Labo vs.

COMELEC proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the

Facts: elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.On May 15,

For the second time around, believing that he is 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for

a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC review with prayer, among others, for the

for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for issuance of a temporary restraining order to set

the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent

Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a

same office on March 25, 1992. Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec

On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a to proceed with his proclamation in the event he

disqualification proceeding against Labo before wins in the contested elections.

the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent

Filipino citizen. Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion

when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the
resolution notwithstanding the fact that said
assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.
resolution disqualifying Labo has already become
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an final and executory.Petitioner Ortega submits that
Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex- since this Court did not issue a temporary
Parte Motion for Clarification”, filed by restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992
respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling
Commission resolves that the decision Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution
promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying has already become final and executory. Ortega
respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become further posits the view that as a result of such
final and executory only after five (5) days from finality, the candidate receiving the next highest
promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, number of votes should be declared Mayor of
Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Baguio City.
Procedure.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue
certificate of candidacy —
to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of
Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final (e) The decision, order, or ruling of the

outcome of this case in the event the issue is Commission shall, after five (5) days from

elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final

or certiorari. and executory unless stayed by the Supreme

Court.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec

resolved, motu proprio to suspend the Issue:
1. WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest
number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor
of Baguio City.
2. WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles
the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest
number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning
candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on
May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo’s)
certificate of candidacy had already become final
and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992,
said resolution having been received by petitioner
Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e.,
May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining
order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992
constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation
as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino
citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the
contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective
office. The fact that he was elected by the
majority of the electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does
not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the
candidate with the next highest number of votes
to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second
highest number of votes for the office of city
mayor, the fact remains that he was not the
choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the
office of mayor in the belief that he was then
qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and
his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously
not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111)
originally filed a disqualification case with the
Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to
deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s)
candidacy, the same did not deter the people of
Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who,
by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec
to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of
finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected.
A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was
proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed
office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the
League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter
(hereafter, League), represented by its President,
Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Commission on
Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo
admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his
affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its
Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order
dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
ask that the said orders be set aside on the
ground that they had been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the
petition, we issued a temporary order against the
hearing on the merits scheduled by the
COMELEC and at the same time required
comments from the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of
the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this
petition are merely secondary to this basic
question.
HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision
in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and
the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of
the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this
being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on
November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself
as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines,
omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1983 per the following certification from the
United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul
Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and
the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of
the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this
being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on
November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself
as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines,
omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1983 per the following certification from the
United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul
Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
If he really wanted to disavow his American
citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship,
the petitioner should have done so in accordance
with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these
categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing
his certificate of candidacy he had, without more,
already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that
cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had
not yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or
judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the
Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private
respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If,
say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner
during her term and by her act or omission
acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to
her title may no longer be made within ten days
from her proclamation? It has been established,
and not even denied, that the evidence of
Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only
eight months after his proclamation and his title
was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person
sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in
the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status
of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more
reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties
and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome
back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by
an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of
his loyalty and love.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Comelec
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed
her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in
1995, providing that her residence in the place
was seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position
filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification
with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did
not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-
year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months
to since childhood under residency. Thus, the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a
Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of
votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself
and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995,
Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of
the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative.
Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which
reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the
House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if
she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court
that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor
of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot
be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring
to petitioner’s various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and
May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
AGAPITO AQUINO v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTION (D)
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate
of Candidacy(CoC) for the position of
Representative for the new 2nd Legislative
District of Makati City providing the following
information; Residence in Constituency: ___
years & 10 months.
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and
Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a
petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman
which should be for a period not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the elections
Petitioner filed another CoC amending the
certificate. Petitioner stated in Item 8 of his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency
for l year and 13 days.
Petitioner filed his Answer praying for the
dismissal of the disqualification case. On the
same day, a hearing was conducted by the
COMELEC wherein petitioner presented in
evidence, his Affidavit, lease contract between
petitioner and Leonor Feliciano.
2nd Division of COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution which DISMISS the: petition for
Disqualification against respondent Agapito
Aquino and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the
Office of Representative in the 2nd District of
Makati City.
Elections were held. In Makati City where 3
candidates vied for the congressional seat in the
2nd District, petitioner 38,547 votes as against
another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained
35,910 votes.
Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon
filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation
of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's
2nd Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a
2nd Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner.
COMELEC issued an Order suspending
petitioner's proclamation.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental
Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent
Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation" wherein he manifested his
intention to raise, among others, the issue of
whether or not the determination of the
qualifications of petitioner after the elections is
lodged exclusively in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to
Sec 17, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution.
COMELEC issued a Resolution reversing the
resolution of the 2nd Division dated May 6, 1995.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the 2nd Division, promulgated on
May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito
A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus
disqualified as a candidate for the Office of
Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City
in the elections, for lack of the constitutional
qualification of residence.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC's finding of
non-compliance with the residency requirement
of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.
HELD: Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-
compliance with the residency requirement of 1
year against the petitioner is valid.
Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy,
indicated not only that he was a resident of San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was
a resident of the same for 52 years immediately
preceding that election. His certificate indicated
that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. His birth certificate places Concepcion,
Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents
Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this
domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home
in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a
lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's
intention to reside in Makati City it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to
prove abandonment of one's original domicile
especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period
of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself
testified that his intention was really for only one
(l) year because he has other "residences" in
Manila or Quezon City.
While property ownership is not and should never
be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted
upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that
he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled
with the short length of time he claims to be a
resident of the condominium unit in Makati
indicate that the sole purpose of transferring his
physical residence is not to acquire's new
residence or domicile but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of
Makati City.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be
legally impossible to impose the one year
residency requirement in a newly created political
district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new
political district is not created out of thin air. It is
carved out from part of a real and existing
geographic area, in this case the old Municipality
of Makati.
MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)
Facts: When his COC for the position of Governor
of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was
the incumbent Representative of the Second
District of Palawan. This district then included,
among other territories, the Municipality of
Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was
elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto
Princesa City, and represented the legislative
district for three (3) terms immediately before the
elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s
second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa
City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city"
and thus ceased to be a component city of the
Province of Palawan. The direct legal
consequence of this new status was the
ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from
voting for candidates for elective provincial
officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running
for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the
transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from
Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto
Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub,
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V.
Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to deny due course
or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for
Governor of Palawan.
Held: YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the
position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme
Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent
himself and that he met the residency
requirement as mandated by the Constitution.
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor
of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was
upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were
not able to present a convincing case sufficient to
overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to
and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his
representation on this point in his COC. Likewise,
the "COMELEC could not present any legally
acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s
statement in his COC regarding his residence
was a misrepresentation."
Rommel Jalosjos vs. Comelec
GR No. 191970 April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon
City. He migrated to Australia when he was eight
years old and acquired Australian citizenship. In
2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in
Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines and was issued a certificate of
reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration and he renounced his Australian
citizenship.
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent
Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the
registration. COMELEC approved the application
and included Jalosjos in the voter's list. This
decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the
RTC.
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy
(COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for
the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to
cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply
with the one year residency requirement of the
Local Government Code (LGC).
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present
ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that
when he first moved back to the Philippines, he
was merely a guest or transient at his brother's
house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim
Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the
elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC is correct
in holding that petitioner did not present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile
at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD: NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos
has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing
his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that
he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga
Sibugay.
The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate
be a resident of the province for at least one year
before the elections. For the purposes of election
laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile: i.e. he must have an
intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must
also have personal presence coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of
intention. To determine compliance with the
residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence
has laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere;
(b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile
at a time.
The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin
was Quezon city. When he acquired Australian
citizenship, Australia became his domicile by
operation of law and by choice. On the other
hand, when he came to the Philippines in
November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos
did so with intent to change his domicile for good.
He left Australia, gave up his Australian
citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that
country and reacquired his old citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. By
his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere
else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new
domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss
of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his
domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a
man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos
did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he
has merely been staying at his brother's house.
A candidate is not required to have a house in
order to establish his residence or domicile in that
place. It is enough that he should live there even
if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend
or relative. To insist that the candidate own the
house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What matters is that
Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical
presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door
neighbors who testified that he was physically
present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with
political leaders and local and national party
mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by
final judgement of the RTC. The court also noted
that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga
Sibugay. This, without a doubt is sufficient to
establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition
and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division dated February 11,
2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc dated May 4, 2010 that disqualified
petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election
as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
A candidate who was elected but was later
disqualified for failing to meet the residency
requirement was never a valid candidate from the
very beginning, and was merely a de facto
officer. The eligible candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes must assume the
office. The rule on succession in the Local
Government Code does not apply (Svetlana
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314, 25
June 2013
DELA TORRE V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 121592;
July 5, 1996)
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified
from running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the
ground that he was convicted of violation the Anti-
Fencing Law.
He argues that he should not be disqualified
because he is serving probation of his sentence
and hence, the execution of his judgment was
suspended together with all its legal
consequences.
ISSUE:
WON Dela Torre is disqualified to run for public
office.
HELD:
Sec.40 of LGC provides:
Disqualifications.
The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
Moral turopitude is considered as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the
"fence" of the fact that property received is stolen
displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one's rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very
nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence Dela
Torre is disqualified from seeking public office.
With regard to his argument that he is under
probation, the court ruled that the legal effect of
probation is only to suspend the execution of the
sentence.
Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains
totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a
criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is not
executory pending resolution of the application
for probation.
Villaber v COMELEC GR No. 148326 11.15.01
F: Petitioner seeks to annul Comelec resolution
disqualifying him as congressional candidate of
Davao Del Sur and for the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy and denial of motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner was disqualified upon
the petition of his rival candidate for
disqualification on grounds of his previous
conviction in violation of BP 22 (bouncing check
law) which constitutes moral turpitude, a ground
for disqualification for electoral candidacy under
the Omnibus Election Code.
I: WON a violation of BP 22 constitutes a
disqualification for electoral candidacy.
R: A violation of BP 22 involves the following
elements:
1. Accused makes, draws, issues any
check to apply to account or for value;
2. Accused knows at the time of the
issuance that there is no sufficient fund
on the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment.
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank.
The presence of the 2nd element represents
moral turpitude as stated in the ruling of People v
Atty. Fe Tuanda where conviction for violation of
BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral
character of a person.
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006
FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition
to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was
convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc
granted her petition and disqualified Moreno.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was already
granted probation. Allegedly, following the case
of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the
sentence of imprisonment, as well as the
accessory penalties, was thereby suspended.
Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final
discharge of the probation shall operate to restore
to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result
of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability
for any fine imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code which
provides that those sentenced by final judgment
for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Since Moreno was
released from probation on December 20, 2000,
disqualification shall commence on this date and
end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation
to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his
sentence but did not affect his disqualification
from running for an elective local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the
disqualification under the Local Government
Code applies only to those who have served their
sentence and not to probationers because the
latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an
exception to the Local Government Code
because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon
of his previous misconduct.
ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the
right to run in public office?
HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law
provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was
finally discharged upon the court's finding that he
has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation, his case was deemed terminated and
all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction were restored to him, including the
right to run for public office.
It is important to note that the disqualification
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the
provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective
office.
Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While
the Local Government Code is a later law which
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications
of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a
special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its
terms and not expressly repealing a prior special
statute, will ordinarily not affect the special
provisions of such earlier statute.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237,
October 9, 2012
FACTS: Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon
City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to
Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old
and there acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to
return to the Philippines and lived with his brother
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his
return, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On
September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian
citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the
same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.)
9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos
acquired a residential property in the same village
where he lived. He applied for registration as a
voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent
Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said
act. Election Registration Board approved it and
included Jalosjos’ name in the COMELEC voters
list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the
exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official
voters list. MTC denied Erasmo’s petition. He
appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same as MTC’s.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10,
2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny
due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the
ground that Jalosjos made material
misrepresentation in the same since he failed to
comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225
and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the
Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled
against Jalosjos, because it failed to comply with
the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos won
the elections
ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-
year residency requirement
HELD: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon
City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of
his birth. His domicile was changed from Quezon
City to Australia when he migrated there at the
age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and
lived in that country for 26 years. Australia
became his domicile by operation of law and by
choice. But, when he came to the Philippines in
November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos
did so with intent to change his domicile for good.
He left Australia, gave up his Australian
citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that
country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his
acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere
else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM
PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia
Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and
setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23,
2013 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En
banc, respectively.
(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S.
Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view
of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada’s) disqualification to run for and
hold public office
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan
convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President
Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the
position of President but was opposed by three
petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of
the cases prospered and MRs were denied by
Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to
garner the second highest number of votes on the
May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada
once more ventured into the political arena, and
filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the
City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s
Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of
the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the
COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the
petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon
him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013
elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim
garnered the second highest votes intervene and
seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as
the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he
be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that former President
Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in
public office as a result of the pardon granted to
him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by
Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any
factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a
“whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were
so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted
an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point
of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada shows that
both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which
states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it
is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President
Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in
Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision
allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final
judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national position.
FALLO:
Petition is dismissed
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
FACTS:
In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct.
Subsequently, he ran as a candidate for councilor
in the Second District of the City of Manila during
the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed
office. After his term, Basco sought re-election.
Again, he won. However, he found himself facing
lawsuits filed by his opponents who wanted to
dislodge him from his position.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be
disqualified from running for any elective position
since he had been “removed from office as a
result of an administrative case” pursuant to
Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.
For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in
1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again
contested. In 1995, petitioner Grego filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The
COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco
in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the
Second District of Manila, placing sixth among
several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco
immediately took his oath of office.
COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for
disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was later
denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC acted in with
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for disqualification.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for disqualification,
however, the Court noted that they do not agree
with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed
resolution.
The Court reiterated that being merely an
implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure must not override, but instead
remain consistent with and in harmony with the
law it seeks to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended
to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the
law. The law itself cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. An administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and
a rule or regulation issued to implement said law,
the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of
Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule
25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to
implement, employed the word “may,” it is,
therefore, improper and highly irregular for the
COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall”
in its rules.
Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of
merit.
Mercado v. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26,
1999
Facts: Petitioners filed for respondent’s
disqualification for election alleging that
respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local
Government Code, dual citizens cannot run for
public office.
Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was
born in the U.S which follows the principle of jus
soli, hence, considered an American citizen as
well.
COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he
was considered natural-born because of the vrtue
that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but
petitioners assail this.
Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and
cannot run for public office?
Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship
and compared it to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship arises when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state that follows jus
saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus
soli, hence, resulting to a concurrent application
of different two laws or more.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation
whre a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two
or more states.
In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his
act of filing a certificate of candidacy tantamount
to his election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he
forswears allegiance to the other country and
thereby terminating their status as dual.
The Court stressed that participating in the
election is an express renunciation of American
citizenship.
Eugenio Eusebio Lopez vs. COMELEC
(DIGEST)
23 July 2008
GR No. 182701
TOPIC:
Loss and Re-Acquisition of CitizenshiP
FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate
for the position of Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October
29, 2007. He was eventually declared the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed
a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the
disqualification of Lopez because he was
ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by
virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all
the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the
Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification of Lopez from running as
Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able
to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez
should have made a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, Lopez resorted to petition for certiorari,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running
and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
disqualifying petitioner.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate
for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately
sought American citizenship and renounced his
Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual
citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the
conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
citizenship may run for a public office in the
Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
– Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship
by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he
took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul
of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in
Los Angeles, California; the same is not enough
to allow him to run for a public office.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American
citizenship as proven by the absence of an
affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this
Commission to believe that he failed to comply
with the positive mandate of law.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON v.
COMELEC, GR No. 198742, 2012-08-10
Facts:
petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen... she
became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to
her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship... pursuant to
The application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines... the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration
and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia,
which in turn issued the Order dated September
27, 2006 certifying that she has... ceased to be
an Australian citizen.
petitioner ran for Mayor in
Caba, La Union... in the 2007 elections. She lost
She again sought elective office during the May
10, 2010 elections this time for the position of
Vice-Mayor.
and was proclaimed as... the winning candidate.
private respondents... filed separate petitions for
quo warranto questioning the... petitioner's
eligibility
The petitions similarly sought the petitioner's
disqualification from holding her elective post on
the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she
failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign... citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath" as imposed by
R.A. No. 9225.
trial court held that the petitioner's failure to
comply with
R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and
hold public office.
the personal... declaration of renunciation she
filed in Australia was not under oath.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the
appeal was dismissed
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse
of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.
Issues:
For purposes of determining the petitioner's
eligibility to run for public office, whether the
"sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship"... in
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma
requirement.
Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective
office for failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-
acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship... by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process
that restores one's Filipino citizenship and all civil
and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed
in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of... any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath... she filed a renunciation of
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under
oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section
5(2) that the renunciation of... foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
compels natural- born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225,... and (2) for
those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of... candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.
[T]he intent of the legislators was not only for
Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take
their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their
foreign... citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate
in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have
one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire
their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
It is the operative act that restores their right to
run for public office. The petitioner's failure to...
comply therewith in accordance with the exact
tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed
As such, she is yet to regain her political right to
seek elective office. Unless she... executes a
sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship,
she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective
office in the Philippines.
The petitioner's continued exercise of his
rights as a citizen of the USA through using
his USA passport after the renunciation of his
USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status
as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him
from being elected to public office. (Agustin v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 207105, November 10,
2015)
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ
vs.
COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996
Facts: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and
private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr.
(Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were
protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon
Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez
won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via
petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC,
alleging that the latter has a pending case in LA,
hence, a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified
for the elective position.
Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from
justice”, which includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support
from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so
conceded as expressing the general and ordinary
connotation of the term
In previous case, the issue of whether or not
Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” under the
definition thus given was not passed upon by the
Court. That task was to devolve on the
COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the
directive to proceed therewith with dispatch
conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.
Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for
the same position of governor. This time,
Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy via
petition for disqualification before the COMELEC,
based principally on the same allegation that
Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.”
The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the
MARQUEZ Decision definition of “fugitive from
justice”, found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate,
Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious
candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the
position of governor.
Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend
Rodriguez’ proclamation which the COMELEC
granted.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC decision
suspending Rodriguez is valid?
Held: No
The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates
one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated
judgment of conviction.
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and
Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is
a “fugitive from justice”) are involved in the
MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The
MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the
Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the
COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal
although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly
(Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of
Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule in the
MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant
petition. And we specifically refer to the concept
of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main
opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, which
highlights the significance of an intent to evade
but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their
proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize
or undermine.
To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only
foment instability in our jurisprudence when
hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ
Decision.
To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as
a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a
person seeking to run for any elective local
petition under Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code, should be understood
according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ
Decision
A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution.
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must
therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge
has already been filed, at the time of flight.
Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this
definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the
Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
Caasi v. CA
GR No. 88831, 84508 November 8, 1990
Grino-Aquino, J.
Doctrine: To be qualified to run for elective office
in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have
“waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country.
Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the
CA and Petition for certiorari to review the
decision of the Commission on Election
Facts:
 Merito Miguel was elected as municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local
elections of 1988.
 Petitions were filed for his disqualification
under Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, on the ground that he is a green
card holder, hence, a permanent resident
of the US, not of Bolinao
o One of the petitioners is Mateo
Caasi, his rival candidate for the
position of mayor
 Miguel admitted that he holds a green
card issued to him by the US Immigration
Service, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the US
o He allegedly obtained the green
card for convenience in order
that he may freely enter the US
for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his
children there.
o He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan that he voted in all
previous elections.
 COMELEC dismissed the petitions,
except for Commissioner Anacleto
Badoy, Jr.
o According to COMELEC, the
possession of a green card by
Miguel does not sufficiently
establish that he had abandoned
his residence in the Philippines
o COMELEC said that as the
respondent meets the basic
requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to
elective local officials under Sec
42 of Local Govt. Code, there is
no legal obstacle to his
candidacy for mayor.
o In the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Badoy, he opined
that a green card holder, being a
permanent resident of or an
immigrant of a foreign country,
under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, has to prove that
he has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant
to be qualified to run for election
office.
Issue: Is green card a proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the US? Yes.
Did Miguel waive his status as
permanent resident or immigrant to US
prior to the local elections? No.
Is he disqualified to become a candidate
of municipal mayor? Yes.
Ruling:
 Miguel’s immigration to the US in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines
o The intention to live there
permanently is evidenced by his
application for an immigrant’s
visa.
o Immigration – removing into one
place from another/entering into
a country with the intention of
residing in it.
o Immigrant – person who
removes into a country for the
purpose of permanent residence
 As a resident alien in the US, Miguel
owes temporary and local allegiance to
the US, in return for the protection given
to him during the period of his residence.
 Sec 18, Art XI of the 1987 Constitution is
not applicable to Miguel
o “Any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status
of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law”
o not applicable to Miguel for he
acquired the status of an
immigrant of US before he was
elected to public office, not
“during his tenure” as mayor
 Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is
the applicable law to him
o “Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless
such person has waived his
status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the
election laws”
o Residence in the municipality
where he intends to run for
elective office for at least 1 year
at the time of filing his certificate
of candidacy is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for
elective public office must
possess.
 He resided in Bolinao for
only 3 months after his
return to the Phils and
before he ran for mayor
 Clear policy of excluding
from the right to hold
elective public office
those Philippine citizens
who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance,
as such are incapable of
the entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of
their homeland
 To be qualified to run for elective office in
the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder
must have “waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country.
o His act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status
as a permanent resident or
immigrant of US
o The waiver of green card should
be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office
o Without such prior waiver, he
was “disqualified to run for any
elective office”
 Miguel’s application for immigrant status
and permanent residence in the US and
his possession of a green card attesting
to such status are conclusive proof that
he is a permanent resident of US despite
his occasional visits to the Philippines
o Miguel filled up his application for
Immigrant Visa in his own
handwriting, answering
“Permanently” on the question of
his length of intended stay.
o On its face, the green card
identifies Miguel in clear bold
letters as a Resident Alien
 SC annulled the election of Miguel as
municipal mayor.
G.R. No. 148075 February 4, 2002
PANGKAT LAGUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TERESITA
"NINGNING" LAZARO, respondents.
Facts:On 30 January 2001, respondent Lazaro,
who was then Vice Governor of Laguna,
assumed by succession the office of the
Governor, when then Laguna Governor Jose D.
Lina, Jr. was appointed Secretary of Interior and
Local Government by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
On 28 February 2001, respondent Lazaro filed
her certificate of candidacy for the gubernatorial
position of Laguna.
On 04 May 2001, herein petitioner Pangkat
Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed with
the COMELEC a petition which sought to
disqualify respondent Lazaro as candidate in the
gubernatorial race.
It alleged that respondent:
1.) committed acts violative of Section 80
(Election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period) and Section 261(v)
(Prohibition against release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds) of the Omnibus
Election Code;
2.) "publicly declared her intention to run for
governor" in the May 2001 elections;
3.) on February 2001, ordered the purchase of
14,513 items such as trophies, basketballs,
volleyballs, chessboard sets, and t-shirts,
allegedly worth Four Million Five Hundred Fifty
Six Thousand and Five Pesos (₱4,556,005.00)
"serving no public purpose but to promote her
popularity as a candidate."
4.) on February 2001, respondent directed the
purchase and distribution of "1,760 medals and
pins valued at One Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱110,000.00) to various schools in
Laguna, serving no meaningful public purpose
but to again promote her forthcoming candidacy.
On 08 May 2001, respondent Lazaro filed an
answer denying the allegations in the petition for
disqualification.
On 11 May 2001, the COMELEC Second Division
granted the petition to disqualify respondent.
Lazaro to file a motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC en banc.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to
Suspend Proclamation.
On 19 May 2001, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lazaro as
the duly elected Governor of Laguna in the 14
May 2001 Elections.
On 24 May 2001, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion
of which declares: "WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by respondent Lazaro is hereby granted. The
resolution issued by the Second Division dated
11 May 2001 is hereby correspondingly
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not there was premature
campaigning.
2.) Whether or not COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
1.) No. as to the issue of "premature
campaigning", this Court holds that respondent
Lazaro was not guilty of violating the provisions
of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to
wit:
"SEC. 80. Election campaign or partisan political
activity outside campaign period. – It shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the
campaign period: Provided, that political parties
may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within thirty
days before the commencement of the campaign
period and forty-five days for Presidential and
Vice-Presidential election."
"Not every act of beneficence from a candidate
may be considered ‘campaigning.’ The term
‘campaigning’ should not be made to apply to any
and every act which may influence a person to
vote for a candidate, for that would be stretching
too far the meaning of the term.
"In this present case, the respondent was not in
any way directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes.”
Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the
duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which
duties she has sworn to perform as the Governor
of the Province of Laguna.
2.) No. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently
establish the allegation that public funds were
released, disbursed, or expended during the 45-
day prohibitive period provided under the law and
implementing rules. Absent such clear and
convincing proof, the factual findings of the
COMELEC cannot be disturbed considering that
the COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked
to decide, except those involving the right to vote,
all questions affecting elections.
Loong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93986, December 22, 1992
Facts: Petitioner filed with COMELEC his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-
Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region.
16 days after the election, respondent Ututalum
filed before the COMELEC a petition seeking to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter
made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy as to his age. Petitioner Loong sought
the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The
motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC
in a resolution which is the subject of this petition.
Petitioner Loong contends that petition to cancel
his certificate of candidacy was filed out of time
because it was filed beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Issue: Whether or not cancellation of certificate of
candidacy was filed within the period prescribed
by law.
Ruling: No. The petition filed by private
respondent Ututalum clearly does not fall under
the grounds of disqualification as provided for in
Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of
the COMMELEC Rules of Procedure governing
petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy.
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the
filing of the petition at any time after the last day
for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation, is merely a
procedural rule issued by respondent
Commission which, although a constitutional
body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it cannot
supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code which is a legislative enactment.
Gonzales v Comelec G.R No. 192856 March
18, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Fernando Gonzales and Reno
Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the 3rd district of
Albay in the May 10, 2010 election. Lim was the
incumbent Congressman while Gonzales was the
former Governor of Albay. On March 30, 2010 a
petiton for disqualification and cancellation of
certificate of candidacy was filed by Stephen
Bichara on the ground that Gonzales is a Spanish
national, being the legitimate child of a spanish
father and a filipino mother, and that failed to elect
Philippines citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority in accordance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act no. 625. And that his
certificate of candidacy contains misleading
information. The Comelec second division
division disqualified Gonzales in the forthcoming
National and Local elections. Gonzales thru
counsel, received a copy of the aforesaid
resolution on May 11, 2010. Lim petitioned the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to consider the
votes cast for Gonzales as stray or not counted
and/or suspend his proclamation, citing the
second division’s May 8, 2010 resolution
disqualifying Gonzales as a candidate. PBOC
dismissed the petition stating that the period for
filing the of a motion for reconsideration of the
comelec resolution has not yet elapsed, and
hence, the same is not yet final and executory.
Based on the results of the counting, Gonzales
emerged as the winner having garnered a total
vote of 96000 while Lim ranked second with a
vote of 68701 votes. On May 12, 2010, PBOC
officially proclaimed Gonzales as the duly elected
Representative of the 3rd district of Albay.
Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over a
Representative which was officially proclaimed
as a winner.
Held: We have constantly held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a member of the
house of rep. the comelec’s jurisdiction over
election, returns, and qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. We declared that
the court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon
the eligibility of the private respondent who was
already a member of the house at the time of the
filing of the petition for cerctiorari.
CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24,
2007
FACTS:
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only
mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections
in Buguias Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the

COC of Cayat on the ground of
misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat
misrepresents himself when he declared in his
COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in
fact he is not because he is serving probation
after being convicted for the offense of acts of
lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and

Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such,
MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the
filing fee and hence, it was declared final and
executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed

as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for
annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared
Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo
Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as

mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of
second placer.

ISSUE:WON the rejection of second placer

doctrine is applicable.

HELD:The doctrine cannot be applied in this case

because the disqualification of Cayat became
final and executory before the elections and
hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate

disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only
candidate and the duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor,

regardless of his intervention in the present case,
if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on
Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on
election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the
presence of two mayoralty candidates for
Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the
decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final
only after the elections.