MEDINA, C.

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RELAMPAGOS VS. CUMBA
G.R. No. 118861
April 27, 1995

Petitioner: EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS

Respondents: ROSITA C. CUMBA, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court (Rule 65)

Decided by EN BANC
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.

FACTS:

 1992, May 11: Petitioner Relampagos and Private Respondent Cumba vied for the Mayoral
position of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. Private respondent won the elections with only
22-vote margin over petitioner.

 Petitioner filed election protest at RTC Agusan del Norte

 1994, June 29: RTC found petitioner to have won 6 votes over private respondent and
declared petitioner as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected mayor of
Magallanes.

 1994, July 4: Private Respondent appealed the RTC’s decision to COMELEC.

 1994, July 12: Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution (MFE) pending appeal (of private
respondent to COMELEC) to the RTC.

 1994, August 3: RTC granted petitioner’s MFE pending appeal. The corresponding writ was
then issued.

 Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MFR) of the order of
execution to the RTC and the sheriff held in abeyance the implementation of the writ.

 1994, August 5: MFR denied

 Private respondent filed to COMELEC a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI to annul the granting
of MFE pending appeal AND the Writ of Execution by the RTC.

 1995, Feb 9: COMELEC granted PETITION resolving that:

 “That is [COMELEC] has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law”

NB: COMELEC in its resolution:

1. Assumes jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari
2. Grants the said petition
3. Order of RTC dated Aug 3, 1994 is declared NULL and VOID
4. Writ of Execution issued on Aug 4, 1994 is LIFTED

 Accordingly, private Respondent is restored as Mayor of Magallanes.

 MEDINA, C.
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CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:

Petitioner:

1. Petitioner pleads that the COMELEC resolution be set aside and nullified for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
He contends that while the COMELEC’s position is inherently compelling, it deserves
scant consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria Ruling.

NB: Garcia and Uy and Veloria Ruling: COMELEC has no jurisdiction because
of the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the
Constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary
writs.

2. The nature and purpose of B.P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the Batasan
Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a temporary statute which self-
destructed after such election.

Respondent COMELEC (adopted by private respondent):

1. COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction, Section
50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), and that it is not exactly correct that
this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election.

2. That in the performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC is the most logical
body to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in
election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction under Section 50, BP Blg. 697
which states that

“Section50. Definition. Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question

pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which
may be raised by any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission. The Commission on
Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
pre-proclamation controversies. The Commission is hereby vested with
exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus involving election cases” (Italics Supplied)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court denied the instant petition, AFFIRMING the COMELEC Resolution
dated Feb 9, 1995.
 MEDINA, C.
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RATIO:

The Court held that Section 50, BP Blg. 697, has not been repealed by the repealing
provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985). The authority
granted to the COMELEC under BP Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election laws.
Thus, by this case, the Court abandons the ruling of Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases and
hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing that the COMELEC is
hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases, remains in full force and effect but
only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Hence, COMELEC correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court. The RTC acted
with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner’s motion for
execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Any motion for execution
pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Since the
motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the
perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. 
 MEDINA, C.
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Edding vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 112060
July 17, 1995.

Petitioner: NORBI H. EDDING

Respondents: COMELEC, and PABLO BERNARDO

Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition

With Urgent Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order
Decided by EN BANC
Ponente: FRANCISCO

FACTS:
 1992, May: During the May 1992 Elections, petitioner Edding and private respondent
Bernardo were among the candidates for Municipal Mayor of Sibuco, Zamboanga del
Norte. Private respondent was declared the winner over petitioner with 212 votes.

 1992, June 9: Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC.

 1993, July 2: RTC rendered judgment proclaiming petitioner as the winner for the
mayoralty seat at Sibuco and declaring null and void the declaration of respondent as
such.

 1993, July 8: Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal while petitioner moved for the execution
of the RTC’s proclamation on his winning. Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion
claiming that RTC has no jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal, and invoked Sec
17 Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure which allows only execution if the judgment
has become final.

 1993, July 12: RTC approved respondent’s Notice of Appeal.

 1993, July 13: RTC granted petitioner’s Motion of Immediate Execution, and ordered the
records of the case to be forwarded to the COMELEC.

 1993, July 15: Petitioner replaced respondent and assumed office.

 1993, July 16: Respondent filed with COMELEC a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with
Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting execution pending appeal.

 1993, July 19: COMELEC issued a temporary restraining order.

 1993, September 23: COMELEC issued assailed order.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:

Petitioner:
1. COMELEC lacks jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari as in consonance with the
Garcia and Uy Ruling which categorically declared that COMELEC does not have
jurisdiction to grant writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

2. The power of RTC to grant execution pending appeal in election cases has already
been confirmed in Tobon-Uy vs COMELEC where it was held that “the COMELEC has
no of authority to deprive RTC of competence to order execution pending appeal”.
 MEDINA, C.
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Respondent COMELEC (adopted by private respondent):

1. COMELEC has the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus thru
Section 2(2) and 3 of Art IX of the 1987 Constitution which provides in part:

Sec 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) xxx appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective

barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Sec 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its Rules of Procedures in order to expedite disposition of
election case including proclamation controversies. xxx"

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of
Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election
cases.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and held that the COMELEC has
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari against interlocutory order of the RTC in election
cases.

RATIO:

The Supreme Court upheld the current rule establish in the case of Relampagos vs Cumba which
states that:

“COMELEC is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide

petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases, remains in
full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”

But notwithstanding the aforementioned pronouncements, the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion when it enjoined the order of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993. In this case, the motion
for execution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal.
The filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing part was of no moment and did not deny the RTC
of its jurisdiction to resolve the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal.
Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction
continued until the matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent action of the
opposing party.

*NB: However, considering that the term of office disputed expired on June 30, 1995
and the election for the contested post has been concluded, the petition was held
moot.
 MEDINA, C.
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