EN BANC

[G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE TAMPARONG ET AL., Defendants-

Appellants.

The appellants in their own behalf.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD INSTANCE; EXTENT OF
REVIEW. — Under the Spanish criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts were
allowed only to Courts of First Instance. By section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this
procedure has been so amended that appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in
such cases when the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved. This
amendment of the procedure does not carry with it the right of review of the facts, but is
confined to the purpose stated — that is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of
the statute or ordinance upon which the judgment was predicated. Former cases
reviewed, showing that such has uniformly been the interpretation of section 43 by this
court.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played
the game of chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to
the Court of First Instance, where they were again tried and convicted upon the same
charge. An appeal was allowed to this court because the validity of Ordinance No, 35
was drawn in question during the trial of the cause in the court below.

Two questions are raised by this appeal: (1) Is Ordinance No. 35 valid, and (2) is this
court required under the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the
guilt or innocence of the defendants?
The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the case of the United
States v. Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1). The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of
this branch of the case is unnecessary.

With reference to the second question, it is said that by reason of the defendants’
having in the lower court questioned the legality of Ordinance No. 35, for the violation of
which they have been convicted, this case has been brought to us in all its details of law
and fact, including the evidence taken at the trial, on which the Court of First Instance
founded its judgment touching the guilt and condemning the defendants. While, on the
other hand, it is contended that the questions of fact, which we are [not] authorized to
examine, are those which are essential to be examined for the purpose of determining
the legality of Ordinance No. 35 and the penalties provided for therein, and no other.

At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal procedure in force in this
jurisdiction prior to the promulgation on the 23d day of April, 1900, of General Orders
No. 58.

The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directing the execution of the royal decree of
September 4, 1884, wherein it was ordered that the Penal Code in force in the
Peninsula, as amended in accordance with the recommendations of the code
committee, be published and applied in the Philippine Islands, as well as the Provisional
Law of Criminal Procedure which accompanied it. These two laws, having been
published in the Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, became effective
four months thereafter.

According to the provisions of Rule 1 of the above-mentioned provisional law, the

justices of the peace, or gobernadorcillos, had original jurisdiction over the offenses set
forth in Book 3 of the Penal Code.

Rule 2 provided that "when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo receives
notice that there has been committed any one of the offenses provided for in Book 3 of
the Penal Code which can be prosecuted by the Government, he shall issue summons
for an oral trial to the complainant, if any, to the alleged culprit, and to the witnesses
who may be able to testify as to the facts, fixing the day and hour for holding the trial. If
this (the trial) takes place at the residence of the promotor fiscal, he shall also be
summoned." Rule 3 provided that the same procedure should be followed in those
cases which can only be prosecuted at the instance of a private party, except that the
promotor fiscal was not cited.

Neither the Provisional Law, the criminal procedural laws of the Peninsula, nor the autos
acordados prescribed any special form for the complaint to be presented to the justice
of the peace or the gobernadorcillo. As to this point, it seems that the Compilation of the
Laws of Criminal Procedure of 1879 was applicable. Articles 405, 406, and 412 read:
"ART. 405. The complaint made in writing must be signed by the complainant, and if he
cannot do so, by some other person at his request. The authority or official who
receives it shall rubricate and seal every page in the presence of the person who
presents it, which also he may do himself or through another person at his request.

"ART. 406. When the complaint is oral, it shall be reduced to writing by the authority or
official who receives it, wherein, in the form of a declaration, shall be set forth such
information as the complainant may have regarding the act complained of and the
circumstances thereof, and both shall sign it at the bottom. If the complainant cannot
sign his name, some other person shall do so at his request."cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 412. Criminal cases that are not instituted by the Government must begin with a
complaint."cralaw virtua1aw library

The oral trial referred to in Rule 2 was held within three days next following the date
when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo received information that the
offense had been committed (Rule 4), the procedure being that provided for in Rule 9,
which reads: "The trial shall be public, beginning with the reading of the complaint, if any
there be, followed by the examination of the witnesses summoned and the introduction
of such other evidence as the complainant, accuser, and public prosecutor, if he take
part, may request and the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo may regard as
pertinent. Immediately thereafter the accused shall be given a hearing, the witnesses
who appear in his defense shall be examined, and such other evidence as the justice or
the gobernadorcillo may declare to be admissible shall be adduced. The parties shall
forthwith make such pleas as they think expedient in support of their respective
contentions, the first to speak being the public prosecutor, if he take part, then the
private complainant, and finally the accused.

"The representative of the public prosecutor shall attend the trial for misdemeanors,
whenever he is cited thereto, in accordance with Rule 2."cralaw virtua1aw library

A record of the trial was made, wherein the whole procedure was clearly and succinctly
set forth, and signed by all the parties participating in the trial. (Rule 11.)

After trial and rendition of judgment, either of the parties could appeal to the Court of
First Instance within the first day next following that on which notice of the rendition of
judgment was served. The appeal suspended the judgment. After the appeal had been
allowed, the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo remitted to the Court of First
Instance the original record and cited the parties to appear within the period of five days
before the appellate court. This time could be extended, if the circumstances of the case
required. (Rule 14.) If the appellant appealed, a day was fixed for the trial; but if he did
not appear, the appeal was dismissed. (Rule 15.) Rule 16 provides the procedure for
the trial in the second instance. This rule reads: "The hearing at the trial shall be public,
and all the proceedings in the case shall be read therein; then the parties or their
attorneys may speak in their turn, and thereafter the judgment shall be pronounced and
communicated to them.

"A record of the trial shall be drawn up in the same manner as fixed by Rule 11."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Rule 17 reads: "In this second instance no evidence may be admitted other than that
which, offered in the first instance, was not taken for reasons independent of the will of
the parties who had offered it."cralaw virtua1aw library

Rule 19 provides: "The judgment of the Court of First Instance will be executory, and
there will be no recourse from the same except that of responsibility before the
audiencia del territorio."cralaw virtua1aw library

The provisions of General Orders No. 58 pertinent to the question under consideration,
are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 43. From all final judgments of the Courts of First Instance or courts of similar
jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts
an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. Appeals shall
also lie from the final judgments of justices of the peace in criminal cases to the courts
of the next superior grade, and the decisions of the latter thereon shall be final and
conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute, wherein
appeal may be made to the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library

"SEC. 54. All cases appealed from a justice’s court shall be tried in all respects anew in
the court to which the same are appealed; but on the hearing of such appeals it shall
not be necessary, unless the appeal shall involve the constitutionality or legality of a
statute, that a written record of the proceedings be kept; but shall be sufficient if the
appellate court keeps a docket of the proceedings in the form prescribed in the next
preceding section."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 43 has been amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627 so as to read as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction,
and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. The convicted party may
appeal from any final judgment of a justice of the peace in a criminal cause to the Court
of First Instance by filing a notice of appeal with such justice within fifteen days after the
entry of judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall forward to the Court
of First Instance all original papers and a transcript of all docket entries in the cause,
and the provincial fiscal shall thereupon take charge of the cause in behalf of the
prosecution. The judgment of the Court of First Instance in such appeals shall be final
and conclusive, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute or
the constitutionality of a municipal or township ordinance."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the fact that this court took the view, prior to the passage of Act No. 1627, that
the military governor and the framers of General Orders No. 58 intended by the use of
the word "statute" found in section 43 (supra) to include "ordinances," the amendment of
this section by section 34 of that Act does not affect the issue in the instant case. The
original section provided that "an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute," and the section, as amended,
authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court in the same class of cases.

It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must
apply the same rule of construction that the courts in England and the United States
have ,almost uniformly applied to the same term and thus derive an unqualified review
of both the law and the facts. This doubtless would be a correct position in some
jurisdictions in the American Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning of the term
"appeal" is followed. The reason for so doing is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. &
Light Co. v. Bunn (168 Fed. Rep., 862), wherein the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the record in an action of law
for a review of questions of law only, and an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon
both the facts and the law, is vital. These remedies have their origin and functions in the
inherent difference between courts of law and courts of equity, differences which are
recognized in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress. The ’writ
of error’ is a common law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in the final
judgment of a common-law court. If error is found, the judgment awards a venire facias
de novo. The ’appeal’ is a procedure which comes to us from the civil law along with the
fundamentals which go to make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its office is to
remove the entire cause, and it subjects the transcript to a scrutiny of fact and law and
is in substance a new trial."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and
equitable relief is dispensed in the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts
of equity as they are known and distinguished in England and the United States. All
cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in the same manner, including their final
disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal," as used in section 43
(supra), does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to
another in its entirety, subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial, but
it is to be interpreted by the ordinary rules of construction.
The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 i8 the law. In order to ascertain
that intention the provisions of the order must be construed in the light of existing law
and the circumstances at the time of its promulgation.

At the time General Orders No. 58 went into effect, criminal cases originating in Courts
of First Instance came to the audiencia in their entirety, subjecting both the law and the
facts to a review or retrial. But the audiencia, or Philippine Supreme Court, could not
review the judgment of a Court of First Instance in any case tried on appeal from courts
of justices of the peace wherein the latter courts had jurisdiction. Such judgments were
final and conclusive. The aggrieved party could go no further with the case. The only
recourse he had was that mentioned in Rule 19 (supra). The penalties for violations of
the provisions of Book 3 of the Penal Code over which justices of the peace then had
jurisdiction were generally arreto or arresto menor and small fines. This was the law in
force at the time section 43 (supra) was framed and these were the conditions
confronting the framers of that section at that time. What changes did the section make?

Section 43 authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of Courts
of First Instance "and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said
courts." This part of the section is limited to judgments rendered in criminal cases
originating in Courts of First Instance. This is necessarily true because the latter part of
the section makes the decisions of the "courts of next superior grade (which were
Courts of First Instance) rendered in cases appealed from justices’ courts final and
conclusive, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." The
result is that the former procedure was amended by section 43 so as to also authorize
appeals to the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned in the latter part thereof when the
validity or constitutionality of a statute was drawn in question. To this extent only was
the former procedural law changed in so far as, the question at issue is concerned.
Among the reasons which induced the lawmakers to make this change was the fact that
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace was "extended to all offenses which the Penal
Code designates as punishable by arresto mayor in all of its grades." (Sec. 108.)

If we had found the ordinance attacked in the case at bar to be illegal and
unconstitutional, the judgment appealed from would necessarily have to be set aside
and defendants would have no interest in presenting to us the evidence taken at the
trial. But we have maintained the legality of that ordinance, and in so doing have we
exhausted our powers and reached the limit of our inquiry? Section 43 does not
expressly so limit our power. Neither does it expressly authorize us to review the
testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants.

The distinction between the illegality of a penalty imposed by a municipal corporation

and the correctness of that imposed by a justice of the peace under a municipal
ordinance, and between the illegality of the ordinance and that of the proceedings or
actions taken under it, is plain and broad. An ordinance may, from the standpoint of the
regularity of all the proceedings leading up to and inclusive of its enactment, be
absolutely faultless and yet the ultimate act done or enacted may be inherently or
intrinsically illegal or unconstitutional. On the other hand, the latter may be perfectly
unassailable and yet the ordinance be illegal or unconstitutional by reason of some fact
or circumstance connected with its passage. It may, for instance, have been presented
in a wrong manner, at a wrong time, or not voted for as directed by law. It is to facts of
this class or character that section 43 refers when it says "the latter thereon shall be
final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a
statute."cralaw virtua1aw library

Such appears to be the meaning and intention manifested from the provisions of the
latter part of section 43, already quoted, especially when they are considered in the light
of the former practice above indicated. Under that practice no appeals whatever were
allowed to the Supreme Court from judgments of Courts of First Instance in cases
originating in justices’ courts. We must assume that the framers of section 43 had
knowledge of this practice and its effects. The framers desired to amend this practice to
the extent only of providing a way by which statutory questions, which might arise in
these cases, could be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This object could be very
imperfectly obtained, if, when the court assumed jurisdiction of such a case, it would not
only determine the statutory questions, but also inquire into and determine every other
question raised during the progress of the trial. In effect, this would entirely destroy the
former practice, because it would render it possible to bring every case here in its
entirety. All that would be necessary would be to raise some statutory question, whether
material to the decision of the case or not, and the right of appeal and reexamination of
the whole case would be assured. Clearly, no such result was intended, nor is it
manifest from the language employed in section 43. But it is urged that our ruling in this
matter "involves the legal absurdity of disjoining a single case and turning over one
fragment to one court and another parcel to another court." (Elliott on Appellate
Procedure, sec. 17.) In this section the author is speaking of appellate jurisdiction where
the distinction between law and equity is rigidly maintained. He says: "Where a court of
equity retains jurisdiction for one purpose, it will retain it for all purposes." The same
author recognizes a difference in the two systems of appellate jurisdiction — that is, the
one where the distinction between law and equity is maintained and, the other, where
the two are blended. (Section 24.) In this last section the author says: "In some respects
an appeal under the code system may be less comprehensive in its scope than an
appeal under the old system," citing Judge Curtis, wherein he said that "it is evident that
an appeal under the code system does not necessarily bring up the entire case." In view
of the fact that the code system prevails in the Philippine Islands, blending legal and
equitable rights and providing for one remedial system, our holding in the instant case is
not in conflict with Elliot on Appellate Procedure.

It is also urged that the rule announced in the case of Loeb v. . Columbia Township
Trustees (179 U. S., 472), and followed in the late case of Boise Artesian Hot and Cold
Water Co., Ltd. v. Boise City (230 U. S., 84), is directly opposed to our holding in the
case under consideration. These two cases went to the Supreme Court of the United
States on writs of error directly from the circuit courts in accordance with the provisions
of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. This section provides "that appeals or
writs of error may be taken from the district courts, or from the existing circuit courts,
direct to the Supreme Court in the following cases: . . ." Here Congress maintains the
distinction between "appeals" and "writs of error." In each case above cited the
Supreme Court of the United States held that it not only had jurisdiction to review the
constitutional questions, but also every other question properly arising. The court then
proceeded to review all legal questions in those cases and not questions of fact, for the
reason that the cases were before the court on writs of error. Even granting that the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction under the Act above mentioned to review both questions
of law and fact in cases appealed to that court, such holding would not be antagonistic
to our views in the instant case for the reason that our power to review the facts
touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants must be found in section 43 of
General Orders No. 58. Our view is, as above indicated, that the framers of that section
did not intend to confer upon this court that power. And all must admit that the military
governor at the time he promulgated General Orders No. 58 had the power to limit or
restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to statutory questions in cases of the
character of the one under consideration.

Our ruling in the case at bar is fully supported by the adjudicated cases of this Supreme
Court.

In the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 531), the court said: "Upon the facts
stated in the complaint the plaintiff is entitled to prosecute an appeal to this court; but
upon such appeal the only question to be considered will be that of the validity or
invalidity of the ordinance. We cannot review the evidence nor pass upon any other
question of law which may appear in the record."cralaw virtua1aw library

In United States v. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), the defendant was convicted in the
municipal court of the city of Manila for violating a municipal ordinance. He appealed to
the Court of First Instance, where he was again convicted. An appeal was allowed to
the Supreme Court on the ground that the constitutionality or validity of the ordinance
was drawn in question. On appeal the appellant insisted, among other things, that the
trial court erred in deciding the case without first consulting with the two assessors. This
court held the ordinance valid and, after quoting with approval the language used in the
case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (supra), said: "In cases where the appeal involves the
constitutionality or validity of a statute, the disagreement of the assessors with the
judgment of the Court of First Instance on appeal does not authorize this court to review
the evidence, but its decision shall be confined only to the question of the validity of the
Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of The United States v. Espiritusanto (23 Phil. Rep., 610), we examined the
facts touching the due enactment of the ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was
held valid, but the facts touching the guilt or innocence of the appellant were not gone
into.

In United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), the court used this language at page 12:
"While we have discussed at length each of the assignments of error made by the
appellants, nevertheless, the only question, in fact, presented by the appeal under the
law, in the first instance, is whether or not the ordinance under which the defendants
were sentenced is legal. Having concluded that said ordinance is legal and within the
express powers of the Municipal Board to enact, the appeal must be dismissed, with
costs in this instance against the appellants in equal parts."cralaw virtua1aw library

In United States v. Abendan (24 Phil. Rep., 165), the court, after quoting the testimony
of a sanitary inspector and after holding the ordinance valid, said: "The evidence in the
case, which is undisputed, is sufficient, in our judgment, to warrant the order
complained of. It does not appear therefrom, the defendant himself having introduced
substantially no proof in the case, that he was treated differently from other persons in
that locality, or that he was required to do a thing that the others had not been required
to do, or that he had in any way been discriminated against in the application of this
ordinance to the facts of his case, or that its application was oppressive or
unreasonable in this particular instance.

"The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Considering this language, together with that used in the opinion wherein the court said,
"The sole question raised on this appeal is that presented by the claim of the appellant
that the ordinance in question is unreasonable and oppressive," it is clear that the court
did not intend to hold that it had authority to examine into the question of the guilt or
innocence of the Appellant.

In United States v. Co Chee (R. G. No. 8269, not reported) the appellants were
convicted of a violation of Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in
question the validity of that ordinance, an appeal was allowed to this court. In disposing
of this case the court said: "Precisely this question was presented in the case of the
United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), just decided by this court, in which we held
that said Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila was valid and constitutional. That case
is on all fours with the present one, and the judgment of conviction of the Court of First
Instance is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants, on the authority of that
case."cralaw virtua1aw library

No attempt was made to examine or pass upon the testimony touching the guilt or
innocence of the appellants.
In United States v. Tiu Un (R. G., No. 7804); United States v. Gaw Kee (R. G., No.
7816); United States v. Lim Cui (R. G., No. 7815); United States v. See Kea (R. G., No.
7828); United States v. Go Tin (R. G., No. 7481); United States v. Sia Kim (R. G., No.
7716); United States v. Lim Baey (R. G., No. 7915); United States v. Li Tia (R. G., No.
7826); and United States v. Tam Bak (R. G., No. 7814), not reported, the appellants
were convicted for a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and,
having drawn in question the validity of that ordinance, appeals were allowed to this
court. This court, upon the authority of the United States v. Ten Yu (supra), dismissed
the appeals and directed the records to be returned to the court below for execution of
the sentences.

Other cases might be cited, but we think the above are sufficient to show that we have
followed in the instant case the uniform holding of this court for more than ten years. In
fact, the court has not, since its organization, held in any case that it has the power to
review the facts touching the guilt of an accused person in cases of the character of the
one under consideration.

Some discussion has arisen in regard to the language we should use in the final
disposition of cases wherein the statute or ordinance has been upheld. Sometimes we
say, "The judgment is affirmed," and at other times we have said "the appeal is
dismissed," etc. The result is the same and it is of little importance which expression we
use. But, as the case comes to us on appeal for the purpose of testing the legality of the
statute or ordinance upon which the judgment rests and as the judgment cannot be
executed without the sanction of this court, it is perfectly legal to "affirm" or "reverse" the
judgment as the case may be.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
the defendants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH
OF CITY OF MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto
Lazaro for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed
the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the
petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's
office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this
Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal
had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient
number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the
Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have
not until now an official information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal
on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have
been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in
order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and
guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether
or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the
city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125
of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next
proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain
any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the
precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of
Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial
authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person
charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the
old Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other
than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge of
crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial authority within twenty four
hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to
was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to
order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city
fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article
204, which complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty
of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following
persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the
law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to
commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds
upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or
officer can not be construed as having been modified by the mere omission of said
provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be
violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination under oath or
affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional
precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by
a public officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone
is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person
arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of
commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and
in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which,
referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person
making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the time
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the
proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and by section
11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to
the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He
shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against
him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may
be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but
that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court. According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall
extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be
allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be
construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they
cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person
surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7,
Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159,
promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city
of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in
section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses
cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere
investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding
information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First
Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or
secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a
substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent
a hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the
courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation
in case of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of
the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are
empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule
108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary
investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the
investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense
cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First
Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a
preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal
of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not
for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court
the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so
warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the
accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or
person making the arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or
surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation
of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the
case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the
preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction,
and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the
provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or
the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall
surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the
investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information within
the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may
issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. And the city
fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially
impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the
arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after
the investigation, either release the person arrested or file the corresponding
information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having
committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of
the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person
arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to
making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information
against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course,
for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for
more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the
time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and
file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without
warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find
sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release
him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process
issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a
complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in
municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he
has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a
probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a
police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation,
he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility
of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman
Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter
in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the
petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have
ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said
policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners
are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless
they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So
ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.