1.
CUA v COMELEC, 1987
FACTS:
The first Division of COMELEC rendered 2-1 decision in favor of Cua but suspended his proclamation
as the winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote
required by the procedural rules in COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2, 1984.
Pursuant to said rules, private respondent Puzon filed a "motion for reconsideration/appeal" of the
said decision with the COMELEC en banc, where 3 members vote to sustain the First Division
decision with two dissenting and one abstaining (one member having died earlier). Cua then moved
for his proclamation by the board of canvassers, which granted his motion. Cua took his oath the
same day, but the next day Puzon filed with the COMELEC an urgent motion to suspend Cua's
proclamation or to annul or suspend its effect if already made. The COMELEC issued a restraining
order enjoining Cua from assuming the office of member of the House of Representatives.
The petitioner then came to this Court to enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion and
enforcing its restraining order.
ISSUE:
WON the 2-1 decision of the First Division was a valid decision of the COMELEC itself despite the lack
of unanimous concurrence.
HELD:
Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Quorum: votes required; substitution. — Two members shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of the official business of the Division.
A case being heard by it shall be decided with the unanimous concurrence of all three
Commissioners and its decision shall be considered a decision of the Commission. If this
required number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be
appealed to the Commission en banc, in which case the vote of the majority thereof shall
be the decision of the Commission. ...
Article IX-A. Section 7 of the new Constitution, providing that "each Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it.
Cua also contends that Puzon's move, treated as a motion for reconsideration, is deemed denied
for lack of the necessary majority to overturn the challenged decision.
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court holds that the 2-1
decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the
Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a
majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also
valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of
the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the House
of Representatives.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The restraining order issued by the COMELEC enjoining
petitioner from assuming office as member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Quirino is LIFTED
2. RULLODA v COMELEC, 2003
FACTS:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the
contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. In June 2002,
Romeo passed away. The wife of Romeo, herein petitioner, wrote a letter to the COMELEC eeking
permission to run as candidate in lieu of her late husband.
Before the election day, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and
Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas to add the words “not counted” on
the ballots in favor of Rulloda. During the July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516 votes
while respondent Placido received 290 votes.5 Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.
After elections, petitioner learned that on July 13, 2002, COMELEC issued Resolution NO. 5217
denying due course to her CoC and the deletion of her name as Brgy Chairman candidate. This
resolution is in accordance with COMELEC’s Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23, 2002, setting forth
the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the July 15, 2002
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Sec 9 thereof prohibits the
substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution
No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217.
ISSUE:
WON substitution of candidates is not allowed in barangay elections.
HELD:
NO. Respondents base their argument that the substitution of candidates is not allowed in
barangay elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code (Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another.) Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay
election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which
to designate the substitute.
It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to
the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. 13 The absence of a specific provision
governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition
against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the
same is not written.
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioner’s favor can not be counted
because she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was the only candidate for
Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as
well as the assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that petitioner’s letter-
request to be allowed to run as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was
treated as a certificate of candidacy.14
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of
the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.15
3. HAYUDINI v COMELEC, 2014
FACTS:
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy 4 (CoC) for the position of Municipal
Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. Ten days after
Omar filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC asserting that Hayudini should
be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence.
On November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the MCTC. The MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition on
January 31, 2013 while the COMELEC’s First Division dismissed7 Omar’s earlier petition to cancel
Hayudini’s CoC for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to
his residency. The case was elevated to RTC which reversed8 the MCTC ruling and ordered the
deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters. Consequently, a
Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy was filed by Omar by virtue of this supervening
event while Hayudini appealed to CA but the same was denied.
On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed
and, consequently, took his oath of office.
On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution 11 granting Omar’s second
petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC. Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course
to a belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening event. The
COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudini’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Corollary
thereto, the proclamation of Hayudini is declared null and void and without any legal force and
effect.
Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
1. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it admitted, and later granted, Omar’s
petition despite failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
2. WON Hayudini committed false representation in the contents of his CoC.
HELD:
1. NO. Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was also the last day of filing of CoC for the
May 13, 2013 elections. Omar, on the other hand, filed the subject petition only on March 26, 2013.
Under the COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel CoC must be filed within five
days from the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy, but not later than twenty-five days from
the time of filing of the CoC subject of the petition (Sec 2). Clearly, Omar’s petition was filed way
beyond the prescribed period. Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation as to why his
petition was not served personally to Hayudini (Sec 4).
Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains the COMELEC’s
liberal treatment of Omar’s petition. As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are
to be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not
be defeated by mere technical objections. COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even
suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of
all matters pending before it.
Given the finality of the RTC decision, the same should be considered a valid supervening event. A
supervening event refers to facts and events transpiring after the judgment or order had become
executory. supervening event refers to facts and events transpiring after the judgment or order had
become executory. These circumstances affect or change the substance of the judgment and
render its execution inequitable.26 Here, the RTC’s March 8, 2013 decision, ordering the deletion of
Hayudini’s name in the list of voters, which came after the dismissal of Omar’s first petition, is
indubitably a supervening event which would render the execution of the ruling in first petition
iniquitous and unjust.
2. a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office
when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code. The false representation mentioned in Sec 78 must pertain to a
material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. It must also be made with a malicious intent to
deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for said office."
A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. When Hayudini stated in his CoC
that "he is eligible for said office," he made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his
eligibility, because he was not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise applies even
if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office. XPN: Congressional &
senatorial candidates whereby the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the SET or
HRET after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also assumed office. 38
In Aratea v. COMELEC,40 which is a case for cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes.
Codilla v. De Venecia case has no application in this case, since it dealt with a petition for
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and not a petition to deny due
course or cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78 which is the case at bar. Section 6839 of
the Omnibus Election Code specifically refer to the commission of prohibited acts, and possession
of a permanent resident status in a foreign country.
4. PAMATONG v COMELEC, 2004
FACTS:
Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, this court explained why nuisance candidates are prohibited
from running for public office:
. . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,
and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in
conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources
in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State
from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be
available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a
disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in
our democratic institutions. . . .
5. TIMBOL v COMELEC, 2015
FACTS:
On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a CoC for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the Second District of Caloocan City. On January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena from COMELEC
Election Officer Valencia, ordering him to appear before her office on January 17, 2013 for a
clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy. Timbol argued that he was not
a nuisance candidate. He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already
appeared in the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution
No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013. Election Officer Valencia recommended that Timbol’s Certificate of
Candidacy be given due course. However, Timbol’s name was not removed from the list of nuisance
candidates posted in the COMELEC’s website. With the printing of ballots for the automated
elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013 a Petition13 praying that his name
be included in the certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections. In the Minute Resolution
dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot, considering that the
printing of ballots had already begun
Hence, a petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction
against COMELEC Resolution No. 9610 declaring him a nuisance candidate and Minute Resolution
denying his Petition to have his name listed in the certified list of candidates and printed on the
ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections.
ISSUE:
1. WON this case is moot and academic
2. WON respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner Timbol’s Petition
for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.
HELD:
1. This case is moot and academic. A case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a justiciable
controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value." Petitioner filed his Petition for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent
began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded,
with the winners already proclaimed.

2. YES. COMELEC’s power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject
to the candidate’s opportunity to be heard.

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional right to run
for or hold public office[.]" To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed
by law." Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates.

Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of
the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has
been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."

The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." In election cases, due process requirements
are satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand."

In Cipriano v COMELEC, the Court stressed that it is not sufficient that the candidate be notified of
the Commission’s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he
must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for
the office he seeks. COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels
a certificate of candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard.

Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his
bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610on January
11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on
January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.

That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure
the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had
he been given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated
February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioner’s Petition on the sole ground that the printing of
ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.