VII. Personal law
Bohanan and her two children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions
Testate Estate of C.O. Bohanan, et al. vs. Magdalena C. Bohanan, et al.
G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
106 SCRA 997
FACTS:
C. O. Bohanan, a citizen the United States and of the State of Nevada executed a last will
and testament in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada on April 23, 1944 in
Manila. The testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909. He
secured a divorce which was granted to him on May 20, 1922. Sometime in 1925,
Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of
the death of the testator in 1944.
On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate the last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan. The Philippine Trust
Company was named as the executor of the will.
The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance
with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator’s grandson Edward
George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies;
(2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his
sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash
and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator’s grandson;
(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter,
Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000;
Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000.
Claiming having been deprived of the legitime, the respondents, the wife Magadalena C.
disposing of the estate in the manner that:
out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash,
the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several
mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a
legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
ISSUE 1? Is the wife entitled to a legitime?
No. The laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of
his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section
9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all
his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the
testator’s debts.
Moreover, in an order dated June 19, 1955 – the court found that there existed no
community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of
divorce was issued. This order was already final and executory and she had not appealed
therefrom.
ISSUE 2: Are the testator’s children entitled to a legitime in accordance with the laws of
the forum?
No. In accordance with Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16,
New Civil Code legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession
as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is
found. It is therefore the Law of Nevada which will govern the disposition of the
properties of the testator but this foreign law must first be proved as our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, the laws of Nevada were not introduced in
evidence by the executor’s at the hearing of the project of partition. It is Magdalena C.
Bohanan, upon her motion for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, who introduced in
evidence the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. Said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor was admitted by the Court. Also the children of
the testator, did not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of
Nevada.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice by the
court, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.
The order of the court approving the project of partition was affirmed.
NOTES:
How are foreign laws proved?
Foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our
Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
2. AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner
Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen
as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced
by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared
by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact
that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned
to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning
of the term “national law” is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen
was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable,
and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of
the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the
rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of
laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California
but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner.
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions
in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16
of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the 3. LLORENTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for
those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
FACTS:
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil
Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937,
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.
he and Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an
American citizen.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article
16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile,
Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente, a brother of Lorenzo and
the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer
the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination the two even have a son.
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing that Lorenzo shall not
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. criminally charge Paula if the she will agree to waive all monetary support from
Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the US.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the
divorce became final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno.
They had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate
to Alicia and their children and left nothing for Paula. In 1983, Lorenzo went
to the court for the will’s probate and to have Alicia as the administratrix of his
property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo
died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate.
RTC ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958
at Manila is likewise void.
The CA affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
Ruling:
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long
before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)
execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer
to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine
is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent
in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
(underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether
the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not
intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national
law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of
the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the
parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that
the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
4. NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19,
1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at
the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was
only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to
the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support
to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is
equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the
son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent
and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at
Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
CRIME CHARGED: violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC)
RTC: DISMISSED on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an ALIEN.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
SC HELD:
*Note: petition was allowed to be directly appealed to the SC without violating
hierarchy of courts since the petition involves purely questions of law.
1. YES. Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the
parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding
the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code, respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support
his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear
basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to
financial support. Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree,
he is not obligated to petitioner for any financial support.
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights
and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine,
if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has
not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be
the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or
that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability for the reason that when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign
law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto.
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made
liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to
give support to petitioner’s son.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we
find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law,
in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support
his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not
admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the
instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime. The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still
ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly
not prescribed.
PETITION GRANTED, CASE REMANDED TO RTC.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country,
not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean
that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law,
the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove
that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should
not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the
laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child
to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the
foreigner is living here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
VIII. Marriage, Adoption and Family Relation
1. Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee
43 Phil 43 [GR No. 18081 March 3, 1922]
Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine
Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of
the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged
that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan
Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora
Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in
Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian
Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried. The conflicting claims to the estate of
Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The
trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence presented by
both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of Cheong
Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but
that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the
son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference
to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the
trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and
the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine
Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters
Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge,
following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of
the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee,
Payang, and Rosalia.
Issues: Whether or not the chinese marriage is valid and recognizable in the
Philippines.
Whether or not the mohammedan marriage is valid.
Held: No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that
“All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws
of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands.” To
establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first
necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law
as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage
by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in
the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion
case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute
twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.
Yes. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is “that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.”
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to
safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason
for denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an
effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid
marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were
against the law. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and
should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that
solution which will mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true
construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here the
consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the
deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro
customs, was void, would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census
shows that there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been
married according to local custom. We then have it within our power either to
nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born
of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality
or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled governmental policy.
Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the
Mohammedan marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage
law as validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion.
2. Ramirez v. Gmur
Doctrine: It is established by the great weight of authority that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and to which one or both may resort merely for obtaining a
divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status;
and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to
recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of the
defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with
jurisdiction.
Facts:
 Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland but a
resident of the Philippines, died in Iloilo City on Junne 29,
1913, leaving valuable asset which he disposed by will. His
will was offered for probate in the CFI of Iloilo, which
allowed it. Werthmuller’s widow, Doñ a Ana M. Ramirez,
was named as executrix. Everything was given to the widow,
as the will provided, except for a piece of real property in
the City of Thun, Switzerland, which was devised to
Werthmuller’s brothers and sisters.
 Werthmuller seemed to have ignored in making his will that
he had heirs from his natural daughter, Leona Castro.
 Leona Castro was the daughter of Felisa Castro and an
unknown father. There was an annotation on the margin of
the original baptismal entry of Leona Castro that a public
document (an “escritura”) states that she was recognized by
Samuel Bischoff on June 22, 1877. This annotation was
authenticated by the signature of Father Ferrero, whose
deposition was taken in this case. Father Ferrero testified
that the word “escritura” in this entry means a public
document; and he says that such document was exhibited
to him when the marginal note was added to the baptismal
record and supplied the basis of the annotation in the entry.
 Samuel Bischoff tacitly recognized Leona Castro as his
daughter and treated her as such. Leona Castro was later
married to Frederick von Kauffman, a British subject, born in
HK and lived in Iloilo City. Leona Castro and von Kauffman
had 3 children (Elene, Federico and Ernesto). Leona Castro
was then brought to Thun, Switzerland to recuperate her
health. Years later, Leona Castro informed von Kauffman
that she does not want to stay married with the latter.
 Von Kauffman later obtained a divorce decree in Paris,
France. It showed that Leona Castro lived in Paris, though
there is no evidence showing that she acquired permanent
domicile in Paris.
 The estrangement of von Kauffman and Leona Castro was
because Leona Castro was attracted to Dr. Ernest Emil Mory,
the physician in charge of the sanitarium in Switzerland where
Leona Castro was brought. Dr. Mory and Leona Castro was
 later married in London, England. It appears that Dr. Mory
was already married to a certain Helena Wolpman, but had
divorced her.
 Before Dr. Mory and Leona Castro got married, they begot a
daughter named Leontina Elizabeth in Thun, Switzerland. A 2nd
daughter, Carmen Maria, was born in Berne, Switzerland, and
a 3rd daughter, Esther. On October 6, 1910, Leona Castro died.
 Now, the 2 sets of children are claiming from the estate of
Samuel Werthmuller. Otto Gmur is the guardian of the 3
Mory daughters. Frederick von Kauffman appeared as
guardian for his own children.
 Ana Ramirez insists, as against the Mory daughters, that
the Leona Castro had never been recognized by Samuel
Werthmuller at all.
 As to the Mory daughters, Leontina Elizabeth is considered an
illegitimate daughter which was legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro. Carmen Maria and
Esther Renate, on the other hand, are to considered legitimate
offspring of Leona Castro since the latter’s marriage to von
Kauffman was already divorced when they were born and
Leona was already married to Dr. Mory.
 The von Kauffman children insists that the divorce decree
was wholly invalid; that the Mory daughters are the offspring
of an adulterous relationship; and that the von Kauffman
daughters alone should be entitled to participate in the division
of the estate.
Issue: Whether or not the Mory daughters and the von Kauffman
children are entitled to participate in the division of the estate of
Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller.
Held: The SC held that the von Kauffman children are entitled to
participate in the inheritance as legitimate children of Leona
Castro and Frederick von Kauffman. Leona Castro’s relationship to
Samuel Werthmuller was ruled as follows:
 It is satisfactorily shown that Leona Castro was a recognized
natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff. The memorandum made
by Father Ferrero as to the recognition of Leona Castro was
found satisfactory, even though the original was not presented
after diligent search and secondary evidence as well as Fr.
Ferrero’s deposition was presented.
 It will be observed that the recognition of Leona Castro as the
daughter of Samuel Bischoff occurred prior to the date when
the Civil Code was put in force in these Islands; and
consequently, her rights as derived from the recognition must
be determined under the law as it then existed, that is, under
Law 11 of Toro, which afterwards became Law 1, title 5, book
10, of the Novisima Recopilacion. Under that law recognition
could be established by proof of acts on the part of the parent
unequivocally recognizing the status of his offspring. In other
words, at tacit recognition was sufficient. Under article 131 of
the present Civil Code, the acknowledgment of a natural child
must be made in the record of birth, by will, or in another public
instrument. We believe the recognition of Leona Castro is
sufficiently shown whether the case be judged by the one
provision or the other.
 But it is contended by counsel for Doña Ana Ramirez that only
children born of persons free to marry may possess the status
of recognized natural children, and there is no evidence to
show that Felisa Castro was either a single woman or widow at
the time of the conception or birth of Leona. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that she was single
or a widow.
 From the fact that Leona Castro was an acknowledged natural
daughter of her father, it follows that had she survived him she
would have been his forced heir, he having died after the Civil
Code took effect; and as such forced heir she would have been
entitled to one-third of the inheritance.
 To determine the rights of the Mory daughters, the SC had
to consider the validity of the divorce decree obtained by
von Kauffman in Paris. If the decree is valid, then the
marriage of Mory and Leona Castro is valid and the Mory
daughters are entitled to participate in the division of the
estate. Otherwise, the Mory daughters would have no such
right.
 As to the Mory daughters, the SC held that the divorce
decree relied upon cannot be recognized as valid in the
courts of the Philippines. The French tribunal has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a
marriage contracted in the Philippines by a person
domiciled here, such marriage being indissoluble under
the laws then prevailing in this country.
 The evidence shows conclusively that Frederick von Kauffman
at all times since earliest youth has been, and is now,
domiciled in the city of Iloilo in the Philippine Islands; that he
there married Leona Castro, who was a citizen of the Philippine
Islands, and that Iloilo was their matrimonial domicile; that his
departure from iloilo for the purpose of taking his wife to
Switzerland was limited to that purpose alone, without any
intent to establish a domicile elsewhere; and finally that he
went to Paris in 1904, for the sole purpose of getting a divorce,
without any intention of establishing a permanent residence in
that city. The evidence shows that the decree was entered
against the defendant in default, for failure to answer, and there
is nothing to show that she had acquired, or had attempted to
acquire, a permanent domicile in the City of Paris. It is evident
of course that the presence of both the spouses in that city was
due merely to the mutual desire to procure a divorce from each
 other.
 It is established by the great weight of authority that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and to which one or both may resort merely for
obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court
is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary
appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does
not invest the court with jurisdiction.
 It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of
the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the
judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse
leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for
the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient
to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State. This is
especially true where the cause of divorce is one not
recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile.
 As the divorce granted by the French court must be ignored, it
results that the marriage of Doctor Mory and Leona Castro,
celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband
and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the Mory children to participate in
the estate of Samuel Bischoff must therefore be rejected. The
right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated, and
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants," as
used in article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to
include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
 Even if the claims of the children were made after the probate,
the same are not divested by the decree admitting the will to
probate since such decree is only conclusive as to the due
execution of the will and not its intrinsic validity.