HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY G.R. No.

L-27873. November 29, 1983 public domain, public forest land, Revised
Administrative Code

The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the
Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject
to titling in favor of private persons.

FACTS:

These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the CA
which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of
private persons. These petitions have their genesis in an application for
confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No.
885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.

Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to the
application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the
title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters
be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The
Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to
the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp
which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain. Another
oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No.
885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque
Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel
Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said
lot registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters
to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was
adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for
over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a
private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration
Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The
Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885
executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was
dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the disputed lot is part of the
public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the CA in passing
upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision
after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of
registration in the names of the private applicants.

RULING:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative
Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as
forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that
in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of
Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had
to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that
the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as
“public forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public
domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC v. CA and BERNABE

G.R. No. L-40402 March 16, 1987; Paras, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision of

Respondent Court of Appeals 1 dated February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 50076-R,
entitled "EMILIO BERNABE, SR., Et. Al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES," affirming the order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dated
August 14, 1971 in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, which
dismissed petitioner Republic’s petition for review of the decrees of registration
issued pursuant to the decision rendered on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in
favor of the private Respondents herein, the lots applied for by them, and the
Resolution of Respondent Court dated March 19, 1975 denying herein Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

FACTS: Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a
decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral
Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot was segregated from the forest zone
and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an Agricultural Land for
disposition under the Public Land Act.
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to
reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 to perfect their rights and register their titles to said
lots. They alleged that they acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of
land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the same
including that of the herein respondents, has always been continuous, open, active,
exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of owners for more than 30 years.

The Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the above petition but later
withdrew the same upon verification of findings that this portion of the timberland
had already been released from the mass of the public forests. Subsequently, the
Acting Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands filed his
opposition alleging that the land is STILL Public Land and as such cannot be the
subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.

The lower court adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that

the latter have complied with all the terms and conditions entitling them to a grant.
This decision having become final, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued
the corresponding decrees of registration. On the other hand, petitioner DL through
the Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees. Afterwards, he filed an
Amended Petition for Review, adding: that respondents executed simulated deeds
of sale conveying portions of the subject parcels to third parties for fictitious
considerations in order to remove the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act
496, but in truth, buyers are mere dummies of petitioners; hence, not purchasers for
value.

The CFI denied this petition and on appeal, the CA affirmed the questioned
decision. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied for lack of
merit; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON THE LOTS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS COULD LEGALLY

BE THE SUBJECT OF A JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER
SEC. 48 (b) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 141 AS AMENDED BY R.A. 1942.

HELD: NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended, applies exclusively to public lands. Forest lands or areas covered with
forests are excluded. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long cannot ripen
into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral
court to register under the Torrens System.
 Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible,
private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA 141.
They can only be credited with 1 year, 9 mos. and 20 days of possession and
occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots involved
had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the BOF as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. As such, respondents
and their predecessors in interest could not have possessed the lots for the required
period of 30 years as disposable agricultural land.

Republic vs. CA and Carantes 125 SCRA 476, Gr. No. L-56984, September
30, 1987 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of
Forest Development and the Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and
in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING PIRASO, Respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet, Branch III, at La Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287, Record No. 37205,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:jgc

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Facts:
"It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by the
late SalmingPiraso and later by his successors-in- interest, who are his children for
a period of more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown to have a
registerable title on the property which the Court therefore confirms and affirms in
accordance with the law. Let the land so described in the technical description of
the survey made of the same and in accordance with the corresponding plan be so
registered." (p. 50, Rollo) On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and
in behalf of the Heirs of SalmingPiraso filed with the Court of First Instance of
Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287, covering the following
described property On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the
Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for registration stating,
among others:jgc:c "That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest
possess sufficient title to said parcel of land the same not having been acquired by
them either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; "That the whole
area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
established under Proclamation No. 217, dated February 16, 1929; "That the area
sought to be registered is neither released for disposition nor alienation; and that
the herein applicant has no registerable title over the whole parcel of land either in
fact or in law."

Issue: 1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve;

Ruling: It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not
capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands.

Daylinda A. Lagua, et al. v. Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, et al.

G.R. No. L-44649, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 260

This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was
instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a logging
road without authority.

Facts:
This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which
was instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a
logging road without authority.
The private respondents contended that the acts complained of by the
petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast
Development Enterprises, Inc. of its rights as a timber licensee, more particularly
in the use of its logging roads. Therefore, the resolution of this question is properly
and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular
courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court
had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first
determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages
can be instituted.

Issue:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over an action for damages arising
from the closure of a logging road.
Ruling:
Yes. The trial court has jurisdiction. “Presidential Decree No. 705 upon
which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau
of Forest Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is
illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages
may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly
for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether such
closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a
matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be
threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the
Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way,
much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every
activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development.”
G.R. No. 79538
Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc
October 18, 1990

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau

of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as
well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to
private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the President and the
MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.

RULING:
The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within
there scope without need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative
bodies are deemed to be in better positions to determine issues within their
specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which
avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment. The rule of res
judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent
authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with
the latter’s duty to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of
the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to
regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot
interfere with. The Court further held that sans grave abuse of discretion which
may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot seek
affirmative relief.

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE

PHILIPPINES v. UP
August 13, 1991
Davide, Jr., J
Luciano, Noel Christian O.

SUMMARY: International Hardwood was the grantee of a License Agreement

effective until 1985. On 1961, Proc. 791 segregates from the public domain
parcels of land and reserved them for use by UP. The land subject of Hardwood’s
timber concession was covered by said Proclamation. On 1964, RA 3990 was
enacted fully ceding ownership over the land described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP
sought to collect forestry charges from Hardwood and demanded that the latter
subject itself to the control and supervision of UP. Hardwood resisted and filed a
petition for declaratory relief.

The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other
limitations than those established by law. In this case, that exception is made for
Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to
UP until February 1985. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and
 obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties to the new owner, UP

DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area
to UP. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing
concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means
that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired, or
diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all
its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed
to U.P

Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from
a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the
authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise
terminated. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area
and to collect forestry charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer.

FACTS: International Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing, and

exportation of plywood. It was granted by the Government an exclusive license for
25 years expiring on Feb 1985 to cut, collect and remove timber from a timber land
in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna.

Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License Agreement, the President
issued Executive Proclamation No. 791. Under this proclamation, certain parcels of
land of the public domain in Quezon and Laguna were withdrawn from sale or
settlement and were reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as experiment
station for the college.

On 1964, still during the effectivity of the License Agreement, RA 3990 was
enacted establishing a central experiment station for UP for the colleges of
agriculture, veterinary medicine, arts and sciences. Under RA 3990 the land
described in Proc. 791 was fully cede to UP, subject to any existing concessions, if
any.

On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:

1. Payment of forest charges due and demandable under the License
Agreement to UP, instead of the BIR
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood within the land
described in RA 3990 be performed by UP personnel
However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s
demands.

International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory relief
seeking a declaration that UP does NOT have the right to:
1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest
products,
2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3. Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from Hardwood
and/or
4. Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its
concession covered by a License Agreement, ceded in full ownership to UP
by RA 3990

Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.

UP filed its Answer:

1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action
2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the forest products cut
and felled within the area ceded to UP under RA 3990

CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood:

1. RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut by
International Hardwood within the tract of land and collect the
corresponding charges prescribed by NIRC
2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim

CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves purely legal
questions.

ISSUE: WON UP as owner had the right to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut
by Hardwood and collect forestry charges thereon.

HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.

I. Arguments of the Parties

A. UP asserts that:
 1. Under RA 3990, the Philippines may effect collection of forest
charges through UP because the License Agreement does not
expressly provide that they be paid to the BIR
2. UP is vested with administrative jurisdiction over and has ownership
over the land in question. Thus, it acquired full control and benefit of
the timber and other resources in the area
3. UP is entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it
by RA 3990
4. UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central experiment station
5. Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of Hardwood by UP
was intended by RA 3990
6. BIR and the Bureau Of Forestry issued specific rulings recognizing
the authority of UP to collect royalties and charges
B. Hardwood contends:
1. UP has not been granted by RA 3990 the authority to collect forest
charges or the authority to supervise the operation of the timber
concession
2. Cession of the land was expressly made subject to any concession, if
any
3. Rulings of BIR and Bureau of Forestry are incorrect
4. It has acquired vested right to operate the timber concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry

II. Discussion on the effect of the laws

A. The laws:
1. Under Proc. 791 – a parcel of land of the public domain was
withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the UP
College of Agriculture as experiment station, subject to private rights,
if any
2. Under RA 3990 – the very same lot referred to in Proc. 791 was ceded
fully to UP, subject to any existing concessions, if any
B. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
1. When RA 3990 ceded the property to UP, the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and segregated the areas covered
by the timber license from the public forest
2. The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to
UP
a. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing
concession
 3. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means
that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected,
impaired, or diminished; it must be respected
4. BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor
of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP
a. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated
b. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject
area and to collect forestry charges and other fees thereon because
of this full transfer.

III. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other
limitations than those established by law. In this case, that exception is made
for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given
the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and
transferred to UP until February 1985.
A. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the
forest charges or royalties to the new owner, UP
B. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to UP.
C. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its
duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber
within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990

DISPOSITIVE: Judgment is rendered reversing the decision of the trial court.

Thus:
1. Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to
its License Agreement within the area ceded and transferred to UP pursuant
to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to UP;
2. UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by
R.A. No. 3990.

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD,

COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO
BUGTAI G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992 Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies
FACTS:

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to

cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares
of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on
September 31, 1992.‘

in 1987, herein private respondents filed a petition with the DENR for the
cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and
the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents,
in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had
no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted
administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by
section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the CA, which sustained
the trial court .The CA held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved
by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in
the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial
intervention.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case
involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or
suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or
body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in
connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or
development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The
respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, where several
presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the
judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration
of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was
improper.
2. Whether the RTC is correct when it declared invalid
Section 1 of PD 605.

RULING:

1. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the
courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one
of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not
jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of
the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the
court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had
been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with
matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the
other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better
position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors
committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if
given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative
decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of
avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9

As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of

instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly
resorted to immediately.

Among these exceptional cases are:

1) when the question raised is purely legal;

2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;

3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;

4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;

5) when the claim involved is small;

6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;

7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

8) when strong public interest is involved;

9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and

10) in quo warranto proceedings.

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the
exceptions because forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a
condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely legal;
application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public
interest is involved.

We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to
administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else,
would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded,
there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the
power and function “to regulate the development, disposition, extraction,
exploration and use of the country’s forests” and “to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction” in the “management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain,” and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest
Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid
regulations here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment
clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first
instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of
justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not
acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case
before the DENR and in the civil case before the RTC, that the petitioner has
violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws
and regulations.

The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting
evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities,
employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly
violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.

As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse
impact of the case on the national interest, the record does not show that the
petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to
justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and
immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must
fall flat against the petitioner’s uncontested contention that it has since 1988
stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.

2.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the
respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was
supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the
petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the
forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis,
determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest
Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the
administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent
for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of
justice.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the
respondent court to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule
is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be
decided on some other available ground, as we have done in the case before us.
The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all the
indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are
satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court “to make
the hammer fall, and heavily,” in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is
warranted.

The petition is GRANTED.

People vs Bagista
Posted on March 2, 2017 by thecasedigester in Criminal Procedure
September 18, 1992

Facts:

On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road,
Baguio City, received information from one of its regular informants that a certain
woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2″ or
5’3″, would be transporting marijuana from up north. Acting upon this piece of
information, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both
private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were
carrying marijuana leaves on board.

After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with
Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet.
Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to
the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search
their baggages. At the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at
the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a
travelling bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the
bag and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted
clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were confiscated and the woman
arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she
was booked and investigated.

Issue:

WON probable cause is present in the conduct of the warrantless search?

WON the warrantless search is valid?

Held:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of

certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, 15 and the seizure of
evidence in plain view. This in no way, however, gives the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence
of probable cause.

In the case at bar, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman
having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-
appellant’s belongings since she fits the description given by the NARCOM
informant.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to
conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could
not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the
truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive
Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's
lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and
shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard
in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet
because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate
of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source
and origin.
The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as
opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the
same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an
illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from
timber

HELD:

No,
The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition
of "Processing plant."
Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market."
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither should we.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON B. QUE,

accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996

FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation
of Section 68 of P.D. 705.
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-
wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte.
Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol
several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and
eventually saw the truck. There were three persons on board the truck: driver
Cacao, Wilson Que, who was the owner of said truck, and an unnamed person. The
police then checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs, but
inserted therein were sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to
show a permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Section 68
of P.D. 705.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated Section 68 OF P.D. 705 because E.O.
277 that amended Section 68, which penalizes the possession of timber or other
forest products without the proper legal documents, did not indicate the particular
documents necessary to make the possession legal, and considering that other laws
and regulations did not exist at the time of the enactment of said E.O. – YES.
HELD: Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to
refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the
enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render
the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The
phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of
possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59
series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and
other forest products. Thus Que’s possession of the subject lumber without any
documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.

Also, the court rejected Que’s argument that the law only penalizes
possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if
he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products
is legal. There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of
P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting, and removing timber and other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;
and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by
presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removing of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or
not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277
considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.

A. Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the
exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in
the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-
venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative

Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which
were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to
submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years
from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines,
Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality
before this Court.

Issue :
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as

amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of
location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or
lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing
law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the
provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are
deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other
words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining
laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing
mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in
force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining
leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through
a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not
be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from
altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211.
Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands
of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive
Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for
the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

B. ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HON.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN,
respondents. ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN
SAINGAN, respondents.
Facts:
Subject Land-41,296 square meters situated in the barrio of Lucnab, Itogon,
Benguet.Parties:A. ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY (claiming that the
said parcel of land is a mineral land.)B. TUKTUKAN SAINGAN (claiming that
the said parcel of land is agricultural.)Contentions:Atok- they contended that the
said parcel of land was being registered in the office of Mining Recorder in 1921
and 1931 pursuant to Philippine Bill of 1902. It is about sixteen years before
TUKTUKAN declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four
(34) years before private respondent filed the land registration proceedings in
1965. They also showed the payment of annual assessment fees for the said land
since 1931.Tuktukan- who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows that he
acquired the land from his father-in-law, Dongail, when he married his daughter;
that he was then 18 years old; that at the time of his acquisition, it was planted with
camotes, casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on the land since
his marriage up to the present; that he has been paying the taxes during the
Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was never disturbed in his
possession. Supporting his oral testimony, applicant [Tuktukan] submitted tax
declarations x xx both dated March 20, 1948, the former for a rural land and the
latter for urban land and improvement therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the said parcel of land is a mineral land or an agricultural land.

History of mining Act1. Spanish Mining Law of 18672. Philippine Bill Of 1902
(American time) when the subject land had been registered3. Commonwealth Act
No. 137 (under the 1935 Constitution)4. Executive Order 141 (Pres. Marcos
1968)5. President Decree No. 1214 (1977)All of the mining acts have a common
provision which is the annual performance of labor or undertaking of
improvements on the mine.
Held:
The SC ruled in favor of the Tuktukan in the reasons that:A. Tuktukan have proven
that he had in possession of the said land in a concept of an owner, continuously,
open and uninterrupted for a period of more than 30 years.B. He had improve
almost 90% of the said parcel of land.C. He had paid tax declaration of the said
land since 1948 up to present.It is evident that Atok had registered the land prior
than Tuktukan but still the SC ruled in favor of Tuktukan for the reasons:A.
Payment of annual assessment fee is not enough proof. There must be an annual
performance of labor or undertaking of improvements in the mine.B. When an
ocular survey was made, it was evident that there was No improvements being
made in the said land and there is any sign of mining had happened in the land.
Hence, the petition is DENIED.

C. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by
the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.

d.Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. vs. Balite Portal Mining

Cooperative, et al. GR No. 135190 – 09 April 2002
FACTS: This case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest River or known as Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Diwalwal has been
embroiled in controversy with hundreds of people perishing in mine accidents,
man-made or otherwise, brought about by unregulated mining activities. On March
10, 1988, Marcopper was granted an Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133)
over 4,491 hectaresoflandwhichincludedtheDiwalwal area. Thisacquisitionof
mining rights by Marcopper was challenged by Apex. However, the Court found
out that Apex did not comply with the procedural requisites of acquiring mining
rights within forest reserves. Subsequently,Congressenacted RA 7076 or the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act where DENR issued an Orderdeclaring729
hectaresof Diwalwal areasnon-forestlandopentosmall-scalemining. Later on, a
petitionforcancellationof EPNo.133 wasfiledbefore DENR and while the case is
pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner herein Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. On March 3, 1995, RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act was enacted which later on allow, through Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board of Davao, issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to small-
scale miners operating in Diwalwal mines. With this, petitioner file a complaint
contending that the illegal issuance of OTPs allowed hauling of P60,000.00 worth
of gold. On 24 June 1997, Memorandum 97-03 was issued by the DEBR secretary
providing for a direct state utilization.
ISSUE:
Whetherornot the Memorandumissuedbythe Secretaryof DENR divested
petitioner’s right to the gold rush area under EP No. 133.
HELD:
No. The challenged Memorandum 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state
utilization as policy in resolving Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the Memorandum
clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option
and nothing else. It did not grant any management/operating profit-sharing
agreement to small-scale miners or to any party but it simply instructed DENR
officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.

e.CASE DIGEST : CARPIO VS SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148267 August 8, 2002 ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs.
SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS : A petition was filed by respondent Sulu Resources Development

Corporation for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA). Petitioner
Armando C. Carpio filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia,
that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by
respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the
quarry resources on his properties.

the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR
rendered a Resolution dated September 26, 1996, upholding petitioner’s
opposition/adverse claim.
Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of
respondent’s failure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining Act’s
Implementing Rules and Regulations. On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication
Board rendered the assailed Order dismissing petitioner’s opposition/adverse
claim. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied
by the Board

Petioner appealed to CA. the CA relying in the case of Pearson v. Intermediate

Appellate Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the Decision of the
Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). The adjudication of conflicting mining claims
is completely administrative in nature.

ISSUE : WON appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines
Adjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by
the respondent and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court
of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner

HELD : Petitioner submits that appeals from the decisions of the MAB should be
filed with the CA. the CA ruled and respondent agrees that the settlement of
disputes involving rights to mining areas and overlapping or conflicting claim is a
purely administrative matter, over which the MAB has appellate jurisdiction. The
CA refused to take jurisdiction over the case because, under Section 79 of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, petitions for review of MAB decisions are to be
brought directly to the Supreme Court

In the case at bar, petitioner went to the CA through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 43, seeking a reversal of the MAB Decision. Given the
difference in the reason for and the mode of appeal, it is obvious that Pearson is not
applicable here.

In Pearson, what was under review was the ruling of the CFI to take cognizance of
the case which had been earlier decided by the MAB, not the MAB Decision itself
which was promulgated by the CA under Rule 43. The present petitioner seeks a
review of the latter.

Pearson, however, should be understood in the light of other equally relevant

jurisprudence. In Fabian v. Desierto, the Court clarified that appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the CA, under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43. This
Rule was adopted precisely to provide a uniform rule of appellate procedure from
quasi-judicial agencies

Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is

prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on
questions of fact. In Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA
have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC decisions and orders, but the review of such
decisions included questions of fact and law. At the very least when factual
findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to have been made in grave abuse
of discretion as in the present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the
constitutional duty of the judiciary.

To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB
Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court

first Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be
reviewed by this Court on a "petition for review by certiorari." This provision is
obviously an expansion of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which
this Court has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily burden it

Second when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s
decisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the
substantive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved party’s right to appeal is
preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made
or decided

Third the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform
rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.

Fourth the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by
RA No. 7902 factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-
judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact,
has more elbow room to resolve them

Fifth he judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct
resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling
within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 of
RA 7942 is likewise to be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-
91, BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative Circular 1-95,
and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB
shall be taken to the CA through petitions for review in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
(PHILIPPINES) INC.

f. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O.

RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H.
RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R.
TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a

exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized
under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995,
the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-
23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between
the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow
fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2
and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is
still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the
DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations
or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or
financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that
the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and
Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether
or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

FirstIssue:

RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting
fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine
which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the
exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such
omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license,
concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment
for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only
―technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service
contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to
avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as
the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its
pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a
service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the
aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the
State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention
of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations
or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected,
must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.

Second Issue:

RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-
products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same
agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together,
grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to
the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently,
the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

g. G.R. No. 157882

Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. v. EliseaGozun
March 30, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, its Implementing
Rules and Regulations Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40), and of the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June
1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a
corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a
single company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining
Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian
nationals.
On 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a
total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the
Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to
occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry
into private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting,
exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of
farmers and indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a
community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other
residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC. They argue that
Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by
virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment of the rights for the public good
and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic

Remman Enterprises Inc., petitioner vs. CA & Crispin E. Lat

G.R. 125018 April 6, 2000 330 SCRA 145

FACTS:

 Remman and Lat are adjoining landowners in Brgy. Bugtong na Pulo, Lipa
City.
 Lat owns 1.8 hectares of agricultural land, planted mostly with fruit trees.
While Remman occupied 15 hectares of land devoted for his piggery
business.
 Remman’s land is ½ meters higher in elevation than that of Lat.
 July 1984- Lat noticed that Remman’s waste disposal lagoon was
overflowing and flooding ¼ of his land. Lat made several representations
with Remman but fell on deaf ears.
 May 15, 1985- Almost 1 hectare of Lat’s plantation was already flooded
with water containing pig manure and as a result, trees growing on the
flooded portion started to wither and die.
 Lat then filed a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory
injunction alleging that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased
beacause of the overflow of water heavy with pig manure from Remman’s
farm.
 RTC conducted ocular inspection evaluating evidences of both parties. It
found out that:
o Waste water lagoon is overflowing flooding 1 hectares of Lat’s
plantation
o Water was ankle-deep causing the death of
 1 jackfruit tree
 15 coconut trees
 122 coffee trees and
 Unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables
  RTC ordered Remman to indemnify Lat P186,975 for lost profits for 3 crop
years and P30,000 attorney’s fee.
 CA affirmed in toto.

ISSUE: WON appellant Remman is liable for damage.

HELD:

YES. Remman is liable for damage for negligence on his part in maintaining the
level of waste water in its lagoon which flooded Lat’s plantation with acidic,
malodorous and polluted water containing pig manure.

ART 637 of Civil Code:

Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and
without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as
well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make
works which will increase the burden.

Similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.1067),
which provides:

Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally
and without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as
well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of
drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase this natural flow.

As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the
lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a
higher state are those which are artificially collected in manmade lagoons, any
damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation.

IDEALS v. PSALM (G.R. No. 192088)

October 9, 2012 | G.R. No. 192088

Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services,

Inc. (IDEAL, Inc.), et al., petitioners

Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp., et al. (PSALM),

respondents

FACTS:

PSALM is a GOCC mandated by RA 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of

2001 or the EPIRA Law) to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization
of the assets of the National Power Corp. (NPC) over a 25-year period. In the
discharge of its said duties, PSALM held a public bidding for the sale of AHEPP, a
246-MW hydroelectric power plant. After evaluating the submitted bids, PSALM
awarded the sale to K-Water, a Korean company.

But even before K-Water was given the Notice of Award, IDEALS had been
sending letters to PSALM to request for copies of documents pertaining to the sale.
The first letter requested for copies of the Terms of Reference and proposed bids
submitted by the bidders. There was no response because at the time no bids have
been submitted yet. Besides, updates about the ongoing bidding were posted on the
PSALM website anyway. The second letter requested for information regarding the
winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person, office address, and
Philippine registration. Despite press releases announcing K-Water as the winning
bidder, PSALM failed to sufficiently provide the petitioners with the information
they were asking for, almost as if PSALM officials were trying to hide something.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file this petition before the Court.

2. Whether or not PSALM violated the Constitution in withholding documents of

public interest.

3. Whether or not a foreign company can own a hydroelectric power facility.

HELD:

1. Yes. As citizens and taxpayers, petitioners do have legal standing to file this
petition before the Court.

2. Yes. In failing to provide the petitioners with the information they were asking
for on their second letter, PSALM violated Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution,which provides for the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. The Court ruled that people's right to information is intertwined
wth the government's constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest, pursuant to Section 28, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution,
which states a policy of full public disclosure. Both of these provisions are also
essential to hold public officials accountable for their actions. An informed
citizenry, said the Court, is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any
democracy.
The Court made it clear that the public is entitled to information even on on-going
negotiations before a final contract, subject to the following exceptions: privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets, and similar matters relating to
national security and public order.

In addition, the Court highlighted the difference between duty to disclose

information and duty to access information on matters of public concern. The duty
to disclose information is mandatory under the Constitution, but it only covers
transactions involving public interest. In the absence of an enabling law for Section
28, Art. II (e.g., Freedom of Information Act, which has been languishing in the
congress for more than 20 years), postings in public bulletin boards and
government websites will suffice.

The duty to access information, on the other hand, requires a demand or request for
one to gain access to documents and paper of a particular agency. It has a broader
scope of information, covering not only transactions of public interest, but also
matters contained in official communications and public documents of any
government agency.

Because of this ruling, PSALM was compelled by the Court to provide all the
documents the petitioners were requesting for.

3. Yes, foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not prohibited under existing

laws. The construction, rehabilitation, and development of hydropower plants are
among the infrastructure projects which even wholly-owned foreign corporations
are allowed to undertake under RA 7718 or the Amended Build-Operate-Transfer
Law.
Vergara vs. Sonkin

G.R. No. 193659

SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA vs. ERLINDA

TORRECAMPO SONKIN

G.R. No. 193659, June 15, 2015

FACTS: The petitioners-spouses Vergara (Sps. Vergara) and Spouses Sonkin

(Sps. Sonkin) are adjoining landowners. The property owned by the Sps. Sonkin
(Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by Sps. Vergara
(Vergara Property).

The Sps Sonkin constructed a house on their property using a portion of the
partition wall as part of the wall of the master’s bedroom and bathroom.

Thereafter, the Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of their property making it
even higher than that of the Sonkin Property. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to
complain that water coming from the Vergara Property was leaking into their
bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint
and the wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara
build a retaining wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had
dumped thereon, but the same went unheeded.

Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The CA on appeal ruled that while the act of the Sps Vergara in elevating their
property was the proximate cause of the water seepage, the Sps. Sonkin were guilty
of contributory negligence in building their house directly abutting the perimeter
wall. Thus, it deleted the actual damages ordered by the RTC. It nevertheless
awarded the Sonkins moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Hence this appeal by the Sps Vergara.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sps Sonkin are entitled to moral damages

HELD: NO. Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.

The CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage sustained by
the house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel and soil
onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall back and causing cracks
thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is nevertheless guilty of contributory
negligence for not only failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the
National Building Code, but also for disregarding the legal easement (to receive
water from higher estates) constituted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin
must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory negligence, the Court deems it appropriate to
delete the award of moral damages in their favor. While moral damages may be
awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause
of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219
of the Civil Code, they are only given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering
and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the
gravity of the wrong done.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended
by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS
III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to
optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal
as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence
undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim
over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a

codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of
our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation

designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does
not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover,
RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty
to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA
3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself
commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach
the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

Universal Robina Corp. vs. Laguna Lake Devt. Authority, G.R. No. 191427,
May 30, 2011

Facts: LLDA found that URC failed to comply with DENR Administrative Orders
(DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35. Later, after receiving a complaint, LLDA conducted
another analysis of petitioners wastewater, which showed its continued failure to
conform to its effluent standard.

Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the

LLDA, petitioners wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the
aforementioned DAOs and only in 2007 that URC’s upgraded wastewater
treatment facility was completed, which petitioners plant finally complied with
government standards.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties to cover only a period of 560
days. However, after conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to
Pay penalties for a total of 1,247 days amounting to PHP 1,247,000.00.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the LLDA, hence, a
petition for certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA
grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence, and
maintaining that the lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy from the
enforcement of LLDAs order justified such recourse as an exception to the rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial action.

The appellate court went on to chide petitioners petition for certiorari as premature
since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the
DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first
been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.

Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is exempted from complying with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling: No.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our

judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.

Executive Order No. 192 was issued charging DENR with the task of promulgating
rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution. It also created
the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary for the
adjudication of pollution cases, including the latters role as arbitrator for
determining reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from
pollution.

Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR

Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary
would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at
best, speculative and presumptuous.

Philippine Clean Air Act

1. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA

G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA

FACTS:

Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of

charcoal briquette, received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the
full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan until further order, and 2)
requesting its Plant Manager to bring before the office of the mayor its building
permit, mayor's permit, and Region III--Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti--Pollution Permit.

Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the

required documents. It sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment
and Natural Resources Anti--Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of the
plant, a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it.
Petitioners also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a
mayor’s permit but were not entertained.

Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked,
effectively causing the stoppage of operation. This was done without previous and
reasonable notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus with preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan
RTC, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was proper, ordering the acting mayor to immediately revoke his closure order and
allow Technology Developers to resume its normal business operations until the
case has been adjudicated on the merits.

Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that
"Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes
coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to
the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a
time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational."
Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. The CA denied Technology Developer's petition
for certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of Technology
Developer

HELD:

YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if
not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police
power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury
to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation
of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by
the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality
but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered
to stop its operation until further orders.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial
Governor through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation
was made by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by
the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution
device has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta.

Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on
March 6, 1987.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was
good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or
validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and
prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this
dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the
need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the
equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the
people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
● The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its
discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may
recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

Petition denied.

2. HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION

FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB devotions) et al.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

FACTS

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a
writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the
particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine
combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity,
infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege that with the
continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are
likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies
showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence
of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is
highest among jeepney drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed more
compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer
that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition
for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an
alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, in Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr. and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
“Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government
agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly
PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit
dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are
curbed falls under respondents’ functions and a writ of mandamus should issue
against them.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to
use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the function of the DOTC is limited
to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said
law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but
it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the
petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would
compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
ISSUES

Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested

alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas (cng)

Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use
compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus

RULING

Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by

law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the
DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has
been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant preferential and
exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of
NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”

In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the
emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as
motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency
whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and
implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal
duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling
the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No.
290, which implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The
court was assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is being
addressed.

3. AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corp.

G.R. No. 166744. November 2, 2006.

SCRA Citation: 506 SCRA 625

DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance; definition – The term “nuisance” is so

comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered
with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of property,
or his comfort; A private nuisance is one which violates only private rights and
produces damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is public when it
interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public
property or by causing a common injury, an unreasonable interference with the
right common to the general public. In this case, the noise generated by an
airconditioning system is considered a private nuisance.

Noise emanating from air-con units not nuisance per se – Noise becomes
actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions
of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener; Injury to a
particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will
not render the noise an actionable nuisance. Whether or not the noise is a nuisance
is an issue to be resolved by the courts.

Test to determine noise as a nuisance – The test is whether rights of property, of

health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the
sufferer is subjected to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical Discomfort]which goes beyond
the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding
property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission
of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or
in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting
with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.

Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of pecuniary estiation – an action to

abate private nuisance, even wehere the plaintiff asks for damages is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation

FACTS: AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-storey building in

Makati City. Frabelle (Respondent) is a condominium corporation who's
condominium development is located behind petitioner. Respondent complained of
the 'unbearable” noise emanating from the blower of the air-conditioning units of
petitioner.

ISSUES:

(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of

proceedings or a nuisance per se?

(2) Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise

generated by the blower of an air-conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays
for damages, one incapable of pecuniary estimation?

(3) What is the determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint?

HELD:
(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of
proceedings; the noise is not a nuisance per se. Noise becomes actionable only
whenn it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality
and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury to a particular
person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not
render the house an actionable nuisance–– in the conditions, of present living,
noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations.

(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a sum of money.

(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is of
such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person
of ordinary sensibilities rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.
Writ of Kalikasan

1. WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. FIRST PHILIPPINE

INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, GR No. 194239, 2015-06-16

Facts:

Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil
Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to
the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and
kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil

Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel
from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60%
of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of
Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.

In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the
residents of West Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within
the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium
premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from... the wall of its Basement 2.
Owing to its inability to control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the
matter to the Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s
Bureau of Fire Protection.

What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day
affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the
City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage
system of Barangay Bangkal.

Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their

respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was shut down.

On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower

Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on
behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding
communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati

City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and
several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest
groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of
the environmental issues... involved.[1]

On November 19, 2010, the Cou... rt issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC,
FGC, and the members o... f their Boards of Directors to file their respective
verified returns. The TEPO... enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from
operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the
whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to
prevent and avert any untoward incident that may result from any... leak of the
pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors
and Officers filed a Joint Compliance[5] submitting the report required by the Writ
of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither own nor operate the
pipelines,... adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity
of the pipelines, much less to cease and desist from operating them as they have no
capability, power, control or responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed
that the directives of the Writ of

Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.

On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page
“Report on Pipeline Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance Program.”

Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on
November 19, 2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the
BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of the DOE,
clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the

Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can
resume operation of its BOPL System.

To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA). By this Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2011,[14]
the appellate court was required to conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a
report and... recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties’
memoranda.

On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration[19]
of the CA’s Report praying that (a) instead of the DOE, the required certification
should be issued by the DOST-Metal Industry Research and Development Center;
(b) a trust... fund be created to answer for future contingencies; and (c) the
directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be held accountable.

On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of
the CA in its Report and Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a
certification from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its operations.

Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter
from the DOE on the state of the WOPL, as well as the parties’ comments thereon,
the following issues defined by the parties during the March 21, 2012 preliminary
conference are now ripe for... adjudication

Issues:

Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other
petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West
Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;

Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct

the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect,
preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future
similar contingencies; and

Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be
held liable under the environmental protection order.

Ruling:

Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[39]
Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real...
parties-in-interest.[40] In other words, the action must be brought by the person
who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.[41]
Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the...
jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially
ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest.

In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected
all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to
evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the
condominium’s electrical power... was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and
residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus,
there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common
interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and
pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers
under RA 4726, otherwise known as The

Condominium Act,[43] it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members.

In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West
Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium
unit owners or... users.

Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof
of juridical personality

Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the

Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council
of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan
Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala

Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as

petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present
controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.

This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7[45] of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental...
disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated,
or threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the
submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of
the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in

the pending motions. Suffice it to state in the outset that as regards the substantive
issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other recommendations of
the CA, with a few... modifications.

II.

Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE
Certification of the WOPL’s Commercial Viability

To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19,
2010 TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to
Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. For its part,
respondent

FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place,
will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.

With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following
systems: (a) regular cleaning scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline
integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line inspections (ILI),
which is done every five years;
(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC
asserted that it also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole
testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as segment pressure test; (c)
pressure-controlled test; (d)... inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e)
inspection and reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement.[47]
Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired
NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI... inspections through magnetic flux
leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the
pipeline and check it for cracks.

The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive
and insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance.
Hence, considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required to ensure
that the WOPL system is free... from leaks and is safe for commercial operation,
the CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the
WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to
the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of... the
appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the
need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the
required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.

The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We
required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013
Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification from the DOE
considering that the core issue of this case... requires the specialized knowledge
and special expertise of the DOE and various other administrative agencies. On
October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30,
2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary
Carlos
Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the
timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue
between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.

After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the
parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter
dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the
resumption of the commercial operations of... the WOPL. The DOE should,
therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August
5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate
reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume
the... operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a
finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is
irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the
closure of the WOPL may be... ordered.

It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s
compliance with pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a
question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence presented by
the parties on the WOPL’s... actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the
numerous findings and recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae
on the WOPL’s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent
propounds.

Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon
FPIC for the resumption of the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the
submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and timetable, is a clear and
unequivocal message coming from the
DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued commercial
operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive
determination by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state through its
proposed activities, and not merely through a... short-form integrity audit,[56] that
the factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on
the pipeline’s structural integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be
subject to this Court’s resolution.

Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted
to equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.

Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund

Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that
under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust
fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment.

A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals
that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future
contingencies.This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund
under the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has

presumably already suffered. Hence,the Court affirms with concurrence the
observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for damages, which
is prohibited by the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view
that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.

The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in
the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from the
same incident if the payment... of damages is found warranted.

Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers

On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and the

IV.

Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers

On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and
officers, the CA found FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to
the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati
City) and criminal complaint

(Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

of Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC
and FGC are not liable in their individual capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual
directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of
kalikasan,the Court cannot... grant the award of damages to individual petitioners
under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As
duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners
against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and... determine the
individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and
the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping
of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal,
Makati City.

Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and
FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal
cases now pending against them.

2. MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the

US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of
the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship
left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for
fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next
port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal
of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging

operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.

Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case
where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being
challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the
rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public

right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in
the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in
Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue
for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of
their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding

officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian
and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of
the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing
official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef
system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while
historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where
they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to

enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave
the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions
of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30

and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s
unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case,
the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS,
as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary
international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS
was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining
(Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of
customary international rules on navigation.”
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in
the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines
as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US
to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been
actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources,
would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship
while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the
UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and
preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis,

directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of
the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond

dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages
caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-
commercial purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal

jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance
of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the
Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-

application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who
may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether

such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot
grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The
Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with
the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

3. G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015

HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, in his capacity as DENR Secretary v. Hon. Teodoro
Casino, et al.
Facts

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental

Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to
be implemented by RP Energy.

Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR
secretary on the ground that actual environmental damage will occur if the power
plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain
laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments
thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated
the ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the
validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for
a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues

Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ
of Kalikasan; and

Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling
Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal,
questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan.

Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such
writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves
environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities
in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or
irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable
connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition
should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with
due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of
the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.