Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 71388 September 23, 1986
MARIA MONSERRAT R. KOH, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. JOB. B. MADAYAG in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge, of Branch CXLV, Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al.,
respondents.
Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Office for petitioner.
Fernandez, Oliva, Umali & Associates and Vicente C. Ramirez, Jr. for respondents.

FERIA, J.:
The Court affirms the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now renamed Court of
Appeals) which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against respondent
Judge Job B. Madayag of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and respondent First Interstate
Bank of California. Petitioner sought to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge
denying her motion to dismiss the complaint based on res adjudicata.
On June 15, 1983, respondent Bank filed a Complaint against petitioner to recover the sum of
US-$7,434.90 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency which, due to a computer error, it had
overpaid to her on October 8, 1981. The Complaint alleged that on September 30, 1981,
petitioner's father sent her US-$500.00 through the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
which was the remitting bank of respondent Bank. But due to computer mistake, respondent
Bank's Los Angeles Office erroneously overstated the amount to US-$8,500.00 instead of US-
$500.00, and as a consequence respondent Bank issued and delivered to petitioner Cashier
Check No. 1217681 amounting to US-$8,500.00 dated October 8, 1981 which petitioner
deposited to her account and subsequently withdrew.
In her Answer dated August 17, 1983, petitioner admitted the above-stated allegations in the
Complaint and alleged that immediately after receipt of a formal demand letter to return the
overpayment, she offered to pay respondent Bank through its lawyer in installments of
$100.00 a month but the offer was unreasonably rejected.
It is significant to note that no copy of said Answer was attached to the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner with the Intermediate Appellate Court, nor was any copy thereof attached to
the petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. It was only in the Comment of
respondents' counsel filed with this Court that a copy of said Answer was attached thereto.
On August 19, 1983, Mr. E.R. Belen, Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 141, sent the following "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" to the parties through their
respective lawyers.
G R E E T I N G S:
Please take notice that cases where issues have been joined will be scheduled
for pre-trial conference only after Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29-where
applicable, necessary and or feasible have been resorted to by the parties.
 If a party believes that those modes of discovery are not applicable, necessary
or feasible with respect to him, he shall file a manifestation to that effect.
The pre-trial conference, shall be scheduled as soon as the respective
manifestations of having resorted to, or of dispensing with, those modes of
discovery have been filed by the parties.
The party, who has dispensed with those modes of discovery shall be deemed
to have waived resort thereto, and, unless for good cause shown, motion to
resort thereto, after termination of the pre-trial, shall not be grantee. The costs
entailed the waiving party in presenting evidence during trial that could have
been obtained through any of those modes of discovery which were waived,
shall not be assessed against the adverse party nor awarded as part of the
litigation expenses.
If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation has been filed,
the case shall be archived or dismissed as the case may be.
Upon Order of the Court, this 19th day of August 1983.
Makati, Metro Manila.
(SGD.) E.R. BELEN
Officer-in-Charge
No manifestation was filed by the parties' lawyers. On November 29, 1983, the presiding
Judge (not respondent Judge), issued the following order:
For non-compliance with the Order (Notice of Case Status) dated August 19,
1983, more particularly the last paragraph thereof, this case is hereby
dismissed.
This order was received by respondent Bank's counsel on December 28, 1983.
On July 4, 1984, respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled its complaint which was
assigned to Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati presided over by respondent
Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res adjudicata, as
well as a supplement thereto, which was opposed by respondent Bank.
On August 27, 1984, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss and on November 27,
1984, he denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, on the following grounds:
(1) The dismissal was too drastic and was tantamount to depriving the plaintiff of its day in
court.
(2) Notwithstanding the failure of the parties in said case to comply with said notice of case
status (above quoted), the court (Branch 141) should have set the case for pre-trial
conference since the last pleading had been filed and there are no other conditions to be
complied with before any case is calendared for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20.
(3) It would be better for the defendant to have a definite and clear-cut decision as to her
liability or non-liability, instead of winning a case on a technicality.
On May 8, 1985, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court
praying that the orders denying the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration be
set aside as null and void and that the complaint be ordered dismissed. On May 21, 1985, the
appellate court, finding no merit to the petition, resolved not to give it due course. In its
decision, the appellate court ruled as follows:
We concur with the above reasoning of respondent Judge. We should add to
that our observation that the order of dismissal of Judge Elbiñas in Civil Case
No. 4272 (Annex F) was null and void for lack of legal basis. The 'notice of case
status' (Annex D) was not an order' of the court. I t was, as its title indicated,
only a 'notice,' not an order. The warning in the last paragraph of the notice
advising the parties that-
'If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation has been filed,
the case shall be archived or dismiss as the case may be.'
was not an order of the court. It was a warning emanating from E.R. Belen, the
officer-in-charge (of civil cases). The failure of the parties to heed the warning
was not tantamount to disobedience of a lawful order of the court, for the 'officer-
in-charge' was not the court or judge.
Since the order of dismissal was null and void, it did not have the force of a
judgment. It did not constitute a bar to the refiling of the bank's complaint.
Respondent Judge did not err, or abuse his discretion, in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7765. (pp. 35-36, Record)
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari to this Court. We are constrained to affirm Indeed, with
the admission in petitioner's Answer of the allegations in the Complaint that due to computer
error there was an overpayment to her of the amount of US-$8,000.00, coupled with her offer
to pay respondent Bank the amount of the overpayment in installments of $100.00 a month,
we cannot find any justification for ruling that the order dismissing the first complaint operated
as an adjudication on the merits or constituted a bar to the second complaint. In fact, the trial
court could have, on motion, rendered a judgment on the pleadings in the first case in favor of
respondent Bank.
True it is that respondent Bank's counsel should have taken the precaution of complying with
the instructions contained in the "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" if only to avoid the consequent
delay resulting from non-compliance; that respondent Bank's counsel was negligent in not
seeking a reconsideration or clarification of the order of dismissal or appealing therefrom. But,
fortunately for respondent Bank, the omissions of its counsel are not fatal to its cause in view
of the defective procedure which culminated in the dismissal of the first complaint.
The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Revised Rules of Court) are
intended to enable a party to obtain knowledge of material facts within the knowledge of the
adverse party or of third parties through depositions to obtain knowledge of material facts or
admissions from the adverse party through written interrogatories; to obtain admissions from
the adverse party regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters of
fact through requests for admission; to inspect relevant documents or objects and lands or
other property in the possession or control of the adverse party; and to determine the physical
or mental condition of a party when such is in controversy. This mutual discovery enables a
party to discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitates an amicable settlement
or expedites the trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so
that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.
Trial judges should, therefore, encourage the proper utilization of the rules on discovery.
However, recourse to discovery procedures is not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to
resort to such procedures, the pre-trial conference should be set pursuant to the mandatory
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 20.
Petitioner argues that respondent Judge was wrong in stating that a pre-trial order should
have been issued since the last pleading had been filed, because the "notice of case status"
was issued on August 19, 1983, while the last pleading or the answer to petitioner's
counterclaim was filed much later. Although, ordinarily, the last pleading which has to be filed
before the court shall set the case for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20 is the answer to the
counterclaim (Itchon vs. Baligod, 17 SCRA 268; Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. vs.
Hontanosas, 78 SCRA 447), in the case at bar, petitioner's counterclaim for damages
resulting from the filing of the complaint did not require an answer (Navarro vs. Bello, 102
Phil. 1019; Gojo vs. Goyola, 35 SCRA 557). Since the counterclaim was the last pleading, the
court should have issued a pre-trial order after its submission and it was the duty of the clerk
of court to place the case in the pre-trial calendar under Section 5 of Rule 20.
Petitioner invokes the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 17 which reads as follows:
Failure to prosecute.-If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the
action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided
by court.
This provision is not applicable to the case at bar. As the appellate court correctly held, the
"notice of case status" was not an order of the court. It was signed by Mr. E.R. Belen, officer-
in-charge. Even the warning in the notice (that if no such manifestation has been filed after 30
days from receipt the case shall be archived or dismissed as the case may be) was
ambiguous. The failure of the parties to heed the warning did not constitute disobedience of a
lawful order of the court. Consequently, the order of dismissal could not have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits. Neither could respondent Bank be considered to have failed to
prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time, inasmuch as petitioner's Answer was
dated August 17, 1983 and the order of dismissal was dated November 29, 1983.
Petitioner cites the case of Arellano vs. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (65 SCRA 45) in
support of her stand. However, in said case, the Court upheld the order of dismissal for failure
of respondent Barreta to serve any answer to petitioner Arellano's interrogatories. The
dismissal was based on Section 5 of Rule 29 which provides that if a party fails to serve
answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such
interrogatories, the Court on motion and notice may dismiss the action or render judgment by
default.
Petitioner further contends that if the ruling of the appellate court regarding the legality of the
notice signed by the officer-in-charge were sustained, then court processes such as
summons, notices of pre-trial, writs of execution and the like can be merely disregarded by
lawyers. This contention is without merit. Section 1 of Rule 14 expressly provides that upon
the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons
to the defendant. Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 20 authorize the clerk of court to issue the notice
of the date of the pre-trial and Section 2 of Rule 22 authorizes the clerk of court to issue the
notice of the date of the trial. A writ of execution may be issued by the clerk of court pursuant
to an order of execution signed by the judge. There is no rule authorizing the issuance of the
"notice of case status" in question signed by an officer-in-charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO,
respondents.
Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and as counsel for respondent Tantoco, Jr.

NARVASA, J.:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago — together with Ferdinand
E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes
Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was
commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to
Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer,
jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR
BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3, 1987. 1 The PCGG filed an
opposition thereto, 2 and the movants, a reply to the opposition. 3 By order dated January 29, 1988, the
Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG
forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations. 4
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25." 5 Basically, they sought
an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon.
Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs.
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the . . case?" 6 The PCGG
responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as
being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is
improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any
guise." 7
On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded
Complaint. 8 As this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of
particulars, through a Manifestation dated April 11, 1988. 9
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, 10 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out,
for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual
basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988.
The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough,"
there are adequate allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged
participation of defendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in said Complaint," and "the
other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature which should be ventilated in the
pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined that "(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue and
without leave of court is premature . . (absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances . . which
would justify . . (the same)."
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18,
1988. 11 In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss Compulsory
Counterclaim " 12
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. 13 On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-
TRIAL. 14 The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties were required
to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date. 15
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," 16 and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' 17
as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. 18
The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's
amended complaint, through such questions, for instance, as—
1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . ., what specific property or properties
does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago for
being ill-gotten?
3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . what specific act or acts . . were
committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with" defendant Ferdinand
Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos
to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?"
5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr.
and Santiago . . were committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alleged
plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?
7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case that
Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially
owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants
Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders of record of the same corporation
are mere "dummies" of said defendants Ferdinand and /or Imelda R. Marcos?
On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination and
copying of—
1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the
Amended Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"
2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and . .
marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and
3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the
decision (of the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar.
By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents (production being
scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively.
On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25,
1989 (allowing production and inspection of documents). It argued that
1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on September
11, 1989 anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on September 14 and 15, are
purposeless and unnecessary;"
2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are clearly described . .
(in) plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief;"
3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used against the PCGG
and/or its Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1, viz.:
(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order.
(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.
It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, 19 which the
Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 21, 1989 (admitting
the Amended Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that —
1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person to whom they are propounded . .," or
"who in the PCGG, in particular, . . (should) answer the interrogatories;"
2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had already been decreed . . as part of the proof
of the Complaint upon trial . .;"
3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact . . which defendants . .
sought to . . (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars;"
4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and irregularly
utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence."
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first,
denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second,
reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).
20
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be nullified because
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. More particularly, it claims
—
a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:
1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular individuals to whom
they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG;
2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan (in denying the
movants' motion for bill of particulars) had already declared to be part of the PCGG's proof
 upon trial; and
3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in
contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances; and
b) as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:
1) that movants had not shown any good cause therefor;
2) that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in
Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, and the movants had viewed, scrutinized
and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon; and
3) that the other documents sought to be produced are either —
(a) privileged in character or confidential in nature and their use is proscribed by the
immunity provisions of Executive Order No. 1, or
(b) non-existent, or mere products of the movants' suspicion and fear.
This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the
Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its questioned resolutions of September 29, 1989 in
Civil Case No. 0008. 21
After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties, the Solicitor
General withdrew "as counsel for plaintiff . . with the reservation, however, conformably with
Presidential Decree No. 478, the provisions of Executive Order No. 292, as well as the
decisional law of 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' (G.R. No. 92561, September 12,
1990) 22 to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this . . Court if
called for by circumstances in the interest of the Government or if he is so required by the
Court." 23 This, the Court allowed by Resolution dated January 21, 1991. 24
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court that the cases from
which the Solicitor General had withdrawn would henceforth be under his (Maceren's) charge
"and/or any of the following private attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko, Mario
Jalandoni and such other attorneys as it may later authorize." 25
The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully ventilated their
respective positions, the Court now proceeds to decide the case.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of
Court: interrogatories to parties , 26 and production and inspection of documents and things. 27
Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if
not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable
disinclination to resort to them — which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of
the deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience
of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and
speed up adjudication. 28 Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential
function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from
the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination
of the facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the
controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied
with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that
adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there is faultiness in the
approximation of objective justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to
see that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration,
misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a
relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during
the trial. 29
Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v. Villamor, 30 this Court described the nature and object of
litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests are to be
conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is,
rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the
facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections
of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested right in
technicalities. . . .
The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in
issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to
him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit
manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts
within his knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings
filed by the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the
pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of a party's claims or defenses is
limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and
logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts." 31
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too
generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an adverse
party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars
seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The
office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more particular or definite the
ultimate facts in a pleading It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common
perception is that said evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only
during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the
trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not
indeed even before the pre-trial — should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant
to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; in
other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the
Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in
Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial,
under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not
only eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also
requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair
settlement before trial is measurably increased. . ." 32
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded
inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation
and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with
the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties,
and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to
repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in
the dark. 33
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad
as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends
to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those
matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible
information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial.
The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) 34 which generally
allows the examination of a deponent —
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending
action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful
in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period
preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . . 35
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism,
such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written
interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for
admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without
court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to
avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. 36 It is only
when an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the
defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these
modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the
disputed facts are not clear. 37
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or
inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental
examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a
showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious,
the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as
dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the
disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the
amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking
the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or
defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. 38
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without
leave and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably
arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a
manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. 39 And . . . further
limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches
upon the recognized domains of privilege." 40
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired
into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within
the bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in
relation of course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be
resolved.
The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court cannot be sustained.
It should initially be pointed out — as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File
Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 41 — that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve
interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In
such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property
subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in
relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires
"leave of court." 42 But there was no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to
serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 1989 43) after they had filed
their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act
thereon.
1. The petitioner's first contention — that the interrogatories in question are defective because
they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed
only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the same matters . . (private respondents) sought
to be clarified through their aborted Motion . . for Bill of Particulars" — are untenable and
quickly disposed of.
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which
states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer
thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely no reason why this proposition
should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the
interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner o
officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to
answer. As the rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof
competent to testify in its behalf."
That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a prior motion
for bill of particulars addressed to the PCGG's amended complaint — and denied for lack of
merit — is beside the point. Indeed, as already pointed out above, a bill of particulars may elicit
only ultimate facts, not so-called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper subject
of discovery. 44
Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack specificity. The merest
glance at them disproves the argument. The interrogatories are made to relate to individual
paragraphs of the PCGG's expanded complaint and inquire about details of the ultimate facts
therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the
interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being
made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it. 45 But until such an objection is
presented and sustained, the obligation to answer subsists.
2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof
upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. As already pointed out, it is the precise
purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all
parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at
which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding
it.
3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the interrogatories would make PCGG
Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related
issuances. In the first place, there is nothing at all wrong in a party's making his adversary his
witness . 46 This is expressly allowed by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 6. Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. — A party may . . . call an
adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation
or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by
leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by
or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party
only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.
The PCGG insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a "fishing expedition," apart
from the fact that the information sought is immaterial since they are evidently meant to
establish a claim against PCGG officers who are not parties to the action. It suffices to point out
that "fishing expeditions" are precisely permitted through the modes of discovery. 47 Moreover,
a defendant who files a counterclaim against the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead
persons (therefore strangers to the action) as additional defendants on said counterclaim. This
may be done pursuant to Section 14, Rule 6 of the Rules, to wit:
Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. — When the presence of parties other than those to the
original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a
 counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if
jurisdiction over them can be obtained."
The PCGG's assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil action "for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by . . (Executive) Order (No. 1)," is
not a ground to refuse to answer the interrogatories. The disclosure of facto relevant to the
action and which are not self-incriminatory or otherwise privileged is one thing; the matter of
whether or not liability may arise from the facts disclosed in light of Executive Order
No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way of defense in
the action.
The apprehension has been expressed that the answers to the interrogatories may be utilized as
foundation for a counterclaim against the PCGG or its members and officers. They will be. The
private respondents have made no secret that this is in fact their intention. Withal, the Court is
unable to uphold the proposition that while the PCGG obviously feels itself at liberty to bring
actions on the basis of its study and appreciation of the evidence in its possession, the parties
sued should not be free to file counterclaims in the same actions against the PCGG or its
officers for gross neglect or ignorance, if not downright bad faith or malice in the
commencement or initiation of such judicial proceedings, or that in the actions that it may bring,
the PCGG may opt not to be bound by rule applicable to the parties it has sued, e.g., the rules of
discovery.
So, too, the PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be "required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial . . proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance," has no
application to a judicial proceeding it has itself initiated. As just suggested, the act of bringing
suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself
within the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and
duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while
the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within
their knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without
its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character
and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG
cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act
for the State. 48
The suggestion 49 that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except
when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental
capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without support in principle or precedent. On
the contrary —
The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied
consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a
contract. 50
The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against the
private parties, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of
the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up
whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. . . . (Sinco,
 Philippine Political Law, Tenth E., pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L.
ed. 899)" 51
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its
jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it
has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just
compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owner. 52
The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of the
nullity of the Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified documents
and things allegedly in its possession.
The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and
inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the
movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made
comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No
serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have
copies of those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the
trial for any purpose allowed by law.
The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in response to
the corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so
unless it is subsequently established that the denial is false.
The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already been
dealt with. The PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within
some other privilege, constitutional or statutory.
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the
production and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53
Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of
several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in
evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by
the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial.
The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the
counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.
One last word. Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery earlier
mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said modes
is a complicated matter, unduly expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
For example, as will already have been noted from the preceding discussion, all that is entailed
to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25
of the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of
least questions with the request that they be answered individually. 55 That is all. The service of
such a communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of
answering the questions "separately and fully in writing underoath," and serving "a copy of the
answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of the
interrogatories . . ." 56 The sanctions for refusing to make discovery have already been
mentioned. 57 So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the
service on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a request that specific
facts therein set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended, be
 admitted in writing. 58 That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has
the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving the party requesting admission with "a
sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters,"
failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted." 59 The taking of depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral examination
or by written interrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as
complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive notion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The temporary
restraining order issued on October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., I also join Justice Cruz's concurrence.
Romero, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25481 October 31, 1969
GERONIMO CAGUIAT, RUFINA CAGUIAT, FELICIDAD CAGUIAT, FABIAN CAGUIAT,
and APOLONIA CAGUIAT, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GUILLERMO E. TORRES and FRANCISCO CAGUIAT, respondents-
appellees.
De Santos and Delfino for petitioners-appellants.
L. D. Fuggan and Associates for respondents-appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35429-R, Geronimo
Caguiat, et al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Guillermo E. Torres and Francisco Caguiat, Respondents, which
"denied and dismissed" the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioners-appellants for the purpose
of annulling and setting aside the order of above-mentioned judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Civil Case No. 8050 of said court between said appellants and private appellee — respondent
herein, Francisco Caguiat granting the latter's motion to enjoin the taking of said appellee's deposition,
by way of discovery, after issues had already been joined by the filing of said appellee's answer as
defendant in said civil case.
The controlling facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Petitioners are plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8050 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
VIII, presided over by respondent Judge, while respondent Francisco Caguiat is the defendant
therein.
On August 18, 1964, after defendant had filed his answer with counterclaim, and the plaintiffs,
their reply to defendant's answer (See Annexes A, B, C, D), the herein petitioners served on
respondent Caguiat a notice to take his deposition (Annex E). On August 26, 1964 respondent
 Caguiat filed with the lower court an urgent motion to prevent the taking of the deposition or to
restrict its scope (Annex F), which urgent motion the petitioners opposed (Annex G). On the
29th of the same month the respondent Judge issued an order (Annex F), to hold in abeyance the
resolution of his co-respondent's urgent motion until after the pre-trial set for September 3, 1963
which was, however, reset for October 2, 1964 to give the parties time to consider an amicable
settlement. The parties however failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
On October 3, 1964 herein petitioners again served on respondent Caguiat a second notice for
the taking of his deposition upon oral examination (Annexes K and L), to prevent which, the
latter filed an urgent motion on the 14th of the same month (Annex M). Petitioners opposed
respondent Caguiat's urgent motion (Annex N). Resolving the urgent motion and the opposition
thereto, the respondent Judge, on the 17th, granted his co-respondent's urgent motion and
ordered the petitioners to refrain from taking the contemplated deposition (Annex O).
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration (Annex P) was denied after its hearing on December 12,
1964 (Annex S).
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners' avowed purpose in securing the deposition of respondent Caguiat is to get the
latter to lay his cards on the table and/or to simplify or abbreviate the proceedings. Respondent
Caguiat, on the other hand, affirms that he has already revealed practically his entire defense,
even to the extent of naming his witnesses, during the pre-trial, so that the necessity of a
deposition has been obviated. In fact, according to respondent Caguiat, he had expressed
willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, but apparently the petitioners did not want to. We
note that the petitioners have not denied respondent Caguiat's assertion that he had already
disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial, neither have they belied that personal animosities
between them and the same respondent which went unfettered during the pre-trial, might
endanger the peaceful and objective conduct of the deposition upon oral examination.
It is significant that the respondent Judge deferred the resolution of his co-respondent's first
motion to prevent the taking of his deposition or to restrict its scope, until after the pre-trial (See
Annex H). Likewise, the second urgent motion of the same tenor (Annex M) and the petitioners'
opposition thereto (Annex N) were resolved only after the completion of the pre-trial and in fact
after the parties' joint petition for hearing on the merits had been granted (Annex J). The fact
that the controverted orders were issued only after the pre-trial supports respondent Caguiat's
affirmation that he had revealed his defense during the trial, and that the respondent Judge had
satisfied himself that after such revelation there was no more need to take the former's
deposition upon oral examination. Indubitably this view must have been shared by the
petitioners, otherwise they would not have filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even
before the orders in question were issued. (Decision of Court of Appeals, pp. 1-2 & 4-5)
Appellants assign the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING ITS DECISION DEPEND ON THE
UNSUPPORTED CONCLUSION THAT 'SINCE THE RESPONDENT FRANCISCO
CAGUIAT HAD PRACTICALLY DISCLOSED ALL HIS EVIDENCE DURING THE PRE-
TRIAL CONFERENCE' THE NECESSITY OF A DEPOSITION THROUGH ORAL
EXAMINATION BY THE PETITIONERS WAS OBVIATED.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS A DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE BY THE
 RESPONDENT CAGUIAT DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND THAT THE
PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES MIGHT BE HEIGHTENED, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING SAID 'FINDINGS' AS GROUNDS TO
COMPLETELY PREVENT AND BAR DISCOVERY THROUGH DEPOSITION ON
EXAMINATION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING PETITIONERS' MODE OF DISCOVERY
TO OTHER MEANS THAN ORAL EXAMINATION IGNORING THEREBY THE SPIRIT
BEHIND THE RULES OF DISCOVERY. (Appellants' brief)
Anent the first alleged error, it is readily to be noted that the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals
being assailed are binding upon the parties and this Court. Indeed, the finding of that appellate court to
the effect that appellee has already disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial and that personal
animosities between the parties "might endanger the peaceful and objective conduct of the deposition
upon oral examination" proposed appears well substantiated in the records before Us. As aptly stated in
the appealed decision:
It is significant that the respondent Judge deferred the resolution of his co-respondent's first
motion to prevent the taking of his deposition or to restrict its scope, until after the pre-trial (see
Annex H). Likewise, the second urgent motion of the same tenor (Annex M) and the petitioners'
opposition thereto (Annex N) were resolved only after the completion of the pre-trial and in fact
after the parties' joint petition for hearing on the merits had been granted (Annex J). The fact
that the controverted orders were issued only after the pre-trial supports respondent Caguiat's
affirmation that he had revealed his defense during the trial, and that the respondent Judge had
satisfied himself that after such revelation there was no more need to take the former's
deposition upon oral examination. Indubitably this view must have been shared by the
petitioners, otherwise they would not have filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even
before the orders in question were issued. (p. 5, CA's decision)
In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the disclosure by appellee of practically all
his evidence at the pre-trial and the danger of heightening the animosities between the parties during
the proposed taking of the deposition of appellee are not enough to warrant the trial court's order
preventing completely the taking of said deposition. Such contention is untenable.
There can be no question that the trial court has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition
shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so ruling. (Cojuangco v. Caluag, L-7952, July 30, 1955,
unreported) That the right of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not exactly absolute is
implicit in the provisions of the Rules of Court cited by appellants themselves, sections 16 and 18 of
Rule 24, which are precisely designed to protect parties and their witnesses, whenever in the opinion of
the trial court, the move to take their depositions under the guise of discovery is actually intended to
only annoy, embarrass or oppress them. In such instances, these provisions expressly authorize the
court to either prevent the taking of a deposition or stop one that is already being taken.
In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all his evidence at the pre-trial, appellee
expressed willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, which offer, appellants rejected. Moreover,
according to Court of Appeals, the parties herein filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even
before the orders in question were issued. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable to conclude that
there was indeed no further need for the deposition desired by appellants. It could have served no
useful purpose, for there was nothing anymore to discover. Appellants have not shown any real
concrete reason for such deposition.
Appellants' inference in their third assignment of error that the Court of Appeals has limited their
modes of discovery only to other means than a deposition is entirely baseless. All that has been done
here is to hold, and rightly, that appellants have failed to show that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in holding that, under the circumstances proven in the records, there existed good reasons to
prevent them from taking the deposition of appellee.
It is Our conclusion that this appeal is absolutely without merit. Instead of availing themselves of the
modes of discovery provided in the Rules in the manner that would accomplish one of the basic
purposes for which they have been designed, namely, to cut down trivial discussion about issues of fact
which are better agreed upon rather than formally tried, appellants have chosen to unduly delay this
case by taking the simple incident herein involved to the Court of Appeals and later to this Court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Treble costs against appellants in this instance.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as
required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did
not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of
its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing
facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy
of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day
of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA
461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July
30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate
and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May
30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to
June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for
new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it
is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be
allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.
73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September
9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it
is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official
Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.
R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of
"last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.