SUCCESSION

NEW CIVIL CODE

ARTICLE 16: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-

appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA
BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.

Jose D. Cortes for appellants.

Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose,
presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and
Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the
said project.

On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23,
1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings:

According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and
therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his
properties are located. This contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long
residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and
he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his
pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent
residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death,
 he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence
for him. That is his exclusive personal right.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death
a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and
testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and
admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the
executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond
in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after taking the
prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its trust. (pp.
26-27, R.O.A.).

It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The
executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the
provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the
Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the
benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining
companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan,
and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of
cash and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies
of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia
Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings,
P2,000;

It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration
expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of
all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same
amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the
testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that
they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan,
should be entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the
testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce
secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87
Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur,
42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the
claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any
portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:

Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose
of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment
of the testator's debts.

Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the
testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June
19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as
Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity.
On December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000
from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp.
294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said error found that
there exists no community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time
the decree of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer
question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired by
the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were
married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was
subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance
in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already
found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan,
the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.

The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who
had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given
their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-
thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-
thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the
forum valid?

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,
expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of

succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country
in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16,
new Civil Code.)

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the
testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and
his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue
is whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of
the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that
the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905,
Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the
project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the
executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts
in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found
that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled
Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See
pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during
the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court
of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary
dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided
and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada,
already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to
his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made
in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants.

CASE DIGEST: TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN

FACTS:
C. O. Bohanan, a citizen the United States and of the State of Nevada executed a last will and
testament in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada on April 23, 1944 in Manila.
The testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909. He secured a
divorce which was granted to him on May 20, 1922. Sometime in 1925, Magdalena C.
Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the
testator in 1944.
On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate the last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan. The Philippine Trust
Company was named as the executor of the will.
The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with
the provisions of the will, the following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator’s grandson Edward George
Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies;
(2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister,
Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of
shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator’s grandson;
(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter,
Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000;
Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000.
Claiming having been deprived of the legitime, the respondents, the wife Magadalena C.
Bohanan and her two children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner that:
out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the
testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining
companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy
of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
ISSUE & RULING
1. Is the wife entitled to a legitime?

No. The laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of
all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his
wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose
of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment
of the testator’s debts.
Moreover, in an order dated June 19, 1955 – the court found that there existed no
community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the
decree of divorce was issued. This order was already final and executory and she had
not appealed therefrom.

2. Are the testator’s children entitled to a legitime in accordance with the laws of the
forum?

No. In accordance with Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art.
16, New Civil Code legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country
in which it is found. It is therefore the Law of Nevada which will govern the
disposition of the properties of the testator but this foreign law must first be proved
as our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, the laws of Nevada
were not introduced in evidence by the executor’s at the hearing of the project of
partition. It is Magdalena C. Bohanan, upon her motion for withdrawal of P20,000 as
her share, who introduced in evidence the foreign law, especially Section 9905,
Compiled Nevada Laws. Said laws presented by the counsel for the executor was
admitted by the Court. Also the children of the testator, did not dispute the above-
quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that the pertinent law of Nevada,
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial
notice by the court, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of
the project of partition.
The order of the court approving the project of partition was affirmed.

NOTES:
How are foreign laws proved? Foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form
and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
. . . (Rule 123).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor
and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi,
Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the
provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila
on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now
Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago,
and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except
my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any
time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her
at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from
the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
 mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be
possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account
and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she
having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is
contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was
alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be
the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the
decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen
having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and
of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity
of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with
which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the
right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's
Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited
in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that
the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in
the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there
for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned
to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military
Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left
for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after
the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed
at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital
in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very
rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never
to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he
would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
 Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in
the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and
the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his
Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a
place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may
reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which
he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on
business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It
is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular
business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well
as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many
shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich,
p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of
the term "national law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law.
So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee
that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the
form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on
the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a
citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was
a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of
the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's
domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum
refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus
its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been
to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule.
It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that
greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more
strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law
problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum.
In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and
they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result
would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold
liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is
in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases
the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the
divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
 internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized
by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable

property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the
law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France,
the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute
of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if
a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be
distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus
applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the
French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and
apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what
a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule
of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers
the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense.
The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing
a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of
laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which,
while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject
of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has
been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would
in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of
the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2
Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in
a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are
to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign
state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory
'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
 xxx xxx xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the
law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain
that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same system of law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality —
that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of
laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but
Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination
of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American
law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person
of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about
the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules
of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is
the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile
of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this
age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but
little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for
those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in
comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must
enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for
those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the
national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article
946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California,
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of
his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not
possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does
not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines,
and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a
citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

CASE DIGEST: AZNAR VS. GARCIA

Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he
resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to
1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death.
However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered
himself as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been
declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art.
16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the
law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be
increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the
other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of
the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal
law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and
consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.
Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen
Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.
1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and
2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that
“if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the
Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court
with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.