Garcia v. Drilon
Thus, this
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be
a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being
threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it
would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied
the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of
the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority
and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it
may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not
be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
1
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only;
and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based
on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The
grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to
due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s
contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of
the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled
that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator.
This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay
officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
People v. Genosa
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat
her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were
quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to
another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of
death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant
invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with
an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination
of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the
said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly
granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case
to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the
“battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as
part of the records.
2

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman
syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
“cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated
by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence”
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the
rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life;
and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of
self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the
life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony
of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation
were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two
circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did
not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over
a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful
as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this
state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the
following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as
3
a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in
order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up
by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the
hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life
and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However,
considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination
that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise
known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was
enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by
the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal
and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
People v. Baldo
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01930, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 73 in Criminal Case Nos. 00-18080 to 00-18082, convicting
and sentencing appellant Elmer S. Baldo to reclusion perpetua for the crime of
rape.
On February 17, 2000, three Informations for rape were filed against appellant and
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-18080 to 00-18082. Except for the dates,
all three informations were similarly worded as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of February 2000 in the City of Antipolo, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with a fan knife, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
[AAA],3 against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment on March 16, 2000, appellant pleaded not guilty to the three
charges.5 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
Twenty-nine-year-old AAA, appellant, and Norman Echani were housemates in a
small one-room house in Purok Maligaya II, Mambugan, Antipolo City. Appellant is
her nephew while Echani is her cousin. As AAA recently resigned from her job and
appellant worked during the night shift in a factory, the two were always left during
daytime when Echani was at work.
On February 10, 2000 at 1:00 p.m., appellant professed his love for AAA in their
living room. She, however, admonished him against his protestation for they are
relatives. He then told her that if she ignores him, he would rape her. She pleaded
to him not to do anything against her will if he really liked her. Appellant then held
her left hand and poked a balisong (fan knife) at her, and then removed her pants
and panty while she was seated at a bench. Then he dragged her and laid her on
the floor, removed his shorts and brief, and placed himself on top of her. AAA tried
to resist by kicking him but he was stronger. Thereafter he placed the knife aside,
then held and pressed her thighs. He then fingered her vagina with his right hand
and inserted his penis into it. After two minutes, appellant stood up but threatened
to kill her if she reported the incident to their relatives. As she was in shock, AAA
just stayed in her room. Appellant thereafter left for work at 5:30 p.m.
According to AAA, appellant repeated his beastly act the following day, February
11 and on the next day, February 12, 2000.
4
In the evening of February 12, 2000, AAA decided to tell Echani what appellant
had done to her. Echani and his brother, Abraham, then accompanied her to the
barangay hall to file complaints against appellant.
The medico-legal police officer who examined AAA on February 13, 2000 found
"deep healing laceration" in her hymen, "compatible with recent loss of virginity"
but negative for spermatozoa.6 Dr. James Belgira testified that the laceration could
have been caused by a penetration of a hard object like an erect penis. He also
found contusions on AAA’s left arm and thighs.7
Appellant, in his own defense, denied the charges against him. He claimed that he
and AAA were lovers since November 1999, and that she had consented to have
sex with him even prior to February 2000. He contended that she charged him
because her parents were against their affair, and that her parents learned of their
relationship because two of their neighbors saw them having sexual intercourse.
He likewise denied poking a knife at her when they "made love." To prove they are
lovers, appellant presented two witnesses: Benjamin
Eubra, Purok Maligaya Chairman, and Simeon de los Santos, appellant’s uncle
and neighbor.
Eubra and De los Santos testified that appellant and AAA were always together
and held hands when walking. Being part of the barangay investigating team,
Eubra said that the crime scene is a single-room house separated from adjacent
houses by plywood and located in a place where market people usually hang out.
He did not believe the charges because the neighbors could always see and hear
what the occupants inside the house were doing. 8
On September 26, 2002, the trial court found appellant guilty in Criminal Case No.
00-18080 but acquitted him in Criminal Case Nos. 00-18081 and 00-18082.
The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ELMER BALDO y SANTAIN is
hereby found guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 00-
18080 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
He is further ordered to pay to the complainant, [AAA], the amount of Php 50,000
as indemnity.
Criminal Cases No[s]. 00-18081 and 00-18082 are hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.9
Since the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, the case was
elevated to this Court for automatic review. Pursuant to People v.
Mateo,10 however, we referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
On July 4, 2006, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court’s
decision. Its fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED,
with MODIFICATION by ordering accused-appellant Elmer Baldo y Santain to
likewise pay [AAA] the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and the amount
of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence this instant petition based on a lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN [PROVEN] BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.12
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether the crime of rape,
particularly the element of force or intimidation, has been proved sufficiently.
Appellant insists that he and AAA are lovers and what happened between them
was consensual. He likewise capitalizes on AAA’s admission that he was no longer
holding the knife when he inserted his finger and subsequently his penis into AAA’s
vagina. Thus, she had all the opportunity to resist his alleged sexual assault.
Appellant further claims that AAA’s failure to make an outcry to call the attention of
their neighbors, as the partition between the rooms was only made of plywood, and
to immediately disclose the incident to her cousin Echani, showed she consented
to the sexual congresses. As he was not covering her mouth, she should have
made her protestations in a voice loud enough for others to hear.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that findings of fact of the trial
court deserve respect and that witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer
information. It stresses that the elements of simple rape, to wit, carnal knowledge
and force or intimidation, were proven during trial. Even granting that appellant and
AAA were lovers, such fact was not a valid defense as a man cannot force his
5
sweetheart to have sexual intercourse with him. The OSG adds that AAA’s account
evinced sincerity and truthfulness and she never wavered in her story, consistently
pointing to appellant as her rapist. Besides, no woman would willingly submit
herself to the rigors, humiliation and stigma attendant in a rape case if she was not
motivated by an earnest desire to punish the culprit.
In our considered view, the prosecution has proven all the elements of the offense
of simple rape, including the use of force or intimidation. We affirm appellant’s
conviction.1avvphi1.zw+
For conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)
that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.13
In this case, the presence of the first element is undisputed since
appellant admits his sexual congress with complainant. While making such
admission however, he contends that there is no force or intimidation to speak of
as it was consensual. Appellant alleges that AAA willingly participated in the sexual
act because they are lovers. He even presented two witnesses to corroborate his
claim. Their testimony, however, leaves us unconvinced of appellant’s alleged
innocence.
The "sweetheart theory" or "sweetheart defense" is an oft-abused justification that
rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests our patience.14 For the
Court to even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be proven by
compelling evidence.15 The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in
support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required -- such
as tokens, mementos, and photographs.16 There is none presented here by the
defense.
Moreover, even if it were true that they were sweethearts, a love affair does not
justify rape. As wisely ruled in a previous case, a man does not have the unbridled
license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires. 17
In a desperate attempt to prove the alleged consensual nature of the sexual
intercourse, appellant capitalizes on AAA’s failure to offer resolute resistance
despite the fact that he was no longer holding the knife while consummating the
sexual act. Appellant also points to AAA’s failure to shout or make an outcry so that
their neighbors can come to her rescue.
AAA’s failure to shout or to tenaciously resist appellant should not be taken against
her since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary her
submission to appellant’s criminal act.18 In rape, the force and intimidation must be
viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims
react the same way.19 Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be
shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. 20 Some
may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all.21 Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape.22 A rape victim
has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or
intimidation employed upon her.23 As long as the force or intimidation is present,
whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. 24 In this case, the
presence of a fan knife on hand or by his side speaks loudly of appellant’s use of
violence, or force and intimidation.
As to the civil indemnity and damages, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court, correctly awarded ₱50,000 civil indemnity and ₱50,000 moral damages in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.25 Likewise, the award of ₱25,000 exemplary
damages due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon (fan knife) is proper.26
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01930 is AFFIRMED.
DOMINGO V RAYALA
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008
Doctrine
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced superiority which is enough to
dampen an employees spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her
sense of judgment; it changes her life.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3
thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3.Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.– Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach,
6
trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is
accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment,
re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting
said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or
privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate,
deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employee;
2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or
3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee.
BRIEF
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the
October 18, 2002 Resolution of the CA’s Former Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No.
61026. The Resolution modified the December 14, 2001 Decision3 of the Court of
Appeals’ Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office of the
President (OP) dismissing from the service then National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
FACTS
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III
at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Chairman Rayala
before Secretary BienvenidoLaguesma of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the
incidences of sexual harassment complained of, indicating that:Chairman Rayala,
while Domingo is typing a letter, holds and squeeze the latter’s shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate
conversations with her, giving her money, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual implications.
Domingo filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of
Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877
in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Rayala being a presidential appointee, DOLE referred the Complaint to the OP.
The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary
Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee
for such purpose. The Committee found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250,
which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.
Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and
Recommendation to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty
should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO
250.
OP Decision
Chairman Rayala of NLRC is found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service.
CA Decision
It held that there was sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that
Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. Petition Dismissed.
Rayala filed 3 petitions which the SC directed their consolidation.
ISSUE
Whether Chairman Rayala committed sexual harassment
7
HELD – Yes.
It is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with
equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s
shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having
inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school
expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening
clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor. It is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued
employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the
respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee. That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating
and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual
finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo
reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave
of absence and requested transfer to another unit.

It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful

and immoral conduct. Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may
also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.Rayala holds
the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice.
Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of
him.

8
Childrens:
ISIDRO OLIVAREZ, versus G.R. No. 163866
COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
July 29, 2005
Facts:
The offended party Cristina Elitiong was a 16-year old high school student
who with her brothers were employed by the accused, 64-year old Isidro
Olivarez, in the making of sampaguita garlands. For one year she had been
reporting for work during weekends at the residence of the accused. Within
the compound and at about three armslength from the main door of the
house was her workplace.At about 11:30 oclock in the morning of July 20,
1997, Cristina, her two brothers Macoy and Dodong, and one named Liezel
were at their work when the accused who was near the main door called for
her. She dutifully approached him. The accused asked her if she had told her
mother that he gave her money, and when she said that she did not, he
embraced her and held her breast. The workers were facing the street so that
the two were not seen. He pulled her to the kitchen and, closing the kitchen
door, kissed her on the lips. She pushed him away and went back to her
station. Her brother Macoy saw her crying when she came out of the house.
She did not say a word, but went to the faucet and washed her face.
The offended party continued to finish the garlands she was working on, and
waited until the afternoon for her wages. When she arrived at her home, she
first told her mother that she no longer wished to go back. When pressed for
a reason, she said basta po mama ayaw ko ng magtuhog. Finally, she told her
mother what happened.Aurora Elitiong, the mother, accompanied the
offended party to the San Vicente Barangay Hall on July 26 to report the
incident and give a statement. Days later, Cristina gave another statement to
the local police.In the defense version, the offended party and her brothers
had slept overnight in the house of the accused. When Isidro woke up in the
early morning to relieve himself, he saw the girl sleeping on the sofa. He
admonished her to join her brothers in the basement. He went back to his
room and slept until 8 A.M. Two hours later, at 10 A.M., he left for the Caltex
Service Station which was only a five minute ride from his home by tricycle.
His daughter Analee Olivarez was staying in another house in the compound
and attended a morning mass. When she returned at 10:30 A.M., she no
longer saw her father. Maritess Buen, the laundrywoman, who was washing
clothes outside the kitchen, saw the accused earlier. By 10 A.M., when she
entered the house, he already left. He returned by noontime.The accused
testified that he was at the Caltex station for two and a half hours waiting for
the shipment of flowers from Pampanga. The goods arrived at 12:15 P.M. He
left shortly thereafter and passed by the market before going home. He
arrived at 12:30 P.M. The next several days were uneventful for him until his
laundrywoman Maritess told him that there was a complaint against him at
the barangay office. A meeting took place between him and the girls family in
the presence of the barangay authorities. The girls mother was demanding
P30,000 for the settlement of the case, but he refused to cave in and told a
barangay official Jaime Ramos that he would rather see his accusers in court
than give a centavo because he did not commit the crime.
Issue:
WON The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
not holding that the essential elements in Violation of Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act 7610, which are age of the offended party and that she is an
abused or exploited child as defined in the law, not having been alleged in the
Information, petitioner/accused cannot be found guilty of said offense and
must be acquitted.
Actions of the courts:
RTC: Found Olivarez guilty of violating Section 5 of R.A. 7610 and sentenced
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify
the minor Cristina Elitiong in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages
and to pay the costs.
CA: Affirmed RTC
SC: Affirmed CA but with modifications on damages
9
Ratio: 2.
Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 states:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following: …
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as
follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
3.
Discussions on the presence of elements
1. The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her
breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances.
On the issue about the information as alleged by Olivarez:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is
likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration;
or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group. ...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a
child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct. (this was
reiterated in Amployo vs People)
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence
of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she
was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious
conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse
occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A.
7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that
Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse because Congress really intended to cover a situation
where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into
lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law
covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual
abuse.
Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was
mentioned in the information, hence he was adequately informed of
the age of the complainant. The prosecution has also established the
minority of the offended party through competent evidence. Cristina
testified that she was 16 years old and a certification from the Office
of the Local Registrar of San Pedro, Laguna was presented showing
that she was born on October 17, 1980. The third element of sexual
abuse is therefore present.
10
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. A complaint is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.[22] The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.In the present case,
the Court of Appeals found the information to be sufficient. Relying on the
principle laid down in People v. Rosare, it held:
Before us is an information for violation of RA 7610 that, as in Rosare, fails to
mention an indispensable element of the offense, the age of the offended
party, but makes allusion to another document, the sworn complaint of the
offended party, and declares it to be the basis upon which the information
was filed. This instrument is the complaint filed by the offended party with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in which she stated that she
was 16 years old at the time of the offense. It forms part of the initial records
of the case and comes before the posting of bail and entry of the plea of not
guilty before the RTC. It appears that after the charge was filed with the MTC,
and as the preliminary investigation went underway, the accused filed a
manifestation stating that he had filed a counter-affidavit to the charge and
reserved the right to file a motion to quash the information if it was filed. The
MTC found probable cause against him and elevated the records to the
provincial prosecutor for filing of the information. A complaint is under the
Rules one of the two charging instruments for the offense of which the
accused was tried and convicted here. While the criminal action was
instituted by the complaint of the offended party, the information signed only
by the fiscal ushered in the formal trial process. But both are accusations in
writing against the accused and serve the purpose of enabling him to take the
necessary legal steps for his defense. What is important is that the
information states that the accused is being charged of an offense under RA
7610 based on the complaint of the offended party, to which the accused had
adequately responded. Under these conditions, the accused was fully
apprised of the accusation against him. The purpose and objective of the
constitutional mandate are discharged and satisfied. The accused may not be
said to be taken by surprise by the failure of the information to state the age
of the offended party, when he had received the initiatory complaint where
he was told how old the offended party was.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 9, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22860 and its resolution dated June
4, 2004, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In addition to the award of
P15,000.00 as moral damages, petitioner Isidro Olivarez is also ordered to
pay a fine in the amount of P15,000.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellant,
vs.
ROBERTO ABAY y TRINIDAD, Appellee.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
On March 8, 2000, appellant Roberto Abay y Trinidad was charged
with rape in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41 under the following
Information:
That sometime in December 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
[appellant] by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious
conduct against [AAA], a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there
kissing her breast and whole body, lying on top of her and inserting his
penis into her vagina, thus succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
11
her, against her will and consent thereafter threatening to kill her
should she report the incident, thereby gravely endangering her
survival and normal growth and development, to the damage and
prejudice of [AAA].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
During trial, the prosecution presented AAA, her mother BBB and
expert witness Dr. Stella Guerrero-Manalo of the Child Protection Unit
of the Philippine General Hospital as its witnesses.
AAA testified that appellant, her mother’s live-in partner, had been
sexually abusing her since she was seven years old. Whenever her
mother was working or was asleep in the evening, appellant would
threaten her with a bladed instrument2 and force her to undress and
engage in sexual intercourse with him.
BBB corroborated AAA’s testimony. She testified that she knew about
appellant’s dastardly acts. However, because he would beat her up
and accuse AAA of lying whenever she confronted him, she kept her
silence. Thus, when she caught appellant in the act of molesting her
daughter on December 25, 1999, she immediately proceeded to the
police station and reported the incident.
According to Dr. Guerrero-Manalo, AAA confided to her that appellant
had been sexually abusing her for six years. This was confirmed by
AAA’s physical examination indicating prior and recent penetration
injuries.
The defense, on the other hand, asserted the incredibility of the charge
against appellant. Appellant’s sister, Nenita Abay, and appellant’s
daughter, Rizza, testified that if appellant had really been sexually
abusing AAA, the family would have noticed. The rooms of their house
were divided only by ¼-inch thick plywood "walls" that did not even
reach the ceiling. Thus, they should have heard AAA’s cries. Moreover,
Nenita and Rizza claimed that they "often caught" AAA and her
boyfriend in intimate situations.
According to the RTC, one wrongly accused of a crime will staunchly
defend his innocence. Here, appellant kept his silence which was
contrary to human nature. On the other hand, AAA straightforwardly
narrated her horrifying experience at the hands of appellant. The RTC
concluded that appellant had indeed sexually abused AAA. A young
girl would not have exposed herself to humiliation and public scandal
unless she was impelled by a strong desire to seek justice.3
In a decision dated November 25, 2003,4 the RTC found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape:
WHEREFORE, finding [appellant] Roberto Abay y Trinidad guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5, Article III of RA
7610 against [AAA], the Court imposes upon him the death
penalty,5 and to pay private complainant moral damages in the amount
of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals (CA), on intermediate appellate review,6 affirmed
the findings of the RTC but modified the penalty and award of
damages.
In view of the enactment of RA 83537 and RA 9346,8 the CA found
appellant guilty only of simple rape and reduced the penalty imposed
to reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, in addition to the civil indemnity ex
delicto (which is mandatory once the fact of rape is proved)9 granted by
the RTC, it awarded ₱50,000 as moral damages and ₱25,000 as
exemplary damages. Moral damages are automatically granted in rape
cases without need of proof other than the commission of the
12
crime10 while exemplary damages are awarded by way of example and to reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, to conform with existing
in order to protect young girls from sexual abuse and exploitation.11 jurisprudence, he is ordered to pay AAA ₱75,000 as civil indemnity ex-
delicto24 and ₱75,000 as moral damages.25
We affirm the decision of the CA with modifications.
WHEREFORE, the January 18, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals
Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if
12 13 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01365 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the victim of sexual abuse14 is below 12 years of age, the offender modification. Appellant Roberto Abay y Trinidad is hereby
should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under found GUIILTY of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code15 and penalized of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay AAA ₱75,000 as
with reclusion perpetua.16 On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or civil indemnity ex-delicto, ₱75,000 as moral damages and ₱25,000 as
older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse17 under exemplary damages.
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph
1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes18 for the same act because his right against
double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice
to criminal liability for a single criminal act.19 Likewise, rape cannot be
complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section
48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes),20 a felony under
the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an
offense penalized by a special law.21

In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was
committed against her. The Information against appellant stated that
AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant
may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or
rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal
Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of both
crimes, the prosecution’s evidence only established that appellant
sexually violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation22 by
threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to
his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.23

Indeed, the records are replete with evidence establishing that

appellant forced AAA to engage in sexual intercourse with him on
December 25, 1999. Appellant is therefore found guilty of rape under
Article 266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced

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