FERNANDO U. JUAN v. ROBERTO U.

JUAN

[ GR No. 221732, Aug 23, 2017]

Facts:

Respondent Roberto U. Juan claimed that he began using the name and mark "Lavandera Ko"
in his laundry business on July 4, 1994. He then opened his laundry store at No. 119 Alfaro St.,
Salcedo St., Makati City in 1995. Thereafter, on March 17, 1997, the National Library issued to
him a certificate of copyright over said name and mark. Over the years, the laundry business
expanded with numerous franchise outlets in Metro Manila and other provinces. Respondent
Roberto then formed a corporation to handle the said business, hence, Laundromatic
Corporation (Laundromatic) was incorporated in 1997, while "Lavandera Ko" was registered as
a business name on November 13, 1998 with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Thereafter, respondent Roberto discovered that his brother, petitioner Fernando was able to
register the name and mark "Lavandera Ko" with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on
October 18, 2001, the registration of which was filed on June 5, 1995. Respondent Roberto also
alleged that a certain Juliano Nacino (Juliano) had been writing the franchisees of the former
threatening them with criminal and civil cases if they did not stop using the mark and name
"Lavandera Ko." It was found out by respondent Roberto that petitioner Fernando had been
selling his own franchises.

Thus, respondent Roberto filed a petition for injunction, unfair competition, infringement of
copyright, cancellation of trademark and name with/and prayer for TRO and Preliminary
Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the case was raffled off at Branch 149,
Makati City. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner Fernando in
Order dated June 10, 2004. On July 21, 2008, due to the death of respondent Roberto, the latter
was substituted by his son, Christian Juan (Christian). Pre-trial conference was concluded on
July 13, 2010 and after the presentation of evidence of both parties, the RTC rendered a
Resolution dated September 23, 2013, dismissing the petition and ruling that neither of the
parties had a right to the exclusive use or appropriation of the mark "Lavandera Ko" because the
same was the original mark and work of a certain Santiago S. Suarez (Santiago). According to
the RTC, the mark in question was created by Suarez in 1942 in his musical composition called,
"Lavandera Ko" and both parties of the present case failed to prove that they were the
originators of the same mark.

Petitioner appealed to CA but CA dismissed due to technical grounds.

Petitioner files Certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT A MARK IS THE SAME AS A COPYRIGHT.

Held:

No. The Ruling of RTC is erroneous.

The law on trademarks, service marks and trade names are found under Part III of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8293, or the Intellectual Code of the Philippines, while Part IV of the same law
governs copyrights.

"Lavandera Ko," the mark in question in this case is being used as a trade name or specifically, a
service name since the business in which it pertains involves the rendering of laundry services.
Under Section 121.1 of R.A. No. 8293, "mark" is defined as any visible sign capable of
distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall
include a stamped or marked container of goods. As such, the basic contention of the parties is,
who has the better right to use "Lavandera Ko" as a service name because Section 165.2[13] of
the said law, guarantees the protection of trade names and business names even prior to or
without registration, against any unlawful act committed by third parties. A cause of action
arises when the subsequent use of any third party of such trade name or business name would
likely mislead the public as such act is considered unlawful. Hence, the RTC erred in denying the
parties the proper determination as to who has the ultimate right to use the said trade name by
ruling that neither of them has the right or a cause of action since "Lavandera Ko" is protected
by a copyright.

By their very definitions, copyright and trade or service name are different. Copyright is the
right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law.[14] An intangible,
incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic
productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of
multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them.[15] Trade name, on the other
hand, is any designation which (a) is adopted and used by person to denominate goods which he
markets, or services which he renders, or business which he conducts, or has come to be so used
by other, and (b) through its association with such goods, services or business, has acquired a
special significance as the name thereof, and (c) the use of which for the purpose stated in (a) is
prohibited neither by legislative enactment nor by otherwise defined public policy.[16]

Section 172.1 of R.A. 8293 enumerates the following original intellectual creations in the literary
and artistic domain that are protected from the moment of their creation, thus:

172.1 Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as "works", are original intellectual
creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation and
shall include in particular:

(a) Books, pamphlets, articles and other writings;

(b) Periodicals and newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery, whether or not
reduced in writing or other material form;
(d) Letters;
(e) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works or entertainment in
dumb shows;
(f) Musical compositions, with or without words;
(g) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography or other works of
art; models or designs for works of art;
(h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not
registrable as an industrial design, and other works of applied art;
(i) Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works relative to
geography, topography, architecture or science;
(j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(k) Photographic works including works produced by a process analogous to photography;
lantern slides;
(l) Audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous
to cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;
(m) Pictorial illustrations and advertisements;
(n) Computer programs; and
(o) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.

As such, "Lavandera Ko," being a musical composition with words is protected under the
copyright law (Part IV, R.A. No. 8293) and not under the trademarks, service marks and trade
names law (Part III, R.A. No. 8293).

Considering, therefore, the above premise, this Court deems it proper to remand the case to the
RTC for its proper disposition since this Court cannot, based on the records and some of the
issues raised by both parties such as the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of registration
issued by the Intellectual Property Office, make a factual determination as to who has the better
right to use the trade/business/service name, "Lavandera Ko."

G.R. No. 210766

MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON
vs. BENJAMIN L. SINGSON
DEL CASTILLO, J.
January 8, 2018

FACTS:
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson
(petitioner) filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No.
07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson
(respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church,
Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of
legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent
was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare,
extremely vain physically and spiritually," and a compulsive gambler; that respondent
was immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was
also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's
abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or
assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from
respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole
breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined
at Metro Psych Facility, a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's
attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the
following diagnosis on respondent: xx
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial
agreement to govern their prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no
conjugal assets or debts.
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity"
must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not
present in the instant case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts.
Xx
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts;
that the land where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family
home is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in
Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and
petitioner also have investments in shares of stocks, cars, household appliances,
furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they came from
petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo
Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity.
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC.
Hence, this Petition wherein notably the petitioner insists that this Court can take
judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders are generally incurable and
permanent, and must continuously be treated medically; that in this case the Clinical
Summary; had pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is
only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that
personality disorders are incurable.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
(2) Whether or not the testimonies of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio and son Jose are meritorious.
(3) Whether or not Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders
are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically.

HELD:
(1) NO.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's
psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters
since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his
property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family
home with petitioner-appellee and their children."40
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter
"was working at a certain point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's
formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and
respondent met at the bank where petitioner was applying for a job and where
respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their
marriage.42
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence
a notarized summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by
the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes,
Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating
that this amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we
note that she admitted under oath that the items for their family budget, such as their
children's education, the payments for association dues, and for electric bills came from
this money.
(2) NO.
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not
specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity.
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are
circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced to
substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner's contention that
respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's conduct was
"dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious
charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner
did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that
this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's
psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been
held that the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he
could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been
expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth."

(3) NO.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that
"personality disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are
mandated to take judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.
Rosario Textile Mills v Home Bankers
Savings and Trust Company G.R. No.
137232 June 29, 2005
MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT
A trust receipt is a security agreement pursuant to which a bank acquires a ‘security interest’ in
the goods. In Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, we elucidated further that “a trust
receipt, therefore, is a security agreement, pursuant to which a bank acquires a ‘security interest’
in the goods. It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security interest that
secures no obligation.”
Facts: Sometime in 1989, Rosario Textile Mills Corporation (RTMC) applied from Home Bankers
Savings & Trust Co. for an Omnibus Credit Line for P10 million. The bank approved RTMC’s credit
line but for only P8 million. The bank notified RTMC of the grant of the said loan thru a letter dated
March 2, 1989 which contains terms and conditions conformed by RTMC thru Edilberto V. Yujuico.
On March 3, 1989, Yujuico signed a Surety Agreement in favor of the bank, in which he bound
himself jointly and severally with RTMC for the payment of all RTMC’s indebtedness to the bank
from 1989 to 1990. RTMC availed of the credit line by making numerous drawdowns, each
drawdown being covered by a separate promissory note and trust receipt. RTMC, represented by
Yujuico, executed in favor of the bank a total of eleven (11) promissory notes.
Yujuico contend that he should be absolved from liability. They claimed that although the grant of
the credit line and the execution of the suretyship agreement. They alleged that the bank gave
assurance that the suretyship agreement was merely a formality under which Yujuico will not be
personally liable. He theorized that when RTMC imported the raw materials needed for its
manufacture, using the credit line, it was merely acting on behalf of the bank, the true owner of the
goods by virtue of the trust receipts.

Issue: Whether or not Yujuico is absolved from liability by the grant of the credit line and the
execution of the suretyship agreement

Held: No. Yujuico’s argument conveniently ignores the true nature of its transaction with the bank. A
trust receipt is a security agreement pursuant to which a bank acquires a ‘security interest’ in the
goods. In Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, we elucidated further that “a trust receipt,
therefore, is a security agreement, pursuant to which a bank acquires a ‘security interest’ in the
goods. It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security interest that secures no
obligation.” In Samo vs. People, we described a trust receipt as “a security transaction intended to aid
in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the
importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through
utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased.”

“If under the trust receipt, the bank is made to appear as the owner, it was but an artificial expedient,
more of legal fiction than fact, for if it were really so, it could dispose of the goods in any manner it
wants, which it cannot do, just to give consistency with purpose of the trust receipt of giving a
stronger security for the loan obtained by the importer. To consider the bank as the true owner from
the inception of the transaction would be to disregard the loan feature thereof.

RTMC filed with the bank an application for a credit line in the amount of P10 million, but only P8
million was approved. RTMC then made withdrawals from this credit line and issued several
promissory notes in favor of the bank. In banking and commerce, a credit line is “that amount of
money or merchandise which a banker, merchant, or supplier agrees to supply to a person on credit
and generally agreed to in advance.”[3]It is the fixed limit of credit granted by a bank, retailer, or
credit card issuer to a customer, to the full extent of which the latter may avail himself of his dealings
with the former but which he must not exceed and is usually intended to cover a series of transactions
in which case, when the customer’s line of credit is nearly exhausted, he is expected to reduce his
indebtedness by payments before making any further drawings.

Estrada v. Desierto
JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)
G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

FACTS:

 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
 Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
 House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or
more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political
convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate
President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
 Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as
judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
 When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust,
Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA
Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
 January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-
km line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on
Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding
petitioner's resignation.
 January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to
the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National
Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to
the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000
strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service
commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.
 January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
 January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers the duties of the Presidency.
 February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further
proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner
as President is over and only if legally warranted."
 February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for
judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.

 Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President.

HELD:
 Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It
can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect.
 In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act
and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
 Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

 An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
 What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of
inability.
 In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made
by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Herrera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005

FACTS:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother Armi
Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he
is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s
mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she
taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences
Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology
Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA
paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing
paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-
incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA Paternity testing violates Herrera’s right against self-incrimination.

RULING:

No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the
prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the
decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).

It is also considered that the Vallejo Guidelines be considered by the courts. The Vallejo Guidelines
determines weight and probative value of DNA test results.

Citibank NA Mastercard vs Teodoro

GR No 150905 23 September 2003
 28 WednesdaySEP 2016

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: Efren Teodoro is a Citibank Card credit card holder. Bt 1995 his outstanding
obligation ballooned to 191,693.25 inclusive of interest and service charges. During the
trial, Citibank presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to only
P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in
evidence as Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures of
respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of the
credit card. MTC decided in favour of Citibank. Teodoro appealed to RTC and affirmed MTC
decision. CA reversed.
Issue: WON CA erred in holding that petitioner failed to prove the due execution and the
cause of the unavailability and non-production of the charge slips marked in evidence as
Exhibits F to F-4
Decision: SC affirmed CA decision.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence.

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original
sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of
the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction
in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

The loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions
that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by
Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to
show that he had subsequently followed up the request.

When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any
one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.
Triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the sales invoice only once.
During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy had gone to respondent, another
to the merchant, and still another to petitioner.

Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were
unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.