SC Petition Marcos COC Cancellation

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
Manila
En Banc
FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE,

WITH cPLED
FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDELIZA P.
HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN
SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL,
AND JOSEPHINE LASCANO,
Petitioners,
2 60374
- versus - G.R. No.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, For: Certiorari,

FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ Temporary
MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF Restraining Order and
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Preliminary Injunction
the Senate President, THE HOUSE and all other
OF REPRESENTATIVES, appropriate legal and
represented by the Speaker of the equitable reliefs
House of Representatives,
Respondents.
PETITION
Petitioners FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, FIDES M. LIM,
MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA,
ROLAND C. VIBAL, and JOSEPHINE LASCANO, by counsel,
respectfully state that:
Elections are more than a numbers

game.' The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility.' The balance must always tilt in
favor of upholding and enforcing the law.'
Chua v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216607, April 5,21)16.

The COMELEC En Banc, as cited in Chaa v. COMELEC, supra.
Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008.
NATURE OF THE PETITION, RELIEFS SOUGHT
AND TIMELINESS
1. This a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64 of the

Rules of Court in relation to Rule 65, in relation to Article IX (A)(7) of
the Philippine Constitution, which provides that “ x x x any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
1.1. In Sardea v. The Honorable Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 106164 (August 17, 1993), this Court
ruled that:
“A perusal of our election laws shows

that they do not explicitly provide for an
appeal from the COMELEC to the Supreme
Court. Section 7, Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution provides that: ‘unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order or ruling of each
[Constitutional] Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty [30] days from
receipt of a copy thereof.’ The petition
for certiorari shall be filed under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Rivera vs. COMELEC, 199
SCRA 178; Galido vs. COMELEC, 193 SCRA
79; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84; Pedalizo vs.
Mariano, UDK-9819, March 15, 1990).
Since no constitutional provision or

law fixes a shorter period, the reglementary
period within which a petition
for certiorari may be filed in the Supreme
Court against the COMELEC is thirty (30)
days from receipt of a copy of the
COMELEC's order, decision, or ruling.”
[Emphasis supplied]
2. This Petition seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution

dated May 10, 2022 of the COMELEC En Banc (“May 10 Resolution”)
and the Resolution dated January 17, 2022 of the Second (2nd) Division
2
of the COMELEC (“January 17 Resolution”) [collectively, the
Questioned Comelec Resolutions”] issued in the case entitled “Fr.
Christian B. Buenafe, et al, vs. Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr.”
docketed as SPA Case No. 21-156 (“case a quo”).
2.1. Certified True Copies of the May 10 Resolution

and the January 17 Resolution are attached as Annex “A”
and “B”, respectively, to the original of this Petition while
photocopies are attached to the other copies of the said
Petition.
2.2. On January 17, 2022, petitioners received the

January 17 Resolution,4 which dismissed the Petition to
Cancel or Deny Due Course the Certificate of Candidacy dated
October 5, 2021 (“Petition to Cancel COC”)5 filed by the
petitioners in the case a quo, which prayed for the
cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy (“COC”)6 of
respondent Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr. (“Marcos,
Jr.”) pursuant to Section 78 in relation to Section 74,
Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code.
2.3. On January 24, 2022, petitioners timely7 filed

their Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated January 20,
2022 (“Motion for Partial Reconsideration”).8
2.4. On May 10, 2022, petitioners received the May

10 Resolution9 denying the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
2.5. Due to the urgency and the paramount

interest involved herein, the instant Petition is being filed
on May 16, 2022 or within five (5) working days from
receipt of the Questioned En Banc Resolution.
3. This Petition prays for the invalidation and reversal of the

Questioned Comelec Resolutions for having been rendered in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondent COMELEC, by refusing to CANCEL or DENY DUE
COURSE the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of respondent Marcos,
4
See Annex A.
5
A copy of the Petition to Cancel COC is attached as Annex “C” hereof.
6
A copy of the Subject COC is attached as Annex “D” hereof.
7
The five (5) day period under Rule 19, Section 2 in relation to Rule 23, Section 7 of the Comelec
Rules fell on January 22, 2022, a Saturday. Thus, the Motion was timely filed on the next working
day, January 24, 2022.
8
A copy of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is attached as Annex “E”.
9
See Annex B.
3
Jr. despite his having deliberately made false material representations
on two material items, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
4. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code clearly warrants

the cancellation sought:
“Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel

a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.”10
5. Grave abuse of discretion exists, among others, when

there is an evasion of a positive duty or refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,11 as in this
case.
6. Here, respondent COMELEC failed to carry out its

mandate to enforce and administer the laws relating to the conduct
of elections when it refused, despite basis, to exercise its duty to
cancel respondent Marcos Jr.’s COC in view of the latter’s material
misrepresentation on two items.
7. As will be further shown in this Petition, the COMELEC’s

disposition of the petition for cancellation constitutes grave abuse of
discretion as it runs counter to the express ruling in Jalosjos vs. The
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013, where this
Court ruled:
“The foregoing matter is not without

established precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and
Cardino, the Court held that the COMELEC’s
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
a CoC in view of a candidate’s
disqualification to run for elective office
based on a final conviction is subsumed
under its mandate to enforce and administer
10
Emphasis supplied.
11
Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 236686 (February 5, 2020).
4
all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the
COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the
candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the
absence of any petition initiating a
quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution
of the same. Thus, the Court stated:
Even without a petition

under either Section 12 or Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, the COMELEC
is under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public
office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of conviction is notice to
the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict
from running for public office. The
law itself bars the convict from
running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final
judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of the court is addressed
not only to the Executive branch,
but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the
final judgment under the law.’”12
8. In view of respondent Marcos Jr.’s material

misrepresentations in his COC, this Court must CANCEL or DENY
DUE COURSE his COC declaring the same void ab initio.
Consequently, respondent Marcos, Jr. must be deemed to have never
been a candidate from the very beginning, his candidacy
invalidated, and the votes attributed to him considered stray.13
9. Time is of the essence as Congress is due to convene as a

National Canvassing body on May 23, 2022. For this reason,
petitioners seek from this Court immediate interim relief in the form
12
Emphasis supplied.
13
Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229 (09 October 2012).
5
of a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER to restrain respondents
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES from considering and canvassing the
Certificates of Canvass for respondent Marcos Jr. only and from
PROCLAIMING respondent Marcos Jr. as the duly-elected President
of the Republic of the Philippines. Should the petition be given due
course by this Court, petitioners also ask that the qualified candidate
for the position obtaining the highest number of votes cast (sans
Marcos Jr.) be proclaimed as the President.
THE PARTIES
10. Petitioners–
10.1. FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE (“Fr. Buenafe”), O.

Carm., is Filipino, of legal age, and a registered voter,
with address at No. 45 Saint Mary Street, Cubao,
Quezon City. He is the Co-Chairperson of the TASK
FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES (TFDP),
a Mission Partner of the Association of Major Religious
Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP) and a non-profit
human rights organization concerned with
documenting human rights violations, assisting the
victims and their families in their material and legal
needs, organizes missions, conducting human rights
education work, campaigns against torture, and
promotes advocacy for human rights defenders and
environmental movement.
10.2. Petitioner FIDES M. LIM (“Lim”) is Filipino, of legal

age, and a registered voter, with address at 2/F
Erythrina Bldg. 1, Maaralin St., Barangay Central,
Quezon City. She is the Board Chairperson of the
KAPATID–FAMILIES & FRIENDS OF POLITICAL
PRISONERS (KAPATID), a support organization of
families and friends of political prisoners in the
Philippines that works for their release and the
protection of their rights and welfare.
10.3. Petitioner MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ

(“Hernandez”) is Filipino, of legal age, and a registered
voter, with address at 20 Road 9, Project 6, Quezon City.
She is the Executive Director of the MEDICAL
ACTION GROUP, INC. (MAG), an organization
6
formed to deliver health services to victims of political
repression and human rights violations, and to promote
justice in health and uphold human rights.
10.4. Petitioner CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA (“Sevilla”) is

Filipino, of legal age, and a registered voter, with
address at Unit 2-C, Tempus Place Condominium 2,
Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City. She is the Secretary
General of the FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF
INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE INC. (FIND), a
non-government organization in Special Consultative
Status with the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations and a nationwide mass organization of
families, relatives, friends and colleagues of the
disappeared victims and surfaced victims of enforced
disappearances that is advocating human rights and
participative empowerment.
10.5. Petitioner ROLAND C. VIBAL (“Vibal”) is Filipino,

of legal age, and a registered voter, with address at Unit
E, 4th Floor, Tempus Place Condominium 2, Matalino
St., Diliman, Quezon City. He is the Luzon
Representative, Council of Leaders of the PHILIPPINE
ALLIANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES
INC. (PAHRA), a non-stock, non-profit alliance duly
registered under the laws of the Philippines, formed as
an alliance of individuals, institutions and
organizations committed to the promotion, protection
and realization of human rights in the Philippines.
10.6. Petitioner JOSEPHINE LASCANO (“Lascano”) is

Filipino, of legal age, and a registered voter, with
address at 29 A Magiting Street, Teacher’s Village East,
Quezon City. She is the Executive Director of BALAY
REHABILITATION CENTER, INC. (BALAY), a
Philippine Human Rights NGO providing psychosocial
services and rehabilitation to internally displaced
persons and survivors of torture and organized
violence.
11. All petitioners may be served with orders, notices, and

pertinent process through counsel at the address and through the
details given below.
12. Respondent COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS is the

constitutional commission created under the 1987 Constitution vested
7
with the mandate to administer and implement all election laws in
the country and to oversee and conduct all elections. Through its
Second Division, respondent Commission dismissed the Petition to
Cancel COC and, acting as an En Banc body, rendered the Questioned
Comelec Resolutions. It may be served with summons, notices, orders,
pleadings and other processes at the following address: Palacio del
Gobernador Bldg., Gen. Luna St., Intramuros, Manila.
13. Respondent MARCOS, JR. is the respondent in the case a

quo. He was convicted by final judgment for violating the National
Internal Revenue Code (“NIRC”). He filed his Certificate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC in relation to the recent 2022 National
Elections where he made material false representations therein under
oath in relation to his alleged eligibility to run for President of the
Republic of the Philippines. He may be served with summons,
notices, orders, pleadings and other processes at the following
address: G/F Sunset View Tower, 2330 Roxas Blvd., Pasay City.
14. The SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES is one of the two Chambers

comprising the Congress of the Philippines. It is impleaded in
relation to the injunctive relief prayed for as it is set to convene on
May 23, 2022 to canvass the results of the elections for President and
Vice President. It may be served with pertinent orders, notices, and
processes through the Secretary of the Senate at its official station at
GSIS Bldg., Financial Center, Diokno Blvd., Pasay City.
15. The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES is the other Chamber

comprising the Congress of the Philippines. Similar to the Senate of
the Philippines, it is impleaded in relation to the injunctive relief
prayed for as it is set to convene on May 23, 2022 to canvass the
results of the elections for President and Vice President. It may be
served with official notices, orders, and processes through its
Secretary-General at its official station at The House of
Representatives, Batasan Road, Constitution Hills, Quezon City.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Criminal Tax Cases
16. Respondent Marcos, Jr. was a public officer for several

terms spanning a period of more than twenty-five (25) years. As
publicly disclosed by respondent Marcos, Jr. himself, his service
record includes the following:
8
Senator : 2010 - 2016
Congressman : Second District, Ilocos Norte, 2007 - 2010
Governor : Province of Ilocos Norte, 1998 - 2007
Congressman : Second District, Ilocos Norte, 1992 - 1995
Governor : Province of Ilocos Norte, 1983 - 1986
Vice Governor : Province of Ilocos Norte, 1981 – 198314
17. Respondent Marcos, Jr., was charged in eight (8) criminal

cases before the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Quezon City, Branch
105 (“Criminal Tax Cases”), involving the following violations of the
NIRC:
(a) Four (4) Informations in Criminal Case Nos.

Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213, and
Q-92-29217 for violating the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977 NIRC, as amended, on his
failure to file income tax returns for the years 1982,
1983, 1984, and 198515; and
(b) Four (4) Informations in Criminal Case Nos.

Q-91-24390, Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, and
Q-92-29214 for violating Section 50 of the 1977
NIRC, as amended, on his non-payment of income
taxes due thereon exclusive of surcharges and
interests.16
18. Significantly, the Criminal Tax Cases involved: (a) income

earned by respondent Marcos, Jr. when he was a public officer; (b)
income tax returns, which respondent Marcos, Jr. failed to file when
he was a public officer; and (c) taxes on such income, which
respondent Marcos, Jr. failed to pay when he was likewise a public
officer.
19. Notably, based on the findings of the Regional Trial Court

as noted by the Court of Appeals (“CA”), the factual antecedents are
as follows:17
14
See https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen_bio/bmarcos_resume.asp (accessed on December
15, 2021). See also https://www.bongbongmarcos.com/political-timeline/ (accessed on
December 15, 2021).
15
Decision dated July 27, 1995, at page 1, a copy of which is attached as Annex “F”; also petitioners’
Exhibit “F” in the case a quo.
16
Decision dated July 27, 1995, at page 1 (Annex “F” hereof); also petitioners’ Exhibit “F” in the
case a quo.
17
Decision dated July 27, 1995, at pages 2 to 3; (Annex “F” hereof); also petitioners’ Exhibit “F” in
the case a quo.
9
“It appears that on June 27, 1990, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue Jose U. Ong created a Special Tax Audit
Team primarily to undertake the investigation for internal
revenue tax purposes as well as the estate tax liability of
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, including identified associates and cronies. The
standard operating procedure was to determine if (1)
income was earned or realized by the taxpayer, (2) the
required tax return was filed, and (3) the corresponding
tax payment was made. x x x
The team ascertained that accused, former

Vice-Governor and later Governor of Ilocos Norte from
November 3, 1982 up to March 31, 1986, received a salary
income per Certification issued by Paula Pastor in the
amount of P243,650.80 (Exh.A), Certification issued by
Gloria G. Agodon of the taxes with-held (Exh. B) and
Memorandum dated July 22, 1991 issued by Norma
Herrera (Exh. C). His annual gross salaries were as
follows: P10,759.17 (1982), P78,215.83 (1983), P64,555.00
(1984), P78,780.00 (1985). x x x
Based on the testimonies of Susana Dagdagan

(Chief Administrative Branch, Revenue Region I, BIR
Baguio City), Glorio Agodon) Revenue Collection Officer
of Laoag City, Perseveranda Pimentel, Feliciano Siva
(Senior Record Officer of Revenue Information Service,
Inc.) and Lydia Aguinaldo (Records Unit, Administrative
Branch, Region 4 B-1, Delta Bldg., Quezon City), there is
no record whatsoever that the accused filed in the
Philippines or abroad of his income tax returns for the
taxable years from 1982 to 1985 (See Exhs. L, M, N and O
– Certifications). For 1982, his income tax due was
P258.70. Since he did not file an income tax return, the
team prepared an income tax form for said tax liability
(Exh. E), but no payment was made by the accused
pursuant to Section 16(a) of the 1977 Tax Code. For 1983,
his income tax, including increments, was computed at
P9,385.40 (Exh. F). No income tax return having been
filed by the accused, the team prepared the necessary
income tax return for 1983 (Exh. G). In 1984, the accused
earned P64,555,00 and after deducting the withholding
tax, the tax deficiency or income tax due, including
10
increments, was P4,388.00 (Exh. H). No income tax return
having been filed, one was prepare by the team (Exh. I).
The accused earned P78,780.00 in 1985 and after
deducting the withholding tax, the income tax due
amounted to P6,376.50, including increments (Exh. J).
Again no income tax return was filed by the accused so
that one was made by the team (Exh. K), For tax year
1982, the last day for filing an income tax return was
March 15, 1983; for 1983, it was March 15, 1984; for 1984,
it was March 15, 1985; and for 1985, it was March 15,
1986.”
20. After due proceedings, the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City, Branch 105, in a Decision dated July 27, 1995, convicted
respondent Marcos, Jr. for violating the NIRC. In its decision, the
Regional Trial Court found, among others:
(a) “Under the 1977 Tax Code, every Filipino citizen

whose income had been derived solely from
salaries, wages, interests, dividend, allowances,
commissions, bonuses, fees, pensions, or any
combination thereof, shall be filed on or before the
eighteenth day of March of each year (Section 45).
The total amount of tax imposed shall be paid at the
time when the return is filed by the person subject
thereto (Section 51)”.18
(b) “Besides, (Marcos, Jr.) admitted that he had no

proof that he filed his income tax returns, he also
failed to pay the taxes due on his realized income
after deducting the taxes withheld on his income
in 1983, 1984, and 1985, with the exception of
taxable year 1982 when no taxes were withheld.
Logically, having failed to file his returns, he also
failed to pay the taxes due on his returns. Further,
the filing of withholding taxes did not constitute the
filing of a return”.19
(c) “The prosecution, on the other hand, presented

more than sufficient, if not overwhelming,
18
case a quo.
19
case a quo.
11
testimonial and documentary evidence to show that
the accused failed to file his returns and pay his
taxes due either on the eighteenth of March or the
fifteenth of April the following year of each taxable
year for 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985.”20
(d) “As Provincial Governor, the accused knew the

importance of taxes. Without such, he could not
have effectively administered the affairs of his local
government unit. It follows then that he was well
aware of the citizen’s duty, as it was also his, to file
income tax return and pay the taxes due. Ignorance
of such obligation to the State was no excuse. Yet,
then Governor Marcos failed for four consecutive
years to file his income tax returns and pay the taxes
due thereon. It was not out of sheer ignorance or
innocent neglect that he failed to do so. The length
of time that he failed to do so indicates that his
omission was willful, intentional and deliberate.
Why not? Not only was he the Provincial Governor;
he was the son of President Marcos. x x x It is
important to note that no evidence whatsoever was
presented by the accused of his promptness and
regularity in making or filing tax returns over a
period of years as proof of his good faith. x x x”21
21. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court sentenced

respondent Marcos, Jr. to imprisonment of nine (9) years and to pay
the fine for his failure to file his income tax returns and/or pay the
taxes due thereon for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985, to wit:22
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ferdinand

Romualdez Marcos II guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as
amended and sentences him as follows:
1. To serve imprisonment of six (6) months and

pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-92-29213, Q-92-29212, and Q-92-29217 for failure
20
case a quo.
21
case a quo.
22
See G.R. Nos. 130371 & 130855, August 4, 2009.
12
to file income tax returns for the years 1982, 1983 and
1984;
2. To serve imprisonment of six (6) months and

pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, and Q-92-29214 for failure
to pay income taxes for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984;
3. To serve imprisonment of three (3) years and

pay a fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Cases No.
Q-91-24391 for failure to file income tax return for the
year 1985; and
4. To serve imprisonment of three (3) years and

pay a fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24390
for failure to pay income tax for the year 1985; and,
5. To pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue the

taxes due, including such other penalties, interests and
surcharges.
SO ORDERED.”23
22. Instead of filing the appropriate return and paying the

proper taxes due, respondent Marcos, Jr. appealed his conviction to
the Court of Appeals in 1997, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
18569.
23. On October 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed

respondent Marcos, Jr.’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt for
violating Section 45 of the NIRC related to his failure to file income
tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985, to wit:24
a. Ordering respondent Marcos, Jr. to pay the

Bureau of Internal Revenue (“BIR”) the deficiency income
taxes due with interest at the legal rate until fully
paid; and
b. Ordering respondent Marcos, Jr. to pay a fine

of P2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-92-29213, Q-92-29212 and Q-92-29217 for failure to file
income tax returns for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984; and
23
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
24
Decision dated October 31, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18569, a copy of which is
attached as Annex “G”; also petitioners’ Exhibit “B” in the case a quo.
13
the fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24391 for
failure to file income tax return for 1985, with
surcharges.25
24. The Court of Appeals found that “(f)or the years 1982 to
1985, for which (respondent Marcos, Jr.) had been charged, he had
been earning compensation/income from the government as
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte”26. The Court of Appeals also
ordered respondent Marcos, Jr. to pay the BIR the deficiency
income taxes due with interest at the legal rate until fully paid.
25. Respondent Marcos, Jr. appealed the Court of Appeals’

Decision to the Supreme Court but later withdrew the same.
25.1. In the Resolution dated August 8, 2001,27 the

Supreme Court in G.R. No. 148434 granted the urgent
motion of respondent Marcos, Jr. to withdraw his motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review, which
sought to assail his conviction. In the Entry of Judgment,28
the Supreme Court certified that its Resolution dated
August 8, 2001 had become final and executory.
25.2. In the Entry of Judgment,29 the Court of

Appeals also certified that its Decision dated October 31,
1997 had become final and executory.
26. Thus, respondent Marcos, Jr.’s conviction is final and

executory and is an incontestable, irrefutable, and binding fact,
regardless of any opinion as to the correctness or propriety of the
CA’s modification of the RTC’s judgment. For all intents and
purposes, but more relevantly in relation to the cancellation of
respondent Marcos, Jr.’s Certificate of Candidacy for “President”,
Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr. is a convicted criminal.
25
Letter dated October 30, 2004 of Jovito Salonga as reportedly published in an article of the
Manila Times (available at
https://nothinginparticular.substack.com/p/from-the-archives-1995-tax-evasion?r=152ay&utm
_source)
26
Decision dated October 31, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18569 (Annex “G”
hereof); also petitioners’ Exhibit “B” in the case a quo.
27
Resolution dated August 8, 2001 of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 148434, a copy of which is
attached as Annex “H”
28
Entry of Judgment issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 148434, a copy of which is attached as
Annex “I”
29
Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, a copy of which is attached as Annex “J”; also
petitioners’ Exhibit “C” in the case a quo.
14
27. Parenthetically, Marcos, Jr. continues his resolute refusal
to comply with the criminal penalty imposed by the courts in a
Decision that attained finality over twenty (20) years ago. As certified
by the Officer-in-Charge of the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC,30
there is no record of respondent Marcos, Jr. 's compliance of
payment or satisfaction of the Regional Trial Court’s Decision dated
July 27, 1995 and the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated October 31,
1997.31
27.1. This is further confirmed in a Certification

dated December 14, 202132 issued by the Clerk of Court
VII & Ex Officio Sheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, it was further
certified that there is no record of respondent Marcos,
Jr.’s payment of a fine in the Tax Evasion Cases:
30
Certifications dated December 2, 2021, copies of which are collectively attached as Annexes “K”
and “L”; also petitioners’ Exhibits “G” and “H” in the case a quo.
31
This statement of non-satisfaction is relevant to these cancellation proceedings to show that
respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot avail of the defense that his misrepresentations were neither
intentional nor meant to mislead.
32
A copy of the Certification dated December 14, 2021 is attached as Annex “M”; also petitioners’
Exhibit “H-1” in the case a quo.
15
27.2. Clearly, respondent Marcos, Jr. has not
served the penalty imposed pursuant to his criminal
conviction. Assuming arguendo that Sec. 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code applies to further affect his
eligibility for the office he aspires for, Marcos, Jr.’s
non-service of his sentence shows that his ineligibility
arising from the perpetual disqualification is a separate
infirmity that continues. For the avoidance of doubt, the
fact of his ineligibility remains, which is a material fact
that respondent Marcos, Jr. falsely and deliberately
misrepresented.
27.3. Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code does not

apply to the present proceedings. This case involves
16
Marcos, Jr.’s misrepresentations pertaining to his
eligibility due to his prior convictions under the 1977
NIRC. The 1977 NIRC does not provide for any manner of
removing perpetual disqualification so even if he served
his sentence, which he did not, his perpetual
disqualification and his ineligibility necessarily continues.
So does his misrepresentation.
Estate Tax Return
28. Respondent’s propensity to flout Philippine laws is

further exemplified by his egregious and obstinate refusal to pay the
estate taxes for the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Sr. (“Marcos, Sr.”).
Notably, Marcos, Jr. is one of the court-appointed administrators for
this estate. For the sole purpose of establishing this depravity,
petitioners likewise state for the record the attendant circumstances
relating to this non-payment of the estate taxes.
29. On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to
conduct investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and
obligations of the late president, as well as that of his family,
associates and “cronies”. Said audit team concluded its investigation
with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The investigation disclosed
that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the death of the
decedent, an estate tax return, as well as several income tax returns
covering the years 1982 to 1986, — all in violation of the NIRC.
Criminal charges were filed against Imelda Marcos for these
violations.33
30. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused

the preparation and filing of the Estate Tax Return for the late
Marcos, Sr., Income Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos from 1985 to
1986, and the Income Tax Return of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. for the
years 1982 to 1985.34
31. The BIR computed the estate tax based on the known
assets of Marcos, Sr. at the time of his death as garnered from
property records in government offices, documents recovered from
Malacañang Palace as well as pleadings filed by his family in court.
The BIR computed the estate tax due on the Marcos Estate at Twenty
Three Billion Two Hundred Ninety Three Million Six Hundred Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Eight Pesos (Php 23,293,607,638.00).
Notices were sent to his widow Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos (“Mrs.
Marcos”). Formal assessment notices were served upon Mrs. Marcos
33
See G.R. No. 120880, June 5, 1997.
34
See G.R. No. 120880, June 5, 1997.
17
through her caretaker at her last known address. The deficiency tax
assessments were not protested administratively.35
32. Since the heirs only ignored the notices sent by the BIR,
the latter sent Notices of Levy on real property for the purpose of
satisfying the deficiency income taxes. Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals questioning the validity of the
estate tax assessment. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as
the estate tax assessment had already become final and unappealable.
This was affirmed by the Supreme Court on June 5, 1997.36
33. To date, there is no showing that the Marcos heirs have

paid the estate tax due. Furthermore, there is no document to show
respondent Marcos, Jr.’s filing of an estate tax return and proper
payment of taxes on the estate of his father, Marcos, Sr.37
a. Marcos, Sr. died more than thirty-two (32)

years ago on September 29, 1989. And yet, his heirs,
including respondent Marcos, Jr., criminally failed to file
an estate tax return, much less pay the corresponding
taxes mandated by law.38
b. Indeed, Marcos, Jr., his mother, Imelda, and

sisters, Imee and Aimee, deliberately and criminally
disregarded the assessment issued by the government
spanning approximately thirty (30) years throughout
multiple administrations,39 which consistently issued
written demands to no avail.
c. The failure of the Marcos family to pay the

estate taxes is to the detriment of the Filipino people, as it
represents once again a “Ferdinand Marcos”, but this time
his Junior, depriving the country and its people of money
properly belonging to them–to the tune of approximately
PhP 203.8 Billion Pesos, inclusive of interest, surcharges
and penalties.40
35
See G.R. No. 120880, June 5, 1997.
36
See G.R. No. 120880, June 5, 1997.
37
The Commission may take judicial notice that Marcos Sr. is known as the dictator of the
Philippines from September 1972 to February 1986, holding the world record for the “Greatest
Robbery of a Government.” See Guinness World Records Website at
https://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/65607-greatest-robbery-of-a-governm
ent.
38
Ferdinand R. Marcos II vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120880, June 5, 1997.
39
Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998), Joseph Ejercito Estrada (1998-2000), Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(2000-2010), Benigno S. Aquino III (2010-2016), and reportedly, even recently during the term
of Rodrigo Roa Duterte (2016-2022).
40
This Commission may, nay must, appreciate the cruel irony and ridiculous audacity of an
aspirant for the presidency who deliberately refuses to pay taxes, the lifeblood of the
18
The Subject COC
34. With full knowledge of his impediments, and with a

deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, and deceive the electorate,
respondent Marcos, Jr. filed the Subject COC41 on October 6, 2021
making two material misrepresentations.
35. The first material misrepresentation pertains to item 11

of the pro forma COC. The second material misrepresentation
pertains to respondent’s answer of “NO” to Box 22 of the COC.
Item 11: The First Material Misrepresentation
36. Item 11 speaks to a general eligibility for the office aspired

for, to wit:
“8. I AM A NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN.
9. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR AN

IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
10. I EXECUTED A SWORN RENUNCIATION OF

FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP. (IF APPLICABLE,
ATTACH A COPY)
11. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE

ELECTED TO.
12. I WILL FILE, WITH THE OFFICE OF THE

COMMISSION, WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS
AFTER ELECTION DAY, MY FULL, TRUE AND
ITEMIZED STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS
AND EXPENDITURES (SOCE) IN CONNECTION
WITH THE ELECTIONS.
13. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE
FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO. I WILL
OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND
government, yet aspires to swear an oath to faithfully execute the laws of the country, which
includes enforcing tax laws.
41
Subject Certificate of Candidacy dated October 5, 2021 (Annex “D” hereof).
19
DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES. I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,
WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR
PURPOSE OF EVASION.
14. I GIVE MY CONSENT TO THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS TO COLLECT, DISCLOSE OR SHARE,
AND PROCESS THE PERSONAL DATA I
PROVIDED HEREIN FOR ELECTION AND
OTHER LAWFUL PURPOSES IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PRIVACY NOTICE AT THE BACK OF
THIS FORM, AND AS MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY
EXISTING LAWS.”42
37. The general statement of eligibility under item 11 pertains

to the minimum qualifications for eligibility under the 1987
Constitution and pertinent laws but also the non-existence of
disqualifications under existing laws. Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s
conviction for the NIRC violations automatically resulted in his
perpetual disqualification.
38. Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s disqualification remains as he

has never served the sentence imposed by the final decision of the
CA. His signing and subscribing to the COC that he is eligible for
office under item 11, with full knowledge that he has never served his
sentence, makes this act a material misrepresentation of his eligibility
for the office he seeks.
Box No. 22: The Second Material Misrepresentation
39. The second material misrepresentation pertains to Box 22

of the subject COC. Respondent Marcos, Jr. declared under oath by
checking the “No” box that he has never been found liable for any
offense, which carries the penalty of perpetual disqualification to
hold public office:
42
Emphasis supplied.
20
40. Objectively, respondent Marcos, Jr.’s checking of the
“No” box in answer to Box 22 is a material misrepresentation as it is a
false statement. As a matter of law and fact, respondent Marcos, Jr.
was, is, and remains to be disqualified to run for any office due to
his conviction for violating the NIRC, which carries with it the
consequence of perpetual disqualification. The statement that he
does not suffer from any such disqualification arising from his
checking the “No” box in Box 22 of the subject COC, with full
knowledge of its falsity, is factually a material misrepresentation
under Rule 23 of respondent COMELEC’s own rules.
41. The two material representations are false as

respondent Marcos, Jr. is clearly disqualified to run for any office.
Despite such falsity being known to respondent Marcos, Jr., he
nonetheless filed the Subject COC and even confirmed such fact
under oath before Atty. Paul Joseph V. Mercado, a notary public
commissioned in the City of Taguig:
21
IV. STATEMENT OF ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
42. On November 02, 2021, petitioners filed the Petition to

Cancel COC43 of even date to cancel and/or deny due course the
certificate of candidacy of respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 78 in
relation to Section 74, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code, and
invoking the Honorable Commission’s mandate to enforce and
administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
43. On November 11, 2021, petitioners and respondent

Marcos, Jr. received a copy of the Summons with Notice of Preliminary
Conference of even date (“Notice of Preliminary Conference”)44 where the
Honorable Commission:
(a) Directed respondent Marcos, Jr. to file his verified

answer within a non-extendible period of five (5)
days from receipt thereof, or until November 16,
2021, failure of which “shall bar the Respondent
from submitting controverting evidence or from
filing a memorandum.”
(b) Set the preliminary conference on November 26,

2021; and
(c) Directed the parties to submit a summary of

documents at least three (3) days before the
preliminary conference.
43
Annex “C” hereof.
44
A copy of the Summons with Notice of Preliminary Conference is attached as Annex “N”.
22
44. On November 16, 2021, respondent Marcos, Jr. failed to
file his Verified Answer on the Petition to Cancel COC. Instead,
respondent Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer dated November 15, 2021 (“Motion for Extension”)45,
requesting for an extension of until November 22, 2021, within which
to file his Answer.
44.1. On the same day, petitioners filed an

Opposition with Motion dated 16 November 2021.46
45. On November 18, 2021, respondent Marcos, Jr.’s

spokesperson announced that respondent’s extension was already
“approved yesterday.” This, however, was contrary to the official
statement made by the Honorable Commission on the same day that
the Motion for Extension filed by respondent Marcos, Jr. was still
pending before the Honorable Division.47 Later that day, the
undersigned counsel for the petitioners received the Order dated
November 18, 2021,48 granting the Motion for Extension filed by
respondent Marcos, Jr.
46. Thus, on November 19, 2021, petitioners, through

counsel, filed their Motion for Reconsideration of even date (“Motion for
Reconsideration”)49 praying that the Honorable Commission deny the
Motion for Extension and bar respondent Marcos, Jr. from submitting
controverting evidence and from filing his memorandum. Petitioners
also prayed that the Honorable Commission take steps in inquiring
into the statements made by the spokesperson of respondent Marcos,
Jr. alluding to inside knowledge of the COMELEC’s actions.
46.1. In an Order dated November 23, 2021,50 the

COMELEC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
46.2. On November 24, 2021, petitioners filed their

Bill of Exceptions of even date.51
47. On November 19, 2021, petitioners filed a Request for

Subpoena Duces Tecum of even date52 for the production of certain
45
A copy of the Motion for Extension is attached as Annex “O”.
46
A copy of the Opposition with Motion dated 16 November 2021 is attached as Annex “P”.
47
Attached to the Motion for Reconsideration as ANNEX R is the video record of Atty. James Jimenez’
press briefing on 18 November 2021. A copy of the press conference is available at:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1M5jmraVSErSd8vTdOMh46ngxMg-D960y/view
48
A copy of the Order dated November 18, 2021 is attached as Annex “Q”.
49
A copy of the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 19, 2021 is attached as Annex “R”.
50
A copy of the Order dated November 18, 2021 is attached as Annex “S”.
51
A copy of the Bill of Exceptions dated November 24, 2021 is attached as Annex “T”.
52
A copy of the Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum dated November 19, 2021 is attached as Annex
“U”.
23
documents of respondent Marcos., Jr. from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
48. On November 23, 2021, petitioners also filed: (a)

Compliance Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam with Ex Parte Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum of even date53; and (b) a Summary of
Documents For the Petitioners dated November 23, 202154 (“Summary of
Documents”) in compliance with the Honorable Commission’s Notice
of Preliminary Conference.
48.1. In the Summary of Documents, petitioners

submitted the list of the following documents in support
of the instant Petition. These include the following,
among others:
(a) Certified True Copy of Ferdinand

Romualdez Marcos Jr.’s Certificate of
Candidacy dated October 5, 2021 and
filed before the COMELEC on October
6, 2021;
(b) Certified True Copy of the Court of
Appeals Special Third Division’s
Decision dated October 31, 1997in
CA-G.R. CR No. 18569;
(c) Certified True Copy of the Entry of
Judgment issued by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569;
(d) Resolution dated August 8, 2001 of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 148434;
(e) Entry of Judgment issued by the Supreme
Court of the Resolution dated August 8,
2001 in G.R. No. 148343;
(f) Certified True Copy of the Decision
dated July 27, 1995 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 105 in the case entitled, “People
of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr.”, Criminal Case Nos.
Q-91-24390, Q-91-24390, Q-92-29212 to
Q-92-29217; and
(g) Proof of compliance or non-compliance
in relation to the fine imposed by the
53
A copy of the Compliance Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam with Ex Parte Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum dated November 23, 2021 is attached as Annex “V”.
54
A copy of the Summary of Documents For the Petitioners dated November 23, 2021 is attached as
Annex “W”.
24
Regional Trial Court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
48.2. Petitioners also reserved their right to submit

additional documents, and to request for the issuance and
service of a subpoena ad testificandum, should the
circumstances warrant during the course of the
proceedings.
49. On November 26, 2021, the preliminary conference was

conducted. During the hearing, counsel for the petitioners manifested
that they have not received a copy of the Answer supposedly filed by
respondent Marcos, Jr. and thus, requested for a copy thereof.
49.1. Upon perusal of the Answer [With Prayer for

Face to Face (FTF) Oral Arguments] dated November 19,
2021 (“Answer”)55, petitioners manifested that Marcos, Jr.
admitted the material factual averments of the instant
Petition.
49.2. Indeed, in the Answer, respondent Marcos, Jr.

admitted the following material factual averments,
among others:
(a) On October 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals

upheld respondent Marcos, Jr. 's conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt for violating
Section 45 of the NIRC related to his failure to
file income tax returns for the taxable years
1982 to 1985. [Paragraph 82];
(b) In the same Court of appeals Decision, the

Court of Appeals ordered respondent
Marcos, Jr. to pay the BIR the deficiency
income taxes due with interest at the legal
rate until fully paid; [Paragraph 83];
(c) The conviction of respondent Marcos, Jr. by

the Court of Appeals was no longer assailed
by him before the Supreme Court as his
appeal was subsequently withdrawn.
[Paragraph 84];
55
A copy of the Answer [With Prayer for Face to Face (FTF) Oral Arguments] dated November 19,
2021 is attached as Annex “X”.
25
(d) There is no document showing respondent
Marcos, Jr.’s service of the penalty imposed
pursuant to his criminal conviction,
specifically the payment of the fine.
[Paragraph 85.1]
(e) With a deliberate attempt to mislead,

misinform, and deceive the electorate, on
October 6, 2021, respondent Marcos, Jr. filed
his COC with the Honorable Commission
and made a material representation that he is
supposedly eligible for the office he is
seeking to be elected to, i.e., the President of
the Republic of the Philippines. [Paragraph
86];
(f) Respondent Marcos, Jr. also declared under

oath that he has never been found liable for
any offense, which carries the penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public
office. [Paragraph 87];
(g) In 2001, respondent Marcos, Jr. was a public

official, being the Governor of the Province of
Ilocos Norte [Page 38];
(h) Respondent Marcos, Jr. deliberately failed to

file any income tax returns for the years 1982
to 1985 during the time that the Tax Evasion
Cases were filed by the BIR, and in fact, even
during the pendency of the Tax Evasion
Cases. [Page 39];
(i) Respondent Marcos, Jr. continuously failed to

file his income tax returns on the mandatory
filing dates for the relevant years, and
continued up to the time of filing of the Tax
Evasion Cases, and even thereafter, until his
CONVICTION. [Page 39];
(j) It is of public record that respondent Marcos,

Jr. was elected as Vice Governor of Ilocos
Norte from 1981 to 1983. Thereafter,
respondent Marcos, Jr. was elected Governor
of Ilocos Norte from 1983 to 1986. As Vice
Governor and Governor, he took an oath to
26
abide by, and enforce, the laws of the
Philippines. [Page 43];
(k) Respondent Marcos, Jr. knows for a fact that

he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt
on multiple charges of violating the NIRC.
[Page 49].
50. During the same preliminary conference hearing, the

parties proceeded to mark their documentary exhibits.
50.1. Petitioners provisionally marked their

Exhibits “A” to “J”56 to be permanently marked upon
receipt by the Honorable Commission of the original
documents.
50.2. Respondent Marcos, Jr., on the other hand,

also confirmed that he has no documentary evidence to
mark in support of his Answer.
51. Thereafter, petitioners moved that the parties be directed

to file their respective Memorandum consistent with the Notice of
Preliminary Conference. The submission of the parties' Memoranda,
however, was suspended during the pendency of the motions for
intervention filed in this case.
51.1. Rommel D. Bautista, M.D., Edwin Theodoro

C. Reyes, Napoleon Alvi L. Siongco, Fernando D.
Guevara, Santiago N. Muñoa, Jr., Carlos Domingo D.
Guevarra, Marie Herminia C. Soriano, and Mario Go
Montejo (“Bautista, et al.”) filed a Motion for Intervention
and Petition for Intervention on November 8, 2021
(“Bautista, et al. Petition-in-Intervention”)
51.1.1. Thereafter, Bautista, et al.

filed a Manifestation dated November 18, 2021
attaching a copy of the Court of Appeals
Decision dated October 31, 1997 and a Motion
for Early Resolution dated November 18, 2021.
51.1.2. In the Order dated

November 25, 2021, the Honorable
Commission directed the parties to file their
56
See Summary of Documents For the Petitioners dated November 23, 2021 (Annex “W” hereof).
27
respective Comments on the Bautista, et al.
Petition-in-Intervention.
51.1.3. Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed

a Comment and Opposition dated December 1,
2021 on the Bautista, et al.
Petition-in-Intervention. In this regard, Bautista,
et al. filed a Reply (To Comment and Opposition
dated 01 December 2021) dated December 3,
2021.
51.1.4. Petitioners on the other hand

filed a Compliance Ex Abundante Cautela By
Way of Comment With Reiterative Motion dated
November 30, 2021.
51.2. Partido Federal ng Pilipinas (“PFP”) filed a

Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion to Admit Attached
Answer-In-Intervention dated November 22, 2021. Further,
Reynaldo S. Tamayo, Jr., Victor D. Rodriguez, and
Thompson C. Lantion (“Tamayo, et al.”) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and Admit Attached
Answer-in-Intervention dated November 22, 2021
[collectively, the “Answers-in-Intervention”].
51.2.1. Petitioners filed a Motion to

Expunge with Opposition Ad Cautelam [To:
Motion for Leave to Intervene and Motion to
Admit Attached Answer-in-Intervention dated
November 22, 2021] dated November 30, 2021
in response to the PFP Motion dated
November 22, 2021.
51.2.2. However, because the

Petitioners never received a copy of the
purported Motion to Intervene and Admit
Attached Answer-in-Intervention dated
November 22, 2021 filed by supposed
intervenors Reynaldo Tamayo, Victor
Rodriguez and Thompson Lantion, petitioners
were unable to give their comments to the
same. They filed instead a Manifestation with
Motion dated December 6, 2021.
51.2.3. Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed

a Comment To The Answers-in-Intervention dated
28
22 and 24 November 2021 dated December 7,
2021.
52. In a Manifestation and Motion dated November 29, 202157,

petitioners prayed that the COMELEC immediately issue an order
directing the simultaneous submission of Memoranda.
53. Petitioners then filed a Submission dated December 6,

58
2021 attaching thereto:
(a) Certified True Copy of the Decision dated July 27,

1995 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 105 in the case entitled,
“People of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand R. Marcos,
Jr.”, Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-24390, Q-91-24390,
Q-92-29212 to Q-92-29217 ; and
(b) Original Copy of the Certification dated December 2,

2021 issued by the Officer-in-Charge Branch Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 105 in the Tax Evasion Cases showing that
there is no record of respondent Marcos, Jr.’s
compliance of payment or satisfaction of the
Regional Trial Court’s Decision dated July 27, 1995
or the Court of Appeals Decision dated October 31,
1997.
54. In the Order dated December 13, 202159, the Honorable

Commission denied the intervention of all other parties in this case,
including PFP, Tamayo, et al., and Bautista, et al. Further, the Bautista,
et al. Petition-in-Intervention and Answers-in-Intervention were all
denied admission and treated as mere scraps of paper. The Honorable
Commission also ruled that it shall not entertain future motions for
intervention and/or answers-in-intervention relative to the instant
case.
55. In another Order dated December 13, 202160, the

Honorable Commission likewise denied the Request and Motion for
Issuance of Subpoenas filed by the petitioners as well as the Motion
for face to face oral arguments filed by respondent Marcos, Jr. In the
same Order, the parties were given a period of five (5) days from
57
A copy of the Manifestation and Motion dated November 29, 2021 is attached as Annex “Y”.
58
A copy of the Submission dated December 6, 2021 is attached as Annex “Z”.
59
A copy of the Order dated December 13, 2021 is attached as Annex “AA”.
60
A copy of the Order dated December 13, 2021 is attached as Annex “BB”.
29
receipt of the said Order within which to file their respective
Memoranda.61
56. Petitioners thereafter filed their Memorandum with Formal

Offer of Evidence dated December 17, 2021.62
57. Respondent Marcos, Jr., on the other hand, filed a

Memorandum dated December 17, 2021.63
58. On January 17, 2022, petitioners received the Questioned

2 Division January 17 Resolution,64 which dismissed the Petition to
nd
Cancel COC.65
59. On January 24, 2022, petitioners timely66 filed their Motion

for Partial Reconsideration.67. The Motion for Partial Reconsideration was
thereafter referred to the COMELEC En Banc in an Order dated
January 27, 2022.68
60. On May 10, 2022, petitioners received the Questioned May

10 En Banc Resolution69 denying the Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
61. Thus, the instant Petition.
61
This Order was received on December 13, 2021, with the fifth day falling on the 18th, a Saturday,
thus making the last day to file the Memorandum falling on December 20, 2021.
62
A copy of the Memorandum with Formal Offer of Evidence dated December 17, 2021 is attached as
Annex “CC”.
63
A copy of the Memorandum dated December 17, 2021 is attached as Annex “DD”.
64
Annex “A” hereof.
65
A copy of the Petition to Cancel COC is attached as Annex “C” hereof.
66
The five (5) day period under Rule 19, Section 2 in relation to Rule 23, Section 7 of the Comelec
Rules fell on January 22, 2022, a Saturday. Thus, the Motion was timely filed on the next working
day, January 24, 2022.
67
Annex “E” hereof.
68
A copy of the Order dated January 27, 2022 is attached as Annex “EE”.
69
Annex “B” hereof.
30
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to cancel the Subject COC of Respondent
Marcos, Jr. and ruling that:
A. The Petition To Cancel COC Should Be Summarily

Dismissed For Allegedly Combining Grounds For
Disqualification And Cancellation of COC,
Supposedly In Violation of The Comelec Rules.
B. Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s material representations,

i.e., that he is eligible for the position of President
and that he has not been convicted of a crime
punished with the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office, are not false;
C. The accessory penalty of Perpetual Disqualification

is not deemed imposed by operation of law in the
judgment of conviction of respondent Marcos, Jr.;
D. Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s status as a public officer

at the time of the commission of the offense he was
convicted of is not a conclusive and
incontrovertible fact,
E. Respondent Marcos, Jr. did not deliberately attempt

to mislead, misinform, or deceive the electorate.
II
Whether The Subject COC Of Respondent Marcos, Jr.

Should Be Cancelled And The Respondent Declared As
Not Having Been A Candidate In The 2022 National
Elections.
GROUNDS
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
CONSIDERING THAT:
31
A. THE PETITION DID NOT VIOLATE COMELEC RULES ON
COMBINING GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF COC AND
DISQUALIFICATION.
B. RESPONDENT MARCOS, JR.’S MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS

IN HIS COC, I.E., THAT HE IS SUPPOSEDLY ELIGIBLE TO
RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE AND THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN
CONVICTED OF A CRIME PUNISHED WITH THE PENALTY
OF PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE,
ARE FALSE.
1. THE ACCESSORY PENALTY OF PERPETUAL

DISQUALIFICATION IS DEEMED IMPOSED BY
OPERATION OF LAW IN THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION OF RESPONDENT MARCOS, JR.
2. RESPONDENT MARCOS, JR.’S STATUS AS A PUBLIC

OFFICER AT THAT TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE HE WAS CONVICTED OF IS A
CONCLUSIVE AND INCONTROVERTIBLE FACT.
C. RESPONDENT MARCOS, JR.’S FALSE MATERIAL

DECLARATIONS IN HIS COC WERE MADE WITH THE
INTENT TO DELIBERATELY MISLEAD, MISINFORM, AND
DECEIVE THE ELECTORATE.
D. WITH RESPONDENT MARCOS, JR.’S VOID COC, THE

ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE WITH THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF
VOTES SHOULD BE PROCLAIMED.
32
DISCUSSION
The COMELEC Committed Grave Abuse Of

Discretion Amounting To Lack Or Excess Of
Jurisdiction Considering That :
A. THE PETITION DID NOT VIOLATE COMELEC

RULES ON COMBINING GROUNDS FOR
CANCELLATION OF COC AND DISQUALIFICATION..
62. In the January 17 Resolution, respondent

COMELEC’s Second Division ruled that the Petition to Cancel COC
supposedly invoked grounds for disqualification, which allegedly
should result in its summary dismissal being an alleged violation of
Section 1, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules.70 This was affirmed in the
May 10 Resolution71 by the respondent COMELEC En Banc.
63. This is without basis. Any reference to respondent

Marcos, Jr.’s disqualification does not constitute a combination of
grounds, warranting summary dismissal of the Petition to Cancel
COC.
64. The nature of the Petition to Cancel COC is clear. The

legal basis under the COMELEC’s Rules– Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code on the ground that the Subject COC contains false
material representations as required under Section 74 of the same
Code–is equally clear.
65. The “Grounds” cited as support for the “Prayer” of the

Petition to Cancel COC are not only clear, they are consistent. They go
directly, and only, into the falsity of the material representation of
eligibility in the Subject COC, warranting the cancellation thereof
by the COMELEC. For reference, the grounds raised in the Petition to
Cancel COC are reproduced below verbatim:
“G R O U N D S
THE SUBJECT COC OF RESPONDENT MARCOS, JR.

SHOULD BE CANCELLED OR DENIED DUE
COURSE BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
CONSIDERING THAT IT CONTAINS A FALSE
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION REQUIRED UNDER
SECTION 74 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.
70
Annex A , at pages 6 to 9.
71
Annex B , at page 7.
33
I
THE REPRESENTATION MADE BY RESPONDENT

MARCOS, JR. THAT HE IS SUPPOSEDLY ELIGIBLE
TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE IS MATERIAL UNDER
SECTION 74 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.
II
RESPONDENT MARCOS, JR.’S REPRESENTATION

THAT HE IS ELIGIBLE TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
IS FALSE.
xxx
III
RESPONDENT MARCOS, JR.’S FALSE ASSERTION

UNDER OATH THAT HE IS ELIGIBLE TO RUN FOR
PUBLIC OFFICE WAS MADE WITH THE
DELIBERATE INTENT TO MISLEAD, MISINFORM,
AND DECEIVE THE ELECTORATE.”
Further, the ultimate relief prayed for in the Petition to Cancel

COC is equally clear, to wit
66. The inclusion in a Petition for Cancellation of A

Certificate of Candidacy of any fact or circumstance that may
likewise be relevant in a Petition for Disqualification is not a fatal
defect if it is pleaded as the object of respondent’s
misrepresentation–as it was in the Petition to Cancel COC.
34
67. In Chua v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216607,
April 5, 2016, this Court ruled that if the false material representation
in a COC relates to a ground for disqualification, the petitioner may
file either a petition for disqualification or a petition to cancel such
COC:
“What remedy to avail himself or herself of,

however, depends on the petitioner. If the false material
representation in the certificate of candidacy relates to a
ground for disqualification, the petitioner may choose
whether to file a petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification,
so long as the petition filed complies with the
requirements under the law.” [Emphasis supplied]
68. Clearly, and contrary to respondent COMELEC’s ruling,

a Petition to Cancel COC may include grounds for disqualification if
the false material representation in a COC relates to such grounds.
69. In the Questioned En Banc Resolution, the COMELEC ruled

that this Court in Chua v. Commission on Elections, supra, qualified
its ruling that a petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to
deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition for
disqualification only if “the petition filed complies with the requirements
under the law”.72 Thus, the COMELEC opined that the combination
of grounds prohibited under the Comelec Rules is supposedly
tantamount to non-compliance with the law.
70. It is ironic that respondent COMELEC now insists on a

strict (and unreasonable) application of the rules when it flagrantly
disregarded its own rules by allowing respondent Marcos Jr. an
extension of time to file his t Answer despite its previous order
making the submission of the Answer non-extendible. Worse, it even
raised issues on undisputed facts in its Resolutions, allegedly
justifying the dismissal of the Petition to Cancel COC, despite such
facts not being disputed and in fact, admitted in respondent Marcos’
Answer. These matters will be further discussed below.
71. In any event, and clearly superior to any Comelec rule, is

the Constitution itself which mandates that the COMELEC enforce
and administer all laws relating to the conducted of elections. In this
regard, in Jalosjos v. The Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205033,
June 18, 2013, this Court even ruled that pursuant to the COMELEC’s
mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of
72
Assailed En Banc Resolution, at page 6.
35
elections, the filing of any petition is not even necessary for the
Commission to exercise its duty to cancel the COC of a disqualified
individual running for office based on a final conviction as it is
duty bound to cancel the Subject COC:
“The foregoing matter is not without established

precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court held that
the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate’s
disqualification to run for elective office based on a final
conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and
administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s
duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s CoC,
notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a
quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same.
Thus, the Court stated:
Even without a petition under either

Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code, the COMELEC is
under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by
virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The
final judgment of conviction is notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the
convict from running for public office. The
law itself bars the convict from running for
public office, and the disqualification is part of
the final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of the court is addressed not only to
the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the
final judgment under the law.’”73
72. Thus, there is no basis for respondent COMELEC to rule

that the Petition to Cancel COC may be summarily dismissed for
noncompliance with the law. To do so is an utter disregard of the
COMELEC’s positive duty under the law.
73
Emphasis supplied.
36
B. Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s Material
Representations In His COC, i.e., That He Is
Supposedly Eligible To Run For Public Office
And That He Has Not Been Convicted Of A
Crime Punished With The Penalty Of
Perpetual Disqualification From Public
Office, Are False.
73. It is a matter of public record that on October 6, 2021,

respondent Marcos, Jr. filed his COC with the COMELEC and
represented therein his supposed eligibility for the office of
President of the Republic of the Philippines. He also asserted therein
that he has never been found liable for any offense, which carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
The first representation he made through Item 11 of the COC, the
second representation he made by ticking “NO” to Box 22 of the
COC.
74. The foregoing assertions constitute material

representations under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code
because one’s eligibility for the office sought is required to be stated
in a Certificate of Candidacy:
“Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.

- The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes;
his profession or occupation; that he will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x”74
74
Emphasis supplied.
37
75. In Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 219603, January 26, 2016, this Court also ruled
that a representation made on one’s eligibility to run for public
office in a Certificate of Candidacy is material under Section 78 in
relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code:
“Considering his ineligibility due to his

disqualification under Section 12, which became final
on 1 June 2009, Pichay made a false material
representation as to his eligibility when he filed his
certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013
elections. Pichay's disqualification under Section 12 is a
material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate
under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The pertinent provisions read:
xxx
Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course

to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy is premised on
a person's misrepresentation of any of the material
qualifications required for the elective office. This is to
be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office. In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, we held that if
a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by
final judgment in a criminal case from running for public
office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then
the candidate clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under
Section 78.
In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his

eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he knew
that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that
he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false
material representation as to his qualification or eligibility
for the office.
xxx
Accordingly, we find that the HRET committed

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess
of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his
38
conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. x
x x”75
76. Respondent Marcos, Jr. blatantly misrepresented that he is

eligible to run for public office in the face of a clear perpetual
disqualification arising from final and immutable conviction for
violating the NIRC. Under Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, supra, such disqualification is a material fact
involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
77. Presidential Decree No. 1994 dated November 5, 1985,

which became effective January 1, 1986, amended, among others,
Title XI of the 1977 NIRC to include the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, to vote and
to participate in any election, in cases of conviction of a crime
penalized under the NIRC:
“Section 286. General provisions. – [a] Any person

convicted of a crime penalized by this Code shall, in
addition to being liable for the payment of the tax, be
subject to the penalties imposed herein: Provided. That
payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not
constitute a valid defense in any prosecution for violation
of any provision of this Code or in any action for the
forfeiture of untaxed articles.
xxx
[c] If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines,

he shall be deported immediately after
serving the sentence without further proceedings for
deportation. If he is a public officer or
employee, the maximum penalty prescribed
for the offense shall be imposed and, in addition, he
shall be dismissed from the public service and
perpetually disqualified from holding any public office,
to vote and to participate in any election. If the offender
is a certified public accountant, his certificate as a certified
public account shall, upon conviction, be automatically
revoked or cancelled.”76
75
Emphasis supplied.
76
39
78. This provision of the NIRC is clear and leaves no room
for interpretation. A person convicted of a crime penalized under the
NIRC shall be perpetually disqualified from holding any public
office, to vote, and to participate in any election.
79. The consequence of perpetual disqualification from

holding any public office, to vote and participate in any election,
applies to ALL convictions of crimes under the NIRC, regardless of
the penalty imposed. The penalty of perpetual disqualification from
holding any public office, to vote and participate in any election
arises solely from the fact of conviction. Plainly, conviction under
the NIRC, results ipso facto in the perpetual disqualification from
holding any public office, to vote and participate in any election.
80. The Regional Trial Court found respondent Marcos, Jr.

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 45 and 50 of the
1977 NIRC, sentencing him to serve imprisonment for the period
corresponding to each charge, and ordered him to pay the
corresponding taxes, penalties, interests and surcharges due the BIR:
(1) Criminal Case No. Q-91-24390 for Violation of NIRC of

1977, RTC, Branch 105, Quezon City - Decision
rendered on July 27, 1995 CONVICTING
respondent Marcos, Jr. of violating the NIRC and
sentencing him to serve imprisonment of three (3)
years and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

sentencing him to serve imprisonment of three (3)
years and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

sentencing him to serve imprisonment of six (6)
months and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

40
sentencing him to imprisonment of six (6) months
and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.




81. This conviction for violation of Section 45 of the 1977

NIRC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The affirmed conviction
by the Court of Appeals was no longer challenged by respondent
Marcos, Jr. before the Supreme Court thus rendering his conviction
final.
82. This final conviction for violating the NIRC, as

amended, was never denied by respondent Marcos, Jr. in his
Answer. It stands as an irrefutable fact, binding and conclusive on
respondent Marcos.
83. Additionally, respondent Marcos, Jr. does not also deny in

his Answer that from 1981 to 1986, he was a public official—being
the Vice Governor and thereafter, Governor of the Province of
41
Ilocos Norte.77 Respondent Marcos, Jr. does not also deny that in
2001 when his conviction became final and executory, he was
likewise a public official, being the Governor of the Province of
Ilocos Norte.78
84. Relevantly, the conviction of respondent Marcos, Jr.

involved: (a) income earned by respondent Marcos, Jr. when he was a
public officer; and (b) income tax returns, which respondent Marcos,
Jr. failed to file when he was a public officer. Thus, by final and
executory judgment, respondent Marcos, Jr. was convicted for
violating the NIRC while he was then a public officer.
85. Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s conviction for four (4) violations

of the NIRC renders him “perpetually disqualified from holding
any public office, to vote and to participate in any election”. This
consequence is deemed written into his conviction by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which renders his statements
under item 11 in relation to Box 22 of the subject COC false.
86. To emphasize, the perpetual disqualification from holding

any public office, to vote, and to participate in any election is an
inevitable and automatic consequence of the mere fact of conviction,
and is not dependent on the penalty actually imposed. Clearly, the
inescapable fact is that the mere fact of CONVICTION for violating
the NIRC perpetually disqualified respondent Marcos, Jr. from
participating in any election, more so to run for any public office. This
automatically rendered false his answer (“No”) in Box 22 of the
subject COC, which when read in relation to his affirmative
declaration in Item 11 makes these two items material
misrepresentations warranting denial of due course or cancellation of
respondent Marcos Jr.’s COC under Rule 23 of the Comelec’s Rules.
87. In the Questioned COMELEC Resolutions, the COMELEC

excluded respondent Marcos, Jr. from the clear coverage of this
provision of the NIRC, as amended, because supposedly -
a) While convicted by final judgment, respondent Marcos, Jr. was

not actually and explicitly “meted” the penalty of perpetual
disqualification; and
b) Respondent Marcos, Jr. was “no longer a public officer” on

March 18, 1986, or the date when he was supposed to file his
77
Petition to Cancel COC, at page 43 (Annex “C” hereof).
78
Petition to Cancel COC, at page 31 (Annex “C” hereof).
42
income tax return for 1985 and was thus “effectively removed
from the purview of Section 286 of P.D. No. 1994.”
88. On these points, respondent COMELEC is wrong and by

so ruling gravely abused its discretion.
1. The Accessory Penalty Of Perpetual

Disqualification Is Deemed Imposed By
Operation Of Law In The Judgment Of
Conviction Of Respondent Marcos, Jr.
89. The finality of Respondent Marcos Jr.’s conviction is a

fact, and the judgment of conviction and its consequences are
immutable and can no longer be modified, let alone denied.
Respondent Marcos Jr.’s conviction for the violation of the NIRC, as
amended, automatically brought about the consequence provided
therein – that he was “perpetually disqualified from holding any
public office, to vote and to participate in any election”. This is a
consequence that is deemed written into the conviction of
respondent Marcos, Jr. by law as decided by the Court of Appeals,
which the COMELEC is mandated to enforce.
90. The COMELEC in the Assailed 2nd Division Resolution ruled

that the “CA Decision was correct for not imposing the penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, voting, and
participating in any election.” The COMELEC En Banc also ruled that
the Court of Appeals did not expressly impose such penalty since
supposedly, it found it to be inapplicable.79 These are contrary to law
and jurisprudence.
91. The penalty of perpetual disqualification was not

explicitly written in respondent Marcos, Jr.’s judgment of conviction
because the CA did not have to do so. The applicable provision of the
1977 NIRC is clear and leaves no room for interpretation: the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any
public office, to vote and to participate in any election, shall be
imposed in cases of conviction of any crime penalized under the
NIRC.
“Section 286. General provisions. – [a] Any person

convicted of a crime penalized by this Code shall, in
addition to being liable for the payment of the tax, be
subject to the penalties imposed herein: Provided. That
79
Assailed En Banc Resolution, at pages 8 and 9.
43
payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not
constitute a valid defense in any prosecution for violation
of any provision of this Code or in any action for the
forfeiture of untaxed articles.
xxx
[c] If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines,

he shall be deported immediately after
serving the sentence without further proceedings for
deportation. If he is a public officer or
employee, the maximum penalty prescribed
for the offense shall be imposed and, in addition, he
shall be dismissed from the public service and
perpetually disqualified from holding any public office,
to vote and to participate in any election. If the offender
is a certified public accountant, his certificate as a certified
public account shall, upon conviction, be automatically
revoked or cancelled.”80
92. A reading of the particular phraseology used in Section

286[c] which identifies three classes of persons makes certain that the
additional penalties imposed upon their conviction do not require
any further act for their effectivity; thus, a convicted foreigner shall be
deported without further proceeding after service of sentence; a
convicted certified public accountant’s certificate is automatically
cancelled or revoked. Neither of those consequences need to be
expressly imposed in the judgment of conviction before the
concerned agency of government can enforce deportation or
cancellation. And so it is with a convicted public officer or employee.
When Section 286 [c] used the word “imposed”, it does so only by
reference to the maximum penalty. It then follows this with
mandatory language–“and in addition, he shall be dismissed from the
public service and perpetually disqualified from holding any public office, to
vote and to participate in any election.” Being an imposition of law, there
is no further need for the court to expressly impose the consequent
penalties for these to take effect. It likewise follows that the
concerned agency, the COMELEC in this instance, can and should bar
the convicted public officer from participating in any election without
need of further pronouncement from any other court or tribunal.
93. Thus, by operation of law, and regardless of whether

such disqualification was expressly directed in the judgment of
conviction, the consequence of perpetual disqualification is deemed
80
44
imposed upon the final conviction of Respondent Marcos, Jr. The
perpetual disqualification is deemed written into the final judgment
of conviction of respondent Marcos, Jr., which the COMELEC was
duty bound to enforce and implement
94. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

205033 (June 18, 2013) citing Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 193237 (October 9, 2012), this Court ruled that the
disqualification under the law is deemed part of the final judgment
of conviction. In fact, perpetual special disqualification takes effect
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final:
“The foregoing matter is not without established

precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court held that
the CoC in view of a candidate’s disqualification to run
for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed
under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws
relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in such a
situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu
proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the absence
of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for
the resolution of the same. Thus, the Court stated:
Even without a petition under either

Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code, the COMELEC is
under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by
virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The
final judgment of conviction is notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the
convict from running for public office. The
law itself bars the convict from running for
public office, and the disqualification is part of
the final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of the court is addressed not only to
the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the
final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is

expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed
45
that the portion of the final judgment on
disqualification to run for elective public
office is addressed to the COMELEC because
under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty
bound to ‘enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.’ The disqualification of a convict to
run for public office under the Revised Penal
Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a
competent court, is part of the enforcement
and administration of ‘all laws’ relating to the
conduct of elections.
xxx
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty

of perpetual special disqualification ‘deprives the convict
of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually.’
The accessory penalty of perpetual

special disqualification takes effect
immediately once the judgment of
conviction becomes final. The effectivity of
this accessory penalty does not depend on
the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or
not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that
‘the offender shall not be permitted to hold
any public office during the period of his
[perpetual special] disqualification.’ Once the
judgment of conviction becomes final, it is
immediately executory. Any public office that
the convict may be holding at the time of his
conviction becomes vacant upon finality of
the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office
perpetually. (Emphasis underscoring
supplied)’”
95. There is no dispute that Respondent Marcos, Jr. was

convicted by final judgment for violating the NIRC. There should,
in similar fashion, be no dispute as to what the applicable law
provides. Consequently, the COMELEC was duty bound to enforce
such perpetual disqualification resulting from his conviction. Its
46
failure to do so undoubtedly amounts to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
96. Ignorance of the law excuses no one; with this comes the
consequences of any law. Respondent Marcos Jr., fully cognizant of
his conviction in the RTC as affirmed by the CA and the effects of
such conviction by reason of his act of voluntarily withdrawing his
appeal to the Honorable Court, was presumed to be fully cognizant
as well of the automatic and mandatory imposition of the
disqualification under Art. 286[c]. This renders Respondent Marcos
Jr.’s statement in Box No. 22 of his COC a knowingly false response.
As the COMELEC has already ruled that Box 22 is a material
representation, the falsity of Respondent Marcos Jr’s answer to Box
22 makes his COC susceptible to cancellation.
97. It was thus grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to

find otherwise and to refuse to cancel Respondent Marcos Jr.’s COC
in the face of a patent and knowing misrepresentation.
1. Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s Status As A

Public Officer At That Time Of The
Commission Of The Offense He Was
Convicted Of Is A Conclusive And
Incontrovertible Fact.
98. In the Questioned COMELEC Resolutions, the COMELEC

concluded that respondent Marcos Jr. was no longer a public officer
when he failed to file his 1985 income tax return on 18 March 1986.81
The COMELEC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion when
it automatically concluded that respondent Marcos Jr. ceased to be a
public officer in February 1986,82 and thus, was already a private
individual.
99. The conclusions of the COMELEC are readily belied by

the admissions of respondent Marcos, Jr. himself, and the rulings of
the RTC and the CA.
100. First, Respondent Marcos, Jr. has already admitted that

he was a public official during the material dates in question.
Nowhere in Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s seven-page Answer is there a
denial that he was a public official at the time the criminal
violations of the NIRC were consummated. He is deemed to have
81
Assailed En Banc Resolution, at p. 10.
82
Assailed 2nd Division Resolution, at p. 18.
47
admitted the same and this admission is binding on the COMELEC,
without need of proof.
101. Second, that Respondent Marcos, Jr. was a public officer

on March 18, 1986 is a question of fact that has long been resolved by
the RTC that convicted him and the CA which affirmed his
conviction. Pertinently, the RTC found as a matter of fact that -
“The team ascertained that accused, former

Vice-Governor and later Governor of Ilocos Norte from
November 3, 1982 up to March 31, 1986…”83
102. Respondent COMELEC itself has recognized that the

RTC decision and the CA decision have long attained finality.
103. Thus, Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s status as a public officer

on March 18, 1986 is not only fact, it is judicial truth that he never
questioned on appeal, and which may no longer be revised even by
COMELEC without violating res judicata84 and the hierarchy of
courts More specifically, re-litigating this question of fact violates the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which precludes the
re-litigation of a particular fact of issue in another action between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action. This is
traditionally known as collateral estoppel; in modern terminology, it
is called issue preclusion.85
104. It was therefore wrong for the COMELEC not only to

revisit Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s status as a public officer on March 18,
1986 outside of a proper case but also to reach a different conclusion
different, and worse, contrary from the one reached by both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals.
105. In the words of the COMELEC itself, under Rule 129 of

the Rules of Evidence, the COMELEC is mandated to take judicial
notice of the official acts of the judicial departments of the
Philippines, among others.86 Thus, COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to take judicial notice of the RTC
decision and the CA decision, finding respondent Marcos, Jr.’s status
as a public officer on March 18, 1986 as fact and judicial truth.
83
Exhibit F, Petitioners’ Memorandum.
84
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit.
85
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, G.R. Nos. 173148 (April 6, 2015).
86
48
106. Third, the 1986 Revolutionary Government that resulted
from the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship after decades of abuse by
the respondent’s family and their cronies cannot now be used to
make allowances for Respondent Marcos, Jr.
107. That Respondent Marcos, Jr. was allegedly constrained to

leave the Philippines for Hawaii in February 1986 considering that
location is not at all determinative of his status as a public officer for
purposes of complying with the law, in this case the NIRC.
108. It is ironic that Respondent Marcos, Jr. now claims that he

was no longer a public officer after EDSA 1 when his own father
Marcos, Sr. repeatedly insisted that he was still the sitting President of
the Philippines and “denounced the Government of Corazon C.
Aquino as ‘a plain and simple dictatorship.’”87
109. Respondent COMELEC quotes the pronouncements of

this Court in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan88 as authority for its own
conclusion that Respondent Marcos, Jr. was no longer a public officer
upon his departure for Hawaii and on March 18, 1986, the last day for
him to file his return for taxable year 1985.
109.1.Specifically, in holding that Section 286 of P.D. No.

1994 cannot be made to apply to Respondent Marcos,
Jr., the COMELEC ruled that “the dismantling of the
whole government, abrogation of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, and the rise of a revolutionary
government, coupled with Respondent’s
abandonment of his post when he and his family fled
to and got exiled in Hawaii, USA, all lead to the
conclusion that Respondent was no longer a public
officer when he failed to file his 1985 income tax return
on 18 March 1986.”89 It went on to state that
“Respondent was no longer a public official, as he was
already in exile in Hawaii with a new revolutionary
government functioning in the Philippines.”90
109.2.Unfortunately for the COMELEC, there is absolutely

nothing in this case that would, even remotely, bear
upon the status of public officers that fled before the
revolution. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan teaches that the
87
See Marcos Declares He Is Still President; available at
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/31/world/marcos-declares-he-is-still-president.html
(last accessed on May 12, 2022).
88
G.R. No. 104768 (July 21, 2003).
89
90
49
revolutionary government was, by definition, a law
unto itself that answered to no higher power other than
the authority emanating from its own laws.
109.3.On the contrary, that part of the decision in Republic v.

Sandiganbayan quoted by the Second Division of the
COMELEC, explicitly refers to the Provisional
Constitution of that revolutionary government,
otherwise known as Proclamation No. 3. Ironically
enough, Art. III, Sec. 2 of Proclamation No. 3, s.1986,
commanded that all elective officers shall continue in
the office, thus -
“Sec. 2. All elective and appointive

officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in the office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such is made within a period of
one year from February 25, 1986.”
110. To an independent and unbiased tribunal, the correct

conclusion should have been obvious and inevitable: Respondent
Marcos, Jr. was a public officer, whether under the 1973
Constitution or under Proclamation No. 3, whether upon his
departure or upon the last day for the filing of his tax return. There
is simply no wiggle room for Respondent Marcos, Jr. to argue
otherwise. That respondent COMELEC would create such room out
of thin air through its gratuitous misrepresentation of law and
jurisprudence is most certainlygrave abuse of discretion.
111. Fourth, the COMELEC repeatedly invoked

“abandonment” of Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s status as a public officer
on the heels of the EDSA People Power Revolution as reason for his
“removal from the purview” of the NIRC penalty of perpetual
disqualification. This is wrong and reliance on this by the COMELEC
is grave abuse of discretion.
112. “Abandonment of office or position” is itself a felony

under the Revised Penal Code. It is thus ludicrous for the COMELEC
to invoke the commission of a felony on behalf of the offender as a
defense against a penalty prescribed by law for another crime he has
already been convicted of. Art. 238 of the Revised Penal Code
provides -
50
“Art. 238. Abandonment of office or position. - Any
public officer who, before the acceptance of his
resignation, shall abandon his office to the detriment of
the public service shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
If such office shall have been abandoned in order to

evade the discharge of the duties of preventing,
prosecuting or punishing any of the crimes falling within
Title One, and Chapter One of Title Three of Book Two of
this Code, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, and by
arresto mayor if the purpose of such abandonment is to
evade the duty of preventing, prosecuting or punishing
any other crime.”
113. This Court in Adiong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

136480 (December 4, 2001), has held that a person holding a public
office may only abandon such office by non-user or acquiescence.
Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise
an office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does
not constitute abandonment where such nonperformance results
from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform.
Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in
his wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary
removal, an unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in
taking steps to vindicate his right may constitute an abandonment of
the office.
114. Neither “non-user” nor “acquiescence” apply here.

Non-performance because of “temporary disability or from
involuntary failure to perform” does not arise to non-user. The
Marcoses’ flight from the country constitutes, at best, involuntary
failure to perform. And, as can be gleaned from their consistent
statements inside and outside court, the Marcoses never acquiesced
to abandoning their stranglehold over the country.
115. Indeed, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the

Marcoses do not indicate any intention to abandon their claim to
power.
115.1. On 31 March 1986, Marcos, Sr. denounced the

Government of Corazon Aquino as a “plain and simple
dictatorship.” He further stated that he still considered
himself the President of the Philippines. Further he
51
went on and said “I do not say I was forced out of the
Philippines,” he added, “I wish I'd stayed there.”91
115.2. Further, in pleadings submitted by the Marcoses in

the case that would eventually become Marcos v.
Manglapus,92 Mrs. Marcos called President Aquino
“illegal,” claiming that it is Marcos, Sr., not Mrs.
Aquino, who is the “legal” President of the Philippines
and declared that the matter “should be brought to all
the courts of the world.”
116. Clearly, Respondent Marcos, Jr’s status as a public officer

at that time of the commission of the offense he was convicted of is a
conclusive and incontrovertible fact.
C. Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s False Material

Declarations In His COC Were Made
With The Intent To Deliberately
Mislead, Misinform, And Deceive The
Electorate.
117. The Second Division and COMELEC En Banc similarly

ruled that respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot be said to have deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render him ineligible “because he had no basis at all to
answer in the affirmative.”93 This ruling is contrary to the law and the
evidence on record and again, amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
118. The COMELEC’s finding begs question of how

Respondent Marcos Jr. could not have known of his conviction by
the RTC and its subsequent affirmation by the CA when he himself
actively participated in trial and its subsequent appeal. To answer
the question begged for respondent COMELEC’s sake–respondent
Marcos Jr.’s basis “to answer in the affirmative” is the immutable fact
of his conviction.
119. Respondent Marcos Jr. cannot invoke good faith to justify

his misrepresentations. It is settled that good faith implies honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry, and its essence lies in an honest
belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
91
See Marcos Declares He Is Still President; available at
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/31/world/marcos-declares-he-is-still-president.html
(last accessed on May 12, 2022).
92
G.R. No. 88211 (October 27, 1989).
93
Assailed 2nd Division Resolution, at p. 22; Assailed En Banc Resolution, at p. 9.
52
absence of intention to overreach another. The totality of the
circumstances–his being part of a decades-long dictatorship, his
having served as a public officer including as a legislator–makes
conclusive his understanding of all the consequences of his illegal
acts.
120. Neither can respondent Marcos, Jr. find shelter under

ignorance. In his case, ignorance is not bliss. Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.94 Respondent Marcos, Jr.,
as with everyone else, is charged with knowing the law and bearing
the consequences of any such violations. As a former Vice Governor,
Governor, Member of Congress, and Senator,95 he, more than the
ordinary citizen, should have been more acutely aware of the laws,
their binding effect, and their lasting consequences.
121. Further, Respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot belatedly deny

knowledge of the proceedings before the courts relative to his
criminal violations of the NIRC. In fact, Respondent Marcos, Jr. never
denied the fact of conviction by the RTC, as modified by the CA; nor
does he deny his personal knowledge of such conviction. Indeed, he
fully participated throughout the entire proceedings before the trial
court all the way up to the Honorable Supreme Court, which
escalation he would eventually withdraw.
122. With Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s withdrawal of his attempt

to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the CA
affirming his conviction with modification of the penalty became
final and binding on respondent–by his own hand.. The act of
appealing the conviction to the CA and later withdrawing any
further appeal to this Court are clearly knowing, willful, and
voluntary acts done with full knowledge of its legal consequences,
contrary to Respondent Marcos Jr.’s belated pleas of ignorance.
Respondent Macos Jr.’s conviction has become final and
immutable and is binding on him – a fact that is conclusively
presumed to be known by him, the omission of which on a
required disclosure constitutes a patent falsity made in bad faith.
123. The foregoing prove a deliberate intent to mislead,

misinform, and deceive the electorate. This intent to mislead,
misinform, and deceive is further shown by the two material
misrepresentations–in item 11 and Box 22 of the subject COC.
94
Article 3, Civil Code.
95
Answer dated November 19, 2021, at par. 3 (Annex “X” hereof).
53
124. It should also not escape notice that Respondent Marcos,
Jr. was fully and presumably competently advised by counsel
throughout these proceedings and was conclusively apprised of the
legal effects of the court’s judgment of conviction. These matters
being within his personal knowledge, he cannot now conveniently
feign ignorance of the criminal acts that he committed, and the legal
effects of these criminal acts.
125. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237 (October 9,

2012), not even the candidate’s reliance on the COMELEC Resolution
adjudging him eligible to run and to be elected as Mayor of Dapitan
City sufficed to excuse Jalosjos’ false material representation
concerning his eligibility. Further, the Court did not even consider
relevant that he had been elected and had served twice as a mayor
despite his prior perpetual special disqualification.
126. Instead, this Court in Jalosjos96 emphasized the

COMELEC’s legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment
of conviction. As in the present Petition, Respondent Marcos, Jr. had
similarly served in various government positions, which are of no
moment, as this Court in Jalosjos has already confirmed.
127. Similarly, Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s reliance on the CA

Decision – which supposedly does not expressly state the imposition
of perpetual disqualification as a consequence of his criminal
conviction – does not excuse his patent and false representation in his
Certificate of Candidacy.
128. In Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851 (April

18, 2008), this Court rejected the candidate’s assertion that he did not
misrepresent his eligibility for the public office of Mayor. The Court
emphasized that even if the candidate might have been of the
mistaken belief that he remained a resident of the Philippines, that he
hid the fact of his immigration to the USA and his status as a “green
card” holder militates against his claim.
129. Respondent Marcos, Jr. must be treated no differently

from Ugdoracion, Jr., and he must not be allowed to conveniently
claim an alleged “honest belief” as a basis to exempt him from the
application of an unambiguous law.
96
Supra.
54
D. With Respondent Marcos, Jr.’s Void
COC, the Eligible Candidate with the
Next Highest Number of Votes Should be
Proclaimed.
130. In Jalosjos,97 this Court ruled that “a void certificate of

candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid
candidacy”, as in respondent Marcos Jr.’s case, to wit: :
“The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’

certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy
on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give
rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he
was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether
his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the
elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such
ground means he was never a valid candidate from the
very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void
ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he
filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed
it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one
qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections
– Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the

second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the
first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should
be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of
filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a
violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, then legally the person who filed such void
certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the
elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate
are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such
non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections.
If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on
the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
97
Supra.
55
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are
stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes
for such candidate should also be stray votes because
the certificate of candidacy is void from the very
beginning. This is the more equitable and logical
approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more
valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.”
131. Based on this Court’s rulings and the patent invalidity of

the COC of Respondent Marcos, Jr. arising from the material
misrepresentations in Box 22 read in relation to Item 11, he was never
a valid candidate from the beginning. Under the law, any votes he
received are considered invalid, the certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio.
132. In Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051 (December 24,

2008), this Honorable Court explained the rationale for applying the
second placer rule:
“Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath

is made, thereby violating both our election and
criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on
the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed
in our laws. In a choice between provisions on
material qualifications of elected officials, on the one
hand, and the will of the electorate in any given
locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we
cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must
always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the
law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of
law.”
133. Velasco grounds its ruling on upholding the rule of law

and the will of the People as it is expressed in laws providing for
eligibility requirements. A contrary ruling, this Court explained, will
allow candidates to bypass substantive eligibility requirements by the
simple expediency of an election victory —
“The first requirement that may fall when an

unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local
government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets
56
out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may
likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the
resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course
to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a
candidate with false COC data wins. To state the
obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC
qualifications if they know that an election victory
will cure any defect that their COCs may have.
Election victory then becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements.
In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and

unequivocal legal command, framed by a Congress
representing the national will, is rendered inutile
because the people of a given locality has decided to
vote a candidate into office despite his or her lack of
the qualifications Congress has determined to be
necessary.”
134. Marcos Jr. made this very wager when he lied and made
his material misrepresentations in his COC despite knowing full well
the fact of his conviction and the repercussions thereof. If this Court
were to allow such a brazen lie to trump the rule of law, all
substantive eligibility requirements in all future elections can be
circumvented by ineligible candidates who happen to secure a
victory. The will of the People, as it has been expressed through law,
will be silenced in perpetuity.
135. The Velasco doctrine was followed and is in line with this
Honorable Court’s rulings in Maquiling v. COMELEC,98 Chua v.
COMELEC,99 and most recently in Halili v. COMELEC.100
136. In Maquiling, this Court held that the popular vote

cannot cure the ineligibility of a candidate in this wise:
“The ballot cannot override the constitutional and

statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires
certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain
disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring
to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications
must be met before one even becomes a candidate.
When a person who is not qualified is voted for and
98
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013.
99
G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016.
100
G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019.
57
eventually garners the highest number of votes, even
the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and
rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We
might as well write off our election laws if the voice of
the electorate is the sole determinant of who should
be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.”
137. Pertinently, this Court in Maquiling abandoned the

competing doctrine in Labo Jr. v. COMELEC G.R. No. 105111 (July 3,
1992), casting it aside as mere obiter:
“As in any contest, elections are governed by rules

that determine the qualifications and disqualifications
of those who are allowed to participate as players.
When there are participants who turn out to be
ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any
of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.

COMELEC that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor of
said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further
complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates
who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s

disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a
qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The
second-placer in the vote count is actually the
first-placer among the qualified candidates.”
58
138. All told, a candidate’s putative election victory cannot
subsequently cure his ineligibility. Elections are more than just a
numbers game101 such that an election victory cannot bypass election
eligibility requirements.102 The balance must always tilt in favor of
upholding the rule of law.103
ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
139. The CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, consisting of the

Senate of the Republic and the House of Representatives, is set to
convene on May 23, 2022 to canvass the votes cast for President and
Vice President and to proclaim the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes cast as the duly-elected President and Vice
President.
140. Considering respondent Marcos, Jr.’s ineligibility arising

from his conviction and respondent COMELEC’s evasion of its
positive duty to CANCEL his COC, there is need to enjoin the
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES from canvassing the votes cast
in favor of respondent Marcos, Jr. and, in the event that the votes
cast constitute a majority, proclaiming him as the duly-elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
141. A Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from this Court is

the only remedy available to enjoin and restrain the Congress of the
Philippines from rendering this Petition moot and, in the event this
Court rules in favor of the petitioners, allowing a candidacy that
should never have been to ripen into a presidency of an ineligible
candidate.
142. It is within the power of this Court to narrowly draw the

TRO as to exclude in the interim only the votes cast for respondent
Marcos, Jr. leaving unaffected those cast for the other eligible
candidates. It is not petitioners’ desire to impede the Congress of the
Philippines from performing its constitutional duty; it is rather
petitioners’ desire to ensure that Congress, in performing this duty,
does not end up performing it in vain. It is of judicial notice that,
should this Court grant this Petition and rule favorably for
petitioners and Congress is not restrained in the interim from
canvassing respondent Marcos, Jr.’s votes, the consequence may be
the proclamation of a candidate that this Court would declare to be
ineligible ab initio.
101
G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016.
102
G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008.
103
Id.
59
143. The injunctive relief sought is clearly urgent. Petitioners
respectfully ask this Court to act without any delay in considering
this application.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed

that the Honorable Court, immediately upon receipt of this Petition,
ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining and
restraining the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES from canvassing the votes cast for FERDINAND
ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR. and proclaiming him, should he be
adjudged to be the one with the highest number of votes obtained, as
President, pending resolution of this Petition.
Upon issuance of the TRO, petitioners further pray that this

Court direct respondents, through counsel, to COMMENT on the
Petition within a reasonable but brief and inextendible period of time.
Thereafter, petitioners respectfully pray that this Court:
1. GIVE DUE COURSE to the Petition;
2. GRANT the relief prayed for by REVERSING

and SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated May 10,
2022 and the Resolution dated 17 January 2022 of the
Commission on Elections;
3. CANCEL and DECLARE VOID AB INITIO the

Certificate of Candidacy for President filed by
FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR. in
connection with the 2022 National Elections and, in
the process, DECLARE Ferdinand Romualdez
Marcos, Jr. to have never been a candidate in the
2022 National Elections.
4. MAKE PERMANENT the TRO issued against

CONGRESS and ENJOIN and RESTRAIN
CONGRESS from canvassing the votes cast for
FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS JR. for
President.
Other reliefs just, consistent, and equitable under the premises

are likewise prayed for.
Quezon City for the City of Manila, 16 May 2022.
60
ARNO V. SANIDAD
THEODORE O. TE
Counsel for all Petitioners

2nd Floor, Eastside Building
77 Malakas Street, Quezon City
~~
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IBP No. 147352/ October 20, 2021/ Makati City
MCLE Exemption No. VI-001316 (Valid until April 14, 2023)
Tel No. 892055141oc. 418/CP-09175202295
Email: Theodore.te@gmaiI.com
V. SANIIJ......IJ
{..;lI~'lNO
SC Roll No. 31374
PTR No. 2443424/ January 3, 2022/Quezon City
IBP Lifetime No. 07913/ January 9, 2009/ Hocos Sur
MCLE Exemption No. VII-Acad004241 (Valid until April 14, 2025)
Tel No. 89200044/89200177
Email: sanidadlawfirm2020@&mail.com
With Collaborating Counsel:
RAFA
v
AQUINO
Collaborating Counsel T Ma. Edeliza P. Hernandez
Roll of ttorneys No. 35221
PTR No. 81317 5/01-04-2022/ Pasig City
IBP (Lifetime) No. No. 09437,12-16-2010/ Quezon City
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Tel. No.: 8638-0400
E-mail: r1aquinox@lmlail.com
61
~~RIWNAS, JR.
Collaborating Counsel for Roland C. Vibal
IBP No. 197580; 01/08/22; Rizal Chapter
PTR No. 8236269; 01/03/22; Antipolo City
MCLE Compliance No. VI - 0000647
Email: marinaslawoffice@gmail.com
..
Cell No.: 0917 53B 4360
JEAN FRA . RIVERA, III

Collaborating Cou · e ,o1"Josephine Lascano
PfR No. 8131618;) ary ~,2022; Pasig City
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(Valid until April 14, 2023)
Email: fdrivera@dfgrlawoffices.com
CP No.: 0998 541 7026
,-~lij~~~~N
Collaborating Counsel for Fr. Christian B. Buenafe

PTR No. 2445685D / January 6, 2022 / Quezon City
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MCLE Compliance No. VI-0005357 / December 28, 2017
Email: cg:p@leflegis.com
CP No.: 09171474770
~
'
MICHAEL CHRIST P ER C. DE CASTRO
Collaborating Coun el for Fides M. Lim
PTR No. 2445691D / January 6, 2022 / Quezon City
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Email: mcdc@lefle~s . com
Cp, No.: 0995651 2090
62
Collabor for Celia Lagman Sevilla
neys No. 69701
PTR No. 888 . ati City I January 26, 2022
IBP No. 177751 I Laguna O1apter I February 9, 2022
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0007414 (Issued on 04-11-2018)
Email: ISpilag@leflegis.com
Copy Furnished:
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA
Counsel for Respondent Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.
Suite A, 18th Floor, 6789 Tower, 6789 Ayala Ave.
1226 Makati City
Email: emram@giobeIines com ph
FERDINAND R. MARCOS JR.

Respondent
G/F Sunset View Tower, 2330 Roxas Blvd., Pasay City 1300.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Palacio del Gobernador Bldg.,
Gen. Luna St., Intramuros, Manila
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GSIS Bldg., Financial Center, Diokno Blvd., Pasay City
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Batasan Road, Constitution Hills, Quezon City
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

134 Amorsolo Street
Legaspi Village, Makati City
63
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING
We, the undersigned, all Filipinos, of legal age, and with addresses listed
below:
Fr. Christian B. Buenafe No. 45 Saint Mary Street, Cubao,

Quezon City, 1109
Fides M. Lim 2/F Erythrina Bldg. 1, Maaralin St.,
Barangay Central, Quezon City, 1100
Celia Lagman Sevilla Unit 2-C, Tempus Place 2
Condominium, Matalino St., Diliman,
Quezon City
Ma. Edeliza P. Hernandez 20 Road 9, Project 6, Quezon City
Roland C. Vibal Unit E, 4th Floor, Tempus Place
Condominium 2, Matalino Street,
Diliman, Quezon City, 1101
Josephine Lascano 29 A Magiting Street, Teacher's Village
East, Quezon City
after having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state
that:
1. We are the petitioners in the instant case;
2. We have caused the preparation and filing of the instant

Petition;
3. We have read and understood the contents of the instant

Petition, and attest that the allegations contained therein are true and
correct of our own personal knowledge and/or based on authentic records;
4. The instant Petition is not being filed to harass, cause

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
5. The factual allegations in the instant Petition have

evidentiary support or, if specifically, so identified, will have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery;
6. We have not commenced any action or proceeding involving

the same issue in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the different
Divisions thereof, the other Courts of law, or any other tribunal or
agency; and
7. If we should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, we shall report that fact within five
(5) calendar days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hand this th day

of May 2022 at Quezon City.
F hristian . Buenafe Ma.
7/A
Fides M. Lim
1 1/
Ro and C. Vibal
Celia Lagman Sevilla Jose 71ascano
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )

QUEZON CITY) S.S.
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public, for and in Quezon City, this th day of
May 2022 appeared:
Name Competent Official Issuing
Evidence of Agency
Identity
Fr. Christian B. Buenafe Unified Multi Purpose SSS
ID CRN-0111-
4675702-5
Fides M. Lim Voter's ID No. 7602- COMELEC

0207A-
I1355FML20001-0
Celia Lagman Sevilla Driver's License No. LTO

NO2-13-017311,
expiring on October 8,
2023
Ma. Edeliza P. Hernandez Voter's ID No. 3901- COMELEC
0014A-
L2260MPH20001-7
Roland C. Vibal TIN 258-799-939 BIR
Josephine Lascano SSS 33-3913443-7 SSS
known to me to be the same person/s who executed the foregoing

instrument, and further acknowledged that the same is of their free and
voluntary act and deed.
This instrument consisting of three (3) pages, including this page on
which the Acknowledgement is written refers to a Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping, signed by the parties on the
signature page.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL on the date and the place first above-
written.
(Xn4/l i
Doc No. 123 ; Atty. GREGORIO TANAKA VITERBO/R.
SC Roll No. 37225
Page No. 24, ; 2F Eastside Bldg., 77 MalakN9wg, BLI C
Book No. )(A-1 ; IBP Lifetime Roll No. 00218/01-10-95/Capiz
PTR No. 2-ciLi*iO4 /19,-
Series of 2022. NP No. 262 (2019 -2021)
Notary Public - Quezon City
Until December 31, 2021 - c.-;(4,0C461. 4 - 30 -22-
MCLE Compliance No. VI/ - 00
issued on 01 April 201.)-/ Valid Until 14 April 202(
Republic of the Philippines)
Quezon City )s.s.
AFFIDAVIT OF FILING, SERVICE AND MAILING IN LIEU OF PERSONAL SERVICE

(in compliance with RULE 13, SECTIONS 16 AND 17 of A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)
I, ( Lin ,
of legal age, as messenger of SANIDAD VITERBO ENRIQUEZ
& TAN LAW FIRM, do hereby state under oath that:
I. On 14 a/nCtAt-lb 92- , I served/filed a copy of the following leading(s)/1 paper(s) in

S14.4-1 * t,u/ r) 5A Q-no GAP.
YS
A-CA-A.141 r
pursuant to RULE 13, SECS. 6, 7, 8, 9, 16 and 17 of A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, as follows:
By Personal Service on:

By delivering personally a copy to the party
or his/her attorney on
20 , as shown on p. .
By leaving a copy in his/her office with his/her
clerk or with a person having charge thereof
on 20 , as shown on p.
By delivering personally a copy thereof to the
Court/Tribunal/Office on
20_, as shown on p. .
By je. s.tered Mail/Private Courier to:

V(fflj ii [ ] By,1epositin on Ay- 20Zat
• LA-1 ,as evidenced by
1)Y- 74tfa,-- rig ?7uY3ciee..J by Official Receipt(s) No(s).
41,1 112 hereto attached and indicated after the names
ate: r7,42.,/t of the addressee(s), and with instructions
s'71)2-7,01a to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days
if undelivered.
By Electronic Mail to:

[ By sending an electronic mail on
as evidenced by the attached proof of transmittal.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this /‘ qinC7 V2-2-- at Quezon City, affiant exhibiting
before me his competent evidence of identity (CEI)W/TIN No. A3 goi,r5/
AT 7)
. GREGORIO TANAKA VIT RBO JR.
SC Roll No. 37225
2F Eastside Bldg. 77 Malakas St. QC
/
Doc. No. 12.[ IBP Life Member Roll No. 00218/01-10-95/Capiz
Page No. PTR No. 2443421/01-03-22/Quezon City
Book No. VI NP No. 262 (2019-2021) Extended to 06-30-22
Series of 2022. Notary Public - Quezon City
Until December 31, 2021- June 30, 2022
MCLE Compliance No. )1/1— 00/43
Issued on 01 April 2022/Valid until 14 April 202.4"
PHL PE7S7Zi
II 11111111 pi-ad:24754,
111 1E14101151j119j.I11)z1111111111 II1,1i1181012,1,811
1,1!ii 111111111i
_
EXP ESS EXPRESS
ED 904 053 003 ZZ
EXPRESS
DATE/TIME Pleaso check kind of mall
XTRJTIME Please check kind ot mall
0 DENS 0 E-POUCH
DEMS 0 E-PODCH DATE/TIME EN:fse ohock Nod of read
COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS (IN BLOCK LETTERS)
TO., COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS (IN BLOCK
LETTERS) 0 OEMS fl E
( 7 7; //, 41.7 TO COMPETE NAME ANDADDRE SS ON BLOCK LE :EPS,
T-ei) /1-1; (i / c /
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6S/c k( < ( 6/Xli
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TEL/MOBILE NO .
Z'P CODE
No.
FROM COMPLETE NAME AND AOORSS (IN BLOCK LETTERS)
TEUMOBILE NO
7/ '.4 i
FROM COMPLETE NAME ANC ADDRESS iN BLOCK ....TTTElr'S.
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TEL/M0111LiNO ' LE CODE
TELMOBILE NO
CONTENTS DESCRIPTION:
(TENTS DESGR
WEIGHT (Kg) I) CONTEN7S DESCRIPTION'
El WIN DG
POSTAGE. WEIGH r (Kg/
POSTAGE:
VAT 12% POSTAGE ....
VAT 12%
al Value :
VAL FEE
Total Value :
Thls ale certify trial toe atom given pedloulars are true and correct and
VAL. FEE. 14 VAT 12%.. _
is to certify that the above Oven particulars an true and cornea and Eat 11 do not contain any dangerous article's prohibited ay legislation /postal that the daunted items
thi dexribed Warns / customs regulation.. AMOUNT- --- Total Value VAL FEE
not contain any dangerous artickils prohibited by legislation /postal / aratorne
regulations AMOUNLrn Sender This sic certify that the content described is Ins and conect
1« PM/Teller ORB'.
PIA/Teller
Vara.
OR AMOUNT
sena.. ftinianik ... Or. Seeder PEEfeeef
RECIPIENTS COMPLETE NAME AND SIGNATURE OAR ,
IPIENT'S COMPLETE NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE/TIME OF DELIVERY
DATE/TIME OF DELIVERY RECIPIENTS COMPLETE NAME AN/) SIGNATURE
DATE/TIME OF DEI IVERY
RTS Reason
RTS
• lITS Reason
11111111111
11111111i11111111 , 11101,11,118111,
111111111 1 1!1,1iIIIIIIIIII EXPRESS
II ED 802 018 023 ZZ
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EXPRESS EXPRESS
ED 802 018 037 ZZ Please check kind of mail
DATE/TIME
El DENIS E E POUCH
z/TINIE DAL I [ !ME Please check kind of mall
Please check kind of mail
El DEMS E POUCH
El OEMS E POUCH TO COMPLE`E NAME AND ADDRESS IN BLOCK LETTERS)
/ COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS .IN BLOCK LEE TEES TO CONIPLETE NAME AND A.DDRESS IN BLOCK LETTERS)
ZIP CODE
ZIP CODE TEL/MOBILE NO
if
TEL/MOBILE NO
FROM COMPLETE NAME ANT ADDRESS ON BLOCK LETTERS)
FROM COMPLETE NAME ANC ADDRESS ON SLOSH LET /ERG
ee
LP CODE
44 . 47
TEI /MOBILE NO
tet.M.i*ILE(NO.:
ENTS CSE CrNTEN1eMbi4NIP11ON
CONTEN S DESCRIPTION
0 WIT OG WEIGHT (Kg) ... .. ..
WITH DG
WEIGHT (Kg) POSTAGE
WEIGHT (Kg): frr:
POSTAGE VAT 12. 4
POSTAGE ,
VAT 12%, VAL FEE ,
VAT 12%.,. .
Total Value
'AL FEE .• - . . . AMOUNT ,
Value: VAL FEE Total Value This is to certify that the content descnbed is true and correct
ThIsis to certify that the content described is true and correct Th.s,s to teddy that the content described is true and correct AMOUNT PNVTAIE, ORB
AMOUNT .
PM/Teller Ewe, PhIGMe OR ..
ORB , , RECIPIENT IA COUPE ATE NAME AND SIGNATURE GATE/TIME OF DELIVERY
ANTS COMPLETE NAME AND SIGNATURE RECIPlENTS COMPLETE NAME AND SIGNATURE DATER IME OF DELIVERY
DATE/TIME OF DELIVERY RTS Reason
RTS Reason RTS P g
VERIFIED DECLARATION
I, JOCEL ISIDRO S. DILAG, hereby declare that the documents

(and annexes thereof) hereto submitted electronically in
accordance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule are complete and
true copies of the documents (and annexes) filed with the Supreme
Court.
JOCE JDRO S. DILAG
Collaborating Cb nsel r Petitioner Celia Lagman Sevilla

May 16, 2022
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 16t 11 May 2022,

affiant exhibiting his competent evidence of identity, to wit: UMID
CRN-0111-6499184-7.
Notary Public
Attlil. )RIO TANAKA VITER6 JR.

Doc No. Ulf ; SC Roll No. 37225
2F Eastside Bldg., 77 Malakas St.,
Page No. e4 : Dilingan, QC
1BP Lifetime Roll No. 0 0218/01-10-95/
Capiz
Book No._71.4_; PTR No. 0434/ Mt' 03 -
7-3-1 UU
Series of 2022. NP No. 262 (2019 - 2021)
Notary Public - Quezon City , ,
Until December 31,2021 — 2 7-
MCLE Compliance No.
Issued on 01. April 201/ Valid Until 14
April 2021-

SC Petition Marcos COC Cancellation

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SC Petition Marcos COC Cancellation

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, For: Certiorari,

Elections are more than a numbers

Chua v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216607, April 5,21)16.

1. This a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64 of the

1.1. In Sardea v. The Honorable Commission on

“A perusal of our election laws shows

Since no constitutional provision or

2. This Petition seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution

2.1. Certified True Copies of the May 10 Resolution

2.2. On January 17, 2022, petitioners received the

2.3. On January 24, 2022, petitioners timely7 filed

2.4. On May 10, 2022, petitioners received the May

2.5. Due to the urgency and the paramount

3. This Petition prays for the invalidation and reversal of the

4. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code clearly warrants

“Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel

5. Grave abuse of discretion exists, among others, when

6. Here, respondent COMELEC failed to carry out its

7. As will be further shown in this Petition, the COMELEC’s

“The foregoing matter is not without

Even without a petition

8. In view of respondent Marcos Jr.’s material

9. Time is of the essence as Congress is due to convene as a

10.1. FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE (“Fr. Buenafe”), O.

10.2. Petitioner FIDES M. LIM (“Lim”) is Filipino, of legal

10.3. Petitioner MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ

10.4. Petitioner CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA (“Sevilla”) is

10.5. Petitioner ROLAND C. VIBAL (“Vibal”) is Filipino,

10.6. Petitioner JOSEPHINE LASCANO (“Lascano”) is

11. All petitioners may be served with orders, notices, and

12. Respondent COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS is the

13. Respondent MARCOS, JR. is the respondent in the case a

14. The SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES is one of the two Chambers

15. The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES is the other Chamber

Criminal Tax Cases

16. Respondent Marcos, Jr. was a public officer for several

17. Respondent Marcos, Jr., was charged in eight (8) criminal

(a) Four (4) Informations in Criminal Case Nos.

(b) Four (4) Informations in Criminal Case Nos.

18. Significantly, the Criminal Tax Cases involved: (a) income

19. Notably, based on the findings of the Regional Trial Court

The team ascertained that accused, former

Based on the testimonies of Susana Dagdagan

20. After due proceedings, the Regional Trial Court of

(a) “Under the 1977 Tax Code, every Filipino citizen

(b) “Besides, (Marcos, Jr.) admitted that he had no

(c) “The prosecution, on the other hand, presented

(d) “As Provincial Governor, the accused knew the

21. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court sentenced

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ferdinand

1. To serve imprisonment of six (6) months and

2. To serve imprisonment of six (6) months and

3. To serve imprisonment of three (3) years and

4. To serve imprisonment of three (3) years and

5. To pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue the

22. Instead of filing the appropriate return and paying the

23. On October 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed

a. Ordering respondent Marcos, Jr. to pay the

b. Ordering respondent Marcos, Jr. to pay a fine

25. Respondent Marcos, Jr. appealed the Court of Appeals’