PEOPLE V.

SALES NOTES: important doctrine of the case

[G.R. NO. 177218; 3 OCTOBER 2011] 44585859949
TOPIC: Parricide
FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Brothers Noemar and Junior left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Penafrancia without the
permission of their parents and they did not return home that night.
2. Their mother found then the next day in the nearby barangay. Afraid of their father’s rage, they refused to return
home but they were persuaded by their mother.
3. The furious appellant confronted them when they reached home.
4. They were beaten with a stick which broke so he brought his children out of their house. He tied both kids to a
coconut tree where the appellant continued t beat them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating, their mother
stayed inside the house for fear for her own life as well.
5. After being beaten, they were brought back to the house where Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness and
thereafter died.
RTC DCN: parricide and slight physical injuries
CA DCN: affirmed.
6. appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death.
Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not
during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered
seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the accused was guilty of parricide?

HELD: yes.
The elements of parricide are:
a. a person is killed
b. the deceased is killed by the accused
c. the deceased is the father, mother, or child whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant, or the
legitimate spouse of accused.
RATIO:
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling without permission and
that was already preceded by three other similar incidents.This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab
thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look
for the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to
discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the
injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when Noemars body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied
and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not
have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was
nevertheless too late to save the childs life. It bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor
child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently
established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior.Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger
brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but
this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part,
Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was
too much for Noemars frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.

as to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemars birth certificate was not
presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered.[23] As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the
father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under oath.[24]Maria also testified
that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship
between appellant and Noemar. Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.

DECISION: The appeal is denied and the court affirms the conviction of the accused of the crime of parricide.

Bagajo v. Hon. Marave and People

86 SCRA 389 (G.R. No. L-33345)

FACTS:
MARCELA M. BAGAJO (petitioner) was convicted by the Municipal Trial Court for the crime of slight physical injuries
committed against her pupil Wilma Alcantara.
There was an accident happen in the petitioner’s classroom which causes one pupil to be hurt and fainted, allegedly
cause by the complainant Wilma Alcantara. The petitioner asked Wilma about what happen but the later denied having to
do with what had just taken place. Petitioner thereupon became angry and with a piece of bamboo stick whipped Wilma,
which causes injuries to the latter.
Petitioner on her defense said that, she was just trying to discipline her pupil and she was not actuated by any criminal
intent.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence rendered constitute criminally liability against the petitioner?

RULING:
NO, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, in the circumstances proven in the
record. Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred by the
proper authorities, we are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish
Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but we are convinced that the means she actually used
was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The nature of the injuries actually
suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to
Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be
discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea.
There is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a
criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears
is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis; she was
within her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the degree of
moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for us, at this moment and
in this case, to determine.

MARCELA M. BAGAJO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE

Petition for certiorari to review, under Republic Act 5440, the decision of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Occidental in Criminal Case No. OZ-95 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered against petitioner by the
Municipal Court of Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental and imposing upon her the penalty to pay a fine of P50.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs, for the crime of slight physical injuries.

The background facts as found by the trial court as follows:

In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2 o'clock, petitioner who was a teacher, left her classroom to go to the
principal's office. While the teacher was thus out of the room, complainant Wilma Alcantara, one of her pupils, left her
desk and went to chat with Lilibeth Purlas, a classmate, while leaning over the desk of Ponciano Navarro, another
classmate. At that juncture, a fourth classmate, Benedicta Guirigay passed near Wilma, who suddenly raised her leg
causing the former to stumble on it and fall down, her head hitting the edge of the desk, her stomach a sharp pointed
umbrella and her knee a nail of the desk. She fainted. At that precise moment, petitioner was entering the room. She
asked Wilma what happened but the latter denied having anything to do with what had just taken place. Petitioner
thereupon became angry and, with a piece of "bamboo stick" which she was using as a pointer whipped Wilma behind her
legs and her thigh, thereby causing the following injuries, according to the medical certificate presented in evidence:

1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. it is about four inches in length and
1/4 centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.

2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface of the
right thigh.
 The above lessions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (Pages 26-27, Record.)

Upon the foregoing facts, petitioner claims in her appeal that respondent Judge erred in convicting her of the crime of
slight physical injuries. She maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying to discipline her pupil Wilma for tripping her
classmate and for denying that she did so. She contends she was not actuated by any criminal intent. And she is joined in
this pose by the Solicitor General, who recommends her acquittal, coupled with the observation that although "petitioner is
not criminally liable for her conduct, she may still be held accountable for her conduct administratively.

We agree with the Solicitor General.

In the school premises and during school activities and affairs, the teacher exercises substitute parental authority over the
students. (Article 349, Civil Code.) More specifically, according to Article 352, "The relations between teacher and pupil,
professor and student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall
corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and
mind of the pupil or student." And pursuant to this provision, Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual
enjoins:

The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about), imposing manual
work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and unusual punishments of any nature, reducing
scholarship rating for bad conduct, holding up a pupil to unnecessary ridicule, the use of epithets and
expressions tending to destroy the pupil's self-respect, and the permanent confiscation of personal effects
of pupils are forbidden.

In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code and administrative injunctions, no teacher may impose corporal
punishment upon any student in any case. But We are not concerned in this appeal with the possible administrative
liability of petitioner. Neither are we called upon here to pass on her civil liability other than what could be ex-delicto,
arising from her conviction, if that should be the outcome hereof. The sole question for Our resolution in this appeal
relates exclusively to her criminal responsibility for the alleged crime of slight physical injuries as defined in Article 266,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which she was prosecuted and convicted in the courts
below.

In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We Hold that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal
liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer, in the circumstances proven in the record.
Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred by the proper
authorities, We are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish
Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but We are convinced that the means she actually
used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The nature of the injuries
actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and ¼ cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner
whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it
cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to
commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions generally the use of corporal punishment by teachers on
their pupils. All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before Us, there is no indication
beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict
the injuries suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted
as she did in the belief as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil inloco parentis, she was within her rights to punish
her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws
and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine.

Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the concept of the disciplinary measures that may be employed by teachers
under Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted above, We feel it is wiser to leave such
determination first to the administrative authorities.

After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the necessary eight (8) votes necessary for
conviction has not been obtained. Accordingly, the petitioner -accused is entitled to acquittal. ,

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to her being dealt with
administratively or in a civil case for damages not resulting exdelicto.
 People v Carmen
G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001
TOPIC: Culpa | Elements
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellants: Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga @ Deding
Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, And Reynario Nuñez @ Rey Nuñez
Ponente: Mendoza

FACTS: RTC Cebu convicted defendants of murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs.
around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1997, 2 girls playing heard a boy shout for help, around the vicinity of the
house of Carmen known as Mother perpetuala. She and two ther women Cledonia and Delia were immersing Randy
Luntayao’s head into a drum of water, forced him to drink water and then banged his head on the bench ehwas tied down
to whenever he tried to raise his head. They pounded the chest and dropped Celedonia’s weight on the boy’s chest. They
plunged a knife on his left side and caught the blood into a plastic gallon container.
Randy was 13, the eldest child of Eddie Luntayao. They thought he had a nervous breakdown, and Carmen said she
could exorcise the boy.
A few hours later, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into the prayer room and placed
him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randy was clearly dead, and Carmen stopped him from seeing the
boy because she said he would be resurrected that evening. But came that time, Carmen asked Nunez to to call the
funeral parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the body would be transferred to the
house of accused-appellant Nuñez. the Luntayao family, accompanied by accused-appellant Nuñez, took Randy's body to
Nunez's house in Tangke, Talisay. The following day, January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Nuñez told Eddie to go with
him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report Randy's death and told him to keep quiet or they might not be able to
get the necessary papers for his son's burial. Nuñez took care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed. At
around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to Tangke, Talisay to ensure that
the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they preferred to bring their son's body with them to Sikatuna,
Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were told by accused-appellant Carmen that this was not possible as she and the
other accused-appellants might be arrested. That same afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried in Tangke, Talisay.
After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from the Bombo Radyo
station in Bacolod City which referred him to the NBI. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint for murder, and asked
that his son’s remains be exhumed and autopsied. Carmen and the others admitted that she and the other accused-
appellants conducted a "pray-over healing" session on the victim on January 27, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen
refused to give any further statement. On Feb 20, 1997, the body was exhumed and autopsied: traumatic head and chest
injuries.
Defense witnesses attested to the healing of Carmen by pray over and without any form of violence.

ISSUE: whether the accused are guilty of murder

HELD: No, because the death resulted from reckless imprudence and there was no malice or intent to kill.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and are each sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay
the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

RULE:
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the
place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due
to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

RATIO:
RTC Ratio: In murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is treachery in the attack, and this is true even if
the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted. Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to
kill. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result
therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the
consequences of his felonious act. In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person committing a felony is criminally liable
although the consequences of his felonious acts are not intended by him. Intent is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may arise from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to
rebut this presumption. In the case at bar, there is enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in
inflicting physical harm to the victim (an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong done resulted in the death
of their victim. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate
result had not been intended.

SC: The treatment was intended to drive the bad spirit away from the boy, but the strange procedure resulted in death.
The accused did not intend to kill him. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to
know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and not of murder. accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious group, known as the
Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing. treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence
of intent to kill, there is no treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure
the safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim.[33] Viewed in this light, the acts
which the trial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants to restrain Randy
Luntayao so that they can effect the cure on him.

Yapyuco vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The accused-petitioners were Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto
Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San
Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and
Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu,
Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of
the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and
Telebastagan. They allegedly received information concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in
Quebiawan. It was so unfortunate that the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn to which
the accused all await. Believing that the victims were the armed NPA members, the accused opened fire to the
passengers of the said Tamaraw. Such shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). The accused were all
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder. Issue:
WON the theory of mistaken belief is applicable in the present case.
Ruling:
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context of
criminal law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which
is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it
negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general
intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of
any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be
a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state
which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal
on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. Thus, Ah
Chong further explained that

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed
the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact
was not due to negligence or bad faith.

G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006

ROLLIE CALIMUTAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

FACTS:
Calimutan was charged with the crime of homicide. On 04 February 1996, Cantre harboring a grudge against Bulalacao,
suddenly punched the latter. Calimutan in order to protect his helper Bulalacao who was much younger and smaller in
built than the victim Cantre picked up a stone as big as a fist and threw the same to Cantre. The stone hit Cantre at the
left side of his back. After which Sañano (who was then with Cantre) was able to convinced both Cantre and Calimutan to
stop fighting and go home. The following day Cantre died. An autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez of NBI. In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and
autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive
accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by
any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to
death by petitioner Calimutan.

ISSUE: Whether or not an accused, who in trying to stop an altercation, inflicted a fatal blow to the victim may be held
liable for an intentional felony.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the negative. In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the
language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in
incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the
offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident
of another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the
victim Cantre. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Reckless imprudence
consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time
and place (Article 365, RPC).

The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which the
parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take. With this in
mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone
at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and
unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from the victim
Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the circumstances, was
forced to act as quickly as possible.

Calimutan v. People
G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006

Lesson: Proof beyond reasonable doubt, Defense of Stranger, Proximate Cause, intentional felonies and culpable
felonies

Laws Applicable: Art. 3, Art. 4, Par. 1

FACTS:
· February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other companions, had a
drinking spree at a videoke bar but as they were headed home, they crossed paths with Calimutan and
Michael Bulalacao.
· Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches, had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old boy of 5ft. for
suspecting that he threw stones at the his house on a previous night so he punched him
· Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a man’s fist and
hitting Cantre at the left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was already able to ran away.
o Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and Calimutan desisted from any other act of
violence
· Witness Sañano then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and also of stomach ache
and was unable to eat
· By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb
o Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just continue to wipe him with a
piece of cloth and brought him some food when he asked.
o After eating a little, he vomited.
o Shortly after complaining again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.
· The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death, issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated
that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning
 · With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, an autopsy was
done by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez which showed that there was internal hemorrhage and massive
accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by a blunt object like a
stone.
· RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of
homicide
· RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident, held that Calimutan was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide with a penalty of imprisonment from 8 years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to
12 years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum
of P50,000 as compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000 as moral damages
o NOT defense of stranger , because after the boxing Bulalacao, he was able to run thereby the
unlawful aggression by Cantre ceased
o The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a
treacherous
o criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate
result had not been intended
· CA: Affirmed RTC
· Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that the dissimilar findings on the cause of
death constituted reasonable doubt

ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide

HELD: NO. MODIFIED Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum
period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner
Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
latter’s death and P50,000.00 as moral damages

· Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind (NOT absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error)
o Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not necessarily bind
the courts, it is accorded great weight and probative value
§ may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the Calimutan
and the lacerated spleen of the Cantre which resulted in the latter’s death
· Proximate cause - cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and WITHOUT which the result would NOT have occurred
o Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the Cantre was the stone
thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan.
· Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning
of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding
of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by
the courts
· Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular:
o (1) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent
§ act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)
o (2) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent
§ act or omission of the offender is NOT malicious
§ the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill
· Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
o Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

People vs. Vistan

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines

Defendant-Appellant: Narciso Vistan

TOPIC:
Quasi-delicts

Negligence

CASE SUMMARY: Vistan, a conductor of a streetcar, was receiving passengers, and allegedly signaled the motorman
to go ahead without taking into account that Borromeo was about to board the car. Borromeo was thrown off the car and
his foot was crushed. He then charged Vistan with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The SC said
that he was only guilty of simple, and not reckless imprudence, and differentiated the two (see Holding).

PRECEDENTS:

US vs. Gomez: The accused was the motorman of a street car that collided with a carabao, and was convicted
for homicide due to reckless negligence.

FACTS:

Vistan was charged at the CFI Manila of the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and
sentenced to imprisonment.

Vistan was the conductor-in-charge of street car no. 203 of Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.

When he was receiving the passengers on the streetcar, he allegedly signaled the motorman of the streetcar to
go ahead without minding and without taking into account that Hugo Borromeo was at that very moment about to
board the car with one foot on the running board.

(Note: Borromeo was boarding after his two sons had already boarded.)

Borromeo was then thrown off of the moving car, and his foot was crushed by the rear wheels of the car. He
wasn’t able to go to work for more than 90 days, and his left foot had to be amputated.

Defense of Vistan:

o tried to prove that the street car being in motion, the offended party ran after it and attempted to board it,
but unfortunately missed the running board and upon falling down one of his feet was caught by the
wheels of the car.

SC believes it to be clear that at the time of boarding the car, the offended party was watching the man who gave
the signal to start, that is, the conductor, and the latter, who, had his eyes toward the door, seeing the nobody
was alighting or boarding the car, rang the bell, whereupon the car started. It is not improbable that when the
accused saw the last passenger with both hands clinging to the holding device of the car and one foot on the
running board, he thought that the passenger had completely boarded the car and that is why he gave the signal
to start.

ISSUES:

WON the accused acted with reckless negligence as alleged in the information – NO.

RULING:
1st issue: NO. Only simple negligence.

o The term "rash imprudence," as used in the Spanish Code, would seem to be approximately equivalent
to the "gross negligence" of the common law.

In common usage the word "rash" seems sometimes to imply a wanton disregard of
consequences, indicative of a state of mind bordering upon deliberate intention to inflict a
positive injury.
o The Court differentiated reckless and simple negligence.
o RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE:
 where immediate personal harm, preventable in the exercise of reasonable care, is threatened
to a human being by reason of a course of conduct which is being pursued by another, and the
danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor, the failure to use reasonable care to
prevent the threatened injury
o SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE:

mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate or
the danger is not openly visible

o Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case at bar, we are of the opinion that the act of the
accused in giving the order to start the car, when the offended party had his hands already on the holding
devices of the car and his foot on the running board, constitutes carelessness or negligence, but does not
show grave fault amounting to reckless imprudence and the accused having acted with simple
imprudence or negligence, has incurred the penalty provided by

article 590, case No. 4, of the Penal Code.

DISPOSITION:

The judgment appealed from is modified, and the accused and appellant is sentenced to pay a fine of 60 pesetas and to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to censure, with the costs of this instance de
oficio. So ordered.

PROVISIONS:
RPC Art. 365 (current law)

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted

a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused,
in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
 Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved
June 21, 1957).

Norman Gaid vs People of the Philippines (Simple Negligence)

Norman Gaid was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide—driving a passenger jeep and running over
and killing Michael Dayata. Gaid was driving his jeep along a 2-lane road near the Laguindingan National HS, and
students were coming out of it. Dayata was siting near a store on the left side of the road, and hailed Gaid’s jeep. Neither
the driver nor the conductor see anybody hail the jeep. Next thing the witness saw, Dayata’s feet were pinned to the rear
wheel of the jeep, lying down on the ground. The first hospital where he was rushed was closed; the second pronounced
him dead on arrival.

HELD: NOT LIABLE. The prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victim’s death was
petitioner’s alleged negligence. In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not stop the
jeepney when he felt the bouncing of his vehicle, a circum -stance which the appellate court equates with negligence.
Petitioner contends that he did not immediately stop because he did not see anybody go near his vehicle at the time of the
incident.

In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas, a motorist traveling within the speed limit and did all was possible to avoid
striking a child who was then six years old only. The place of the incident was a neighborhood where children were
playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The court ruled that it must be still proven that the driver did not exercise due
care. The evidence showed that the driver was proceeding in lawful manner within the speed limit when the child
ran into the street and was struck by the driver’s vehicle. Clearly, this was an emergency situation thrust upon
the driver too suddenly to avoid.

If at all again, petitioner’s failure to render assistance to the victim would constitute abandonment of one’s victim
punishable under Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by the information. Thus,
to hold petitioner criminally liable under the provision would be tantamount to a denial of due process

Simple negligence. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.

The elements of simple negligence:

p that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and
q that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.

The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a
duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure
to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

NORMAN A. GAID v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 171636 April 7, 2009
TINGA, J
FACTS:
- Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is
located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental.
- At the time several students were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael
Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road.
From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s jeepney which was
traveling on the right lane of the road. However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw
anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point. The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayatas feet was pinned to the rear
wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney.
- Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also situated on the left side of the street but directly in
front of the school gate, heard a strong impact coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order
to hurdle an obstacle. Dayata was then seen lying on the ground] and caught in between the rear tires. Petitioner felt that
the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.

- Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death. She testified that the head
injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.

Issue: WON petitioner is negligent

Held: Yes but Gaid is not liable.

-presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the death of
Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney
while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered
the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to
a halt.
- During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.
-Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
- Petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by two eyewitnesses. Prosecution witness Actub
affirmed this fact on cross-examination. Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour.
-It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the
right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side.
Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In Dayatas haste to board the jeep which was then running,
his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong
impact coming from the jeep.
-With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely
his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.
- For the second stage, petitioner is negligent for failing to stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his
vehicle
-Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
-The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
-The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes
a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of
this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
-For one to be liable for negligence, It must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability
for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the
causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.
-The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as
indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately
stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.

Petition Granted. Norman Gaid is acquitted.