RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

The complaint as defined under Sec 3 is different from the

Section 1. Institution of criminal actions. — Criminal actions shall be complaint filed with the Prosecutor’s office. The complaint mentioned
instituted as follows: in this Section refers to one filed in court for commencement of a
criminal prosecution for violation of a crime, usually cognizable by
(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant municipal trial courts
to section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer
for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation. Section 4. Information defined. — An information is an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
Preliminary investigation is required for offenses where the prosecutor and filed with the court. (4a)
penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1
day (or prision correccional in it medium term) COMPLAINT INFORMATION
Proper Office - refers to officers authorized to conduct the
SUBSCRIPTION
requisite preliminary investigation namely, the provincial or
city prosecutors and other offices as may be authorized by
law. Subscribed by the Subscribed by the
offended party, any peace Prosecutor (indispensable
(b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly officer or other officer requirement)
with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or charged with the
the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other enforcement of the law
chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the
prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters. WHERE FILED

[Effect] The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running Court or Prosecutor’s Court
period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise Office
provided in special laws. (1a)
NECESSITY OF OATH
**Institution is in consideration of VENUE:
1.) Within Metro manila or any chartered cities: Made under Oath The fiscal who files it is
All offenses will be under the office of the prosecutor by already acting under his
Complaint with or without the need for preliminary oath of office.
investigation - you cannot file directly with MeTC
SCOPE
2.) Outside Metro Manila or any chartered cities:
Preliminary investigation - Office of the prosecutor - Usually refers to felonies Usually refers to public
Complaint w h i c h c a n n o t b e crimes
No preliminary investigation - MunTC of MunCTC - prosecuted de oficio
Information
Who is qualified to institute it:
**Filing in the wrong venue will still interrupt prescription.
a.) complaint, de part -
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1.) Offended party
Under the rules on Summary Procedure, the filing of criminal cases
2.) Any peace officer
falling within its scope shall be either by
3.) Other public officer charged with enforcement of the law
a.) Complain or
violated.
b.) Information
Provided, however, in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities,
b.) information, de oficio -
such cases shall be commenced only by Information, except when the
1.) City or provincial prosecutor and their assistants
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
2.) Duly appointed special prosecutors
When is it deemed instituted: Instituted once a Complaint has been
Section 5: Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal
filed in the proper office or court as the case may be.
actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
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under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in
Section 2. The Complaint or information. — The complaint or
Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the
information shall be (1) in writing, (2) in the name of the People of the
prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the
Philippines and (3) against all persons who appear to be responsible
offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the
for the offense involved. (2a)
enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case.
Section 3. Complaint defined. — A complaint is a (1) sworn written
1.) Workload
statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
2.) Authorized in writing
offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with
3.) by Regional or State Prosecutor
the enforcement of the law violated. (3)
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4.) Approved by Chief prosecutor
**Private prosecutors can only appeal from RTC to CA only in civil
cases.
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CASE: Jimenez vs Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151
K: Complaint for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.
F: The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their
stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation to secure a license to
operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and large
scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor
approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal
information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City.
The RTC ruling:
In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s
motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s motion for
judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable
cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the
respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate
as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent
Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing
of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the
case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing
the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that
respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.
In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments
in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion
expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public
prosecutor’s conformity.
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to
expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to
appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent
acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.
In its August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice
of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the
Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the
Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC
ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records
The CA ruling: In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed
outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to
file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that
only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality
to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the
petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case,
him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents,
but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA
denied the motion for reconsideration that followed.
I: The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case.
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.” Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy,
or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When
the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is
dismissible.
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.”
In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court,
the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code. This section explicitly provides
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the
OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the
CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several
cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the
petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence
of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged
pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the
reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This
involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the
People, as represented by the OSG
Denial of due process or Civil Aspect: Private person may pursue the
appeal
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Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the:
(1) name of the accused;
(2) the designation of the offense given by the statute;
(3) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
(4) the name of the offended party; (5) the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and
(5) the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.
Purpose:
1.) To inform the accused of the nature and cause of accusation
against him; and
2.) To notify the defendants of the criminal acts imputed to him so that
he can duly prepare his defense.
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*Sufficient in form - all information is indicated
*Sufficient in substance - no grounds for motion to quash the
complaint or information
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Section 7. Name of the accused. — The complaint or information
must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation
or nickname by which he has been or is known. If his name cannot be
ascertained, he must be described under a fictitious name with a
statement that his true name is unknown.
If the true name of the accused is thereafter disclosed by him or
appears in some other manner to the court, such true name shall be
inserted in the complaint or information and record.
Purpose:
1.) To make a specific identification so that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over his person and to inform him of the facts.
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Section 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the
acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it. (8a)
Purpose:
1.) To enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged; and
2.) To enable the court to pronounce proper judgment
Allegations prevail over the designation of the offense in the
information: It is not the designation of the offense in the Complaint or
Information that is controlling; the facts or acts or omissions alleged
therein and not its title determine the nature of the crime.
Reason: The designation of the offense is only the conclusion of the
Prosecutor.
*Designation must be provided by the statute, or particular law and
section violated.
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Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
(9a)
General Rule: The accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless
it is clearly charged in the Complaint or Information. Constitutionally,
he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Exception: Accused’s failure to object is considered a waiver of the
constitutional right to be informed or the nature and cause of the
accusation
Rule on Allegation of Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances:
The qualifying and aggravating circumstances cannot be appreciated
even if proved unless alleged in the information.
The failure to allege such circumstances cannot be cured by an
amendment of the Information after the accused entered his plea.
**The nature is accusatory, that is why there is no need to include
mitigating circumstances
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Section 10. Place of commission of the offense. — The complaint or
information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that
the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense or is necessary for its identification. (10a)
Purpose:
To show territorial jurisdiction
General Rule: The Complaint or Information is sufficient if it can be
understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or
some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court.
Exception: Unless the particular place where it was committed
constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
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Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary
to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense
was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense.
The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a)
General Rule: It is not necessary to state in the Complaint or
Information the precise date the offense was committed. The offense
may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible
to the actual date of its commission.
Exception: When the date is a material ingredient of the offense. 

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Section 12. Name of the offended party. — The complaint or
information must state the name and surname of the person against
whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known.
If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under
a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property must be described with such particularity
as to properly identify the offense charged.
example: money is a generic thing, hence offended party
must be specified; insufficient in form:
(b) If the true name of the of the person against whom or against
whose properly the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed
or ascertained, the court must cause the true name to be inserted
in the complaint or information and the record.
example: Senador vs People, March 20, 2013
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its
name, or any name or designation by which it is known or by
which it may be identified, without need of averring that it is a
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 juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law.
(12a)
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Section 13. Duplicity of the offense. — A complaint or information
must charge but one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses. (13a)
Duplicity of Offense in Information or Complaint means the joinder of 2
or more separate and distinct or different offenses in 1 and the same
Information or Complaint.
Purpose: The Court should not heap upon the defendant two or more
charges which might confuse him in his defense.
General Rule: A Complaint or Information must charge only one
crime.
Exceptions:
1.) Complex crimes
2.) Special complex crimes
3.) Continuous crime/delito continuado/continued crime. Vs Continuing
crime.
4.) Crimes susceptible of being committed in various modes
5.) Crimes of which another offense is an ingredient
6.) When a single act violates different statutes.
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CASE: People vs Valdez
K: Marijuana
I: Whether the prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to prove the
accused’s guilt.
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the
testimony of the police officers to the effect that appellant
admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked
who planted them. It made the following observation:
H: An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from
the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. The moment the
police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information
from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at
that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished
the police appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm,
where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the
police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said
information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the
police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no
longer a general inquiry.
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may
be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the
accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the
accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must
likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is "generally
admissible" evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of
such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is,
allow it to be introduced at trial.
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative
matter to convict appellant of the offense charged. These were the
seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary
confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to the police. Other
than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link
appellant with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error
on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these proofs against
the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For
said evidence is doubly tainted.
CASE: Miguel vs Sandiganbayan
K: Sufficiency of the information; Falsification of Public Document
I: Whether the information alleged was sufficient
H: In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed
of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires,
inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that
these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is
described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with
reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the
offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges
an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. The raison detre of the
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare
his defense.
CASE: People vs Soria
K: Rape
I: Whether the information alleged is enough to convict accused of
rape or qualified rape
H: The Information alleged the qualifying circumstances of relationship
and minority. It was alleged that appellant is the father of "AAA".
During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated that "AAA" is the
daughter of appellant. During trial, appellant admitted his filial bond
with "AAA". “Admission in open court of relationship has been held to
be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove relationship with the
victim.
It is settled that "when either one of the qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in
the information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an
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aggravating circumstance.” As such, appellant’s relationship with Rules on Amendment:
"AAA" may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. 1. BEFORE the plea:

With respect to minority, however, the Information described "AAA" as
a 7-year old daughter of appellant. While this also became the subject
of stipulation during the pre-trial conference, same is insufficient
evidence of "AAA’s" age. Her minority must be "proved conclusively
and indubitably as the crime itself”. “There must be independent
evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused.”
Documents such as her original or duly certified birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or school records would suffice as competent
evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to prove the
minority of "AAA" other than her testimony, appellant’s absence of
denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The prosecution also failed to
establish that the documents referred to above were lost, destroyed,
unavailable or otherwise totally absent.
In view of these, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal which
ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor which ranges from six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years. Hence, a penalty of twelve (12) years of
prison mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, is imposed upon appellant
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Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
General rule: any amendment, formal or substantial, before the
accused enters his plea may be done without leave of court
Exception: any amendment which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged or excludes any accused from the Complaint or
Information can be made only:
a. Upon motion by the Prosecutor,
b. With notice to the offended party, and
c. With leave of court
Doctrine of Supervening Event - an amendment due to a supervening
event is considered only as a formal amendment as it did not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused.
2. AFTER the plea : covers only formal amendments provided that:
a. Leave of court is obtained
b. Such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the
accused
General rule: There can be no substantial amendment in the
information after the plea
Exception:
a. It violates the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
b. It violates the rue on double jeopardy
Distinguished Substitution vs Amended: COLDD-PP

An amendment refers to a change in either form or substance Amendment Substitution

of the same offense in the Information.
As to Change: Formal & Substantial only
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature Substantial
of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint
or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with As to Offense: Same as to the Offense is
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall original and different from the
state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall amended original offense
be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
As to Leave of After plea Always
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been court:
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging As to Dismissal: No dismissal Will be
the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided dismissed
the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. As to Double Can be invoked Cannot be
(14a) Jeopardy if made after invoked
plea
Kinds of Amendments:
1.) Formal - does not change another offense different from that As to Preliminary No need for Needs another
charges in the original one. Investigation another plea
2.) Substantial - consists of changing the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the court. As to Plea No need to enter Need to enter
new plea new plea

NOTE: Section 14 applies only to original case and not appealed

cases.
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Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public
or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or
territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during
such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of
its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the
generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under
Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the
court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)
Note: Unlike in civil cases, finding of improper venue in criminal cases
carries jurisdictional consequences.
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Section 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. —
Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene
by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (16a)
General Rule: The offended party has the right to intervene by counsel
in the prosecution of the criminal action, where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
Exception:
1. The nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it no
civil liability arises in favor of the offended party
2. The offended party has waived his right to civil indemnity
3. The offended party has expressly reserved his right to institute a
separate action
4. The offended party has already instituted said action
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RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall
be made: A.) before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information,
the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by
the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
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CASE: Solidum vs People
K: Physician-anesthesiologist
F: Failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia
administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a
consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD
ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a
defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen
supply in the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing,
to his damage and prejudice.
I: Whether Ospital ng Maynila shall be held jointly snd severally liable
with Dr. Solidum with regard to indemnification of damages.
H: No.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that
arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the
RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious
fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been
charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted
capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against
Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings.
Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the
outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this
fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling
rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party.
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CASE: Castillo vs Salvador
K: The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. While,
petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged in real
estate business, educational institution, boutique, and
trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador and his brother,
Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance business
I: WON the award of damages or the civil aspect be retained.
H: The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two
kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused.
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First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of
the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of
any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto
is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code, where the civil  action  for damages is “for the
same act or omission.
alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the
actuation of someone who had been swindled.
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CASE: Lim vs Kou Co Ping
K: FRCC issued withdrawal authorities to FCCT; filing of Estafa
through misappropriation or conversion
I: Whether Lim committed forum shopping in filing the civil case for
specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal
on the civil aspect
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Not done….

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was

acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by
appellant, the general presumption, “that a person is innocent of the
crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove
that all the elements of Estafa are present in this case as would
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in
fact, the prosecution’s primary witness herself could not even establish
clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She
failed to convince us that she was deceived through
misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a
remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in
this case indicate the weakness of her submissions.

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt,

respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only.

In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the

concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the

aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater
weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth.
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by

preponderance of evidence. In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that
she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that:
(1) petitioner failed to  show  how she was able to raise the
money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting
versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require
respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the
transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was
allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of
trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was
inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous
transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the
7 of 36
 Preliminary Investigation vs Preliminary
RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION Examination
A. Definition As to nature: Executive Natural
Section 1 of Rule 112: Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to When is preliminary investigation required?
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing
of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
Nature: prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day, without regard to the fine.
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation
is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to CASE: Fenequito vs Vergara Jr.
pass upon.
F: On February 11, 2004, an Information for falsification of public
The term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila against herein
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into petitioners.
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of The MeTC issued an Order dated July 9, 2004 dismissing the case on
constitutes the offense charged, as there is a trial for the reception of the ground of lack of probable cause.
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment setting aside the July 9,
Purpose: 2004 Order of the MeTC and directing the said court to proceed to
trial.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review.
him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, On March 9, 2006, the CA rendered its presently assailed Resolution
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from dismissing the petition. The CA ruled that the Decision of the RTC is
useless and expensive trials. interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not appealable.
When a matter of right:
I:
1. whether the MeTC erred in granting their Motion to Dismiss. (on
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional
the ground of lack of probable cause)
right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information
2. whether the inconclusive findings by the PNP crime laboratory is
or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the
enough to established that there is insufficient evidence to
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for
support a finding of probable cause
quashing the Information. If the lack of a preliminary investigation does
not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court
H:
over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a
1.) NO, In the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC set
motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the
court of its jurisdiction over the case. aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed
to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is
clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the
Preliminary Investigation vs Preliminary case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits.
Examination
2.) No, the fact that an expert witness already found that the
P. Investigation P. Examination questioned signatures were not written by one and the same person
already creates probable cause to indict petitioners for the crime of
As to purpose: To ascertain whether the To determine
alleged offender should falsification of public document.
be held for trial, to be probable cause
subjected to the for the issuance
expense, rigors, and “A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
embarrassment of trial of a warrant of
or if the offender is showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
arrest
released
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt” “
As to who may By the By the judge
conduct: prosecutor

8 of 36
 "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against
the (accused] are required, not absolute certainty.”
In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the
ruling of the RTC that the offense charged was committed and that
herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof
CASE: Burgundy Realty Corp vs Reyes
K: Real estate agent; Estafa
F: Private respondent Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes (Reyes), sometime in
1996, offered her services to petitioner as the latter's real estate agent
in buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be
developed into a golf course. Convinced of her representations,
petitioner released the amount of ₱23,423,327.50 in her favor to be
used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those
parcels of land, converted and misappropriated the money given by
petitioner to her personal use and benefit.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes, the
Assistant Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Resolution dated April 27,
2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“It is most respectfully recommended that respondent be indicted of
the crime of Estafa defined and under the Revised Penal Code. xxx”
On September 22, 2006, Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzalez issued a
Resolution granting the petition for review of Reyes, the fallo of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is directed to cause
the withdrawal of the information for estafa filed in court against
respondent Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes xxx”
I: Whether the Secretary of Justice erred in reversing the investigating
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause that all the elements of the
crime of estate are present.
H: Yes.
A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor
was correct in finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of
estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of
₱23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks and vouchers
to be used in purchasing the parcels of land. Petitioner wrote a
demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was not
heeded. Hence, the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the
entrusted money, despite demand and the duty to do so, constituted
prima facie evidence of misappropriation.
Thus, the mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is
enough to conclude that a probable cause exists for the indictment of
Reyes for Estafa. As to whether the presumption can be rebutted by
Reyes is already a matter of defense that can be best presented or
offered during a full-blown trial.
CASE: City Prosecutor Abanado vs Judge Bayona
F: On March 24, 2009, complainant City Prosecutor Armando P.
Abanado filed the Information in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Bacolod City.
On April 13, 2009, respondent issued the following order:
1. xxx
2. xxx
3. Memorandum of the transfer of case assignment from designated
Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor; 

4. xxx
With respect to item 3 thereof, complainant, in a letter also dated April
29, 2009, explained that there was no memorandum of transfer of the
case from the investigating prosecutor, Assistant City Prosecutor
(ACP) Dennis S. Jarder, to him. In his aforementioned letter,
complainant discussed that the case was initially handled by ACP
Jarder who found no probable cause against Cresencio Palo, Sr.,
accused in Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474. However, complainant,
upon review pursuant to Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure found otherwise; that is, there was probable cause
against Palo. Thus, complainant disapproved ACP Jarder’s Resolution
and filed the Information in court.
In an Order dated May 5, 2009, respondent stated that the Jarder
Resolution (dismissing the complaint) was part and parcel of the
official records of the case and, for this reason, must form part of the
records of the preliminary investigation.
On May 11, 2009, in view of the foregoing order, the Office of the City
Prosecutor again sent a letter explaining the impossibility of submitting
the Jarder Resolution to the court. The letter stated that the Jarder
Resolution was no longer part of the records of the case as it was
disapproved by complainant and it attached a letter of Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño.
On February 2, 2011, the OCA submitted its report and
recommendation. It noted the June 15, 2009 Gellada Order which held
that the resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding probable
cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. In
such case, the resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded,
and no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case and it
need not be annexed to the information filed in court. Thus, the OCA
held that complainant cannot be held guilty of contempt.
On February 2, 2011, the OCA submitted its report and
recommendation. It noted the June 15, 2009, Gellada Order which
held that the resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding
probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor. In such case, the resolution recommending the dismissal
is superseded, and no longer forms an integral part of the records of
the case and it need not be annexed to the information filed in court.
Thus, the OCA held that complainant cannot be held guilty of
contempt.
I: whether respondent was administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law, gross misconduct and violation of Supreme Court Circular
No. 12 dated June 30, 1987 for requiring the Office of the City
Prosecutor to submit the Jarder Resolution to the court despite the
reversal thereof.
9 of 36
H: Yes.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive
function. Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the
Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question.
We find that there is nothing in the DOJ-NPS Manual requiring the
removal of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor recommending
the dismissal of a criminal complaint after it was reversed by the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor.
Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to an
information filed in court is optional under the aforementioned manual.
The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as
practicable.” Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required
under the rules.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent erred in
insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution when all other
pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have been
submitted to his court, and in going so far as to motu proprio initiating
a proceeding for contempt against complainant.
CASE: HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA VS ATTY. OBIAS
F: On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning at the Pili
Airport in Camarines Sur, Engr. Nestor Tria, was shot by a gunman
while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was brought to a hospital
but died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape.
Subsequently, the incident was investigated by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
On July 31, 1998, NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife,
Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Roberto Obet Aclan y
Gulpo, Juanito Totoy Ona y Masalonga and Atty. Epifania Fanny
Gonzales- Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria.
On July 2, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines
Sur issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for murder
against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the case for insufficiency of
evidence as against herein respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias.
On January 25, 2000, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas issued a
Resolution modifying the July 2, 1999 resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor and directing the latter to include respondent in the
information for murder filed against Aclan and Ona.
Sometime in October 2001, the prosecution filed with the RTC Quezon
City a Motion to Admit Amended Information to include respondent
as one of the accused for the murder of Tria.
On October 8, 2001, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the DOJ
under the provisions of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987. In
a letter dated December 3, 2001 addressed to respondents counsel,
the DOJ denied respondents notice of appeal on the ground that
pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated November 4, 1983,
as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993,
appeals to the OP where the penalty prescribed for the offense
charged is reclusion perpetua to death, shall be taken by petition for
review. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of
her notice of appeal.
In his Order dated March 24, 2004, Presidential Assistant Manuel C.
Domingo granted respondents motion for reconsideration and
reversed the DOJ resolutions. It was held that mere close relationship
without any corroborative evidence showing intent to perpetrate the
crime is not enough probable cause. Accordingly, the case against
respondent was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

I: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the
OPs dismissal of the murder charge against respondent
H: YES
In resolving the issue of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion
in affirming the OPs reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, it
is necessary to determine whether probable cause exists to charge
the respondent for conspiracy in the murder of Engr. Tria.
We reverse the OPs ruling that the totality of evidence failed to
establish a prima facie case against the respondent as a conspirator
in the killing of Engr. Tria. To begin with, whether or not respondent
actually conspired with Aclan and Ona need not be fully resolved
during the preliminary investigation. The absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. The
same is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where
the parties can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
CASE: ATTY GERLIE UY VS JUDGE ERWIN JAVELLANA
F: Pettioner: Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest
without propounding searching questions to the complainants and
their witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused
under immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana issued
warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily
surrendered or when a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Respondent: Judge Javellana claimed to have conducted preliminary
examination, asking the complainants and their witnesses searching
questions, before issuing warrants of arrest. According to Judge
Javellana, he would sign the official form of the warrant of arrest right
after the preliminary examination. In some cases, Judge Javellana
was not aware that the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or
was already taken into custody by virtue of a warrantless arrest
because police officers did not timely inform the court of such fact.
I:
H: Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the
filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established
herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in
People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to
conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress
that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted
to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of
10 of 36
cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy
disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily
conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or
delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose
of said Rule.

CASE: PEOPLE VS VALENCIA

F: Accused-appellants Segundino Valencia y Blanca, Johnny Tadena y

Torda and Domingo Deroy, Jr. y Sarocam were charged and convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for violation of Section 15
of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act

I: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence
to the improbable testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution.

H: No,
Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in a buy-bust
operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways
and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing
their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and
credit

———————————————————————————————

11 of 36
RULE 113 - ARREST
SARAUM VS PEOPLE
F: According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call
was received by PO3 Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in
Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-bust team was
then formed against a certain "Pata."
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards
his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a curtain as
partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza,
who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to
have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum’s
possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter).
I: whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Saraum
H: No, Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which
instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest,
entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally
caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any
satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at the vicinity of
the buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized items that he
claims to have "countless, lawful uses.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the
shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize the drug
paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
1âwphi1
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were
plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them
DOCTRINE: In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has
just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section
12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are:
(1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and
(2) such possession is not authorized by law.
Even if we consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have
waived any objection thereto when he did not raise the issue before
entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for
the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment.
Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection to the
admission of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and
search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution.
COMERCIANTE VS PEOPLE
F: At around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo
Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy
Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, at a speed of 30
kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of
about 10 meters, two (2) men standing and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to
the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a
distance of around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a
police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two
(2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them
I: whether PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him
H: Yes, A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case
reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made
on Comerciante. PO3 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when
he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing
plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided
to effect an arrest.
The Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming
that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while
aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very
small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that
no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to
rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily,
the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over
something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing
"improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the
same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
DOCTRINE: In flagrante delicto
12 of 36
LUZ VS PEOPLE
F: On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, PO2
Alteza saw the accused, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that
this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something
from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel- like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon
seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after
the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out
to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while
the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
I: Whether there is lawful arrest
H: No, there was no valid arrest of petitioner.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There
was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him
of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may
be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial
court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to
the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which
was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of
Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be
stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense.
In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.
NOTE:
Terry Stop - The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that police may
briefly detain a person whom they reasonably suspect is involved in
criminal activity; the Court also held that police may do a limited
search of the suspect's outer garments for weapons if they have a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be
"armed and dangerous”
ANTIQUERRA VS PEOPLE.
F: At around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio,
PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and
two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were
conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when
they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and
immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers
approached the house from where the men came and peeked through
the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw
accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter.
Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an
aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at
the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house,
introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.
I: whether there was valid warrantless arrest
H: NO, the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made
in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw
two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street,
Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been
committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to
the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers
were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing
suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave
priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going
on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as
they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity
that warranted their entering it.
Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door
wide open to peep through its opening because you did not
know what was happening inside? A – Yes, Your Honor.
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the
irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
Additional Doctrine: Fruit of the poisonous tree
13 of 36

PEOPLE VS VASQUEZ
F: P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a
confidential informant went to their office and reported that a certain
Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. P/Insp. Fajardo
was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust
against alias Don.
I: Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest
H: At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer
assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that
"[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having
failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before
their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary
submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction
The fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-
bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest
made without warrant is deemed lawful.
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and
void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation
shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family
or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights
of by any international non-governmental organization duly
accredited by the Office of the President. The person's
"immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé or
fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or
grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

RA 7438: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under

Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation

shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order
or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for
the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language
known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his
own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately
with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer.

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by

the investigating officer, provided that before such report is
signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does
not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately
explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect
known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such
investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.

(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained

or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's
absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the
parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
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RULE 114 - BAIL
FLORESTA VS JUDGE UBIADAS
F: Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, without
giving notice to the prosecution, the petition for bail of Jose Mangohig,
Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the Municipal
Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause against
him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610
(Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act)
Respondent informs that the petition for bail of Mangohig who was
then under preliminary investigation, which motion was filed on
January 3, 2000 on which same date a copy of said petition was
furnished the public prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig heard on the
morning of January 4, 2000 during which there was no appearance
from the Prosecutors Office; and that as the offense for which
Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense, respondent
granted him bail.
The OCA stressed that the Rules of Court requires a movant to serve
notice of his motion on all parties concerned at least three days before
the hearing thereof, hence, respondent erred in granting the petition
for bail without hearing the prosecutions side.
I: Whether the granting of bail was in accordance with the rules
H: NO, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case
No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. Given the filing of the
petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said
that the prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to
present evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes before
it was filed in court. It bears stressing that the prosecution should be
afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on the application for bail
by showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is
provided as it merely requires the court to give a reasonable notice of
the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a
three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15
allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice,
there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for
hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each
particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense committed
and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of
the prosecution.
In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec
5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, which is punishable by reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for statutory rape
qualified by relationship which is punishable by death.
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the
prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure which is a serious charge
under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits or suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more than
P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.
DOCTRINE: [Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca] instructs:
A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise
thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to
present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications
for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally
and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after the
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. (Italics in
the original; underscoring supplied)
ZUO VS CABEBE
F: Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that Criminal Case No. 3950-18
for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte against Rey
Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas
Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio
Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On March
14, 2001, the prosecution filed with this Court a petition for change of
venue but was denied in a Resolution dated August 13, 2001. On
October 8, 2001, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration. n the
meantime, the proceedings before respondents court were
suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as
ground the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an Order
granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in
cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn
Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash.
Respondent judge issued the Order without the accused’s application
or motion for bail. In his comment, respondent denied the charges.
While admitting that he issued the Order dated November 5, 2002
granting bail to the accused without any hearing, the same was
premised on the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.
There was delay in the proceedings due to complainants frequent
absences and failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in
court, resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The prosecution did
not object to the grant of bail to the accused
I: Whether the grant of bail without the necessary hearing, whether
summary or otherwise, was in accordance with the law
H: NO, In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, we held that
jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of
a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.
Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the
grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion,
15 of 36
hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the
evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with
the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he
must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt
is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a
hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the
accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as
follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail
under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of
the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation. (18a)
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the
duties of the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the
petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the courts
order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented
is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure
enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing before he granted
bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to
interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on
the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail
hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are
considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution
and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its
recommendation on whether or not bail should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to
the accused, hence, he cannot be held administratively liable for not
conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada, We held that the failure to raise or the absence
of an objection on the part of the prosecution in an application for bail
does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to
the granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant without
hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or
ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the
strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused.
Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution
such questions as would ascertain the strength of the States evidence
or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Irrespective of
respondent judges opinion that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that
a hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary
release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection
to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein
should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and
diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in
fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also
necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set
forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail, Only after
respondent judge had satisfied himself that these requirements have
been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged
absence of objection on the part of the prosecution to the grant of bail
to the accused.
Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled to their
right to a speedy trial, hence, he granted bail without a hearing. He
blames the prosecution for the delay.
Respondents contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the
records of the criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally
delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay, this
does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter
disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has been
incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the
Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature
of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties.
16 of 36
He must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these
standards.
GOVT OF HK VS OLALIA
F: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong
Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage
as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of
arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,-
a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was
granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail,
I: the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to
criminal proceedings.
H: In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held
that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings.
As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right
to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that
are not criminal in nature.
There should be clear and convincing evidence in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
the orders and processes of the extradition court.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
F: On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding
probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of
several criminal Informations against the former President and the
other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the
crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for
[Jinggoy] and his co- accused. On its basis, [Jinggoy] and his co-
accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, [Jinggoy] filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion
alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold
him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved
in illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or
criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
On December 18, 2001, Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion
praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/
Humanitarian Considerations.
The report was submitted as directed. Attached to the Report was a
copy of the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated December 20, 2001
denying Jinggoys motion for bail for lack of factual basis. According to
the graft court, basing its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr.
Anastacio, Jinggoy failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the
court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be
confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail
On February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoys petition in G.R.
No. 148965, on the following rationale:
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital
offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail
hearings xxx. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show
strong evidence of guilt.
17 of 36
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to [Jinggoy] as the matter
requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the
Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its
Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical
evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five
months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioners
guilt was presented before the lower court.
On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an
Omnibus Application for Bail, and on Resolution of March 6, 2003,
respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted the omnibus
application for bail
I: whether the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion granting the bail to Jinggoy Estrada
H: the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is
predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence
adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of
the right to bail is warranted.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution
mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness
of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if
the probability of escape is great.
Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little
more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by
Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now
almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that
those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their
reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as they can flee from
the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation
and a respectable name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to
jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that
someone who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring
any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a
fugitive from justice.
OKABE VS GUTIERREZ
F: Maruyama alleged, inter alia, that on December 11, 1998, she
entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the
petitioner, who was engaged in the business of door-to-door delivery
from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed
to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the
said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
Appended to the Information was the affidavit-complaint of respondent
Maruyama and the resolution of Investigating Prosecutor Vibandor. On
May 19, 2000, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioner with a recommended bond of P40,000.
On June 15, 2000, the petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the
said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City, who
forthwith recalled the said warrant.
The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without
the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28,
2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on
July 12, 2000.
On July 14, 2000, the trial court issued an Order setting the petitioners
arraignment and pre- trial at 2:00 p.m. of July 16, 2000. On the same
day, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the
issuance of the hold departure order.
On August 25, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion for the postponement
of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial court ruled adversely
thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and seek relief from the
appellate court. The court denied the petitioners motions on the
following grounds:
(b) When the petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her provisional
liberty, she thereby waived her right to question the courts finding of
the existence of probable cause for her arrest and submitted herself to
the jurisdiction of the court, more so when she filed the motion for the
lifting of the hold departure order the court issued, and the motion to
defer the proceedings and her arraignment;
On January 31, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision partially granting
the petition in that the assailed order of the trial court denying the
petitioners motion to lift/recall the hold departure order was set aside.
However, the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the trial courts
decision was denied and her petition for the nullification of the August
25, 2000 Order of the respondent judge was dismissed. The CA ruled
that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the
petitioner waived her right to assail the respondent judges finding of
the existence of probable cause. The appellate court cited the ruling of
this Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
On March 6, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for a partial
reconsideration of the decision of the CA contending that the appellate
court erred in applying the ruling of this court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals instead of Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The petitioner posited that the said rule, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, before the court rendered its
decision, had superseded the ruling of this Court in the Cojuangco
case. However, the appellate court held that Section 26, Rule 114 of
18 of 36
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure cannot be applied
retroactively, because the petitioner had posted bail on June 15, 2000
before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect.
I: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE RULING IN
THE CASE OF COJUANGCO, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, [300
SCRA 367 (1998)] WHEN IN FACT SAID RULING IS NOW
OBSOLETE AND NO LONGER APPLICABLE
H: We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the appellate
court erred in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, viz:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or
irregular preliminary investigation. An application for or admission to
bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest
or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the
regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of
the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering
his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but
not later than the start of the trial of the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings
of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the
accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the
warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon.
The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red.
The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed
to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules
governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by
their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a
general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to
that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other
words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001,
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It
behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving
the petitioners petition for certiorari and her motion for partial
reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her
personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to
question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be
clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When
the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should
be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, the records
show that a warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City
for the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When
the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a
personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her provisional
liberty. Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City
approved the bond and issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest
against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond
was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it
should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.
LEVISTE VS CA
F: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal,
he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal,
citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked
the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the
discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
I: Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court?
H The SC denied his petition.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority
in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand,
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114
is present then bail shall be denied. (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
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determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages:
(1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court
must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether
or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2)
the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case
falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion,
the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other
than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114,
including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it
may either allow or disallow bail.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice
occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with
the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other
hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of
discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion
and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications
for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by
the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years,
petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary.”
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6,
Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read
as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody,
shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under
the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future
as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en
banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the
bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out
on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense
than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set
forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No.
12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes
in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From
then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of
being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. 
ENIRLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN J
F: Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the
Sandiganbayan for their alleged involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriation under the PDAF. When his warrant was
issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was later
confined and detained at the PNP General Hospital, he then filed a
motion to fix bail where he argued that:
He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;
Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion
temporal considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, his
voluntary surrender and that he is already at the age of 90
That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously
considered
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:
He is charged with a capital offense
That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because
the prosecution have not yet presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.
I: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his
motion to fix bail?
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H: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily
ignored the objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen.
Enrile’s fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter of right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal
appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court requires
and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process which
is the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme
Court further explained that Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the
right to bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and attended, which will then enable him to attend trial
therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.

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RULE 115
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE
F: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo
was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the
RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement the
search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run
towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar
with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the
residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay
tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two
barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the
nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who
searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the
barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance.
Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred
in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa
hut.
I: Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere presumption that the petitioner has
dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found?
H: No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or
seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is
under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any
evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was
it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as
well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said
structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner
being an electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and
dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure
to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion,
there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal
case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the
status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of
proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and
satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable
to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
F: On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other
local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) charging
the petitioner, among others, with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural
aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision and
management of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project)
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner]
Pendente Lite.
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed
resolution suspending the petitioner pendente lite.
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his
suspension order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari
petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.
I: Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to hearing when no
actual hearing prior to his suspension was held.
H: No, The absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be
determinative of the validity of a suspension orders.
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to
determine the validity of the Informations that had been filed against
petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and
against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to
due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and
the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda
and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process
requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate
opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the
mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would
have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.[25]
[47] It is well settled that “to be heard” does not only mean oral
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to
the OSP’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after
receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for
reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii)
filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.
Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s continued demand
for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing – based on the
same alleged “defect in the information, which we have found wanting
– has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
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In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court considered the opposition of
the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as
sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s
motion for hearing.
In Luciano v. Mariano, that the petitioner relied upon, the Court
required, “by way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the
exercise of the power of suspension,” that –
(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue
an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show
cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of
the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion
for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion
to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such
show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information,
and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of
suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or
withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair
and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right
of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which
would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13
of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any
of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
PEOPLE VS LARA
F: Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with
the RTC.
On May 31, 2001, 9:00 AM, Sumulong withdrew the amount of
P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray
the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian Allied Services and
while at around 10:30 AM, while the pickup he was riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara
suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and
pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?”;
Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the
bag. He threw the bag in Bautista's direction and Bautista alighted
from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while
firing his gun. He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the
office of San Sebastian to relay the incident and when he went back to
where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the
vehicle and saw blood on the ground; He was informed by one
bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from
him;
On June 7, 2001: While on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking
along Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City and he alerted the
police and Lara was thereafter arrested. At the police station, he, Atie
and Manacob (other companions at pickup) identified Lara as the one
who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian's money.
I: Whether Section 12, Article III of the Constitution / Paragraph C of
Rule 115 were violated when accused was not assisted by counsel
when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the
witnesses for the prosecution. The police line-up is part of custodial
investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.
H: No, There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a
police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial investigation and
this does not constitute a violation of his right to counsel. The right to
counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not
the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
In People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the
1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked
only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation
and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence,
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage. This is because during a police line-up, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who
is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the
line-up.
An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus
of police attention at the start of the investigation.
23 of 36
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
PEOPLE VS AYSON
F: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and
was allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales of plane
tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's
Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by
Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The
findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that
he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was
prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise
however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was
charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to
which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not
admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this
appeal.
I: Whether the respondent Judge was correct in making inadmissible
as evidence the admission and statement of accused.
H: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused
was not under custodial investigation when his statements were
taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in
administrative proceeding.
The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are
accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial
inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police
authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his
freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond
the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted
in court.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
VILLAREAL VS PEOPLE
F: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). Hazing was pre-
requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had
undergone the process. After the initiation, Lenny’s condition
worsened due to the blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to
the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks
after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993,
Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340
dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of
violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal
case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial.
I: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion on the ground
that the right to speedy trial was violated when it dismissed the
criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel
Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano
(Adriano)
H: No, While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing
factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are
justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has
been utterly violated in this case.
The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that
the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring
from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through
the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case
from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the
said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a
quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such
order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5,
2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court
because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting
the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5,
2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all
on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both
the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January
29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on
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August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained
dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity
whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns
upon.
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial
was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show
that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
RULE 116
ARRAIGNMENT & PLEA
ARRAIGNMENT
PEOPLE VS ESTOMACA
F: The accused, an illiterate laborer, was charged guilty of five
instances of rape of her daughter. When he was arraigned, he pleaded
guilty to all of the complaints against him. Eventually however, he
informed the court that he was only guilty of two counts of rape, that
the other three might have been done by the victim’s boyfriend and he
was merely blamed for it. Since he was charged for a heinous crime,
the case was elevated to Supreme Court, which found the arraignment
process of the accused to be questionable.
I: Whether or not the arraignment was valid.
H: No. Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment
should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the
clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading
the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and
asking him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the
reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and known is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole
of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law
affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is,
therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary
defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process
clause under the Constitution.
In the case at hand, the arraignment appears to have consisted
merely of the bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically
and cryptically reported in the transcript. Moreover, the court
found out that the complaint or information was not read to the
accused in the language known to him, as his local dialect was
kinaray-a and the lower court conducted the arraignment in
Ilonggo.
The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be based on a
free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial
court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the
full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of
the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the
appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellants full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The records do not
reveal any information about the personality profile of the appellant
which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and
educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial
court.
25 of 36
ARRAIGNMENT counsel would have objected and informed the court of this
blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was
PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure
undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and
F: Pangilinan is the husband of BBB and the father of AAA. On sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his
September 9, 1995, AAA felt that appellant approach their bed where constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this
she and her two siblings are sleeping. Appellant removed her shorts procedural defect. SC did not allow it.
and lay on top of her. Her hands were pinned down above her head by
the appellant. Appellant tried to insert her penis on the vagina of AAA In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was
but was not successful. On the following night, again appellant did the raised under similar circumstances, we held that while the arraignment
same but this time he had forcibly inserted his penis unto the vagina of of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for
AAA. During the month of September 1995, appellant repeatedly decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since
raped AAA. appellants rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in
procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of
On the month of January 1997, appellant did the same act towards the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.
AAA. On March 1997, BBB the mother of AAA went home from
Singapore. AAA kept her silence until the time when BBB is about to
leave for Singapore. BBB was confronted by the grandmother of AAA
saying that appellant is molesting AAA. BBB confronted AAA and she
tearfully confessed. BBB filed the complaint. Prosecution finally
offered the evidences in which the trial court finds that those
evidences against the accused are strong. Trial court having
discovered that the accused has not be arraigned, scheduled his
arraignment.

I: Whether the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of two
counts of rape despite the fact that he was not properly arraigned.

On the assigned error, appellant assails his conviction because he

was not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only after the
case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a
procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount
to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation
against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure
the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for
bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his
person.

H: NO, In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His
arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over
his person.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the

constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is,
thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even
of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at
the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is
mobilized against him.

Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for
decision. The question is: Were appellants rights and interests
prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of
the proceedings?

Appellant’s belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural

defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without
raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. His
counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His
counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication
that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his
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PLEA
DAAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN KINDS OF PLEA

F: Accused Joselito Raniero Daan, together with accused Benedicto
E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of
malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00,
P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried
to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period
making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the
new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their
respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not.
Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were
also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee.
The accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with
a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable
officer to render accounts. The Sandiganbayan denied the plea
bargain of the accused
I: Whether the accused may plead guilty to lesser offense.
H: Yes. The lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and
Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily
included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and
Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was
originally charged.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant’s
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts
of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for
the graver charge.
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require
plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference.
1. Guilty
2. Not Guilty
3. No Contest
a. Conditional Plea - A conditional plea is one where the defendant
pleads guilty to the offense, but specifically reserves the right to
appeal certain aspects of the charges
b. Unconditional Plea - As a general rule, a defendant who
voluntarily and intelligently enters an unconditional guilty plea
waives all defects in the proceeding, including constitutional
defects that occurred before entry of the plea.
c. Negative/Indirect (refusal to plead) - a plea that will deny the
substantial charges and specify a fact that will make the position
of the plaintiff untenable.
d. Inverted (pleads guilty with exculpatory evidence) -
e. Improvident Plea - Plea involuntarily made and without consent,
It would be considered if there was failure to conduct
searching inquiry, failure of prosecution to present evidence,
no rational basis between testimony and guilt
PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE VS NON-
CAPITAL OFFENSE
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court must
assure itself that the plea is not improvidently made so it must: 

(1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea;
(2) require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of his culpability; and

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its
case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made
only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.
(3) ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence in his
behalf, and allow him to do so, if he so desires. If these
conditions are not met by the court, the plea may be considered
as improvidently made.

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites
upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea
of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial
court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts
are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense
than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter
of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.

27 of 36
PLEA
PEOPLE VS JANJALANI
F: On feb 14 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two
men got on the bus. Both seemed suspicious according to Elmer
Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and the
bus exploded. After the explosion, the spokesperson for abu sayyaff
announced over radio that the explosion was a valentine’s gift.
Accused Asali, member of abu sayaff, gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused
Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who
had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did
not conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from
"not guilty" to "guilty."
I: Whether the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-
appellants' plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
said plea
H: NO, The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge - multiple murder - based on
the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The
Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt,
accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt -
one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the
other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the
case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused's plea of guilt
was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under
consideration.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned,
the evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be
drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the
testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the...
accused-turned-state-witness, Asali.
Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two
men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus... and who had
scampered away from the bus... moments before the bomb exploded.
On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan
and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City.
The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently
established by these corroborating testimonies,... coupled with
their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and
extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both
stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the
Valentine's Day bombing.
SUSPENSION OF ARRAIGMENT
ABS CBN VS GOZON
petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal
F: On August 13, 2004
complaint against respondent GMA for (alleged) act of
copyright infringement under the Intellectual Property Code because
the GMA aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo
dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN
stated that it has an agreement with Reuter's that the petition will
contribute news and content that it owns and makes to Reuters in
exchange of the latter's news and video material, and Reuters will
ensure that ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in the country
I: Whether the granting of the trial court on the motion to suspend
proceedings was proper
H: NO, The trial court granted respondents' Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and deferred respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas' arraignment for 60 days in view of the Petition for Review
filed before the Department of Justice. Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the accused’s
arraignment in certain circumstances only: SEC. 11. Suspension of
arraignment. -Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall
be suspended in the following cases
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such
case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending
at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60)
days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office.
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-
Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-day period from the
filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on
March 8, 2005. It was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial court
erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period.
It had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned
in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the
arraignment "disregards the requirements of due process [and] erodes
the Court's independence and integrity
28 of 36
BILL OF PARTICULARS Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or
commissions amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been
ENRILE VS PEOPLE allegedly received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is obviously hampered.
This defect is not cured by mere reference to the prosecution’s
F: The Office of Ombudsman filed an Information for attachment, as Enrile already stated in his Reply that the “desired
plunder against Enrile. details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked
by the prosecution, which documents are not integral parts of the
Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of
Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him of his informing Enrile what these overt acts were by simply pointing to these
arraignment. Before the dare of arraignment. Enrile filed a documents.
motion for bill of particulars asserting that the Information
The prosecution made little or no effort to particularize the transactions
remains indefinite, vague and fatally insufficient even if that would constitute the required series or combination of overt acts.
supplemented by the bill of particulars. According to him,
the bill of particulars fails to indicate the particular overt
acts constituting the predicate crime of “unjust
enrichment,” and the overt acts are not constitutive of the
predicate crime of “receiving kickbacks or commissions.”
He also argues that the bill of particulars must indicate
how the kickback was received, when it was received and
how it was received. He further argues that the alleged
overt acts do not show that he received kickbacks or
commissions allegedly because the particulars were lifted
from Luy’s ledger which is questionable, the amounts
stated therein refer to deliveries to other persons and not
to accused Enrile, the project description is vague, the
date of receipt of alleged kickbacks or commissions is not
an approximate date and that two (2) entries in the said bill
of particulars contain no data on the project description
and the names of IA and NGO involved.

According to the prosecution, the said motions replead the

same arguments in assailing the Information and the bill of
particulars. The said bill of particulars, however, was
already noted by the Supreme Court and accused Enrile
did not register any objection to it. It further contends that
the validity of the Information had been affirmed by the
Court in its Resolutions dated July 3, 2014 and August 8,
2014.

I: Whether the denial of the motion for bill of particulars

because it is just “substantial reiteration” was proper.

H: No, the denial was not proper. That every element

constituting the offense had been alleged in the
Information does not preclude the accused from
requesting for more specific details of the various acts or
omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request
for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.

29 of 36
POST MIDTERMS PRE-TRIAL CIVIL CRIMINAL
RULE 118 PRE-TRIAL 5. Pre-trial briefs Required to file and No mention in Rule
serve pre-trial briefs 118
- a proceeding conducted BEFORE the trial of the case for the
purpose of considering the following: 6. In writing and Y e s , n o s t r i c t Yes, otherwise they
s i g n e d b y t h e warning. cannot be used
a.) plea bargaining accused and against the accused
counsel
b.) stipulation of facts
c.) marking for identification of evidence of the parties 7 . A b s e n c e o f Possibility to be Sanction only
d.) waiver of objections to admissibility of the parties Accused dismissed
e.) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes a lawful defense; and
f.) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the ——————————————————————————————-
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
RULE 119 TRIAL
General Rule: No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and
offered during trial other than those identified and marked during the Important: A.M. No. 12-11-2 SC: Guidelines for Decongesting
pre-trial Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and
to Speedy Trial.
Exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown.
________________________________________________________ The trial shall be set NOT LATER than 30 days from the termination of
the pre-trial conference.
PRE-TRIAL: Civil vs Criminal
After the plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least
15 days to prepare for trial.
PRE-TRIAL CIVIL CRIMINAL

1. Motion ex Parte Filed by plaintiff to Not necessary

set the case for pre-
trial

2. Pre-trial Set by the court after Shall by ordered after

the requisite motion arraignment and
from the plaintiff after within 30 days from
all pleadings have the date the court
been served and filed acquires jurisdiction
over the person of
the law accused,
unless a short period
is provided by
special laws or
circulars of SC

3. Purpose Rule 18 - considering Rule 118 - an offer or

the possibility of an compromise may be
amicable settlement received as evidence
or of a submission to as an implied
alternative modes of admission of guilt.
dispute resolution Except those
compromise made
by the accused in
cases involving
quasi-offenses or
those allowed by law
to be compromised.

4. Sanction for non- Imposed upon the Imposed upon the

appearance non-appearing party counsel of the
accused or the
prosecutor in case of
failure rot offer an
acceptable excuse
for lack of
cooperation

30 of 36
CASES:
SALVANERA VS PEOPLE
Facts: In an Information dated November 30, 1996, petitioner
Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay
and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane
The prosecution, on March 4, 1997, moved for the discharge of
accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state
witnesses. The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It
discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the
Information to become state witnesses.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in discharging the accused to become
state witness wherein the testimony of the accused cannot be
substantially corroborated by other prosecution witness and not by a
co-accused
Held: To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar (NOT CO-
ACCUSED) to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on
the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that
"there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the
state witness." It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is
corroborated by some other witness or evidence.
In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that
the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important
points by each other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to
such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the
criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret,
the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they
have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not
eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except
the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of
the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can
directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.
VDA DE MANGUERRA VS RISOS
Facts: On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged before the
RTC of Cebu City with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document, a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by
respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of
the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her
signature to the document.
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that
Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati
City.
On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision; Pursuant to the
specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition
should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case
is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of
Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC
clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE APPLIES TO THE DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.
Held: No, It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at
the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially true
in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives
the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions
as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to
test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge
to observe the witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of
the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that
may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted
either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery.
In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December
1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses.
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.
Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the
trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
31 of 36
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at
bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be made
before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary
that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination,
subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to
the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in
the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through
question and answer.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is
pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is nothing in the rule
which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement
applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of
said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case.
Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions.
Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not
contemplated.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for
the purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court,
or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no
necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the
CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able
to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this
requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the
witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility.
This is especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the
prosecutions case.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its witness
testimony to prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are
designed mainly for the protection of the accused’s constitutional
rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
JIMENEZ VS PEOPLE
Facts: On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former
employee of the BSJ Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed
sworn statements confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby
Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose), and naming petitioner Jimenez, Lope
Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner Jimenez’s younger brother),Lennard A.
Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert Ponce (Robert) alias "Obet,"
and Eric Fernandez (Eric), as his coconspirators.
Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled "Motion for
the Discharge of the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness
Protection Program" pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The People
also filed a motion to discharge Montero as a state witness for the
prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions.
The RTC’s ruling:
Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the discharge of an accused as a state witness; it failed
to clearly show that Montero was not the most guilty or, at best, the
least guilty among the accused. The judge further ruled that Montero’s
statements were not corroborated by the other evidence on record.
On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge,
reconsidered and reversed Judge Almeyda’s order and ruled that the
prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
showing compliance with the requisites of Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The CA’s Amended Decision:
The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in
ordering Montero’s discharge to become a state witness because the
prosecution had complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Issue: Whether CA erred in affirming the decision discharging Montero
as accused to be a state witness:
First, there is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness
because:
1) the voluntary sworn extrajudicial confessions of Montero are all in
the possession of the prosecution which they could readily present in
court without discharging Montero; and
2) there was unjust favoritism in the discharge of Montero because all
the other conspirators are equally knowledgeable of the crime
Second, contrary to the CA’s ruling, the judge, and not the
prosecution, has the ultimate discretion in ensuring that the
requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 are complied with
Third, the cases the CA cited are factually different from the present
case. Chua v. CA should not apply as it deals with two accused, one of
whom was ordered discharged.
32 of 36
Fourth, Montero’s testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its
material points as the prosecution’s own evidence contradicts his
declarations.
Fifth, Montero appears to be the most guilty. He was the architect who
designed and actively participated in all phases of the alleged crime.
Sixth, the discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena
failed to conduct a prior hearing.
Finally, Montero already executed a notice of withdrawal of consent
and testimony which was submitted to the CA
Held: No, We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied
with the requisites under Section 17,Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides that:
Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be
discharged when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more
concrete terms, necessity is not there when the testimony would
simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s
evidence.43 We do not agree with Jimenez that the Court’s
pronouncement in Chua v. CA et al.is inapplicable in the present case
simply because more than two accused are involved in the present
case. The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a
state witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless
of the number of the participating conspirators.
In the present case, not one ofthe accused-conspirators, except
Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose
and their participation in her killing. Hence, the CA was correct in
ruling that Judge Docena acted properly and in accordance with
jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the
testimony of Montero. He alone is available to provide directevidence
of the crime.
We also do not find merit in Jimenez’ argument that Montero’s
testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material points
and is even contradicted by the physical evidence of the crime. As the
trial court properly found, the evidence consisting of the steel casing
where the cadaver was found; the drum containing the cadaver which
the prosecution successfully identified (and which even the acting
Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby Rose; the spot in the sea that
Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the apparel
worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burned personal
effects, all partly corroborate some of the material points in the sworn
statements of Montero
RULE 122 to 125 - APPEALS
MACAPAGAL VS PEOPLE
ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision
FACTS: On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own
benefit, the total amount of ₱800,000.00, which is the value of the
unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.
Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely
moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated
May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009.
She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the
same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE:
1. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9,
GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
2. 2. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9,
GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL
HELD: Petition is DENIED.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial
court’s denial of her notice of appeal.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is
taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper
cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court;
and
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial
Court or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing
a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within
fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the
final order appealed from xxx
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the
disallowance of the appeal itself.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of
appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme
Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is
33 of 36
not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. 

The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be
taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather,
the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil
action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in
this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule
65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule
65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC
and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as
granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling
reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are
not present in this case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the
petition as an appeal of the trial court’s decision convicting her of
estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural
shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner
elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of
appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the
Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of
the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June
29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to
attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her
motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy
or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or
judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Principles: It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural
remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. The
requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely
harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In
these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations,
parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in order to
facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
PEOPLE VS MORALES (wrong case)
ACTION: Appeal to Supreme Court from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court
FACTS: According to Jennifer, on September 6, 1995, at about 7:30 in
the evening, after coming from school, she rode on a tricycle driven by
accused Franco Morales. There were four other passengers.
Everyone alighted ahead of Jennifer. Instead of bringing her home,
accused Franco Morales brought her to a nipa hut near a vacant lot.
Accused Morales led Jennifer to a small bedroom. He asked her to
undress. She refused. She was still wearing her school uniform at that
time. He lifted her skirt and pulled down her underwear. He also took
off his clothes. Jennifer tried to ward him off and kept on kicking him
for about twenty-five (25) minutes, but she never shouted. He
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. He put the knife on
the bed and covered Jennifers mouth to prevent her from screaming
for help.
In his defense, accused Franco Morales denied having sexually
abused Jennifer. He admitted that Jennifer was his passenger on the
fateful night of September 6, 1995. After all the passengers have
alighted, Jennifer started to cry. She asked him to go around and
refused to be brought home, claiming that her uncle maltreated her
and was doing bad things to her. She pleaded with accused Franco
Morales to give her a job so she could move out of her uncles house
On January 12, 1998, the trial court rendered its judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge (sic), said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer a minimum penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the complainant Jennifer Combo the
amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether it is correct to file for an appeal directly to the
Supreme Court.
HELD: YES,
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is
taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper
cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court;
and
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (c) The appeal to the Supreme Court
in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is
imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which
arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
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QUIDET VS PEOPLE
ACTION: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) July 22, 2005 Decision
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner),
Feliciano Taban, Jr. (Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged
with homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-079 for the death of Jimmy
Tagarda (Jimmy)
On May 16, 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and
Tubo guilty of homicide and all three accused (petitioner, Tubo and
Taban) guilty of frustrated homicide.
From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.
On July 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming
with modifications, the judgment of the RTC.
The CA, however, disagreed with the trial courts finding that the
accused are liable for frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries
sustained by Andrew. According to the CA, the accused failed to inflict
mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter successfully deflected
the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have
healed within five to seven days even without medical treatment. The
crime committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.
ISSUE: Whether the favorable appeal of Quidet will extend to the
other two accused who did not appeal.
HELD: YES. Although they did not appeal their conviction, this part of
the appellate courts judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are
entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.
RULE 122 Sec. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a)
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
BALABA VS PEOPLE
ACTION: This petition for review assails the 15 December 2004
Decision and 24 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
FACTS: On 18 and 19 October 1993, State Auditors Arlene Mandin
and Loila Laga of the Provincial Auditors Office conducted an
examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of
the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol. The State Auditors discovered
a cash shortage of P56,321.04, unaccounted cash tickets of
P7,865.30 and an unrecorded check of P50,000 payable to Balaba, or
a total shortage of P114,186.34. Three demand letters were sent to
Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the accounts.
Unsatisfied with Balabas explanation, Graft Investigation Officer I
Miguel P. Ricamora recommended that an information for Malversation
of Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, be filed against Balaba with the Sandiganbayan.
In an Information dated 26 April 1995, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor charged Balaba with the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds.
On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty.
On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he
indicated that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Appellees Brief,
filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for the dismissal of the appeal
for being improper since the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction
over the appeal.
In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Balabas appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that it had no
jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal
instead of certifying the case to the proper court.
HELD: NO. An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to
the appeal.
However, the correction in designating the proper appellate court
should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made
within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court
may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the
Court of Appeals. An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall
be dismissed outright.
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the
appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal.
The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba
filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals
issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December
2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005,
clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of
the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any
error when it dismissed Balabas appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
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 substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the
PEOPLE VS OLIVO modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.

ACTION: This is an appeal from the Decision dated November 30, The accused-appellants upon appeal were acquitted.
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR HC No. 00595 which had
affirmed in toto the Decision dated August 24, 2004 of the Regional The other accused, Joey Zafra, who was likewise convicted on the
same evidence but did not perfect an appeal, was also acquitted
Trial Court
because the present rule provides that an appeal taken by one or
more several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
FACTS: That on or about the 21st day of November 2000, in Quezon except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
City, Philippines, the said accused, by then and there armed with guns and applicable to the latter. 
forcibly entered the hardware store of Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta
located at Eagle Street, Sitio Veterans B, Bgy. Bagong Silangan, this
City, then announced that it was [a] HOLD- UP and ordered Maricel
Permejo, storekeeper thereat, at gunpoint to give them the money of
said store, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously took,
rob and carry away the total amount of P35,000.00 Philippine
Currency, representing the days earnings of said hardware store. that
on the occasion of and by reason of the said robbery and in pursuance
of their conspiracy, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of one MARIANO CONSTANTINO
Y ZOLETA, by then and there shooting him with a gun hitting him on
the trunk and extremities, thereby inflicting upon said Mariano
Constantino [y] Zoleta serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta.

Accused-appellants Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court of

Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellants can be convicted guilty

beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery with homicide
despite the dubious and questionable circumstances of the trial.

HELD: NO, After review, we find that the accused-appellants should

be acquitted.

Apparently, the accused-appellants were arrested without a warrant

during a buy-bust operation on November 24, 2000, transferred to
Camp Karingal under dubious circumstances, and made to stand in a
police line-up and identified by an eyewitness who failed to identify
them three times. These circumstances were ignored by the trial court
who gave too much credence on the positive identification of the
accused-appellants by the same eyewitness during direct
examination. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of RTC and
CA for two reasons: One, the accused-appellants were not arrested
for the crime of robbery with homicide but were arrested during a buy-
bust operation; Second, the material fact that the lone alleged
eyewitness, Maricel Permejo, was not able to identify them as the
perpetrators of the crime, their guilt has not been proved with the
required quantum of evidence.

SC ruled that with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution

evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt, trial courts
are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses
but to the totality of evidence before them. In every case, the court
should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented
by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during the
trial. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals
ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of

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