case referring to formal, rather than informal, institutions (Adger, 1999). Ultimately, this
appears to be the sort of adjustment that will be necessary across the board in El Salvador – in
governing structures and institutions related to economic growth, religious beliefs,
relationships between NGOs and other organizations and local communities and the
Government of El Salvador, and interpretations and implementation of risk management. The
legacy of war is not easily affected, and will possibly require time to enable the different
views to be reconciled. It is unlikely that the buffering of such a superficial characteristic as

21
adaptive capacity will result in long-term, sustainable changes to the levels of risk, as this will
not address the core causes of vulnerability.

In sum, key factors are identified in El Salvador that pose as obstacles to adapting to climate
change and climate variability, and that instead contribute to increasing vulnerability to
climate change and may not easily be addressed by focusing on increasing adaptive capacity.
As is clear in the concept of “double exposure” applied in the case of the agriculture sector,
the factors here are not simply obstacles to adapting to climate change, but also obstacles to
development. Clearly, differences between the requirements for sustainable development and
adaptation are minor.

Nevertheless, this does not imply that adaptation is not a useful concept for guiding policy
actions to address risk from climate change. Rather, adaptation has a unique and rapidly
expanding niche within the discourses on climate change, risk and development that will
enable adaptation discussions to find greater authority beyond the existing global policy
process on climate change. The relationships between these three discourses is also gaining
attention (UNDP, 2004), but the intellectual communities require merging, so that lessons
learnt in one discipline can inform others. It is apparent that a vast amount of literature
informing adaptation to climate change stems from the risk and hazards discourse. It is also
evident that there is interest within these intellectual communities to share their knowledge
among each other (UNDP, 2002), as well as desire within the development assistance
community to incorporate aspects of adaptation to climate change (AfDB et al., 2003). The
empirical evidence from El Salvador indicates that the merger of these three fields may also
be necessary in order to facilitate adaptation in reality. In this position, adaptation to climate
change can be seen as a uniting concept that could draw together policy objectives of
reducing vulnerability and risk and promoting sustainable development.

Acknowledgements

This research was funded through a Ph.D. studentship from the Tyndall Centre for Climate
Change Research (TRS01), the UK Overseas Research Studentship Award
(ORS/2001013003), and a contribution from the Overseas Development Group of the School
of Development Studies, University of East Anglia. Institutional support was provided by the
University of El Salvador, and the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources in El
Salvador. The author would like to thank Kate Brown, Declan Conway, Mike Hulme, Mark
Pelling, Mike Mortimore, Allan Lavell, Ben Wisner and Ian Burton, among many others, for
their invaluable comments on this work.

22
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i
The dam ‘5 de Noviembre’, at an elevation of 180m, was built in 1954 and thereby represents the first
dam to be built along the Lempa River. The dam ‘Cerrón Grande’ (elevation 243m) was installed in
1977, and ‘15 de Septiembre’, built in 1983, was the final dam to be constructed on the Lempa River,
at an elevation of 49m.
ii
Floods recorded before the first dam was built on the River were in 1931, 1934 and 1936 (Romano,
1996).
iii
According to PROESA, an organization promoting investment in El Salvador, wages in El Salvador
are “one of the most competitive in Latin America”, with wages at US$ 0.60/hour. Labour costs are
estimated at US$ 1.06/hour, compared with US$2.70 in Costa Rica, and US$0.88 in Nicaragua
(http://www.proesa.com.sv/textil.asp).
iv
Dollarisation in El Salvador took place in 2001. The United States Dollar is the official unit of
currency, along with the Salvadoran colón, at a rate of 1US$ = ¢ 8.75.
v
Since 1998, distribution of electricity has been privatised, according to a 1996 law. Several
companies have been created to take over the responsibilities of distributing electricity. The thermal
energy generation units are owned and operated separately from the hydroelectricity units
(http://www.cel.gob.sv/marco_cel.htm, July 28, 2003).
vi
The subject of dams is controversial globally; they are associated with environmental destruction, but
also with creating problems between upstream and downstream stakeholders, among other things.
vii
Other major energy sources include thermal and geothermal sources (IEA, 2003).
viii
This has also been reported as 11 million or 18 million colónes in articles in El Diario de Hoy.
ix
The groups that made up the leftist party were: Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party
(PRTC), People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL),
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), and the Communist Party of El Salvador's Armed
Forces of Liberation (FAL).
x
Samaritan’s Dilemma is a variant of moral hazard and describes how disaster relief and reconstruction
can work as a negative incentive for governments not to invest in disaster risk reduction.
xi
http://www.snet.gob.sv/Documentos/conceptos.htm
xii
Although Catholics may also believe in the influence of a divine power. An example of belief in
divine powers, and yet a proactive attitude is: “During droughts we do not have any options. We just
have to overcome what God sends us. But during floods, the dike makes us feel safe. We have built this
second floor to put the most necessary there.”
xiii
“Belief that the Christian Gospel demands ‘a preferential option for the poor’, and that the church
should be involved in the struggle for economic and political justice in the contemporary world –
particularly in the Third World. Dating to the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) and the Second Latin
American Bishops Conference, held in Medellin, Colombia (1968), the movement brought poor people
together in base communities, or Christian-based communities, to study the Bible and to fight for social
justice. Since the 1980s, the church hierarchy, led by Pope John Paul II , has criticized liberation
theology and its advocates, accusing them of wrongly supporting violent revolution and Marxist class
struggle.” (Encyclopedia.com, http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/l1/liberati.asp, Columbia
Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition)
xiv
This may be relevant to recovery after an event as well: those who believe that events are caused by
God may rebuild their houses in the same high risk location as before .

26
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Public participation and climate change The Costs of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation
adaptation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 95 with Induced Technological Change: A
Meta-Analysis of Estimates in the
• Corbera E., Kosoy N, Martinez Tuna M, Literature, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 89
(2006) Marketing ecosystem services
through protected areas and rural • Kuang C, Stansby P, (2006) Sandbanks for
communities in Meso-America: coastal protection: implications of sea-level
Implications for economic efficiency, rise. Part 3: wave modelling, Tyndall Centre
equity and political legitimacy, Tyndall Working Paper 88
Centre Working Paper 94
• Kuang C, Stansby P, (2006) Sandbanks for
• Schipper E. Lisa, (2006) Climate Risk, coastal protection: implications of sea-level
Perceptions and Development in El rise. Part 2: current and morphological
Salvador, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 93 modelling, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 87

• Tompkins E. L, Amundsen H, (2005) • Stansby P, Kuang C, Laurence D, Launder B,

Perceptions of the effectiveness of the (2006) Sandbanks for coastal protection:
United Nations Framework Convention on implications of sea-level rise. Part 1:
Climate Change in prompting behavioural application to East Anglia, Tyndall Centre
change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 92 Working Paper 86

• Warren R., Hope C, Mastrandrea M, Tol R S • Bentham M, (2006)

J, Adger W. N., Lorenzoni I., (2006)
Spotlighting the impacts functions in
integrated assessments. Research Report
Prepared for the Stern Review on the
Economics of Climate Change, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 91
• Warren R., Arnell A, Nicholls R., Levy P E,
Price J, (2006) Understanding the regional
impacts of climate change: Research
Report Prepared for the Stern Review on
the Economics of Climate Change, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 90
An assessment of carbon sequestration
potential in the UK – Southern North Sea
case study: Tyndall Centre Working Paper 85
• Anderson K., Bows A., Upham P., (2006)
Growth scenarios for EU & UK aviation:
contradictions with climate policy,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 84
• Williamson M., Lenton T., Shepherd J.,
Edwards N, (2006) An efficient numerical
terrestrial scheme (ENTS) for fast earth
system modelling, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 83

Tyndall Working Papers 2000 - 2006

• Bows, A., and Anderson, K. (2005) An
analysis of a post-Kyoto climate policy
model, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 82
• Sorrell, S., (2005) The economics of
energy service contracts, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 81
• Wittneben, B., Haxeltine, A., Kjellen, B.,
Köhler, J., Turnpenny, J., and Warren, R.,
(2005) A framework for assessing the
political economy of post-2012 global
climate regime, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
80
• Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005)
Can adaptation and mitigation be
complements?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
79
• Agnolucci,. P (2005) Opportunism and
competition in the non-fossil fuel
obligation market, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 78
• Barker, T., Pan, H., Köhler, J., Warren., R
and Winne, S. (2005) Avoiding dangerous
climate change by inducing technological
progress: scenarios using a large-scale
econometric model, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 77
• Agnolucci,. P (2005) The role of political
uncertainty in the Danish renewable
energy market, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
76
• Fu, G., Hall, J. W. and Lawry, J. (2005)
Beyond probability: new methods for
representing uncertainty in projections of
future climate, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
75
• Ingham, I., Ma, J., and Ulph, A. M. (2005)
How do the costs of adaptation affect
optimal mitigation when there is
uncertainty, irreversibility and learning?,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 74
• Walkden, M. (2005) Coastal process
simulator scoping study, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 73
• Lowe, T., Brown, K., Suraje Dessai, S.,
Doria, M., Haynes, K. and Vincent., K (2005)
Does tomorrow ever come? Disaster
narrative and public perceptions of climate
change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 72
• Boyd, E. Gutierrez, M. and Chang, M. (2005)
Adapting small-scale CDM sinks projects to
Tyndall Working Papers
low-income communities, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 71
• Abu-Sharkh, S., Li, R., Markvart, T., Ross,
N., Wilson, P., Yao, R., Steemers, K., Kohler, J.
and Arnold, R. (2005) Can Migrogrids Make a
Major Contribution to UK Energy Supply?,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 70
• Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. A. (2005)
Natural hazards and climate change: what
knowledge is transferable?, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 69
• Bleda, M. and Shackley, S. (2005) The
formation of belief in climate change in
business organisations: a dynamic
simulation model, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 68
• Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A. and O’Riordan,
T., (2005) Developing regional and local
scenarios for climate change mitigation
and adaptation: Part 2: Scenario creation,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 67
• Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine, A., Lorenzoni, I.,
O’Riordan, T., and Jones, M., (2005) Mapping
actors involved in climate change policy
networks in the UK, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 66
• Adger, W. N., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E. L.
(2004) Why do resource managers make
links to stakeholders at other scales?,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 65
• Peters, M.D. and Powell, J.C. (2004) Fuel
Cells for a Sustainable Future II, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 64
• Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. and Kovats,
S. (2004) Floods, health and climate
change: a strategic review, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 63
• Barker, T. (2004) Economic theory and
the transition to sustainability: a
comparison of
approaches, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 62
• Brooks, N. (2004) Drought in the African
Sahel: long term perspectives and future
prospects, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 61
• Few, R., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E.L.
(2004) Scaling adaptation: climate change
response and coastal management in the
UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 60
• Anderson, D and Winne, S. (2004)
Modelling Innovation and Threshold Effects
2000 - 2006
In Climate Change Mitigation, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 59
• Bray, D and Shackley, S. (2004) The Social
Simulation of The Public Perceptions of
Weather Events and their Effect upon the
Development of Belief in Anthropogenic
Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
58
• Shackley, S., Reiche, A. and Mander, S
(2004) The Public Perceptions of
Underground Coal Gasification (UCG): A
Pilot Study, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 57
• Vincent, K. (2004) Creating an index of
social vulnerability to climate change for
Africa, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 56
• Mitchell, T.D. Carter, T.R., Jones, .P.D,
Hulme, M. and New, M. (2004) A
comprehensive set of high-resolution grids
of monthly climate for Europe and the
globe: the observed record (1901-2000)
and 16 scenarios (2001-2100), Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 55
• Turnpenny, J., Carney, S., Haxeltine, A., and
O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and
local scenarios for climate change
mitigation and adaptation Part 1: A
framing of the East of England Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 54
• Agnolucci, P. and Ekins, P. (2004) The
Announcement Effect And Environmental
Taxation Tyndall Centre Working Paper 53
• Agnolucci, P. (2004) Ex Post Evaluations
of CO2 –Based Taxes: A Survey Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 52
• Agnolucci, P., Barker, T. and Ekins, P.
(2004) Hysteresis and Energy Demand: the
Announcement Effects and the effects of
the UK Climate Change Levy Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 51
• Powell, J.C., Peters, M.D., Ruddell, A. and
Halliday, J. (2004) Fuel Cells for a
Sustainable Future? Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 50
• Awerbuch, S. (2004) Restructuring our
electricity networks to promote
decarbonisation, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 49
• Pan, H. (2004) The evolution of economic
structure under technological
Tyndall Working Papers
development, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
48
• Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Gann, D. M.,
(2004) Learning to adapt: Organisational
adaptation to climate change impacts,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 47
• Watson, J., Tetteh, A., Dutton, G., Bristow,
A., Kelly, C., Page, M. and Pridmore, A., (2004)
UK Hydrogen Futures to 2050, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 46
• Purdy, R and Macrory, R. (2004) Geological
carbon sequestration: critical legal issues,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 45
• Shackley, S., McLachlan, C. and Gough, C.
(2004) The Public Perceptions of Carbon
Capture and Storage, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 44
• Anderson, D. and Winne, S. (2003)
Innovation and Threshold Effects in
Technology Responses to Climate Change,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 43
• Kim, J. (2003) Sustainable Development
and the CDM: A South African Case Study,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 42
• Watson, J. (2003), UK Electricity
Scenarios for 2050, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 41
• Klein, R.J.T., Lisa Schipper, E. and Dessai,
S. (2003), Integrating mitigation and
adaptation into climate and development
policy: three research questions, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 40
• Tompkins, E. and Adger, W.N. (2003).
Defining response capacity to enhance
climate change policy, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 39
• Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk
and adaptation: a conceptual framework,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 38
• Ingham, A. and Ulph, A. (2003)
Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Precaution and
the Social Cost of Carbon, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 37
• Kröger, K. Fergusson, M. and Skinner, I.
(2003). Critical Issues in Decarbonising
Transport: The Role of Technologies,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 36
2000 - 2006
• Tompkins E. L and Hurlston, L. (2003).
Report to the Cayman Islands’
Government. Adaptation lessons learned
from responding to tropical cyclones by the
Cayman Islands’ Government, 1988 –
2002, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 35
• Dessai, S., Hulme, M (2003). Does
climate policy need probabilities?, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 34
• Pridmore, A., Bristow, A.L., May, A. D. and
Tight, M.R. (2003). Climate Change, Impacts,
Future Scenarios and the Role of Transport,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 33
• Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G.
(2003). Integrating Renewables and CHP
into the UK Electricity System:
Investigation of the impact of network
faults on the stability of large offshore
wind farms, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 32
• Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine A. and O’Riordan,
T. (2003). A scoping study of UK user needs
for managing climate futures. Part 1 of the
pilot-phase interactive integrated
assessment process (Aurion Project),
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 31
• Hulme, M. (2003). Abrupt climate
change: can society cope?, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 30
• Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). A
Multi-Criteria Assessment Framework for
Carbon-Mitigation Projects: Putting
“development” in the centre of decision-
making, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 29
• Dessai, S., Adger, W.N., Hulme, M.,
Köhler, J.H., Turnpenny, J. and Warren, R.
(2003). Defining and experiencing
dangerous climate change, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 28
• Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003).
Building resilience to climate change
through adaptive management of natural
resources, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 27
• Brooks, N. and Adger W.N. (2003).
Country level risk measures of climate-
related natural disasters and implications
for adaptation to climate change, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 26
• Xueguang Wu, Mutale, J., Jenkins, N. and
Strbac, G. (2003). An investigation of
Tyndall Working Papers
Network Splitting for Fault Level
Reduction, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 25
• Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G.
(2002). Impact of Integrating Renewables
and CHP into the UK Transmission
Network, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 24
• Paavola, J. and Adger, W.N. (2002).
Justice and adaptation to climate change,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 23
• Watson, W.J., Hertin, J., Randall, T.,
Gough, C. (2002). Renewable Energy and
Combined Heat and Power Resources in
the UK, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 22
• Watson, W. J. (2002). Renewables and
CHP Deployment in the UK to 2020, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 21
• Turnpenny, J. (2002). Reviewing
organisational use of scenarios: Case study
- evaluating UK energy policy options,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 20
• Pridmore, A. and Bristow, A., (2002). The
role of hydrogen in powering road
transport, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 19
• Watson, J. (2002). The development of
large technical systems: implications for
hydrogen, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 18
• Dutton, G., (2002). Hydrogen Energy
Technology, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 17
• Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway,
D. and Hulme, M. (2002). Adaptation to
climate change: Setting the Agenda for
Development Policy and Research, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 16
• Köhler, J.H., (2002). Long run technical
change in an energy-environment-economy
(E3) model for an IA system: A model of
Kondratiev waves, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 15
• Shackley, S. and Gough, C., (2002). The
Use of Integrated Assessment: An
Institutional Analysis Perspective, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 14
• Dewick, P., Green K., Miozzo, M., (2002).
Technological Change, Industry Structure
and the Environment, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 13
• Dessai, S., (2001). The climate regime
from The Hague to Marrakech: Saving or
2000 - 2006
sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 12
• Barker, T. (2001). Representing the
Integrated Assessment of Climate Change,
Adaptation and Mitigation, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 11
• Gough, C., Taylor, I. and Shackley, S.
(2001). Burying Carbon under the Sea: An
Initial Exploration of Public Opinions,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 10
• Barnett, J. and Adger, W. N. (2001).
Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 9
• Adger, W. N. (2001). Social Capital and
Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
8
• Barnett, J. (2001). Security and Climate
Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7
• Goodess, C.M., Hulme, M. and Osborn, T.
(2001). The identification and evaluation of
suitable scenario development methods for
the estimation of future probabilities of
extreme weather events, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 6
Tyndall Working Papers
• Barnett, J. (2001). The issue of 'Adverse
Effects and the Impacts of Response
Measures' in the UNFCCC, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 5
• Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2001). How High
are the Costs of Kyoto for the US
Economy?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 4
• Berkhout, F, Hertin, J. and Jordan, A. J.
(2001). Socio-economic futures in climate
change impact assessment: using
scenarios as 'learning machines', Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 3
• Hulme, M. (2001). Integrated
Assessment Models, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 2
• Mitchell, T. and Hulme, M. (2000). A
Country-by-Country Analysis of Past and
Future Warming Rates, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 1
© Copyright 2006
For further information please contact
Javier Delgado-Esteban
2000 - 2006