Republic of the Philippines Thereafter, respondent Rolan G.
Buagas (Buagas), then Acting
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 192289               January 8, 2013
KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROLAN G.
BUAGAS, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order1 filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court assailing
the following resolutions of the public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC):
(a) Minute Resolution No. 09-09462 (December 22, 2009
Resolution), dated December 22, 2009, disqualifying the
petitioner herein, Kamarudin K. Ibrahim (Ibrahim), from the
2010 Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay, Maguindanao for
supposedly not being a registered voter of the said
municipality; and
(b) Resolution3 (May 6, 2010 Resolution) issued on May 6,
2010, relative to SPA Case No. 10-002 (MP) LOCAL,
denying Ibrahim’s opposition4 to Resolution No. 09-0946.
Antecedent Facts
On December 1, 2009, Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to
run as Vice-Mayor of Datu-Unsay in the May 10, 2010 elections.
Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the
COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department) the names of 20
candidates who were not registered voters therein. The list 5 included
Ibrahim’s name, along with those of two candidates for mayor, one
for vice-mayor and 16 for councilor.
In a Memorandum6 dated December 10, 2009, the Law Department
brought to the attention of the COMELEC en banc the names of 56
candidates running for various posts in Maguindanao and Davao del
Sur who were not registered voters of the municipalities where they
sought to be elected. The Law Department recommended the
retention of the said names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for
the COMELEC to motu propio institute actions against them for
disqualification and for violation of election laws. Thereafter, the
COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed December 22, 2009
Resolution approving, but with modification, the Law
Department’s recommendation in the following wise:
1. to disqualify the foregoing candidates for not being
registered voters of the respective municipalities where they
seek to be elected without prejudice to their filing of an
opposition within two (2) days from publication hereof; and
2. to file election offense cases against said candidates for
violation of Sec. 74 in relation to Sec. 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code.7 (Italics ours)
On January 8, 2010, Ibrahim and 50 other candidates filed a
Petition/Opposition8 to assail the Resolution dated December 22,
2009. In the Petition/Opposition, which was docketed as SPA 10-002
(MP) LOCAL, it was stressed that some of those affected by the
Resolution dated December 22, 2009 had participated as candidates
in the 2004 and 2007 elections. If indeed they were not registered
voters, they should have been disqualified then. Further, it was
emphasized that the candidates who filed the Petition/Opposition
were permanent residents and were domiciled at the place where
they sought to be elected.
The COMELEC en banc denied the Petition/Opposition through the
herein assailed Resolution dated May 6, 2010. The COMELEC
declared that the Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was
anchored on the certification, which was issued by Buagas and
Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B.
Orbase, stating that Ibrahim, among other candidates, were not
registered voters of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao. The certification was
issued in the performance of official duty, hence, the presumption of
regularity attached to it in the absence of contrary evidence. Ibrahim
and company failed to adduce evidence proving their allegations of
registration and residence.
In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the Resolution
dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained 446
votes, the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu
Unsay.9 However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC),
which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahim’s
proclamation on the basis of Section 5, Rule 2510 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.11
Issue
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued
the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010.
Arguments in Support of the Instant Petition
Ibrahim posits that the MBOC is a ministerial body created merely "to
take the returns as made from the different voting precincts, add
them up and declare the result."12 As long as the returns are on their
face genuine and are signed by the proper officers, sans indications
of being spurious and forged, they cannot be rejected on the ground
of alleged questions on the qualifications of voters and the existence
of electoral frauds and irregularities. Further, since Ibrahim received
the highest number of votes for Vice-Mayor, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of his eligibility, lest the will of the
electorate, which should be the paramount consideration, be
defeated.13
In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, 14 the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) proposes for the instant Petition to be
granted. The OSG points out that in Cipriano v. Commission on
Elections,15 this court nullified, for lack of proper proceedings before
their issuance, the resolutions issued by the COMELEC relative to
the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. The OSG emphasizes
that similarly, Ibrahim was disqualified as a candidate without prior
notice and hearing and he was given the chance to file an opposition
only after the issuance of the Resolution dated December 22, 2009.
Further citing Bautista v. Comelec,16 the OSG argues that jurisdiction
over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy pertains to the
COMELEC sitting in division and not to the COMELEC en banc. The
COMELEC en banc can only take cognizance of petitions to cancel a
certificate of candidacy when the required number of votes for a
division to reach a decision, ruling, order or resolution is not
obtained, or when motions for reconsideration are filed to assail the
said issuances of a division.
The OSG likewise refers to Section 4(B)(3)17 of Resolution No.
869618 to stress that generally, the COMELEC cannot motu propio
file petitions for disqualification against candidates. Section 5 19 of the
same resolution, however, provides the only exception to the
foregoing, to wit, that certificates of candidacy of those running for
the positions of President, Vice-President, Senator and Party-List
maybe denied due course and canceled motu propio by the
COMELEC based on grounds enumerated therein. While there was
a Petition for Disqualification20 filed by Bai Reshal S. Ampatuan
against Ibrahim and company, it was not the basis for the COMELEC
en banc’s issuance of the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and
May 6, 2010. Instead, the certification issued by Buagas was the
basis for the subsequent actions of the Law Department and the
COMELEC en banc leading to the issuance of the herein assailed
resolutions.
The OSG also invokes Section 1621 of COMELEC Resolution No.
867822 to assert that the MBOC had no authority to order the
suspension of Ibrahim’s proclamation. Upon motion, the suspension
of a winning candidate’s proclamation can be ordered during the
pendency of a disqualification case before the COMELEC. However,
only the COMELEC, as a tribunal, has the authority to issue orders
relative to cases pending before it. The MBOC cannot substitute its
own judgment for that of the COMELEC’s. The MBOC can suspend
a winning candidate’s proclamation only when an actual issue within
the Board’s jurisdiction arises in the course of conducting a canvass.
The aforementioned issues include the commission of violent and
terrorist acts or the occurrence of a calamity at the canvassing site.
Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as
well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the
winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the MBOC
concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the
result.23
It is also the OSG’s position that Section 5, Rule 25 24 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure was irregularly worded for using the
word "shall" when Section 625 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6646,26 which the rules seek to implement, merely employed the
word "may". The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension
of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and
operates to confer discretion.27
The COMELEC’s Contentions
In the Compliance28 filed with the court, the COMELEC assails as
improper Ibrahim’s immediate resort to the instant Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Despite the issuance
of the herein assailed resolutions, Ibrahim’s name was not stricken
off from the certified list of candidates during the May 10, 2010
elections and the votes cast for him were counted. Hence, no actual
prejudice was caused upon him as the COMELEC did not even
direct the MBOC to suspend his proclamation. It was the MBOC’s
ruling which resulted to the suspension of his proclamation. Such
being the case, Ibrahim should have instead filed a pre-proclamation
controversy before the COMELEC anchored on the supposed
illegality of the MBOC’s proceedings. Section 241 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), defines pre-proclamation controversies as
referring to any questions "pertaining to or affecting the proceedings
of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or
by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised xxx in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns." Had Ibrahim instituted instead a
pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC could have corrected
the MBOC’s ruling, if indeed, it was erroneous.
The COMELEC further argues that Ibrahim was not denied due
process as he and the other candidates referred to in the Resolutions
dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were given the
opportunity to file their opposition. Ibrahim did file his
Petition/Opposition and sought reliefs from the COMELEC en banc.
Now, he should not be allowed to repudiate the proceedings merely
because the result was adverse to him. Moreover, the OSG’s
invocation of the doctrines enunciated in Bautista v. Comelec 29 is
misplaced because in the said case, there was a total absence of
notice and hearing.
The COMELEC emphasizes that Ibrahim was undeniably not a
registered voter in Datu Unsay when he ran as Vice-Mayor in the
May 10, 2010 elections. He cannot possess any mandate to serve as
an elected official as by his act and willful misrepresentations, he had
deceived the electorate.
Our Ruling
We grant the instant Petition.
Before resolving the merits of the petition, the court shall first dispose
of the procedural issue raised by the COMELEC.
Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court to assail the Resolutions dated December 22,
2009 and May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc.
The COMELEC seeks the dismissal of the instant Petition on the
basis of a technical ground, to wit, that Ibrahim’s resort to a petition
for certiorari filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to challenge
the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 is
improper. Ibrahim should have instead filed before the COMELEC a
pre-proclamation controversy to allow the latter to correct the
MBOC’s ruling if it was indeed erroneous.
The claim fails to persuade.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially
provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional
Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on
certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders,
ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc
must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power.30 Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
states that it shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
A pre-proclamation controversy is defined in Section 241 of the OEC
as referring to "any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233,31 234,32 23533 and 23634 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns." Section 243 of the OEC restrictively enumerates as
follows the issues which can be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain
material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or
contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234,
235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats,
coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured
or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted
polling places were canvassed, the results of which
materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate
or candidates.
The illegality of the proceedings of the board of canvassers is the
first issue which may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. To
illustrate, the proceedings are to be considered as illegal when the
board is constituted not in accordance with law, or is composed of
members not enumerated therein, or when business is transacted
sans a quorum.
In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22,
2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with finality by the COMELEC en
banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said
resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for
certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged
irregularities in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or to the composition and
proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant Petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahim’s
proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed
resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as one
which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.
The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim
as a candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay.
Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc. (Italics ours)
Further, the circumstances obtaining in Bautista v. Comelec35 cited
by the OSG in its Manifestation are similar to those attendant to the
instant Petition. In Bautista, the election officer reported to the Law
Department that Bautista was ineligible to run as a candidate by
reason of his being an unregistered voter. The Law Department
recommended to the COMELEC en banc to deny due course or
cancel Bautista’s certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc
adopted the recommendation and consequently issued a resolution.
In the said case, this Court discussed the COMELEC en banc’s
jurisdiction over petitions for disqualification, for denial of due course,
or cancellation of certificates of candidacy in the following wise:
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., the Court held that it is the COMELEC sitting
in division and not the COMELEC en banc which has jurisdiction
over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court held:
The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the
procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy,
viz:
"Sec.78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.1âwphi1  A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election."
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has
made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition
may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by
the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the
COMELEC itself.
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in
Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of
votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in
the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are
resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
xxxx
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear
that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-
judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division
should first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation
proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the
election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in
the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division
because it denies due process to the candidate.36 (Citation omitted
and italics ours)
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein
assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s disqualification even when no
complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that
if filed before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted
against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered
voter of Datu Unsay disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His
supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act
falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if
we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the
COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
took cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription
and jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its
divisions.
Ibrahim is not estopped from challenging the COMELEC en banc’s
jurisdiction to issue the assailed resolutions.
In Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation, 37 we stated:
The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of
the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if
raised for the first time on appeal.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped
from raising such jurisdictional question if he has actively taken part
in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the
court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him" is based on the doctrine of
estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by
this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In Tijam, the party-litigant actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed
pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an
adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the
party-litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the
unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack
of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People, we cautioned that
Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and
applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is
similar to that in the latter case.38 (Citations omitted and italics ours)
As enunciated above, estoppel by laches can only be invoked in
exceptional cases with factual circumstances similar to those in
Tijam.39 In the case now before us, the assailed resolutions were
issued on December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010. The instant Petition,
which now raises, among others, the issue of the COMELEC en
banc’s jurisdiction, was filed on June 3, 2010. With the prompt filing
of the instant Petition, Ibrahim can hardly be considered as guilty of
laches.
Ibrahim was not denied due process.
Interminably, we have declared that deprivation of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance
to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.40
In the case before us, Ibrahim was afforded the chance to file an
opposition to the assailed resolutions. Nonetheless, even if due
process was substantially observed, the assailed resolutions remain
null and void for want of authority on the part of the COMELEC en
banc to take cognizance of a matter which should have instead been
referred to one of its divisions.
The MBOC has no authority to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation
especially since the herein assailed resolutions, upon which the
suspension was anchored, were issued by the COMELEC en banc
outside the ambit of its jurisdiction.
Mastura v. COMELEC41 is emphatic that:
(T)he board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined by law
to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to it in due form. It
has been said, and properly, that its powers are limited generally to
the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and
declaring the apparent result of the election by adding or compiling
the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns
before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so
ascertained. x x x.42 (Italics ours)
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain
and declare the apparent result of the voting while all other questions
are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting
elections or in quo warranto proceedings.43
In the case at bar, the MBOC motu propio suspended Ibrahim’s
proclamation when the issue of the latter’s eligibility is a matter which
the board has no authority to resolve. Further, under Section 644 of
R.A. 6646, the COMELEC and not the MBOC has the authority to
order the suspension of a winning candidates’s proclamation. Such
suspension can only be ordered upon the motion of a complainant or
intervenor relative to a case for disqualification, or a petition to deny
due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy pending before the
COMELEC, and only when the evidence of the winning candidate’s
guilt is strong. Besides, the COMELEC en banc itself could not have
properly ordered Ibrahim’s disqualification because in taking
cognizance of the matter, it had already exceeded its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 Resolutions
issued by the COMELEC en banc is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the suspension by the MBOC of Ibrahim’s
proclamation on the basis of the herein assailed resolutions is
likewise ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In the absence of a judgment,
order or resolution relative to another action or petition finally
disqualifying Ibrahim, denying due course or cancelling his certificate
of candidacy, the MBOC of Datu Unsay is directed to convene within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof and to proclaim Ibrahim as the
duly-elected Vice-Mayor of the said municipality.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with
SUPREME COURT Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.4
Manila
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of
EN BANC election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest
on May 24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010-42).5 The protest was raffled to the
G.R. No. 194139               January 24, 2012 COMELEC First Division.

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, Petitioner, In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,6 the petitioner averred as
vs. his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a
BAUTISTA, Respondents. detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of.

DECISION On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first
assailed order denying the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner, 7 viz:
BERSAMIN, J.:

After careful examination of the records of the case, this Commission

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of
(First Division) makes the following observation:
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest may
not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory 1. Protestant paid the cash deposit amounting to one hundred
order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) on June 3, 2010 as
evidenced by O.R. No. 1118105; and
2. Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by
For resolution is the petition for certiorari brought under Rule 64 of
the Protestant set forth the specific details of the acts
the Rules of Court, assailing the order dated August 13, 2010
and omissions complained of against the Protestee.
(denying the affirmative defenses raised by the petitioner), 1 and the
order dated October 7, 2010 (denying his motion for
reconsideration),2 both issued by the COMELEC First Division in It is therefore concluded that the payment by the Protestant on June
EPC No. 2010-42, an election protest entitled Claude P. Bautista, 3, 2010 is a substantial compliance with the requirement of
protestant v. Douglas R. Cagas, protestee.3 COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, taking into consideration Section
9(e), Rule 6 of said Resolution. Furthermore, the Protestant has
likewise essentially complied with Section 7(g), Rule 6 of the
Antecedents
above-mentioned Resolution.
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista)
In view of the foregoing, this Commission (First Division) RESOLVES
contested the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur
to DENY the Protestee’s special affirmative defenses.
in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fast
transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of
the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did
not discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in
the conduct of the elections, in violation of Section 2, paragraph
2,9 Rule 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,10 requiring all
decisions to clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on
which they were based; and that it also contravened Section
7(g), 11 Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requiring a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of. He prayed that
the matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Section
1,12 Section 5,13 and Section 6,14 all of Rule 20 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804.
The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had
introduced the requirement for the "detailed specification" to prevent
"shotgun fishing expeditions by losing candidates;" 15 that such
requirement contrasted with Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure,16 under which the protest needed
only to contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts" constituting
the cause or causes of action; that Bautista’s protest did not meet the
new requirement under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804; and that
in Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,17 the Court
upheld the dismissal of a protest by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) for not specifically alleging the electoral
anomalies and irregularities in the May 8, 1995 elections.
In his opposition,18 Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being
merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC en
banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC;19 that the rules
of the COMELEC required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or
omissions constituting the electoral frauds, anomalies and election
irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon which the cause
of action was based; and that Peña v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal did not apply because, firstly, Peña had totally
different factual antecedents than this case, and, secondly, the
omission of material facts from Peña’s protest prevented the
protestee (Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from being apprised of the issues
that he must meet and made it eventually impossible for the HRET to
determine which ballot boxes had to be collected.
On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second
assailed order,20 denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law, to wit:
The Protestee’s August 28, 2010 "Motion for Reconsideration with
Prayer to Certify the Case to the Commission En Banc" relative to
the Order issued by the Commission (First Division) dated August
13, 2010 is hereby DENIED for failure to show that the assailed order
is contrary to law
Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in
the protestant’s petition have substantially complied with the
requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant
the opening of the ballot boxes in order to resolve not only the
issues raised in the protest but also those set forth in the
Protestee’s answer. When substantial compliance with the rules
is satisfied, allowing the protest to proceed is the best way of
removing any doubt or uncertainty as to the true will of the
electorate. All other issues laid down in the parties’ pleadings,
including those in the Protestee’s special and affirmative
defenses and those expressed in the preliminary conference
brief, will best be threshed out in the final resolution of the
instant case.
The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration to
the Commission En Banc is DENIED considering that the 13
August 2010 Order is merely interlocutory and it does not
dispose of the instant case with finality, in accordance with
Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action
directly in this Court.
Issue
The petitioner submits that:—
THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PROTEST FOR
INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND CONTENT.
The petitioner argues that Section 9,21 Rule 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804 obliged the COMELEC First Division to
summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form and
content; and that the insufficiency in substance arose from the failure
of the protest to: (a) specifically state how the various irregularities
and anomalies had affected the results of the elections; (b) indicate
in which of the protested precincts were "pre-shaded bogus-ballots"
used; (c) identify the precincts where the PCOS machines had failed
to accurately account for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege
with particularity how many additional votes Bautista stood to receive
for each of the grounds he protested. He concludes that the
COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in allowing the
protest of Bautista despite its insufficiency.
Moreover, the petitioner urges that the protest be considered as a
mere fishing expedition to be outrightly dismissed in light of the
elections being held under an automated system. In support of his
urging, he cites Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,22 where the
Court took judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability of the PCOS
machines and CCS computers, such that allegations of massive
errors in the automated counting and canvassing had become
insufficient as basis for the COMELEC to entertain or to give due
course to defective election protests.23 He submits that a protest like
Bautista’s cast doubt on the automated elections.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
Bautista both posit that the COMELEC had the power and
prerogative to determine the sufficiency of the allegations of an
election protest; and that certiorari did not lie because the COMELEC
First Division acted within its discretion. Additionally, the OSG
maintains that the assailed orders, being interlocutory, are not the
proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
As we see it, the decisive issue is whether the Court can take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari.
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter
is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review
any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to
a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC  en banc,  and does
not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review
on  certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued
by a Division of the COMELEC. The following cogent observations
made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections24 are enlightening, viz:
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of
the Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:
"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter
is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof." [emphasis supplied]
"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings
and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be
a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The
Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en
banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court,
now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is
a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by
this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of
the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a
motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-
requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory.xxx25
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by
the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of
the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the
COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and
if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special
affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other
errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, as the
Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections.26 In that case,
the protestant assailed the order of the COMELEC First Division
admitting an answer with counter-protest belatedly filed in an election
protest by filing a petition for certiorari directly in this Court on the
ground that the order constituted grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC First Division. The Court granted the petition
and nullified the assailed order for being issued without jurisdiction,
and explained the exception thuswise:
As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to
the COMELEC en banc, this Court finds the respondent
COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated
February 28, 1996 that no final decision, resolution or order has
yet been made which will necessitate the elevation of the case
and its records to the Commission en banc. No less than the
Constitution requires that election cases must be heard and decided
first in division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission  en banc. Apparently, the orders
dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and February 28, 1996 and
the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-
protest are issuances of a Commission in division and are all
interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an incidental
issue regarding the admission of Espinosa's answer with counter-
protest and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they
leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits.
In such a situation, the rule is clear that the authority to resolve
incidental matters of a case pending in a division, like the questioned
interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself, and not on the
Commission en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure explicitly provides for this,
Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx
xxx
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of
a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except
motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be
resolved by the division which issued the order. (emphasis provided)
Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure confirms that the subject case does not fall on any of the
instances over which the Commission en banc can take cognizance
of. It reads as follows:
Section 2. The Commission en banc. — The Commission shall sit en
banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-
proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a
Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized
to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a
Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or
proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en
banc.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject
controversy is one of the cases specifically provided under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may
sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the present controversy a
case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation
wherein the members of the First Division unanimously voted to
refer the subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the
Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above,
can not be the proper forum which the matter concerning the
assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division
committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to
an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall
under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en
banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to
elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance
being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the
COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not
authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote
to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party
can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is
not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed
interlocutory order can be reviewed.
However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no
application herein, because the COMELEC First Division had the
competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the
acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for
the outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution
vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving not only the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of elections but also the resolution and determination of
election controversies.27 The breadth of such powers encompasses
the authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in
every election protest and to decide based on such allegations
whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to
outrightly dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
The Court has upheld the COMELEC’s determination of the
sufficiency of allegations contained in election protests, conformably
with its imperative duty to ascertain in an election protest, by all
means within its command, who was the candidate elected by the
electorate.28 Indeed, in Panlilio v. Commission on Elections,29 we
brushed aside the contention that the election protest was insufficient
in form and substance and was a sham for having allegations
couched in general terms, stating:
In Miguel v. COMELEC, the Court belittled the petitioner’s argument
that the protestant had no cause of action, as the allegations of fraud
and irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not
sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots.
The Court states the rules in election protests cognizable by the
COMELEC and courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:
The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer.
In a string of categorical pronouncements, we have consistently ruled
that when there is an allegation in an election protest that would
require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it
is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the
ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited
therein.
In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, the Court
considered the allegations in an election protest, similar to those in
this case, as sufficient in form and substance.
Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC, the Court declared that allegations of
fraud and irregularities are sufficient grounds for opening the ballot
boxes and examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is
in accordance with Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
reads:
Judicial counting of votes in election contest. – Where allegations in
a protest or counter-protest so warrant, or whenever in the opinion of
the court in the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately
order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and
other documents used in the election be brought before it and that
the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.lawphi1
In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the
allegations in the protest and counter-protest warranted the opening
of the contested ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to
settle at once the conflicting claims of petitioner and private
respondent.
The petitioner adds that with the Court having  noted the reliability
and accuracy of the PCOS machines and consolidation/canvassing
system (CCS) computers in Roque, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,30 Bautista’s election protest assailing the system and
procedure of counting and canvassing of votes cast in an automated
system of elections should be immediately dismissed.
We are not persuaded.
Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of
an election protest to challenge the outcome of an election
undertaken in an automated system of elections. Instead, the Court
only ruled there that the system and procedure implemented by the
COMELEC in evaluating the PCOS machines and CCS computers
met the minimum system requirements prescribed in Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 8436.31 The Court did not guarantee the efficiency
and integrity of the automated system of elections, as can be
gleaned from the following pronouncement thereat:
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing
would go wrong, that a successful automation election unmarred by
fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the
moment on May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot
guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity
of the counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That
task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part of its mandate
to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent
constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers
and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions.
The road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections
would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under
very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all
advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of
goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel
address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like
anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to
succeed, credibly.32

In view of the foregoing, we have no need to discuss at length the

other submissions of the petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165550              October 8, 2008
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, petitioners,
vs.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION
(SCBEU), respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court of Standard Chartered Bank assailing the
Decision1 dated July 1, 2004 as well as the Resolution2 dated September
23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71448. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the appellate court affirmed
the Orders3 dated March 11, 2002 and April 29, 2002 of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) which sustained the outpatient
medicine reimbursements of the employees of petitioner as well as the
maternity benefits of the spouses of its male employees. Respondent
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (SCBEU) filed
its Comment (to the petition)4 on March 28, 2005 and petitioner filed
its Reply5 thereto on June 21, 2005.
The facts are culled from the records of the case.
On August 25, 1998, petitioner Standard Chartered Bank entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement6 (CBA) with respondent Standard
Chartered Bank Employees Union (SCBEU), which provided, among
others, for medical benefits. Under Article XI, Section 1 of the CBA,
petitioner committed to "continue to cover all its employees with a group
hospitalization and major surgical insurance plan including maternity
benefits."77"> At the time of the signing of the said CBA, the group
hospitalization insurance plan in force was Group Policy No. P-1620
issued by the Philippine American Life (Philamlife) Insurance Company
with * Additional Member as per Special Order No. 520.
an effective date of March 3, 1977.8
After the signing of the CBA, petitioner changed its insurance provider
from Philamlife to Maxicare, a Health Maintenance Organization, to
allegedly provide its employees with improved medical benefits under
the CBA.
Subsequently, respondent charged petitioner with unfair labor practice
before the DOLE for alleged gross violation of the economic provisions
of the CBA and diminution or removal of benefits. Respondent
contested, among others, the exclusion of the outpatient medicine
reimbursements of the employees and the maternity benefits granted to
the spouses of the male employees of petitioner in the new insurance
policy provided by Maxicare.
In support of its allegations, respondent presented a letter addressed to
petitioner’s Personnel Manager from the Group Marketing Officer of
Philamlife and documents indicating reimbursements for outpatient
services to prove that the petitioner’s employees had been enjoying
outpatient medicine reimbursements. Respondent also cited Schedule L
of the CBA and affidavits of employees to prove that the spouses of the
male employees of petitioner were entitled to maternity benefits.
Petitioner, in turn, argued that there was no diminution of benefits as the
insurance policy issued by Maxicare contained similar benefits to those
contained in the previous Philamlife policy. Petitioner alleged that
outpatient medicine reimbursement was not expressly provided for in the
Philamlife insurance policy and that this was precisely the reason
petitioner’s employees were provided with a medicine allowance under
the CBA. Petitioner also contended that the maternity benefits as
provided in the CBA were exclusive to its female employees and that the
past practices cited by the respondent were "malpractices" which it
seeks to curtail and correct.
In a Decision dated May 31, 2001, the DOLE gave credit to the claims of
respondent. It ruled that the "outpatient benefit [had] been a regular
feature of the [petitioner’s] medical coverage and as a regular feature,
cannot be withdrawn unilaterally."9 The insurance policy issued by
Philamlife allowed outpatient benefits as claims against maximum
disablement, notwithstanding the lack of an express provision regarding
outpatient benefits. Moreover, the DOLE found that petitioner
acknowledged, without disapproval or objection, employees’ requests for
reimbursement of outpatient medical expenses under the old insurance
plan. The DOLE also held that the spouses of the male employees of
petitioner were entitled to maternity benefits as a matter of practice. This
finding was supported by the claims for reimbursement of maternity
expenses of the spouses of bank employees covering the period from
1984 to 1998. The 1984 claims indicated that the same were approved
by petitioner and that there was no showing that it disapproved or
challenged the other claims. The DOLE said that these circumstances
negated petitioner’s contention that there was a mistake in the
processing of claims for the said maternity benefits.
In an Order10 dated October 5, 2001, the DOLE acted on the separate
motions for reconsideration of the parties and sustained its earlier
findings but reversed its ruling that the maternity benefits granted by
petitioner extend to the spouses of its male employees. Respondent
allegedly failed to dispute the assertion of petitioner that there were only
three out of four claims covering the period of twenty years that were
processed by Philamlife. The DOLE was convinced that there was no
voluntary practice of giving said maternity benefits to spouses of male
employees.
Respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration 11 and contended
that it submitted documentary evidence showing that there were nine
claims of the subject maternity benefits that were processed and
approved. These were in addition to the four affidavits of bank
employees attesting to the fact that the medical hospitalization plan of
Philamlife included such maternity benefits. Respondent further pointed
out that these benefits were even integrated in the CBA.
In the assailed Order dated March 11, 2002, the DOLE reverted to its
original ruling that the spouses of male employees of petitioner were
entitled to maternity benefits. Petitioner disagreed and filed a second
motion for reconsideration to this ruling and a motion for clarification
regarding the grant of "outpatient benefits" to the employees. In a
subsequent Order dated April 29, 2002, the DOLE denied the said
motion and clarified that the grant of outpatient benefits includes
medicine reimbursements.
Petitioner elevated this case before the appellate court through a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The said
court dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Orders dated
March 11, 2002 and April 29, 2002 of the DOLE and held that the basis
for the grant of the subject maternity benefits was Schedule L of the
CBA of the parties. The appellate court likewise denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration thereto for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner assails the rulings of the appellate court on the ground that the
same are not in accord with evidence, law, and the applicable decisions
of this Court and raises the following issues:
ISSUES
A. Whether or not, on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate
court is correct in ruling that spouses of male employees are entitled to
maternity benefits despite its own finding that there was no established
company practice of granting maternity benefits to male employees’
spouses; and
B. Whether or not, on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court is correct in ruling that there is an established company
practice of granting outpatient medicine reimbursements to petitioner’s
employees.
Anent the first issue, petitioner claims that the spouses of its male
employees are not entitled to maternity benefits as these are exclusively
intended for its female employees. It is petitioner’s view that the CA
erred in finding that Schedule L of the CBA obligates it to pay maternity
benefits to spouses of its male employees, despite ruling that there is no
company practice granting maternity benefits to such persons.
According to petitioner, the literal interpretation of Schedule L of the CBA
is not the real intention of the parties to the contract. Such an
interpretation is purportedly iniquitous to the bank as the same will also
mean (a) that the children of married employees and the mothers of
single employees will enjoy the same benefits and (b) that the spouses
of the male employees who also happen to be employed in the bank or
any other company will benefit twice. Schedule L of the CBA should
instead be read compatibly with the provisions of the contract itself to
determine the real intention of the parties thereto.
Petitioner points out Section 1 of Article XI of the CBA and claims that
this provision shows that the maternity benefits provided in Schedule L
extend only to its employees, thus, the spouses of its male employees
are not entitled to these benefits. Petitioner asserts that the CBA would
have stated expressly that spouses of male employees are entitled to
the said benefit had this been the intention of the parties, similar to the
provision granting of advances and medicine allowances to the
employees and their dependents. Moreover, the CA allegedly erred in
applying Article 4 of the Labor Code in interpreting Schedule L of the
CBA instead of Articles 1370-1379 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner adds that its previous medical insurance policy which was
provided by Philamlife granted insurance benefits only to its "regular,
full-time employees" and that there is nothing in the said policy granting
maternity benefits to the spouses of its male employees. Hence,
petitioner asserts that the CA, having correctly ruled that petitioner had
no company practice of extending such benefits to the spouses of its
male employees, should not have granted such benefits on the basis of
Schedule L of the CBA.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that the appellate court erred
in ruling that its employees are entitled to "outpatient medicine
reimbursements" distinct and separate from the "medicine allowances"
granted in the CBA. This would allegedly result in the unjust enrichment
of the employees at the expense of petitioner.
In its Comment, respondent contends that the instant petition must fail
as it raises questions of fact when it should be limited to questions of
law. Respondent adds that there is no real and material conflict between
the findings of fact of the DOLE and the appellate court so as to claim
that this case is an exception to the rule that only questions of law are
elevated to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appellate
court allegedly shares the conclusion of the DOLE that the maternity
benefits granted to the employees extend to the spouses of the male
employees of petitioner although the basis for the ruling is not anchored
on an established company practice but rather on the basis of Schedule
L of the CBA.
In its Reply, petitioner claims that "when the facts are undisputed, then
the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
Court of Appeals is correct is a question of law." 12 The issues before this
Court are thus questions of law because petitioner seeks the review of
the "evidence on record and the conclusion drawn by the appellate
court."
In the alternative, petitioner further asserts that assuming the issues
raised are questions of fact, this Court is still not precluded from taking
cognizance of the case as the same falls within the exceptions laid in the
case of Fuentes v. Court of Appeals.13 The factual findings of the CA
may be reviewed by this Court (i) when the appellate court fails to notice
certain relevant facts which will justify a different conclusion; and (ii)
when the findings of fact are conflicting. Petitioner points out that the
appellate court erroneously concluded that the spouses of its male
employees are entitled to maternity benefits on the basis of Schedule L
of the CBA despite finding that there is no company practice of granting
the said benefit. Petitioner adds that this finding is consistent with the
finding of the DOLE that the said company practice does not exist.
The petition is bereft of merit.
With respect to the procedural issue, we agree with respondent that the
issues raised by the bank are essentially questions of fact that cannot be
the subject of this petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised on
appeal by certiorari. Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the principle that
this Court is not a trier of facts and that it is neither the function of this
Court to analyze or weigh the evidence of the parties all over
again.14 The ruling in Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.15 elucidates
the distinction of a question of law and a question of fact as follows:
… A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what
the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
xxx xxx xxx
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved
without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances
and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. Our
ruling in Paterno v. Paterno is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be
accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or
spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are
clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in
issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of
proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to
contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong,
clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by
one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests
as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not
inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to
justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.
[Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner wants this Court to determine if (i) the maternity benefits
provided to its female employees extend to the spouses of its male
employees and if (ii) its employees are entitled to "outpatient medicine
reimbursements" as a matter of company practice. Indeed, petitioner, in
phrasing the issues in this Petition, urges this Court to scrutinize the
"evidence based on record." Such language militates against petitioner’s
contention that the Petition involves purely questions of law.
We disagree with petitioner that the conclusion drawn by the appellate
court from the "evidence based on record" is a question of law. This is
the opposite definition of a question of law. Petitioner’s reliance on the
ruling in Commissioner of Immigration v. Garcia16 that "when the facts
are undisputed, then the question of whether or not the conclusion
drawn therefrom by the Court of Appeals is correct is a question of law"
is misplaced. In the present case, the facts are disputed. Respondent
claims that there is an existing company practice entitling petitioner’s
employees to "outpatient medicine reimbursements" and entitling the
spouses of its male employees to maternity benefits. Petitioner
persistently argues the contrary. Both parties point to their CBA and
various documents inclined to prove or disprove their respective factual
contentions.
This case likewise does not fall within any of exceptions to the rule that
only questions of law are proper in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The findings and
conclusions of the appellate court show that the evidence and the
arguments of the parties had all been carefully considered and passed
upon. There are no "relevant facts" that will justify a different conclusion
which the said court failed to consider. There are likewise no factual
conclusions of the CA and the DOLE which are in conflict.
In any event, even if this Court evaluates petitioner’s arguments on the
merits, we still find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA on the
basis of the records of this case, particularly the attachments to the
Petition.
With respect to the first issue, the CA ruled in this wise:
xxx
Indeed, it has been held that for benefits to be considered as voluntary
employer practice which cannot later on be unilaterally withdrawn by the
employer under Article 100, Labor Code, it must be shown that the
practice has been, for a long period of time, consistently and deliberately
made by the employer.
The Court finds that the element of consistency in the alleged
practice of giving maternity benefits to spouses of petitioner’s male
employees is lacking in this case.
In its motion for reconsideration of public respondent’s Order dated
March 11, 2002, petitioner enumerated names of twenty (20) male
employees whose spouses gave birth during the alleged period of
entitlement (1984-1998) but who did not avail of maternity benefits. In its
comment on the motion for reconsideration, while private respondent
disputed the names of ten (10) employees, it did not contest the rest of
the names mentioned in the list. This only shows that the granting of
maternity benefits to spouses of male employees was not consistently
practiced by petitioner.
Nonetheless, the Court still sustains the grant of maternity benefits
to spouses of male employees on the basis of Schedule L of the
1998-2000 CBA, explicitly providing the coverage of the "Group
Hospitalization Benefits" (which include maternity benefits), to
include married staff and spouses and eligible children.
Schedule L, referred to in Article XI of the CBA, provides:
Basic Medical Php
Room & Board (31) 750
Hospital Service 7,500
Doctor’s Call (31) 600
Maternity Benefits
Normal Delivery 10,000
Miscarriage 22,837.50
Caesarian 20,000
xxx xxx xxx
Coverage
Married staff and spouse and eligible children as defined in the
plan. Single staff and one parent who has not reached 65 year of
age.
Petitioner, however, gives a different interpretation of the foregoing
provision and claims that "the persons enumerated in Schedule L
refer only to those who are covered by the insurance in case of
hospitalization due to ill health considering that in such a
circumstance, immediate dependents are likewise covered." The
claim cannot prevail over the specific provision of said coverage of
benefits. If ever the provision is capable of two interpretations, the
same must be resolved in favor of labor. Nonetheless, since the grant
of maternity benefits to spouses of male employees of petitioner is
premised on the CBA, the same may be the subject of future
renegotiation. As held in "Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs.
NLRC", 163 SCRA 71 (1988), "the CBA is the law between the parties
and, if not acceptable, can be the subject of future
renegotiation."17 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
Petitioner exhorts this Court to interpret Schedule L of the CBA in
relation to Section 1, Article XI of the CBA which provides:
Section 1. Group Hospitalization Insurance
The BANK shall continue to cover all its employees with a group
hospitalization and major surgical insurance plan including maternity
benefits with a disablement maximum amount of PHP100,000.00 per
illness per year. All employees will be furnished with a copy of the
booklet explaining the coverage of the Plan (See Schedule L).
The BANK shall continue extending advances to staff members (or their
dependents as defined in the insurance plan), who have been
hospitalized due to ill health. The amount advanced will be the amount
fully reimbursable under the Group Hospitalization Plan less Medicare
but including the twenty percent (20%) deductible under the plan which
absorbed by the BANK. Any shortfall is to be met by the employee. 18
Petitioner argues that the above-quoted provision expressly limits the
grant of benefits, specifically maternity benefits, under the group
hospitalization insurance plan to its own employees and that dependents
of employees are only entitled to benefits for hospitalization due to ill-
health. In addition, petitioner stresses that there is nothing in the group
hospitalization insurance plan which expressly provides for maternity
benefits for spouses of its male employees. Thus, petitioner asserts that
maternity benefits under the CBA should be deemed granted only to
petitioner’s female employees.
We are unconvinced by petitioner’s reasoning. A reading of Section 1,
Article XI of the CBA shows that at the time the CBA was signed there
was already an existing group hospitalization insurance plan and
petitioner was committing under the CBA to "continue" the same. It is
undisputed that the plan referred to in said provision is Philamlife’s
Group Policy No. P-1620, a copy of which was attached to the Petition
as Annex "O." In determining the coverage of the benefits under the said
plan, it is the provisions of the plan itself that govern. In the said plan,
the term "dependent" includes "a member’s spouse who is not more
than 65 years of age."19 The plan further provides that "[u]nless
dependents are excluded in any particular Insurance Schedule the term
‘insured person’ shall be deemed to include any dependent insured
under the Policy."20 In other words, dependents enjoy the same benefits
as the insured person unless they are expressly excluded in the
Insurance Schedules of benefits. This Court notes that there is
nothing in the Insurance Schedules or the plan itself which
excludes dependents from availing of the maternity benefits
granted under the plan. Thus, Schedule L appears to accurately
summarize the provisions of the existing group hospitalization insurance
plan with respect to the types of benefits under the plan and the persons
who may avail them. The CA did not err in relying on Schedule L in
finding that the spouses of petitioner’s male employees may avail of
maternity benefits.
Neither can petitioner believably claim that it had no intention to extend
maternity benefits to the spouses of its male employees under the CBA.
Under the same Section 1, Article XI of the CBA, petitioner also
committed to furnish all employees with a booklet explaining the
coverage of the group hospitalization insurance plan. A copy of that
booklet called the "Standard Chartered Bank Employee Medical
Insurance Plan" was attached to the Petition as Annex "P." 21 Petitioner
points to the following passage in Appendix B of the booklet to bolster its
position that only female employees can avail of maternity benefits:
Do I qualify for Maternity Benefits even if I am pregnant at the time I
become eligible?
If you are a female employee and your pregnancy commences prior to
your eligibility date for this insurance, you can claim for the benefits
stated in the Schedule of Medical Insurance Benefits provided you apply
for this insurance within 31 days from the date you become eligible for
this insurance. However, the dependent of an insured employee can
only claim under this benefit after the insured dependent has been
continuously insured for a period of 9 months. (emphasis supplied)
In its pleadings, petitioner conveniently omits the second sentence of the
foregoing quote but this Court is not misled by such dissembling tactic. It
is undeniable from the full text of petitioner’s explanation of maternity
benefits that the dependent of an insured employee can claim
maternity benefits subject only to the condition that she has been
continuously insured for a period of nine months. This booklet appears
to be a publication solely of petitioner and it is clear evidence that
petitioner itself interprets Philamlife Group Policy No. P-1620 as
authorizing the grant of maternity benefits to dependents of its
employees. Having knowingly and voluntarily incorporated by reference
the provisions of its Philamlife group hospitalization insurance plan in the
CBA (as can be seen in Article XI, Section 1 thereof in relation to
Schedule L), petitioner cannot now assert that it never intended to
extend maternity benefits to the spouses of its male employees under
the CBA.
Anent the second issue, the Court likewise finds no reason to deviate
from the factual finding of both the DOLE and the CA that there is an
established company practice of reimbursement of outpatient services,
including medicine reimbursement, despite the absence of a provision in
the group hospitalization insurance plan regarding outpatient benefits.
Petitioner admits that outpatient benefits, as a matter of practice, were
paid by Philamlife as claims against the "disablement maximum."
However, petitioner is not assailing the payment of outpatient benefits in
the present case but only assailing the inclusion of "outpatient medicine
reimbursements" in the term "outpatient benefits."
In this regard, we find well-taken the following excerpt from the DOLE’s
Order22 dated April 29, 2002, attached as Annex "N" of the Petition:
xxx
Insofar as the outpatient benefit is concerned, it must be stressed that
this Office directed the Bank to continue with the outpatient benefit under
the old insurance plan and to carry it over to the new health care plan.
This means that the components of the old health insurance scheme on
this particular benefit should be the same component under the new
health plan. In the Decision dated 31 May 2001, this Office made
particular mention of the claims for reimbursement appearing as
Annex "O" of the Union’s Position Paper as basis for its directive to
the Bank to continue with the outpatient benefits. These claims refer not
only to x-ray services but also to reimbursement of prescription
drugs. The existence of these benefits were further buttressed in the
Union’s "Reply to SCB’s Motion for Reconsideration" (dated 11 July
2001) where the Union submitted copies of claims for doctor’s
fees, prescription drugs and laboratory fees processed, approved
and paid. These should provide ample guidance to the parties in the
grant of outpatient benefits, which includes medicine reimbursements as
earlier practised [sic].

In making this clarification, we are not unaware of the Bank’s position

that medicine reimbursement is not part of the HMO package but was
unilaterally granted by the service provider. Even if this were so,
however, we do not believe that the grant by the service provider was
without the conformity of the Bank in light of the exhibits submitted by
the Union in its "Reply to the SCB’s Motion for Reconsideration" (dated
11 July 2001, Annexes "B-86-1" to "B-99-1," covering the period 1986 to
1999). Thus, viewed from another angle, a conclusion similar to the
spousal maternity benefit obtains, i.e., that a practice on medicine
reimbursement has similarly developed which the Bank cannot now
unilaterally withdraw. (emphasis supplied)

xxx

We see no reversible error in the CA’s adoption of said findings of the

DOLE. It is elementary that factual findings of labor officials, who are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction,
are accorded not only respect but finality. 23 In a recent case, it was
similarly held that where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or
agencies conform to, and are affirmed by, the CA, the same are
accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this Court. 24

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated July 1, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71448 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.