G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981 appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt.

appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond
paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead,
vs. he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea,
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant. telling, the latter that they would talk the matter over in the municipal building of
Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the
murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n.,
Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount
of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana —
and to pay the costs. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica —
who were all seated at a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away
The information alleges: from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but
Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his
lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the
That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of
combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of
above-named accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident
Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n.,
premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully,
Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while
unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the
the companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon
latter was in the performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab
City where he expired several hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by
wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.
the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-
Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of the
Contrary to law cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings, which are embodied in his
Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:
Postmortem findings.
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard General:
serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having
lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971;
Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem
pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating,
lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and
they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant
toe tips are pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen,
blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing,
measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18)
Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out
stitches applied. There are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen,
of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself
measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm.
as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of
from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain
answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and
sticking out of each, respectively.
attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's
gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the
appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana
and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters
from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10,
t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed
TRUNK:
(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior
midline, 128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards and
slightly upwards, passing superficially between muscles and tissues.
(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior
midline, 121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior wards,
downwards and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.
(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior
midline, 96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards,
upwards and to the left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and
the gastric vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-
medial border of the lower lobe of the right lung.
(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm.
from the posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring
3 by 0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index
finger, measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.
Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic
cavity.
There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater
curvature of the stomach.
There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and
intrathoracic hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body,
perforating the stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the
right lung.
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the
following facts:
At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife
were in a restaurant near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their
lunch. They had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22,
t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the accused saw three persons to his
right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt.
Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting
for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him whether he was
Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After receiving
an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The
accused accepted the invitation so the two moved over to the officer's table where the
deceased offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was still
hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report
any matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had
not reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the
accused for his identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the
latter did by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that
he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n.,
Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the
accused insisted that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the
accused when the latter was about to put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal
to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice,
demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to
surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist and
hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2) time Immediately, blood gushed
from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused for the third
time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and
stabbed the officer two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran
out of the restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where
he intended to surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan,
the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him why his head and
face were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a
gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to
accompany the accused to the municipal building. Arriving there, one Victor, a
policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was
just across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4,
t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by
the Indang policeman to the municipal, building where he was detained for two days
before he was picked up by the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to
the 121th PC Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40,
t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as
heretofore stated.
I quo asked the accused to show the scar produced by the injuries inflicted by the
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People
vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs.
Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59
Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to prove justification,
the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs.
Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6
SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58
Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7 2). The rationale for this jurisprudence
is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held
criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the
fact of legitimate self-defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo
Masana who committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with
the handle of his gun after he refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the
same was his and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his
(deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how this refusal of the accused could have
provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the aggression by
drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt, knowing that the accused was
no longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him. Besides,
an agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use force,
except in an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active resistance, and
finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the
offender. Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the
deceased was unarmed when the incident happened, he being then on leave. As a
matter of fact, he was then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE
are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the accused who had every reason to be
resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his
plea that his gun be returned him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable
conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who initiated the aggression
which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in his death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried
the third blow. This claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a
deceased when he refused to give his ID thus —
Court
Q Where is that scar?
(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"
[pp. 86,88 t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing
testimony in his medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:
Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n.,
Dec. 7, 1971). It also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the
deceased and the accused were facing each other. If that was the case, and
considering that the deceased was, according to the accused, holding the gun with
his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his head and and on his
right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of the accused that it was the
deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third
blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location of the
scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the
protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing that they were both right-
handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given by one, if not parried by the
other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right, side of the body of the
recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the same
being contrary to the natural course of human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio times with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal wounds on the chest and stomach.
Fidel, is that the victim parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an
force that appellant bumped his head on the edge of the table causing blood to ooze unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the latter to flee or
from the resulting injury on his head. defend himself before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14,
Appellee's brief).
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to
the municipal building from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs.
to the authorities, he claims that he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
his head with the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr.
Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he was detained in the municipal building of WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the
Indang, Cavite for two days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC following testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
Headquarters. During all this time, he did not give any written statement, much less
inform any PC or other police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense. It COURT
was only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2)
months that he claimed self-defense during the preliminary investigation of the case
Q What is the truth?
before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the
accused had really acted in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the Chief
of Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo
allegedly asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with Masana, Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped on the edge
a gun. He did not tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the of a table; that is why he sustained an injury and blood oozed from his head
deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made before the municipal judge (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied).
of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement
made so long after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
deserve credence since the same is obviously an afterthought, which cannot
overthrow the straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio ATTY. MUÑOZ
Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased
witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the absence of any showing as to Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a table and
any motive that would impel them to distort the truth, must be afforded full faith and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?
credit as a whole.
A Yes, sir.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was
treated by Dr. Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police
Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?
was present during the incident between the appellant and the victim and that the
police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the knife from appellant, whom he
A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally bumped his
thereafter brought to the municipal building.
head on the table.

II
Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana

Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide

A Yes, sir.
complexed with assault upon an agent of authority?

Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the extent that he
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was
bumped his head on the table?
established by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly
and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several
 A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana already
stabbed?
A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet stabbed.
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel,
one of the prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the
victim were indeed face to face when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was
not treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the same with his hand. As a
matter of fact, the force he used in warding off the attack was so strong that the
accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him which
necessitated medical treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the
spur of the moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support
a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the
record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to
insure the commission of the crime, making it at the same time possible or hard for
the victim to defend himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing
the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the accused
employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to
himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking distance
of his three companions, two of whom were police officers. Furthermore, there was an
altercation between the accused and the victim about the confiscation by the latter of
the gun belonging to the former, and at the moment when the victim was about to
stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed the victim in
the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his
victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This
kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission
of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as
the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in
the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or treachery exists when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim,
who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he
cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a
person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact
that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was
an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did
attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of
his official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the
essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily
requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver
offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and
specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation,
the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only
be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the
attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be
considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt or with insult to the public
authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art.
XIV, Revised Penal Code).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused
must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority (People vs. Villaseñor 35 SCRA 460
[19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626
[1916]).
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that
failure toexpressly alleged in the information that the accused had knowledge that the
person attacked was a person in authority does not render the information defective
so long as there are facts alleged therein from which it can be implied that the
accused knew that the person attacked was a person in authority. Thus, the
information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the
crime of Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality
of Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school
teacher in the school bonding of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such
and while in the performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor,
by then and there pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed. and repeatedly
trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the
crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of having committed
it inside the school building and during school classes.
 Contrary to law.
And the ruling of the Court was:
Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, ... shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised
Penal Code).
By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons
in authority, in applying the provisions of article 148." This special classification
is obviously intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in
the performance of their official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed
the information on the ground that there is no express allegation in the
information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a
person in authority. This is clearly erroneous.
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the
accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the
performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in
authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such
knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a
person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance thereof
could not excuse non- compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This
article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs.
Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta,
1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28,
1975), the information for Direct Assault reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin,
Municipality of Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto,
Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with
a piece of wood, except Paulo Coraide conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with said pieces of wood one Rufino
Camonias a councilman of barrio Languyin of said municipality, duly elected
and qualified as such while said councilman was engaged in the actual
performance of his duties.
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the
information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and
that such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is
fatal in this case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on
certiorari but the refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following
considerations:
The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that
'(I)t is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There
is want of factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have
been based.'
It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information
was deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct
assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority
held by the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the
agent of a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People
vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. 11, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p.
225].
What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is
that it is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the
position of authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school
teacher, then engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is
not necessary to allege further that the accused also knew that such position
was that of a person in authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the
accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged
in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a
person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It
matters not that such knowledge on `his part is not expressly alleged,
complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law and
not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his
 part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic
laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and
whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for
reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information
for failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with
factual findings as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent that the
fiscal's proper course is not the present petition but the refiling of a valid
information against respondents-accused, as herein indicated.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a
valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated
(emphasis supplied).
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra,
applies to the instant case; because the information in the former is strikingly similar
to the information in the latter and does not allege facts from which inference can be
deduced that the accused knew that the person assaulted is a person, or an agent of
a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it
is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the
accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior
both in rank and social status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a
high social position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded
official standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in
which said officers are placed in the army and navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p.
90); or to the designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix
his relative position in reference to other officers in matters of privileges, precedence,
and sometimes of command or by which to determine his pay and emoluments as in
the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to
a grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of
comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a
position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil 92
SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel
Transaction of the Civil Service Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62
SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs.
Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder
of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a
city chief of police by the chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero 88
Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First Instance by a
justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a
Spanish consul by his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106
Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-
4642, May 29, 1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those
"generally considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or
sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social
condition between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating circumstance
sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. — The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed.,
p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere
member of an anti-smuggling unit, is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault
against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public
authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is
inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person
in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only.
Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated
murder, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission,
was charged with and convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel
transaction of the said Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and convicted
of murder for the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the
injuries inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted of robbery
with homicide for the killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the
Bacolod City Police Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of
police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under
paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in
the case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo
Panaligan of Indang was present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant
when the incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the
accused from behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the
municipal building of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him even then as the
town chief of police, although he now claims that he went to the municipal building to
surrender to the chief of police who was not allegedly in the restaurant during the
incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-
158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this
Court ruled that the term public authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC
lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public authority but merely an agent of
a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling since it is not
justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of
Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in Articles
148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the
doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public
authority should comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have
easily utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14
in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 1452. The
lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public authority, which
may however include, but not limited to persons in authority.
and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and
municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute
and who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically mentioned
as persons in authority by the decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads and
supervises the entire police force in the municipality as well as exercises his authority
over the entire territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than and includes
the school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority or
jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant
should therefore be condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion
temporal the penalty prescribed for homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC
AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY
ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY
SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN
ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or
barangay captain is a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school
teacher is now considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending Article 152
of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town
municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well as a nurse, a
municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs.
Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).

The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in

authority; for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a
complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado
Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and in her own room
situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance
that it was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter
not having givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its
decision on May 30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer
"not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal and
not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the
costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a
notice of appeal; forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered
a decision the dispositive portion of which follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused
Amado Daniel has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he
should accordingly suffer the penalty for the crime herein charged.
We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the
judgment appealed from is not in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964,
amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, providing that —
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the
use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
(Republic Act No. 296, as amended) —
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as
herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment; ...
WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court
for appropriate further proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to
this Court and in a Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question —
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the
very root of a long standing practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or
so since the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of
Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but without imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section
12, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court?5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that
for this Court to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before Us must have
imposed on the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the
facts warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and
hold the view that the dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is in
accordance with the Constitution and the law, and vests jurisdiction on the Court to
act on the appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the ground that
it was "on the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed ill this case is reclusion
perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, and not reclusion temporal, as
imposed by tile lower court." The question arose as to the proper procedure to be
followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said
division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the
Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been
brought before it on appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We
may say, strong reactions from the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity
we shall not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that the Court of Appeals
was duty bound to make its findings of facts to support its opinion that the penalty to
the imposed upon the appellant was either life imprisonment or death so as to bring
the case within the jurisdiction of this Court.
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran,
We quoted the following pertinent portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, as provided in the above-quoted provisions of the
law, must of necessity defend upon the correctness of that opi nion
There is nothing in the law precluding this Court from exercising ing
its authority to pass upon such question which concerns its own
jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may exercise its power of
review the Court of appeals is bound to make in its order f
certification such findings of facts as are necessary to support its
conclusion that either life imprisonment or death is the penalty to be
imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3, which
provides th where a court to which an appeal has been taken has
no appellate jurisdiction over lic case and it certifies the same to the
proper court, it must do so "with a specific and clear statement of
grounds therefor." the requirement of with and specific grounds is
precisely a device to prevent erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction
from a lower to a superior court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment
thereon" appearing in the provision above quoted, are sufficient
indication that the Court of Appeals, at the time of certifying the
case to this Court, had already examined the evidence and was
ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found from the
facts established by proof that the penalty to be imposed is either
death or life imprisonment, instead of entering judgment thereon , it
certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final determination.
Since the Certification is the only ground for determining our
jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but also
findings of fact, the latter being more important than the former for
they supply the real basis for determining jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly
from a Court of First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or
death penalty is imposed, for in such cases, if we assume
jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be erroneous on
its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already
exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits
containing both findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under
such circumstance it is more practical for the administration of the
law that this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by
examining the evidence and correcting all errors both of fact and of
law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here, the
Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the
merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the
Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer the case to this
Court. lt is in that transfer that we believe we may intervene in order
to prevent an erroneous transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method
designed to make effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the
Court of Appeals and this Court, as defined by law. According to the
law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259), offenses, for
which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including
offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed on the
same occasion, come within the appellate jurisdiction of the
 Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this,
the Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its
findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that the penalty
to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death. While this Court
will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the correctness
of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds
the conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds
them to be wrong, the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals.
(pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was
substantial compliance with the law as the order of certification made reference to the
opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contained sufficient
findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed
upon the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the
Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the
Court of Appeals is bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to
determine whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from that portion of the
Resolution which accepted the case as he was of the opinion that the case should
have been remanded to the Court of Appeals.7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority
insofar as it held that it was necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to
state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty or life imprisonment should be
imposed. He particularly dissented from statements that if this Court found the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals to be wrong, the case should be returned to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings. According to Justice Tuason when a case is
certified to this Court it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits;
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither essential nor necessary. Justice
Tuason was joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief
Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino Padilla.8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled
in Ramos — that is, for the Court of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and
finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as
the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law
which confers on the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal
and impose the corresponding penalty in criminal cases where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not be
deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph
of Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases
"should be imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment", viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said
division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the
Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been
brought before it on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate
court with the duty of imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
death. All that the Rule requires is that should the Court of Appeals
be of the opinion that death or life imprisonment should be
imposed, it "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of
Appeals shall refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion
that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the crime committed. This
can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without
jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not
to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in
relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of
judgment" presupposes a final judgment — final in the sense that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial or appellate court within the reglementary period. A
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.12 It is only then that
there is a judgment which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of
judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule
124 enjoins the Court of Appeals from entering judgment" when there is no judgment
to be entered .
But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court when the decision being certified contains no penalty or sentence, as
distinguished from appeals from the Court of First Instance where there is a complete
judgment to be passed upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself states that the
case is for final determination by the Supreme Court as if the case had been brought
before it on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of facts of the appellate court which
as a rule are conclusive and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness
of the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the
correct penalty for the offense committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain
from renderingjudgment " there would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only
assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the Court when it drafted the
Revised Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible contrary or adverse
interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation under the phraseology used. It is
incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was conceived and
in harmony with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal —
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of
the testimony of the offended party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who
at the time of the incident was a little less than 13 years of age, on the basis of which
the trial court found the charge of rape duly established. The happenings are briefly
summarized in the People's brief as follows:
The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on
November 20, 1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang
Tublay, Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the incident in
question on September 20, 1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at a
house located at Pinsao Guisad Baguio City, as she was then a first year high
school student at the Baguio Eastern High School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36,
Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just
arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it
was then raining and the bus was parked several meters away from the bus
station, she waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about three minutes of
waiting, the accused came and started molesting her by inquiring her name
and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, Id.). But she did not allow him to hold
her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention of the bus driver and the
conductor about the actuation of the accused, but it seemed that the former
were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100
meters away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely followed her (p. 4, Id.).
When the jeep started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her (p.
5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to
negotiate a distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also alighted and
again he tried to carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was not allowed to carry
her bag, her was adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it
when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.).
When she entered her room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled a
dagger eight inches long and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p.
7, Id.). Margarita was stunned into silence because of her fear (p. i Id.).
Thereupon, the accused held her hair with his left hand and forced her Lo lie
down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his left hand with a handkerchief in
Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the dagger and her neck with his
right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She was forcibly made to the down and, at this
moment, the accused removed the buttons of his pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put
down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate herself from
the accused was to no avail assile was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed
about 95 to 100 pounds (p. 35, Id.)while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall
and weighed about 126 pounds (pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8.
36, Id.), used his thigh to separate the legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but
failed. to remove her panty (p. 36,Id.). He nonetheless guided his penis and
inserted it inside the vagina of the complainant after prying open the part of her
panty covering her private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost
consciousness. When she recovered, he was already gone (p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the
terrible misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was immediately
brought to the Baguio General Hospital where she was examined (p. 10, Id.).
 Then they proceeded to the Police Department. The Chief of Police
accompanied them to the Health Center where she was again examined by
Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3,
rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her father gave their respective
statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.).
She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio
(Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and
he testified on the physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng
on September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and
11:00 o'clock positions in the face of a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall — tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear — negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or
extra-cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the
condition of the hymen revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the
incident complained of, and that the number of lacerations and contusions at the base
of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each
other since 1963, and there were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that
the incident of September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with the latter's
consent, and in fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the first
time having occurred inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry
her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the
findings of facts of the trial court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after
the latter had examined the evidence as a result of which it certified the case to this
Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible
motive could a thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that
could only bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation and make her an
object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her
hometown. It cannot be denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature
subjects the victim to what can be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical
examination of her body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court
for the hearing where she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event
which she would prefer to forget and leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did
forego all these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was due to
her simple and natural instincts of speaking out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the
girl although he promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965,
Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and was not of marriageable
age, hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony
that the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's
uncle, the trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity
to ask for help or attract the attention of other people before she reached her boarding
house, she failed to do so. According to counsel there were people at the Dangwa
station, in the busy streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place where
the girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses
the closest of which was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever made by
complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from
the moment she saw the appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions
of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to hold her bag
and she caged the attention of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of
appellant but the two did not do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from
the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she did
not suspect that he was following her. To a question propounded by His Honor
whether she suspected that appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No sir,
I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita could not call the attention of the people in
the street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant was
not doing anything against her. And when Margarita reached the boarding house
there were no persons around 19 and in fact she went straight to her room and it was
at that particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she could close
the door. In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of
appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I
will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that — some may manifest an
aggressive or violent attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while
others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent. fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts
of the accused at the time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by
the medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries on the girl's
body, and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of
Margarita's straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old
farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21 and six inches
tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her
resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed
around 95 lbs.21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long
as it brings about the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less
irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to
consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation.
A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of superior physical
strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the
existence of the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in
accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is
only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing
Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine has
been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one of the
latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA
665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or
violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size,
and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. 23
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter
submits herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this
case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and with it threatened
to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened
whatever resistance Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant was
able to consummate his coitus on the victim. 24
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who
at the time of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant
voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of Investigation
and the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was
telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one of which was whether he
forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was
"No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and
We quote from his decision the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and
credit on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy
depends upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature
of the subject. If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were
not conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test will fail. The subject
had nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He was not confronted by
the victim or other persons whom he had a reason to fear. Naturally, his
reaction to the questions propounded was normal and unaffected and the
apparatus could not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly
weapon with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling
of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a
boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the
term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law,
that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or
a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and
uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of
votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for
the crime of rape as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuaand order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in
the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs.
Decision Modified. SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUFINO MIRANDILLA
BERMAS, accused-appellant.
In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has
been adduced; it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his
fundamental rights.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 274, Metro Manila, to the crime of rape under a criminal complaint,
which read:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla
Bermas, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, while armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Paraaque, Metro Manila
August 8, 1994
(SGD) MANUEL P. BERMAS
Complainant
Assisted by:
(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS
Mother[1]
Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the lower
court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May
1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer
the extreme penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by way
of automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as An Act To Impose Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised
Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes,
which took effect on 31 December 1993).
The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account,
rather briefly, of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.
"On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her
own father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed
inside their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8, Paraaque, Metro Manila
(pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed the victim's
shorts and panty, placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and
conducted coital movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful
desire, he threatened the victim with death if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9,
ibid.)
"On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which yielded
the following findings:
"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on
the body of the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible
and its orifice wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an
average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any
hymenal laceration."[2]
The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge, and
that of his married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made
by her younger sister to a mere resentment by the latter. The trial court gave a summary
of the testimony given by the accused and his daughter Luzviminda; viz:
The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on her
daughter, the complainant. He told the Court that he could not do such a thing
because he loves so much his daughter and his other children. In fact, he said that he
even performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the time of
his separation from his wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of
the crime of rape, the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in
view of the numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her
frequent coming home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew of no other
reason as to why his daughter, the complainant, would ever charge him of the crime
of rape except probably in retaliation for being admonished by him whenever she c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;
comes home late in the night.
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number;
The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that the
complainant was raped by the accused. She said that the complainant did not come e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;
home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a liar. She told the Court that the
concoction by the complainant of the rape story is probably due to the resentment by f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.
the latter of the frequent scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused. She
further added that she was told by the previous household employer of the
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio
complainant that the latter is a liar. She went on to testify further that she does not
believe that the accused, who is her father, raped the complainant, who is her
younger sister.[3] a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;

The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the prosecution b. His work was shoddy;
against the accused as having been duly established and so ruled out the defense
theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of private complainant that allegedly 4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio
had motivated the filing of the complaint against her father. The court adjudged:
5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and
prejudicial to the accused.
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify
B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY
the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, and to pay the
AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.
costs.

C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD

"SO ORDERED."[4]
AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.

In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in

D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.
collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly
committed by the court a quo; thus:
E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE
A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
AND VIGILANT COUNSEL
DOUBT."[5]

1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing
the accused's counsel de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;
a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal arrest;
b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid filing of
the information;
The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal
enough to warrant a remand of the case for new trial.
It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of
age, assisted by her mother Rosita Bermas, executed a sworn statement before SPO1
Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Paraaque Police Station, stating, in sum, that she had
been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own father, in 1991 and 1993,
as well as on 03 August 1994, particularly the subject matter of the complaint,
hereinbefore quoted, duly signed and filed conformably with Section 7, Rule 112, of the
Rules of Court. The Second Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect
that the accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused was
brought before the trial court without counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa
Elmira C. Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be the counsel de officio. Accused
forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The prosecution
placed complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. She testified on direct
examination with hardly any participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later
waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her duty as
counsel de officio.
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my paero besides
me, would accede to my request that I be relieved as counsel de officio
because I could not also give justice to the accused because as a lady lawyer
. . . if my paero here and if this Honorable Court will accede to my request.
"COURT:
It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is your sworn
duty, Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are you retracting?
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court."[6]
Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new
counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross-examine the
complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he barely had time, to prepare
therefor. On this score, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva in the instant
appeal would later point out:
To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez to be
appointed as defense counsel de oficio. And so the trial court appointed him.
Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross examination,
presumably to prepare. But a ten minute preparation to cross examine the
complainant upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on the accused who
stands to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far too inadequate. He could
not possibly have familiarized himself with the records and surrounding circumstances
of the case, read the complaint, the statement of the complainant, the medico-legal
report, memos of the police, transcripts and other relevant documents and confer with
the accused and his witnesses, all in ten minutes.[7]
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had
testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994; it
was later reset to 09 January 1995. When the case was called on 09 January 1995, the
following transpired:
COURT:
Where is the counsel for the accused?
COURT:
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the defense
to present its evidence.
PROSECUTOR GARCIA:
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
COURT:
Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that the
accused is under detention ... it seems he cannot comply with his obligation.
COURT:
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
ACCUSED R. BERMAS:
Wala po.
COURT:
It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In view of
the fact that the defense counsel is not interested anymore in defending the
accused because last time he moved for the continuance of the hearing of this
case and since this time he did not appear, he is unduly delaying the
proceedings of this case and considering the accused here is under detention,
I think it would be better if the Court appoints another lawyer. He should file
his withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear in this
Court to defend his client-accused, the Court is hereby constrained to appoint
another counsel de officio to handle the defense of the accused. For this
purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de officio
for accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas.[8]
The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the request of
Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as
counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted; thus:
 COURT:
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I be
allowed to give her my responsibility as counsel de officio considering that the
lawyer from the PAO ...
COURT:
What about?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will allow us
to be relieved from our responsibility as appointed counsel de officio of the
accused ...
COURT:
You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de officio? As
an officer of the Court you don't want to handle the defense of the accused in
this case?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my responsibility
as counsel de officio.
COURT:
So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
ATTY. LONZAME:
Yes, Your Honor.[9]
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness stand. He
denied the accusation against him. The next witness to be presented was his married
daughter who corroborated her fathers claim of innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who
himself, for one reason or another, had ceased to appear for and in behalf of accused-
appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not
properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to
counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor
laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of
an accused has already been recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April
1900, stating that a defendant in all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every
stage of the proceedings,[10] and that if he is unable to employ counsel, the court must
assign one to defend him.[11] The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in
declaring, in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that -
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973
Constitution, essentially, has remained unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a
worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the provision from which prevailing
jurisprudence on the availability of the right to counsel as early as the stage of custodial
interrogation can be deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states -
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 14. x x x x x x x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures
which declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the
trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the
arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal
proceedings should never be taken lightly.[12] Chief Justice Moran in People vs.
Holgado,[13] explained:
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to
be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask
him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own."[14]
In William vs. Kaiser,[15] the United States Supreme Court, through the late Justice
Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the
victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the laws complexity or of his own ignorance or
bewilderment. An accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for,
unless so represented, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf
will be as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings.[16] The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is not
a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to
counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at
the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused,
his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds
substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his
client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a
simple perfunctory representation.[17]
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he
should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that
he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to
him at his request.[18] Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. - The court, considering the gravity of the
offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de
oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their
experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. But in localities where
such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the
accused.
A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost.[19] A mere pro-forma appointment
of de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits
disapprobation.[20] The exacting demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than
stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not as a burden but
as an opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be
excused from this responsibility except only for the most compelling and cogent
reasons.[21]
Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on 29
March 1999, this Court has said:
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over
the manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of
them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve
his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense
lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the
accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de oficio to
the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have
been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante,
Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in
the Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in
the future will be severely sanctioned.
The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a
quo for new trial.
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the
basis of the complaint, aforequoted, under which he was arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A.
Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby appointed counsel de
officio for the appellant.
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Paraaque, Roberto
Gomez and Nicanor Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen much too
short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the Bar and are
warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt with most severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan
Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato,
Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from behind and
inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing
behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to
his assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro
Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the street,
and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was
about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the
left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the
rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in
banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both
wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the
former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on
the Spaniard Juan Igual.
In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court
charging Manalinde with the crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted,
the trial judge, in view of the evidence adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of
February of said year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has
been submitted to this court for review.
From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the
crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was
committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that the deceased was
unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep cut on the left shoulder at the
moment when he had just put down the load that he was carrying and was about to
start for the door of the store in front of which he stopped for the purpose of entering
therein. As a result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and
unexpected blow, he was unable, not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that
he was unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling to the ground, died in
an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form employed in the
attack the violent death of the said Chinaman was consummated with deceit and
treachery (alevosia), one of the five qualifying circumstances enumerated in the
aforesaid article as calling for the greatest punishment.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had
perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one
hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of
the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato
in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge
against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he,
Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his
return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by
order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to
kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he
concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon
reaching the town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a
store and, wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by,
just as the latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was
about to enter a store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he
further stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.
From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and
self-convicted author of the crime in question has been unquestionably established,
nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he
was not responsible exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper obedience.
The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account
killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would
have killed many more, because it is the barbarous and savage custom of
a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can not under
any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of civilized nations; such
exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people
who up to the present time have been practicing such acts are well aware that the
established authorities in this country can never allow them to go unpunished, and as
has happened a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of
appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime so committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances
3 and 7 of article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that
promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held
to be generic, since the crime has already been qualified as committed with the
treachery, because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given
him by Datto Mupuck to go juramentado and kill some one in the town of Cotabato,
with the promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty
woman. Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own
volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on some of his
fellow-beings, depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that
he was about to commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country
and the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered
and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well
that he might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon
accepting the order and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith,
deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and
the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he
was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it
by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose
of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he
had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent,
might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the
instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first
encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation.
The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the
culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim
was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person
having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is
considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the accused
from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was
committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of
money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being
inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two,
premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer
of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the
former, the one being independent of the other. In the present case there can be no
doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the
criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to
carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial
whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the
inducement and voluntarily executed it.
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by
the United States vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV
of the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be seen from the mere perusal of the
statement of facts. It is also different from the case where a criminal who has made
up his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other than the object of his
criminal intent. On going to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the
first two persons he encountered, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined
does not alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason
that to cause the violent death of a human being without any reasonable motive is
always punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the nature of the
concurrent circumstances.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is
present to neutralize the effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs provided however, that the
penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of
Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall
likewise be sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the
Penal Code. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.
This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses
disclose that at around six o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo
Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to
gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside
the hut. While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a
volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went
outside the hut. From a distance of about twenty-five meters, she saw five
men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already
wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His
assailants were about five meters away from him.
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who
were firing at her husband. She and her brother Ricardo had known
Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales,
Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted,
"Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". The five persons fired at her.
She was then about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to the hut
for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes,
Laureano Sangalang and his companions left the place. When Flora returned
to the spot where her husband was prostrate, he was already dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old,
a brother of Flora, was inside his own nipa hut which was about ten meters
away from Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children were
eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came out of his hut. He saw his
brother-in-law being shot by Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino
Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He saw Sangalang using a
Garand carbine in shooting his brother-in-law. The latter fell from the top of
the coconut tree after he was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to
approach her husband but she had to flee to her hut when Sangalang and
his companions fired at her. He wanted to join her but he was likewise fired
upon by the five men. So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after
she left the hut and went to see her dead husband, who was lying on the
ground, face up, at the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his
brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his children and brought them
to Sitio Biga, which was more or less thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio
Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief of police who went to the
scene of the crime with some policemen and Constabularymen.
The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained
twenty-three gunshot wounds on the different parts of the body, fourteen of
which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A and B). He
died due to the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C).
On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were
interrogated by the Silang police. They executed sworn statements before
the Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales,
Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the assassins of
Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in her statement that she knew those persons
because from time to time they used to pass by her place. They resided at
Barrio Capitula, Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio Adlas. On the basis of
those statements, the police filed on June 10 in the Municipal Court a
complaint for murder against the five aforenamed persons. Sangalang was
arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000 on June 13. He waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. The other accused have not
been apprehended. On August 8, 1968 the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for murder against Sangalang.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch,
rendered a judgment convicting Sangalang of murder, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow moral damages in
the sum of ten thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang
appealed.
The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and
that he knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He pleaded an alibi. He declared that in
the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the house of
Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's
place at six o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the
matriculation fees of his children.
As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until
morning. He would try to raise the sum of two hundred pesos which
Sangalang desired to borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They
allegedly slept in Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The next morning,
they breakfasted in that house. At about ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula
delivered the two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then went
to the Central Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They returned to Cavite
and arrived at seven o'clock in the evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula.
Gatdula and Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.
In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law,
Ricardo Sarno. The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony that
they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five armed persons, who riddled
Cortez with fourteen gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to overcome his
alibi. In essence, the case projects the ever recurring conflict in criminal
jurisprudence between positive identification and alibi.
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses,
Mendoza and Gatdula, learned of his arrest, and Mendoza even visited him
in the municipal jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not interpose the
defense of alibi when he was investigated by the police and when he was
summoned at the preliminary investigation.
Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez
and her brother Ricardo Sarno. Those inconsistencies, which are not glaring,
strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies were not coached
nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may be attributed to deficiencies in
observation and recollection, or misapprehension of the misleading and
confusing questions during cross-examination, or to the defective translation
of the questions and answers but they do not necessarily indicate a wilful
attempt to commit falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People vs.
Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350).
The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently
testified that they saw Sangalang, a person already well-known to them,
among the five armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That unwavering
identification negates appellant's alibi.
The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand,
Sangalang did not show that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a
malicious desire to falsely incriminate him. .
Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies
in the evidence for the prosecution. He made a spirited defense of the
appellant. However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable doubt on
Sangalang's complicity in the killing.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He
was unarmed and defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did
not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows
that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which
insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which
the victim could have made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery
(alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly established (See
art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be categorized as
murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046). Treachery absorbs the
aggravating circumstance of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident
premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not proven.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on
Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ALFANTA y
ALO, accused-appellant.
Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, dated 29 July 1996,
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting[1] accused-appellant
Rolando Alfanta y Alo of rape with two aggravating circumstances and sentencing him
to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that simply
read:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge upon the person of one NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her
will and consent.[2]
When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty
to the crime charged. Trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in its
decision under review, thus:
The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation who testified that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45
in the afternoon, he performed a physical examination and medico genital
examination on one Nita Fernandez for alleged rape. Upon physical examination he
found mark swelling on the left lower jaw or on the mandibular area left portion; and,
upon examination of the hymen, he found that the labia majora and minora gaping,
similar to the appearance of a woman who had just given birth; or a normal
appearance as a result of several sexual intercourses that had been performed. He
submitted a report on his findings (Exhibit A).
The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the information
who testified that on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep
in the residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio, Makati city, a man whom she
had not seen before suddenly entered the house where she was sleeping, pulled her,
boxed her jaw and put his hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey
him, he will kill her. She resisted, but could not do anything. Thereafter, she was
forced to climb a fence. Because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she
followed. After climbing the fence, the man instructed her to go to a vacant
house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house, she was told to
undress, she did because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man
embraced and kissed her. Then she was told to lie down and told to separate her
legs. The man inserted his penis into her vagina. After inserting the mans penis to her
vagina, she was told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his
penis into her anus. After inserting the mans penis into her anus, she was told to turn
around face up. All these acts of the man hurt her. After turning around face up, the
man inserted his fingers in and out into her private part. After the man had finished
inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she was told to go near him and lie
beside him, and not to dress up as he was going to take a rest and at the same time
telling her not to tell what happened to others saying that lahat ng nirape ko ay
pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong. All the time the man was inserting his
penis and fingers into her private part and into her anus, she was shouting: tulungan
po ninyo ako,' but nobody responded. Noticing that the man was already sleeping,
she suddenly got the knife at waist of the man and stab the man on his chest. The
knife broke. She suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack the man several
times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the bolo and ran to the signal
office of soldiers. When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the
persons she met that she killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the
soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to the place where she was raped. They found the
man lying down still alive. The man was brought to the hospital. The man turned out
to be accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed an affidavit (Exh. C),
narrating what happened to her to the police; and was brought to the NBI Medico-
Legal Officer for examination.
On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she
worked as housemaid, she went to her friends house named Patrick because she
brought mongo and because she and Patricks wife Inday, are friends, arriving in the
house of Patrick at 6:30 in the evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able to go
back to her place of work at Valle Verde, Pasig because it was already late at night
and was told to sleep at Patricks house. Earlier that evening, at 9:00, she saw
accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from her two (2) other persons slept in
the house of Patrick, Inday and son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and her son in
a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not locked. In entering the house
were she slept, one has to reach the sala first. When awakened, she shouted, but
nobody heard her because they were sleeping and at the same time the accused
placed his hand on her mouth. She was really afraid because she was boxed on her
chest and accused was holding a bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At
the garage, which was not lighted, she was told to undress. She followed, because of
fear. Accused also undressed himself.While accused was on top of her, holding a
bolo, she cried. Accused is not her sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack him if
he is my sweetheart.
The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit, Makati
Police Station who testified that she came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D,
because Nita Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A. The bolo, which was brought
by Nita Fernandez to the Military Signal Village, was in turn given to the Central
Police Desk wherein she is the Investigator. After the bolo was handed to her by the
soldiers of the Signal Village, she conducted an investigation. Based on her
investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that when Nita Fernandez woke up at
12:00 midnight on August 26, 1995, Nita Fernandez saw a man standing beside
her. Nita was punched on the left portion of the face and ordered her to go outside,
instructed to climb over a fence on the other side of the house. After climbing the
fence, Nita Fernandez was told to undress, was boxed on her breast and was told to
lie down in a vacant house owned by Captain Pascua, where suspect raped Nita
Fernandez. On their way to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked
accused why he rape Nita Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not
telling the truth because they were sweethearts.
Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995, while at
AFOVAI Village, Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the house of General
Renato Icarma together with many other laborers, somebody told him that his wife
was waiting for him in the house of Captain Pascua. At 10:00 oclock that evening, he
went to the house of Captain Pascua; and upon reaching the house, he knocked, and
called Patrick Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of Captain Pascua. Belinda Ablon, the
cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the door. After opening the door, Nita
Fernandez, his live-in partner for almost a year came out, in an angry mood, because
she has been waiting for him for long, and asked him why he was late. He explained
that he did not expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita Fernandez was, he
will call her by phone or write her before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him
that they talk outside as she was ashamed with the neighbor, and they will disturb the
child who was sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to sleep. He and Nita
went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they arrived in
the vacant house, it was closed, so they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what
Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that, he was surprised why Fernandez
hacked him, for he knows of no reason why Nita Fernandez will hack him. He
believes that Nita Fernandez concocted the story of rape because of fear that he will
file a case against Nita Fernandez for hacking him.
On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house of
General Romeo Icarma (the house where he and 15 other workers were constructing
a fence), since 1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason, since 1993. In February 1995,
the daughter of Nita Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to Lito introduced him to
Nita. He and Nita became sweethearts in February 1995.They have not live together
because Nita was working at Valle Verde. They only meet during Nitas day off. He
has been at Nitas place of work, but he used to call then at her telephone numbers
which are 6326062 and 6356060. They used to see each other at Gen. Icarmas place
where he lived. On August 26, 1995, when the incident in questioned happened,
Lucia and Lito were no longer residing at Gen. Icarmas place because they were told
to leave in April 1993. On August 26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just 100
meters away from the house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking for him. Because
Nita does not know the workers in Gen. Icarmas house, Nita left and went to the
house of Captain Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the
squatters area, Melchor Rudy Abella told him that Nita was looking for him. He went
to the house of Captain Pascua. At Captain Pascuas place, he met Nita. Present in
the house of Captain Pascua were Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin
and a small child who were all awake, except the child. Although Ablon was very
much willing to accommodate him in Ablons house, he brought Nita to the house of
the Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to protect them and ashamed
to stay at Ablons house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in Ablons place, saying that
instead of sleeping at Ablons place, she prefers to go back at Valle Verde. He did not
allow Nita to go back at Valle Verde because it was already late at night and if
anything happens to her, her daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame
him. He did not bring Nita to Gen. Icarmas house because it is crowded and the
Colonels house is just 20 meters from Captain Pascuas house. They went to the
Colonels house, climbing the fence. When they climbed the wall, he was carrying
banig, pillow and blanket, and did not notice that Nita was carrying a knife. Nobody
live in the Colonels house and was closed. They slept in the terrace of the house on a
cement flooring. While he was sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife. When
hacked, he just said aray. The bolo was not used in hacking him. After stabbing him,
Nita left and went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen knife. When the Military
Police arrived, he was no longer at the Colonels house because he went to another
house, where he slept. After he was stabbed, he asked the assistance of
Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the Military Police. He did not leave the
colonels house. He just stayed in the premises. Despite his wounds, he was able to
sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the morning. When asked why Nita stabbed him, he said
that it was because he hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand and pushing her on her chest
when Nita insisted in leaving for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did not file
a complaint against Nita for hacking him.[3]
In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced judgment,
thus:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, with aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, and indemnify complainant
Nita Fernandez the sum of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit.[4]
Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and
the imposition of the death penalty decreed by the trial court; he contends that -
I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY.[5]
The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases
that have been previously reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the instances before
it, of two people, each testifying on the same incident but making a clearly discordant
testimony. Since only the participants could directly testify on the sexual congress, here
conceded to have taken place, extreme care is observed in evaluating the respective
declarations of the complainant and the accused. The doctrinally accepted rule is to
accord great respect over the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of the
witnesses and, in the usual words of similar import employed by the Court, it would be
best not to disturb the findings of the court which has heard the evidence except only
when a material or substantial fact has truly been overlooked or misappreciated which
if properly taken into account can alter the outcome of the case. [6] Regrettably for
accused-appellant, no such exceptive instances of possible oversight are perceived or
evident in this case.
Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the
trial court and by this Court as well, of what had transpired during the late hour of the
night in question.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on August
26, 1995 at around 12:00 oclock midnight?
A At Fort Bonifacio.
Q What city or municipality?
A I do not know but it must be here sir.
Q Meaning Makati City?
A Yes sir.
Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?
A I was sleeping in my friends residence.
Court:
Q What is the address of that friends residence at Fort Bonifacio?
A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.
Q Why were you there at that time?
A Because I always go there and my sons residence is beside the house of my
friend sir.
Court: Proceed fiscal:
Pros. Manola:
Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your friend in
AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati City do you recall of any unusual incident that
happened?
A There was sir.
Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?
A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend suddenly there
was a man who entered the house where I was sleeping.
Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my mouth sir.
Q What else happened after that?
A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo and he
said if I will not obey him he will be going to kill me sir.
Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?
A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.
Q Did you climb over the fence?
A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.
Q Were you able to go over the fence?
A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.
Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb over the
fence?
A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.
Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam witness?
A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to undress and
I took off my clothes he embraced me and kissed me sir.
Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey him?
A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.
Q Did you obey him?
A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.
Court:
Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of the
accused for you to undress?
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man to go to
that vacant house and to undress why did you follow this instruction?
A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.
Q Why do you say that he might kill you?
A He like to rape me sir.
Court:
Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?
A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q So what happened after according to you you were instructed to undress?
A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.
Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.
Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?
A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the he inserted
his penis to my vagina sir.
Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what happened
next Mrs. Witness?
A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my anus sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his fingers to
my private parts going it and out sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this person
according to you lie down after he put his fingers inside your private part?
A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.
Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?
A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.
Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?
A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that he does
not want me to tell it to anybody because he have raped many.
Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court room would
you be able to recognize him?
A Yes sir I could recognize him.
Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this person if he
is inside?
Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him and A The ambulance of the soldier.
when asked his name answered as Rolando Alfanta.
Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in
Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the name of connection with what you have just narrated or told or testified to this
Rolando Alfanta uttered the words lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil afternoon?
sa ayokong may magsumbong what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I could remember.
A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going to take
Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?
a rest.
A Yes sir.
Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?
Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutors office
A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife and stab
consisting of two pages kindly go over it and tell us if you recognize this
him in the chest sir.
statement?
Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A Yes sir I could recognize this.
A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack him sir.
Q Is that your statement
Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A Yes sir.
A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the signal
xxx xxx xxx.
where the soldiers were.
Q Now this bolo which according to you surrendered to the soldier at the signal if
Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to you?
you see this bolo again would you be able to recognize it again?
A Yes sir.
A Yes sir.
Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?
Prosecutor Manola:
A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.
We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when this
Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that according bolo is presented by the policeman who is in custody of this bolo.
to you you have killed a person what happened next?
Court:
A We went to the person who raped me sir.
Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist line of
Q And did you see him there? the accused did you bring it also?
A Yes sir. A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I brought.
Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were allegedly Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?
raped?
A Yes sir.
A The soldiers sir.
Q How did you ask for help?
Q Did you find this person who raped you?
A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir.
A Yes sir.
Q The question to you was how did you ask for help?
Q What was he doing?
A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako.
A He was lying down sir.
Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?
Q What happened after that?
A None sir.
A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the hospital.
Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to your
Q Who brought him to the hospital? private part?
A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir. Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of that
house?
Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into your
vagina? A It was closed but it was not locked.
A He forced that to insert it. xxx xxx xxx.
Q Forced it to where? Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your friend when
you could already at the house of your employer?
A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.
A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to them sir.
Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your vagina?
Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that mongo
A Yes sir I feel it sir.
to your friend?
Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were awakened?
A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.
A I do not know him.
Q By the way what time did you go there?
Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?
A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.
A I saw him around 7:00 oclock in the evening that he was passing thru the front of
Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?
the house of my friends where I was sleeping.
A 6:30 sir.
Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you sleeping?
Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isnt?
A Only me sir.
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to reach that
Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you stab him
place isnt?
with the knife how many times have you stabbed him with the knife?
A Three rides sir.
A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.
Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where you were
Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got hold of
sleeping at the time the place where you were sleeping or the place of the
the bolo you hacked him how many times have you hacked him?
room where the owner of the house were sleeping?
A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of him he
A First it is the sala where he passed.
might kill me.
Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other improvised locked
Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.
placed in that door like a wood?
Court: Cross-examination.
A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.
Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.
Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that time?
Court: Proceed.
A Patrick sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q And how are you related to Patrick?
Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house of your
A His wife is my friend sir.
friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?
Q What is the name of his wife?
A One of their children so there were three and I was one.
A Inday sir.
Q Were you sleeping in one room?
A I was sleeping in the sala sir.
Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the house of A None sir.
your friend Inday did you not shout when you saw a person pulling you holding
Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?
a bolo?
A Near sir.
A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at the same
time he placed his hands on my mouth sir. Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?

Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how many times A Yes sir.
were you boxed by the accused on the chest? Q How big?
A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really afraid of him. Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.
Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest? Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.
A Yes sir. Court: Answer
Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and also on A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.
her mouth.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Was it strong?
Q And then you lie down?
A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.
A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.
Note: Witness holding on his left chin.
Q Was he still holding the bolo?
Q How about on the chest?
A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.
Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.
Q How did you see him?
A It was not too strong sir.
A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of me I
Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow? cried and he was holding the bolo.
A Yes sir. Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.
Q Where? A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
A I fell on the ground down. Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
Q Where were you boxed by the accused? A He was molesting me sir.
A Outside sir of the house. xxx xxx xxx
Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the ground is Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend according to
that correct? you?
A Yes sir. A 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.
Q And you followed him? Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of your friend?
A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and because A I saw him that he was passing.
I was afraid because he was holding a bolo sir.
Q Where were you at the time?
Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?
A I was seating by the window sir.[7]
A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was undressing
himself. The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward categorical,
Q Was it lighted the place? and relatively free from any serious flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to
sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that the trial court has erred in giving due
weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant. Neither is evidence adduced
to show that the complainant has had any ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh
accused-appellant in a fabricated charge. The Court repeats the familiar doctrine that
when a woman claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show such a fact so long as her testimony can meet the test of credibility, [8] for it is
said that no woman in her right mind will cry rape, allow examination of her private
parts, or subject herself and her family to the humiliation concomitant to the prosecution
of the case, unless the story were true.[9]
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant
had been lived-in partner for almost a year, and that while they did sleep together on
26 August 1995 at the porch of the house of a certain Air Force officer, accused-
appellant denied any carnal knowledge of the victim that evening. In his appeal brief,
accused-appellant sought to negate any possible or likely use of violence or
intimidation, considering that: (a) in the house where the victim was sleeping on the
night of 26 August 1995, there were at least three persons (the caretaker of the house
Patrick Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couples son) who could have
responded to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the door of the house was purposely
left unlocked in order to enable accused-appellant to come into the house, and (c) when
the victim was made to climb a fence followed by the accused, she could have escaped
but did not.
The sweetheart theory of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out
strategy, often resorted to as a last ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal
liability. No documentary evidence of any sort, like a letter or a photograph or any piece
of memento, was presented to confirm a romantic liaison between accused-appellant
and the complainant. The latter testified:
Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?
A No sir.
Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?
A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart?
Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is concerned
because your sweetheart was then womanizing?
Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.
Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.
Court: Answer.
A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Really?
A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir.[10]
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her
beloved for petty reasons. The trial court was not out of line when it made this
evaluation; viz:
This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita
Fernandez were sweethearts, for such a claim defies rationality, let alone common
sense, because if they were sweethearts, she will not hack him. Not only that, the
manner on which she stabbed and hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo,
shows a complete anger to vindicate the outrage on her. If they were sweethearts,
she would not have acted in the manner she did in stabbing and hacking him. At
least, if they have some relationship, she would not show anger the way she did.[11]
Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August
1995 in the house where victim was sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It
was already close to midnight when the incident occurred, and the other occupants of
the house were by then apparently all sound asleep. The evidence is to the effect that
accused-appellant immediately after getting into the house hit her on the jaw, put his
hand on her mouth and threatened to kill her if she dared refuse to yield to his
demands. Understandably, the victim was shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed
into submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the offense and not by any kind
of hard and fast rule. It would be unreasonable to expect the victim to act with
equanimity of disposition and to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat made by accused-appellant.[12]
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant
wanted accused-appellant to have a chance to see her during the late evening indeed
should deserve scant consideration. The so-called love angle was properly ruled out
by the trial court for lack of concrete evidence to establish any such relationship.
Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered
her to climb a fence, it should be enough to state she did not appear to have had any
real opportunity to flee from the clutches of the intruder who was, in fact, just behind
her. After scaling the fence and while inside the abandoned and enclosed house, she
could not have done any much better since she was all the time within striking distance
of the bolo-wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and
ending at dawn.[13] The law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise.[14] By and
of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is specially
sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage of by him, or it facilitates the
commission of the crime by insuring the offenders immunity from capture. [15] As an
ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so considered provided it is duly
proved although not alleged in the information. [16] The Court entertains no doubt that
appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of darkness to facilitate the
commission of the crime without being recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted
his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal
desire on her, assured of the stillness of a sleeping world.[17] The Court has long held
that this aggravating circumstance can be considered when an accused takes
advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from his illegal
act.[18]
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his
penis into her vagina, appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in that position
had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down again and this time
he inserted his finger inside her. The Solicitor General correctly invoked the case of
People vs. Saylan,[19] where this Court said:
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the
missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also the same position as
dogs do i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because
The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this position is not novel
and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation.
(Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners
but not otherwise.[20]
Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an
aggravating circumstance any means employed or circumstance brought about which
add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The circumstance, it is said,[21] "pertains
to the moral order [and] adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the
crime.
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.[22]
In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed
with a bolo to realize his criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon
could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape [23] for not
having been correspondingly alleged in the information as to make the offense fall
under the jurisprudentially referred qualified rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. In People vs. Garcia,[24] the Court declared:
One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced
amendments thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the death
penalty, that is, when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape the victim becomes
insane, or, under the same circumstances, a homicide is committed. The homicide in
the last two instances in effect created a special complex crime of rape with
homicide. The first two attendant circumstances are considered as equivalent to
qualifying circumstances since they increase the penalties by degrees, and not
merely as aggravating circumstances which affect only the period of the
penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree. The original provisions of Article
335 and the amendments of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.
xxx xxx xxx.
Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly
pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be
considered only as aggravating circumstances, (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610
[1934]; People vs. Jovellano, et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156;
People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January 17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289; People vs.
Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309.) since the latter
admit of proof even if not pleaded. (U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People vs.
Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 73464, August
1988, 164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he
is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with
death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in
capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. [25]
Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Thus, even if there were aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
ignominy in attendance the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under
the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Rolando
Alfanta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION by hereby lowering the penalty therein imposed from death
to reclusion perpetua. An award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is likewise ordered
to be paid by accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta to the victim Nita Hernandez in
addition to the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delictu granted by the trial
court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36662-63 July 30, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.
MANDATORY REVIEW of the death sentence imposed upon the accused Filomeno
Camano by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case Nos. T-20
and T-21, for the killing of Godofredo Pascual and Mariano Buenaflor.
The inculpatory facts as stated by the trial court show that:
On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province
of Camarines Sur, between the hours of four and five o'clock in the afternoon,
after the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim
Godofredo Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular Bicol "palas" which is a
sharp bladed and pointed instrument about two feet long including the black
handle, tapering to the end, about one and one-half inches in width, (Exhibit
"C") while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost infront of
the store of one Socorro Buates. The victim, Godofredo Pascua, sustained two
mortal wounds for which he died instantaneously, described by Dr. Constancio
A. Tan, Municipal Health Officer, of Sagñay Camarines Sur, in his Autopsy
Report (Exhibit "A", pp. 5, Record Crim. Case No. T-21) as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB - three (3) inches long at left side, three (3) inches
below left axilla, a little bit posteriorly, cutting the skin, subcutaneous
tissues, muscles one (1) rib, pleura of left lung, pericardium,
penetrating the ventricles of the heart, Media stinum, the right lung and
exit to the right chest. One inch opening.
2. WOUND INCISED, one inch long at the left arm
CAUSE OF DEATH - Wound No. 1 causing instant death due to severe
hemorrhage.
After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused
proceeded to the seashore of the barrio, and on finding Mariano Buenaflor
leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling position, with both
arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down hacked the latter with
the same bolo, first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the
ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the
ground, face up, when the accused gave him a final thrust of the bolo at the
left side of the chest above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side
a little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back, of one (1) inch
opening, (Exhibit B) causing instant death. The victim, Mariano Buenaflor
sustained eight wounds, which were specifically described by Dr. Tan in his
Autopsy Report (Exhibit "B" dated February 17, 1970, as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest above
the nipple, running to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly
with an exit at the back of one (1) inch opening. Penetrating the skin,
subcutaneous tissues, pericardium the auricles of the heart, the left
lung towards the right side of back.
2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep
three-fourth (3/4) inch long penetrating the skin and the sternum.
3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long one and
one-half (1-1/2) inches deep.
4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches long.
5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting skin and
bone of anterior side.
6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.
7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at the back
near spinal column.
8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head cutting skin
and bone.
CAUSE OF DEATH — Wound number one (1) causing instant death due to
severe hemorrhage from the heart." Out of the eight (8) wounds, two (2) are
mortal wounds, namely wound Number one (1) and wound Number Three (3),
(Exhibit "B") (t.s.n., pp. 18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The two victims
Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together with the accused are
neighbors, residing at the same street of Barrio Nato, Sagñay, Camarines Sur
(t.s.n., pp. 31, Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident was not preceded
or precipitated by any altercation between the victims and the accused (t.s.n.
p. 60, Nov. 22, 1971).
 Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this incident, the two
victims had a misunderstanding with the accused while fishing along Sagnay
River. During this occasion it appears that the accused requested Godofredo
Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by Mariano
Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This refusal greatly offended
and embittered the accused against the victims. From this time on, the
accused begrudged the two, and entertained personal resentment against
them. And although on several occasions, the accused was seen at the game
table with Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the friendly attitude towards
Pascua, seems to be merely artificial than real, more so, with respect to
Mariano Buenaflor whom he openly detested. He consistently refused to
associate since then with the two victim especially, Mariano Buenaflor. In fact,
no less than ten attempts were made by Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting
the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were refused. Instead,
defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge Mariano Buenaflor to
a fight and announce his evil intention to kill them. (t.s.n., pp. 50-53, session
November 22, 1971.)
Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or "palas" belongs to the
accused. That after killing the two victims, he returned to his house, where he
subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, Erasmo
Valencia, upon demand by laid peace officers for him to surrender. When
brought to the Police headquarters of the town for investigation he revealed
that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden by him under the table of his
house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched, and
recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to he
Chief of Police was still stained with human blood from the base of the handle
to the point of the blade. And when asked as to who was he owner of said
bolo, the accused admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of Godofredo
Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. however, when he was asked to sign a
statement, he refused. 1
For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano was
charged, under two (2) separate informations, with the crime of murder attended by
evident premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties, the two cases were
tried jointly.
The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-
defense. He denied killing Godofredo Pascua. He also denied holding a grudge
against Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and belittled the fist fight he had
with Mariano Buenaflor. He said that while they were drinking, they had a heated
discussion, and because they were drunk, it resulted in a fist fight, which they had
soon forgotten. 2
His version of the incident is that in the early morning of February 17, 1970, he was
fishing in the open sea. He went ashore at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning and was
met by Mariano Buenaflor who, upon seeing that he had a big catch, demanded a
percentage. for the fishery commission. When he refused to give what was asked,
Buenaflor remarked that he was hard-headed. He went home, taking his things along
with him. After eating breakfast, he went to sleep and awoke at about 3:30 o'clock in
the afternoon. 3 He ate his dinner 4 and prepared to go out to sea again. While he was
standing in the yard of his house, Mariano Buenaflor, Godofredo Pascua, Gorio
Carable, Jesus Carable, Tomas Carable, Abelardo Bolaye, Amado Payago, and
Loreto Payago, who were drinking at the store of Socorro Buates, went to him and
Godofredo Pascua, without any provocation whatsoever, boxed him. He recounted
what happened next: "I defend myself but inspite of that I was hit on my upper arm.
Then after that I was again boxed by Mariano Buenaflor and I was hit on my lower
jaw. (Witness pointing to the bolo marked Exhibit C.) And I was able to grab that bolo
from him."
"When I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing me but I was able to
take hold of his hands and I was able to grab the bolo. After I have taken the bolo
from Godofredo Pascua, all I know is that he fell on the ground and the rest of the
group except Mariano Buenaflor run away after seeing that Godofredo Pascua fell
already on the ground. Mariano Buenaflor approached me having also a bolo then
immediately when we meet each other I boloed him and when he has wounded he
run away and when he was running away I run after him. After I have boloed Mariano
Buenaflor he run away so I run after him because I know that he has a gun and if he
reach home he will get that gun and he might shoot me." 5 Mariano Buenaflor was hit
on the head.
The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused, saying:
Coming to the evidence for the defense, the Court, much to its regret cannot
give credence to the testimony and story of the accused, and his lone witness,
Nemesio Camano, who is his first cousin. The claim of self-defense does not
find support in the evidence presented. The claim, that a group of eight (8)
men headed by Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor ganged up on him
by boxing him one after another while others were throwing stones at him; that
he was attacked by Godofredo Pascua with a bolo which he succeeded in
wresting from him; that he did not know Godofredo Pascua was killed; that he
killed said Mariano Buenaflor after a bolo duel, are mere fictions of a
desperate man without evidentiary support. His testimony on these points, and
that of his cousin Nemesio Camano are simply incredible not only because
they are inherently improbable in themselves, but also because of their clear
inconsistencies on contradictions against each other. For, conceding in gratia
argumenti that he was really ganged up by eight (8) persons, some boxing him
while others throwing stones at him, and two of whom were armed with a bolo,
and that he was all alone fighting them and yet he did not suffer any physical
injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. With eight (8) persons to
contend with, two armed with bolos, it is simply unbelievable that he should
come out of the melee unscathed.
The Court has carefully examined and verified very carefully each and every
piece of evidence presented by the defense and has relaxed all technical rules
of evidence in favor of the accused in search for evidentiary support of his
claim of self-defense in vain. Conscious of the enormity of the offense and the
bitterness attached to an adverse decision, the Court has earnestly searched
in vain for facts upon which to lay the basis at least of a finding of reasonable
doubt in favor of the accused at least just to avoid the ugly and unpleasant
task of signing an adverse court decision. But, the falsity of their concocted
story is so apparent and self-evident to need further elucidation. This is
demonstrated by the record. They simply cannot stand, as basis of belief.
Moreover, the Court feels very much intrigued by the fact that notwithstanding
that many people witnessed the incidents, having occurred in broad daylight,
and that the accused had more sufficient time to look for witnesses among his
friends, relatives, and neighbors in the barrio, during the long period that this
case has been pending trial since February 17, 1970, that he could not get any
witness to testify in his favor, other than his lone witness, Nemesio Camano,
whose testimony, coming as it is from a very close relative is naturally very
vulnerable to grave doubt and suspicion for coming from a biased source.
Could this mean lack of public sympathy because the horrible act was in truth
committed by the accused? Is this a sign of public condemnation? Be it as it
may, this unpleasant circumstance has no bearing or influence in the painful
decision of this case. What impelled and compelled this Court in making this
painful decision, much to his dislike, are the bare and incontrovertible facts of
the case born out by the evidence presented indicating beyond per adventure
of doubt the stark reality which shows that there exist that moral certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act
upon it. (People v. Lavarios, L-24339, June 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1321) For the
bitter conclusions herein reached, is based on the compelling and irresistible
facts born out by the evidence of record found after sleepless night of study
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
committed with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
treachery, abuse of superior strength, and intoxication with no mitigating
circumstance. The accused and his only witness, Nemesio Camano changed
their declarations not only once, twice, or thrice, but many times, placing the
Court in quandary and confused what theory or testimony is to be believed and
considered among the mess of contradictory, inconsistent, and diametrically
opposed statements. Considering the manner and tenor they were given, - the
accused and his only witness changing stand in every turn, leaves no room for
doubt than that said testimonies are merely concocted and fabricated as a
desperate attempt to salvage a hopeless case. 6
In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and the
cause of their deaths are not disputed. Counsel de oficio merely claims that the
accused is guilty of homicide only in each case, and not murder, as charged; and
prays for the modification of the judgment and the consequent reduction of the
penalty imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano.
(1) Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation since the acts of the
accused, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, are all indicative of E, "spur-of-
the-moment" decision and action.
The contention is well taken. There is evident premeditation when the killing had been
carefully Planned by the offender, when he prepared beforehand the means which he
deemed suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had sufficient time
dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences, and when there has been
a concerted plan. 7 It has also been held that evident premeditation requires proof of
the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will. 8 In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the
killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how
and when the plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time had
elapsed before the plan was carried out. The trial court merely concluded that the
killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was premeditated because "the accused has been
nursing the evil design to kill both the victims since three years prior to the occurrence
of the incident on February 18, 1970, when both of them refused the request of the
accused to have his boat towed by the motor boat belonging to Mariano Buenaflor
while fishing along Sañgay River," and "from that time on, to the fatal killings, said
accused refused consistently to join his neighbors in their drinking spree where both
the victims especially Mariano Buenaflor were present;" "in fact, no less than ten
attempts made by witness Amado Payago inviting the accused to be reconciled with
the victims were rejected;" and that "on the contrary, it has been established that
whenever the accused was drunk, he announces his intention to kill the victims, and
as a matter of fact he challenged several times Mariano Buenaflor to a fight."
The incident referred to, however, does not establish the tune when the appellant
decided to commit the crime. If ever, the aforementioned incident merely established
the motive for the killing of the two victims. 9
The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor to a fight whenever he
was drunk and announces his intention to kill the latter does not reveal a persistence
of a criminal design since there is no showing that in between the utterances of the
threats and the consummation of the crime, the appellant made plans or sought the
deceased to accomplish the killing.
As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation in the killing of Pascua
and Buenaflor and of the marked persistence to accomplish that plan, the trial court's
conclusion cannot be sustained.
(2) Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not present in the
commission of the crime.
The contention is without merit. Amado Payago categorically declared that Filomeno
Camano attacked Godofredo Pascua from behind, a method which has ensured the
accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to the perpetrator arising from the
defense that his victim may put up. His testimony reads, as follows:
Q At that time and date while you were in front of your house did you notice
whether there is anything unusual incident that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you relate before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please relate it?
A I saw Filomeno Camano run towards his house and took a bolo and run after
Godofredo Pascua and immediately stabbed him.
Q How far more or less were you when Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by
Filomeno Camano?
A More or less 12 to 15 meters.
Q What was Godofredo Pascua doing when he was stabbed by Filomeno
Camano?
A He was walking to his house.
Q In relation to Godofredo Pascua where was Filomeno Camano at the time
that Filomeno Camano stabbed Godofredo Pascua?
A From behind sir.
Q After Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano what happened
to Godofredo Pascua?
A He fell down and keep on turning.
Q What about Filomeno Camano, what did he do after Godofredo Pascua fell
down?
10
A He run towards the seashore looking after Mariano Buenaflor.
His testimony is corroborated by the nature and location of the wounds sustained by
the deceased Godofredo Pascua. The autopsy report, 11 showed that the point of
entry of the stab wound inflicted upon Pascua was three (3) inches long and three (3)
inches below the left armpit, a little bit posteriorly or toward the hinder end of the
body; and the point of exit was the right chest, one (1) inch Iateral to the right nipple
with a one (1) inch opening. If the deceased was stabbed while he was facing his
assailant, as claimed by counsel for the accused, the entrance wound would have
been in the front part of the body, and its exit wound, if any, would be at the back. The
trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding that the deceased Godofredo
Pascua was assaulted from behind.
With respect to Mariano Buenaflor, the evidence shows that he was attacked while in
a kneeling position, with his arms on top of the gate of the fence surrounding his hut
and his head was "stooping down." 12 He was hacked on the head, causing him to fall
to the ground, and then successively hacked and stabbed without respite, as he lay
on the ground, until he died. The attack was also sudden, unexpected, and lethal,
such as to disable and incapacitate the victim from putting up any defense.
(3) Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which the lower court appreciated in fixing the penalty, is absorbed
in treachery.
This contention is likewise correct. The rule is already settled that abuse of superiority
is absorbed in treachery. 13
(4) Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance of intoxication was
erroneously appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Counsel argues thusly:
As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is respectfully submitted
that there was no proof that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the
killing other than the bare testimony of Payago that from his house he
allegedly saw the accused drinking in his house which is about 30 meters
away. The prosecution did not present any police report or doctor's certification
that accused was found to be intoxicated at the time of the killing. Moreover, it
was not shown by competent evidence that accused purposedly became
drunk to facilitate the commission of the offense.
If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance because it affected accused's mental facilities such that it
diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts and to comprehend
fully the consequences of his acts. 14
There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental,
not habitual nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It
is aggravating if habitual or intentional. 15 To be mitigating, it must be indubitably
proved. 16A habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of
intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it
be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and
undermines will-power making its victim a potential evildoer. 17
The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to excessive
use of intoxicating drinks although he used to get drunk every now and then. The
testimony of Amado Payago to this effect, reads as follows:
Q But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno Camano are already
in good terms because they even go on drinking spree, is it not?
A Yes, sir, that is true but Filomeno Camano has an evil plan against
Godofredo Pascua.
Q And how did you come to know about this plan?
A He talk(s) (about) that very openly specially when he is drunk.
Q During the three years that the incident where Camano's boat was not
towed, could you remember how many times more or less did you hear him
speak about his plan before the stabbing incident?
A Whenever he is drunk.
Q Can you not remember more or less how many times have you heard him?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q About five times?
FISCAL CLEDERA:
Already answered.
A Whenever he is drunk.
ATTY. TRIA:
Q How often does he drunk (sic), if you know?
A I cannot estimate, sir.
Q What about Mariano Buenaflor, could you also state that there had been an
altercation between him and Filomeno Camano prior to the incident, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was this altercation about?
A It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his boat was refused
by Godofredo Pascua because that boat used by Godofredo Pascua is owned
by Mariano Buenaflor.
Q How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic) this Buenaflor?
A Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano Buenaflor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink liquor immediately
prior to the incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A In his house.
Q When you saw him where were you?
A I was also in my house because I can just see his house from our window.
Q About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno Camano so that
you can see from your house?
A More or less 30 meters.
Q With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?
A Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons (who) are
arriving far from our house.
Q According to your personal knowledge do you know whether or not the
accused was drunk when this incident happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q But the truth is that, you still affirm that you don't know of any incident
immediately prior that has precipitated this stabbing incident between the
accused and the victim
A None, sir.
ATTY. TRIA:
Q How about you, did you now drink that time?
No, sir. 18
The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and considering that the said
appellant was in a state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the
alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
5. Finally, counsel claims that death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in
the cases at bar, citing Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the Constitution which provides that:
"Excessive fines shag not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted."
The contention is without merit. The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. In
the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 19 the Court said:
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-Parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
"punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the Constitution." It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life."
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno Camano guilty of
Murder in each of the two cases. The offense being attended by the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the
imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and
1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.
WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed upon the appellant, as
above indicated, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED
in all other respects. With costs against the said appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and
sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty,
and to pay the proportional costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as
committed by the court below in its judgment to wit:
The lower court erred:
1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular
Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of the administrative
investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and
Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of
whom have since been dismissed from service.
2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments
have passed thru the customhouse without the knowledge of the customs
secret service."
3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in
denouncing the accused was actuated by a desire to protect himself and to
injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly
instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.
4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs
secret service agent of Cebu, is above reproach and utterly irreconcilable
with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.
5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the
court room while other prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the
previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from the
court room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular
Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan
Samson as supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu.
6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.
7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng
to order the opium from Hongkong.
8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the
conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.
9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the
conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Lua Chu.
10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the
crime of illegal importation of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four
years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the
presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the
unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, emanating from a spirit of revenge and from a
contaminated, polluted source.
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to
his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan
Samson, had returned from a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of
customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a
short conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the
secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a
drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him,
saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to
recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and put it into
the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu.
A week later, Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred
to consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to
Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house
and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The
said accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and
that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had
been in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting a ship that would go direct
to Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the
steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina — a shipping company in Cebu
had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H."
About the same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been
put on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that
Samson would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be
distributed among certain employees in the customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of
November, Natividad informed the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to
Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there until December
7th. In view of this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but
he was told each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship
was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on board.
The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he
was examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship.
After conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything possible to
have the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the
morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had
the papers ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse.
Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to
have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was told
that he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy
Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner,
and we see whether we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day
Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place,
and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to
discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson
agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to
the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and asked for a
stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that
night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good
stenographer available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez &
Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of
December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the
stenographer went to Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain
made of strips of wood which hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the
house on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson
asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not, saying that the
owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to
tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After
pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him
where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered
11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that
night accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner
of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also
owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the
latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had
brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the opium
was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken down in
shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old
fellow, why didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu
answered: "Impossible, sir; you were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On
being asked by Samson how he had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered:
"I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was
good business, because opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this
conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that Uy Se
Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the appointed
hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng
was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who
had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the
aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1), and in
invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in Exhibit
B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and
notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to
search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu
said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese characters relating to
the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to
the Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the
cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium
tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated
amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu
and asked him to tell the truth as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu
answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not
going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this
contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge
of those — " pointing towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200
from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it
only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he
could make a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson
told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the
collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who
told him he had no objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had ordered it,
Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the
payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent
cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded
and the captain of the Kolambuganrefused to let him unload it; that when the opium
arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did
not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and
proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se
Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had passed
the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December
17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the
P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally promised to pay him that amount.
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its
judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge to permit the presentation of
certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal
witness for the Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to
the admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the
others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings
against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson,
supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the
service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those
proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one
of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end.
With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the
principal witness of the Government, from the court room during the hearing, it is
within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he has
abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).
Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of
stenographic notes of the defendants' statements, since they contain admissions
made by themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand attested at the trial
that they were faithfully taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by
unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the
information, we find that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution
should be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and the chief of the
customs secret service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the
defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal importation of the opium,
though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the
payment of the gratuity which the former collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had
asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion,
however, is contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and overheard
by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the opium that had been
unlawfully imported.
But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to
import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection
with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A
public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not
take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the
offender, before having obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson
smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the
accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its
introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he
did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure
the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit
crime, as laid down by the courts of the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus
Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the
practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting
criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable,
the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to
expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed,
and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective.
The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is
no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original
design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person
approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in
carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally
held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the
purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are
cases holding the contrary.
As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-
appellants to import the opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to
have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had
promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise
so far as the customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him
out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited
drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in
this or against the public good which should prevent the Government from
prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person
is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch
a criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the
customs secret service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported
opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said
opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of
the latter.
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-46638 July 9, 1986 Complainant Gertrudes M. Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio
Yoyongco, an employee of the National Irrigation Administration
AQUILINA R. ARANETA, petitioner, assigned as instrument man at the Upper Pampanga River Project.
vs. Upon the death of her husband on April 27, 1971, she approached
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. the appellant, a hearing officer of the Workmen's Compensation
Unit at Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the procedure for filing a
claim for death compensation. Learning the requirements, she
prepared the application forms and attachments and filed them with
the Workmen's Compensation Unit at San Fernando, Pampanga.
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now
(pp. 213, TSN, October 3, 1973).
Intermediate Appellate Court, finding the accused appellant guilty of the crime of
bribery. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
After a few days, the complainant went back to San Fernando to
verify the status of her claim. She was informed that the death
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of conviction, We hereby
certificate of her husband, their marriage contract and the birth
find the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
certificates of their children were needed. She secured these
bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised
documents and brought them to San Fernando. She was told that
Penal Code; and there being no mitigating or aggravating
her claim papers had been forwarded to Cabanatuan City,
circumstances, We hereby impose upon her the penalty of
particularly to the appellant, for consolidation of the requirements.
imprisonment consisting of four (4) months and twenty-one (21)
So she went to see the appellant. (pp. 13-18, TSN, October 3,
days and a fine of P 100.00. The defendant shall also suffer the
1973).
penalty of special temporary disqualification from holding office.
With costs.
When she saw the appellant, the complainant was told that she had
to pay P 100.00 so that her claim would be acted upon. The
Atty. Aquilina Araneta was charged with violation of Section 3, Subsection B of
complainant told the appellant that she had no money then, but if
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"
the appellant would process her claim she would give her the
in an information which reads:
P100.00 upon its approval. The appellant was adamant. She would
not agree to the complainant's proposal. According to her, on
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the City of previous occasions certain claimants made similar promises but
Cabanatuan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this they failed to live up to them. (pp. 18-24, TSN, October 3,1973).
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then employed
as Hearing Officer in the Department of Labor, with station at
The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco,
Cabanatuan City, and therefore, a public officer, did then and there
erstwhile chief of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand and receive for herself
Constabulary, to inform him of the demand of the appellant. Col.
the amount of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency,
Yoyongco gave the complainant two 50-peso bills (Exhibits B and
from one Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco, as a condition and/or
B-1 ) and instructed her to go to Col. David Laureaga, Provincial
consideration for her to act on the claim for compensation benefits
Commander of Nueva Ecija, for help. (pp. 24-25, TSN, October 3,
filed by the said Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco pertaining to the
1973).
death of her husband, which claim was then pending in the office
wherein the abovenamed accused was employed and in which,
under the law, she has the official capacity to intervene. After listening to the complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt.
Carlito Carlos to entrap the appellant. The two 50-peso bills were
marked with the notations 'CC-NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2', photographed
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the respondent appellate court in
and dusted with ultra-violet powder. With this preparation, Lt.
its decision as follows:
Carlos, Sgt. Beleno, CIC Balcos and the complainant proceeded to
the office of the appellant. When they arrived thereat, the appellant
 was talking with three persons who had a hearing before her. They
allowed the three persons to finish their business with the appellant.
After the group had left, the complainant and CIC Balcos who
pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the
appellant. Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno stationed themselves outside
the room and observed events through a glass window. Aside from
the appellant, the complainant and CIC Balcos, there were three
other persons inside the office. These were Atty. Herminio Garcia,
Renato de Lara and Gregorio Ocampo. The complainant again
requested the appellant to process her claim. The appellant
countered by asking her if she already had the P100.00. In answer,
the complainant brought out the two 50-peso bills from her bag and
handed them to the appellant. As the appellant took hold of the
money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand and told her she was under
arrest. Whereupon, Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno immediately entered
the room and helped in the arrest of the appellant. (pp. 3-12, TSN,
November 6, 1973).
The appellant was brought to the PC headquarters where her
hands were examined with a special light for the presence of ultra-
violet powder. The examination was witnessed by Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Talavera. The result was positive. (pp. 12-13,
TSN, November 6, 1973).
On the other hand, the petitioner presented her own version of the facts:
On her part, the appellant testified that there was indeed an offer of
P 100.00 by the complainant. She declined the offer and never
touched the bills when they were laid on her table. If she was found
positive for ultra-violet powder, it was because CIC Balcos rubbed
the bills on her hand and dress. He did it four times once at her
office, once at the Milky way Restaurant and twice at the PC
Headquarters. (Decision, Court of Appeals, Annex "A", p. 5)
When the complainant went to the office of the appellant in
Cabanatuan City, she demanded the release of the decision of her
case, but appellant told her that she cannot do so for the reason
that she is only a hearing officer to receive evidence about the
claim for compensation due to the death of her husband, and the
real office to decide the case is that Workmen's Compensation
Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga. The complainant went to her
brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, Chief of the Criminal Investigation
Service, Philippine Constabulary, Cabanatuan City to inform him of
the demand of the appellant for P100.00. Col. Yoyongco gave
complainant two fifty (P50.00) peso bills. After listening to the
complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap
appellant by the use of fifty (P50.00) peso bills which were marked
with the notation 'CC-NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2', photographed and
dusted with ultra-violet powder, the two fifty-peso bills. After this
preparation Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno and the complainant proceeded
to the office of the complainant. When they arrived in the place the
complainant was talking to the 3 persons who had then a hearing
before her. After the appellant finished the hearing the complainant
and the CIC Balgos who pretended to be the complainant's nephew
approached the appellant. Then the complainant again requested
the appellant to process her claim by this time the complainant took
the 2 fifty-peso bills from her bag and gave to the appellant but the
appellant pushed the money, and CIC Balgos grabbed her hand
and told her appellant was under arrest. The appellant was brought
to the headquarters where her hands were examined with special
light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The examination was
witnessed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cabanatuan City
and the result was positive. (TSN, pp. 12- 13, November 6, 1973)
On the other hand, Renato de Lara, a witness for the appellant
testified that he was in the office of the appellant at the time the
incident took place and he saw the amount of P100.00 being
offered by the complainant to the appellant but the latter refused to
accept the money. When appellant refused, CIC Balgos took it,
rubbed it on the hand of the appellant and announced that he was
arresting her.
Appellant further testify (sic) that complainant offered P100.00 to
her to expedite the preparation of the decision of her claim and said
complainant put two fifty peso bills in her table after which she was
arrested and investigated and a complaint was filed against her for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After trial, the lower court convicted the petitioner as charged. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Atty. Aquiline R.
Araneta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information and hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment for
ONE (1) YEAR, with perpetual disqualification from public office,
and to pay the costs. The P100.00 consisting of two fifty-peso bills
which were marked as Exhibits 'B' and 'B-l' are hereby ordered
returned to Mrs. Gertrudes Yoyongco who owns them.
As indicated earlier, the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower
court and convicted the petitioner instead of the crime of bribery under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner now assigns the following errors:
I already stated, entrapment does not exempt the criminal from
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT EVIDENCE
DEVISED BY MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
IN CABANATUAN CITY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONER OF BRIBERY WHERE SUCH CRIME WAS NOT
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE FISCAL
AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Relative to the first error, the petitioner submits that the criminal intent originated in
the mind of the entrapping person and for which reason, no conviction can be had
against her.
This argument has no merit.
The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation, We agree with the submission of
the Solicitor General that:
xxx xxx xxx
... There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and
schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the
actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the
accused was induced to commit the crime (People vs. Galicia, [CA],
40 OG 4476). The difference in the nature of the two lies in the
origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates
from the mind of the criminal. The Idea and the resolve to commit
the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives
the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the Idea and carries it into execution.
The legal effects of entrapment and instigation are also different. As
liability. Instigation does.
Even more emphatic on this point is People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng (56 Phil.
44) where this Court ruled that the mere fact that the Chief of Customs Secret Service
pretended to agree to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the
customs house, in order to assure the seizure of the said opium and the arrest of its
importers is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter. In that case, this
Court quoted with approval 16 Corpus Juris, p. 88, Sec. 57, which states that:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.- While it has been said that
the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of
instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while
instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been
condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from
being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense
to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
'decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that
class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield
defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the
influence of the instigation of the detective. ...
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that she was denied due
process of law because she was not charged with bribery in the information but for a
crime falling under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Again, this argument is erroneous. The contention of the petitioner was squarely
answered in United States vs. Panlilio (28 Phil. 608) where this Court held that the
fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of Act No. 1760 does not
prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal
Code. To the same effect is our ruling in United States vs. Guzman (25 Phil. 22)
where the appellant was convicted of the crime of estafa in the lower court, but on
appeal, he was instead convicted of the crime of embezzlement of public funds as
defined and penalized by Act No. 1740.
As long as the information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of bribery and
the facts proved during the trial show its having been committed beyond reasonable
doubt, an error in the designation of the crime's name is not a denial of due process.
In United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. 740), this Court held that:
The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony
of credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred,
show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted
bribery, as defined in article 387, in connection with Article 383 of
the Penal Code, has been committed, it being immaterial whether it
is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act No. 355 of the
Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as the same
recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of
bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid articles of the
Penal Code.
Our review of this decision shows that the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED without costs.
Considering however, that this case has been pending since 1971, that the amount
involved is only P100.00 and that the defendant-appellant is a mother of four, it is
recommended that the petitioner either be granted executive clemency or be given
the privilege of probation if she is qualified.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Ministry of Justice for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 146309. July 18, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROBERTO MENDOZA
PACIS, appellant.
Entrapment is a legally sanctioned method resorted to by the police for the
purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plans.
Bare denials by the accused cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the
arresting officers performance of official functions.
The Case
Roberto Mendoza Pacis appeals the August 18, 2000 Decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 265) in Criminal Case No. 6292-D, in which he
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua after being found guilty of violating Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act 6425 (RA 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA
7659).
The Information dated June 3, 1998, and signed by State Prosecutor Marilyn
RO. Campomanes, charged appellant as follows:
That on the afternoon of April 07, 1998, inside Unit #375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street,
Valle Verde II, Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above
named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute
and dispatch 497.2940 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known
as SHABU, a regulated drug to undercover NBI agents who acted as poseur-buyer[s],
without the corresponding license, and/or prescription to sell, distribute and dispatch
the aforementioned regulated drug, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of
the Philippines.[2]
During his arraignment on July 30, 1998, appellant refused to plead despite the
assistance of counsel.[3] Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered for him. [4] After due
trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the [a]ccused, ROBERTO
MENDOZA PACIS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Section 15, Article III [of] Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No,
7650, and hereby SENTENCES him to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), plus the cost of suit.
The Shabu, subject matter of the Information in this case, is hereby ordered
FORFEITED in favor of the [g]overnment and ordered TURNED OVER to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal as provided by law. [5]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
 The prosecutions version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) as follows:[6]
On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent of the Dangerous Drugs
Division-National Bureau of Investigation, received information that a certain Roberto
Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-half (1/2) kilogram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu for the amount of nine hundred fifty pesos (P950.00) per gram
or a total of four hundred seventy five thousand pesos (P475,000.00). The NBI Chief
of the Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and
Senior Agent Midgonio S. Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case.
In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon and the informant
went to the house of appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II,
Pasig City. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to appellant as interested buyer. They
negotiated the sale of one-half (1/2) kilogram of shabu. The total price was reduced to
four hundred fifty thousand pesos (P450,000.00). It was agreed that payment and
delivery of shabu would be made on the following day, at the same place.
On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI agents and the informant went
to appellants house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag with markings yellow
cab. When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found a transparent plastic bag with white
crystalline substance inside. While examining it, appellant asked for the
payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior Agent Congzon to get the money from the
car. When Senior Agent Congzon returned, he gave the boodle money to Atty. Yap
who then handed the money to the appellant. Upon appellants receipt of the payment,
the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him.
Per instruction of Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon transmitted the shabu to the
Forensic Chemistry Laboratory for examination.
NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosales testified that on April 8, 1998, she received
the specimen from Senior Agent Congzon together with the letter request. The
specimen weighed 497.292940 grams. After examination, the specimen was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, presents the following version of the facts: [7]
Accused-appellant, ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS is a legitimate businessman
having been engaged in the sale of imported automotive for quite a long time. On
April 6, 1998, he was in his house at 375 Caimito Street, Caimito Ville, Valle Verde II,
Pasig City. In the afternoon of April 6, 1998, he was in Caloocan City in Dome Street,
in the house of defense witness Ramon Ty. He was there to pick-up witness Ty
because they had an agreement that he was to bring him to far away Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. They left right after lunch at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. Witness
Ty mentioned to him that they were to meet Mr. Andrada and Dr. Lachica. They
reached Pangasinan at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon.They saw the persons they
were supposed to meet in Urdaneta, Pangasinan and after seeing those persons,
they stayed overnight. In his address at Valle Verde II, accused-appellant had a live-in
partner named ANNIE GONZALES. He was a car owner and had a former driver
named Rey, who drove for him for less than a year. He had to dismiss his driver Rey
because he was always late or would be absent for work without informing him ahead
of time. After staying overnight in far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan, they left for Manila
on April 7, 1998 at 7:00 oclock in the morning. When they reached Manila proper, he
dropped off witness Ramon Ty in his house at Caloocan. Then, he went straight home
to Valle Verde to take a nap. At more or less 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 7,
1998, he was at home at Valle Verde, together with his live-in partner, ANNIE
GONZALES. Later that afternoon, three (3)-armed persons entered his condominium
unit. There was a commotion downstairs and his live-in partner Annie Gonzales
opened the door and he was awakened.Annie told him that there were three (3)
people with guns looking for him and they went up to the room right away. The three-
armed men told him that they were NBI agents but did not show any
identification. Agent Justo Yap, Jr. was one of them. Agent Congzon Jr. was also one
of them, but NBI Special Investigator Larosa was not one of them. When they entered
the room, the gun of NBI Agent Yap was already pointed at him while the two (2)
other agents were holding the butts of their guns. They were in civilian clothes. They
told him to step-out and that they were looking for [s]habu. They were not able to find
any in his room or downstairs. When they were looking for the [s]habu, the accused
appellant responded WHAT SHABU? What [s]habu are you looking for? When he
stepped out of the room to go down to the living room, he saw his former driver Rey
together with his father. Rey[,] as stated before was his former driver and he had seen
the father of Rey once or twice before. Rey and his father were also in the living
room. A paper bag with the lettering CAB was presented to the accused appellant in
his house. He noticed that the bag came from Rey and was hiding it behind him when
he gave it to agent Yap. Agent Yap got it from the cabinet near the kitchen. Agent Yap
wanted him to admit that it belongs to him and that it came from his
condominium. Agent Yap also showed him the bag with white powder and what was
shown to him was a white substance in powdery form. After it was shown to him and
he was asked to admit that it was taken from his place, he and his live-in partner
ANNIE GONZALES were brought to the NBI at Taft Avenue. He did not see Rey and
his father anymore at the NBI Office. When they were at the NBI, the Agents asked
the accused-appellant to admit that the shabu was taken from his apartment. He told
them that it was not from his apartment. Agent Yap told him that if he will not admit he
will stay in jail longer or will be put behind bars. The accused appellant was brought to
the NBI Headquarters on April 7, 1998. When he was taken from his house by the
three NBI Agents, he was not informed or appraised of his constitutional rights such
as the right to counsel and to remain silent. The same thing is true when he was
brought to the NBI Headquarters, where he was not appraised of these basic
rights. When he was asked to admit that the shabu was taken from his place, he told
them that it was not from him and asked why [they were] doing [this] to him. The NBI
Agents insisted that he is hard-headed and if he would just follow them he will be free
if he will tell the source of the shabu. There were no statements taken from the
accused-appellant in the afternoon of April 7, 1998; no statements were also taken
from him in the morning of April 8, 1998. The agents were trying to negotiate with
him. The negotiation was such that if he cannot produce the source of the
contraband, then he had to produce P200,000.00 in order to get himself free. The NBI
Agents agreed to let Annie Gonzales go and look for money. Annie Gonzales was
able to produce only P40,000.00. It was brought back by Annie Gonzales to the NBI
on April 8, 1998 and gave the sum to Agent Yap. Agent Yap looked very disappointed
when he received the money. He said that it was not the agreement that was
made. That, the agreed price of P200,000.00 was short of P160,000.00. The
accused-appellant requested again if he could use the phone to call up his cousin J-C
Mendoza. He got in touch with his cousin, who said that he will try to get the
amount. He again requested Agent Yap if he could allow Annie Gonzales [to] go to his
cousin and see if there was cash that she can get. Annie Gonzales was allowed to
leave again but the P160,000.00 was not produced. Annie Gonzales did not come
back anymore because she was not able to produce the money. She did not show up
anymore at the NBI Headquarters because she will be detained together with him
(accused-appellant).
Defense witness Ramon V. Ty corroborated, on all material points, the testimony of
the accused-appellant. He was the driver of Joey Albert, the singer, for three (3) years
more or less. He knows accused-appellant because he is the brother-in-law of Joey
Albert. He first met Roberto Mendoza Pacis at his house, when he together with
Vicente Pacis, husband of Joey Albert, went there. In the morning of April 6, 1998, he
was at home. In the afternoon, they left his house at around 2:00 oclock. They were
bound [for] far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan, because his physical therapist, Dr.
Lachica who resided in Pangasinan, was supposed to buy some instruments from
him. He needed the instruments to help him exercise his body even without therapy
because he had a stroke in 1993. When they reached Urdaneta, Pangasinan, he did
not see his therapist because the latter was at his cousins house. After being told
where Dr. Lachica was, they went to see him. They were able to get the gadget from
him. They went to Manila the following morning. They left at about 7:00 oclock in the
morning of April 7, 1998 and reached his house in Caloocan City at around 10:30
oclock in the morning. Whe[n] they reached Caloocan, he went home and Roberto
Mendoza Pacis said that he will also go home.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, noting that they testified in a clear and straightforward manner. It debunked
appellants defense of frame-up as it was neither substantiated nor proven. It held that
affirmative testimony, especially when it came from the mouth of a credible witness,
was far stronger than a negative one.
Hence, this appeal.[8]
The Issues
Appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:
1. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended, despite the
inherent incredibility of the NBI (National Bureau of Investigation) version of the
manner the alleged buy-bust operation was conducted.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving too much weight to the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution when their testimonies were shot with material
discrepancies and inconsistencies.
3. The lower court erred when it failed to accord full significance [of] the fact that the
informant was not presented in court when circumstances demand for his
presentation.
4. The lower court erred when it failed to give weight and credence to the alibi offered
by the accused as a defense.[9]
These issues may be summed as follows: (1) whether the buy-bust operation that
led to appellants arrest was valid, (2) whether the presentation of the informant was
necessary to prove appellants guilt, and (3) whether the trial court erred in not giving
weight and credence to appellants alibi.
This Courts Ruling
The appeal is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Validity of the Buy-Bust Operation
Claiming that he was framed by the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), appellant assails the validity of the buy-bust operation that led to his arrest.
Entrapment Distinguished
from Instigation
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other
hand, instigators practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the
offense and become co-principals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by
this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprehending
criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. [10]
A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to the arrest
of appellant was indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. The trial courts assessment
of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the highest respect, because it had the
advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a better position to discern if
they were telling the truth or not.[11] In the present case, the RTC noted that the
prosecution witnesses testified in a clear and straightforward manner in narrating the
events that had transpired before and during the buy-bust operation.
Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for
they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. [12] Accordingly,
in entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by prosecution
witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary. [13]
No Proof of Ill Motive
on the Part of NBI Agents
It is not unusual in criminal cases of this kind to have a version of the prosecution
so diametrically opposed to that of the defense. However, upon a careful perusal of the
records, we find the evidence presented by the defense to be unsound and self-serving.
Appellant did not submit any plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers to falsely impute to him a serious and unfounded charge. Where there
is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper
motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved, and that their testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.[14] The records show that appellant had a ready supply
of shabu for sale and disposition to anyone willing to pay the right price.
Elements of Crime
Duly Proven
Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to
another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous
drug.[15] These elements were duly proven in the case herein. The records show that
appellant sold and delivered the shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers. It was seized
and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence. Appellant
was likewise shown to be aware that what he was selling and delivering was a
prohibited substance.
Second Issue:
Identity of Informant Not Necessary
With respect to the informants identity, we hold that it may remain
confidential. There are strong practical reasons for keeping its secrecy, including the
continued health and safety of the informant and the encouragement of others to report
any wrongdoing to police authorities.[16] This is settled jurisprudence and we will not
belabor it here.
Third Issue:
Alibi as a Defense
On April 6, 1998, NBI agents, acting as poseur-buyers of illegal drugs, allegedly
went to the house of appellant to discuss with him preliminary arrangements for the
sale. However, Pacis disputed this allegation. To bolster his claim, he presented his
sister-in-laws driver, Ramon V. Ty, who testified that he was with the former in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan on that same day; hence, appellant could not have been with
the poseur-buyers in Manila to discuss the quantity and the price of the shabu to be
delivered the next day.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The
excuse must be so airtight that it admits of no exception.[17]
In the present case, however, we agree with the RTC that the claim of Ty was not
substantiated by the testimonies of the persons he and appellant were supposed to
have met in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
Hence, appellant was unable to disprove the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that on April 6, 1998, he was discussing the terms of the sale with the poseur-
buyers.
Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the positive identification of the accused
-- when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses -- prevails over alibi and denial which are negative and self-
serving, undeserving of weight in law.[18]
Compared with the detailed, convincing and well-documented Decision of the trial
court, appellants denial and alibi pale into insignificance.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8578 November 17, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANSELMO DIRIS, EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, and TOMAS OLEA, defendants.
ANSELMO DIRIS and EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, appellants.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
convicting the defendants of the crime of robbery.
During the pendency of the proceedings in this court the defendant Tomas Olea
withdrew his appeal and the judgment of the lower court is therefore final as to him.
The only question now presented for our consideration is the appeal of the
defendants Anselmo Diris and Eustaquio Siaga.
We are of opinion that the evidence of record fully sustains the contentions of the
prosecution and the findings of the lower court as to the facts. It will not therefore be
necessary to review the evidence in detail.
It appears that Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of Calauag, Province of
Tayabas, received from the railroad company on July 7, 1912, more than P400 in
payment of certain land expropriated by that company, and that the defendant Tomas
Olea, a nephew of Fugencio Seal, was present when the money was counted and
paid over to his uncle. The record shows that the money was deposited in a trunk and
that this fact was also known to Olea, who had free access to his uncle's house and
was accustomed to come and go at will.
On the morning of July 12, following the date of the receipt of the money from the
railroad company, Fulgencio Seal left the house between 8 and 9 o'clock in the
morning, leaving his wife in charge of their tienda. A short time thereafter the three
defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio Siaga engaged the woman in
conversation while the other two defendants went upstairs, broke open the trunk, and
took the money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for P100. The record shows that at
the time of the robbery part of the money received from the railroad company had
been paid out and that the balance in the trunk was only P353.
The woman was somewhat deaf and had no knowledge of what was taking place
upstairs. She stated that she saw the two defendants go up into the house, but as
Tomas Olea was her husband's nephew and accustomed to come to the house she
thought nothing of it. Upon the return of Fulgencio Seal later in the morning the
robbery was discovered, and when his wife reported who had been there he
immediately went in search of his nephew. The nephew when found admitted the theft
of the money and promised that if the uncle would not make any trouble about it he
would try and recover it from the other defendants. Together with Olea the uncle then
went in search of Diris. The uncle was told to wait at a certain place until the nephew
should return, and when he failed to come back the uncle went in search of him and
after found him and Diris in a barber shop in the municipality of Lopez. The matter
was reported to the justice of the peace of that municipality and the two defendants
were arrested. On the person of Tomas Olea were found two bank notes of the
denomination of P10 each, P3 in half-peso denominations, and P4 in 10-centavo
pieces.
Fulgencio Seal testified that the money in the trunk consisted of one bank notes of the
value of P200, P100 in the bank note of the value of 10 pesos each, and the
remainder in currency in P1, 50-centavo, and 10-centavo denominations, there being
P23 in 10-centavo pieces. It appears that by some error on the part of the justice of
the peace the money was returned to Olea; however, there can hardly be any doubt
that it was a part of the money which his uncle had in the trunk. At the trial the
defendants denied that they were the authors of the crime; Olea and Diris denied that
they were present at the house on the morning in question; and Eustaquio Siaga,
while admitting that he was at the tienda stated that he went there alone. The
presence of the defendants at the house on the morning in question is not only
established by the wife of Fulgencio Seal, but her testimony on this point is
corroborated by that of Conrado Fernandez, a neighbor. In view of all the facts of
record the statements of the defendants cannot be credited. Their guilt is conclusively
established.
Olea having withdrawn his appeal and the other evidence of record being sufficient in
itself to sustain the conviction of all the appellants, it is not necessary for us to discuss
the objections set forth in their brief as to the admission of the alleged confession of
guilt of Olea.lawph!1.net
It has been suggested by counsel, that the defendant Eustaquio Siaga, who remained
below in the tienda and engaged the woman in conversation while the other
defendants went up into the house, should only be held as a complice (accessary
before the fact) as defined in the Penal Code, and not as a principal. In support of this
view we are cited to Viada (Vol. I, p. 370), as follows: "The persons who entertains
the owner of a house while robbers are assaulting it, so that he will not return thereto
until after the robbery has been consummated, is also an accomplice in the crime,
inasmuch as he cooperated therein by a simultaneous act, although not an
indispensable one for its accomplishment."
It will be seen however that the case supposed by the noted commentator clearly
implies that the owner of the house was entertained at some distance from the place
where the robbery was committed; it does not appear how far away, but apparently
not anywhere in the immediate neighborhood. The present case offers a different
situation. The defendant Siaga acted concurrently with the other defendants, and
must be held to have been present with them aiding and abetting them in the
commission of the crime by remaining below and talking with the woman in order to
distract her attention from what was going on upstairs. In doing so he was evidently
serving as a guard to warn his companions in case there should arise any necessity
for giving an alarm. When the other defendants came down out of the house he went
away with them.
This court has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty purpose and aids and
abets the commission of a crime by his presence at the time of its perpetration, even
though he may not have taken an active part in its material execution, is guilty as a
principal. We have also held that one who stands as guard near the place where a
crime is committed to keep others away or to warn his companions and fellow
conspirators of danger of discovery, takes a direct part in the commission of the crime
and is therefore guilty as a principal under article 13 of the Penal Code (U. S. vs.
Reogilon and Dingle, 22 Phil. Rep., 127; U. S. vs. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep., 545; U. S.
vs. Ramos, 4 Phil. Rep., 555.)
Under all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that Siaga was properly
convicted as a principal.
It appears that the trial court treated the stolen receipts for P100 as being of that
value. The actual money stolen amounted to only P353.
While we have held that checks, warrants and similar instrument, payable to order an
evidencing an obligation to pay money, may under certain circumstances be treated
as worth their face value in fixing the value of the stolen property for the purpose of
grading the crime and the penalty to be imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the
penalty prescribed in the Code is made to depend on the value of the property taken
(U. S. vs. Raboy, 25 Phil. Rep., 1; U. S. vs. Wickersham, 20 Phil. Rep., 440), we are
of opinion that a mere receipt such as that under consideration, especially in the
absence of any proof as to its value, cannot be held to have anything more than a
mere nominal value in fixing the penalty and assessing the civil indemnity to be
imposed on one convicted of its theft.
The record further shows that Anselmo Diris is a recidivist, having been previously
convicted of the crime of robbery by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in the case
of the United States vs. Anselmo Diris, on April 12, 1904, which judgment of
conviction was affirmed by this Court on May 9, 1905 (4 Phil. Rep., 498).
The judgment of the trial court should be modified, in so far as it affects these
appellants, by reducing the amount of the civil indemnification from P453 to P353 and
by substituting the words presidio mayor for the words prision mayor in the dispositive
part thereof, and thus modified the judgment convicting and sentencing the appellants
Diris and Siaga should be and is hereby affirmed, with a proportionate share of the
costs of this instance against each of the appellants.
G.R. No. L-39086 October 26, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ONG CHIAT LAY, ET AL., defendants.
ONG CHIAT LAY, appellant.
Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly informed against
by the provincial fiscal of Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a
building in which was located a store belonging to the appellant. Upon a plea of "not
guilty," appellant and his codefendants were tried jointly upon said information; and,
after trial, while Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing were acquitted, appellant was found
guilty of the crime of arson and sentenced to suffer sixteen years and one day
of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
Francisco Barrios and Mariano Atienza in the sums of P16,000 and P5,000,
respectively, and to pay one-third of the costs.
In support of this appeal, appellant has signed the following errors:
First. The lower court erred in holding that evidence presented against the
accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, namely, that
the crime of arson had been committed.
Second. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented against
the accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish his guilt of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it must be
shown either (1) that he took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that
he directly forced or induced another or others to commit it; or (3) that he cooperated
in the commission of the offense by an act without which it would not have been
accomplished. (Revised Penal Code, article 17.) They take direct part in the execution
of a criminal act who, participating in the criminal design, proceed to carry out their
plan and personally take part in its execution by acts which directly tend to the same
end. (Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's Revised Penal Code Ann.,
144.)
In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a direct part in the
burning of the building. In fact, the prosecution lays stress on appellant's absence
from the scene of the fire as one of the suspicious circumstances indicating his guilt.
Appellant was prosecuted on the theory that he induced his said codefendants to set
fire to the building. Hence the three were charged jointly on an information alleging
conspiracy among them. This allegation of conspiracy, however, has been negatived
by the acquittal of appellant's codefendants. The same may be said with regard to the
theory that appellant had induced his codefendants to perpetrate the unlawful deed;
for it seems clear that one can not be held guilty of having instigated the commission
of a crime without its first being shown that the crime has been actually committed by
another.
In acquitting Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, the lower court said: "Pero las prueblas de
la acusacion, a juicio del Juzgado, no establecen que los acusados Ong Ban Hua y
Kua Sing hayan cooperado directa o indirectamente a su coacusado Ong Chiat Lay
en la comision del delito. Las pruebas indiciarias presentadas contra los referidos
acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing no pueden producir mas que mera sospecha de
que dichos acusados tuvieron conocimiento de lo que habia realizado Ong Chiat Lay,
pero esta sospecha no puede servirse de base para una sentencia condenatoria, y
por ende se debe absolver a los mismos acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing de la
querella."
While not exactly in point, the principle discussed in State vs. Tom (13 N. C. [2 Dev.
L., 569), is pertinent to the question now under consideration. In that case, the court
held that although more than two persons are charged with conspiracy, the acquittal
of all but one of those charged amounts to the acquittal of that one, since there can
be no conspiracy unless at least two unite. Ruffin, J., therein said: "Conspiracy being
a crime, requiring the guilty cooperation of two, at least, to constitute it, in which there
is a mutual dependence of the guilt of each person upon that of the other, principle
would seem to demand that all the accused should be jointly tried and convicted, or
acquitted. In other cases of dependent crimes, that upon which the rest depends must
be first established. Such is the law between principal and accessory. The reason is
that there may be as full defense as possible upon the very point of the principal's
guilt, by that principal himself who is best able to make it. To make that rule effectual,
it became necessary to establish another that, but by the accessory's own consent,
no proof of the principal's guilt should be heard against him until it was first
established against the principal himself. The rule arises out of the nature of
dependent criminality. Now conspirators may be said to be co-principals. The guilt of
both must concur to constitute that of either; and it must consists of a joint act, and it
makes one crime in both. As the trial of one need not precede ha of the other, the trial
of both ought to be concurrent. I think it more than probable that anciently such was
the course. But, clearly, now it is otherwise. There are many precedents of the
separate trial of person indicted for offences that could not be committed by less than
two. (. . . Rex vs. Kinnersly [1719], 1 Strange, 193; Rex vs. Niccolls [1745], 2 Strange,
1227.) It is too late now to question it. But it can never follow from those cases that
where one of the persons, the establishment of whose guilt is essential to the
conviction of the other, has been legally acquitted, the other does no hereby become
discharged. It cannot be that a man can be held guilty to any purpose who has, in due
course of law, been found not guilty. The analogy between this case and that of the
accessory is strict. The acquittal of the principal is an immediate and absolute
discharge of the accessory. For there can be no aid given to a deed when the deed
itself was never perpetrated. So, where guilt consists in the joint act or intent of two,
and it is found that one of them did not join in the act or intent, it is conclusive as to
both. For A could not conspire with B if the latter did not conspire at all. In all the
cases, therefore, a verdict affirming the guilt of fewer persons than could commit the
crime, and affirming the innocence of all others charged, has been held to be an
acquittal of all." (4 B. R. C., 930.)
While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a distinct offense, it
is clear from the nature of the evidence presented that appellant alone could not have
committed the unlawful act. As already stated, the theory of the prosecution was that
he conspired with or induced his codefendants to commit the crime. The gravamen of
the charge was conspiracy, and the acquittal of his codefendants is clearly
inconsistent with appellant's guilt.
This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of this case. Appellant was
convicted wholly on circumstancial evidence. As stated in the decision of the trial
court: "Las pruebas de la acusacion son todas indiciarias, que son las que siempre se
presentan para probar esta clase de delito, porque su autor o autores ordinariamente
no lo practican en presencia de un trercero." Continuing, the court further said: "El
traslado de los muebles del acusado Ong Chiat Lay a varios sitios antes de occurrir
este incendio, su indiferencia a todo lo que ocurria en la madrugada de autos, su
ausencia del lugar donde estaba instalado su bazar mientras ardia el edificio ocupado
por este, y el hecho de no haberse negado que fuera el el autor del incendio ante el
teniente Piccio, son pruebas indiciaras muy fuertes contra este acusado. El hecho de
que se olia a gasolina dentro de la casa ocupada por el establecimiento "China
Bazaar" en la ocasion en que el repetido Ong Chiat Lay transladaba sus muebles y
su residencia a otro sitio, y el haber sido encontradas varias latas de petroleo o
gasolina vacias en el mismo terreno donde estuvo levantada dicha casa
inmediatamente despues de occurrir el incendio de esta, son tambien pruebas
indiciarias muy fuertes contra el susodicho acusado Ong Chiat Lay. Todas estas
pruebas apreciadas en su conjunto constituyen una evidencia clara de la culpabilidad
del acusado Ong Chiat Lay."
It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for crime can not be had
unless the corpus delicti is first established. (State vs. Sullivan, 17 L. R. A., 902.) To
establish the corpus delicti in arson the proof of two elements is required, namely, (1)
the burning of the house or other thing, and (2) the criminal agency in causing it.
(Spears vs. State, 16 L.R.A. [N. S.}, 285.) The corpus delicti may be proved by
circumstancial evidence. (State vs. Sullivan, supra.) However: "Before a conviction
can be had upon circumstancial evidence, the circumstances proven should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion,
which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. It is
indispensable that the evidence be derived from interrelated facts and duly proven in
a manner that will lead to a logical and rational conclusion, beyond all reasonable
doubt, that the accused is the author of the crime. In other words, there must be from
all the circumstances, a combination of evidence which, in the ordinary and natural
course of things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused."
(Moran, The Law of Evidence, 453; numerous cases cited in support of the text.)
While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise grave suspicions
against the appellant, they fall far short of establishing his guilt clearly and
satisfactorily, as required by the well-settled rules of evidence. This court held in
United States vs. Levente (18 Phil., 439), that to warrant a conviction upon
circumstancial evidence, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. The chain of circumstances which would have pointed
to the appellant as the guilty person was broken by the acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and
Kua Sing. As already explained, the acquittal of his said codefendants is not only
consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is innocent, but is inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is guilty.lIt results that the judgment appealed from must be
reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant.
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder, and
sentencing him to be hanged.
The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman of
Parang. He is alleged to have committed the murder by inducement. The proofs
tend to demonstrate that on the 24th day of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk
to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The following day, Induk, in
obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the house, whereupon the accused
ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in
the presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in the room.
This was about 4:30 in the afternoon. Sariol remained there with his hands tied
behind his back until night, when the accused, in the presence of several
witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese cemetery and there killed,
the accused asserting at the time that he had an order to that effect from the
governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the time
that Sariol was killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure of the
work being well done, the accused ordered Akiran to take his (the accused's)
bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the cemetery, in an
isolated spot a considerable distance from the road and about 200 yards from the
nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the first blow with his bolo, while
Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time he was killed
had his hands tied behind his back. On returning to the house of the accused
after the death of Sariol, Unding told the accused that Sariol had been killed,
whereupon the accused said that it was all right and appeared to be very much
pleased.
The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused was the recognized
headman of Parang, and it appears from the testimony of the witnesses,
Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran, that he had a very powerful influence over them,
hence this power over them was such that any order issued by him had the force
and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the witnesses testified: "He (the
accused) knows what is good and what is bad, and he is the headman of the
governor. He is headman of Parang." And in answer to the question, "He is the
biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied: "There is none, only himself." He
further said: "The people do not hesitate to take his orders because he is the
headman of the governor." Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to get angry
with the people, what would he do to them?" this witnesses answered: "I do not
know; might kill them." Another witness, answering the question as to why he did
not run away instead of going to the Chinese cemetery as the accused ordered
him, answered: "The reason why I did not run away, well, take the same thing as
the Government soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they do it." Prior to this
time the same witness had said: "If a chief says anything to a man like me and
tells me it is by order of the governor and that he has a warrant there, well, a man
like me does what he tells me." Another witness declared: "I am afraid of him. I
did not believe that he would make me do anything unjust." The same witness
afterwards testified in answer to the question: "Would you have killed this man if
any other person besides Panglima, the headman, had ordered you to ?" "I would
not." Another witness declared: "Well, he was the headman. It was the
headman's orders, and if we did not do it, he would get angry with us." This
witness, answering the question, "Did Panglima make you think that he was
acting under the orders of the Government in causing this man to be killed?"
testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the question, "And you thought that
it was a legal execution, did you?" answered, "Yes, because he (the accused) is
not afraid of the governor."
We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons who,
at his orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him responsible for
whatever they did in obedience to such orders.
Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a
crime "who directly force or induce others to commit it."
Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:
They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or
grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening
means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on
paragraph 9 of article 8 (page 28), we have already said that he who
suffers violence acts without will and against his will, is no more than an
instrument, and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such
case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those
who force the other to commit the crime.
One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for
a consideration, or by any other similar act which constitutes the real and
moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of
inducing such criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose. We have
already seen in our commentary on paragraph 12 of article 8 that the
one who physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility
by showing that he acted with due obedience to an order; in such case
the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the one who orders, that is,
upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to commit
the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior is not due to the
superior and therefore not necessary, and does not, therefore, exempt
him from criminal responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he
who thus, by his command, directly induced him to the criminal act is
considered by the law also as principal in the crime.
 The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand
which commits the crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the
consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because
without such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been
committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually commits
the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is
exempted from criminal responsibility; on the contrary, we have already
seen in our comments on paragraph 3 of article 10 that such
circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime.
We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and
the pacto there are similar means by which another may be induced to
commit a crime which also make the one who offers the inducement the
principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of article 13, paragraph
2. But it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not
consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or
in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice
and such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement
condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of
the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary
that such advice or such words have a great dominance and great
influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct,
as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence
itself.
The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain illustrate the principles
involved and their application to particular cases:
It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that one who, during a riot
in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab
him!", it not appearing that he did anything more than say these words except to
be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement, the
court saying that, "considering that, although the phrases pronounced were
imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be
considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede
the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it the act would not have been performed."
In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle was laid down that
"a person who advised a married woman whose husband was very stingy and
treated her badly that the only thing for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of
the crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason that imprudent and ill-
conceived advice is not sufficient."
In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883, it was held that a father who simply
said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit
him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given,
under the facts presented. The court said: "It being held in mind that the
inducement to the commission of the crime by means of which a person may be
considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes the act itself can
only be founded in commands, sometimes in advice, in considerations, or by
inducement so powerful that it alone produces the criminal act. None of these
characteristics pertain to the words of Miguel Perez, inasmuch as the
circumstances which surrounded the event at the time do not appear in sufficient
detail to show with clearness the effects which the words produced, or the
relative situation of the deceased and of the one who killed him, or the point to
which the fight had progressed at the time the words were spoken. Moreover, the
decision of the court below does not show sufficient facts upon which to affirm
that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke
the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced him to use said
weapon."
In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held that the fact "of
having proposed to other persons the abstraction of the tickets which were the
subject matter of the robbery, at the same time telling them the place where they
were to be found, does not constitute inducement to commit the robbery because
the proposal to commit the robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to be the
cause of the crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been committed
without it; nor was the indication of the place where the money was to be found a
sufficient motive to induce the robbery."
The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose of showing
concrete cases in which the acts of the accused were not sufficient, as a matter
of law, to constitute inducement. They not only lay down the legal principles
which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also illustrate in the most
valuable way the application of those principles to actual cases.
The following decisions of the same court present instances in which the acts of
the accused constitute inducement under the law and illustrate the application of
the principles to concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by the court were: "It
appeared that Lulu, who was living with Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the
town of X, gave birth to a child on the morning of the 28th of March, the offspring
of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously agreed upon by the first
three named to deliver the child to William as soon as it was born, with
instructions to deposit it in some frequented place so that it might be found and
taken up; but Joe changed his mind and handed the child over to the father,
telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it whatever you please; throw it into the
sea if you choose to,' which the latter actually did." Under the facts the accused
was held guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of January, 1873, it was held that "a
woman who, living with a man in scandalous concubinage in the presence of a
daughter who continually manifested her disgust and repugnance for such
conduct, conceived against the daughter the most profound hatred and
conceived the purpose of killing her by most insidious methods, obtaining for that
purpose poison and various deadly weapons, and contriving that she and her
family and all of the tenants in the house should go to the theater on an evening
during which the daughter was sick and obliged to remain at home, in order that
her lover might be entirely undisturbed in killing the daughter and that he might
not be surprised in the act, such woman is the author and principal of the crime
the same as her lover who actually committed the deed."
In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one who takes
advantage of his position as an inspector for the maintenance of public peace
and proposes to a private citizen the perpetration of a robbery, with the threat
that unless he did commit the robbery he would be arrested as an escaped
prisoner, at the same time offering to withdraw the officers from the vicinity of the
place to be robbed, and who after the robbery received a part of the booty, was
guilty of the crime as principal, although he did not take personal part therein."
In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an alcalde of a barrio
who, accompanied by a number of peace officers, ordered them to stop certain
music that was being played in the public street, and after the order had been
obeyed and the music stopped one of the persons expressed his resentment
against the act whereupon the alcalde ordered the peace officers to attack the
man, which they did, inflicting upon him various wounds, was guilty of the crime
of lesiones graves by inducement."
In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a father who from the
balcony of his house cried out in a loud voice to his sons who were fighting with
others to kill those with whom they were fighting before they were killed
themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big thing as a little, was
guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by inducement by reason of the injuries
inflicted under such orders."
In a decision of the 22nd day of December, 1883, the court said, "that the
inducement and the commission of a crime whereby the inducer becomes a
principal to the same extent and effect as if he had physically committed the
crime exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or agreement for a
consideration, or through influence so effective that it alone determines the
commission of the crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid down the proposition
that the secretary of the ayuntamiento who induced a certain persons to form
new lists of compromisarios five days prior to the election of senators was guilty
as principal of the crime against the election lists, saying: "It appearing and it
being a fact proved that the secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel
Antonio Dura, induced the members of the council to commit the act stated, his
participation as principal in the commission of the act is well established
according to the provisions of paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code,
because such inducement coming from a person of such influence as the
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be considered sufficiently
dominant to turn the mind of those induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was held that a woman
who was at enmity with an uncle for having refused to renounce in her favor a
donation which a relative had given to him, who made frequent threats to kill the
uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum of money together with
the land involved in the donation if he would kill the uncle, and who told her son
that, if they were unable to get anybody else to kill the uncle, he must do it
himself as he would thus inherit 15,000pesetas with which they could flee
abroad, and in case he refused to do it he must leave the house because he was
a coward, was guilty as principal of the crime of murder committed by the son
under such inducement. The court said: "It being borne in mind that the
suggestions with which the mother moved the mind of her son to kill the uncle
had the force of a real inducement and inclined and decided the will of the son by
means of the relations which she bore to him as well as the reward which she
held up before him."
In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that finding as principal in a
crime, him who, "by direct and influential means and taking advantage of the
inexperience of a boy of tender age," induces him to commit a crime, was
warranted by law, the court saying that "in view of the fact that the inducement
exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to the boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the
jewels in question from his grandmother's house shows such a direct and
inducing cause of the criminal act that without such inducement the crime would
not have been committed."
In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement
referred to in paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code exists whenever the act
performed by the physical author of the crime is determined by the influence of
the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act, whatever be the source of
such influence."
In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it was declared that one was the
"principal by inducement in five different larcenies, it having been proved that the
inducer, knowing that the oil which was brought to her for sale was stolen by the
persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them thereupon to continue
stealing oil and furnished them vessels in which to carry it and contributed on five
different occasions to the realization of the larcenies, it appearing that the
physical authors of the crime were boys under 15 years of age and that they
acted upon the suggestions of the inducer without discernment or judgment of
their own," the court saying that in view of the fact that she knew that the oil
which she first purchased from the boys was stolen oil, that the boys were less
than 15 years of age, and therefore easily led, that she furnished the vessels in
which to carry the stolen property — all indicate conclusively that the five crimes
were committed by the influence exercised by the woman, which inducement was
not merely that of favoring the execution of the crime but was that which
determined its commission."
In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that the command of a
master to his servant, by reason of the special relations which exist between
them, contains the elements of inducement which makes the master who orders
such servant to cut wood belonging to a third person, in order that he might
benefit thereby, the principal of the crime committed by such servant," the court
saying that "in view of the fact that the command of the master to the servant,
made within the sphere and under the ordinary conditions of domestic life, when
they relate to acts simple and apparently legitimate, contains the necessary
elements, directly and sufficiently efficacious, of inducement according to the
provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, it appearing that the
master, taking advantage of the ascendency and authority which he naturally
must exercise over his servant or inferior, ordered him to cut and carry away
wood from land which he knew did not belong to him, without disclosing to the
servant that circumstance, which concealment gave rise to the influence which
the master exercised over the servant in that particular act."
The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands apply the
foregoing principles to particular cases.
In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that
one of the defendants conceived the idea of the robbery of a warehouse and
assisted in procuring false keys with which to open it. He took no immediate part
in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion said:
These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt
of the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein
prosecuted. From him came the initiative in the robbery; he was the first
to conceive the idea of its commission, and, being unable or unwilling to
carry it out himself, he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material
execution of the crime by a promise to pay him P16 for each case of
whisky that he was able to steal. The better to induce him to commit the
offense, he clearly demonstrated how easily it could be accomplished,
instructed him as to the best means of carrying it out, and offered him
money to pay for the false key. He thus removed all the difficulties in the
way of determination to execute, and the actual execution of the robbery
in question. These acts constitute a real inducement made directly for
the commission of the said robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in
the position of principal in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of
the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that
the accused induced certain Igorrotes to kill a third person by holding up before
them the fact that by such act they would be able to obtain P40 which was then in
the house of the victim, as well as the carabao which he owned, saying to them,
"If you go to work you only make a little; it is better to kill this man and take his
carabao and the P40 which was received from the sale of the house in town."
They having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the proposed victim
and having returned and explained why they had not been able to kill them, the
accused said to them: "Why did you eat my chickens if you are not going to do
what I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in Cambaguio because I
thought you were going to kill them." The Igorrotes then spent three days clearing
some land for another person from whom they received P2.25. About noon of the
third day of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now you must
repeat what I told you to do, and comply with our agreement; I am going to
Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and
conceal yourselves in the same place you were concealed before." The murder
was committed as proposed. Upon these facts and inducer of the crime, and that
he was liable as principal. (Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of
January, 1887, 12th of January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared
that the accused had a conversation with Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the
accused asked him if he knew Antonio Gavato and his associates, to which he
replied in the negative. The defendant then said: "I wish to confer upon you a
commission, which is as follows: Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of
Gavato, and when you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was
reluctant to obey this order, but defendant gave him something to eat and drink
until he became intoxicated, and then he gave him a bolo and P10 and said:
"Comply with what I have ordered and in case you incur any responsibility I will
be responsible to the court, and as soon as you wound any person or persons,
return to me and I will defend you." The court held that these facts constituted
sufficient inducement to bring the accused within the provisions of article 13,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:
Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman,
and more or less dependent upon his uncle for subsistence. On the
other hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when this crime was committed, a
man of great influence in Escalante. He had a great number of people
working for him, one of whom was his nephew Mauricio. He was the
local political leader of his party. One of his nephews was president of
the town. He had two brothers-in-law in the municipal council. Of his
nephews, one was chief of police and two others were members of the
police force. He had acquired, as we have said, a bitter hatred toward
the Roman Catholic Church and the Spanish friars and priests. He called
a meeting in his own house on the afternoon of May 15, where the
question of murdering the priest was discussed. He was the prime mover
in this meeting. He dominated all who were present. He selected his
nephew Mauricio to commit the crime and directed him to do it. Mauricio,
immediately after murdering the priest, returned to the house of his uncle
Gil and reported the fact. The influence exercised by Gil Gamao over his
nephew was so great and powerful that the latter, through fear, could not
resist it. That Mauricio was directly induced to murder the priest by his
uncle Gil we think there can be no question.
In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was
held that the "one who employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as
a principal, although he does nothing himself in the actual commission of the
crime."
In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared that
"a married woman suggested to her paramour, with whom she had been
maintaining illicit relations that he kill her husband in order that thereafter they
might live together freely. The paramour acting upon these suggestions and
actuated by a desire to possess the woman for himself without the interference of
the husband, killed him. The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their escape
and lived together as man and wife until the time of ] their arrest." Upon these
facts the court said:
We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is
fully established por pacto (for a consideration); that is to say, on the
understanding that the woman would live in illicit relations with the
murderer after the death of her husband; and por precepto (by precept)
which constituted "a real, intentional, direct and efficacious exciting
inducement (excitacion) to commit the crime." The propositions and
suggestions of the woman constituted something more than mere
counsel or advice which her co-defendant was entirely free to accept or
not, in that they were coupled with a consideration which, in view of the
relations existing between them, furnished a motive strong enough to
induce the man to take the life of her husband; and for the further reason
that due to these illicit relations she had required such an influence over
her co-defendant that her insistent suggestions that he commit the crime
had a marked and controlling influence upon his mind.
In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that
the accused proposed to his companions an assault upon the house of Francisco
Tolosa; that armed with a talibon he accompanied them during the assault; that,
while the assault was being made, he stood watch at the foot of the stairs of said
house so that his companions would not be caught, and that, finally, he
accompanied them to the place where the deceased was killed. These facts were
held by the court to be sufficient to make the accused a principal by inducement
as well as by direct participation.
In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a
command. There does not seem to have existed, however, any official relation
between the accused and the persons whom he induced to kill Sariol. While he
appears to have been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced held no
official position under him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedience.
According to tradition and custom, however, the headman seems to have been a
person whose word was law and whose commands were to be obeyed.
Moreover, the accused represented to those who physically committed the crime
that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts
committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey the commands of
the Government. This representation was false, but it produced the same effect
as if it had been true. It cannot be doubted that the accused knew the
representation was false and purposely and intentionally made it as an additional
factor going to insure obedience to his orders.
Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the acts
of the accused within the definition of inducement by command, and we do not
believe there is, there would still remain all of the elements necessary to qualify
the crime as murder by inducement. From the authorities heretofore cited and the
principles laid down therein as those which must govern in the determination of
whether or not the acts of an accused constitute inducement under the law, it
may be stated as a general proposition that, where the inducement offered by the
accused is of such a nature and made in such a way that it becomes the
determining cause of the crime, and such inducement was offered with the
intention of producing that result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of the
crime committed by the person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be
intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in
view.
The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where
there exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most
persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation, as
well as words or acts which are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of
reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or
temptation. A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a
situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or
even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent reason
predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act
having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real
intention that it produce a result. In such case, while the expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the
crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to concrete
cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made
directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such
inducement must be the determining cause of the crime.
In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to the
persons who actually committed the crime that he had an order from the
Government requiring the death of Sariol and that they were under obligation to
carry out that order. It is clear from the evidence that this inducement was offered
by the accused directly to the persons interested with the intention of moving
them to do his bidding, and that such representation was the moving cause of the
fatal act. While it may be said, and is true, that the personal commands of the
accused were entirely sufficient to produce the effects which actually resulted
and that such commands may be considered the moving cause of the crime, still
there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the representation that the accused
had in his possession an order from the Government commanding the death of
Sariol was also of material influence in effecting the death; and where two
fundamental causes work together for the production of a single result and one of
those causes would lead to a conviction upon one theory and the other upon
another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder. There were
present, also, the aggravating circumstances of desplobado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court below is well founded,
and we accordingly affirm the same, with costs.
G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO
CORTESANO,
Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao finding
them guilty of frustrated homicide, with the aggravating circumstance that
advantage was taken of their superior strength, and sentencing each of them to
suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years of prision correccional to twelve
years of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel Pulido jointly and severally in the sum
of P540, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
corresponding costs.
The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the defendants is that the
lower court erred in convicting the appellants, and in not acquitting them with the
costs de oficio.
The first question to be considered is the participation of the several defendants
in the commission of the crime.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion, and
Agapito Cortesano were working on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under
the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer or
manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the gross receipts. The four
defendants lived together in a house on the plantation.
Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road through the
plantation. According to the offended party he refused to grant this request
because there was already an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine on the other hand
contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission requested and he began
work on December 24, 1933. When Angel Pulido and his son, Hilario,
accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by the name of Barabadan, were
returning home from the cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable
number of hemp plants had been destroyed for the purpose of opening a new
road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel Pulido and his party
went to the house of the defendants, who had just finished their supper. There is
a sharp conflict in the evidence as to what followed. The witnesses for the
prosecution contend that while the offended party was talking with Omine,
Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, but was prevented by Hilario Pulido; that
Eduardo Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not wound him except
on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano then held Angel Pulido
by the arms, and when Eduardo Autor approached, Omine shouted to
him "pegale y matale", and Autor struck Angel Pulido in the breast with his bolo.
Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the other hand maintain
that the offended party and his son were the aggressors; that the first to arrive
was Hilario Pulido, who after applying to Kiichi Omine an offensive epithet and
asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants, struck him in the breast with
brass knuckles; that when Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, Angel Pulido
and his son attacked him their fists, Hilario Pulido him on the right cheek with
brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano ran away before Angel
Pulido was wounded by Eduardo Autor; that Kiichi Omine never uttered the
words attributed to him or urged Autor to strike Angel Pulido.
The only eyewitness for the prosecution were the offended party and his son, and
a Bagobo, named Saito, who was their relative and lived with them. Barabadan
was not presented as a witness. The witnesses for the defense were the four
appellants.
The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it was
struck by Eduardo Autor. The anger of Angel Pulido and his son was, however,
directed chiefly against Kiichi Omine, who was responsible for the destruction of
the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy among the defendants, but
the offended party and his son and his relative, Saito, narrated the facts of the
incident in such away that all the four defendants would appear to be equally
responsible for the injury sustained by the offended party. The evidence does not
convince us that Ladion and Cortesano took any part in the fight; on the contrary
it inclines us to believe that they ran away and were not present when Angel
Pulido was wounded. This impression is strengthened by the fact that they were
not included in the original complaint subscribed and sworn not by the offended
party on December 29th. They were not included as defendants until the
amended complaint was filed on February 19, 1934. But if they were present and
held the offended party by the arms, as alleged by him, the evidence does not
show that they held him for the purpose of enabling Eduardo Autor to strike him
with his bolo. If they did in fact intervene, it may have been for the purpose of
preventing the offended party and his son from continuing their attack on Omine.
There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to hold Angel Pulido in order to
enable Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo, or for Kiichi Omine to induce
him to do so by shouting "pegale y matale". According to the witness for the
prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor had already struck each other in
the face with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had received a blow in the right eye,
and then struck Hilario Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally
intervene in the fight between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor,
who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him without the need of any
inducement from Omine. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case,
even if it were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in
question, we are of the opinion that they would not be sufficient to make him a
principal by induction, because it does not appear that the words uttered by Kiichi
Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the first place, as we
have indicated, Eduardo Autor had already other reasons for striking Angel
Pulido when Omine is alleged to have uttered the words of inducement. In the
second place, the words in question were not in this particular case sufficient to
cause Eduardo Autor to strike the offended party with his bolo. Although Eduardo
Autor was working under the direction of Omine, apparently according to the
testimony of Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear that
Omine had any particular influence over Eduardo Autor. The cases cited by the
Solicitor-General of a father giving orders to his son are obviously different from
the case at bar.
In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held
that in order that a person may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is
necessary that the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring
the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the determining cause
of the commission of the crime. In that case various decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain illustrating the principles involved and their application to particular
cases were cited with approval. One of the decisions cited was that of April 24,
1871, where it was held that one who, during a riot in which a person was killed,
said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing the he did
anything more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not
guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of Spain said:
"Considering that, although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and even
culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be considered the principal
and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred
from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would not have been
performed." Another decision cited was that of December 22, 1883, where it was
held that a father who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in
combat with another. "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries
committed after such advice was given.
Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, which has been
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code without change as No. 2 of article 17,
Viada says that in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be
considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words
have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that it is
necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral
coercion or as violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th Edition.)
We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of Eduardo Autor are not
responsible for the injury inflicted by him on Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and location of the wound of
the offended party, found that it was the intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor
to kill the offended party, and accordingly found said defendant guilty of frustrated
homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does not justify this finding. It is true
that the wound was serious and in a vital part of the body, but judging from the
nature of the wound, which was about eleven inches in length, extending from
the breast to the lower ribs on the right side, we think it is probable that it was
caused by the point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It was not a stab wound,
and was probably given during a commotion and without being aimed at any
particular part of the body. As we have already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the
offended party only once. This fact tends to show that it was not his intention to
take the offended party's life. If he had so intended, he could easily have
accomplished his purpose, so far as the record shows. It might be contended that
Eduardo Autor did not strike the offended party a second time, because he
thought that he had already killed him. This was apparently the theory of the
prosecution, because the offended party and his witnesses testified that the
offended party dropped down unconscious when he was wounded, but the
evidence does not seem to us to sustain that contention. In the first place a
cutting wound like that in question would not ordinarily render the injured man
immediately unconscious.
In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one of the witnesses for
the prosecution, that Angel Pulido did not fall down unconscious; but swayed and
asked for help, while the blood was flowing from his breast and stomach; that
Saito approached the wounded man to support him and take him home.
It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be guided by the result
unless the intent to kill is manifest.
When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform an
act which was not realized, the facts from which it is claimed that
intention sprang must be such as to exclude all contrary supposition.
When this intention is not necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by
the defendant, greater importance should not be given to such acts than
that which they in themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability
be extended beyond that which is actually involved in the material results
of his act. Intention may only be deduced from the external acts
performed by the agent, and when these acts have naturally given a
definite result, the courts cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold
that some other result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)
There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that Angel Pulido was
accidentally wounded in a struggle for the possession of the offended party's
bolo. That claim is disproved by the affidavit of Autor, Exhibit E, executed on
December 26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out his bolo and struck
Angel Pulido in the stomach because Pulido was very aggressive.
We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves,
since the offended party was incapacitated for the performance of his usual work
for a period of more than ninety days, and not of frustrated homicide.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi
Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the
proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As to the appellant Eduardo Autor, the
decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted of lesiones
graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and twenty-one days
of prision correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third
of the principal penalty, and to pay the corresponding costs. In accordance with
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by him is
fixed at one year of prision correccional.
G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant.
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who is
constitutionally presumed innocent, depends upon the strength of the prosecution and
not the weakness of the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in authority, undoubtedly already
strong, was made even stronger by the defense itself.
As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime imputed to Napoleon
Montealegre was committed as follows:
At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilia was eating
at the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and
saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his car whom he hailed to report the matter. After
parking his vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and soon thereafter
the two smelled marijuana smoke from the table occupied by Vicente Capalad and
the accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and collared both of
them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?' Forcing them up, he asked the waitress ff
she knew them but the waitress said she did not. 1 Then the mayhem began.
While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand and Capalad
with his left hand, Capalad suddenly and surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a
scabbard tucked in the right side of his waist and started stabbed Camantigue in the
back. 2Camantigue let loose Montealegre to draw the gun from his holster but
Montealegre, thus released, restrained Camantigue's hand to prevent the latter from
defending himself Montealegre used both his hands for his purpose 3 as Capalad
continued stabbing the Victim. 4 While they were thus grappling, the three fen to the
floor and Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose and scampered toward the
door. Camantigue fired and, continuing the pursuit outside, fired again. 5 Capalad fled
into a dark alley. Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to a
hospital. Capalad was later found slumped in the alley with a bullet wound in Ms
chest. Neither Camantigue nor Capalad survived, both expiring the following day. 6
The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion. 7 Having been
informed of the incident, Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite police immediately
organized a team that went to look for him that very night. 8 They did not find him in
his house then but he was apprehended in the morning of March 12,1983, on board a
vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but later admitted he was
the fugitive being sought. 9
Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the Camantigue's body, testified that Q. With what hand?
death was caused by shock due to massive internal hemorrhage caused by seven
stab wounds affecting the heart, lungs, liver, stomach, pancreas, and A. Both hands, sir.
diaphragm.10 The weapon used was 6" in length and about 2 to 2.5 cm. in width and
the blood found on it was analyzed as human.11 The stabbing incident was narrated in Q. And was Camantigue able to pull out from his waist the gun?
detail at the trial by Abadilla, 12 who was corroborated by Generoso San Juan. 13

A. No. sir.
On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Montealegre prevented Camantigue from
drawing his pistol while he was being stabbed by Capalad, demonstrating with the aid
Q. Why?
of court personnel the relative positions of the three during the incident. 14

A. Because Montealegre was holding his hand, Your Honor.

On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration even more emphatically,
thus:
Q. With both hands?
Q. When accused Montealegre held the hand of Pfc. Camantigue upon
drawing his gun, what happened to Camantigue? A. Yes, sir.

A. He could not move, sir. He could not make any defense because he was
being held by Montealegre and he was being stabbed at the back. 15
He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the participation of the
accused-appellant —
Q. When accused Capalad started stabbing Pfc. Camantigue at the back,
accused Montealegre was being held by Pfc. Camantigue at that time?
Q. Montealegre was holding with both hands rights hand of Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at this moment when Montealegre was holding with both hands the
hand of Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?
A. Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue, Your Honor. 17

A. Yes, sir. San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on direct examination.

Q And in fact Montealegre was very close to the right of Camantigue at that Q. When Camantigue was being stabbed, where was Montealegre?
time?
A. He was on the right side.
A. Yes sir.
Q. What was he doing at that time?
Q And Montealegre was aware that Capalad was stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A. When Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun but
A. Yes, sir, he knew. 16 Montealegre held his hand.

In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he declared: Q. Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?

Q. And when Montealegre saw that Camantigue was about to draw gun, A. No. sir.
Montealegre grabbed the hand of Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir.
 Q. What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun? They slammed Q. Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
down on the floor and when they were already on the floor, I ran away
because I was already figures lightened. 18 A. I did not see. 22

The cause of the defense did not improve when on cross-examination, he insisted: xxx xxx xxx

A. When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre suddenly held Q. From whom did you come to know that Pfb. Camantigue shot and killed
the hand of Camantigue. Vicente Capalad?

Q. And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of Camantigue, what A. From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that Camantigue killed
happened to Camantigue? Capalad. 23

A. He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was holding his xxx xxx xxx
hand, Capalad was stabbing him at the back. 19
Q. Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc.Camantigue was holding both of
And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as follows: you, did you notice that Vicente Capalad stabbed Pfc. Camantigue?

Q. So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while Montealegre was A. I did not see anything. 24
holding the right hand of the policeman to prevent him from drawing his gun?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir. 20
Q. And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue while Capalad
The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only succeeded in confinning his own was on the left side?
guilt. He claimed he ran away before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of
denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of ignorance and forgetfulness and A. I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the left.
protestations of innocence, does not have the ring of truth. The following excerpts are
reflective of the kind of defense he offered to exculpate himself from the charge
Q. But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of Camantigue?
established against him by the prosecution.

A. I am not sure if that is the right side.

Q. Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad, what
happened if any?
Q. But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster were placed?
A. Camantigue pulled his gun.
A. I cannot remember. 25
Q. What happened after that?
It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not know what was happening
21 on that evening of March 11, 1983. As one of the principal figures of the stabbing
A. Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened.
incident, he could not have not known, nor could he later not remember, that startling
event that even more onlookers could not forget. The evidence has established that
xxx xxx xxx the accused-appellant was directly and personally involved and was in fact one of the
two persons held by the victim when he was stabbed. Yet Montealegre would now
A. I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really happened. insist, quite incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that night.
If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing, there would have been
less likelihood of Capalad's attack as Camantigue's attention would have been fully
concentrated on his lone captive. Moreover, there would have been nothing to
restrain the policeman from drawing his pistol and defending himself against Capalad
if the accused-appellant had, by his own account, already escaped before the
stabbing.
It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the authorities, what the accused-
appellant did was attempt to hide, only to be found the following morning on board a
bus bound for outside Cavite City. When apprehended, he first gave a false name
before he finally admitted his Identity, thus beginning the mesh of contradictions,
admissions and denials, in which he would enshare himself.
The Court accepts the evidence established by the prosecution that at the time of the
stabbing, the victim was in uniform and, therefore, could easily be recognized as a
person in authority. Several witnesses testified as to his attire when he was
killed. 26 And even assuming that the victim was in civilian clothes on that tragic night,
the record shows that no less than the accused-appellant himself, replying to
questions put to him by the prosecution, declared twice that he knew the victim to be
a policeman. 27
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated
with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad
actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to
the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While
it is true that the accused- appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he
was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from
As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:
resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the
criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and
(2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without
which it would not have been accomplished.
The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence correspondence of a
prior agreement between Capalad and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should
prove the presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view, which conforms
to our consistent holding on this matter:
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred from
the acts of the appellants. It is enough that, at the time the offense was
committed, participants had the same purpose and were united in its
execution; as may be inferred from the attendant circiumstances. 29
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan to kill Regino
Bautista. The whole incident happened because the accused came upon
Bautista and Mallabo fishing within or near the fishpond enclosure of Carlo
Aquino which was under the care of Vicente Cercano.
But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused to be established,
it is not necessary or essential that there be a previous plan or agreement to
commit the assault; it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all the
accused by their acts manifested a common intent or desire to attack Bautista
and Mallabo, so that the act of one accused became the act of all. 30
xxx xxx xxx
If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert
is proven. A conspiracy only be entered into after the commencement of overt
acts leading to the consummation of the crime. 31
There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim from behind
when the latter was stabbed by his collaborated Victor Buduan, was a positive
act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent can
be classified as instantaneous. It can be safely assumed that had not appellant
held both arms of the victim from behind, the latter could have partied the
thrust or even run away from his assailant. By immobilizing the two hands of
the victim from behind, and although there was no anterior conspiracy , the
two cousins showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediateIy before
the actual stabbing. 32
xxx xxx xxx
It has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles seized the running
decedent in such a manner that the latter could not even move or tum around.
This enabled the pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn bolo and was
 barely five meters away from the decedent, to finally overtake him and stab
him at the back with hardly any risk at all. Cabiles therefore performed another
act-holding the decedent—without which the crime would not have been
accomplished. This makes him a principal by indispensable cooperation. 33
The above requisites having been established, the accused-appellant was correctly
convicted of the complex crime of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon
a person in authority. Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty imposed upon him, to
wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus
the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00, and the actual, mectical
and fimeral expenses in the sum of P37,380.00 as proved at the trial.
Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died in line of duty while
enforcing the law against the abuse of dangerous drugs. He was struck down with no
less than seven vicious stabs by a man who, by his own admission, was at the time of
the incident "burned" on marijuana. The kiner also eventually succumbed, and that
made the second life needlessly lost to the wickedness of drug addiction. There was
another Iife also ruined, this time of the 28 year-old accused-appellant himself,
although, fortunately for him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever
foreclosed. In the somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the wrong he
has done, he may yet find his ultimate redemption in rehabilitation and remorse.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
[G.R. No. L-39401. September 30, 1982.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERTO SIMBRA and
SERGIO TOLIBAS, Accused. SERGIO TOLIBAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
Charged with rape committed according to the information, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That in or about the evening of May 24, 1972, in Langihan, Butuan City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually, helping one another by means of
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, and forcibly feloniously and
successively have carnal knowledge with the complainant, one Gresilda Gonzales, a
girl 16 years old."cralaw virtua1aw library
Sergio Tolibas was found guilty and sentenced "to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify the offended party, Gresilda
Gonzales, in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. In the service of
his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the period of his preventive detention
conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended I Rep. Act 6127, it
appearing that on 6 June 1972 he signed a voluntary agreement to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners."cralaw virtua1aw library
Quoting from appellee’s brief, the crime was committed follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At about 7:30 p.m. on May 24, 1972, complainant Gresilda Gonzales left her house
in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water from the artesian well located in the public
market. She carried a pail and a hose. About 36 meters away from her house, along
an unlighted portion of the road leading to the public market, appellant and Berto
(Roberto) Simbra, strongly smelling of ‘tuba’, Accused her. Berto Simbra grabbed her
by the arms. She struck him with the hose she was holding and shouted for help.
Appellant quickly covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Helping each other,
appellant and Berto Simbra dragged her to the ‘serin’ (as spelled in appellant’s Brief;
also spelled ‘siren’ and ‘seren’ in the transcript of stenographic notes). The ‘serin’ is a
pile of sawdust surrounded by breast-high grasses and big trees, near the public
market. (pp. 48-53, 68-69, 71-75, November 22, 1972; pp. 6, 9-10, TSN, February 6,
1973).
"At the ‘serin’, Berto Simbra threw complainant to the ground and, with appellant
holding her arms and covering her mouth, forcibly removed the men’s pants and
panties that she was wearing. Then he brought out his penis and went on top of her.
She kicked and struggled vigorously but he nevertheless succeeded in inserting his
penis into her vagina and having carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and wanted to
shout but she could not do so because appellant covered her mouth. After a while,
Berto Simbra stood up and went to urinate. When he came back, he had another
sexual intercourse with her. (pp. 53-56, 75-81, TSN, November 22, 1972.)
"With Berto Simbra also holding complainant, appellant also had carnal knowledge of
her although she resisted vigorously and kicked him. He was able to do so three
times. (pp. 56-57, 80-82, TSN, November 22, 1972).
"When Berto Simbra and appellant were finished, complainant noticed a wet
substance and plenty of blood in her genitals. (pp. 4-5, TSN, December 11, 1972)
"Before leaving the ‘serin’, appellant and Berto Simbra instructed complainant not to
reveal what happened on pain of being killed. Appellant emphasized the threat by
pretending to choke her. (p. 57, TSN, November 22, 1972; p. 12, TSN, December 11,
1972)
"Berto Simbra and appellant brought complainant to the house of Ernanita Jusay,
sister of appellant, which was about 250 meters distant from the ‘serin’. Although her
house was in the same community, complainant told Ernanita Jusay that she came
from Buenavista because that was the instruction of appellant and Berto Simbra.
Complainant stayed in the house of Ernanita Jusay until 9:00 p.m. of May 25, 1972
when her aunt, Alicia Pepito, who lived nearby, and Langihan policeman Domingo
Macuno, Jr. fetched her. She could not leave until she was fetched because appellant
and Berto Simbra were guarding her. (pp. 58-60, 81-86, TSN, November 22, 1972).
"Complainant was brought to Alicia Pepito’s house, then to her house and finally to
the police station where she was interrogated. She and her mother gave sworn
statements (Exhibits C and 2) to the police. (pp. 19-22, 60 62, 86, TSN, November 22,
1972; pp. 6-7, TSN, December 11, 1972).
"Dr. Angelus R. Tupaz, Medico-Legal Officer of the Butuan City Police Department,
examined complainant at 2:30 p.m. on May 27, 1972. He found still fresh lacerations
of her hymen at 3:00 and 6:00 o’clock positions which he said were probably caused
by sexual intercourse. He also found a shiny white substance at the cul-de-sac of
Douglas of complainant’s genitals. The substance turned out to be spermatozoa upon
examination. The spermatozoa was about one (1) cc., indicating that it may have
come from more than one man. (pp. 67, 11, TSN, November 22, 1972). He prepared
a medical report containing his findings. (Exhibit A/Exhibit 1)
"After the incident, Berto Simbra absconded. He left his house at Langihan; Butuan
City, and was nowhere to be found at the time of the trial. (p. 14, TSN, February 6,
1973) Thus, the trial was only against appellant."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that about 8:30 in the evening of May 24, 1972,
he and Berto Simbra went to the dance hall at the Emilio Compound in Butuan City to
dance. They met Gresilda Gonzales, the sweetheart of Simbra, and upon invitation of
Simbra the three of them went to the "serin" (pile of sawdust) at about nine o’clock. In
going to the "serin" they passed through a street where there were many people.
Simbra and complainant were conversing with other as they walked side by side,
while he (appellant) was about twelve (12) feet behind them. Upon reaching the
"serin" he (appellant) remained at a place about thirty-five meters away to watch for
people who might come around. After a while he saw complainant taking off her pants
and panties, spread them on the "serin" and then lay down on them. Berto Simbra
went on top of her and they had sexual intercourse twice within one hour. After
Simbra was through, he approached appellant and told him to go to her as she was
still lying down on the "serin." He did go to where complainant was and asked her if
he could also lie down with her. She consented and three times he had sexual
intercourse with her.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
About 12:00 midnight, the three of them (Simbra, complainant and appellant) went to
the house of Ernanita Tolibas Jusay (appellant’s elder sister). He introduced
complainant to Ernanita as his sweetheart from Buenavista. However, Simbra told
Ernanita that he and appellant had just had sexual intercourse with complainant.
Appellant and complainant spent the night in that house while Simbra went home to
his own house which was about 150 meters away. The following morning,
complainant spent the whole day in Ernanita’s house doing nothing except sat in the
sala, ate and slept. At about 8:30 in the evening, complainant was fetched by her aunt
and a policeman.
Thus, appellant admits that he had carnal knowledge with complainant but claims that
he did so with her consent.
The testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by his sister Ernanita
Tolibas Jusay.
The issue in this case is whether appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant
against the will of the latter and through the use of force and intimidation. Appellant
claims that the court erred "in giving too much credence to the testimony of the
offended party Gresilda Gonzales."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above pretentions of appellant are not true. Complainant did not for a moment
tolerate the indecent acts of appellant and Simbra. She was going to the artesian well
at the public market in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water, when she was seized by
Berto Simbra and appellant. Simbra held her arms and dragged her towards the
"serin." Her mouth was covered with a handkerchief by appellant. She struggled and
even kicked Berto Simbra and appellant. Upon reaching the "serin," Simbra threw
complainant on the ground while appellant held her arms as Simbra forcibly took-off
her pants and panties and had sexual intercourse with her, twice. Thereafter, Simbra
also held complainant when appellant had sexual intercourse with her, thrice.
After she was raped, complainant was threatened by Simbra and appellant with death
if she would reveal what happened to her. Appellant emphasized the threat by
pretending to choke her.
Appellant contends that if violence was employed upon complainant, there would be
abrasions and contusions on her body. While it is true that Dr. Tupaz found no injuries
on her body, except the lacerations on her hymen, the fact is, the rapists did not really
employ violence upon her but only used force by holding her arms, covering her
mouth, dragging and throwing her to the ground and pinning her down. She was not
boxed, beaten or injured in any way. The force coming as it did from two big men and
applied on a 15-year old girl was enough to overcome whatever resistance there was,
without necessity for violence. This explains the lack of contusions, hematoma, and
other injuries on complainant’s body, except the lacerations on her hymen.
Further, complainant denied the truth of the testimony of appellant that she was the
girlfriend of Simbra. She has seen her rapists passing her house before the date of
the incident but the fact is, she came to know their names at the Police Station only
when she was investigated.chanrobles law library

The version of the appellant is hard to believe. Complainant was not a woman of
loose morals that after her alleged sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to
have sexual intercourse with appellant and with the blessings of Simbra. Even a
woman of loose morals would not agree to allow two men to successively take
advantage of her in the presence of the other. In the case of People v. Soriano, 35
SCRA 633, this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To begin with, their version is inherently incredible. Indeed, no woman would have
consented to have sexual intercourse with two men-or-three, according to Antonio
Gallardo — in the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally
debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that
Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On
the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her
youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would
falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant against her will by
employing force and intimidation, the crime committed is rape through direct
participation. And, when he aided Berto Simbra and made it possible for the latter to
have carnal knowledge of complainant also against her will and through force and
intimidation, appellant committed another crime of rape through indispensable
cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty of two crimes of consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED but modified in the sense
that appellant Sergio Tolibas is hereby sentenced twice to the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. With costs against Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32624 February 12, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, GAUDENCIA NIERRA, FELICISIMO DOBLEN
alias Simoy and VICENTE ROJAS, accused-appellants; GASPAR MISA, accused
whose death sentence is under automatic review.
PER CURIAM:
Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Pagano Nierra and Gaudencia
Nierra appealed from the decision dated March 4, 1970 of Judge Pedro Samson C.
Animas of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City Branch
II, convicting them of murder, sentencing each of them to death and ordering them to
pay solidarity an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of the victim Juliana
Nierra (Criminal Case No. 2081).
Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge, was also sentenced to death
and ordered to pay a similar indemnity (Decision of August 25, 1969, pp. 36-8,
Record). His death sentence is under automatic review.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and
Pagano Nierra, 39, her brother-inlaw, were competitors in the businesses of launch
transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.
Juliana sold coca-cola while Pagano sold pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two
motor launches, Elsa I and II, while Paciano was the owner of two
launches, Sylvania I and II. Juliana was the wife of Aniceto Nierra, Paciano's elder
brother. To mollify Pagano, by diminishing the competition between their launches,
Aniceto sold Elsa II. Nonetheless, Aniceto and Paciano were not on speaking terms.
In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the
Idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a
cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house in the afternoon of July 4,
1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the
Davao Penal Colony (Exh. E-4 and E-5, pp. 10-11, Folder of Exhibits). Misa came to
Barrio Tinago in June, 1969. He resided with his cousin, Silvestre Misa. (See Pareja
vs. Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)
Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the presence of Gaudencia
Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano, agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of three
thousand pesos. Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing he would pay
Misa four hundred pesos near the municipal hall of Tupi, South Cotabato which is
about forty kilometers away from General Santos City. The balance would be paid in
the same place on August 12, 1969.
That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When Misa scheduled the
assassination on July 8, 1969, Pagano said that it was up to Misa since he was the
one who would kill Juliana.
In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of Pagano Nierra, delivered to Misa
at the beach a package containing a caliber .38 pistol with five bullets. Misa contacted
his friend, Vicente Rojas, and apprised him that he (Misa) had been hired to kill
Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout on the night of July 8, 1969 when the
killing would be perpetrated.
On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store near the creek or canal
about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. Gaudencia was stationed near
the house of Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps from the scene of the crime.
Pagano was near the house of Juanito Desinorio about twenty-seven steps from the
scene of the crime. The houses of the two Desinorios were separated from the house
of Juliana Nierra by an alley.
Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps from the scene of the crime
in close proximity to the back of Juliana's house where. as he had previously
observed some nights before, she used to answer the call of nature. The house was
at the back of the Esso Gas Station near the beach of Sarangani Bay at Barrio
Tinago, General Santos City.
Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the beach
where she was accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly
appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that posture, he
inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia,
who were near the beach, witnessed the actual killing.
The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana sustained a gunshot wound in the
tongue. The bullet passed through the buccal cavity down to the spinal column where
the slug was extracted.
Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing commotion, went down from
the house and saw his prostrate wife with blood oozing from her mouth and nose. Her
panty was pulled down, her dress was raised up to her waist, and her genital organ
was exposed. At the hospital, the doctor pronounced her dead.
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front of Paciano and
Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the houses of Tony Desinorio and Francisco
Desinorio, emerged at the back of the Esso Gas Station crossed the creek or canal
on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the gun into the dense talahib grass and
rode on a bus. He proceeded to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his
mind and returned to the beach near the victim's house.
The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing through the alley between
the house of the victim and the Desinorio houses, which alley separated the building
of the Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas Station, and
emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which intersects Saguing Street where Paciano
and Gaudencia resided. Their residence was about two hundred meters away from
the scene of the crime.
A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be at the Villa Bus
Terminal at around eight-thirty in the evening of July 8, 1969, when the killing was
perpetrated, testified that she saw Pagano Nierra wearing an underwear and striped
T-short running from Saguing Street to Barrio Tinago. About five minutes later, she
saw Pagano the boulevard and running towards Saguing Street. He was wearing long
pants. The witness made a statement to the police about what she had seen.
Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound for Tupi and alighted near
the municipal building. Paciano Nierra arrived in that place and gave him four hundred
pesos. Misa returned to General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to Rojas, and
proceeded to the victim's house where he mingled with the persons playing cards and
domino. He kept vigil there, staying there for four nights.
He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the , buses and the pumpboat of
Rojas. He received a commission of one peso per passenger. Policemen arrested
him and Rojas as for questioning but they were later released. He left the city and
brought his family to Barrio Luan, Maitum South Cotabato. There, he was arrested
again, this time by Constabulary soldiers.
On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of the city
police department. He signed a confession admitting the killing of Juliana Nierra and
implicating the other accused therein. The statement was sworn to before the fiscal.
Two days later, he reenacted the killing. Photographs were taken of the reenactment.
A sketch of the scene of the crime was prepared.
On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary in-vestigation. In his testimony,
he admitted again the killing and confirmed his confession implicating Paciano Nierra,
his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed another confession on August
12, 1969 which was sworn to before the city judge.
Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969, Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the
Nierra spouses, as co-conspirators, were charged with murder aggravated by reward,
treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy and abuse of superiority and,
as to Misa, recidivism, since he had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the
murder of Antonio Abad Tormis in Cebu City.
As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his co accused, his confessions
and testimony were offered by the prosecution and were the main bases of the
judgment of conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.
As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their individual cases will be
separately reviewed.
Misa's case. — His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made an improvident plea
because the trial court allegedly failed to explain thoroughly to him the gravity of the
offense and the consequences of his plea of guilty.
That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped prisoner, had acquired some
experience in criminal procedure. Not only that. He executed two extrajudicial
confessions. He reenacted the crime as the triggerman He testified at the preliminary
investigation, and, after he was sentenced to death, he was the prosecution star
witness during the trial of his co-accused. His testimony against his co-accused,
delineating their roles in the commission of the killing, which he had perpetrated,
fortified his plea of guilty and removed any scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and
as to his understanding of the consequences of his mea culpa (See People vs.
Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de oficio's prayer that the
judgment of conviction be set aside and that the case be remanded to the lower court
for new trial To hold a new trial. wherein Misa himself would again be the star
prosecution witness, would be a repetitious and preposterous ceremony.
The case of the Nierra spouses. — They denied any complicity in the killing of Juliana
Nierra. Their version is that in the evening of July 8, 1969, at about eight o'clock in the
evening, Paciano Nierra was inside a room of his house. Gaudencia Nierras was in
her room, writing something. Eduardo Nierra, the couple's son, was alone in the sala
while Encarnacion Sabihon a housemaid, was somewhere in the house premises.
Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he came out of the room, he
met Nolasco Docallos who said that Juliana Nierra was shot. Paciano Nierra asked
who shot her. Docallos answered that he did not know.
Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latter's motorcycle in going to the
hospital. Paciano instructed his son Eduardo to render assistance. Paciano could not
go out because two years before he had undergone a surgical operation in Cebu City.
Gaudencia could not leave the children alone in the house. Eduardo phoned from the
funeral parlor that Juliana was already dead.
At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day, Gaudencia went to the funeral
parlor. She talked with Rodelio, the son of Juliana. Aniceto Nierra, her brother-in-law
and husband of the victim, did not answer when she tried to talk with him.
Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and his wife and their Muslim friend
Pandita E. Saguil and Fernando Erro, the uncle of Paciano, boarded a bus and went
to Tupi ostensibly to buy bamboos for the outrigger of a vinta, a trip which the Nierra
spouses had previously agreed upon with Saguil. They arrived in Tupi at past ten
o'clock. They were not able to buy bamboos. They ate lunch at the Fernandez
Restaurant.
The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there at two o'clock in the
afternoon. They went to the funeral parlor. They were not able to talk with Aniceto
Nierra. In the evening of that day, Gaudencia led the prayers for the repose of the
soul of Juliana and she performed that task on the second, third and fourth nights.
She did not lead the prayers on the succeeding nights because she was advised that
it was bad for her to do so. Their child attended the novena Paciano could not attend
the novena because he had kidney trouble. They gave one hundred pesos to
Juliana's family as contribution to the funeral expenses.
The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the burial, Aniceto lost
consciousness and collapsed Paciano revived him by pressing his abdomen. After the
coffin was placed in the tomb, Paciano closed the niche. The Nierra spouses gave to
Aniceto an additional two hundred pesos (Pars. 5-6 and 9-15, pp. 6-11, Appellants'
Brief).
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible witness because he was a
recidivist and his testimony is riddled with inconsistencies. That contention is devoid
of merit.
Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic point in his confessions and
testimony was that he was hired by the Nierra spouses, through Doblen to kill Juliana
for the price of three thousand pesos. That is sufficient for the conviction of the Nierra
spouses as the inducers of the assassination of Juliana. The discrepancies in his
testimony refer to minor details.
And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their contractual commitment
to pay Misa the balance of two thousand six hundred pesos must have impelled him
to unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a revelation speeled his own
destruction.
The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among the accused is belied by
the facts shown in the record. Misa had no personal motive for killing Juliana Nierra.
He was induced to do so because of the monetary consideration promised by the
Nierra spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to Paciano's cousin, introduced Misa to the
Nierra spouses. Before Juliana's assassination, Gaudencia had contracted Misa to kill
Nene Amador, her former housemaid, who was allegedly Paciano's mistress. That
projected killing did not materialize.
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as to the alleged conspiracy is
inadmissible in view of the rule that "the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be admitted as evidence against
appellants Nierra, the alleged conspiracy must first be proven by evidence other than
such testimony and that there is no such independent evidence. This argument is
wrong. It is not supported by action 27 of Rule 130
Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to testimony given
on the stand at the trial where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant" (People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531, 541).
Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in finding that the motive for the
killing was to stifle business competition. This argument is refuted by the testimonies
of Aniceto Nierra and his son Rodelio which show that Paciano Nierra was
antagonistic to his sister-in-law, Juliana, the manager or "brains" of Aniceto's
transportation and coca-cola distribution businesses.
In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's launch, Elsa II, while it was under
construction. Aniceto had to sell that launch because of Paciano's threat that
somebody would be hurt if its operation was continued. Pagano told Rodelio that the
latter's mother, Juliana, who was pockmarked was bad and dominated her husband
Aniceto. On two occasions, Paciano even challenged his brother to a fight.
Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court convicted them on the basis
of the hearsay testimonies of Guillermo Sanchez and Jose Samoya. This argument is
misleading. The judgment of conviction was anchored principally on the confessions
and testimony of Misa, the tool used by the Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's
death. Misa's evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.
The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved that Misa, Rojas and Doblen
were implicated in the killing of Juliana Nierra. It was the affidavit of Sanchez, linking
Misa to the killing, that gave the police a breakthrough in the solution of the case.
After the connection of Misa with the crime was established, the police arrested him
and obtained his confessions which implicated appellants Nierra as the investigators.
The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that the trial court erred in
admitting as evidence the affidavit of appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J) which was
obtained through an alleged promise of immunity. The record is not clear as to that
promise of immunity. Rojas' statement was taken on August 1, 1969. On August 12,
he testified at the pre investigation. The record of his testimony before the fiscal was
signed by him. He was assisted by counsel at that pre investigation. (Exh. K et seq.)
No promise of immunity was shown to have been made by the fiscal to Rojas.
In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is cumulative in character.
As already stated, the crucial and decisive evidence consists of Misa's testimony and
confessions.
Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted acted the preliminary
investigation as counsel of appellant Doblen, having been allegedly hired by the
offended party, Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he acted as counsel de oficio of
Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as having unduly prejudiced
appellants Nierra who, as already noted, were convicted on the basis of Misa's
confessions and testimony. The appellants have not successfully overthrown or
rebutted Misa's evidence.
It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of Paciano Nierra and at
the same time he posed as a friend on Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no
hand in the assassination of Aniceto's wife.
We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. On the night of the shooting, Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra did not go
to the funeral parlor to view the remains of Juliana.
After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder, there was a confrontation
between the said spouses and Aniceto Nierra in the house of their brother, Alonso, in
the presence of their other brother, Gerundio. The following dialogue took place
between Paciano and Aniceto:
Paciano: Noy, why did you suspect us to be the
killers of your wife?
Aniceto: Will you still deny when Gaspar Misa
pointed to you that you were standing by the post
and Paciano (Gaudencia) was also standing in a
another post when he (Misa) killed my wife. From
now on I have no brother by the name of Pacing.
Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.
Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when they were confined in the
city jail (translation):
My companion Pacing (Paciano):
I am directly telling you and you could be sure that I will do my best
that you will be free. Before the trial of (in) court, I would like that
you give me the sum of P600 even if you give the cash advance of
P 500 before Sunday. OK and you give the same thru the hole.
Your companion,
(Sgd.) Gaspar Misa
Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately. (Exit 1)
The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were co- conspirators. The
Nierras were co-principals by inducement. By acting as lookouts during the
perpetration of the killing, they became co-principals by cooperation as well.
Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. — Doblen's alibi was that on the night of the killing, he
was stranded at Margos, Glan, South Cotabato. He returned to General Santos City
at ten o'clock in the morning of the following day. He denied that he accompanied
Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on July 4, 1969 and that he delivered to Misa the
package containing the murder weapon.
Rojas' alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in his pumpboat at Lion's
Beach, General Santos City. However, that could not have precluded him from having
acted as lookout on that same beach.
These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that Misa's confessions and
testimony have no probative value because there was no other evidence proving the
alleged conspiracy. As already stated, that rule does not apply to testimony given on
the witness stand where the defendants have the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant (People vs. Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).
It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator because he was not present
when Misa and the Nierra spouses discussed the liquidation of Juliana Nierra and that
when Doblen delivered the package to Misa, he (Doblen) did not know that it
contained the murder weapon. As to Rojas, it is contended that he was not present at
the said conference between Misa and the Nierra spouses.
These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of Doblen and Rojas indubitably
show that they had community of design with the Nierra spouses and Misa in the
assassination of Juliana Nierra.
Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J) because it was obtained under an alleged
promise of immunity.
It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not contain anything connecting him to
the murder. In that affidavit, he denied that he had any participation in the commission
of the crime and that he conspired with Misa. So, the admission in evidence of that
affidavit did not prejudice him at all.
consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder form of
liability may be applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and other cases).
In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does
not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the
perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character
(See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs. Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs.
Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598; People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is affirmed with respect to Gaspar Misa
and Paciano Nierra.
(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is communited to reclusion
perpetua. The civil liability imposed upon her by the trial court is affirmed.
(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are convicted as accomplices.
They are each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision
mayor medium as minimum to seventeen years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and to pay solidarily with the principals an indemnity of six thousand pesos
(as their quota) to the heirs of Juliana Nierra. They are each subsidiarily liable to the
extent of six thousand pesos for the principals' civil liability. Costs against the
accused.

The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as murder qualified by
treachery and aggravated by premeditation and price or reward. As to the Nierras,
relationship is an additional aggravating circumstance.

Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The manner in which Misa
liquidated Juliana Nierra added shame, disgrace or obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar 2 Phil. 417).

In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance offset his plea of guilty.

That did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty upon him.

Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty imposed on the Nierra
spouses is in accordance- with law. However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the
death penalty imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted to reclusion
perpetua.

Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses and delivering
the murder weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene of the crime. On the
other hand, Rojas acted as lookout and received fifty pesos for his work.

After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have

reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true,
strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished as co-principals.
However, since their participation was not absolutely indispensable to the
G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE
and ANTONIO ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants.
This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple homicide, multiple
frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons in authority, on June 14,
1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only five of ten accused were brought to trial, the other five
named only as "John Does" in the information having remained at large. Two of the
five accused who stood trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino were acquitted, while the
trial court, the Court of first Instance of Rizal, imposed the death penalty on the
appellants herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin The
decision of the trial court is now before Us for review for having imposed the death
penalty.
Both the de •ficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Q.
Antonio, a retired Justice of this Court, agree that as so narrated in the appealed
decision, and as quoted in appellants' brief, the relevant and material facts accurately
reflect the evidence presented, except only as to the fact that there were eight
malefactors, with respect to which appellants are not in full conformity (p. 2,
Appellants' Brief).
As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows:
Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of them heavily
armed with pistols, carbines and Thompsons, left the shores of Manila in a
motor banca and proceeded to Navotas, Rizal. "Their mission: to rob the
Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company. Once in Navotas
and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men disembarked
from the banca and proceeded to the beach in the direction of the branch
bank. Within a few minutes, shots were heard throwing the people around in
panic. As confusion reigned, the people ran in different directions scampering
for safety. As time went on, the shots grew in intensity. As the commotion died
down, the eight men returned to their banca, still fully armed and some of them
carrying what looked like "bayongs". "They boarded the waiting motor banca
and sped away. As a result of the shooting, many people got killed and some
injured. Among those who were killed were agents of the law, like Sgt.
Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl.
Teofilo Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department. Dominador Estrella, a
market collector, was also killed. 'Those who were injured were Pat. Armando
It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the killing
Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus Jose Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and Pedro de la
that followed in its wake were actually committed, the three appellants had no
Cruz.
participation. It is not surprising that the Solicitor General has recommended the
The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office located at the North
hay Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object of the bloody mission, has an
unusual banking hours. It opens at midnight and closes at 8:00 in the morning.
The bank has ten employees, more or less, including a security guard. It has
two cages or compartments for tellers. One cage was under the care of Melvin
Domingo and the other one under the care of Alejandro San Juan. At around
12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant cashier of the bank, was
near the cage of Domingo when two men entered the bank asking that their
money be changed. Domingo refused, saying that they had no small
denominations. Suddenly, three men armed with long guns barged in and fired
at the ceiling and the wall of the bank. They ordered the employees to lie
down, face downward and then demanded the key to the vault. When Reyes
answered that they do not have the key, the armed men aimed their guns at
the vault and fired upon it until its doors were opened. They entered the vault
and found that they could not get anything as the compartments inside the
said vault were locked. Not being able to get anything from the vault, the
armed men went to the two teller cages and took whatever they could lay their
hands on. Not long afterwards, the men left, carrying with them the sum of
P10,439.95.
Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in question, Pat.
Nicolas Antonio was in the outpost, together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats. Pangan,
Burgos, Rosal Ocampo and Cpl. Evangelists. were on duty watching the fish
landing. Suddenly, Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he heard a burst which
he believed came from a Thompson. He said he saw a man pointing a
Thompson upwards while he was in front of the banca Afterwards, Antonio
said, he heard another burst coming from the same direction. Antonio and his
companions then went to the middle of the road and again they heard shots,
and this time they were successive, coming from their left. Antonio could not
see who was firing the shots. Suddenly, he said, he saw one of this
companions Cpl. Evangelista topple down. He saw also Dominador Estrella
sitting down folding his stomach. They were both felled by the shots coming
from the left side of the bank. Antonio told Ocampo to go beside the outpost
and held Sgt. Aguilos by the arm. Sgt. Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell
down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio said, he went to the outpost and told Pat.
Ocampo to go too. He said that from the outpost he heard some more shots.
Then he saw Ocampo hit in the thigh. After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his
wounded companions placed in a vehicle, together with Evangelista and
Aguilos who were already dead. Later on, he said he saw Sgt. Alcala, a
member of the PC, lying prostrate in the ground already dead. (pp. 83-85,
Rollo).
acquittal of one of the appellants, Simeon Doble. With this recommendation, it might
be well to take up the case of this appellant ahead of the other two, appellants
Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble.
In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the following
observation:
As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the malefactors met in
his house to discuss the plan to rob the Prudential Bank This circumstance,
standing alone, does not conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
facts do not show that he performed any act tending to the perpetration of the
robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other persons to
commit, or that he cooperated in its consummation by some act without which
it would not have been committed. It could be that Simeon was present at the
meeting held in his house and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme
but, aside from this, he did not cooperate in the commission of the robbery
perpetrated by the others. At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy
which is not punishable. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the
act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose (15 CJS 1062).
We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower court that
Simeon was a principal both by agreement and encouragement, despite his
non-participation in the commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved that
Simeon received a part of the looted money as to make him an accessory.
Romaquin's testimony that the day after the robbery he gave P2.00 to Simeon
who had asked for cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967) could hardly be
considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is significant that in his statement
he claimed he had not yet received his share. (pp. 10-11, Appellee's Brief; p.
146, Rollo).
A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the Solicitor
General to be with convincing rationality it is only that portion in which is cited
Simeon's statement made before the Navotas Police Department (Exh. I pp. 28-29,
Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not yet received his share" that detracts from the
solidity of the Solicitor General's recommendation, for it gives the impression that
Simeon had given material or moral support or encouragement to the malefactors
(referring to those still at large as the principal culprits) as to entitle him to a share in
the loot. However, a reading of his whole extra-judicial statement would erase that
impression, and reveals the true import of that statement as intended only to show
that Simeon had nothing to do with commission of the crime and therefore did not
receive any share of the fruits thereof. Thus, to quote pertinent portions Of his
statement. on custodial investigation:
3. T — Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?
S — Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang Bangko sa
Navotas, Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M. P. D.
4. T — Kailan ka hinuli?
S — Noon pong Miyerkules ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang petsa pero
nito pong buwan na ito.
5. T — Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng isang
bangko dito sa Navotas?
S — Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang mga taong
nangholdap dito sa Navotas.
6. T — Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?
S — Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na dalawa pa at
ang mga kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na may an ng bangka, si Joe
Rondina Cresencio Doble at narinig kong may tinawag pang Erning. lyon pong
iba ay hindi ko alam ang pangalan pero makikilala ko Pag aking nakitang muli.
7. T — Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong ito?
S — Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras pero hatinggabi na nong Lunes ng gabi
(June 13, 1966).
8. T — Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?
S — Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa Navotas,
9. T — Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?
S — Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon, after being
shown five (5) other pictures).
10. T — Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?
S — Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa Navotas,
Rizal.
11. T — Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?
S — Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat ako ay
nakikinig lamang.
12. T — Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan, ano pa
ang iba mong mga narinig?
S — Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at ni Jose
Rondina na "MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO MASYADONG MAPANGANIB,
AT KAILANGAN AY HANDA TAYO."
13. T — Ano pa ang sumunod?
S — Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing paglaban.
 14. T — Ano pa ang nangyari?
S — Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.
15. T — Pagkatapos?
S — Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang lahat.
16. T — Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na sila?
S — Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming bahay ay
nagmamadali na silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa kanila. At noon
pong umaga ng araw na iyon ay nagpunta ako kay Tony (Antonio Romaquin at
kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00) dahil iyong aking parte ay hindi pa
naibibigay sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi na ako sa amin.
17. T — Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito. Ikaw ba ay
mayroong nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa salaysay mong ito?
S — Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.
18. T — Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?
S — Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usap-usap silang
lahat at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at nakapagbigay pa ako ng
mungkahi na ako na lamang ang maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may
pinsala sa paa at maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at qqqmahuh lamang.
19. T — Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?
S — Opo, may limang (5) taon na.
20. T — Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?
S — Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.
21. T — Ano pa ang masasabi mo?
S — Wala na po.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used as the
meeting place of the malefactors for their final conference before proceeding to
Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them because of a
qqq5yeat old foot injury which would make him only a liability, not one who can help in
the devilish venture. To the malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they
met at his house it was only because it was near the landing place of the banca, and
so he invited them to his house while waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere
presence in his house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling them that he
could not join them because of his foot injury, and will just wait for them; evidently as
a mere gesture of politeness in not being able to join them in their criminal purpose,
for he could not be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid being
suspected that he was against their vicious plan for which they may harm him,
Simeon is by no means a co-conspirator, not having even taken active part in the
talks among the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable participation of Simeon
Doble in the commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he
could not in any way be of help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their criminal
design, nor could he have been desired by the latter to be one of them.
Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble, their
main contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon which their conviction was
principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been allegedly obtained by force
and intimidation, and in violation of basic constitutional rights to counsel and against
self-incrimination. In support of this contention, appellants have only their own self-
serving testimony to rely upon.
Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas police department someone
he could not name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson hit him on the left
side with the butt of a gun causing him to lose consciousness; that he was made to lie
on a narrow table and peppery liquid was poured over his face, his eyesight then
becoming dim, and it was then that he was made to sign a piece of paper which he
could not read because of his blurred eyesight.
Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force him to
admit culpable participation in the heist. The inquiry must, accordingly, be whether the
claim of violence and involuntariness of their statements is true as to render said
statements inadmissible in evidence.
Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial statements
(Exhibits E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that the same is negated by
how the details as given by both appellants in their respective statements fit into each
other, at least as to the part played by each from the time Cresencio went to
Romaquin's place to procure the latter's banca up to their get-away from the scene of
the crime. Thus, while Romaquin claimed in his statement that although he wanted to
escape from the scene after his passengers have disembarked for their evil mission,
he could not do so because Cresencio had a gun pointed at him to prevent his
escape, as was the order given Cresencio by the rest of the gang. The latter denied
this allegation when he testified that he returned the gun given him because he did
not know how to use or manipulate it, although in his extra- judicial statement (Exhibit
M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he stated that he accepted the gun.
The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself which is
generally taken as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted on one while giving
his statement on custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679).
The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent maltreatment to
which appellant's were subjected to, that neither one of the appellants presented
medical certificate to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted (p. 3, Appellee's Brief)
which disproves the claim (People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88
Phil. 79). He also points to the fact that in his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35,
Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of the accused, made no admission of his
participation in the bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court, he admitted that
no violence was applied to him when he gave his statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12,
1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). 'This is evidence enough that the appellants could not
have been dealt with differently as their co-accused Aquino who was allowed to give
his statement freely without the employment of force or intimidation upon him. The
evidence also disclosed a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to Romaquin
asking the latter not to reveal the names of their companions. This means that the
names of the members of the band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to both
appellants. That the Identity of five of those charged in this case has remained only as
"John Does" indicate the non-employment of any coercive means with which to force
them into revealing the names of their companions in the robbery, again negating the
claim of torture and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually confirmed
their extra-judicial statements when they testified in court. By all the proofs as cited,
persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their custodial statements plus the
positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one named among the alleged torturers, that
any violence was practiced by the investigators, specifically, the alleged delivery of
fist blows on Cresencio. (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged
involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly attempting to
escape could have instilled fear in the minds of the appellants which affected their
freedom of will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellant's Brief). This is a far-
fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the giving of the statements, the killing
having taken place after their interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July
5, 1966 Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the person of
Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore, took place long after appellants have given their
main statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had only bothered to
check the dates of the main statements of both appellants which were given not later
than just past the middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary statement of
Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he would not have probably come forth with this
argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L.
Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the inadmissibility of appellants' custodial statements, for their
having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right thereto during the
interrogation. 'There might be merit in this contention were the right to counsel during
custodial interrogation one of constitutional grant as is provided in our 1973
Constitution, before which the right was given only to an accused, not to a mere
suspect during in-custody police interrogation (Magtoto vs. Manguera 63 SCRA 4;
People vs. Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the time of their
custodial interrogation in 1966, however, the requisite of assistance of counsel was
not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it has been granted only by the new
1973 Constitution.
The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither be
appreciated to impair the admissibility of their extra-judicial statements. It is the
voluntariness of an admission or confession that determines its admissibility, for no
principle of law or constitutional precept should stand on the way of allowing voluntary
admission of one's guilt, the only requisite justly demanded being that ample
safeguard be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the element of
voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is even presumed, the
admissibility of an extra-judicial confession, admission or statement becomes
unquestionable. 1
The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with the
testimony they gave in court, would convince Us that their liability is less than that of a
co-principal by conspiracy or by actual participation, as as was the holding of the trial
court. The most damaging admission made in the extra-judicial statements of
Cresencio is that he was asked by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the
evening of June 13, 1966, if he could procure a banca for his use, and that Joe Intsik,
on being asked by Cresencio, allegedly told him that the banca would be used for
robbery. Cresencio gave an affirmative answer to Joe Intsik's query, having in mind
Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio accompanied Joe Intsik to Romaquin at
12:00 in the evening. In Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1, Romaquin, p. 15,
Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked him to bring his friends in his banca, to
board a launch for a trip to Palawan. The discrepancy between the statements of
Cresencio and Romaquin as to the intended use of the banca is at once apparent, for
while according to the former, it was for the commission of robbery, according to the
latter, it was to bring Cresencio's friends to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. What
is demonstrated thereby is the full freedom with which both appellants were allowed
to give their respective statements while in custodial interrogation.
Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily make him a
co-conspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Cresencio into
his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more than just asking his help
to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men all with arms and weapons to
perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to execute
the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which is not shown with respect to
appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just a few
hours before the actual robbery.
Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors still at
large, to be asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The amount received by
Romaquin who alone was given money by the malefactors in the sum of P441.00,
indicate that the latter did not consider appellant as their confederate in the same
character as those constituting the band of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin
could very well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the cooperation he
extended to the malefactors, which, by no means, is an indispensable one.
Cresencio, on the other hand, was not given any part of the loot. It was only
Romaquin who gave him P4 1.00, clearly not what should represent his share if he
were a full-fledged ally or confederate.
The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of their vicious
misdeeds, Romaquin might speed away from the scene in fear of being implicated, as
shown by the measure they had taken to prevent his escape, is further proof that
Romaquin was not considered a co-conspirator, who is one who should not be looked
upon with mistrust. For his part, Cresencio testified that while he was given a gun with
which to cover Romaquin who might escape, he returned the gun because he did not
know how to use it, and so one of the malefactors was left near the beach to prevent
appellants fleeing from the scene of the crime with banca. In his statement, however,
(Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he refused to accept the gun, but they gave it just
the same, and he received it.
The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in
the crime charged. At the most their liability would be that of mere accomplices. They
joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a banca and
Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the
malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose for
which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that brought the malefactors to the
bank to be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to prevent
their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner.
Even without appellants providing the banca, the robbery could have been committed,
specially with the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in committing the
crime.
The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit "H", p. 26,
Record of Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to reveal to the police the
names of their companions. He went to Romaquin and asked for money which the
latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to show that he had helped in some material
way to deserve a share in the loot.
As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with
which the latter would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away from the scene, evidently
to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that all his acts were in fear
of bodily harm and therefore, not voluntary, the measure taken by the malefactors to
prevent his escape, could have been just an extra precaution, lest he would be
stricken with fear in the course of the commission of the crime specially if attended by
shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he never voluntarily made the trip with
knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio saying that he returned the
gun given him with which to prevent Romaquin from speeding away, Romaquin could
have tried a get-away, as should have been his natural impulse had he not joined in
the criminal design. His act of hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and
repainting his boat, all attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of
cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve their criminal
purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the Revised
Penal Code, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a Community of unlawful purpose
between the principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally
given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil. 526), to supply material and moral aid in the
consummation of the offense and in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil.
38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for
abduction which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as held in People vs.
Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of
Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out
successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the
criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must,
accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing. Having been left in the
banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking
relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised Penal
Code). 2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient
considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which they were charged.
The evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a previous conspiracy
with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed and injured several
persons, including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and actual
culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the
outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not been
shown to be as abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring
extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in meting out a penalty to
appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery in
band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as so
recommended by the Solicitor General who finds no sufficient evidence, to which We
agree, to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin, as
accomplices for the crime of robbery in band is prision mayor minimum which has a
range of 6 years, 1 day to 8 years as provided ill Article 295 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of the same code. The commission of the
crime was aggravated by nighttime and the use of a motorized banca. There being no
mitigating circumstance, both appellants should each be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years, four (4) months, twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of 1112,000.00 not P6,000.00
as imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed
in all other respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble who is hereby acquitted
is ordered, unless he should be continued in confinement for some other legal cause.
Proportionate costs against Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C.
DOCTOLERO alias"CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C.
DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio
Doctolero, charged with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance, Branch II,
Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries,
appealed from the decision of the court a quo the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused
Ludovico Doctolero guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado
Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in committing the
crime of Murder, which caused the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on
the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other
circumstances to mitigate the penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS
(CADENA PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4
Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto mayor, for inflicting slight physical
injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado
Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero, as accomplices, are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty of 10
Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion
temporal, for the death of Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years
and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal,
for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional penalty of 2 Months
and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight physical injury suffered
by the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused Ludovico, Conrado and
Virgilio all surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of P12,000.00; the heirs of the
deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00; and the heirs
of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay
three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted,
with one-fourth (1/4) cost de oficio.1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as
follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday,
municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed
with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat, conspiring
together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, with abuse of superior strength and with
 extreme cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hack, stab and strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania
Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter, the same
accused while already on the road, conspiring together and mutually aiding
one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery,
attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting upon him
multiple mortal wounds which caused his death.2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In its
decision, the trial court made the following findings and a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution thus:
It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio
and Lolita de Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio
Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they
were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was
on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the breast of his
mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun,
Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital but he died on the way. . . .
The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused,
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for
the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting
physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter, with
their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo
Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife
Maria Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at
about 6:30 in the evening on November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria
Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-
Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came from the field
where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in
Bo. Binday they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning
and without cause or reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his
left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow
and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the latter.
Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and
Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo of the former, so
she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she
was cleaning palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo
Doctolero, she saw the accused, Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all
surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While
throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house to
come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial
Sagun and saw the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming
down from the house going towards her. She told them: "Why can't you be
patient and forget?" But she was asked not to interfere. At about that time,
Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of the three
accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the
three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them
why they can't be patient and forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of
your mother, we will also kill you." Then they struck Marcelo Doctolero
several times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio Doctolero
arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo
Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.
The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by
the testimony of Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared
that while she was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported
the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she saw the
three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at their house
and called to all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to
their house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico,
Conrado and Virgilio going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few
meters away from their house. While there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her
adopted mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your children." Then she
saw the three accused coming down from the house, going towards the road
where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several times until
he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero
with a bolo. Then they all left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico
Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian,
Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio
Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the
brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn,
p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were
on their way home. (p. 8, Ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid)
He noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he
asked his cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter
unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing. He
parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the process
(p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero
also unsheathed his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with
the two women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of
Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were
towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio
Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at
 the back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and
Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was
eating his meal, together with his small children upstairs, while accused-
appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his
meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-
Salazar).
He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his
children as he might meet something bad that night. He did not enter the
house anymore: he was only until the door. Then he ran away. His father
asked him what happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4,
Salazar).
He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of
his cousins, Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his house,
he saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor.
His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house calling him to get down. When
Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial Sagun was not
there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial
Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman
hit him at the back of his neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed
her several times (p. 13-19, tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the
trunk of the buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not
notice anyone coming from the south or the east. So he tried to move, but as
he did so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from the yard of
Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize the man and thinking
that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that the man
was Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its
scabbard. He asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but
Marcelo Doctolero answered him, "because of your foolishness" and hit him
on the shoulder, but in the process of evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero
was hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time
he took a side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it away, causing
Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get the club, but
Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed Ms bolo. When the latter insisted on
unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero boloed him many times. (pp. 19-
26, ibid).4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused to
the child. A doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the crime and pictures
were then taken.5
Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court below
established that ––
. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side
of the forehead. There is fracture of the underlying skull.
(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound with
fracture of the underlying skull.
(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with
fracture of the underlying skull.
(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left
eyebrow to the right eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying skull.
(5) Incised wound –– 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the month
towards the lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the ear is
detached.
(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a
severance from the level of the middle finger.
(8) Incised wound –– 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd
of the forearm, left.
(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.
xxx xxx xxx
One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab
wound around 3 cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal space
just at the left border of the sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds
were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep
penetrating the sternal bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space.
(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right
clavicular region.
(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the
second wound.
(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the underlying
skull at the right frontal portion of the head.
(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the
head.
(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint,
exposing the bony portion, left.
(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.
(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.
(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion of
the hand right. There was fracture of some of the underlying bones. 6
Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows:
"Stab wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the
dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was another about 1 inch of the middle
aspect of the right forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2 inch,
temporal right." He further testified that the child was admitted to the hospital on
November 8, 1970 and was discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later.7
During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico
Doctolero, on May 17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal8
and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day. 9
In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of counsel for
accused-appellants, dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero died on
October 22, 1983 as per death certificate attached thereto as Annex "A".10 Hence, this
review is only with respect to the liability of appellant Conrado Doctolero.
The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an
accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies
having participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi,
contending that he was not at the place where the crimes were committed.
Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than
the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-
conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted
source and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel suspicion. 11
This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and
categorical testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the
positive declarations of the prosecution Witness and the negative statements of the
accused, the former deserves more credence.12
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against
appellants. The only imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had
against appellants occurred years ago and she was, at the time she testified, on good
terms with appellants as shown by the following testimony of Ludovico Doctolero
himself:
Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the
prosecution witness (sic) your relationship with her was harmonious and
rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives
she did not fail to see you in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria Sagun
(wife of Marcial Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio,
all surnamed Doctolero, as the persons who went up her house that night of
November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a grudge against the accused
Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that previous incident at the crossing yet, no reason
or motive is shown why Maria Sagun should also implicate Conrado and Virgilio
Doctolero in the commission of the crime."14
When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part
of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full
credit.15
And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for
the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not
so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to certain
inconsistencies that allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
incredible. These inconsistencies, however, are not so substantial as to destroy their
credibility. As correctly explained by the People, the seeming contradictions and
minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out by the
appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential variations on the part of each
observer in relating his own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and
inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far from
demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith. Not all persons who
witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner and it is but natural that
said eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details.17
In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.18And where the prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify the
appellants as the authors of the crime and the testimonies were, on the whole,
consistent oil material points, the contradictions become insignificant. 19
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who
conducted the investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the
multiple killings. Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly performed their
duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. Appellants have not shown
that this prosecution witness was motivated by an improper motive other than that of
accomplishing his mission.20
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police
department of San Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were committed were
to the effect that the Doctoleros were involved. He further testified that when he
immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime and investigated Paciencia Sagun-
Diamoy she told him that the accused Doctoleros came with bolos from the house of
Marcial Sagun.21
In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his investigation
and the weight to be accorded to his findings was properly addressed to the trial
court.
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio, participated as
accomplices in the slaying of the women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We
agree with its findings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General with its evidentiary
substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning
and hurling challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have
already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and
shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146,
tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up the house.
Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and
Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother
Ludovico was brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of
said house. Furthermore, from the nature, number, and locations of the
many wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-
1), it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and
Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear either
the screams of pain of their brother's victims or the contact between the
blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly
hacking them several times. . . . Under these circumstances, it is obvious
that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was
going on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and
did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his
women victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two
appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother Ludovico
Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend
assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two
appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother
Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did
proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women
and a child.22
We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the
house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively
supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an
accomplice.23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought
or impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This pretension
must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the
actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit
act.24
This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that where the
accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, they
were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to
commit homicide was unknown to the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of
appellants Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they were
liable but only with regard to the extent of their participation. There being ample
evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the nature of their
liability, the courts should favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is that
of being mere accomplices,26
no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries
inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fifteen (15)
days, hence the liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries
punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. There
being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto
menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an
accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal
terminated only his criminal liability but not his civil liability.27
Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case
law, the same should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore
withdrawn his appeal and the judgment rendered by the trial court having long since
become final and executory with respect to him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby
rendered IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate
sentences of ten (10) years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal each for the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto
menor for the less serious physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant
Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in
the sum of P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania
Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2)
of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO
BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life
imprisonment, with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased
Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the accused the namely, Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, the
last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no certificate nor any
other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be
charged with parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and
appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their house at
Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of
the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had been strained and beset with
troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and each time
Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions, appellant
Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work,
and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter
living with them, go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten
wind that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a
quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get
pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed,
Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than
three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen
together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two
(2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel;
Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went down the house and sought
the help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity
of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for
accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the
place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between
10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon,
who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with
Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides
in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's
house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a
bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter,
she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while
the same 12-year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the
kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go down the house through the stairs and
go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants. As they were barely 3-4
meters from the place where the child was in the "batalan", she heard them
conversing in subdued tones, although she could not discern what they were saying.
She was able to recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the
kitchen through the open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all residents
of Sobosob and she used to see them almost everytime. She noted that the
appellants had long guns at the time. Their meeting did not last long, after about two
(2) minutes Teresa came up the house and proceeded to her room, while the other
appellants went under an avocado tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child
caged her parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen did not
heed his daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also
excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate
supper alone, and as soon as she was through she again called her parents to eat.
This time, she informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs, but
Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself
on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that moment, he
was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then
climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo
was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire
their guns at that precise time, but when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned
her, saying "You call for help and I will kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants
then fled from the scene, going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived
nearby. Teresa came out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside and questioned
her, and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers of her father to be
her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal the matter to anyone,
threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and
helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy on which was
performed in his own house by the Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26,
1967, about 36 hours after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's
brother who came from Manila arrived one day after the burial followed by their
mother who came from La Paz, Abra where she resides. Corazon, who had not
earlier revealed the Identities of the killers of her father because she was afraid of her
own mother, was somehow able to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing to
these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter executed
on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of the information for murder against
the herein five (5) appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her
marriage with Bernardo, was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister
in Manila and two (2) brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said
brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending her monthly $100.00 in
checks, starting from the time she was still single up to the time of her husband's
violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they moved to
and resided in her husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3)
carabaos and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land
in said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of land worked on by Bernardo's
parents and their other children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which
was about 4-5 meters away from the house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo
dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her; although
sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his own mother who
wanted that Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo never
did, and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me alone". Her
in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings of
Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On his part,
Juanito also disliked her because she did not give him any of the carpentry tools
which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She never left their conjugal
home for any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-law, and if she ever did
leave the house to go to other places they were only during those times when she
had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB branch there, and even
on said trips, she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone
and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with
merchants going to Bangued in the morning and always rode back with them to
Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the weapons carrier is owned
by a resident of Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only
when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos
and horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo
would go and report the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to his
policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so that they may help locate the lost animals;
Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the latter's home being only
about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit relationship had never existed
between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house
cooking their food for supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her.
Her husband, Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a plow. He had to
make the plow at that time of the night because at daytime he worked as a carpenter
in the convent. As soon as the food was ready, she and the children moved over to
the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper, and he then
proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him
to the kitchen when suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun
shots coming from near their "batalan". They were all so terrified that they
immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet at that precise time that her
husband was shot, as she and the children were still in the other room on their way to
the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her
husband crying in pain, and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her
arms. She did not see the killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and
it was raining. Bernardo was in her arms when the first group of people who
responded to their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of police, some
members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even advised Teresa not
to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6) months
pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation of the surroundings and
he found some empty shells and foot prints on the ground some meters away from
the "batalan". He also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said "batalan"
and on the nothern wallings of the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to
relay the information about the death of her husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra,
and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's mother and her family in La Paz,
Abra, where they were then residing, as they have left their house in Sallapadan
about two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to till there in a case
with the natives called Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June
26, 1967, and after Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their
house, they conducted an investigation, but she did not give them any information
relative to the Identity of the persons who shot her husband because she did not
really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, Juanita Bagabag, arrived
later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after
the usual nine (9) days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's
children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-in-law and her
brother-in-law have axes to grind against her and they have her daughter, Corazon,
under their custody, they had forced the said child to testify against her. She further
declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies during his lifetime, as he had
quarrels with some people over the land they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was not in
Sallapadan at the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a policeman
of the place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted
as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of
them leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning thereto four (4) days later on June
26, hence, he could not have anything to do with the said killing. On the other hand,
Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date of
said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called upon by the chief of police
of the place to accompany him in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim.
The other two appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were in the same
house of Mrs. Bayongan on that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs.
Bayongan and had been staying in her house for a long time. They were sleeping
when the chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who was then
municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did not join
them, but continued sleeping. They never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which
is about 250-300 meters away from the place of the killing, that evening of June 24,
1967.
After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution and
defense, We have no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967,
appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all
armed with long firearms and acting inconspiracy with each other gunned down
Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the supper table in their house at Sobosob,
Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing the offense by the witness
Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father
nearby. They were all known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she
used to see them often before that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias
continued firing at her father after they had climbed the stairs of the "batalan", it was
Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if she called for help. Berras did not
fire any shot then. But even before the four appellants went up the "batalan", they
already fired shots from downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday,
June 22, 1967, the deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel
during which he slapped her several times. She went to seek the help of the police,
and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their town, who went to the vicinity of
their house and challenged her father to come down, but the latter refused because
the former was a policeman and was armed. And so, Talingdan left after shouting to
her father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous
relationship between her mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier
above. So also her testimony that in the morning following the quarrel between her
father and her mother and the threat made by Talingdan to the former, between 10:00
and 11:00 o'clock, she saw all the herein four male accused-appellants meeting with
her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters away from their house, near where
she was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard one of them
ask "Could (sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to whether or
not her mother did say to her in shoving her away upon seeing her approach, "You
tell your father we will kill him." If it were true that there was really such a message, it
is to be wondered why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she
again saw the said appellants on the very night in question shortly before the shooting
talking together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms. Moreover, it
is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We have
carefully reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto
Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as charged, and
that they committed the said offense in conspiracy with each other, with evident
premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense, namely, evident
premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital
contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently
unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General
has well pointed out, the fact that the witness varied on cross-examination the exact
time of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was before or
after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot; (2) whether it was before or after
seeing her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23,
1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already
upstairs or still downstairs when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of
her having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and cold-bloodedly shooting her
father to death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the
circumstances related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor
General:
Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of
Corazon Bagabag by pointing out five supposed unnatural declarations in her
testimony; First, she said that her father, appeared unconcerned when she
informed him of the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed
by the prosecuting fiscal the witness does not know then "the mentality of her
father" (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also
declared that the accused conversed that Saturday night preceding the day
the crime charged was committed in a lighted place although there was a
place which was unlighted in the same premises. But this only proves that the
accused were too engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of whether the
place where they were talking was lighted or not, and unmindful even of the
risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides and Augusto
Berras did not fire their guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire,
however, since they were privies to the same criminal design, would this alter
their culpability? Should the witness Corazon Bagabag be discredited for
merely stating an observation on her part which is not inherently unnatural?
Fourth, Corazon also declared that only three bullets from the guns of the four
male accused found their mark on the body of her father. But would this not
merely prove that not all the accused were good shots? And fifth, the witness
declared that her father was still able to talk after he was shot yet Dr. Jose
Dalisan declared that his death was instantaneous It is respectfully submitted,
however, that the doctor's opinion could yield to the positive testimony of
Corazon Bagabag in this regard without in the least affecting the findings of
 said doctor as regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus
viewed, there are no evident badges of falsehood in the whole breadth and
length of Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her father, if
it were not basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen
(13) years old when she testified, an age when according to Moore, a child , is, as a
rule, but little influenced by the suggestion of others" because "he has already got
some principles, lying is distasteful to him, because he thinks it is mean, he is no
stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he never loses an opportunity of being
right in what he affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation
has been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to three other men,
aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother, were she merely
making-up her account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been
shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her
uncle, His Honor pointed out that said "testimony, both direct and cross, would show
that she was constant, firm and steady in her answers to questions directed to her."
We have Ourselves read said testimony and We are convinced of the sincerity and
truthfulness of the witness. We cannot, therefore, share appellants' apprehension in
their Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave imputation of a mother's infidelity
and her suggested participation in the killing of her husband, would if consistently
impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a vicious poison enough to make the
child, right or wrong, a willing instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked
mother. We feel Corazon was too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother
in the manner the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole
testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent
for a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain throughout her stay on
the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long cross-
interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described. We
reject the possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as she
did.
The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit serious
consideration. Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that the following
refutations of the Solicitor General are well taken:
Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the
testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the distance between the assailants and the
deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were fired. But the
appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first shot
was fired, the gunman was about 3-½ meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 29, 1968), which disproves the theory of the defense that the
killers fired from a stonepile under an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away
from the deceased's house. Appellants also insist that the Court a quo ignored
the testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police
Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks on the southern walling of the
house of the deceased, as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the
aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however, made the following apt
observations on the testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:
This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate
the crime after the deceased had already been buried; that he investigated the
widow as well as the surroundings of the house where the deceased was shot.
He found empty shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He stated that the
'batalan' of the house of the deceased has a siding of about 1-½ meters high
and that he saw bullet holes on the top portion of the wall directly pointing to
the open door of the 'batalan' of the house of the deceased. When the court
asked the witness what could have been the position of the assailant in
shooting the deceased, he stated that the assailant might have been standing.
The assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the top portion of the
sidings of the 'batalan' because the 'batalan' is only 1-½ meters high, and
further, when asked as to the level of the ground in relation to the top sidings
of the 'batalan,' he answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this
is true, it is impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion
sidings of the 'batalan,' hence, the testimony of this witness who is a PC
corporal is of no consequence and without merit. The court is puzzled to find a
PC corporal testifying for the defense in this case, which case was filed by
another PC sergeant belonging to the same unit and assigned in the same
province of Abra (pp. 324- 325, rec.).
As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it
to state that no testimony has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said
shells to the bullets that were fired during the shooting incident. Surmises in
this respect surely would not overcome the positive testimony of Corazon
Bagabag that the accused shot her father as they came up the 'batalan' of
their house. (Pp. 11-12, People's Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene of
the crime when it happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial
court, but it was properly brushed aside as untenable. In their brief, no mention
thereof is made, which goes to show that in the mind of the defense itself,. it cannot
be successfully maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on it. Nonetheless, it
would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the apt pertinent ratiocination of His
Honor in reference thereto thus:
This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand
firmly in the face of a positive and unwavering testimony of the prosecution
witness who pointed out to the accused as the authors of the crime. This is so
because, first, according to the three accused — Bides, Tobias and Berras —
they were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan
which is only 250 meters away from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the
sake of argument, but without admitting, that they were already sleeping at
8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon Bagabag clearly stated
that her father was gunned down at sunset which is approximately between
6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and Bides
could have committed the crime and went home to sleep in the house of Mrs.
Bayongan after the commission of the crime. According to Pedro Bides, the
house of Mrs. Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the victim.
Second, the three accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of
Mrs. Bayongan, the owner of the house where they slept that night to
corroborate or bolster their defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of
Appellants' Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense
of alibi, stated that on June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio
Banawa of Sallapadan to Bangued, together with policeman Cresencio
Martinez for the purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued They started in
Sallapadan in the early morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived in Bangued the
same day. According to him, he went to accompany the mayor to the cursillo
house near the Bangued Cathedral and after conducting the mayor to the
cursillo house, he went to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor Banawa
near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the
mayor until after they went home to Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned
anytime on the evening of June 22 or anytime before the commission of the
offense to Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then
returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to
Sallapadan on the 26th.
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have
been accompanied by witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As a
matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra,
and also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who accompanied
the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan.
Why were not the mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or deny
the testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the
Cursillo Movement, was presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On
the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of
Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at the
St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967.
As a matter of fact, Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo
held on October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen in his 'Guide Book' where
the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears because they both attended
Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the
testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants'
Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the
Solicitor General has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not
as wholly innocent in law as she appears to the Counsel of the People. It is
contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy
to kill her husband because there is no showing of 'actual cooperation" on her part
with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death. If at all, what is
apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on
her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a
conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that way.
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond
reasonable doubt, for which reason, sue cannot have the same liability as her co-
appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband.
Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof,
albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object.
(U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she
masterminded it either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At
best, such conclusion could be plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really
includible. After all, she had been having her own unworthy ways with him for quite a
long time, seemingly without any need of his complete elimination. Why go to so
much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and not even very
surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one
time was "If you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst
he did to her for all her faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the
record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the
offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband
was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was
able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified appellants
Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning
her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the LITO VINO, petitioner,
peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of vs.
helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband,
she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, RESOLUTION
known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in
her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an
of this Court dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a
accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the
alleged principal in a separate proceeding.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder
qualified by treachery. It being obvious that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their
suddenly and without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of their number
house at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro
and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery to insure success in attaining
Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of
their malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted with
Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in
evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night,
a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so
then he met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on
he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children
Saturday evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive
Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who
Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for his paramour, Teresa and enough time to
was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by
meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved to proceed with their objective. Finally,
turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After
they committed the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.
meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle
coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was
In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto.
qualified by treachery, and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.
evident premeditation and that the offense was committed in the dwelling of the
offended party, the Court has no alternative under the law but to impose upon them
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo
the capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only
Cacananta took his ante-mortem statement. In the said statement which the victim
as an accessory to the same murder.
signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his assailant.

WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
The autopsy report of his body shows the following-
appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of
the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be Gunshot wound
executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the 1 & 2 cm. diameter left
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) Slug found sub cutaneously,
years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all 2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against CAUSE OF DEATH
appellants.
Tension Hemathorax 1

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC
Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan.
However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the
Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the
military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then
filed an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of
Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then
commenced with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of
presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21,
1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory
to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years
of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the
costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered
affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE
PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE
INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE
CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED
SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19,
PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH
A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE
PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar
in the JAGO was remanded to the civil court as he was discharged from the military
service. He was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court of
Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated
November 14, 1988, petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted
by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was
submitted by the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the
Court resolved to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.
Hence, the present motion for reconsideration to which the respondents were again
required to comment. The required comment having been submitted, the motion is
now due for resolution.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the
information as a principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as
an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under
Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons
responsible for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the
accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that
the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner
was present during its commission or must have known its commission is the only
logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a
bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly
thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts.
It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's
liability is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved
or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense
charged included in that which is proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that
there was a mistake in charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein,
in which case the defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a good
cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer for the
proper offense. 6
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The
commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance
as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the
petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the
information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely
that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An
accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information
charging him as a principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory
right then and there. The degree of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the
evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can
proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The
answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of
the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was
acquitted can the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this
Court ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting
circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory
may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson
case that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the
accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was
the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the
accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of
the petitioner as an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt
that the commission of the same offense had been proven in the separate case
against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory.
The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It
observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other
witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the information,
who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the
prosecution.
The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim
pinpointing Salazar as his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim
revealed the identity of Salazar to his father and brother who came to his aid
immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored the failure of the
prosecution and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the
bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet
empty shells recovered at the crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from
the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following observation:
There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude
of the law enforcement agencies to gather material and important evidence
and the seeming lack of concern of the public prosecutor to direct the
production of such evidence for the successful prosecution of the case. 9
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure
of the prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a
conviction as he was not positively identified as the person who was seen holding a
rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an
unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the
crime immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission of
the crime and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified,
was established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted
and held liable independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he
could be tried and sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the
commission of the offense and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory was
duly proven? The answer is no, he should be held criminally liable as an accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant
was Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino,
in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as
the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with
the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino,
wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an
accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape
of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no
material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the
assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is
indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.