WEEK 6

SUCCESSION
DIGESTS

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al.

[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000.]
PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS:
 Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; an appendix) of Aleja Belleza, was
instituted devisee of Lot No. 1392 with an area of 511,855 square meters with the obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein private respondent every year during the latter's lifetime.
 The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the instituted heir but also to his
successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants."
 Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children, one of whom is herein petitioner.
 Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to comply with their obligation, filed a complaint
with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject property to the surviving heirs of the
testatrix.
 During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement was concluded between the parties wherein the
lessee of the property assumed the delivery of 100 piculs of sugar to private respondent; however,
only partial delivery was made.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, “While there may
be the non-performance of the command as mandated, exaction from them (the petitioners), simply
because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does
not warrant the filing of the present complaint.”
 The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature of a
modal institution and a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose when petitioner failed
to comply with their obligation under the codicil, and in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the
estate of testatrix. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent has a legally demandable right against the petitioner, as one of
the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.

HELD:
YES.It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of
law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow
or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs
of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need
of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of
death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to
the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
mjprivate respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL
Principle:
A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-law by right of representation. Article 971
explicitly declares that the representative is called to succession by law because of blood
relationship. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded. A widow of the person represented cannot assert the
same right of representation as there is no filiation by blood.
Facts:
Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survived by her husband, their two (2) children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving
behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales,
1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that
she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Petitioner contends that she is a compulsory heir as enumerated in Art. 887 being the widow or
widower of the son of the decedent and that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales
he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as her compulsory heir.
Issue: Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?
Held: NO
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit
from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions
of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the
deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving
spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow
or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-
law.
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the
Civil Code, viz—
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative
is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because
of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented)
who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had
an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it
may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not
succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They
had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about
1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May
1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition
for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation;
and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition
by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO
183 SCRA 565, March 22, 1990
Digested by: ARCISO, Diane Gale B.

FACTS:
Bienvenido Nacario was driving a tricycle with a passenger when he was hit with a bus
driven by Edgar Bitancor and owned by Jose Baritua. Bienvenido and his passenger died and the
tricycle was damaged.
There was an extra-judicial settlement negotiation wherein Beienvenido’s estranged wife,
Alicia, with whom he has a child, received P18, 500. With that, she executed a “Release of
Claim” discharging Bitancor, Baritua, and the bus insurer from all actions, claims, and demands
arising from the accident. She also executed an affidavit of desistance manifesting her lack of
interest in instituting any case, civil or criminal, against them.
After a year and ten months from the date of accident, the parents of Bienvenido filed a
complaint for damages against Bitancor and Baritua. They alleged that they were the ones who
spent for their son’s funeral and loaned to him the purchase price of the damaged tricycle.
Claiming that it is them who suffered damages, they shall be indemnified for their son’s death.

ISSUE:
Whether the spouse was entitled to receive the petitioner’s payment.

HELD:
Yes. Under Article 1240 of the Civil Code, payment shall be made to the person in whose
favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to
receive it. Certainly, Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred
to by law as the persons authorized to receive payment.
Further, Articles 887 and 985 of the Civil Code provide that the parents of the deceased
succeed only when the person dies without a legitimate descendant. Since it has been
established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the parents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. Even if Alicia had been
estranged from Bienvenido, mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the parents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. Such are mere money claims against the estate of their
deceased son, which had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement
concluded with Alicia, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child,
her co-heir.

Lauro Vizconde v. CA
G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998

FACTS:

Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas have five children, namely: Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde (wife
of herein petitioner LauroVizconde); Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon;
and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. On June 30, 1991, Estrellita and her two daughters were
killed. In an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita, Rafael and Salud,
together with petitioner Vizconde, inherited from Estrellita’s estate.

Subsequently, when Rafael died in 1992, an intestate estate proceeding was instituted by one of
the heirs of Rafael. Private respondent Ramon, among other things, averred that petitioner should
be impleaded as one of Rafael’s children “by right of representation as the widower of deceased
legitimate daughter Estrellita.” Pursuant to the order of the probate court, petitioner filed a
Manifestation contending that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and
he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted Ramon’s motion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding regarding
Rafael’s estate is proper.

RULING:

No. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is exclusive, which
negates the rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall be included in the proceeding as a
compulsory heir for he is only a son-in-law of decedent Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not even
shown to be a creditor of decedent is considered a third person or stranger. Petitioner may not be
dragged into the proceeding herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to intervene as he has
no personality or interest in the said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.

G.R. No. 70722 July 3, 1991

CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts:
Jose Velasquez, Sr. died intestate. Petitioner Canuta Pagkatipunan is the surviving spouse and
the other 13 petitioners are their children. The respondents are his descendants with his first wife
Victorina Real who died in 1920. The controversy in this case is the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership properties acquired by the deceased in his two marriages. It appears that after the
death of Real in 1920, no dissolution has been made. Neither had there been any liquidation of
the second partnership after the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in 1961. Based on the Report
submitted by the commissioners, all of the 20 properties were acquired by the decedent during
his first marriage. A judgment was rendered by the trial court: 1) Declaring the properties as
belonging to the estate from the first marriage; 2) Confirming all the conveyances executed by
the decedent during his lifetime; 3) Declaring null and void the transfers executed by
Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister which was reconveyed to her and the deeds of assignments
executed by Pagkatipunan in favor of her children; 4) Ordering the partition of the house and lot
in West Avenue, Quezon City. The Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated a decision,
affirming the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the entire estate belonged to the first marriage.

Held:
No. The Court finds that both the lower Courts failed to consider the following basic principles
which renders the appealed decision defective:
ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those
imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by the decedent in favor of some
of his compulsory heirs. It appears that there was no determination whatsoever of the gross value
of his conjugal properties with Real. Likewise, no collation of the donations he executed during
his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain
whether or not such donations trenched on the heirs’ legitime.
Article 909 of the Civil Code provides: “ Donations given to children shall be charged to
their legitimes. Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of
which the testator could have disposed by his last will. Insofar as they may be inofficious or
may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established
by this Code."
Relative to the sale executed by Pagkatipunan to her sister and the resale of the same property to
her and the subsequent deeds of assignment she executed in favor of her children, the trial court
had clearly established that Pagkatipunan employed fraudulent acts to acquire title over the said
properties. Hence, the said sales and assignments are null and void, sham and fictitious. No
conclusion as to the legal share due to the compulsory heirs can be reached in this case without
(1) determining first the net value of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr.; (2) collating all the
donations inter vivos in favor of some of the heirs; and (3) ascertaining the legitime of the
compulsory heirs.
Civil Case No. SC-894 is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, for further
proceedings and the same Court is directed to follow the procedure for partition herein
prescribed.
Buhay De Roma v. CA (July 23, 1987)
Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate.
When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an
inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties donated by
their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled
P10,297.50 and the value is not disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because
when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation “sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli” which the TC interpreted as a
prohibition to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On
appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express
prohibition to collate.
Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Held: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should
be reduced as inofficious. (1036)
The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and that it merely described the donation as
irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated
properties from collation as required under the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise
language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would have included an express prohibition
to collate if that had been the donor’s intention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule
not the exemption should be applied.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P.
ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO,Petitioner,- versus -FRANCISCO PASCUAL and
MIGUEL PASCUAL,Respondents.G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010 CARPIO
MORALES, J.:

FACTS: 1. Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely:
a) petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters;
b) Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes)
c) Nona P. Arellano
d)Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual
2. In a petition for “Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration,” filed by the respondents before the RTC of Makati, there is an allegation that the
donation to petitioner is an advance of her legitime;
3. The said prorperty is now registered under the name of the petitioner covered by TCT 181889
RD of Makati;
4. Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedent’s estate,the probate court found the
Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus
went on to hold that it is subject to collation ;
5. An appeal to the CA was made, questioning the order of the trial court to include the property
subject of the donation as part of the advance inheritance of the petitioner;
6. The CA sustained the findings of the trial court as to the collation of the said parcel of land;

ISSUE: WON the property subject of the donation is subject of collation and
WON the estate was devided equally;

HELD: On the first issue:

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by
the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate;
and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the
testator during his lifetime.
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations
may be reduced.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime
to be safeguarded.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was
at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid,is deemed as donation made to a
“stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir,
however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-
collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to Art. 1003 and 1004 of the NCC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. THe decision of the CA affirming the findings of the
trial court is hereby reversed and SET ASIDE. The case is further REMANDED to the court a qou
for the determination of the equal sharing among the heirs.

Imperial vs Ca
G.R. No. 112483. October 8, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land known as
Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his natural son,
Eloy Imperial, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several
lots. Eloy Imperial and the respondents Villalons admit that, the transaction was in fact a donation
despite being designated as a deed of absolute sale.
After 2 years, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on
the ground that he was deceived into signing the document. The dispute was resolved through a
compromise agreement.
Leoncio died pending the execution of the judgment leaving Eloy and his adopted son Victor
Imperial. Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio and it was he who moved for the execution.
Such motion was granted. Victor died single survived only by his natural father, Ricardo
Villalon. Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the donation. Eloy
moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, for Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. It was alleged that
Eloy caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the latters physical
weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner
impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
In his Answer, Eloy alleged that: (1) Leoncio had conveyed sufficient property to Victor to
cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated
the defense of res judicata, and (3) raised the additional defenses of prescription and laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died and was substituted in this action by his sons, namely, Antonio,
Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther H.
Villalon.
 The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis
of its finding that at the time of Leoncios death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square
meter parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC went on further to state that
petitioners allegation that other properties existed and were inherited by Victor was not
substantiated by the evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.
Issues:
1. WON respondents have the right to contest the donation
2. WON the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years
Held:
1. Yes
Our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it
requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:

The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition

presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.

Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio upon the latters death, his act of moving for execution
of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was,
therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation,
under Article 772. Nor are Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to
do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:

If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be
transmitted to his heirs.

2. No.

The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1)
four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four
years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during the lifetime
of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his
or their support. Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges
upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive
period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive
period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the
Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, recognized
that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly
so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes
may be determined.
 It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action,
therefore, has long prescribed.