JUANCHO MIGUEL ORBISO

SUCCESSION

MORALES vs ANA MARIA

GR 198994

FACTS: Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
case to proceed intestate because: (1) the probate of a decedent’s will is mandatory; (2) the
RTC Branch 254 already ordered the case to proceed into probate; (3) the order setting the
case for probate already attained finality; (3) the probate court cannot touch on the intrinsic
validity of the will; and (4) there was no preterition because Francisco received a house and
lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.
The respondent heirs counter: (1) that it is within the RTC’s jurisdiction to reverse or modify an
interlocutory order setting the case for probate; (2) that the petitioner failed to mention that she
did not appear in any of the evidentiary hearings to disprove their allegation of preterition; (3)
that the RTC and the CA both found that Francisco was preterited from the will; and (4) that
Francisco’s preterition annulled the institution of heirs and opened the case into intestacy. They
conclude that the RTC did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion when
it reinstated Alfonso Jr. as the administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed
intestate.

ISSUE: Is there preterition?

RULING: Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he
is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir
nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the
heir of his legitime.5 Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also
receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.6
In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the
testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation. 

NUGUID vs NUGUID

17 SCRA 449

 
FACTS:
HRosario Nuguid Remedios Other brothers and sistersRosario died without descendants. She
was survived by parents and 6 siblings. Remedios, a siter, filed for the probate of the H will of
Rosario, executed some 11 years before her death. The parents opposed alleging
that the institution of Remedios as universal heir would illegally preterited them as
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line and therefore,said institution is void.CFI: null and
void.

RULING:
: Affirmed. In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, andresolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testamentary capacity and the compliancewith the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.
However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsicvalidity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet the issue.Where the deceased left no
descendants, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her Hwill
does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names, the case is one of
Preterition and not a case of  ineffective disinheritance since there is no specific legacies or
bequest.Preterition consists in the omission in the ‘OR’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, whether because they are notmentioned therein or though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.Disinheritance in turn, is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a causeauthorized by
law. The former is presumed to be involuntary, while the latter is always voluntary. Preterition
shall annulthe institution of heir with the exception of the devises and legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance, such shall annul the institution of heirs but only insofar as it
may prejudice the person disinherited

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al

GR 113725
FACTS:
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; an appendix) of Aleja Belleza,
was instituted devisee of Lot
No.1 3 9 2   w i t h   a n   a r e a   o f   5 1 1 , 8 5 5   s q u a r e   m e t e r s   w i t h   t h e obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein private respondent every year during the latter's
lifetime.The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not onlyon the instituted
heir but also to his successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, private
respondent shallseize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's
"near descendants."Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children,one of whom
is herein petitioner.Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to complywith their
obligation, filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject
property to the survivingheirs of the testatrix.D u r i n g   t h e   p r e -
t r i a l ,   a   c o m p r o m i s e   a g r e e m e n t   w a s concluded between the parties
wherein the lessee of thep r o p e r t y   a s s u m e d   t h e   d e l i v e r y   o f   1 0 0   p i c u l s
o f   s u g a r   t o private respondent; however, only partial delivery was made.The trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of  action stating that, “While there may be the
nonperformanceo f   t h e   c o m m a n d   a s   m a n d a t e d ,   e x a c t i o n   f r o m   t h e m   ( t h e petition
ers), simply because they are the children of JorgeRabadilla, the title holder/owner
of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.”The CA, reversed
the decision and held that the institution of D r . R a b a d i l l a i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f a m o d a l
i n s t i t u t i o n a n d a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose
whenpetitioner failed to comply with their obligation under  thec o d i c i l , a n d i n
o r d e r i n g t h e r e v e r s i o n o f L o t 1 3 9 2 t o t h e estate of testatrix. Thus, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent has a legally demandableright against the petitioner, as one
of the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.

HELD:
YES.It is a general rule under the law on succession
thats u c c e s s i o n a l   r i g h t s   a r e   t r a n s m i t t e d   f r o m   t h e   m o m e n t   o f   death of the
decedent and compulsory heirs are called tosucceed by operation of law. The
legitimate children anddescendants, in  relation to their legitimate parents,
and thew i d o w   o r   w i d o w e r ,   a r e   c o m p u l s o r y   h e i r s .   T h u s ,   t h e petitioner, his
mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of theinstituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
succeeded the latter byoperation of law, without need of further proceedings,
andthe successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.U n d e r   A r t i c l e   7 7 6   o f   t h e   N e w   C i v i l   C o d e ,   i n h e r i t a n c e includes
all the property, rights and obligations of a person,not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rightsDr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to
his forced heirs, at the time of his death. Andsince obligations not extinguished by death also
form part.
MORENTE vs DELA SANTA
19 PHIL 387

FACTS: The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:lawphil.net

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband,
Gumersindo de la Santa.

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall
not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not
convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the
two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he
have any.

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is

located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.

ISSUE: Proper construction of the clause in the will.

RULING:

We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with
reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such
consideration we can not say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married
again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express
condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we can not say that any
condition can be implied from the context of the will. In the case of Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime
Vano (8 Phil. Rep., 119), we held that the legacy contained in the will therein mentioned was not
conditional. It is true that case arose under article 797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not
strictly applicable to this case, but we think that it may be argued from what is said in article 797
that, in order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear
from the language used in the will. Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the
will are natural children or legitimate children we do not decide, for no such question is before
us, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause not having arisen, and we limit
ourselves to saying merely that by the subsequent marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the
legacy given to him by the first part of the will. That was the only question before the court
below. the judgment of that court, denying the petition, is accordingly affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

SANTOS vs BUENAVENTURA

18 SCRA 47
FACTS: n October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1 The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a
sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces.
Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de
Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased.

Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed on November 28, 1956 an opposition to the
probate of said will.

Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not
executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the
testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured
through fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of
making a will.

ISSUE: Should an amendment be made.

RULING: This notwithstanding, We believe that appellant should receive the fruits of the
property given to her in devise. The provisions of law regarding devised proper are emphatic in
stating that a devise of a specific things includes its fruits and income accruing after the
testator's death, ordering that these shall be delivered with the thing devised:ART. 948. If the
legacy or devise is of a specific and determinate thing pertaining to the testator, the legatee or
devisee acquires the ownership thereof upon the death of the testator, as well as any growing
fruits, or unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected income; but not the income which was due
and unpaid before the latter's death.From the moment of the testator's death, the thing
bequeathed shall be at the risk of the legatee or devisee, who shall, therefore, bear its loss or
deterioration, and shall be benefited by its increase or improvement, without prejudice to the
responsibility of the executor or administrator.ART. 951. The thing bequeathed shall be
delivered with all its accessions and accessories and in the condition in which it may be upon
the death of the testator. (Civil Code)

MICIANO vs BRIMO

15 PHIL 867

FACTS: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this
case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3)
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and
the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference
to the Turkish laws

ISSUE: Which law would prevail?

RULING: Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as
not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores
the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.Said condition
then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution
of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary
to law.All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's
national law.