Hernania “Lani” Lopez, pet., vs. Gloria Ulame-Cosme, resp.

G.R. No. 171981

Facts:
 Petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 seeking to review the decision of the CA that reversed
the decision of the RTC (Q.C.)
 Respondent, Gloria Umale-Cosme filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on the grounds of
expiration of contract of lease and non-payment of rentals from Dec. 1998 against petitioner,
Lani Lopez, who denies the allegation and claims respondent did not collect the rentals to make it
appear she was in arrears, furthermore Lopez claims she has been depositing her monthly rentals
in a bank in trust for respondent since Feb 1999.
 MeTC: sided with respondent and ordered petitioner to: (1) vacate the leased premise (2) pay
Cosme the monthly rental amounting to P 1, 340 stating Dec 1998 up to the time they have vacated
the premise (3) to pay the plaintiff the amount of P 20,000 for attorney’s fee and (4) costs of suit.
 RTC: REVERSED THE DECISION. It ruled that the contract of lease between respondent and
petitioner lacked a definite period. Thus if the lease has no period but to be fixed yet by the judicial
authorities, the lessee may not be ejected on the ground of termination of the period.
 CA: REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE RTC. Citing Article 1678 of the Civil Code: “if
the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed
upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;
and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.” Furthermore, jurisprudence dictates that Lease
agreements with no specified period but rentals are paid monthly shall be considered as month-to-
month basis and such period expires after the last day of any given 30 day period. Upon proper
demand and notice by the lessor, the lessee must vacate the property leased. Thus denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the contract of lease between petitioner and respondent has a specified period.
2. Whether or not CA gravely erred when it ruled that petitioner may be ejected on the ground of termination
of lease contract.

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that yes, there is a specified period of contract of lease. It is well settled that
where a contract of leave is verbal and on a monthly basis, the lease is one with a definite period which
expires after the last day of any given 30 day period. Jurisprudence dictates that when the lease of contract
between parties did not stipulate a fixed period, the rentals being paid monthly, the period of such lease is
deemed terminated at the end of each month. The contract expires by operation of law. Thus without a lease
contract petitioner has no right of possession to the subject property and must vacate the same.

2. The CA did not erred when it ruled that petitioner may be ejected on the ground of termination of lease
contract. Petitioner’s ejectment, in this case, is the only reasonable consequence of his unrelenting refusal
to comply with respondent’s demand for the payment of rental increase agreed upon by both parties. The
lessor has a right to rescind the contract of lease for non-payment of the demanded increase rental.

The instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals if AFFIRMED.
Spouses Edmundo and Lourdes Sarrosa, pet., vs. Willy O. Dizon, resp.
G.R. No. 183027

Facts:
 Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration for failure to state material dates and for lack of merit.
 Spouses, Edmundo and Lourdes Sarrosa obtained a loan from respondent, Willy Dizon in the
amount of two million pesos secured by a real estate mortgage of petitioners’ property located in
San Dionisio, Paranaque, City covered by TCT No. S-92903. On June 30, 2001 the loan became
due and demandable however the petitioners failed to pay the loan. After a year, respondent
demanded the payment of the obligation otherwise the mortgaged property would be foreclosed,
petitioners however failed to pay their obligation.
 Dizon filed a petition to sell in extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage with the office of the clerk of
court (ex-officio sheriff) of RTC of Paranaque. Petitioners filed a civil case for Breach of Contract,
Damages and Detailed Accounting with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/injunction to restrain respondent from proceeding with the foreclosure. However, in a public
auction the said property was sold to herein respondent. Dizon was now the owner of the foreclosed
property after registering the same to the Register of Deeds and was issued a new title (TCT
162999).
 Dizon demanded petitioners to vacate the said property but the latter stayed. Dizon filed an Ex-
parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. In consolidating the civil case filed by
the respondent and the ex-parte petition for issuance of writ of possession, the RTC ruled that it
was procedurally improper. The RTC granted the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
Dizon. RTC held that respondent is entitled to a writ of possession based on the rule that after the
redemption period has expired, the purchaser of the foreclosed property has the right to be placed
in possession thereof. Possession of the property becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as
owner; and upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of a writ of possession in his
favor becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
 Petitioners filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition but was dismissed
for failure of petitioners to state material dates and lack of merit. Furthermore it stated that
consolidation is a matter of discretion of the court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in denying petitioners’ petition for
certiorari/prohibition and precipitately ignoring existing law and jurisprudence related to their petition.

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err. Due to petitioners’ failure to state when petitioners received the RTC Order dated
June 29, 2008, the court of appeals could not determine whether the petition for certiorari was filed on time.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to comply with the requirements such as statement of material
dates, is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. Furthermore, the RTC’s ruling denying the consolidation
was correct, for consolidation only becomes a matter of right when the cases sought to be consolidated
involve similar questions of fact and law. In the case at bar the civil case and the issuance of writ of
possession contained no similarities.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed
property becomes absolute upon the expiration of the redemption period. The basis of this right to
possession is the purchaser’s ownership of the property. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to redeem the
subject property within one year from the date of registration of sale, hence respondent consolidated
ownership over the subject property. Herein petition is denied. Decision of Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Heirs of Jose T. Calo, namely: Gilda Calo-Sanchez, Nemia Calo-Teano and Wilfredo C. Pabio., pet.,
vs.
Nona Calo and the heirs of Romualda Calo, namely: Lucinda Lamigo, anita Lamigo, Manuel Lamigo,
Jesus Lamigo, Federico Lamigo, Ricardo Lamigo and Chona Lamigo., resp.
G.R. No. 156101

Facts:

 Nona Calo, herein respondent, filed at the RTC of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City (Branch 5)
a petition for reconstitution of Original Title Certificate (OCT) No. 337 covering a lot in Butuan
Cadastre issued to Alejo Calo, Romualda Calo, Leoncio Peincenaves and Vicente Calo. The
original title was lost during the second world war. However several partites intervene in the
reconstitution including the heirs of Jose T. Calo. The heirs of Jose claimed that Jose was one of
the six children of Ventura Calo, the original owner, and was given 1/6 portion.
 Heirs of Jose asserted that, Jose gave Teofilo Montilla possession of 1/6 portion of Lot 306 and the
latter leased in it to Bunawan Sawmill. Upon the death of Montilla the possession of the land was
passed on to his heirs. Montilla’s heirs executed a deed of conveyance and relinquishment of rights
in favor of herein petitioners. Thus, Nona and the intervenors agreed to convert the petition for
reconstitution to an action for partition and stipulated on the procedure and manner of presenting
evidence.
 RTC: confirmed the ownership and possession of the land of intervenors: heirs of Ismael Rosales,
heirs of Roque Andaya and Cesar Magsaysay; petitioners: heirs of Vicente Calo, heirs of Jose
Calo and heirs of Leoncio Peincenaves except for the heirs of Romualda.
 Nona appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was granted, the decision of the RTC was
affirmed with modification. The heirs of Jose Calo was not granted ownership over the said land.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in excluding the claim of the heirs of Jose Calo regarding the
land in question.

Ruling:

No, the Court of Appeals did not err. The Supreme Court held that as a general rule only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari; in the case at bar the fact finding of the RTC and CA
were markedly different. However, the CA was correct in excluding the heirs of Jose due to the fact that
the petitioners failed to present any document proving Jose was indeed a son of Ventura. Neither did they
establish that Jose was fraudulently excluded as a registered owner by his co-heirs when they obtained OCT
No. 337. Petitioners only presented the deed of conveyance and relinquishment. And it was later revealed
that Montilla was only a witness and not a lessor of Bunawan Sawmill.

Hence, Alejo Calo, Romualda Calo, Leoncio Peincenaves and Vicente Calo’s ownership over the said land
can no longer be challenged and such ownership shall be annotated on OCT No. 337.

Petition is denied. Costs against petitioners.