Philippine Marine Radio Officers Association v. CIR (1957)

9/23/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 102
[No. L-10095 and L-10115. October 31, 1957]
THE PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS'

ASSOCIATION, petitioner vs. THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, COMPAÑÍA MARÍTIMA,
PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION Co., MADRIGAL
SHIPPING Co., NORTH CAMARINES LUMBER
SHIPPING Co., PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING Co., HlJOS
DE F. ESCAÑO, INC., VlSAYAN TRANSPORTATION
CO., ROYAL LlNES, INC., CARLOS A. GOTHONG
SHIPPING Co. and BISAYA LAND TRANSPORTATION
Co., respondents. COMPAÑÍA MARÍTIMA, PHILIPPINE
STEAM NAVIGATION and MADRIGAL SHIPPING Co.,
INC., petitioners vs. PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO
OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.
374
374 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Phil. Marine Radio Officers' Assn. vs. Court of Ind.
Relations, et al.
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; STRIKE NOT CAUSED

BY ILLEGAL AND UNFAIR ACT; ABSENCE OF
DEMAND TO RETURN TO WORK; NO BACKPAY.—
Where the strike is not caused by any illegal or unfair
labor practice on the part of the employers and neither the
strikers have demanded the privilege to return to work,
but their return to work was left at the discretion of the
court, Held: that the strikers are not entitled to pay or
backpay during the period they voluntarily absented
themselves from work and such situation is governed by
the general principle of fair day's wage for a fair day's
labor.
2. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; CASE

CERTIFIED TO IT BY PRESIDENT; POWER OF CIR.—
Upon certification by the President of a case to the C.I.R.
under section 10 of Republic Act 875 it comes under the
operation of "Commonwealth Act 103 which enforces
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d5b9679b9b069397b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/14
compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in

industries indispensable to the national interest. The
evident intention of the law is to empower the Court of
Industrial Relations to act in such cases not only in the
manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act 103, but
with the same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by
that act. If the Court of Industrial Relations is granted
authority to find a solution which consists in the ordering
of employees to return back to work, it has, likewise the
power or jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect, to
fix the terms and conditions of employment, and to order
the return of the workers with or without backpay as a
term or condition of the employment.
PETITION for review by certiorari of an order of the Court

of Industrial Relations.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Villaluz, Viola & Associates for the PHILMAROA.
Florencio L. Albino and Pedro L. Albino for the Visayan
Transportation Co., Inc., Carlos A. Go Thong & Co., Inc.,
and Royal Line, Inc.
Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo for the PSNCO.
Rafael Dinglasan & Mariano H. Laurel for the compañia
Marítima.
Mariano B. Tuason and Silverio Q. Cornejo for the
respondent CIR.
Bausa & Ampil for the Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc.
375
VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 375

The Phil Marine Radio Officers' Assn. vs. Court of Ind.
Relations, et al.
Manuel V. San José for the North Camarines Lumber Co.,

Inc.
Vicente L. Faelnar & Emilio R. Rosal for respondent
Hijos de F. Escaño, Inc.
Nicolás Belmonte & Silverio B. Bay for respondent
BLTCO, Inc.
José Raval for the intervenor Radio Operators
Association of the Philippines.
LABRADOR, J.:
In the above-entitled cases petitioners seek the annulment

and or revision of an order of the Court of Industrial
Relations concurred in by Judges Lanting, Jimenez Yanson

and Martinez, the main provisions of which: (1) direct the
return of the strikers, members of the Philippine Marine
Radio Operators Association and the different shipping
companies parties to the action, (2) but refuse the grant of
backpay to them during the period of the strike.
The facts that led to the promulgation of the order in
question may be briefly stated as follows: On August 28,
1953, the Philippine Marine Radio Officers Association
(PHILMAROA) presented a list of demand to the
Association de Navieros, the Philippine Shipowners'
Association and the Luzon Stevedoring Company, the most
important of which are: (1) the standardization and
increase of salaries; (2) sick and vacation leave; (3)
hospitalization and sick leave; and (4) a closed shop
agreement. On September 25, 1953, the Associacion de
Navieros informed the Philmaroa that the matter of their
petition was referred to the members of the Association,
the most important of which were the Compañía Maritima
and the Philippine Steam Navigation Company. On
October 22, 1953, the Philippine Shipowners' Association,
the most important members of which are the Madrigal
Shipping Company, the Visayan Transportation Company
and the
376

Relations, et al.
Bisaya Land Transportation, informed the Philmaroa that

it could not deal with the latter and requested that the
demands be made on the member companies. On
September 26, 1953, the Philmaroa also presented the
demands with the Bisaya Land Transportation Company
and the Royal Steamship Lines. As none of the companies
were willing to consider its demands the Philmaroa gave
notice of its intention to strike to the different shipping
companies and to the Chief, Conciliation Service Division,
Department of Labor. This notice to strike was sent on
October 17 and October 24. On October 31, 1953 the Chief
of the Conciliation Service called the parties for conference.
At this conference the Associacion de Navieros and the
Philippine Shipowners' Association gave the information
that they had no authority or power to bargain collectively
and suggested that the members of the said association be
notified, so the union sent notices to the different
companies. After being notified, the respondent companies,

on November 7 and November 13, answered, questioning
the authority of the Philmaroa to act as representative of
the radio operators and demanding that the list of the
members employed who belong to the Philmaroa be
furnished them. But the Philmaroa refused to do so for fear
of reprisal against its members.
The respondent companies also averred that some of
them had given salaries over and above that demanded in
the standardization, some have given sick and vacation
leave and hospitalization, etc.
At a conference held on November 13, 1953 before the
Conciliation Service Division of the Department of Labor, it
was agreed that the respondents be allowed six days of
grace within which to act upon or answer the demands
made by the Philmaroa. But without the period of six days
having expired the Philmaroa declared a strike on
November 16, against the Compañía Maritima, on
November 19, against the Philippine Steam Navigation
Company.
377
VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 377

Relations, et al.
On February 22, 1954, the President of the Philippines

certified the case to the Court of Industrial Relations in
accordance with section 10 of Republic Act No. 875. The
case was then heard by the Court of Industrial Relations
with Hon. Jose S. Bautista, presiding. After trial he
rendered a decision ordering the respondent companies to
reinstate the radio operators on strike, with backpay to
their former positions on the vessels under the terms and
conditions on August 28, 1953. The judge also granted
demand (c) or free hospitalization and sick leave of 15 days
every year with pay. All the other demands were denied.
Standardization was denied because the cost of operation of
the vessels cannot be controlled and not all of the
companies are of the same level and the work and cost of
living vary among the different vessels. Vacation leave
with pay was denied because the court found that many of
the respondents did not have the ability to pay. The closed
shop agreement was denied because there was no need for
it as the nature of the work of radio operators did not need
to be the subject of bargaining. Against this decision all the
parties appealed the court in banc. Judge V. Jimenez
Yanson voted to allow the strikers to go back to their

respective positions, but without backpay. He voted to
affirm the other portions of the decision denying
standardization, vacation leave and closed shop agreement,
but granting sick leave, free hospitalization with pay.
Judge Martinez concurred in this opinion of Judge Vicente
Jimenez Yanson. Judge Lanting concurred also with this
decision of Judge Jimenez Yanson, giving the grounds for
his concurrence. All the parties to the action have appealed
to Us by certiorari from the order of the court in banc.
Their appeals shall be considered separately.
APPEAL OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO

OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION (G. R. No. L-10095)
The first error claimed to have been committed by the court

a quo in its resolution is in finding that there was no
378

Relations, et al.
allegation or issue of unf air labor practice before the court,

and in concluding that the latter could not, therefore, grant
backpay to the employees who were ordered to return back
to their work. It is argued by the petitioner that the
existence of unfair labor practice was an issue in the case
because the Philippine Steam Navigation Company and the
other steam companies, in their pleadings and allegations,
claim that the strike was illegal because of acts of the
union amounting to unfair labor practice, and that under
such allegations and pleadings the court had the power and
jurisdiction to find that it was the respondents who
committed unfair labor practice, as a result of which the
strike could not have been illegal. It is argued as a
consequence that the finding of the trial judge that the
respondents were guilty of unfair labor practice because
they delayed passing upon the demands of petitioners
union should be sustained by Us.
We agree with the finding of the majority of the court
below that there was no unreasonable delay by the
respondents in the consideration of the union demands.
The demands were quite many and varied, involving very
fundamental questions that could affect the life of the
business of each of the respondents, like increased salaries,
standardized salaries, vacation leave with pay, closed shop
agreement. It is unreasonable to require the respondents,

therefore, to answer the demands in the very short period
of time that the case was before the Conciliation Service
Division of the Department of Labor. Furthermore, it was -
agreed at the conference that respondent companies were
to be granted six days after November 13, within which to
present their answer to the list of demands; but the
petitioner union began calling the strikes before the
expiration of said period. It is possible under certain
circumstances that delay in consideration of demands of a
labor union may amount to a ref usal to bargain
collectively, within the meaning of Section 4, par. 6 of the
Industrial
379
VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 379

Relations, et al.
Peace Act, but we find that under the circumstances of the

case there was no unreasonable delay which would amount
to a refusal to bargain within the meaning of said
provision.
With this holding, it becomes unnecessary to consider
the correctness of the resolution appealed from insofar as it
declares that no employer may be declared guilty of unfair
labor practice without allegation to that effect in the
pleadings and opportunity on the part of the employer to
deny the same, to contest the charge, and submit evidence
in support of the denial.
It is also argued before Us that the respondent
companies were guilty of unfair labor practice because
while the strike was in progress, Case No. 161-ULP was
instituted against the Compañia Maritima for having
removed or dismissed employee Manuel C. Romero, whom
the Court of Industrial Relations ordered returned to his
former position. This contention is without merit. The case
of Romero was never mentioned as a cause of the strike,
and neither is it mentioned as a cause of finding said
respondent company or any one of respondents guilty of
unfair labor practice. As a matter of fact, the trial judge
had not considered the incident of Romero as a cause of
unfair labor practice against the Compañia Maritima; it
was the supposed delaying tactics that were found by the
trial judge to constitute the act of unfair labor practice.
Furthermore, the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations in the case of Romero did not result in anything
except in the reinstatement of Romero. No other matter

was decided in that case, hence the petitioner union cannot
claim it to be a cause or reason for declaring respondent
companies guilty of unfair labor practice in the case now at
bar.
The second important error assigned in this appeal is
the refusal of the majority of the court below to grant
backpay. The alleged labor practice imputed to their
respondent companies is again used as a ground for
380

Relations, et al.
granting backpay to the members of the petitioner union,

but as we have found above that there was no act on the
part of respondent companies amounting to unfair labor
practice, this ground for the demand must be rejected.
This brings us to a consideration of that part of the
decision that has a relation to the right to backpay. The
basic facts are stated in the opinion of the three judges who
denied the backpay claim:
"On February 25, 1954, this court issued an order setting the
hearing of the case on March 1, 1954. At the hearing, Atty.
Cipriano Cid, then counsel for the petitioner, was asked several
times by the trial Court and by counsel of Compañía Maritima
whether he wanted the strikers to be ordered back to work, and
his reply was: 'We have not asked that yet. (p. 15-19 hearing on
March 1, 1954). And when counsel for PSNCO directly asked him
if he wanted the strikers to go back to work, his answer in effect
was, if ordered by the Court. * * *." (p. 5, Annex F-1 to Petition.)
It is clear from the above that the petitioner union never

demanded the privilege to have its members reinstated to
their positions immediately, but that they left this matter
of their return to the discretion of the court. The court, on
the other hand, did not order the return of the strikers; it
did so only in its decision after the hearing and termination
of the case.
Under the circumstances as above indicated it is
apparent that the strikers never expressed a desire or
willingness to return back to work, leaving that to the
court's discretion. The denial of backpay to the strikers is
clearly justified, in accordance with previous decisions of
this Court.
It must be taken into account that neither the pleadings,

nor the evidence, nor the judgment disclose the existence of
any act amounting to discrimination or unfair labor
practice. The strike was resorted to by members of the
petitioner union as an economic weapon to compel the
respondent companies to grant improvement in the pay
381
VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 381

Relations, et al.
of the members of the union and in the conditions of their

employment.
As a matter of fact they expressly wanted closed shop,
standardization and increase of salaries as well as vacation
leave with pay. At the hearing of the case before the court a
quo, counsel for the petitioner union, when asked if the
strikers wanted to return back to work, did not say so, but
instead expressly declared that the strike was adopted as a
weapon to enforce their demands. The strike was by all
means, therefore, a voluntary act on the part of the
strikers, not one to which they were compelled by reason of
any act of discrimination, or unfair labor practice, or
refusal of the respondent companies to admit them back to
work. The strike may have been legal because it was used
as a weapon in the interest of labor; but it was not caused
by any illegal or unfair act on the part of the employers,
and the strikers should not be entitled to pay during the
period they voluntarily absented themselves from work.
What we stated in the case of J.P. Heilbrown Company vs.
National Labor Union, (92 Phil., 575, 49 Off. Gaz., [2] 547)
are exactly applicable:
"* * *. The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and
capital or management and employee is that of a 'fair day's wage
for a fair day's labor.' If there is no work performed by the
employee there can be no wage 01- pay, unless of course, the
laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally
locked out, dismissed or suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an
employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the
employer's time."
No commission of any unfair labor practice is involved in

the case. The grant of backpay is, therefore, to be governed
by the general principle of "fair day's wage for a fair day's
labor." If even in cases of unfair labor practices the court
may be justified in denying backpay (See section 5 (c) of

Industrial Peace Act), there is absolutely no reason for
granting backpay if there has
382

Relations, et al.
not been any unfair labor practice on the part of the

respondent companies at all.
For the foregoing considerations the appeal should be
denied.
APPEAL OF COMPAÑÍA MARITIMA, ET AL. (G. R.

No. L10115)
This appeal involves the interpretation of Section 10 of the

Industrial Peace Act, which is as follows:
"Labor Disputes in Industries indispensable to the National

Interest.—When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines
there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the
national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the
President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said Court may
cause to be issued a restraining order forbidding- the employees to
strike or the employer to lockout the employees, pending an
investigation by the Court, and if no other solution to the dispute
is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and
conditions of employment."
It is contended that under the above-quoted provision the

Court of Industrial Relations, in a case certified to it by the
President of the Philippines under the provisions of the
above-quoted section, has no power to order the
reinstatement of employees and to grant them backpay. It
is argued that the Industrial Peace Act does not prohibit
the replacement of strikers, and if this is so the employer
has the right to make replacements during the strike,
which replacements may not be nullified by a subsequent
order of the Court of Industrial Relations for the return of
the strikers.
We cannot subscribe to the above contention. We agree
with counsel for the Philippine Marine Radio Officers'
Association that upon certification by the President under
Section 10 of Republic Act 875, the case comes under the
operation of Commonwealth Act 103, which enforces
compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in

industries indispensable to the national interest when the
President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations. The evident intention of the law is to empower
383
VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 383

Medrana, et al., vs. Hon. G. R. Sepulveda, et al.
the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not

only in the manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act
103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdiction
granted by that Act. If the Court of Industrial Relations is
granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute
and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to
return back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court
of Industrial Relations does not have the power or
jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of what
use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not
have the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the
solution it has adopted. Lastly, if the said court has the
power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it
certainly can order the return of the workers with or
without backpay as a term or condition of the employment.
The appeal is, therefore, without merit.
For the foregoing considerations, the appeals in the
aforesaid cases are hereby dismissed, with costs against
the petitioner in G. R. No. L-10095, and the petitioners in
G. R. No. L-10115.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,

Bautista Angelo, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.
Appeals dismissed.
________________
[No. L-10450. October 31, 1957] SANTIAGO

MEDRANA, SR. and SANTIAGO MEDRANA, JR.,
petitioners and appellees, vs. HON. GAVINO R.
SEPULVEDA and HON. MANUEL CABAGUIO, in
their capacities as Judge and Fiscal, respectively of
the city of Davao, respondents and appellants.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT;

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF ACCUSATION; MERE
READING OF INFORMATION, NOT SUFFICIENT.—Section
11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
384
Medrana, et al. vs. Hon. G. R. Sepulveda, et al.
requires that the accused be informed not only of the accusation

against him but also of the substance of the testimony and other
evidence to support that accusation. Merely informing him of the
charge by reading to him the information or complaint will not
necessarily apprise him of the evidence he has to controvert, thus
leaving him in a position where he can not properly show his
innocence or at least the absence of reasonable ground to put him
upon trial.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

Davao. Fernán, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Quitain & Vega for appellees.
Leo D. Medialdea for appellants.
REYES, A., J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First

Instance of Davao Province, requiring the municipal court
of Davao City in a murder case pending before it for
preliminary investigation to conduct such investigation "by
requiring the prosecution to present witnesses or evidence
against the accused."
From the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, it
appears that on September 12, 1955, the city fiscal of
Davao filed in the municipal court of that city an
information for- murder against the herein appellees, with
a certification to the effect that a preliminary investigation
had been conducted in the case and the witnesses
examined under oath. On the strength of that certification,
the municipal judge had the accused arrested, and after
their arraignment and following their plea of not guilty, set
a date for the holding of the preliminary investigation. To
prepare for the investigation the accused moved that they
first be informed of "the substance of the testimony and
evidence presented against them" in accordance with

section 11 of Rule 108. But the prosecution objected,
contending that the reading of the information to them was
sufficient compliance with
385
VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 385

the rule. And the objection having been sustained, the

defense petitioned the Court of First Instance of Davao to
have the municipal judge grant what was prayed for in its
motion.
Acting on the petition, the Court of First Instance, after
hearing, handed down its order, which is the subject of the
present appeal.
Obviously, the object of the preliminary investigation for
which a day was set by the municipal judge in the present
case was to determine if there was reasonable ground for
holding the defendants for trial before the Court of First
Instance. The procedure for such investigation is outlined
in section 11 of Rule 108, which reads:
"SEC. 11. Rights of defendant after arrest.—After the arrest of the

defendant and his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of
the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be
informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence
presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present
witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The
testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that
of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him."
As stated by Chief Justice Moran in his "Comments on the

Rules of Court" (1957 ed., Vol. 2, p. 676), the purpose of this
section "is to afford the accused an opportunity to show by
his own evidence that there is no reasonable ground to
believe that he is guilty of the offense charged and that,
therefore, there is no good reason for further holding him to
await trial in the Court of First Instance." To that end the
section requires that the accused be informed not only of
the accusation against him but also of the substance of the
testimony and other evidence to support that accusation.
Needless to say, merely informing him of the charge by
reading to him the information or complaint will not
necessarily apprise him of the evidence he has to con-
386

trovert, thus leaving him in a position where he cannot

properly show his innocence or at least the absence of
reasonable ground to put him upon trial. It follows that in
denying to the present defendants the right to be informed
of "the substance of the testimony and evidence presented
against them" the municipal judge did not comply with
what is clearly required by the Rules.
But while hypothetically conceding this proposition, the
city fiscal would still maintain that the Court of First
Instance went beyond the law in ordering the municipal
judge to require the prosecution to present witnesses.
Actually, the order is to require the prosecution "to present
witnesses or evidence against the accused." As thus
worded, the order does not really require the presentation
of witnesses, for it also permits the alternative of requiring
other evidence instead, which may be satisfied with the
presentation of an abstract or resumé of the testimony and
evidence against the accused. What the order clearly
implies is that the municipal judge should comply with the
requirement of section 11 of Rule 108 that the defendants
be informed of the evidence presented against them so that
they may be in a position to rebut it with evidence of their
own.
The claim of the city fiscal that defendants also asked
for copies of the affidavits of witnesses against them is
denied and is not borne out by the record. It is therefore
unnecessary to determine whether defendants were
entitled to such copies.
Wherefore, the order complained of is affirmed, without
special pronouncement .as to costs.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista

Angelo, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia. JJ.,
concur.
Ordered affirmed.
387
VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 387

Chung Te & Co. vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
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9/23/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 102

[No. L-10095 and L-10115. October 31, 1957]

THE PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS'

374 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; STRIKE NOT CAUSED

2. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; CASE

compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in

PETITION for review by certiorari of an order of the Court

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 375

Manuel V. San José for the North Camarines Lumber Co.,

In the above-entitled cases petitioners seek the annulment

Relations concurred in by Judges Lanting, Jimenez Yanson

376 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bisaya Land Transportation, informed the Philmaroa that

companies. After being notified, the respondent companies,

VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 377

On February 22, 1954, the President of the Philippines

Yanson voted to allow the strikers to go back to their

APPEAL OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO

The first error claimed to have been committed by the court

378 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

allegation or issue of unf air labor practice before the court,

agreement. It is unreasonable to require the respondents,

VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 379

Peace Act, but we find that under the circumstances of the

except in the reinstatement of Romero. No other matter

380 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

granting backpay to the members of the petitioner union,

It is clear from the above that the petitioner union never

It must be taken into account that neither the pleadings,

VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 381

of the members of the union and in the conditions of their

No commission of any unfair labor practice is involved in

may be justified in denying backpay (See section 5 (c) of

382 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

not been any unfair labor practice on the part of the

APPEAL OF COMPAÑÍA MARITIMA, ET AL. (G. R.

This appeal involves the interpretation of Section 10 of the

"Labor Disputes in Industries indispensable to the National

It is contended that under the above-quoted provision the

compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in

VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 383

the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not

Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,

[No. L-10450. October 31, 1957] SANTIAGO

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT;

384 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medrana, et al. vs. Hon. G. R. Sepulveda, et al.

requires that the accused be informed not only of the accusation

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

REYES, A., J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First

evidence presented against them" in accordance with

VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 385

the rule. And the objection having been sustained, the

"SEC. 11. Rights of defendant after arrest.—After the arrest of the

As stated by Chief Justice Moran in his "Comments on the

386 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

trovert, thus leaving him in a position where he cannot

Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista

VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 387

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