[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.] Lot No.
Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL
ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, Respondents.
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT
LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS
RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS,
RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. — A
forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered
with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED.
— This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23
SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted
the petition on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and
title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET,
RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. — In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the
applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is
part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his application.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the
Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not
subject to titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of
imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz.
The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui,
petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque
and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion
of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be
confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of
title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever
rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter
also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered
in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square
meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square
meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and
1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their
respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that
have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the
northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was
Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs
of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be considered is
whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not
amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the
Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application
was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that
during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber
licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut
timber within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had
stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the
testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and the only
time when the property was converted into a fishpond was sometime after
1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but only after
there had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that could not
be done because it was classified as a public forest; so that having these in
mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into
effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower
Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he
must have shown.
"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the application;’
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the
applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty
(30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a
registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the
application, he had been in
"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain’,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout
that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their
predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny
all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled
notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private
litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right
to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way to
the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as complete as
possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed;
the application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the
Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more
pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons
for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942,
said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the
name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review
on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint
against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the
annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in
favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of
the Court of Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain.
The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing
upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final
decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as
forest land.chanrobles law library : red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not
capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified
as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp."
Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification
of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said
Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still
subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in
actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land
was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept
under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and
title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the
instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its
being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The
appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as
stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as
1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde.
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate
court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut
timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District
Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public
forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but
that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or
that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions
implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot
No. 88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The
evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as
forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute
of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from
the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw
library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part
of the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to
pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 112526. October 12, 2001]
STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B.
AMANTE, FRANCISCO L. ANDAL, LUCIA ANDAL, ANDREA P.
AYENDE, LETICIA P. BALAT, FILOMENA B. BATINO, ANICETO
A. BURGOS, JAIME A. BURGOS, FLORENCIA CANUBAS,
LORETO A. CANUBAS, MAXIMO A. CANUBAS, REYNALDO
CARINGAL, QUIRINO C. CASALME, BENIGNO A. CRUZAT,
ELINO A. CRUZAT, GREGORIO F. CRUZAT, RUFINO C.
CRUZAT, SERGIO CRUZAT, SEVERINO F. CRUZAT, VICTORIA
DE SAGUN, SEVERINO DE SAGUN, FELICISIMO A.
GONZALES, FRANCISCO A. GONZALES, GREGORIO
GONZALES, LEODEGARIO N. GONZALES, PASCUAL P.
GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO A.
JUANGCO, GERVACIO A. JUANGCO, LOURDES U. LUNA,
ANSELMO M. MANDANAS, CRISANTO MANDANAS, EMILIO M.
MANDANAS, GREGORIO A. MANDANAS, MARIO G.
MANDANAS, TEODORO MANDANAS, CONSTANCIO B.
MARQUEZ, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, ARMANDO P. MATIENZO,
DANIEL D. MATIENZO, MAXIMINO MATIENZO, PACENCIA P.
MATIENZO, DOROTEA L. PANGANIBAN, JUANITO T. PEREZ,
MARIANITO T. PEREZ, SEVERO M. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S.
PASQUIZA, BIENVENIDO F. PETATE, IGNACIO F. PETATE,
JUANITO PETATE, PABLO A. PLATON, PRECILLO V. PLATON,
AQUILINO B. SUBOL, CASIANO T. VILLA, DOMINGO VILLA,
JUAN T. VILLA, MARIO C. VILLA, NATIVIDAD A. VILLA,
JACINTA S. ALVARADO, RODOLFO ANGELES, DOMINGO A.
CANUBAS, EDGARDO L. CASALME, QUIRINO DE LEON,
LEONILO M. ENRIQUEZ, CLAUDIA P. GONZALES, FELISA R.
LANGUE, QUINTILLANO LANGUE, REYNALDO LANGUE,
ROMEO S. LANGUE, BONIFACIO VILLA, ROGELIO AYENDE,
ANTONIO B. FERNANDEZ, ZACARIAS HERRERA, ZACARIAS
HERRERA, REYNARIO U. LAZO, AGAPITO MATIENZO,
DIONISIO F. PETATE, LITO G. REYES, JOSE M. SUBOL,
CELESTINO G. TOPI NO, ROSA C. AMANTE, SOTERA
CASALME, REMIGIO M. SILVERIO, THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, and REGIONAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER FOR REGION IV, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals [1] affirming the decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board[2] (hereafter DARAB) ordering the
compulsory acquisition of petitioners property under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter,
SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay
Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total
area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are
watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community,
and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area. [3]
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property,
thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents
filed a civil case[4] with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an easement
of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim,
however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents.
In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial
Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate complaints for forcible entry against
respondents.[5]
After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the compulsory acquisition of the
SRRDC property under the CARP.
On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of coverage to petitioner and invited its
officials or representatives to a conference on August 18, 1989. [6] During the
meeting, the following were present: representatives of petitioner, the Land
Bank of the Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna, the
BARC Chairman of Barangay Casile and some potential farmer beneficiaries,
who are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the
consensus and recommendation of the assembly that the landholding of
SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition.
On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a Protest and Objection to the compulsory
acquisition of the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate for
agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and
above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled
to any land as beneficiaries.[7]
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC
chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the land
is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically
viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the
Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna. [8]
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary
investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory Acquisition Folder
Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter,
PARO).[9]
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his
endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR forwarded two (2)
Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC,
covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to the President, Land Bank of the
Philippines for further review and evaluation. [10]
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor
Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition[11] to petitioner, stating that
petitioners landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an
area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and
P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters [12] separately
addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the
amount of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2)
notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for
summary proceedings to determine just compensation under R. A. No. 6657,
Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders
previously referred for review and evaluation to the Director of BLAD
mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some
deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote
Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to forward the two (2) claim folders
involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary
proceedings to determine the just compensation for the land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the
Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles were exempt
from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area
and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the
two (2) claim folders (CACFs) to the Executive Director of the DAR
Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on the CACFs,
on September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the office
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before
it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings. [13]
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the
subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition
Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the
parcels of land may be granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the
Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations) and
the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two
issues raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the notice
of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12,
1989, the property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports the
DAR position on the coverage of the said property. During the consideration of
the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion
specifically concerning the parcels of land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the
parties interested, setting the hearing for the administrative valuation of the
subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991,
Atty. Ma. Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board
requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction of the records of the case
because the records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo
Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for SRRDC and had possession of
all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and could not be
contacted. The Board granted counsels request and moved the hearing to
April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the
latter to resolve SRRDCs petition for exemption from CARP coverage before
any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and
subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without objection from
counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of
subject property at Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as
Exhibit 5 for SRRDC. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked
for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning
Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification issued on
September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were
classified as industrial Park per Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89
dated March 29, 1989.[14]
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to
the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a petition [15] with
DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB
refused to address the issue of beneficiaries.
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court,
Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision, [16] finding that private respondents
illegally entered the SRRDC property, and ordered them evicted.
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a
memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust
account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC
property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:
1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory
coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation
(Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766
hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation the amount of Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-
One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos
(P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer
Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should there be a rejection of the
payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for
said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation;
3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch
Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and
encumbrances;
4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its
Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a final
segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer certificate of Title Nos.
84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the Register of Deeds to
the name of the Republic of the Philippines;
5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its
Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to take immediate possession
on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the immediate
issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna. [17]
On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24,
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. B-2333 [18] ruling that respondents were
builders in bad faith.
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review of the DARAB decision. [19] On November 5, 1993, the Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal
portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated September
19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court
on the issue of just compensation.[20]
Hence, this petition.[21]
On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:
G. R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al.) Considering the compliance, dated December 13, 1993, filed
by counsel for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8, 1993 which
required petitioner to post a cash bond or surety bond in the amount of
P1,500,000.00 Pesos before issuing a temporary restraining order prayed for,
manifesting that it has posted a CASH BOND in the same amount with the
Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the attached official receipt no. 315519,
the Court resolved to ISSUE the Temporary Retraining Order prayed for.
The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing its decision dated December 19,
1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which ordered,
among others, the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
through its Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate
possession of the landholding in dispute after title shall have been transferred
to the name of the Republic of the Philippines and to distribute the same
through the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-
beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Officer of Cabuyao,
Laguna, (b) The Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons acting for and in their
behalf and under their authority from entering the properties involved in this
case and from introducing permanent infrastructures thereon; and (c) the
private respondents from further clearing the said properties of their green
cover by the cutting or burning of trees and other vegetation, effective today
until further orders from this Court.[22]
The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by
CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area
prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657.
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of
private land: compulsory and voluntary. In the case at bar, the Department of
Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property under
R. A. No. 6657, Section 16, to wit:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
a.) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the
land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered
mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the
DAR to pay corresponding value in accordance with the
valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent
provisions hereof.
b.) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written
notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner,
his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c.) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall
pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty
(30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in
favor of the government and other muniments of title.
d.) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP
and other interested parties to submit fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period,
the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
e.) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment,
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner,
upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this act, the DAR shall make immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register
of Deeds to issue Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.
f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court[23] of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the
landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification,
the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal
delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal
building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in
favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30)
days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner accepts,
he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and
surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the
deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the
purchase price.If the landowner rejects the DARs offer or fails to make a reply,
the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just
compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other
interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen
days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the
case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just
compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of
rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall
immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall
then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the
decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts (provisionally the Supreme
Court designated branches of the regional trial court as special agrarian
courts) for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land
acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in
compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the
farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification
process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued
Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating procedure
in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with the assistance of the
pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall:
 1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the
CARP in his area of responsibility; the masterlist should
include such information as required under the attached
CARP masterlist form which shall include the name of the
landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax
declaration number.
2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for
each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I
and II of the CARP except those for which the landowners
have already filed applications to avail of other modes of land
acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly
accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1MARO investigation report
b) CARP CA Form No 2 Summary investigation report findings and evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3Applicants Information sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-
mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the same
are true and correct.
3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a
conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the
Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said
conference meeting shall also be sent to the prospective
farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representatives, the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and the other
interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the
property.
He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the views,
objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The
landowner shall also ask to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the
meeting shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an
integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his
MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the
valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, series of
1988. The valuation worksheet and the related CACF
valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO
and all the personnel who participated in the accomplishment
of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO
through ocular inspection and verification of the
property. This ocular inspection and verification shall be
mandatory when the computed value exceeds P500,000 per
estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder,
together with the duly accomplished valuation forms and his
recommendations, to the Central Office.
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy
each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the
PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final land
valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A
summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared and
duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel directly
participating in the review and final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly
authorized representative, a notice of acquisition (CARP
Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the notice to the
landowner personally or through registered mail within three
days from its approval. The notice shall include among
others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the
amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DARs offered value, the
BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval
the order of acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-
reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a
summary administrative hearing to determine just
compensation, in accordance with the procedures provided
under Administrative Order No. 13, series of
1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARABs decision on
just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the
Secretary for approval the required order of acquisition.
4. Upon the landowners receipt of payment, in case of
acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated
bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary
shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to
issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the
property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall
take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified
beneficiaries.
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural
lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required
information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder
(CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner
a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/ meeting over
the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective
farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other
interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and
solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the
meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the land. Ocular
inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory
when the computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon
determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with
his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office,
specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall
prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject property. From this point,
the provisions of R. A. No. 6657, Section 16 shall apply.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are
required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary
conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP,
farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No.
12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner
under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the
letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be
understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of
the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that
the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived
of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a
taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in
question. However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with
the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds,
not by trust account as was done by DAR.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, we held that The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt
of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.Until then,
title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.[24]
Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals
DARABs decision ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioners property.
[25]
 Here, petitioner pressed the question of whether the property was a
watershed, not covered by CARP.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067)
provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural
resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by
such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or
occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such
waters.
Watersheds may be defined as an area drained by a river and its
tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds. Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man,
so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is
simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources had not declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of
land in Barangay Casile were declared as PARK by a Zoning Ordinance
adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution [26] voiding the zoning classification of
the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now
classified as agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning
classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent
domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. [27]
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform [28] we held that
lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL may not
be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the
fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in
question form a vital part of a watershed area. [29]
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a
watershed or part of the protected area for watershed purposes. Ecological
balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be
interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land must be aware of
this deadly combination. In the case at bar, DAR included the disputed parcels
of land for compulsory acquisition simply because the land was allegedly
devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable
land that may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and
reassessment. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form
a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes.  In a
report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a
research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the
Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they concluded that:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland
of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig
waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil
and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital
waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental
effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit
river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-
an side, this wouldmean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged
areas of the Matang Tubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no
direct interest in the protection of the Matang Tubig structures they couldnt
care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by
it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource
water. x x x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road
building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would
not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of
watershed degredation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive
watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and
implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate
rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and program
be formulated and implemented by the Canlubang Estate in coordination with
pertinent government agencies.[30]
The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team headed by Dr.
Emilio Rosario, the ERDB Director, who holds a doctorate degree in water
resources from U.P. Los Banos in 1987; Dr. Medel Limsuan, who obtained his
doctorate degree in watershed management from Colorado University (US) in
1989; and Dr. Antonio M. Dano, who obtained his doctorate degree in Soil and
Water management Conservation from U.P. Los Banos in 1993.
Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the
President dated September 7, 1993 (Subject: PFVR HWI Ref.: 933103
Presidential Instructions on the Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang
Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna) which reads:
It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained for
watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations, among
others. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP beneficiaries will
be affected, it is important that a larger view of the situation be taken as one
should also consider the adverse effect on thousands of residents downstream
if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for watershed purposes.
The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate area
be allocated for the affected farmers, and that the Canlubang Estates be
mandated to protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent
watershed reserved.[31]
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a
watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of
the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds
is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the
DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes
of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A.
No. 6657, Section 10, provides:
Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and
mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production
centers, church sites and convents appurtenent thereto, communal burial
grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by
the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers, and all
lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act.
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the
disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition
coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land involved
in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of
the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-
evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to
resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform
Program.
 In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to
supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary
restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect
until final decision on the case. No costs SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002]
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE
AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES,
JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS,
FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T.
TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD,
ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO
BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE,
AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO
ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA,
MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA
MOISES, respondents/intervernors.
The Case
This Petition[1] seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
[2]
 dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and
void the Decision[3]dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179,
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land
registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an
approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (Lot for
brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-
boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to
the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620
signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division,
Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed. On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended
Application to include additional co-applicants.[4] Subsequently, more
applicants joined (collectively referred to as petitioners for brevity). [5]
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. In due course, the
land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time
immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva,
one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners
declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real
estate taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-
indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners
submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-
interest of the Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious
and continuous possession of the property in the concept of
owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on 22
March 1902 (Exhibit W and W-1 testimonies of J. Torres on
16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December
1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva,
who inherited the property. He had the property
resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit X and
X-1; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from
Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese Occupation of the
Philippines during World War II. He owned
and possessedthe property until 1958. He declared the
property for tax purposes, the latest of which was under Tax
Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit I
and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio
Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February
1958 (Exhibit H). During the ownership of the property by
Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of
Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the
farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina
Reynoso declared the property in her name under Tax
Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax
Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax
Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and
under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso
on 16 October 1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in
a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO
TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO
MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property from
Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November
1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO
ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ
TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR.,
RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO,
CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO
TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD
bought portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May
1986 (Exhibit S to S-3).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA,
CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold
their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO,
IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and
FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January
1987 (Exhibit T to T-9).[6]
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial
prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors
to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an order
considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of the
petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to January
14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date,
counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due notice. Hence, the
court again issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the
evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land
registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to
establish their registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a
decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent
portions of the courts decision, as follows:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the
witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual,
open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been
testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre,
Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for
Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes
were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said property was
planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing
purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to
establish registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the
Court can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to private rights.
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734,
1983 private rights is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of
acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by private rights
means that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the
property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory Information
title, or any other means for the acquisition of public landsxxx (underscoring
supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated,
Applicants have acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants
that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated
March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area
excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order
No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June
21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended
by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod
Silangan Townsite Reservation.(Exhibit K).[7]
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on
April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991
confirming their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a
copy of the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land
registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary
decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered a
decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an
appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy
of the land registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on
February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an
order directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129
on the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated
Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They
likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated
inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that
they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of
stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the
preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary
conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed
that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the
public domain.[8]
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the
land registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1),
1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents
herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
(Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been
segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed."
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is
confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a
Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case
No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in
private respondent Collados application that said parcel of land known as Psu-
162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application
and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis
supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these
vital documents which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public
lands. They should have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming
jurisdiction over the case.
x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the
public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition
of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and
Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners
did have the said properties surveyed even before the same was declared to
be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so
converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action
must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how
long, cannot convert the same into private property. And courts are without
jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirsof Gumangan vs.
Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA
387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may
be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339). [9]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR
CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION
FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity)
dated July 26, 1904 [10] established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR
for brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even
concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical,
literal description of the MWR.However, the main thrust of petitioners claim
over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting
aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights. They
point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject
to existing private rights, if any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of
ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-
interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim
that the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by
individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva
before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation.
 Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. [11] The
Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the  Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias [12] which laid the foundation that
all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. [13]Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[14]
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or
the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The
Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law as
well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law
promulgated in the Philippines. It required the adjustment or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state. [15]
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands
through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States
colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926,
the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to
public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public land referred
to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government
and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. [16]
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919.
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA
141 for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to
this day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition
of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. [17]
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system. [18] The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the
title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are
quieted upon issuance of the certificate. [19] PD 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978, [20] amended and updated Act
496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain. [21] Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
[22]
 explained thus:
One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources
of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was
seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to
control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates
to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in
the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII [23] of the 1935 Constitution, on Conservation
and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural
resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the
Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV [24]on the National Economy and the
Patrimony of the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian
doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII[25] on National Economy and Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as
well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong
to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal,
minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a
human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community,
and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property
devoted to park and recreational purposes.[26]
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al .,
[27]
 the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court
resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is
exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL for brevity).[28] The Court defined watershed as an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide
which separates it from adjacent watersheds. However, the Court also
recognized that:
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The
most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most
important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered
now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural
Resources as a protected area.Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by
such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or
occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such
waters.
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect
watershed areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and
Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the
environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland
of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig
waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil
and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital
waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental
effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit
river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-
an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged
areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no
direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt care
less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by
it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource
water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road
building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would
not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of
watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive
watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and
implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and
Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the
parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the
misuse of natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to
forest zones.Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on
the environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities
could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by
constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of
the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as
they vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the
issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as
amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for
is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect
title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or
royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el
estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.[29] Or,
that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by
Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time
petitioners application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985. [30] As
amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars
or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. [31]
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to
register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right
or title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession,
whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO
33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners
had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode
of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription.  As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior
to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a
watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public
land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has
been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of
petitioners application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no
longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b)
of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are
excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable
public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago,
Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,[32] the Court declared that inalienable public
lands -
x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both
acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim
of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from
the State.
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeal s[33] is in point. In Gordula,
petitioners did not contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land
lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which
Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners
in Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes
private rights of landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have
established their private rights to the subject land. The Court ruled:
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that
there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner
Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January,
1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in
June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as
public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in Proclamation No.
573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if
the claimant had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of
years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real
estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and
possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the
government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year
possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short
of the 30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,
as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the private rights
recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands
vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of private rights to
exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show x x x by clear
and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] x
x x means for the acquisition of public lands.
In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A.
No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which
prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-
year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the
State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only
by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession.
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to
the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had
subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot
alienable and disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an
area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-
boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small
part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites
are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED
JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16,
BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED
RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE
LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER
WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR
TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation
of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive
Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same,
together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite
purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to
private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance
with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of
Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are more
particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the
Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-
74-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N
33 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3;
thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5;
thence N 14 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point
7; thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to
point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m.
to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00
m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due
East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to point 18; thence
Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20;
thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to
point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South 1000.00
m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due
West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three thousand
seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of
alienable and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked 1
on sketch plan being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM
1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due
West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence
Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8;
thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point
10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to
point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E 458.36
m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14 18 E
1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30
50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s
33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning.Containing an area of one thousand
two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No.
1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and
location of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O.
Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by
petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage.
[34]
 Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES
OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF
LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED
PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to
the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21,
1974 which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of
Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the
area and revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein,
subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more
particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation
amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan
Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo,
and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along
lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the
Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by
the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the
Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-
33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed
Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on theTopographic Maps with the
Scale of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future
survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely
within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive
Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a
watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.[35] Unless and until the land classified as such is
released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.[36]
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private
character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed
(Exh. R). The Certification reads:
 Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described
on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo
Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded
from the operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283,
promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso Townsite
Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known
as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D.
1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as
contained in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification
had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is
contradicted by several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before
the land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a
Report[37] dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio
of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He
thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration. The Report
states:
COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the
Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it
was found that a portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in
plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of registration in
Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and
was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the
name of Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and
Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and
March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining portion of
plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed.  x x x
WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to
the Honorable Court for its information and guidance with the
recommendation that the application in the instant
proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining
supplied).
Likewise, in a letter[38] dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land
Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The
letter states:
That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO
SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-
162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
x x x
That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the
Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to
disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social
Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for
rejection (Underlining supplied). Copy of the letter is attached herewith as
Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof.
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna
T. Collados [as original applicant] application is the technical description [39] of
the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey
Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated
that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to
show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as
in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of
such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even
if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR
upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners
possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985 would have
been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in
1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando
Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in
1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary
Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite
reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly
populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following
ruling may be applied to this case by analogy:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. [40]
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgmentshould
have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the
Republics petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the
decision of the land registration court had allegedly become final and
executory. The land registration court rendered its decision on January 30,
1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23,
1991.[41] Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP
Blg. 129[42] only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become
final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor
General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration court issued
its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the
ground that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case,
specifically, over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor
General maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private
land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land
registration courtsjurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the
proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not
alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not
clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620,
ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the
public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged
procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving
the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,[43] as follows:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private
applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as
regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners
may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is
not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns
over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,[44] which involved the registration of
public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of  res
judicata and estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The
Court said:
It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply
when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor
does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy,
and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality.
The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State
of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of
holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated
Social Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29,
1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which
petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their
forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government, they
filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau
to take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430
hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENRs
Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904
WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-
12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS
EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY
OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of
Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein
situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and
Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under
the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in
the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point 1 on plan,
being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430)
Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as
amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force
and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C.
AQUINO
President of the
Philippines
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting
through the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued
sometime between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship
contracts to bona fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the
proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those
awarded were intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually
contracts of lease granted by the DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land
under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for
another twenty-five (25) years. [45] The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship
to ISF participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other
barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had
conducted.[46]
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the
pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert
their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned
that the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30,
1991 confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a copy
of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and
for new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the
land registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land
registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor
General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus
constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which
allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [47] provides in pertinent
parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial
court, as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago
vs. Court of Appeals[48] reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when
the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants
at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x
and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant
petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision
by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period
prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is
simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make
the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose
of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to
secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of
intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the
validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly
possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact,
intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the
Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault
the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival
groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already
claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of
the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It
also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival groups
including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the rules
would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated
January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC
No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner 
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove
swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our
public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are
considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be
judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located
in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its
registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The
Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not
subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private
respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to
this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of
mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and
therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as
agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill
of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law,
lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three
grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This
classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That
new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted
the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has been
reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when
this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their
disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest
lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified
as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909,
mangrove swamps or manglareswere defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide,
in which grows various kindred plants which will not live
except when watered by the sea, extending their roots
deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also
germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of
the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to
some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well
as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although
these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the
opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in
which that term is used in the cases cited or in general
American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them
are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may
be disposed of without impairment of the public interest
in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory
condition of the law, the custom had grown of converting
manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the
same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one
of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and
prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible
of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the
above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this
country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective
on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this
chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated,
all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and
all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court
maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it held in the
case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of
that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error
in this translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.'
Lumber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler
plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has
 only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber
land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps
does not change the general character of the land from manglare to timber
land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820,
the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court
said that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish
law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands
that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative
Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the
rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v.
Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a
unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the
land covered by the application there are mangrove
lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think
this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable,
inasmuch as it has been definitely decided
that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in
which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the
cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in
Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the
mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted
with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove
species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit
only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not
of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land
into public land. Such lands are not forest in character.
They do not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public
lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public
lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary
farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of
decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in
1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain
while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court
was more positive when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885
cannot be classified as forest land because it is not
thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although
conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the
classification of forest land in accordance with Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the
said Code as first, second and third groups are found on
the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot
885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to
land registration proceedings because the property had
been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land'
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes and not required by the public interests
to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it
of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless
and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where
this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in
dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not
private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve
days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a
categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of
whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the
legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional provision
classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to
provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such
implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own
role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy
prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid
down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is
claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do
the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the
objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural
resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the
Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
 time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law
provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition,
the lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition shall be classified, according to the use or
purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications
provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner,
transfer lands from one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as
follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. -
Upon there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of
the Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest
reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the
establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter
such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of,
but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the
same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter
or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke
any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve
shall be and become part of the public lands as though such proclamation
had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in
public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the
Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable
for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public
interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department
Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within
the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820
of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we
have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the
exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to
date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to
justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case
that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to
apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our
agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands over
which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917
became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest
lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right
protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago
in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of
the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later
classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of
the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in
fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be
considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse
possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in
support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released
as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification
the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps
approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It
should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not
have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious.
The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the
aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine
whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses,
as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private
ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public
domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and
alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of
swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while
such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released
for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has been
declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter
bow long cannot convert it into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the
proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is
remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no
convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly
obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it
been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in
the registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and
adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by
the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be
established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were
practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of
possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not
sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the
declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to
the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must
be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition
embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which
remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of
the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the
Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural
land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with
cost against him. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163509             December 6, 2006
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, 
vs.
BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION, and THE MINES
ADJUDICATION BOARD,respondents.
PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated November 28, 2003 and its Resolution2 dated May 5, 2004, which
respectively denied its petition for review and motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts quoted from the appellate court's Decision are as follows:
In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development
Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating
Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and
Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the
latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration,
development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI's
eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed
applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with
the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was
issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and
dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its
expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice
by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in
petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw
Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to
the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an
access/right of way to its mining claims.
In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to
applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for
brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18,
1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven
(37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals
Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The
transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own
right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining
operating agreement with CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner,
immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in
favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing
private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims.
On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended
Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of
Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional
documents in support of the application. Area clearances from the
DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh
and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required.
On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals' amended
MPSA applications were published in accordance with the
requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-
Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an
Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base
Metals' application on the following grounds:
I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE
OF THE MPSA OF BASE METALS WILL VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF
OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT.
II. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION WILL DEFEAT
THE RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN ADVERSE CLAIMANT
AND/OR OPPOSITOR.
In its Answer to the Adverse Claim and/or Opposition, private
respondent Base Metals alleged that:
a) the Adverse Claim was filed out of time;
b) petitioner PICOP has no rights over the mineral
resources on their concession area. PICOP is asserting
a privilege which is not protected by the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution;
c) the grant of the MPSA will not impair the rights of
PICOP nor create confusion, chaos or conflict.
Petitioner PICOP's Reply to the Answer alleged that:
a) the Adverse Claim was filed within the reglementary period;
b) the grant of MPSA will impair the existing rights of petitioner
PICOP;
c) the MOA between PICOP and Banahaw Mining provides for
recognition by Banahaw Mining of the Presidential Warranty awarded
in favor of PICOP for the exclusive possession and enjoyment of said
areas.
As a Rejoinder, private respondent Base Metals stated that:
1. it is seeking the right to extract the mineral resources in the applied
areas. It is not applying for any right to the forest resources within the
concession areas of PICOP;
2. timber or forest lands are open to Mining Applications;
3. the grant of the MPSA will not violate the so called "presidential fiat";
4. the MPSA application of Base Metals does not require the consent of
PICOP; and
5. it signified its willingness to enter into a voluntary agreement with
PICOP on the matter of compensation for damages. In the absence of
such agreement, the matter will be brought to the Panel of Arbitration in
accordance with law.
In refutation thereto, petitioner PICOP alleged in its Rejoinder that:
a) the Adverse Claim filed thru registered mail was sent on time and
as prescribed by existing mining laws and rules and regulations;
b) the right sought by private respondent Base Metals is not absolute
but is subject to existing rights, such as those which the adverse
claimant had, that have to be recognized and respected in a manner
provided and prescribed by existing laws as will be expounded fully
later;
c) as a general rule, mining applications within timber or forest lands
are subject to existing rights as provided in Section 18 of RA 7942 or
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and it is an admitted fact by the
private respondent that petitioner PICOP had forest rights as per
Presidential Warranty;
d) while the Presidential Warranty did not expressly state exclusivity,
P.D. 705 strengthened the right of occupation, possession and control
over the concession area;
e) the provisions of Section 19 of the Act and Section 15 of IRR
expressly require the written consent of the forest right holder, PICOP.
 After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel
Arbitrator issued an Order dated December 21, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which reads as:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement Application Nos. (XIII) 010, 011, 012
of Base Metal Resources Corporation should be set
aside.
The disapproval of private respondent Base Metals' MPSA was due
to the following reasons:
Anent the first issue the Panel find (sic) and so hold (sic) that the
adverse claim was filed on time, it being mailed on November 19, 1997,
at Metro Manila as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 26714. Under the
law (sic) the date of mailing is considered the date of filing.
As to whether or not an MPSA application can be granted on area
subject of an IFMA3 or PTLA4 which is covered by a Presidential
Warranty, the panel believes it can not, unless the grantee consents
thereto. Without the grantee's consent, the area is considered closed to
mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40). The Panel believe
(sic) that mining location in forest or timberland is allowed only if such
forest or timberland is not leased by the government to a qualified
person or entity. If it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in
addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned
before it is subjected to mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off
tangent to mining. Both are extremes. They can not exist at the same
time. The other must necessarily stop before the other operate.
On the other hand, Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation can not
insist the MPSA application as assignee of Banahaw. PICOP did not
consent to the assignment as embodied in the agreement. Neither did it
ratify the Deed of Assignment. Accordingly, it has no force and effect.
Thus, for lack of consent, the MPSA must fall.
On January 11, 1999, private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice
of Appeal with public respondent MAB and alleged in its Appeal
Memorandum the following arguments:
1. THE CONSENT OF PICOP IS NOT NECESSARY
FOR THE APPROVAL OF BASE METALS' MPSA
APPLICATION.
2. EVEN ASSUMING SUCH CONSENT IS
NECESSARY, PICOP HAD CONSENTED TO BASE
METALS' MPSA APPLICATION.
In Answer thereto, petitioner PICOP alleged that:
1. Consent is necessary for the approval of private
respondent's MPSA application;
2. Provisions of Memorandum Order No. 98-03 and
IFMA 35 are not applicable to the instant case;
3. Provisions of PD 7055 connotes exclusivity for timber
license holders; and
4. MOA between private respondent's assignor and
adverse claimant provided for the recognition of the
latter's rightful claim over the disputed areas.
Private respondent Base Metals claimed in its Reply that:
1. The withholding of consent by PICOP derogates the State's power to
supervise and control the exploration, utilization and development of all
natural resources;
2. Memorandum Order No, 98-03, not being a statute but a mere guideline
imposed by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), can be applied retroactively to MPSA applications
which have not yet been finally resolved;
3. Even assuming that the consent of adverse claimant is necessary for
the approval of Base Metals' application (which is denied), such consent
had already been given; and
4. The Memorandum of Agreement between adverse claimant and
Banahaw Mining proves that the Agusan-Surigao area had been used in
the past both for logging and mining operations.
After the filing of petitioner PICOP's Reply Memorandum, public
respondent rendered the assailed decision setting aside the Panel
Arbitrator's order. Accordingly, private respondent Base Metals'
MPSA's were reinstated and given due course subject to
compliance with the pertinent requirements of the existing rules and
regulations.6
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the
Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP
and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of
its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of
Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement.
The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a
contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government
in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application.
Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive possession,
occupation and exploration of the concession areas covered. If that were so,
the government would have effectively surrendered its police power to control
and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources.
On PICOP's contention that its consent is necessary for the grant of Base
Metals' MPSA, the appellate court ruled that the amendment to PTLA No. 47
refers to the grant of gratuitous permits, which the MPSA subject of this case is
not. Further, the amendment pertains to the cutting and extraction of timber for
mining purposes and not to the act of mining itself, the intention of the
amendment being to protect the timber found in PICOP's concession areas.
The Court of Appeals noted that the reinstatement of the MPSA does not ipso
facto revoke, amend, rescind or impair PICOP's timber license. Base Metals
still has to comply with the requirements for the grant of a mining permit. The
fact, however, that Base Metals had already secured the necessary Area
Status and Clearance from the DENR means that the areas applied for are not
closed to mining operations.
In its Resolution7 dated May 5, 2004, the appellate court denied PICOP's
Motion for Reconsideration. It ruled that PICOP failed to substantiate its
allegation that the area applied for is a forest reserve and is therefore closed to
mining operations because it did not identify the particular law which set aside
the contested area as one where mining is prohibited pursuant to applicable
laws.
The case is now before us for review.
In its Memorandum8 dated April 6, 2005, PICOP presents the following issues:
(1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals' MPSA are closed to mining
operations except upon PICOP's written consent pursuant to existing laws,
rules and regulations and by virtue of the Presidential Warranty; (2) its
Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in its petition.
PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as
these are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under
Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly
also part of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA
3092),9 and overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are
expressly prohibited under RA 7586.10 Hence, the area is closed to mining
operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.11
PICOP further asserts that to allow mining over a forest or forest reserve would
allegedly be tantamount to changing the classification of the land from forest to
mineral land in violation of Sec. 4, Art. XII of the Constitution and Sec. 1 of RA
3092.
According to PICOP, in 1962 and 1963, blocks A, B and C within the Agusan-
Surigao-Davao forest reserve under Proclamation No. 369 were surveyed as
permanent forest blocks in accordance with RA 3092. These areas cover
PICOP's PTLA No. 47, part of which later became IFMA No. 35. In turn, the
areas set aside as wilderness as in PTLA No. 47 became the initial
components of the NIPAS under Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586. When RA 7942 was
signed into law, the areas covered by the NIPAS were expressly determined
as areas where mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance
agreement applications shall not be allowed. PICOP concludes that since
there is no evidence that the permanent forest areas within PTLA No. 47 and
IFMA No. 35 have been set aside for mining purposes, the MAB and the Court
of Appeals gravely erred in reinstating Base Metals' MPSA and, in effect,
allowing mining exploration and mining-related activities in the protected areas.
PICOP further argues that under DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 96-40
implementing RA 7942, an exploration permit must be secured before mining
operations in government reservations may be undertaken. There being no
exploration permit issued to Banahaw Mining or appended to its MPSA, the
MAB and the Court of Appeals should not have reinstated its application.
PICOP brings to the Court's attention the case of PICOP Resources, Inc. v.
Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez,12 wherein the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Presidential Warranty issued to PICOP for its TLA No. 43 dated July 29, 1969,
a TLA distinct from PTLA No. 47 involved in this case, is a valid contract
involving mutual prestations on the part of the Government and PICOP.
The Presidential Warranty in this case is allegedly not a mere confirmation of
PICOP's timber license but a commitment on the part of the Government that
in consideration of PICOP's investment in the wood-processing business, the
Government will assure the availability of the supply of raw materials at levels
adequate to meet projected utilization requirements. The guarantee that
PICOP will have peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its
concession areas is impaired by the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA in
that the latter's mining activities underneath the area in dispute will surely
undermine PICOP's supply of raw materials on the surface.
Base Metals' obtention of area status and clearance from the DENR is
allegedly immaterial, even misleading. The findings of the DENR Regional
Disrector and the superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary
are allegedly misplaced because the area applied for is not inside the Agusan
Marsh but in a permanent forest. Moreover, the remarks in the area status
itself should have been considered by the MAB and the appellate court as they
point out that the application encroaches on surveyed timberland projects
declared as permanent forests/forest reserves.
Finally, PICOP insists that it has always maintained that the forest areas of
PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 are closed to mining operations. The grounds
relied upon in this petition are thus not new issues but merely amplifications,
clarifications and detailed expositions of the relevant constitutional provisions
and statutes regulating the use and preservation of forest reserves, permanent
forest, and protected wilderness areas given that the areas subject of the
MPSA are within and overlap PICOP's PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 which
have been classified and blocked not only as permanent forest but also as
protected wilderness area forming an integral part of the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve.
In its undated Memorandum,13 Base Metals contends that PICOP never made
any reference to land classification or the exclusion of the contested area from
exploration and mining activities except in the motion for reconsideration it filed
with the Court of Appeals. PICOP's object to the MPSA was allegedly based
exclusively on the ground that the application, if allowed to proceed, would
constitute a violation of the constitutional proscription against impairment of the
obligation of contracts. It was upon this issue that the appellate court hinged its
Decision in favor of Base Metals, ruling that the Presidential Warranty merely
confirmed PICOP's timber license. The instant petition, which raises new
issues and invokes RA 3092 and RA 7586, is an unwarranted departure from
the settled rule that only issues raised in the proceedings a quo may be
elevated on appeal.
Base Metals notes that RA 7586 expressly requires that there be a prior
presidential decree, presidential proclamation, or executive order issued by the
President of the Philippines, expressly proclaiming, designating, and setting
aside the wilderness area before the same may be considered part of the
NIPAS as a protected area. Allegedly, PICOP has not shown that such an
express presidential proclamation exists setting aside the subject area as a
forest reserve, and excluding the same from the commerce of man.
PICOP also allegedly misquoted Sec. 19 of RA 7942 by placing a comma
between the words "watershed" and "forest" thereby giving an altogether
different and misleading interpretation of the cited provision. The cited
provision, in fact, states that for an area to be closed to mining applications,
the same must be a watershed forest reserve duly identified and proclaimed by
the President of the Philippines. In this case, no presidential proclamation
exists setting aside the contested area as such.
Moreover, the Memorandum of Agreement between Banahaw Mining and
PICOP is allegedly a clear and tacit recognition by the latter that the area is
open and available for mining activities and that Banahaw Mining has a right to
enter and explore the areas covered by its mining claims.
Base Metals reiterates that the non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise
of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The Constitution
prohibits the passage of a law which enlarges, abridges or in any manner
changes the intention of the contracting parties. The decision of the MAB and
the Court of Appeals are not legislative acts within the purview of the
constitutional proscription. Besides, the Presidential Warranty is not a contract
that may be impaired by the reinstatement of the MPSA. It is a mere
confirmation of PICOP's timber license and draws its life from PTLA No. 47.
Furthermore, PICOP fails to show how the reinstatement of the MPSA will
impair its timber license.
Following the regalian doctrine, Base Metals avers that the State may opt to
enter into contractual arrangements for the exploration, development, and
extraction of minerals even it the same should mean amending, revising, or
even revoking PICOP's timber license. To require the State to secure PICOP's
prior consent before it can enter into such contracts allegedly constitutes an
undue delegation of sovereign power.
Base Metals further notes that Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), under
which PTLA No. 47, IFMA No. 35 and the Presidential Warranty were issued,
requires notice to PICOP rather than consent before any mining activity can be
commenced in the latter's concession areas.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Memorandum 14 dated April
21, 2005 on behalf of the MAB, contending that PICOP's attempt to raise new
issues, such as its argument that the contested area is classified as a
permanent forest and hence, closed to mining activities, is offensive to due
process and should not be allowed.
The OSG argues that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of
the due process and non-impairment clauses. The Presidential Warranty
merely guarantees PICOP's tenure over its concession area and covers only
the right to cut, collect and remove timber therein. It is a mere collateral
undertaking and cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its PTLA No. 47 and
IFMA No. 35. To hold that the Presidential Warranty is a contract separate
from PICOP's timber license effectively gives the latter PICOP an exclusive,
perpetual and irrevocable right over its concession area and impairs the
State's sovereign exercise of its power over the exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources.
The case of PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez, supra, cited
by PICOP cannot be relied upon to buttress the latter's claim that a presidential
warranty is a valid and subsisting contract between PICOP and the
Government because the decision of the appellate court in that case is still
pending review before the Court's Second Division.
The OSG further asserts that mining operations are legally permissible over
PICOP's concession areas. Allegedly, what is closed to mining applications
under RA 7942 are areas proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. The law
does not totally prohibit mining operations over forest reserves. On the
contrary, Sec. 18 of RA 7942 permits mining over forest lands subject to
existing rights and reservations, and PD 705 allows mining over forest lands
and forest reservations subject to State regulation and mining laws. Sec. 19(a)
of RA 7942 also provides that mineral activities may be allowed even over
military and other government reservations as long as there is a prior written
clearance by the government agency concerned.
The area status clearances obtained by Base Metals also allegedly show that
the area covered by the MPSA is within timberland, unclassified public forest,
and alienable and disposable land. Moreover, PICOP allegedly chose to cite
portions of Apex Mining Corporation v. Garcia,15 to make it appear that the
Court in that case ruled that mining is absolutely prohibited in the Agusan-
Surigao-Davao Forest Reserve. In fact, the Court held that the area is not
open to mining location because the proper procedure is to file an application
for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development.
In addition, PICOP's claimed wilderness area has not been designated as a
protected area that would operate to bar mining operations therein. PICOP
failed to prove that the alleged wilderness area has been designated as an
initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree,
presidential proclamation or executive order. Hence, it cannot correctly claim
that the same falls within the coverage of the restrictive provisions of RA 7586.
The OSG points out that the Administrative Code of 1917 which RA 3092
amended has been completely repealed by the Administrative Code of 1978.
Sec. 4, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, provides that
Congress shall determine the specific limits of forest lands and national parks,
marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Once this is done, the area
thus covered by said forest lands and national parks may not be expanded or
reduced except also by congressional legislation. Since Congress has yet to
enact a law determining the specific limits of the forest lands covered by
Proclamation No. 369 and marking clearly its boundaries on the ground, there
can be no occasion that could give rise to a violation of the constitutional
provision.
Moreover, Clauses 10 and 14 of PICOP's IFMA No. 35 specifically provides
that the area covered by the agreement is open for mining if public interest so
requires. Likewise, PTLA No. 47 provides that the area covered by the license
agreement may be opened for mining purposes.
Finally, the OSG maintains that pursuant to the State's policy of multiple land
use, R.A. No. 7942 provides for appropriate measures for a harmonized
utilization of the forest resources and compensation for whatever damage
done to the property of the surface owner or concessionaire as a consequence
of mining operations. Multiple land use is best demonstrated by the
Memorandum of Agreement between PICOP and Banahaw Mining.
First, the procedural question of whether PICOP is raising new issues in the
instant petition. It is the contention of the OSG and Base Metals that PICOP's
argument that the area covered by the MPSA is classified as permanent forest
and therefore closed to mining activities was raised for the first time in PICOP's
motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
Our own perusal of the records of this case reveals that this is not entirely true.
In its Adverse Claim and/or Opposition16 dated November 19, 1997 filed with
the MGB Panel of Arbitrators, PICOP already raised the argument that the
area applied for by Base Metals is classified as a permanent forest determined
to be needed for forest purposes pursuant to par. 6, Sec. 3 of PD 705, as
amended. PICOP then proceeded to claim that the area should remain forest
land if the purpose of the presidential fiat were to be followed. It stated:
Technically, the areas applied for by Base Metals are classified as a
permanent forest being land of the public domain determined to be
needed for forest purposes (Paragraph 6, Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended) If these areas then are classified and
determined to be needed for forest purpose then they should be
developed and should remain as forest lands. Identifying,
delineating and declaring them for other use or uses defeats the
purpose of the aforecited presidential fiats. Again, if these areas
would be delineated from Oppositor's forest concession, the forest
therein would be destroyed and be lost beyond recovery. 17
Base Metals met this argument head on in its Answer18 dated December 1,
1997, in which it contended that PD 705 does not exclude mining operations in
forest lands but merely requires that there be proper notice to the licensees of
the area.
Again in its Petition19 dated January 25, 2003 assailing the reinstatement of
Base Metals' MPSA, PICOP argued that RA 7942 expressly prohibits mining
operations in plantation areas such as PICOP's concession area. Hence, it
posited that the MGB Panel of Arbitrators did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that without PICOP's consent, the area is closed to
mining location.
It is true though that PICOP expounded on the applicability of RA 3092, RA
7586, and RA 7942 for the first time in its motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court's Decision. It was only in its motion for reconsideration that
PICOP argued that the area covered by PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 are
permanent forest lands covered by RA 7586 which cannot be entered for
mining purposes, and shall remain indefinitely as such for forest uses and
cannot be excluded or diverted for other uses except after reclassification
through a law enacted by Congress.
Even so, we hold that that the so-called new issues raised by PICOP are well
within the issues framed by the parties in the proceedings a quo. Thus, they
are not, strictly speaking, being raised for the first time on appeal. 20 Besides,
Base Metals and the OSG have been given ample opportunity, by way of the
pleadings filed with this Court, to respond to PICOP's arguments. It is in the
best interest of justice that we settle the crucial question of whether the
concession area in dispute is open to mining activities.
We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is
enshrined in our laws towards the end that the country's natural resources may
be rationally explored, developed, utilized and conserved. The Whereas
clauses and declaration of policies of PD 705 state:
WHEREAS, proper classification, management and utilization of the
lands of the public domain to maximize their productivity to meet the
demands of our increasing population is urgently needed;
WHEREAS, to achieve the above purpose, it is necessary to
reassess the multiple uses of forest lands and resources before
allowing any utilization thereof to optimize the benefits that can be
derived therefrom;
…
Sec. 2. Policies.—The State hereby adopts the following policies:
a) The multiple uses of forest lands shall be oriented to
the development and progress requirements of the
country, the advancement of science and technology,
and the public welfare;
In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance between mining and
timber rights, gives a mining contractor the right to enter a timber concession
and cut timber therein provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall
be properly compensated for any damage done to the property as a
consequence of mining operations. The pertinent provisions on auxiliary
mining rights state:
Sec. 72. Timber Rights.—Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, a contractor may be granted a right to cut trees or
timber within his mining areas as may be necessary for his mining
operations subject to forestry laws, rules and
regulations: Provided, That if the land covered by the mining area is
already covered by existing timber concessions, the volume of
timber needed and the manner of cutting and removal thereof shall
be determined by the mines regional director, upon consultation
with the contractor, the timber concessionair/permittee and the
Forest Management Bureau of the Department: Provided,
further, That in case of disagreement between the contractor and
the timber concessionaire, the matter shall be submitted to the
Secretary whose decision shall be final. The contractor shall
perform reforestation work within his mining area in accordance with
forestry laws, rules and regulations.
…
Sec. 76. Entry into Private Lands and Concession Areas.—Subject
to prior notification, holders of mining rights shall not be prevented
from entry into private lands and concession areas by surface
owners, occupants, or concessionaires when conducting mining
operations therein: Provided, That any damage done to the
property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a
consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as
may be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, further, That to guarantee such
compensation, the person authorized to conduct mining operation
shall, prior thereto, post a bond with the regional director based on
the type of properties, the prevailing prices in and around the area
where the mining operations are to be conducted, with surety or
sureties satisfactory to the regional director.
With the foregoing predicates, we shall now proceed to analyze PICOP's
averments.
PICOP contends that its concession area is within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao
Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 and is closed to
mining application citing several paragraphs of Sec. 19 of RA 7942.
The cited provision states:
Sec. 19 Areas Closed to Mining Applications.—Mineral agreement
or financial or technical assistance agreement applications shall not
be allowed:
(a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior
written clearance by the government agency concerned;
… rules and regulations. No location, prospecting, exploration,
(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;
… concessions shall be allowed unless proper notice has been served
(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest
reserves, wilderness areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests,
national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game
refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law in areas expressly
prohibited under the National Ingrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586, Department Administrative
Order No. 25, series of 1992 and other laws. [emphasis supplied]
We analyzed each of the categories under which PICOP claims that its
concession area is closed to mining activities and conclude that PICOP's
contention must fail.
Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a
government reservation, defined as proclaimed reserved lands for specific
purposes other than mineral reservations,21 such does not necessarily
preclude mining activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that
government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior
written clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such
reservation.
Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other
than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain
limitations. It provides:
Sec. 6. Other Reservations.—Mining operations in reserved lands
other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the
Department, subject to limitations as herein provided. In the event
that the Department cannot undertake such activities, they may be
undertaken by a qualified person in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary. The right to develop and
utilize the minerals found therein shall be awarded by the President
under such terms and conditions as recommended by the Director
and approved by the Secretary: Provided, That the party who
undertook the exploration of said reservations shall be given
priority. The mineral land so awarded shall be automatically
excluded from the reservation during the term of the
agreement: Provided, further, That the right of the lessee of a valid
mining contract existing within the reservation at the time of its
establishment shall not be prejudiced or impaired.
Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves
but only those proclaimed aswatershed forest reserves. There is no evidence
in this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed
as watershed forest reserves.
Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area
is absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to PICOP's obvious
misreading of our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the
effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve
established under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually ruled that
pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights
within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by
initially applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and
Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of
Mines and Geosciences.
Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty
subject to existing rights and reservations. It provides:
Sec. 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations.—Subject to any existing
rights or reservations and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral
resources in public or private lands, including timber or forestlands
as defined in existing laws, shall be open to mineral agreements or
financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any
conflict that may arise under this provision shall be heard and
resolved by the panel of arbitrators.
Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which
include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest
reservations.22 It states:
Sec. 47. Mining Operations.—Mining operations in forest lands shall
be regulated and conducted with due regard to protection,
development and utilization of other surface resources. Location,
prospecting, exploration, utilization or exploitation of mineral
resources in forest reservations shall be governed by mining laws,
utilization, or exploitation of mineral resources inside forest
upon the licensees thereof and the prior approval of the Director,
secured.
…
Significantly, the above-quoted provision does not require that the consent of
existing licensees be obtained but that they be notified before mining activities
may be commenced inside forest concessions.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the
issuance of area status and clearance or consent for mining applications
pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest lands, military and other
government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves other than critical
watershed forest reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas within timber or
forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open to mining
applications subject to area status and clearance.
To this end, area status clearances or land status certifications have been
issued to Base Metals relative to its mining right application, to wit:
II. MPSA No. 010
1. Portion colored green is the area covered by the
aforestated Timberland Project No. 31-E, Block A and
Project No. 59-C, Block A, L.C. Map No. 2466 certified
as such on June 30, 1961; and
2. Shaded brown represent CADC claim. 23
III. MPSA No. 011
1. The area applied covers the Timberland, portion of Project No. 31-E,
Block-E, L.C. Map No. 2468 and Project No. 36-A Block II, Alienable and
Disposable Land, L.C. Map No. 1822, certified as such on June 30, 1961
and January 1, 1955, respectively;
2. The green shade is the remaining portion of Timber Land Project;
3. The portion colored brown is an applied and CADC areas;
4. Red shade denotes alienable and disposable land. 24
IV. MPSA No. 012
Respectfully returned herewith is the folder of Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation, applied under Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA (XIII) 012), referred to this office per memorandum
dated August 5, 1997 for Land status certification and the findings based
on available references file this office, the site is within the unclassified
Public Forest of the LGU, Rosario, Agusan del Sur. The shaded portion is
the wilderness area of PICOP Resources Incorporated (PRI), Timber
License Agreement.25
V. MPSA No. 013
1. The area status shaded green falls within Timber Land, portion of Project
No. 31-E, Block-A, Project No. 59-C, Block-A, L.C. Map No. 2468 certified as
such on June 30, 1961;
2. Colored brown denotes a portion claimed as CADC areas;
3. Violet shade represent a part of reforestation project of PRI concession;
and
4. The yellow color is identical to unclassified Public Forest of said LGU and
the area inclosed in Red is the wilderness area of PICOP Resources, Inc.
(PRI), Timber License Agreement.26
Thirdly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the
MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the
NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or
executive order as required by RA 7586.
Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586 provides:
Sec. 5. Establishment and Extent of the System.—The
establishment and operationalization of the System shall involve the
following:
 (a) All areas or islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated
or set aside, pursuant to a law, presidential decree,
presidential proclamation or executive order as national park,
game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness area, strict
nature reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary,
natural and historical landmark, protected and managed
landscape/seascape as well as identified virgin forests before the
effectivity of this Act are hereby designated as initial components of
the System. The initial components of the System shall be governed
by existing laws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this
Act.
Although the above-cited area status and clearances, particularly those
pertaining to MPSA Nos. 012 and 013, state that portions thereof are within the
wilderness area of PICOP, there is no showing that this supposed wilderness
area has been proclaimed, designated or set aside as such, pursuant to a law,
presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order. It should be
emphasized that it is only when this area has been so designated that Sec. 20
of RA 7586, which prohibits mineral locating within protected areas, becomes
operational.
From the foregoing, there is clearly no merit to PICOP's contention that the
area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities.
Finally, we do not subscribe to PICOP's argument that the Presidential
Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the non-
impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.
An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply
reassures PICOP of the government's commitment to uphold the terms and
conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and
adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources
of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only
the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not
extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources,
occurring within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA
No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. We agree with the OSG's position that it is merely a
collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its timber
license. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran27 that a timber license is not
a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We
declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause; it is only a license or a
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it a
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation' (C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary:
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements
are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads:
"Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.28 [emphasis supplied]
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a
contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and
enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the
complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to
control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources in the area.
In closing, we should lay emphasis on the fact that the reinstatement of Base
Metals' MPSA does not automatically result in its approval. Base Metals still
has to comply with the requirements outlined in DAO 96-40, including the
publication/posting/radio announcement of its mineral agreement application.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158290             October 23, 2006
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L.
HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and
CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners, 
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD
and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require
public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation
Study of 1996,1 the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National
Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian Development Bank,3 the Manila
Observatory4 and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership
in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine
powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants,
petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the
bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust,
dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into
the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on
health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners
particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion
when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with
hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NO x) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it
creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts
to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation
and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon
monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere
and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged
exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with
weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country
will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being
phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation over the next
10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy
and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment
Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's major cities, Metro Manila,
Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM 10, a finer PM which can
penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at
over US$430 million.8 The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have
caused the following:
· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about
US$140 million.
· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued
at about US$120 million.
· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro
Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six
times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million.
This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when compared with
the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which
reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91
and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to
the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that
pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to
27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and
15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the
children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than
their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the
emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs,
petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural
gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of
propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest
fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum;
produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel;
reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half;
emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although,
according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more
methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming. 11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use
CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, 12 Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic
Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners'
motion to implead the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General,
cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the
writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only
to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is
required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 15 Further citing existing
jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary
act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor
vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does
not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that
unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the
respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement
Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is
the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 26 16 of Rep. Act No. 8749,
that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related
products to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency and reduced
emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act, the
DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles,
and the herein respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission
standards. The Solicitor General opines that the Court should declare the
instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance
with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically
Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that under these laws and with
all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of CNG,
respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize
CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought
about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and
the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law
enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners
insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very same Section
3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE
PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED
BY LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY
RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED
ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO
USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE
COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE
COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality
to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus issue against
respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the
policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a
healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation
of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to
petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant petition. They
aver that when there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in
this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all
remedies to challenge this omission by the government. This, they say, is
embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents' functions
and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent
government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to
compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General
explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission
standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as
setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not
recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the
petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that
would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only
procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners
propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered
course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in
the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have
standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do not
question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of
petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the
issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand
that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance
to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with
public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles
immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the
legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if
the writ could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of
the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case
any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and
(3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does
not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a
course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On
the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary
that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ
will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to
do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which
he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes
duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and
to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced
hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in
operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when
PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on
respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall
implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant
to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission
standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish
the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall
consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure
substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and
welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and
LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control and
management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with
the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to
set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action
plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and
the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an
action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely
the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We also said, it
is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the said
right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in
their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents
to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general
mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly
the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the
use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290,
entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport
(NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among
others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the
potential to produce substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-
Power Project as representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the
Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its
objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport.
Furthermore, one of the components of the program is the development of
CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic locations in the
country to serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290,
consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead
agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the
DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG.
Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE,
to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in
PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon
through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in
present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened
routes…" A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain
extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought
by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to
require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is
no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners
of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O.
No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive
Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs
based on the results of the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation
cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is
prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a
coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal
branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this
petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a
balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld the
right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we
recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to
clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second,
the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come. . ." 29
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the
premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark
case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the
present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these
pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to
drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must
admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes
an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of
mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to
us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory
remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY.
VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation
Division, DENR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-
CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P.
PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were
originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court,
respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of
the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-
1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune
Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly
registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD)
under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such
was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty.
Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the
DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard.  In the
course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce
the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from
Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from
the petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and
slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. [3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's
lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove
the legitimacy of their source and origin.[4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the
owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory
of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The
owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. [5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles
requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the
required documents covering the seized articles because some of them,
particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of
Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents being
required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products
placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report
recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber
Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an
unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of
Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required
documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard
including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber
loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event
its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the
source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of
Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances
warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber
and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes
through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458
as well as the lumber loaded therein for transport lumber
using recycled documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending
immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469
and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its
lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to
Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required
documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after
reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered
CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance
with law the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga
lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard. [9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary
injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A.
Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil
Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner
questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and
seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its
cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different
sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of
Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of
3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D.
No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were
committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No.
897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of
the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team
caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's
permit had already been suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the
petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-
type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was
informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the
petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the
transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the
caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's
president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of
town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles
of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting
machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with
lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately
20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises
by issuing a receipt therefor.[10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case
(hereinafter, theSECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
complaint against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po,
for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After
appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro
Arellano, handed down a resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an
information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and
for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and
slabs covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. [12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H.
Bello, III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging. [13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991
by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po
with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL
CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent
thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune
Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and
unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations.[14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its
decision[15] in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized
from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on
April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated,
and instead the respondents are required to report and bring
to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000
board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and
sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the
appropriate action before the proper court regarding the
lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions
loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which
were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on
August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon
compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said
petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the proper court
has taken cognizance and determined how those lumber,
shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless
search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving
out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with
large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of
its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and
seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of
the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is
justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle. [16] As to the seizure of a large
volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April
1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that made
the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even
question.[17] And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because
it is settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands
observed during the conduct of the search. [18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May
1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government
for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search
warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to
him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the
trial court ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the
expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a
fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No.
25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a
Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following
grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession
of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him
for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-
53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then
pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure,
raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the
required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions
of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section
68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal
logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. [20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, [21] respondent
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed
the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents
required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime." [22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18
October 1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R.
No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [24] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from
the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on
the issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband
articles since there is no law punishing the possession of lumber, and
that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal
documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals
held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest
product involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in
the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider
is that when appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its
acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present
any despite the period of extension granted to it. [25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992. [26] Hence, the petitioner
came to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a
decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies;
(b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not
lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure
was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the
seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained
the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL
CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs,
especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted
for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is
included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest
product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or
employee can seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775,
which provides in part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of
the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National
Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall
also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment
used in committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by
the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section
80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products or possession of timber or other forest products without the required
legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court
on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with
which the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-
V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge
Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor
"other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not
prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an
information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do
not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of
this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of
the offense,[29] and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the
sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided,
That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned
without any authority; and (b) possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But
conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from
the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible
conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom
that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without
the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as
lumber. They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated
by the words approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not
with the preposition of. They must then be raw forest products or, more
specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin,
gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as
grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
information. The public and the private respondents obviously
miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even
if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above
fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly
charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his
dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information
for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers
to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at
the conclusion that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition
violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law
violated must be considered in determining whether an information charges an
offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to
justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova,
Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to, [30] cannot
lead one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8
thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four
(4) truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of
narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited
wood species. (Italics supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution [31] of the
investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the
information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an
information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal
shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended
by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as
an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded
from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus
possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the
contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of
the same section in the definition of Processing plant; which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper
or other finished wood products.
 This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest
raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared
for the market.[32] Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words
and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning.[33] And insofar as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither
should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172
of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion
in granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably
failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its
assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with
Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded
with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were
not accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The
seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended
by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving
vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1)
search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view,
(3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. [35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April
1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any
time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished
in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until
completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was
interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day,
provided it is still within the ten-day period. [36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because
possession of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified
therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further
discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case
palpably fail to show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by
the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution
of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for
utter want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to comment on
the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from
the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner
never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been
suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was
never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September
1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise
dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized
representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of
this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or
his duly authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not
penalized must also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue
in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the
violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more
than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts
to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which
deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm
and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous
destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an
inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government
must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without
fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and
protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING
ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August
1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita
Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91,
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po; (c)
REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and
(d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to
hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No.
123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that the
respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error
in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995
in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131270             March 17, 2000
PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming
petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of §68 2 of the
Revised Forestry Code 3 (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut
lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and
trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided
the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found
a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that
the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two
receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated
March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the
receipt considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long
been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw
and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted
29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day,
September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces
measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE
stockyard in Sumpong; Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order 4 was served
on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company, but he
refused to acknowledge it.
On October 1, 1992, raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company
president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who
represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the operations
to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the
court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was
denied. 5 Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9,
1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As before, however,
petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR
officers (Exhs. E, F & G).
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy,
as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged
with violation of §68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. The Information alleged: 6
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto at
the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation Compound, municipality
of Valencia, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
possess 2,115 pieces [of] lumber of different dimensions in the total
volume of 29,299.25 board feet or equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters
with an estimated value of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR PESOS AND
45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine Currency, without any authority,
license or legal documents from the government, to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the amount of P488,334.45.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by
E.O. 277.
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994,
judgment was rendered as follows: 7
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Perfecto Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of having in their possession timber products worth of
P488,334.45 without the legal documents as charged in the
information in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as
amended and are, therefore, each sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. The
lumber subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of the
government.
Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack
of evidence against them.
Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on
October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for
lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized
lumber. 8
Hence this petition which raises the following issues: 9
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
PETITIONER PALLADA.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT
THE PROPER DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S
POSSESSION OF THE SQUARED TIMBER OR FLITCHES.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE PRESENCE OF ERASURES IN THE
CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS
AS EVIDENCE.
First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as
summarized by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal: 10
1. Exh. 6 — Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short), dated
December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of flitches equivalent to 12.23
cubic meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del Sur of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Taken from the forest
area of Wahab and H.D. Pangcoga.
Exh. 6-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 6-B — Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for
short)
Exh. 6-C — Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for
463 pieces of lumber equivalent to 5,056.94 board feet
Exh. 6-D — Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991,
from WHP Enterprises of Maguing, Lanao del Sur, to the
Corporation for the lumber mentioned in Exh. "6-C"
Exh. 6-F — Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to
WHP Enterprises, dated December 16, 1992, for the
5,056.94 board feet of lumber
Exh. 6-D-1 — [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above
2. Exh. 7 — CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent to
25.4 cubic meter[s] taken from the forest area of a certain Somira
M. Ampuan in Lama Lico, Bombaran of the ARMM.
Exh. 7-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 7-B — CTA
Exh. 7-C — Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961
pieces of lumber equal to 10,758.2 board feet
Exh. 7-D — Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest
Corporation issued by SMA Trading Company, dated
February 6, 1992
Exh. 7-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee issued
to Somira N. Ampuan, dated August 9, 1991
Exh. 7-F — Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the
Corporation in payment to SMA Trading Company for
10,758.02 board feet of lumber, dated February 6, 1992
3. Exh. 8 — CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an
equivalent volume of 18.93 cubic meter from the forest area of
Wahab Pangcoga and H.D. Pangcoga, dated February 25, 1992
Exh. 8-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 8-B — CTA.
Exh. 8-C — Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber.
Exh. 8-D — Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest
Corporation issued by WHP Enterprises,
Exh. 8-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 8-F — Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for
8,024.99 board feet of lumber issued by the Corporation
payable to WHP Enterprises
4. Exh. 9 — CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent
volume of 12.24 cubic meters from licensee Somira M. Ampuan of
 Lama Lico, Bombaran, Lanao del Sur, consigned to the
Corporation, (undated). Stamped "Release 3/2/92"
Exh. 9-A — Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 9-B — CTA, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-C — Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-D — Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading
Company to the Corporation, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-E — Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 9-F — Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for]
5,189 board feet of lumber
Exh. 9-D-1 — Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"
The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of
Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company
should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. 11 For indeed, as BFD
Circular No. 10-83 12 states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability
and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity
in documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is]
hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized
BFD officers . . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate
of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered
as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to
confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD
implementing guidelines.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the
Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been
considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the
lumber. 13In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang
Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 14
The contention has no, merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is
merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber,
was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase
"posses timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that
only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents
required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not
liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate
certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different
certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest
products. 15 As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-
83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for
lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for
shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin
thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute
for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were
justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and
defects found in the documents presented by the latter. According to the trial
court: 16
Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches,
the supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the Delivery Receipt
from the lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces
of lumber. . . .
In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of
log, respectively. But the supporting documents describe the forest
product[s] as lumber.
The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678
pieces of hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also states the
same load of lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of
mentioning lumber in the Auxiliary Invoice and so the words "flitches
87 pieces" were written down and enclosed in parenthesis.
The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]
The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan
de Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A") mentions Valencia
Golden Harvest Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO
states (at the back page) that the same is covered by Auxiliary
Invoice No. 00491; in fact, the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has
invoice number 000488.
In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the
consignee was clearly erased and changed to "Valencia, Golden
Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon". In the Auxiliary Invoice
(Exh. "7-A") the blank space for the name and address of the
consignee was smudged with a typewriter correction fluid (the better
to erase what was originally typewritten in it?) and changed to
"Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon".
The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-
A" [were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh. "[7]" and Exh. "[7-
A]". 17
Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly
accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in blank.
Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears
no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on
August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February
6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list in sizes and volume of the
lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut lumber from the
dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company bought
the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and they
were cut into lumber by the company. 18
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are
found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in
giving no credence to the same. 19
It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be
taken against petitioner because the documents came from lumber dealers. In
addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public
documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in their
execution. 20
This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal
effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not
have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the
corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should
have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to
have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as
he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete. 21
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the
CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The
presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public
accomplished.22documents are, on their faces, regular and properly
accomplished. 22
Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised
Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, §68, provides:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished
by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium;
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000 pesos
but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
 the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the Case may be. . . .

As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, 23 the penalty to be imposed should be six (6)
years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.

WHEREFORE the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1997,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.