Political Law 1

a. Political Question

Javellana vs. the Executive Secretary

Constitutional law; Doctrine of Separation of powers; Six Justices agree that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation 1102 (announcing the ratification of the proposed Constitution) is a justiciable question;
four Justices differ.—On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine, Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Chief Justice Concepcion, or six (6) members of the Court, hold
that the issue of the validity of Proclamation 1102 presents a justiciable and non-justiciable question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their
discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as it is claimed
that there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not
there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep its hands-off out
of respect to the people’s will, but, in the negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal
angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution has been complied with.” Justices Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and “beyond the
ambit of judicial inquiry.” Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, No. L-36142 March 31, 1973

Phil. Bar Association vs. COMELEC

b. Sec. 1, Article VIII; Expanded Jurisdiction of the SC

Araullo et al. vs. Aquino III et al.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Courts; The Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme
Court (SC) and in such lower courts as may be established by law.—The Constitution vests judicial
power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower
court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its
creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of judicial power.
However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in
its exercise of the legislative power.

Same; Same; The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”—The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was
confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally
demandable and enforceable.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; The present Rules of Court uses two
special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.—What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
may be determined under the Constitution? The present Rules of Court uses two special civil
actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is
expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a
corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is
directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition
is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.—
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to
be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the
reexamination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding
in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing
to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.—With respect to the Court, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph
of Section 1, supra. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials. Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry
provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been
thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Requisites for the Exercise of Judicial Review.—The requisites
for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must be an
actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be
ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of
the case. Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014

Lansang vs. Garcia

Constitutional law; Judicial review; Habeas Corpus.—–The Supreme Court has the authority under
the Constitution to inquire into the existence of a factual basis for the issuance of a presidential
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of determining
the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

Same; Grant of power to suspend writ privilege neither absolute nor unqualified.—–Far from
being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumscribed, confined
and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but,
also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. Like the limitations
imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and
compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by the courts of justice.
Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless.

Same; Requisites for valid suspension of writ of habeas corpus.—–For a valid suspension of the
privilege of the writ: (a) there must be “invasion, insurrection or rebellion” or—– pursuant to
paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution—– “imminent danger thereof”; and (b)
public safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present.

Same; Results of court’s findings.—–On the basis of the evidence adduced before the Supreme
Court, the members thereof entertained no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of
men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus and still are
engaged in rebellion against the government.

Same; Separation of Powers.—–Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our

system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation
of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the
system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension
of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law,
and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

Same;Same.—–In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check—
– not to supplant—– the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act.

Same; Same; Test for determining validity of presidential suspension of writ.—–The Solicitor
General urged that “judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no
further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct and that public safety
was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending
the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily. “No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant
the rejection of such test.

Same; Same; Same.—–Considering the data in the possession of the President, the Court is not
prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when
he then concluded that public safety and national security required the suspension of the privilege
of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent demonstrations
staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the
assistance and cooperation of the dozens of GPP organizations, and the bombing of water mains
and conduits, as well as electric power plants and installations—– a possibility which, no matter
how remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and
arrest.

Same; Same; President acted in good faith.—–Neither should the Court overlook the fact that the
President could have declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, he limited the
suspension to persons detained “for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and
offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith. Even this was further limited by a succeeding proclamation.

Constitutional law; Where persons detained have been charged criminally, action taken by
Supreme Court.—–The members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of
the opinion that instead of the Court or its commissioner taking evidence adverted to above on
whether the detainees had been apprehended and detained “on reasonable belief” that they had
“participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion”, it is best to let the preliminary examination
and/or investigation before the Court of First Instance in which the detainees had been charged
for alleged violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, be completed, so that their release could be
ordered by the court below, should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a
warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a probable cause be established against them.
Such course of action is more favorable to the petitioners (detainees), inasmuch as a preliminary
examination or investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish
that the Executive had not acted arbitrarily in causing the petitioners to be apprehended and
detained upon the ground that they had participated in the commission of the crime or rebellion
or insurrection.

Same; Same; Release of detainees will not be ordered unless trial court orders otherwise.—–The
majority of the Court declined to accept the view of Mr. Justice Fernando that when a formal
complaint is presented in court against a detained person, the court steps in and the executive
steps out. The major-ity’s reasons are: (1) If the suspension of the writ is valid as in the instant
case, the filing of a complaint against a detainee does not affect the suspension of the privilege,
and, consequently, his release may not be ordered by the Supreme Court; (2) As the filing of a
complaint does not detract from the validity and efficacy of the suspension of the privilege, it
would be more reasonable to construe the filing of said formal charges in the court of first
instance as an expression of the President’s belief that there is sufficient evidence to convict the
detainees so charged and that they should not be released, therefore, unless and until the court
below—– after conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation—– shall find that
the prosecution has not established the existence of a probable cause; and (3) From a long-range
viewpoint, this is more beneficial to the detainees because the opposite view of Mr. Justice
Fernando would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it
may be possible. Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, NO.L-33964, No. L-33965, No. L-33973, No. L-
33982, No. L-34004, No. L-34013, No. L-34039, No. L-34265, No. L-34339 December 11, 1971

Aytona vs. Castillo

Political law; Appointing power; Midnight or last minute appointment; Rule; Exception.—As a rule,
once an appointment is issued, it cannot be reconsidered specially where the appointee has
qualified. On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying
revocation such as when mass ad-interim appointments (350) issued in the last hours of an
outgoing Chief Executive are to be considered by the Commission on Appointments that is
different from that existing at the time of the appointment and the names are to be submitted by
an incoming Chief Executive who may not wholly approve of the selections especially if it is
doubtful that the outgoing President exercised double care in extending such appointments.

Same; Same; Malacañang's practice; Reasons for.— is Malacañang's practice, which is logical, to
submit ad-interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One
good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified
are submitted for confirmation.

Same; Executive department; Care-taker administration; Extent of authority.—After the

proclamation of the election of an incoming Chief Executive, the outgoing Chief Executive is no
more than a "care-taker" administration. He is duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President and he should not do acts which, he ought to know, would
embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It is not for him to use his powers as incumbent
President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential
prerogatives to serve partisan purposes.

Same; Same; Same; Filling of vacancies.—The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few,
and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may be undoubtedly permitted. But
the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them a
few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by
the latter as an abuse of presidential prerogatives.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Double care necessary.— When the President makes ad-interim
appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval
of his selection either by previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by
thereafter explaining to them the reason for such selection. Where the Commission on
Appointments that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the
appointment and where the names are to be submitted by his successor who may not wholly
approved of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such
appointments.

Same; Separation of powers; Power of appointment; Case at bar.—The separation of powers,

under the circumstances in the instant case, prevents the Supreme Court to disregard a
presidential directive issued by an incoming President cancelling "midnight" or "last minute"
appointments.

Same; Public officers; Appointment; Equitable rights; Case at bar.—Once the appointee has
qualified, the latter's equitable rights can be set up to deny the power to revoke the appointment.
Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be set up in the present case where rush conditional
appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracted from that degree of good
faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. Aytona
vs. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1, No. L-19313 January 19, 1962

Arnault vs. Nazareno

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY.—
The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.
2.ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY.—The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of
legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, and the field
of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define any limits by which the
subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the
range of legislative power.
3.ID.; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A WlTNESS FOR CONTEMPT.—No
person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is
required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
4.ID. ; ID.—Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination.
5.ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION.—The materiality of a question that may be
propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not
by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
6.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY.—Where the immateriality of
the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. Although the legislative
body has the power to make the inquiry, the Court is empowered to correct a clear abuse of
discretion in the exercise of that power.
7.ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE ACTION.—Since the
Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say
that the information sought from a witness which. is material to the subject of the legislative
inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not within the province of the
 Court to determine or imagine what legislative measures Congress may take after the
completion of the legislative investigation.
8.ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WlTNESS FOR CONTEMPT
BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION.—There is no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish. for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of
Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a
continuing body which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or
of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.
9.ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO ANSWER.—Testimony
which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as
contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.
10.ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER QUESTION is INCRIMINATORY.—It is not
enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of
his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from
all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general 'Conception of the
relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to
determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. The witness cannot assert
his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an. imaginary danger, or to
secure immunity to a third person.
11.ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN.—It is the duty of every citizen to give frank, sincere,
and truthful testimony before a competent authority. His constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that duty. When a specific right and a
specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is
clear and imperative, the former must yield to the latter. The right to live is one of the most sacred
that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding
obligation to respect the life of others. Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

The 1987 Constitution; Date of Effectivity

In Re Saturnino Bermudez (1986)

De Leon vs. Esguerra (1987)

The Elements of a State; Definition of a State

CIR vs. Atonio Campos Rueda

US vs. Dorr

1.CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITION; GOVERNMENT DEFINED.—The term "government" as employed in Act No.
292 of the United States Philippine Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system
as distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government. United States vs. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332, No.
1051 May 19, 1903

The Doctrine of State Immunity

a. The State may not be sued without its consent

Article XVI, Sec. 3

Kawananaka vs. Polybank

Garcia vs. Chief of State

Actions; Money claim against tiie government should be filed with the Auditor General.—A claim for
the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with
the principle thai the State cannot be sued without its consent. (New Manila Lumber Co. vs. Republic,
L-14248, April 28, 1960). Garcia vs. Armed Forces of the Philippines, et al., 16 SCRA 120, No. L-20213
January 31, 1966

The Holy See vs. Rosario

Public International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; Non-suability; Courts and Practices; A state or
international agency requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court
that it is entitled to immunity.—In Public International Law, when a state or international agency
wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of
the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

Same; Same; Same; In the Philippines, the practice is for the government sovereign or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity.—In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts
varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the
latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In
World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the
trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of
the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a “suggestion” to respondent Judge. The
Solicitor General embodied the “suggestion” in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

Same; Same; Same.—In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of
Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court
allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner’s claim of sovereign
immunity.
Same; Same; Same; Statehood; In 1929, through the Lateran Treaty, Italy recognized the exclusive
dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City.—In 1929, Italy and the Holy
See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign
jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive
foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according
to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81
[1948]).

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City.—The
Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City “for the purpose of assuring to the Holy
See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the
field of international relations” (O’Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent
government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy
See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world.—
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of
“sovereignty” must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states
(Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of
national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical
purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent
government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy
See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world.
Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an
“international state” (Fenwick, supra. 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the Holy See that is the international person.—Inasmuch as the
Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the
name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope’s own view, it is the Holy See that is the
international person.

Same; Same; Same; The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since 1957.—The Republic of the Philippines has
accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the
Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo,
p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.

Same; Same; Same; The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving
state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.—Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from
the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation
and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force
in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off
the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for
the purpose of the donation.—The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal
thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit
or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have
occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has
been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).

Same; Same; Same; The issue of Petitioner’s non-suability can be determined by the trial court
without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of the private
respondent.—The issue of petitioner’s non-suability can be determined by the trial court without
going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides,
the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and
Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the
Philippines’ foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of
Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy
See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local
jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy
in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a
state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is
conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
[1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty
of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting the country’s foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]).
As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the
certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Same; Same; Same; Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels
aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through
diplomatic channels.—Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved
by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic
channels.

Same; Same; Same; Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign
Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See.—Private respondent can ask the Philippine
government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to
persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course,
the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations
between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against
Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919
[1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a
private cause. Holy See, The vs. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
US vs. Guinto

Actions; Public Corporations; Constitutional Law; Contracts; In suits against a foreign government, a
distinction must he made between acts jure imperil and acts jure gestionis. As to the former, the State
immunity prevails.—The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them—between sovereign and governmental acts
(jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now
the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia
and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984]).

Judgments; An obiter has no value as an imperative authority.—It can thus be seen that the statement
in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so
that it has no value as an imperative authority.

Actions; Public Corporations; Constitutional Law; Contracts; States may be sued only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions. Infrastructure projects of U.S. Naval Base in Subic
involve governmental functions.—The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts, It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted
to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes. United States of America vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487, No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

Torio vs. Fontanilla

Damages; Municipal corporations; In the absence of a statutory law, municipal corporations are not
liable for damages for acts done in the performance of governmental functions.—If the injury is
caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule,
can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers,
so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly
and maliciously. In Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al., 1958, a truck driver employed by
the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work at the
construction of a road. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for
damages held that the province could not be made liable because its employee was in the
performance of a governmental function—the construction and maintenance of roads—and however
tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay
monetary consideration.
Same; Same; The rule is otherwise where it is engaged in the exercise of proprietary functions.—With
respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons ex contractu or ex delicto. Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts
and in tort.

Same; Same; The holding of a town fiesta by a municipality is an exercise of a private function of the
municipality.—Coming to the case before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold
that the holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was an
exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality.

Same; Same.—This provision (Section 2282, RAC) simply gives authority to the municipality to
celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if
the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the
special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance
of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain
but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance,
the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is a private
undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for
public service.

Same; Same; Under the doctrine of respondent superior, a municipality may be held liable for the acts
of Us agent relative to the exercise thereof of acts proprietary in character.—Lastly, petitioner or
appellant Municipality cannot evade responsibility and/or liability under the claim that it was Jose
Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council
appointed, Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the
construction of the “zarzuela” stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under
the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the
negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

Same; Same; Article 27 of the Civil Code providing indemnification for damages where a public servant
“refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty” covers a case of non-feasance as
distinguished from negligence or misfeasance in carrying out official duties. Municipal councilors
found negligent in supervising safe use of a stage used in a town fiesta are not liable under this article
of the Civil Code.—In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was
negligence on their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying
Article 27 of the Civil Code against them, and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of
the stage and the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. We agree with petitioners that the Court
of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them, for this particular article covers
a case of non-feasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does nof apply to
a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.

Same; Same; A municipal corporation exercising proprietary functions is on the same footing as a
private corporation. Its governing board or municipal council is not liable solidarily for acts committed
by its employees unless there is bad faith or wanton negligence on their part.—The Court of Appeals
in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of
Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal consequence thereof is
that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal
council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter
are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence (culpa aquiliana)
committed by the corporation’s employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross
or wanton negligence on their part. Torio vs. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599, No. L-29993, No. L-30183
October 23, 1978

MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (1916)

1.DAMAGES; MEASURE OF.—Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated
for six months it is an error to restrict the damages to a shorter period during which he was confined
in the hospital.

2.SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE SUED; CONSTRUCTION.—The Government of the

Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the federal and state governments of the United
States" the decisions of the high courts of that country may be used in determining the scope and
purpose of a special statute.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.—The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an Act abrogating that
immunity will be strictly construed.

4.ID.; ID. ; ID.—An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing
unless it is clearly expressed in the act.

5.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LlABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS,
AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES.—The Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for the negligent
acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are acting as special agents within. the meaning
of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a
special agent.

Republic vs. Purisima

Constitutional law; State immunity from suit; The doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent applies to the Rice and Corn Administration. This certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose
from the failure of respondent Judge x x x to apply the well-known and oft-reiterated doctrine of the
non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so
alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit
in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of
contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. x x x. At that time, the
leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon
stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity
acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been
applied in 53 other decisions. There is thus more than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdiction
infirmity against the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972.
What is more, the position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this
provision of the present Constitution: “The State may not be sued without its consent.” The merit of
the petition for certiorari and prohibition is thus obvious.

Same; Same; The consent to be sued to be effective must come from, the State thru a statute, not
through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently
respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff
in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case
of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be
effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by
Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed
to had no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. (1950)

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION ; COUNTERCLAIM NOT BARRED BY PRIOR

JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO APPEAL FROM DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION WITH
RESERVATION.·An order dismissing the complaint in intervention after a counterclaim has been filed
but reserving the right of the defendant as against the intervenor, does not bar the defendant from
proceeding with its counterclaim against the intervenor, notwithstanding the failure of the defendant
to appeal from said order.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COUNTERCLAIM FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION.·The
complaint in intervention sought to recover possession of the vessel in question from the plaintiff,
which claim is adverse to the position assumed by the defendant that it has a better right to said
possession than the plaintiff, on the theory that the latter had already lost his rights over the same,
and that, on the other hand, the defendant is relying on the charter contract executed in its favor by
the intervenor. Held: The counterclaim calls for specific performance on the part of the intervenor
and therefore states a cause of action.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION BY THE GOVERNMENT is WAIVER OF
NONSUABILITY.·The filing by the Government of a complaint in intervention is in effect a waiver of its
right of nonsuability.

Immunity Against Execution of Judgment: Suability vs. Liability

Republic vs. Villasor (1973)

Constitutional law; State immunity; The State cannot be sued without its consent. It is a fundamental
postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well
as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it
must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: “A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”

Same; Same; Judgment against the State cannot be enforced by execution. The universal rule that
where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimants’ action “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the state of execution”
and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

PNB vs. Pabalan

Administrative Law; Execution; Garnishment; Constitutional Law; Actions; State immunity from suit;
Funds of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration on deposit with the Philippine National Bank
may be garnished State immunity from suit cannot be validly invoked with regards to funds of public
corporations.—This is not the first time petitioner raised that issue. It did so before in Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, decided only last January. It did not meet with success,
this Court ruling in accordance with the two previous cases of National Shipyard and Steel Corporation
and Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, that funds of public corporations
which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. As respondent Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration is likewise a public corporation possessed of the same attributes, a similar
outcome is indicated. This petition must be dismissed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—As noted at the outset, petitioner Philippine National Bank
would invoke the doctrine of non-suability. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution,
what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in
express terms: “The State may not be sued without its consent.” If the funds appertained to one of
the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar
to garnishment. Such is not the case here. Garnishment would lie. Only last January, as noted in the
opening paragraph of this decision, this court, in a case brought by the same petitioner precisely
invoking such a doctrine, left no doubt that the funds of public corporations could properly be made
the object of a notice of garnishment. Accordingly, this petition must fail.

Same; Same; Same; Government-owned and controlled corporations have a personality of their own,
separate and distinct from the government, their funds, therefore although considered to be public
in character, are not exempt from garnishment.—The alleged grave abuse of discretion, the basis of
this certiorari proceeding, was sought to be justified on the failure of respondent Judge to set aside
the notice of garnishment of funds belonging to respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration. This excerpt from the aforecited decision of Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Industrial Relations makes manifest why such an argument is far from persuasive: “The premise that
the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that
they were exempt from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial
Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief
Justice, Concepcion; ‘The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the
government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable
for, as a government-owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has—pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order
No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 * * *, pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established—“all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law * * *.” Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and
may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459, as
amended.)’ * * *

Same; Same; Corporation Law; Where the government engages in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, it divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to subject
itself to the rules governing private corporations.—The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation
decision was not the first of its kind.

The ruling therein could be inferred from the judgment announced in Manila Hotel Employees
Association v. Manila Hotel Company, decided as far back as 1941. In the language of its ponente,
Justice Ozaeta: “On the other hand, it is well-settled that when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244). By engaging in
a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac
vice of its sovereign character, so as to tender the corporation subject to the rules of law governing
private corporation.”

Chartered Agencies

Arcega vs. CA

Central Bank, Suability of; Suit against Central Bank for refund of foreign exchange tax collected
pursuant to Republic Act 601, as amended, not a suit against State; Reasons.·The suit is brought
against the Central Bank of the Philippines, an entity authorized by its charter to sue and be sued. The
consent of the State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given. Furthermore, section 5 of Republic
Act No. 601 (as amended) directs that refund of taxes be made by the Central Bank.

Rayo vs. CFI of Bulacan (1981)

Constitutional Law; Immunity from suit, not a case of; National Power Corporation, with a separate
personality and can sue and be sued, even in tort claims; Reason.—It is not necessary to write an
extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a governmental function with respect to
the management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has
organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court
under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3, (d).) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it
has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (See National
Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963, 8. SCRA 781.) Moreover, the charter
provision that the NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is without qualification on the cause of
action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.

PNR vs. IAC (1993)

Political Law; Sovereign immunity from suit; Acquiescence of State manifested expressly or indicated
implicitly; Case of government corporation not performing a governmental function.—The bone of
contention for exculpation is premised on the familiar maxim in political law that the State, by virtue
of its sovereign nature and as reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is insulated from suits without its
consent (Article 16, Section 3, 1987 Constitution). However, equally conceded is the legal proposition
that the acquiescence of the State to be sued can be manifested expressly through a general or special
law, or indicated implicitly, as when the State commences litigation for the purpose of asserting an
affirmative relief or when it enters into a contract (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 edition, page
33; Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, 1962, page 34). When the State participates in a
covenant, it is deemed to have descended from its superior position to the level of an ordinary citizen
and thus virtually opens itself to judicial process. Of course, We realize that this Court qualified this
form of consent only to those contracts concluded in a proprietary capacity and therefore immunity
will attach for those contracts entered into in a governmental capacity, following the ruling in the
1985 case of United States of America vs. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487 [1985]; cited by Cruz, supra at page 36-
37). But the restrictive interpretation laid down therein is of no practical worth nor can it give rise to
herein petitioner PNR’s exoneration since the case of Malong vs. Philippine National Railways (138
SCRA 63 [1985]); 3 Padilla, 1987 Constitution with Comments and Cases, 1991 edition, page 644),
decided three months after Ruiz was promulgated, was categorical enough to specify that the
Philippine National Railways “is not performing any governmental function” (supra, at page 68).

Unchartered or Unincorporated Agencies

National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro

1.PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ACTIONS AGAINST THE STATE; WHEN MAY BE SUED WITHOUT ITS
CONSENT.—Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune to suits.
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.
"Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private
or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for
public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather
than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state.
The latter is true, although the state may own the stock or property of such a corporation, for by
engaging in business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign
character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation." (59 C. J., 313.)
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION.—Among the general powers of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration are, under section 3 of Executive Order No. 365, to execute contracts of
any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under section 4, to charge landing
fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the
use of any property under its management. These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics
Administration the power to sue and be sued, which is implied from the power to transact private
business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
with greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National
Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all
the liabilities of the latter.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION.—The National Airports Corporation is
abolished for all purposes; it can not be regarded as still in existence even for the limited object of
winding up its affairs. No trustees, assignees or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation
thereof and, what is more, there is nothing to liquidate, as everything the National Airports
Corporation had, has been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. To all legal intents and
practical purposes, said corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal
representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name.

Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association

Bureau of Printing; Work is governmental in character; Court of Industrial Relations; No jurisdiction

over employees of the Bureau of Printing.—The Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality of the
Government. It operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary. It is designed to
meet the printing needs of the Government. It is primarily a service bureau. It is obviously not engaged
in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its appropriations are
provided for in the budget. It is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.

Sam; Acceptance of outside work and payment of overtime compensation does not make work of
Bureau of Printing proprietary.—Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the
interest of the service so requires. The payment of overtime compensation is discretionary with the
Director, depending upon the Bureau's current appropriations. The additional work, which it executes
for private persons, is done upon request. It is not solicited. It is accepted only as the requirements of
the Government Jobs would permit. It is merely incidental to its governmental function.

Same; Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.—As a Government office, without any juridical personality,
the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.

Same; Constitutional law; Actions; Immunity from suit.—Any suit, action or proceeding against the
Bureau of Printing would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself. The
Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.
Mobil Philippines Incorporation, Inc. vs. Customs Arrastre Services

Pleading and practice; Parties; Constitutional law; Arrastre; Bureau of Customs and Customs Arrastre
Service cannot be sued.—A defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person
or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. The Bureau of Customs and (a fortiori) the Customs
Arrastre Service are not persons. They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. The Customs
Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Customs, set up under Customs Administrative Order No. 8-
62 of November 9, 1962. It follows that they cannot be sued as natural or juridical persons.

Same; Arrastre; Its nature.—The arrastre service is a proprietary or nongovernmental function.

Same; Actions; Performance by a non-corporate governmental entity of a proprietary function does

not make it suable.—The fact that a noncorporate government entity performs a function proprietary
in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is
undertaken as an incident to its governmental functions, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government entity (Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing
Employees Association, L-15751, Jan. 28, 1961).

Same; Tariff and Customs Code; Administrative law; Arrastre service is a necessary incident to the
functions of the Bureau of Customs.—The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from
that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting
lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines,
and penalties (Sec. 602, Rep. Act No. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.
For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply
receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and
imposing the duty provided in the Tariff Law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the
declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed
merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said
customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations. Although said arrastre function
may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of
the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable
to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing
itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the end should not be denied as to the necessary
means to that end.

Same; Constitutional law; State cannot be sued without its consent.—Regardless of the merits of the
claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent.
The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operations
of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime
government function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

Same; Strict construction of statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit.—Statutory
provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and waiver of immunity, being in
derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred.

Same; Remedy of consignee in case Customs Arrastre Service does not deliver all the landed cargo.—
Where the Customs Arrastre Service did not deliver all the landed cargo to the consignee, the latter's
remedy is to file a money claim with the General Auditing Office pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
327.

Immunity Not an Instrument to Perpetrate Injustice

Santiago vs. Republic

Constitutional Law; Actions; The state cannot be sued without its consent, such consent, however,
need not be express and may be presumed as when the Government benefited by the taking of land
and has not yet paid the compensation justly due.—Fortunately, the constitutional provision itself
allows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It can be
implied. So it was more than implied in Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu: “The doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen.” The fact that this decision arose from a suit against the Public Highways Commissioner and
the Auditor General for failure of the government to pay for land necessary to widen a national
highway, the defense of immunity without the consent proving unavailing, is not material. The
analogy is quite obvious. Where the government ordinarily benefited by the taking of the land, the
failure to institute the necessary condemnation proceedings should not be a bar to an ordinary action
for the collection of the just compensation due. Here the alleged failure to abide by the conditions
under which a donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the
consent likewise being presumed. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that while a donation
partakes of a contract, there is no money claim, and therefore reliance on Commonwealth Act No.
327 would be futile.

Same; Same; A donor of land to the Government of the Philippines is entitled to go to court in case of
an alleged breach of the conditions in the deed of donation. Consent to be sued is therein implied on
grounds of equity.—Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor,
with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged
breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstance, the
fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to
the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The
government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest
ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the
repository of the sovereign power. The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave responsibility
of living up to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law. Only by
displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it happens to be one of the departments of a
litigant, can the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command respect and be entitled to
acceptance.

Amigable vs. Cuenca

Political law; Immunity of State from suit; Exception.—Where the government takes away property
from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
 negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

Same; Same; Same; Reason for exception.—The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and
only upon pay ment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender of the party entitled
to such pay ment of the amount fixed, may it “have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.”

Same; Relief available to aggrieved owner; Just compensation.—As registered owner, she could bring
an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is
one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the
government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for
road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it
could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis
should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

Political Law

People v. Perfecto

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the
relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet.,
511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U. S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of
Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious
when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn,
supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political
character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a
cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power—and the latter is involved in the former—to the
United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of
the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of
obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme
Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United
States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive
or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject
to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding
it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 How., 210.) People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, No. 18463 October 4, 1922

Macariola v. Judge Asuncion

Same; Same; Same; Same; “Political Law” defined.—Political Law has been defined as that branch of public
law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defined
the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]).
It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative
law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce prohibiting certain public officers
from engaging in business activities is political in nature and has already been abrogated with the transfer
of sovereignty from Spain, to the United States and later to the Republic of the Philippines.—Upon the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic
of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or
not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the
effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the
Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Macariola vs. Asuncion, 114 SCRA
77, Adm. Case No. 133-J May 31, 1982

The Supremacy of the Constitution

Mutuc v. COMELEC

Same; Obedience to the fundamental law.—The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or
the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule
of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three
departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice
but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Mutuc vs.
Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228, No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Constitutional Law; Statutes; Contracts; Words and Phrases; A constitution is a system of fundamental
laws for the governance and administration of a nation—it is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme Iaw of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.—We now
resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation.
It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has
been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. lt prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under
the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that
law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent
of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and.construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.—Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations
of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the
purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of
citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Same; Same; Same; Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing.—As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon
a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.

Same; Same; Same; Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing
nature of constitutional provisions.—Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such
a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,
the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long
as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

Same; Same; Same; The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing
a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing—the rule is
that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional
right and make it more available.—In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient
remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself,
fully enforceable.

Same; Same; Same; A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-executing in
another.—Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
selfexecuting. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be selfexecuting as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another. Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System,
267 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. CA

Constitutional Law; While as a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-
executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement, some provisions have already been
categorically declared by the Supreme Court as non selfexecuting.—As a general rule, the provisions of
the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their
enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be
easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically
declared by this Court as non self-executing. In Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997), the Court
specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non selfexecuting and
ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented: By its very
title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” x x x. These principles
in Article II are not intended to be selfexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA
52 (1991), this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section
2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994), the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions,
which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non
selfexecuting and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

Same; Constitutional provisions which are statements of principles and policies are mere directives
addressed to the executive and the legislative departments—if unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the
courts but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.—In the remaining
provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords
recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working
conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family;
and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like
the provisions that were declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 (1991), and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994),
they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather,
the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes. The rationale for this is given by Justice
Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442
SCRA 573 (2004): x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the
full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would be
impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being
overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these
guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss,
formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution. The HSRA cannot
be nullified based solely on petitioners’ bare allegations that it violates the general principles expressed
in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of action
to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process and the
limitations of judicial power. Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals, 527 SCRA
746, G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007

The Preamble
Aglipay v. Ruiz

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent
in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 13,
subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or
for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any
penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state.
Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and
the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos
Constitution recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission,
reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied
in the Constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to
say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government,
from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind
themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent
limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino
people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish
a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote
the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from
taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of
the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto;

Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher,
minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional
religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII,
Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week,
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of
the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes
against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code). Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64
Phil. 201, No. 45459 March 13, 1937

Two-fold Functions of the Government

Bacani v. Nacoco

The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut Corporation may be considered as
included in the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” for the purposes of the exemption
of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

As may be noted, the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” refers to a government entity
through which the functions of government are exercised, including the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central government or
to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government. This requires a little digression
on the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.

To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This
institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through
which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and
ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature;
the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are
merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as ex ollows:

“'(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and
robbery.
'(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.

'(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its
liabilities for debt or for crime.

'(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.

'(5) The definition and punishment of crime.

'(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.

'(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.

'(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or
encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.’ " (Malcolm, The Government of the
Philippine Islands, p. 19.)

The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health
and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles determining whether or not
a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for
the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a
government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals. (Malcom, The Government of the
Philippine Islands, pp. 19–20.)

From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our government is required
to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an
attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or
controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the
National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations
which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal
characteristics of a private corporations under the Corporation Law.

The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporation perform certain functions of
government make them a part of the Government of the Philippines?

The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under
the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National Coconut Corporation.
While it was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of
trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products
and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to
exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its
corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth
Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, “The mere fact that the
Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation” (National Coal
Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586–587). “By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal
Company, the Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of
the corporation. * * * Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is
subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government.”
(Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)

To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the
functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those
arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government
and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined
in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption
clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.

“Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State.” (Section
3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation Law)

“‘The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only include organized cities and
towns, and like organizations, with political and legislative powers for the local, civil government and
police regulations of the inhabitants of the particular district included in the boundaries of the
corporation.’ Heller vs. Stremmel 52 Mo. 309, 312."

“In its more general sense the phrase ‘municipal corporation’ may include both towns and counties, and
other public corporations created by government for political purposes. In its more common and limited
signification, it embraces only incorporated villages, towns and cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues,
85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661." (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. I, p. 385.)

“We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict sense to be the
incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and
authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and
regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power of local government is the
distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.” (Dillon, Municipal
Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.) Bacani and Matoto vs. Natl. Coconut Corp., et al., 100 Phil. 468, No. L-
9657 November 29, 1956

ACCFA v. Gucco

Labor law; Land Reform Code; ACA is a government office engaged in governmental, not propriatary
function.—The ACA is a government office engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. There can
be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the Land Reform Code is
beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental
function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And
when, aside from the governmental objectives, of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of
the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the
formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of
the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its
personnel are subject to Civil Service Laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and
salaries, any vestige 01 doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

Same; Same; Same; Functions of ACA may not be strictly described "constituent," as distinguished from
"ministrant," functions.—The governmental functions of ACA may not be strictly what President Wilson
described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance
of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national
defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people—these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the
part of the government The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete, The areas
which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to
enter optionally continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges
of the times. In the Philippines as abmost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a
national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social
justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various
agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Administration vs. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices, 30 SCRA
649, No. L-21484, No. L-23605 November 29, 1969

PVTA v. CIR

Constitutional law; Functions of government; Government to provide for general welfare.—The welfare
state concept “is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution.” It is much more so under the
present Charter, which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights.
There is manifest, to recall Laski, “a definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience,” resulting
in “a state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its members.”

Same; Same; Distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of government obsolete.—The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional classification of the functions of
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise
and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only because it was
better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here
as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. Phil. Virginia
Tobacco Administration vs. CIR, 65 SCRA 416, No.L-32052 July 25, 1975

Parens Patriae

Government v. Monte de Piedad

FACTS: In 1863 the inhabitants of the Spanish dominions contributed funds for the relief of those damaged
by an earthquake in the Philippine Islands and the money was remitted to the Philippines to be distributed
by a central relief board. Part of the "funds contributed were turned over to the "Monte de Piedad" to be
held at the disposal of the relief board.

HELD: That the Philippine Government is the proper party to maintain an action to recover the funds thus
loaned or deposited for the purpose of carrying out the intention of the contributors.

XXX

In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 How., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a
charity case, said:

"When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people
of the States. And this power still remains with them except so far as they have delegated a portion of it
to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. The State
as a sovereign, is the parens patriæ."

Chancelor Kent says:

"In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriæ, has the right to enforce all
charities of a public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests,
where no other person is entrusted with it." (4 Kent Com., 508, note.) The Supreme Court of the United
States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last quotations, said:

"This prerogative of parens patriæ is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power
is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction
of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient function, and often necessary to be exercised in
the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves."

The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497),
wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature
to authorize the sale of the estates of infants, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in
being, who cannot act for themselves, said:

"These remarks in reference to infants, insane persons and persons not known, or not in being, apply to
the beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for
protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriæ. They show that this beneficient function
has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now
resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes
of justice and right, and is as clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases
whatever." Government of the P. 1. vs. Monte de Piedad., 35 Phil. 728, No. 9959 December 13, 1916

Cabañas v. Pilapil

Civil law; Parent and child; The mother, as natural guardian is preferred over the uncle in the possession
and administration of the minor’s property.—In a dispute between the mother and the uncle of a minor
over the possession and administration of the proceeds of an insurance policy belonging to the child, the
mother is entitled to a distinct preference in view of Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. With the added
circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal
care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the
assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in
the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle.

Constitutional law; Powers of the State; State acting as parens patriae will see to the best interest of the
child.—The judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending
suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. ... What is more, there
is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: “The State shall strengthen the family as a
basic social institution.” If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. Cabanas vs.
Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94, No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

De Jure and De Facto Government

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

1. POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF ACTS OF "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT.—It is a legal
truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.

2. ID.; KINDS OF "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENTS.—There are several kinds of de facto governments.

The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and
control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains
itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by
Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.

The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force,
as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of
Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States.

And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise
in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt
against the Union during the war of secession.

3.ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF SECOND KIND OF "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT.—The

distinguishing characteristics of the second kind of de facto government, more aptly denominated a
government of paramount force, are

(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government; and

(2), that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are
established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered by
military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly
by military force.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS AND DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT OF PARAMOUNT FORCE.—The powers and duties
of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907,
which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of Military
Authority over Hostile Territory. Article 43 of said Section III provides that "the authority of the legitimate
power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to
reestablish and issue, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."
5. ID. ; ID. ; ID.; ID. ; PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION, A "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT OF THE SECOND
KIND.—It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued
on January 23, 1942 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the
military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different
from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico,
Mexico. As Halleck says, "the government established over an enemy's territory during the military
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered,
and is subject to restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government
be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same.
In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of
such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol.
2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government
and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence.

6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OF SAME CHARACTER AS PHILIPPINE
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION.—The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and
organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in
truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of
occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source
of its authority was the same—the Japanese military authority and government. Japan had no legal power
to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize
the latest sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands
had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other
means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in international law,
recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population
of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that belligerent occupation, being
essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the
de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such.
Even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino people who,
taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, had organized an
independent government under that name with the support and backing of Japan, such government
would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the
parent state of the United States. And, as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that
organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the Supreme
Court of the United States in numerous cases; and similar to the short-lived government established by
the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto
government by same court in the case of McCleod vs. United States (229 U. S., 416).

7.lD.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF JUDICIAL ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION
AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AFTER REOCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES.—The governments of
the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and,
by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good
and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under
the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

8.ID. ; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR ANNULLING ALL '-
PROCESSES OF ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES."—The phrase "processes of any other
government" is broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative,
as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies
established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgments and judicial proceedings, which
are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation
were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power
of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of
General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said
proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only
reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial
processes or court proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in
25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."

9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF COMMONWEALTH TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS IN

ACTIONS PENDING IN COURTS DURING JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION.—Although in theory the
authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military
occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his
own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he
is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. Following this practice and the precepts of the law
of nations, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces proclaimed on January 3, 1943, when Manila
was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and
ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions,
shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their
present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission
was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of
the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively,
continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and justices of the peace courts,
with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the
Imperial Japanese army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called
Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial change
in the organization and jurisdiction thereof. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the
Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it
stands to reason the same courts, which become reestablished and conceived of as having been in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending
in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINUITY OF LAW.—It is a legal maxim that, excepting that of a political nature,
"Law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not changed
merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary section 9,
citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise 011 the Conflict
of Laws (Cambridge, 1916, section 131): "There can be no break or interregnum in law. From the time the
law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final
disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change takes place, and when changed
it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is
impotent to bring law to amend; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change." As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence
depends upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such
laws, not being of a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force
"ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts
are expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if
made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. As a consequence,
enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to
another court, are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary
only in case the "f ormer courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer
continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts
or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil. 113, No. L-5 September 17, 1945
Peralta v. Director of Prisons

1. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND CONSTITUTION OF THE SO-CALLED

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR.—As the so-called Republic of the
Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), the questions involved in
the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government,
because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in
carrying out the administration over said territory (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, Sixth Edition,
Revised, 1944, p. 342); and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases
involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto
governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which
is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light
of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as
defined in the usages of nations.

2. VALIDITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL AND ExCLUSIVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.—The
so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant,
had the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No
question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is a mere governmental
agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and
sentences may be of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so
applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.

3. VALIDITY OF THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR SAID COURT.— With respect to the summary
procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the
conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. The only restrictions or
limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones,
especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military
purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those
imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and
the requirements of public conscience, It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration
does not violate those precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public
conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory
system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system
prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe.

4. VALIDITY OF ACT No. 65 OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SOCALLED REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.—It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate,
through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act "No. 65 of the said
Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses
demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country
by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and
efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons
charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution
of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much
heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized
by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called
martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other
necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook
and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that in case
of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the
right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. LII, sec. III,
Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take
judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce
of this country.

5. POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE CRIMES PENALIZED BS SAID ACT No. 65 AND ORDINANCE No. 7. OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE So CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.—The crimes penalized by Act No. 65—
as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, and the crimes against public order,
penalized by Ordinance No. 7. and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction—are all of a political complexion, because the acts constitutingthose offenses were
punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor
of the enemy and directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.

6. VALIDITY OF SENTENCES DURING OCCUPATION FOR CRIMES OF PoLITICAL COMPLEXION, AFTER

REOCCUPATION OR LlBERATION.—The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid
during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso
facto upon the reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth
Government. (Hall's International Law, seventh edition, p. 518; Westlake, International Law, Part II, War,
pp. 97, 98; Wheaton's International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 245.) Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, 75 Phil. 285, No. L-49 November 12, 1945

Alcantara v. Director of Prisons

1.INTERNATIONAL LAW; NATURE OF SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PHILIPPINE

EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED DURING THE JAPANESE REGIME; VALIDITY OF JUDICIAL ACTS
THEREOF.—The so-called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established
in the Philippines during the Japanese regime, were governments de facto organized by the belligerent
occupant, and the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those of a political complexion,

2.ID.; ID.; COURTS; STATUS OF COURT OF APPEALS CONTINUED DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION.—
The Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of
Appeals that existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37.
The division of the Court of Appeals into several District Courts of Appeals, and the reduction of the
number of Justices sitting in each division, during the regime of the so-called Republic, effected no
substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS NOT OF POLITICAL COMPLEXION. RENDERED DURING THE
JAPANESE OCCUPATION.— Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court
created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of
such court, like those of the courts which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and
valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable, now after the liberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political complexion.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. WHEN Is A PUNITIVE OR PENAL SENTENCE SAID TO BE OF A POLITICAL COMPLEXION.—
A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not
defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the
belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and
the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons,
acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare,
safety and security of the belligerent occupant. As examples, the crimes against national security, such as
treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc,, were crimes against
the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes
against the belligerent occupant. Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 494, No. L-6 November 29,
1945

Sovereignty

Tañada v. Angara

Same; International Law; While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all—
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limi tation s vol un tari ly
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a mem ber of the family of nations.—This Court
notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue.
However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. Tañada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA
18, G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Reagan v. CIR

Political law; Sovereignty; Extent of Philippine territorial and personal jurisdiction.—Nothing is better
settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit
to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has
to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
Same; Same; Concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.—It is to be admitted that any state may by its
consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment
of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation,
which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from
the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Reagan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
30 SCRA 968, No. L-26379 December 27, 1969

People v. Gozo

Political law; Philippine sovereignty over American bases; Extent of.—As was so emphatically set forth in
People v. Acierto: “By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents
that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as a matter of
comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential
but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional
rights not granted, but also such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their
own decline to make use of.” People vs. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476, No. L-36409 October 26, 1973

Sec. 2, Article II

Kuroda v. Jalandoni
Ichong v. Hernandez

ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS NOT VIOLATED BY REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180; TREATIES
SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY SUBSEQUENT LAW.—The law does not violate
international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed.,
pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment
to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country". But the nationals
of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail
trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same
may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed.,
539). Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento, 101 Phil. 1155, No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions; Professionals governed by treaty.—The
Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish State, is intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and
the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. A Filipino citizen desiring to
practice the legal profession in the Philippines, is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

Same; Treaty cannot modify regulations governing admission to Philippine bar.—The aforementioned
Treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon
the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art. VIII, Philippine Constitution.) In re Garcia, 2 SCRA 984,
August 15, 1961

Gonzales v. Hechanova

Courts; Jurisdiction; Power to invalidate treaties.—The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled
the question of whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts in the affirmative,
by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the Supreme Court may not be deprived “of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question.” In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. Gonzales vs.
Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230, No. L-21897 October 22, 1963

In RE Garcia

Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions; Professionals governed by treaty.—The
Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish State, is intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and
the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. A Filipino citizen desiring to
practice the legal profession in the Philippines, is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

Same; Treaty cannot modify regulations governing admission to Philippine bar.—The aforementioned
Treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon
the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art. VIII, Philippine Constitution.) In re Garcia, 2 SCRA 984,
August 15, 1961

Reyes v. Bagatsing

Bayan v. Zamora
People v. Lagman

1. NATIONAL DEFENSE; COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE; VIOLATION OF SECTION 60 OF

COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 1, REGARDING FAILURE TO REGISTER IN THE MILITARY SERVICE.—The
National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against section
2, Article II of the Philippine Constitution but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The
duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable
should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

2. ID.; ID.; IN THE UNITED STATES.—In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that
the compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the
Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war
and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty
to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.
S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution a person may be
compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests and even against his
religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the
chance of being shot down in its defense.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.—In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not
deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property
to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the
actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what
justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation
to make it more effective, in case of need.

4. ID. ; ID.; PECUNIARY ALLOWANCE TO ATTEND TO FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES.—The circumstance that

the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present
themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment
in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend
to these family responsibilities (sections 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1). People vs. Lagman, 66
Phil. 13, No. 45892, No. 45893 July 13, 1938

People v. Manayao

1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; "MAKAPILI" NOT PART OF JAPANESE ARMY.—The Makapili, although
organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a
part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple.

2. ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF STATE, CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF CITIZEN; CITIZENSHIP CANNOT BE CAST OFF IN
TIME OF WAR.—The constitutional duty of the citizen to defend the State cannot be cast off when his
country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in
the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps.

3. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; CASE AT BAR.—It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that
the appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which
under the circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and
thereby placed himself beyond the arm of the treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the
shield that would protect him from punishment. People vs. Manayao, 78 Phil. 721, No. L-322 July 28, 1947

Separation of Church and State

Gerona v. Sec. of Educ

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; DAILY FLAG CEREMONY NOT A RELIGIOUS RITUAL.—
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty,
of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and
protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly
devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag
salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a
candidate for admission to the bar.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT ON SCHOOL PUPILS TO SALUTE THE FLAG NOT AN IMPOSITION OF
RELIGION.—In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of
Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely
enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem,
Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the
Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to
establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools
aim to develop, among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship.

3. ID.; ID.; EXEMPTION FROM FLAG CEREMONY NOT PROPER.—The children of Jehovah Witnesses cannot
be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption.
Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the
school population which by far constitutes the great majority.

4. ID.; ID.; NON-COMPLIANCE WITH NON-DISCRIMINATORY LAWS NOT A PART OF RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM.—The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority. Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et at., 106 Phil. 2, No. L-
13954 August 12, 1959

Ebralinag v. The Division Supt. of Schools of Cebu

Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; Nature thereof.—Religious freedom is a fundamental right which
is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).

Same; Same; Same; Two-fold aspect of right to religious profession and worship; Scope.—The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second
is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare" (J.
Cruz, Constitutional Law 1991 Ed pp 176-177).

Same; Same; Same; Prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom, sole justification
thereof, explained.—"The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest', that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the
expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.

Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; Administrative Code; Flag Salute Law; Compulsion to observe flag salute
law on pain of dismissal from one's job or expulsion from school is alien to the conscience of present
generation of Filipinos, being violative of their constitutional rights to free speech and free exercise of
religious profession and worship.—Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year-old decision of this
Court in Gerona upholding the flag salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey
it, is not lightly to be trifled with. It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received
legislative cachet by its incorporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that
the time has come to reexamine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job
or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut
their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973
Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Jehovah's witnesses are accorded exemption to the observance of flag
ceremony in deference to their religious beliefs but said right not to participate in the flag ceremony does
not give them the right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.—Exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's
Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs,
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag
ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited
by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right
to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the
flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to free education; Expulsion from school by reason of one's
religious belief considered a violation of a citizen's right to free education.—Moreover, the expulsion of
members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as
Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State
to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to make such education
accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To force a religious group, through statutory compulsion, to
participate in a ceremony violative of its religious belief is not conducive to love of country or respect for
duly constituted authorities.—Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about
the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive
to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. Ebralinag vs. The Division Superintendent of
Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, G.R. No. 95770, G.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993

Pamil v. Teleron

Supreme Court; Quo warranto; Constitution Law; Election Law; Administration Law; Provision of Revised
Administrative Code barring ecclesiastics from being elected to public office held constitutional; Minority
votes of 5 members of Supreme Court prevailed over insufficient 7 votes of members, as the requirement
to declare a law unconstitutional is 8 votes; Case at bar.—There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal.
After a lengthy and protracted deliberation, the Court is divided on the issue. Seven members of the Court
are of the view that the judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is no longer operative
either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed. Outside of the writer of this
opinion, six other Justices are of this mind. They are Justices Teehankee, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. For them, the overriding principle of the supremacy of the Constitution
or, at the very least, the repeal of such provision bars a reversal. The remaining five members of this Court,
Chief Justice Castro, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino, on the other hand, hold the position
that such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not tainted with any
constitutional infirmity. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority,
the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect.
The presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the
conclusion arrived at by the writer of this opinion, joined by Justices Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez,
and Guerrero. They have no choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and
declare ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the
aforesaid five other members, led by the Chief Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility,
this petition for certiorari must be granted. Pamil vs. Teleron, 86 SCRA 413, No. L-34854 November 20,
1978

German v. Barangan

Constitutional Law; Exercise of right to religious freedom must be done in good faith without any ulterior
motive, e.g., political.—The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of
petitioners in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion.
While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom,
the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article
19 of the Civil Code admonishes: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties x x x x x observe honesty and good faith.”

Same; Reasonable restrictions in use of thoroughfares near the Malacañang Palace are valid as threats to
lives of heads of states are constant and real.—Even assuming that petitioners’ claim to the free exercise
of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be
characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators
crashed through the Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel
Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected
thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous,
unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if
it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as
other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacañang. The need
to secure the safety of heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized. The
threat to their lives and safety is constant, real and felt throughout the world Vivid illustrations of this
grave and serious problem are the gruesome assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of violence and
terrorism that have been perpetrated against heads of state and other public officers of foreign nations.

Same; Same.—Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive offices within the
Malacañang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices include
communications facilities that link the central government to all places in the land. Unquestionably. the
restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive branch of the
government, which petitioners’ mass action would certainly disrupt.

Same; Freedom to translate religious belief into action may be curtailed.—In the case at bar, petitioners
are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner
by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the
pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education.
Same; Freedom of locomotion may be curtailed.—Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use
of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of which have already been discussed, is allowed
under the fundamental law, the same having been established in the interest of national security. German
vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, No. L-68828 March 27, 1985

INC v. Gironella

Judges; Judgments; Constitutional Law; The use of such word as "gimmick" in the judgment of the trial
court in referring to the Iglesia ni Cristo 's efforts at assisting a member thereof in her complaint for rape
is not in good taste and should be avoided as they could offend the sensibilities of a religious sect.—This
administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution. The use of the word "gimmick" could offend
the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood in the
popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to
persuade others to take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. While it would be
going too far to assert that intentional deceit is employed, it could have that effect. The Latin maxim,
Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri, comes to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of
having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain converts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion
implies respect for every creed. No one, much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the
actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost sight of either that the attendance
at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution. The right to a public trial
is safeguarded by the fundamental law. No adverse implication can arise from such an occurrence. It goes
without saying that if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the power of a trial judge to
maintain the proper decorum.

Same; Same; A misuse of a word by a judge should not automatically be followed by a reprisal of a severe
character. The right of a court to give expressions to its views equally deserves protection.—The Court,
however, takes into consideration the fact that the right of a court to give expression to its views is equally
deserving of protection. At any rate, it is not an affront to rationality if note be taken that not all members
of the bench are possessed of such an extensive vocabulary in the English language that the misuse of a
word is to be followed automatically by reprisal of a severe character. While under the circumstances,
some members of the Court are of the opinion that censure is warranted, it is the view of the majority
that an admonition would suffice. Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Gironella, 106 SCRA 1, Adm. Matter No. 2440-CFI
July 25, 1981

Estrada v. Escritor

Estrada v. Escritor

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; In the United States, there is probably no more intensely
controverted area of constitutional interpretation than the religion clauses.—The case at bar takes us to
a most difficult area of constitutional law where man stands accountable to an authority higher than the
state. To be held on balance are the state’s interest and the respondent’s religious freedom. In this highly
sensitive area of law, the task of balancing between authority and liberty is most delicate because to the
person invoking religious freedom, the consequences of the case are not only temporal. The task is not
made easier by the American origin of our religion clauses and the wealth of U.S. jurisprudence on these
clauses for in the United States, there is probably no more intensely controverted area of constitutional
interpretation than the religion clauses. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that in this
constitutional area, there is “considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court.” As stated
by a professor of law, “(i)t is by now notorious that legal doctrines and judicial decisions in the area of
religious freedom are in serious disarray. In perhaps no other area of constitutional law have confusion
and inconsistency achieved such undisputed sovereignty.” Nevertheless, this thicket is the only path to
take to conquer the mountain of a legal problem the case at bar presents. Both the penetrating and
panoramic view this climb would provide will largely chart the course of religious freedom in Philippine
jurisdiction. That the religious freedom question arose in an administrative case involving only one person
does not alter the paramount importance of the question for the “constitution commands the positive
protection by government of religious freedom -not only for a minority, however small- not only for a
majority, however large- but for each of us.”

Same; Same; One cannot understand, much less intelligently criticize the approaches of the courts and
the political branches to religious freedom in the recent part in the United States without a deep
appreciation of the roots of these controversies in the ancient and medieval world and in the American
experience.—To understand the life that the religion clauses have taken, it would be well to understand
not only its birth in the United States, but its conception in the Old World. One cannot understand, much
less intelligently criticize the approaches of the courts and the political branches to religious freedom in
the recent past in the United States without a deep appreciation of the roots of these controversies in the
ancient and medieval world and in the American experience. This fresh look at the religion clauses is
proper in deciding this case of first impression.

Same; Same; While Protestants are accustomed to ascribe to the Reformation the rise of religious liberty
and its acceptance as the principle governing the relations between a democratic state and its citizens,
history shows that it is more accurate to say that the “same causes that gave rise to the Protestant
revolution also resulted in the widespread acceptance of the principle of religious liberty, and ultimately
of the principle of separation of church and state.”—The corruption and abuses of the Catholic Church
spurred the Reformation aimed at reforming the Catholic Church and resulting in the establishment of
Protestant churches. While Protestants are accustomed to ascribe to the Reformation the rise of religious
liberty and its acceptance as the principle governing the relations between a democratic state and its
citizens, history shows that it is more accurate to say that the “same causes that gave rise to the Protestant
revolution also resulted in the widespread acceptance of the principle of religious liberty, and ultimately
of the principle of separation of church and state.” Pleas for tolerance and freedom of conscience can
without doubt be found in the writings of leaders of the Reformation. But just as Protestants living in the
countries of papists pleaded for toleration of religion, so did the papists that lived where Protestants were
dominant. Papist and Protestant governments alike accepted the idea of cooperation between church and
state and regarded as essential to national unity the uniformity of at least the outward manifestations of
religion. Certainly, Luther, leader of the Reformation, stated that “neither pope, nor bishop, nor any man
whatever has the right of making one syllable binding on a Christian man, unless it be done with his own
consent.” But when the tables had turned and he was no longer the hunted heretic, he likewise stated
that when he made an alliance with the secular powers that “(h)eretics are not to be disputed with, but
to be condemned unheard, and whilst they perish by fire, the faithful ought to pursue the evil to its source,
and bathe their hands in the blood of the Catholic bishops, and of the Pope, who is a devil in disguise.” To
Luther, unity among the peoples in the interests of the state was an important consideration. Other
personalities in the Reformation such as Melanchton, Zwingli and Calvin strongly espoused theocracy or
the use of the state as an engine to further religion. In establishing theocracy in Geneva, Calvin made
absence from the sermon a crime, he included criticism of the clergy in the crime of blasphemy punishable
by death, and to eliminate heresy, he cooperated in the Inquisition.

Same; Same; The entire history of church-state relations in Europe up to the time the United States
Constitution was adopted shows two salient features—first, with minor exceptions, the history of church-
state relationships was characterized by persecution, oppression, hatred, bloodshed, and war, all in the
name of the God of Love and of the Prince of Peace, and second, likewise with minor exceptions, this
history witnessed the unscrupulous use of religion by secular powers to promote secular purposes and
policies, and the willing acceptance of that role by the vanguards of religion in exchange for the favors
and mundane benefits conferred by ambitious princes and emperors in exchange for religion’s invaluable
service.—In 1784, James Madison captured in this statement the entire history of church-state relations
in Europe up to the time the United States Constitution was adopted, viz: Torrents of blood have been
spilt in the world in vain attempts of the secular arm to extinguish religious discord, by proscribing all
differences in religious opinions. In sum, this history shows two salient features: First, with minor
exceptions, the history of church-state relationships was characterized by persecution, oppression,
hatred, bloodshed, and war, all in the name of the God of Love and of the Prince of Peace. Second, likewise
with minor exceptions, this history witnessed the unscrupulous use of religion by secular powers to
promote secular purposes and policies, and the willing acceptance of that role by the vanguards of religion
in exchange for the favors and mundane benefits conferred by ambitious princes and emperors in
exchange for religion’s invaluable service. This was the context in which the unique experiment of the
principle of religious freedom and separation of church and state saw its birth in American constitutional
democracy and in human history.

Same; Same; American Religion Clauses Case Law: Religion cases arise from different circumstances, the
more obvious ones arise from a government action which purposely aids or inhibits religion, and the more
difficult religion clause cases involve government action with a secular purpose and general applicability
which incidentally or inadvertently aids or burdens religious exercise.—Religion cases arise from different
circumstances. The more obvious ones arise from a government action which purposely aids or inhibits
religion. These cases are easier to resolve as, in general, these actions are plainly unconstitutional. Still,
this kind of cases poses difficulty in ascertaining proof of intent to aid or inhibit religion. The more difficult
religion clause cases involve government action with a secular purpose and general applicability which
incidentally or inadvertently aids or burdens religious exercise. In Free Exercise Clause cases, these
government actions are referred to as those with “burdensome effect” on religious exercise even if the
government action is not religiously motivated. Ideally, the legislature would recognize the religions and
their practices and would consider them, when practical, in enacting laws of general application. But when
the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and burdened turn to the courts for protection.
Most of these free exercise claims brought to the Court are for exemption, not invalidation of the facially
neutral law that has a “burdensome” effect.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Even as defining religion is a difficult task for even theologians,
philosophers and moralists cannot agree on a comprehensive definition, courts must define religion for
constitutional and other legal purposes.—With the change in political and social context and the
increasing inadvertent collisions between law and religious exercise, the definition of religion for purposes
of interpreting the religion clauses has also been modified to suit current realities. Defining religion is a
difficult task for even theologians, philosophers and moralists cannot agree on a comprehensive
definition. Nevertheless, courts must define religion for constitutional and other legal purposes. It was in
the 1890 case of Davis v. Beason that the United States Supreme Court first had occasion to define religion,
viz: The term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations
they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is often confounded
with the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter. The First
Amendment to the Constitution, in declaring that Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or forbidding the free exercise thereof, was intended to allow everyone under
the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and
the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments
in such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit
legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any sect. The definition was
clearly theistic which was reflective of the popular attitudes in 1890.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In 1944, the Court stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), that
the free exercise of religion “embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the
hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths” but by the 1960s, American pluralism
in religion had flourished to include non-theistic creeds from Asia such as Buddhism and Taoism.—In 1944,
the Court stated in United States v. Ballard that the free exercise of religion “embraces the right to
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox faiths.” By the 1960s, American pluralism in religion had flourished to include non-theistic creeds
from Asia such as Buddhism and Taoism. In 1961, the Court, in Torcaso v. Watkins, expanded the term
“religion” to non-theistic beliefs such as Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism. Four
years later, the Court faced a definitional problem in United States v. Seeger which involved four men who
claimed “conscientious objector” status in refusing to serve in the Vietnam War. One of the four, Seeger,
was not a member of any organized religion opposed to war, but when specifically asked about his belief
in a Supreme Being, Seeger stated that “you could call (it) a belief in a Supreme Being or God. These just
do not happen to be the words that I use.” Forest Peter, another one of the four claimed that after
considerable meditation and reflection “on values derived from the Western religious and philosophical
tradition,” he determined that it would be “a violation of his moral code to take human life and that he
considered this belief superior to any obligation to the state.” The Court avoided a constitutional question
by broadly interpreting not the Free Exercise Clause, but the statutory definition of religion in the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1940 which exempt from combat anyone “who, by reason
of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” Speaking
for the Court, Justice Clark ruled, viz: Congress, in using the expression ‘Supreme Being’ rather than the
designation ‘God,’ was merely clarifying the meaning of religious tradition and belief so as to embrace all
religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views (and) the test of belief ‘in
relation to a Supreme Being’ is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in
the life of its possessor parallel to the orthodox belief in God. (emphasis supplied) The Court was
convinced that Seeger, Peter and the others were conscientious objectors possessed of such religious
belief and training.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It has been proposed that basically, a creed must meet four criteria to qualify
as religion under the First Amendment—(a) there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that
occupies a central place in the believer’s life, (b) the religion must involve a moral code transcending
individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely subjective, (c) a demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but
the court must not inquire into the truth or reasonableness of the belief, and (d) there must be some
associational ties.—Federal and state courts have expanded the definition of religion in Seeger to include
even non-theistic beliefs such as Taoism or Zen Buddhism. It has been proposed that basically, a creed
must meet four criteria to qualify as religion under the First Amendment. First, there must be belief in
God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the believer’s life. Second, the religion must
involve a moral code transcending individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely subjective. Third, a
demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not inquire into the truth or
reasonableness of the belief. Fourth, there must be some associational ties, although there is also a view
that religious beliefs held by a single person rather than being part of the teachings of any kind of group
or sect are entitled to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.

Same; Same; Same; U.S. jurisprudence has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of
jurisprudence on the religion clauses—separation (in the form of strict separation or the tamer version of
strict neutrality or separation) and benevolent neutrality or accommodation.—In upholding religious
liberty as the end goal in religious clause cases, the line the court draws to ensure that government does
not establish and instead remains neutral toward religion is not absolutely straight. Chief Justice Burger
explains, viz: The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line;
rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be
sponsored or favored, none commanded and none inhibited. (emphasis supplied) Consequently, U.S.
jurisprudence has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of jurisprudence on the
religion clauses: separation (in the form of strict separation or the tamer version of strict neutrality or
separation) and benevolent neutrality or accommodation. A view of the landscape of U.S. religion clause
cases would be useful in understanding these two strains, the scope of protection of each clause, and the
tests used in religious clause cases. Most of these cases are cited as authorities in Philippine religion clause
cases.
Same; Same; Same; Free Exercise Clause; Words and Phrases; “Belief-Action Test”; The belief-action test
allows absolute protection to belief but not to action.—The Court first interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
in the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States. This landmark case involved Reynolds, a Mormon who
proved that it was his religious duty to have several wives and that the failure to practice polygamy by
male members of his religion when circumstances would permit would be punished with damnation in
the life to come. Reynolds’ act of contracting a second marriage violated Section 5352, Revised Statutes
prohibiting and penalizing bigamy, for which he was convicted. The Court affirmed Reynolds’ conviction,
using what in jurisprudence would be called the belief-action test which allows absolute protection to
belief but not to action. It cited Jefferson’s Bill Establishing Religious Freedom which, according to the
Court, declares “the true distinction between what properly belongs to the Church and what to the State.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Free Exercise Clause accords absolute protection to individual religious
convictions and beliefs and proscribes government from questioning a person’s beliefs or imposing
penalties or disabilities based solely on those beliefs—it extends to both beliefs and unbeliefs.—The Free
Exercise Clause accords absolute protection to individual religious convictions and beliefs and proscribes
government from questioning a person’s beliefs or imposing penalties or disabilities based solely on those
beliefs. The Clause extends protection to both beliefs and unbelief. Thus, in Torcaso v. Watkins, a
unanimous Court struck down a state law requiring as a qualification for public office an oath declaring
belief in the existence of God. The protection also allows courts to look into the good faith of a person in
his belief, but prohibits inquiry into the truth of a person’s religious beliefs. As held in United States v.
Ballard, “(h)eresy trials are foreign to the Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They
may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Next to belief which enjoys virtually absolute protection, religious speech and
expressive religious conduct are accorded the highest degree of protection.—Next to belief which enjoys
virtually absolute protection, religious speech and expressive religious conduct are accorded the highest
degree of protection. Thus, in the 1940 case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a state law
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation for any religious or charitable cause without prior approval of a state
agency. The law was challenged by Cantwell, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses which is committed
to active proselytizing. The Court invalidated the state statute as the prior approval necessary was held to
be a censorship of religion prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The least protected under the Free Exercise Clause is religious conduct, usually
in the form of unconventional religious practices.—The least protected under the Free Exercise Clause is
religious conduct, usually in the form of unconventional religious practices. Protection in this realm
depends on the character of the action and the government rationale for regulating the action. The
Mormons’ religious conduct of polygamy is an example of unconventional religious practice. As discussed
in the Reynolds case above, the Court did not afford protection to the practice. Reynolds was reiterated
in the 1890 case of Davis again involving Mormons, where the Court held, viz: “(c)rime is not the less
odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Deliberate-Inadvertent Distinction”; Under the
“deliberate-inadvertent distinction,” the court recognizes the distinction between deliberate state
interference of religious exercise for religious reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and
government’s inadvertent interference with religion in pursuing some secular objective.—The belief-
action test in Reynolds and Davis proved unsatisfactory. Under this test, regulation of religiously dictated
conduct would be upheld no matter how central the conduct was to the exercise of religion and no matter
how insignificant was the government’s non-religious regulatory interest so long as the government is
proscribing action and not belief. Thus, the Court abandoned the simplistic beliefaction distinction and
instead recognized the deliberate-inadvertent distinction, i.e., the distinction between deliberate state
interference of religious exercise for religious reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and
government’s inadvertent interference with religion in pursuing some secular objective. In the 1940 case
of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court upheld a local school board requirement that all public
school students participate in a daily flag salute program, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses who were
forced to salute the American flag in violation of their religious training, which considered flag salute to
be worship of a “graven image.” The Court recognized that the general requirement of compulsory flag
salute inadvertently burdened the Jehovah Witnesses’ practice of their religion, but justified the
government regulation as an appropriate means of attaining national unity, which was the “basis of
national security.” Thus, although the Court was already aware of the deliberate-inadvertent distinction
in government interference with religion, it continued to hold that the Free Exercise Clause presented no
problem to interference with religion that was inadvertent no matter how serious the interference, no
matter how trivial the state’s non-religious objectives, and no matter how many alternative approaches
were available to the state to pursue its objectives with less impact on religion, so long as government
was acting in pursuit of a secular objective.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Balancing Test; Under the two-part balancing test established in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the first step is for the plaintiff to show that the regulation placed a real
burden on his religious exercise, and the burden would be upheld only if the state showed that it was
pursuing an overriding secular goal by the means which imposed the least burden on religious freedom.—
Nearly a century after Reynolds employed the belief-action test, the Warren Court began the modern free
exercise jurisprudence. A two-part balancing test was established in Braunfeld v. Brown where the Court
considered the constitutionality of applying Sunday closing laws to Orthodox Jews whose beliefs required
them to observe another day as the Sabbath and abstain from commercial activity on Saturday. Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the Court, found that the law placed a severe burden on Sabattarian retailers.
He noted, however, that since the burden was the indirect effect of a law with a secular purpose, it would
violate the Free Exercise Clause only if there were alternative ways of achieving the state’s interest. He
employed a two-part balancing test of validity where the first step was for plaintiff to show that the
regulation placed a real burden on his religious exercise. Next, the burden would be upheld only if the
state showed that it was pursuing an overriding secular goal by the means which imposed the least burden
on religious practices. The Court found that the state had an overriding secular interest in setting aside a
single day for rest, recreation and tranquility and there was no alternative means of pursuing this interest
but to require Sunday as a uniform rest day.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Compelling State Interest Test; The compelling state interest test stresses the
state interest is not merely any colorable state interest, but must be paramount and compelling to
override the free exercise claim.—Two years after came the stricter compelling state interest test in the
1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner. This test was similar to the two-part balancing test in Braunfeld, but this
latter test stressed that the state interest was not merely any colorable state interest, but must be
paramount and compelling to override the free exercise claim. In this case, Sherbert, a Seventh Day
Adventist, claimed unemployment compensation under the law as her employment was terminated for
refusal to work on Saturdays on religious grounds. Her claim was denied. She sought recourse in the
Supreme Court. In laying down the standard for determining whether the denial of benefits could
withstand constitutional scrutiny, the Court ruled, viz: Plainly enough, appellee’s conscientious objection
to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of
state legislation. If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant’s
constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no
infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden
on the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation
of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate . . .’ NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415, 438 9 L
ed 2d 405, 421, 83 S Ct 328. (emphasis supplied) The Court stressed that in the area of religious liberty, it
is basic that it is not sufficient to merely show a rational relationship of the substantial infringement to
the religious right and a colorable state interest. “(I)n this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’ Thomas v.
Collins, 323 US 516, 530, 89 L ed 430, 440, 65 S Ct 315.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Exemption Doctrine; Under the exemption doctrine when general laws conflict
with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some “compelling state interest”
intervenes.—The Court thus carved out for Sherbert an exemption from the Saturday work requirement
that caused her disqualification from claiming the unemployment benefits. The Court reasoned that
upholding the denial of Sherbert’s benefits would force her to choose between receiving benefits and
following her religion. This choice placed “the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against (her) for her Saturday worship.” This germinal case of Sherbert firmly
established the exemption doctrine. viz: It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by
all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to
be granted unless some ‘compelling state interest’ intervenes. Thus, in a short period of twenty-three
years from Gobitis to Sherbert (or even as early as Braunfeld), the Court moved from the doctrine that
inadvertent or incidental interferences with religion raise no problem under the Free Exercise Clause to
the doctrine that such interferences violate the Free Exercise Clause in the absence of a compelling state
interest—the highest level of constitutional scrutiny short of a holding of a per se violation. Thus, the
problem posed by the belief-action test and the deliberate-inadvertent distinction was addressed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the Free Exercise Clause, religious belief is absolutely protected,
religious speech and proselytizing are highly protected but subject to restraints applicable to non-religious
speech, and unconventional religious practice receives less protection.—It may be seen from the
foregoing cases that under the Free Exercise Clause, religious belief is absolutely protected, religious
speech and proselytizing are highly protected but subject to restraints applicable to non-religious speech,
and unconventional religious practice receives less protection; nevertheless conduct, even if its violates a
law, could be accorded protection as shown in Wisconsin.

Same; Same; Same; Establishment Clause; The U.S. Supreme Court’s first encounter with the
Establishment Clause was in the case of Everson v. Board of Education.—The Court’s first encounter with
the Establishment Clause was in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education. Prior cases had made
passing reference to the Establishment Clause and raised establishment questions but were decided on
other grounds. It was in the Everson case that the U.S. Supreme Court adopted Jefferson’s metaphor of
“a wall of separation between church and state” as encapsulating the meaning of the Establishment
Clause. The often and loosely used phrase “separation of church and state” does not appear in the U.S.
Constitution. It became part of U.S. jurisprudence when the Court in the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United
States quoted Jefferson’s famous letter of 1802 to the Danbury Baptist Association in narrating the history
of the religion clauses, viz: Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and
his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the
Government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their Legislature should ‘make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation
between Church and State. (emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; The interpretation of the Establishment Clause has in large part been in cases
involving education, notably state aid to private religious schools and prayer in public schools.—The
interpretation of the Establishment Clause has in large part been in cases involving education, notably
state aid to private religious schools and prayer in public schools. In Everson v. Board of Education, for
example, the issue was whether a New Jersey local school board could reimburse parents for expenses
incurred in transporting their children to and from Catholic schools. The reimbursement was part of a
general program under which all parents of children in public schools and nonprofit private schools,
regardless of religion, were entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs. Justice Hugo Black, writing
for a sharply divided Court, justified the reimbursements on the child benefit theory, i.e., that the school
board was merely furthering the state’s legitimate interest in getting children “regardless of their religion,
safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.” The Court, after narrating the history of the First
Amendment in Virginia, interpreted the Establishment Clause, viz: The ‘establishment of religion’ clause
of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall
of separation between Church and State.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The most controversial of the education cases involving the Establishment
Clause are the school prayer decisions.—The most controversial of the education cases involving the
Establishment Clause are the school prayer decisions. “Few decisions of the modern Supreme Court have
been criticized more intensely than the school prayer decisions of the early 1960s.”

Same; Same; Same; Strict Neutrality and Benevolent Neutrality Standards; Two main standards used by
the U.S. Supreme Court in deciding religion clause cases—separation (in the form of strict separation or
the tamer version of strict neutrality or separation) and benevolent neutrality or accommodation.—But
the purpose of the overview is not to review the entirety of the U.S. religion clause jurisprudence nor to
extract the prevailing case law regarding particular religious beliefs or conduct colliding with particular
government regulations. Rather, the cases discussed above suffice to show that, as legal scholars observe,
this area of jurisprudence has demonstrated two main standards used by the Court in deciding religion
clause cases: separation (in the form of strict separation or the tamer version of strict neutrality or
separation) and benevolent neutrality or accommodation. The weight of current authority, judicial and in
terms of sheer volume, appears to lie with the separationists, strict or tame. But the accommodationists
have also attracted a number of influential scholars and jurists. The two standards producing two streams
of jurisprudence branch out respectively from the history of the First Amendment in England and the
American colonies and climaxing in Virginia as narrated in this opinion and officially acknowledged by the
Court in Everson, and from American societal life which reveres religion and practices age-old religious
traditions! Stated otherwise, separation—strict or tame—protects the principle of church-state
separation with a rigid reading of the principle while benevolent neutrality protects religious realities,
tradition and established practice with a flexible reading of the principle. The latter also appeals to history
in support of its position.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The two streams of jurisprudence—separationist and accommodationist—are
anchored on a different reading of the “wall of separation.”—The two streams of jurisprudence—
separationist or accommodationist—are anchored on a different reading of the “wall of separation.” The
strict separationist view holds that Jefferson meant the “wall of separation” to protect the state from the
church. Jefferson was a man of the Enlightenment Era of the eighteenth century, characterized by the
rationalism and anticlericalism of that philosophic bent. He has often been regarded as espousing Deism
or the rationalistic belief in a natural religion and natural law divorced from its medieval connection with
divine law, and instead adhering to a secular belief in a universal harmony. Thus, according to this
Jeffersonian view, the Establishment Clause being meant to protect the state from the church, the state’s
hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two. In fact, when Jefferson became
President, he refused to proclaim fast or thanksgiving days on the ground that these are religious exercises
and the Constitution prohibited the government from intermeddling with religion. This approach erects
an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious institutions could not
receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to
alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. Only the complete separation of religion from politics
would eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political
views thus a strict “wall of separation” is necessary. Strict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is
deeply embedded in history and contemporary practice that enormous amounts of aid, both direct and
indirect, flow to religion from government in return for huge amounts of mostly indirect aid from religion.
Thus, strict separationists are caught in an awkward position of claiming a constitutional principle that has
never existed and is never likely to.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or
separationist view is largely used by the Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards
a more secular society.—A tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or
separationist view is largely used by the Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards
a more secular society. It finds basis in the Everson case where the Court declared that Jefferson’s “wall
of separation” encapsulated the meaning of the First Amendment but at the same time held that the First
Amendment “requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions than it is to favor them.” (emphasis supplied) While the strict neutrality approach is
not hostile to religion, it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for
purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or
obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not permit, much less
require, accommodation of secular programs to religious belief. Professor Kurland wrote, viz: The thesis
proposed here as the proper construction of the religion clauses of the first amendment is that the
freedom and separation clauses should be read as a single precept that government cannot utilize religion
as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either
to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under benevolent neutrality, which gives room for accommodation, the wall
of separation is meant to protect the church from the state.—Consequently, the Court has also decided
cases employing benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality which gives room for accommodation is
buttressed by a different view of the “wall of separation” associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode
Island colony. In Mark DeWolfe Howe’s classic, The Garden and the Wilderness, he asserts that to the
extent the Founders had a wall of separation in mind, it was unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant to
protect the state from the church; instead, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state, i.e., the
“garden” of the church must be walled in for its own protection from the “wilderness” of the world with
its potential for corrupting those values so necessary to religious commitment. Howe called this the
“theological” or “evangelical” rationale for church-state separation while the wall espoused by
“enlightened” statesmen such as Jefferson and Madison, was a “political” rationale seeking to protect
politics from intrusions by the church. But it has been asserted that this contrast between the Williams
and Jeffersonian positions is more accurately described as a difference in kinds or styles of religious
thinking, not as a conflict between “religious” and “secular (political)”; the religious style was biblical and
evangelical in character while the secular style was grounded in natural religion, more generic and
philosophical in its religious orientation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Benevolent neutrality is congruent with the sociological proposition that
religion serves a function essential to the survival of society itself—there is no human society without one
or more ways of performing the essential function of religion.—Benevolent neutrality is congruent with
the sociological proposition that religion serves a function essential to the survival of society itself, thus
there is no human society without one or more ways of performing the essential function of religion.
Although for some individuals there may be no felt need for religion and thus it is optional or even
dispensable, for society it is not, which is why there is no human society without one or more ways of
performing the essential function of religion. Even in ostensibly atheistic societies, there are vigorous
underground religion(s) and surrogate religion(s) in their ideology. As one sociologist wrote: It is widely
held by students of society that there are certain functional prerequisites without which society would
not continue to exist. At first glance, this seems to be obvious—scarcely more than to say that an
automobile could not exist, as a going system, without a carburetor . . . Most writers list religion among
the functional prerequisites. Another noted sociologist, Talcott Parsons, wrote: ‘There is no known human
society without something which modern social scientists would classify as a religion . . . Religion is as
much a human universal as language.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Accommodation is distinguished from strict neutrality in that the latter holds
that government should base public policy solely on secular considerations, without regard to the religious
consequences of its actions.—Accommodation is distinguished from strict neutrality in that the latter
holds that government should base public policy solely on secular considerations, without regard to the
religious consequences of its actions. The debate between accommodation and strict neutrality is at base
a question of means: “Is the freedom of religion best achieved when the government is conscious of the
effects of its action on the various religious practices of its people, and seeks to minimize interferences
with those practices? Or is it best advanced through a policy of ‘religious blindness’—keeping government
aloof from religious practices and issues?” An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and
sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid
interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it is
good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy
even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Reasons for Preferring the Accommodationist Position; The accommodationist
interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment.—There are strong and
compelling reasons, however, to take the accommodationist position rather than the strict neutrality
position. First, the accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First
Amendment. The religion clauses contain two parallel provisions, both specifically directed at “religion.”
The government may not “establish” religion and neither may government “prohibit” it. Taken together,
the religion clauses can be read most plausibly as warding off two equal and opposite threats to religious
freedom—government action that promotes the (political) majority’s, favored brand of religion and
government action that impedes religious practices not favored by the majority. The substantive end in
view is the preservation of the autonomy of religious life and not just the formal process value of ensuring
that government does not act on the basis of religious bias. On the other hand, strict neutrality interprets
the religion clauses as allowing government to do whatever it desires to or for religion, as long as it does
the same to or for comparable secular entities. Thus, for example, if government prohibits all alcoholic
consumption by minors, it can prohibit minors from taking part in communion. Paradoxically, this view
would make the religion clauses violate the religion clauses, so to speak, since the religion clauses single
out religion by name for special protection.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First
Amendment.—Second, the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First
Amendment. The principle underlying the First Amendment is that freedom to carry out one’s duties to a
Supreme Being is an inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace of legislature. Although inalienable,
it is necessarily limited by the rights of others, including the public right of peace and good order.
Nevertheless it is a substantive right and not merely a privilege against discriminatory legislation. The
accomplishment of the purpose of the First Amendment requires more than the “religion blindness” of
strict neutrality. With the pervasiveness of government regulation, conflicts with religious practices
become frequent and intense. Laws that are suitable for secular entities are sometimes inappropriate for
religious entities, thus the government must make special provisions to preserve a degree of
independence for religious entities for them to carry out their religious missions according to their
religious beliefs. Otherwise, religion will become just like other secular entities subject to pervasive
regulation by majoritarian institutions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect
adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance
and indifference and overt hostility to the minority.—Third, the accommodationist interpretation is
particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of
majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority. In a
democratic republic, laws are inevitably based on the presuppositions of the majority, thus not
infrequently, they come into conflict with the religious scruples of those holding different world views,
even in the absence of a deliberate intent to interfere with religious practice. At times, this effect is
unavoidable as a practical matter because some laws are so necessary to the common good that
exceptions are intolerable. But in other instances, the injury to religious conscience is so great and the
advancement of public purposes so small or incomparable that only indifference or hostility could explain
a refusal to make exemptions. Because of plural traditions, legislators and executive officials are
frequently willing to make such exemptions when the need is brought to their attention, but this may not
always be the case when the religious practice is either unknown at the time of enactment or is for some
reason unpopular. In these cases, a constitutional interpretation that allows accommodations prevents
needless injury to the religious consciences of those who can have an influence in the legislature; while a
constitutional interpretation that requires accommodations extends this treatment to religious faiths that
are less able to protect themselves in the political arena.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way to
deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation.—Fourth, the
accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and
beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. Without accommodation, many otherwise beneficial laws
would interfere severely with religious freedom. Aside from laws against serving alcoholic beverages to
minors conflicting with celebration of communion, regulations requiring hard hats in construction areas
can effectively exclude Amish and Sikhs from the workplace, or employment anti-discrimination laws can
conflict with the Roman Catholic male priesthood, among others. Exemptions from such laws are easy to
craft and administer and contribute much to promoting religious freedom at little cost to public policy.
Without exemptions, legislature would be frequently forced to choose between violating religious
conscience of a segment of the population or dispensing with legislation it considers beneficial to society
as a whole. Exemption seems manifestly more reasonable than either of the alternative: no exemption or
no law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Benevolent neutrality gives room for different kinds of accommodation—those
which are constitutionally compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause; and those which are
discretionary or legislative, i.e., and those not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless
permitted by the Establishment Clause.—Benevolent neutrality gives room for different kinds of
accommodation: those which are constitutionally compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause;
and those which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., and those not required by the Free Exercise Clause
but nonetheless permitted by the Establishment Clause. Some Justices of the Supreme Court have also
used the term accommodation to describe government actions that acknowledge or express prevailing
religious sentiments of the community such as display of a religious symbol on public property or the
delivery of a prayer at public ceremonial events. Stated otherwise, using benevolent neutrality as a
standard could result to three situations of accommodation: those where accommodation is required,
those where it is permissible, and those where it is prohibited. In the first situation, accommodation is
required, to preserve free exercise protections and not unconstitutionally infringe on religious liberty or
create penalties for religious freedom. Contrary to the Smith declaration that free exercise exemptions
are “intentional government advancement”, these exemptions merely relieve the prohibition on the free
exercise thus allowing the burdened religious adherent to be left alone. The state must create exceptions
to laws of general applicability when these laws threaten religious convictions or practices in the absence
of a compelling state interest. By allowing such exemptions, the Free Exercise Clause does not give
believers the right or privilege to choose for themselves to override socially-prescribed decision; it allows
them to obey spiritual rather than temporal authority for those who seriously invoke the Free Exercise
Clause claim to be fulfilling a solemn duty. Religious freedom is a matter less of rights than duties; more
precisely, it is a matter of rights derived from duties. To deny a person or a community the right to act
upon such a duty can be justified only by appeal to a yet more compelling duty. Of course, those denied
will usually not find the reason for the denial compelling. “Because they may turn out to be right about
the duty in question, and because, even if they are wrong, religion bears witness to that which transcends
the political order, such denials should be rare and painfully reluctant.”

Same; Same; Before our country fell under American rule, the blanket of Catholicism covered the
archipelago—there was union of church and state and Catholicism was the state religion under the
Spanish Constitution of 1876.—Before our country fell under American rule, the blanket of Catholicism
covered the archipelago. There was a union of church and state and Catholicism was the state religion
under the Spanish Constitution of 1876. Civil authorities exercised religious functions and the friars
exercised civil powers. Catholics alone enjoyed the right of engaging in public ceremonies of worship.
Although the Spanish Constitution itself was not extended to the Philippines, Catholicism was also the
established church in our country under the Spanish rule. Catholicism was in fact protected by the Spanish
Penal Code of 1884 which was in effect in the Philippines. Some of the offenses in chapter six of the Penal
Code entitled “Crimes against Religion and Worship” referred to crimes against the state religion. The
coming of the Americans to our country, however, changed this state-church scheme for with the advent
of this regime, the unique American experiment of “separation of church and state” was transported to
Philippine soil.

Same; Same; Even as early as the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain
on December 10, 1898, the American guarantee of religious freedom had been extended to the
Philippines.—Even as early as the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain
on December 10, 1898, the American guarantee of religious freedom had been extended to the
Philippines. The Treaty provided that “the inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or
cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of religion.” Even the Filipinos themselves
guaranteed religious freedom a month later or on January 22, 1899 upon the adoption of the Malolos
Constitution of the Philippine Republic under General Emilio Aguinaldo. It provided that “the State
recognizes the liberty and equality of all religion (de todos los cultos) in the same manner as the separation
of the Church and State.” But the Malolos Constitution and government was short-lived as the Americans
took over the reigns of government.

Same; Same; Philippine Religion Clauses Case Law; A close scrutiny of the Philippine cases involving the
religion clauses would reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two main streams
of interpretation—separation and benevolent neutrality—the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence on
this subject is for the most part benevolent neutrality which gives room for accommodation.—Considering
the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the intent to adopt the historical background,
nature, extent and limitations of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it was included in
the 1935 Bill of Rights, it is not surprising that nearly all the major Philippine cases involving the religion
clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in explaining the nature, extent and limitations of these clauses.
However, a close scrutiny of these cases would also reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion clauses
flows into two main streams of interpretation—separation and benevolent neutrality—the well-spring of
Philippine jurisprudence on this subject is for the most part, benevolent neutrality which gives room for
accommodation.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Religion” is derived from the Middle English religioun, from Old
French religion, from Latin religio, vaguely referring to a “bond between man and the gods”; While the
U.S. Supreme Court has had to take up the challenge of defining the parameters and contours of “religion”
to determine whether a non-theistic belief or act is covered by the religion clauses, this Court has not
been confronted with the same issue—in Philippine jurisprudence, religion, for purposes of the religion
clauses, has thus far been interpreted as theistic.—In revisiting the landscape of Philippine jurisprudence
on the religion clauses, we begin with the definition of “religion”. “Religion” is derived from the Middle
English religioun, from Old French religion, from Latin religio, vaguely referring to a “bond between man
and the gods.” This pre-Christian term for the cult and rituals of pagan Rome was first Christianized in the
Latin translation of the Bible. While the U.S. Supreme Court has had to take up the challenge of defining
the parameters and contours of “religion” to determine whether a non-theistic belief or act is covered by
the religion clauses, this Court has not been confronted with the same issue. In Philippine jurisprudence,
religion, for purposes of the religion clauses, has thus far been interpreted as theistic. In 1937, the
Philippine case of Aglipay v. Ruiz involving the Establishment Clause, defined “religion” as a “profession
of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator.” Twenty years later, the Court cited
the Aglipay definition in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, a case involving the Free Exercise clause.
The latter also cited the American case of Davis in defining religion, viz: “(i)t has reference to one’s views
of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character
and obedience to His Will.” The Beason definition, however, has been expanded in U.S. jurisprudence to
include non-theistic beliefs.

Same; Same; Same; Free Exercise Clause; The Free Exercise Clause principally guarantees voluntarism,
although the Establishment Clause also assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the advancement of
religious groups on their intrinsic merits and not on the support of the state.—Freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden,
whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one’s religion. The Free Exercise Clause principally guarantees
voluntarism, although the Establishment Clause also assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the
advancement of religious groups on their intrinsic merits and not on the support of the state.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty—
the difficulty in interpretation sets in when belief is externalized into speech and action.—In interpreting
the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of
Education is instructive on the matter, viz: The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded
only by one’s imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and
without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same
may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.
The difficulty in interpretation sets in when belief is externalized into speech and action. Religious speech
comes within the pale of the Free Exercise Clause as illustrated in the American Bible Society case.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The statement in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957),
that any restraint on the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship can only be
justified on the ground that there is clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent is the Court’s maiden unequivocal affirmation of the “clear and present danger” rule
in the religious freedom area, and in Philippine jurisprudence, for that matter.—After defining religion,
the Court, citing Tañada and Fernando, made this statement, viz: The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent. (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, vol. 1, 4th ed., p.
297) (emphasis supplied) This was the Court’s maiden unequivocal affirmation of the “clear and present
danger” rule in the religious freedom area, and in Philippine jurisprudence, for that matter. The case did
not clearly show, however, whether the Court proceeded to apply the test to the facts and issues of the
case, i.e., it did not identify the secular value the government regulation sought to protect, whether the
religious speech posed a clear and present danger to this or other secular value protected by government,
or whether there was danger but it could not be characterized as clear and present. It is one thing to apply
the test and find that there is no clear and present danger, and quite another not to apply the test
altogether.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In sum, the Philippine Supreme Court has adopted a posture of not invalidating
a law offensive to religious freedom, but carving out an exception or upholding an exception to
accommodate religious exercise where it is justified.—In sum, the Philippine Supreme Court has adopted
a posture of not invalidating a law offensive to religious freedom, but carving out an exception or
upholding an exception to accommodate religious exercise where it is justified.

Same; Same; Same; Establishment Clause; In Philippine jurisdiction, there is substantial agreement on the
values sought to be protected by the Establishment Clause, namely, voluntarism and insulation of the
political process from interfaith dissension; Non-establishment calls for government neutrality in religious
matters to uphold voluntarism and avoid breeding interfaith dissension.—In Philippine jurisdiction, there
is substantial agreement on the values sought to be protected by the Establishment Clause, namely,
voluntarism and insulation of the political process from interfaith dissension. The first, voluntarism, has
both a personal and a social dimension. As a personal value, it refers to the inviolability of the human
conscience which, as discussed above, is also protected by the free exercise clause. From the religious
perspective, religion requires voluntarism because compulsory faith lacks religious efficacy. Compelled
religion is a contradiction in terms. As a social value, it means that the “growth of a religious sect as a
social force must come from the voluntary support of its members because of the belief that both spiritual
and secular society will benefit if religions are allowed to compete on their own intrinsic merit without
benefit of official patronage. Such voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated
from religion and unless religion is insulated from politics.” Non-establishment thus calls for government
neutrality in religious matters to uphold voluntarism and avoid breeding interfaith dissension.

Same; Same; Same; Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause; In both Philippine and U.S. jurisdiction,
it is recognized that there is a tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in
their application—there is a natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a
command not to inhibit its practice.—In both Philippine and U.S. jurisdiction, it is recognized that there is
a tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in their application. There is a
natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its
practice; this tension between the religion clauses often leaves the courts with a choice between
competing values in religion cases.

Same; Same; Same; Same; How the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause will be resolved is a question for determination in the actual cases that come to the Court—the
two clauses should be balanced against each other.—How the tension between the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause will be resolved is a question for determination in the actual cases that come
to the Court. In cases involving both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, the two
clauses should be balanced against each other. The courts must review all the relevant facts and
determine whether there is a sufficiently strong free exercise right that should prevail over the
Establishment Clause problem. In the United States, it has been proposed that in balancing, the free
exercise claim must be given an edge not only because of abundant historical evidence in the colonial and
early national period of the United States that the free exercise principle long antedated any broad-based
support of disestablishment, but also because an Establishment Clause concern raised by merely
accommodating a citizen’s free exercise of religion seems far less dangerous to the republic than pure
establishment cases. Each time the courts side with the Establishment Clause in cases involving tension
between the two religion clauses, the courts convey a message of hostility to the religion that in that case
cannot be freely exercised. American professor of constitutional law, Laurence Tribe, similarly suggests
that the free exercise principle “should be dominant in any conflict with the anti-establishment principle.”
This dominance would be the result of commitment to religious tolerance instead of “thwarting at all costs
even the faintest appearance of establishment.” In our jurisdiction, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. asserts that a
literal interpretation of the religion clauses does not suffice. Modern society is characterized by the
expanding regulatory arm of government that reaches a variety of areas of human conduct and an
expanding concept of religion. To adequately meet the demands of this modern society, the societal
values the religion clauses are intended to protect must be considered in their interpretation and
resolution of the tension. This, in fact, has been the approach followed by the Philippine Court.

Same; Same; Same; The history of the religion clauses in the 1987 Constitution shows that these clauses
were largely adopted from the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.—The history of the religion
clauses in the, 1987 Constitution shows that these clauses were largely adopted from the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The religion clauses in the First Amendment were contained in every
organic Act of the Philippines under the American regime. When the delegates of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention adopted a Bill of Rights in the 1935 Constitution, they purposely retained the phraseology of
the religion clauses in the First Amendment as contained in the Jones Law in order to adopt its historical
background, nature, extent and limitations. At that time, there were not too many religion clause cases in
the United States as the U.S. Supreme Court decided an Establishment Clause issue only in the 1947
Everson case. The Free Exercise Clause cases were also scarce then.

Same; Same; Same; With the expanding reach of government regulation to a whole gamut of human
actions and the growing plurality and activities of religions, came an expansion of the interpretation of
the religion clauses, at times reinforcing prevailing case law, at other times modifying it, and still at other
times creating contradictions so that two main streams of jurisprudence had become identifiable—one
employing separation while the other employing benevolent neutrality in interpreting the religious
clauses.—Over the years, however, with the expanding reach of government regulation to a whole gamut
of human actions and the growing plurality and activities of religions, the number of religion clause cases
in the U.S. exponentially increased. With this increase came an expansion of the interpretation of the
religion clauses, at times reinforcing prevailing case law, at other times modifying it, and still at other
times creating contradictions so that two main streams of jurisprudence had become identifiable. The
first stream employs separation while the second employs benevolent neutrality in interpreting the
religious clauses. Alongside this change in the landscape of U.S. religion clause jurisprudence, the
Philippines continued to adopt the 1935 Constitution religion clauses in the 1973 Constitution and later,
the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries on the religious
clauses also continued to borrow authorities from U.S. jurisprudence without articulating the stark
distinction between the two streams of U.S. jurisprudence; The intent of the framers was to adopt a
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the Philippine constitutions, and
the enforcement of this intent is the goal of construing the constitution; It is a cardinal rule in
constitutional construction that the constitution must be interpreted as a whole and apparently
conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that will give to all of them full
force and effect.—Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries on the religious clauses also continued to
borrow authorities from U.S. jurisprudence without articulating the stark distinction between the two
streams of U.S. jurisprudence. One might simply conclude that the Philippine Constitutions and
jurisprudence also inherited the disarray of U.S. religion clause jurisprudence and the two identifiable
streams; thus, when a religion clause case comes before the Court, a separationist approach or a
benevolent neutrality approach might be adopted and each will have U.S. authorities to support it. Or,
one might conclude that as the history of the First Amendment as narrated by the Court in Everson
supports the separationist approach, Philippine jurisprudence should also follow this approach in light of
the Philippine religion clauses’ history. As a result, in a case where the party claims religious liberty in the
face of a general law that inadvertently burdens his religious exercise, he faces an almost insurmountable
wall in convincing the Court that the wall of separation would not be breached if the Court grants him an
exemption. These conclusions, however, are not and were never warranted by the 1987, 1973 and 1935
Constitutions as shown by other provisions on religion in all three constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in
constitutional construction that the constitution must be interpreted as a whole and apparently
conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that will give to all of them full,
force and effect. From this construction, it will be ascertained that the intent of the framers was to adopt
a benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the Philippine constitutions, and
the enforcement of this intent is the goal of construing the constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions on tax exemption of
church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, optional religious instruction and
the preamble all reveal without doubt that the Filipino people, in adopting these constitutions, did not
intend to erect a high and impregnable wall of separation between the church and state.—The provisions
of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions on tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers
in government institutions, optional religious instruction and the preamble all reveal without doubt that
the Filipino people, in adopting these constitutions, did not intend to erect a high and impregnable wall
of separation between the church and state. The strict neutrality approach which examines only whether
government action is for a secular purpose and does not consider inadvertent burden on religious exercise
protects such a rigid barrier. By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos
manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religion clauses, an
approach that looks further than the secular purposes of government action and examines the effect of
these actions on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino
people and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that
government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, government might adopt
laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent
neutrality gives room for accommodation of these religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause. It allows these breaches in the wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the
integral purpose of the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of accommodation where
an exemption is sought from a law of general applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent
neutrality, it does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim
comes before it, but that the Court will not look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs
and practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible constitutional limits;
it does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause.—Although our
constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, benevolent neutrality does not
mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it
does mean that the Court will not look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs and
practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible constitutional limits; it
does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the
conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by the
religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of legislation granting exemption from a law
of general applicability, the Court can carve out an exception when the religion clauses justify it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the
benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly,
because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the
launching pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases.—While the Court
cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining
the degree of burden on religious practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the
means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on the ideal towards which
religious clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine
jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not, only because of its merits as discussed
above, but more importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that
benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion
clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty “not
only for a minority, however small—not only for a majority, however large—but for each of us” to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While the U.S. and Philippine religion clauses are similar in form and origin,
Philippine constitutional law has departed from the U.S. jurisprudence of employing a separationist or
strict neutrality approach—the Philippine religion clauses have taken a life of their own, breathing the air
of benevolent neutrality and accommodation.—While the U.S. and Philippine religion clauses are similar
in form and origin, Philippine constitutional law has departed from the U.S. jurisprudence of employing a
separationist or strict neutrality approach. The Philippine religion clauses have taken a life of their own,
breathing the air of benevolent neutrality and accommodation. Thus, the wall of separation in Philippine
jurisdiction is not as high and impregnable as the wall created by the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson. While
the religion clauses are a unique American experiment which understandably came about as a result of
America’s English background and colonization, the life that these clauses have taken in this jurisdiction
is the Philippines’ own experiment, reflective of the Filipinos’ own national soul, history and tradition.
After all, “the life of the law . . . has been experience.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; While history, constitutional construction, and earlier jurisprudence
unmistakably show that benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion
clause cases, it must be stressed that the interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection,
and for which a test must be applied to draw the line between permissible and forbidden religious
exercise.—But while history, constitutional construction, and earlier jurisprudence unmistakably show
that benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, it must be
stressed that the interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. To do this, a test must
be applied to draw the line between permissible and forbidden religious exercise. It is quite paradoxical
that in order for the members of a society to exercise their freedoms, including their religious liberty, the
law must set a limit when their exercise offends the higher interest of the state. To do otherwise is self-
defeating for unlimited freedom would erode order in the state and foment anarchy, eventually
destroying the very state its members established to protect their freedoms. The very purpose of the
social contract by which people establish the state is for the state to protect their liberties; for this
purpose, they give up a portion of these freedoms—including the natural right to free exercise—to the
state. It was certainly not the intention of the authors of the constitution that free exercise could be used
to countenance actions that would undo the constitutional order that guarantees free exercise.

Same; Same; Law and Morality; At base, morality refers to, in Socrates’ words, “how we ought to live” and
why, and any definition of morality beyond Socrates’ simple formulation is bound to offend one or another
of the many rival theories regarding what it means to live morally.—At base, morality refers to, in Socrates’
words, “how we ought to live” and why. Any definition of morality beyond Socrates’ simple formulation
is bound to offend one or another of the many rival theories regarding what it means to live morally. The
answer to the question of how we ought to live necessarily considers that man does not live in isolation,
but in society. Devlin posits that a society is held together by a community of ideas, made up not only of
political ideas but also of ideas about the manner its members should behave and govern their lives. The
latter are their morals; they constitute the public morality. Each member of society has ideas about what
is good and what is evil. If people try to create a society wherein there is no fundamental agreement about
good and evil, they will fail; if having established the society on common agreement, the agreement
collapses, the society will disintegrate. Society is kept together by the invisible bonds of common thought
so that if the bonds are too loose, the members would drift apart. A common morality is part of the
bondage and the bondage is part of the price of society; and mankind, which needs society, must pay its
price. This design is parallel with the social contract in the realm of politics: people give up a portion of
their liberties to the state to allow the state to protect their liberties.

Same; Same; Same; In a constitutional order, people make fundamental agreement about the powers of
government and their liberties and embody this agreement in a constitution, hence referred to as the
fundamental law of the land.—In a constitutional order, people make a fundamental agreement about
the powers of government and their liberties and embody this agreement in a constitution, hence referred
to as the fundamental law of the land. A complete break of this fundamental agreement such as by
revolution destroys the old order and creates a new one. Similarly, in the realm of morality, the
breakdown of the fundamental agreement about the manner a society’s members should behave and
govern their lives would disintegrate society. Thus, society is justified in taking steps to preserve its moral
code by law as it does to preserve its government and other essential institutions. From these propositions
of Devlin, one cannot conclude that Devlin negates diversity in society for he is merely saying that in the
midst of this diversity, there should nevertheless be a “fundamental agreement about good and evil” that
will govern how people in a society ought to live. His propositions, in fact, presuppose diversity hence the
need to come to an agreement; his position also allows for change of morality from time to time which
may be brought about by this diversity. In the same vein, a pluralistic society lays down fundamental rights
and principles in their constitution in establishing and maintaining their society, and these fundamental
values and principles are translated into legislation that governs the order of society, laws that may be
amended from time to time. Hart’s argument propounded in Mr. Justice Vitug’s separate opinion that,
“Devlin’s view of people living in a single society as having common moral foundation (is) overly simplistic”
because “societies have always been diverse” fails to recognize the necessity of Devlin’s proposition in a
democracy. Without fundamental agreement on political and moral ideas, society will fall into anarchy;
the agreement is necessary to the existence and progress of society.

Same; Same; Same; In a democracy, the common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the
public square, and where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every
moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life
together.—In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public
square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited
from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a
necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is
finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e.,
the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution
and the limits it specifies—including protection of religious freedom “not only for a minority, however
small—not only for a majority, however large—but for each of us”—the majority imposes upon itself a
self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities. In the realm of religious exercise, benevolent neutrality that gives room for
accommodation carries out this promise, provided the compelling interests of the state are not eroded
for the preservation of the state is necessary to the preservation of religious liberty. That is why
benevolent neutrality is necessary in a pluralistic society such as the United States and the Philippines to
accommodate those minority religions which are politically powerless. It is not surprising that Smith is
much criticized for it blocks the judicial recourse of the minority for religious accommodations.

Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The laws enacted become expressions of public morality, and as Justice
Holmes put it, “(t)he law is the witness and deposit of our moral life.”—The laws enacted become
expressions of public morality. As Justice Holmes put it, “(t)he law is the witness and deposit of our moral
life.” “In a liberal democracy, the law reflects social morality over a period of time.” Occasionally though,
a disproportionate political influence might cause a law to be enacted at odds with public morality or
legislature might fail to repeal laws embodying outdated traditional moral views. Law has also been
defined as “something men create in their best moments to protect themselves in their worst moments.”
Even then, laws are subject to amendment or repeal just as judicial pronouncements are subject to
modification and reversal to better reflect the public morals of a society at a given time. After all, “the life
of the law . . . has been experience,” in the words of Justice Holmes. This is not to say though that law is
all of morality. Law deals with the minimum standards of human conduct while morality is concerned with
the maximum. A person who regulates his conduct with the sole object of avoiding punishment under the
law does not meet the higher moral standards set by society for him to be called a morally upright person.
Law also serves as “a helpful starting point for thinking about a proper or ideal public morality for a
society” in pursuit of moral progress.

Same; Same; Same; Not every moral wrong is foreseen and punished by law, criminal or otherwise.—Not
every moral wrong is foreseen and punished by law, criminal or otherwise. We recognized this reality in
Velayo, et al. v. Shell Co. of the Philippine Islands, et al., where we explained that for those wrongs which
are not punishable by law, Articles 19 and 21 in Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the New Civil Code,
dealing with Human Relations, provide for the recognition of the wrong and the concomitant punishment
in the form of damages. Articles 19 and 21 provide, viz: Art. 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith. xxx xxx xxx Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Civil Service; Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct; The public morality
expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the
state from establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions.—The public morality expressed in
the law is necessarily secular for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. Religious morality proceeds from a person’s
“views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and
character and obedience to His Will,” in accordance with this Court’s definition of religion in American
Bible Society citing Davis. Religion also dictates “how we ought to live” for the nature of religion is not just
to know, but often, to act in accordance with man’s “views of his relations to His Creator.” But the
Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against establishment of this morality arising from one religion
or the other, and implies the affirmative “establishment” of a civil order for the resolution of public moral
disputes. This agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the “war of all sects against all”;
the establishment of a secular public moral order is the social contract produced by religious truce.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the law speaks of “immorality” in the Civil Service Law or
“immoral” in the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or “public morals” in the Revised Penal
Code, or “morals” in the New Civil Code, or “moral character” in the Constitution, the distinction between
public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind—
the morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious.—Thus, when the law
speaks of “immorality” in the Civil Service Law or “immoral” in the Code of Professional Responsibility for
lawyers, or “public morals” in the Revised Penal Code, or “morals” in the New Civil Code, or “moral
character” in the Constitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and
religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The morality referred to in the law is public and
necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. “Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved
only on grounds articulable in secular terms.” Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what
some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion,” anathema
to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom
for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class
citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion;
governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose.—In other words, government
action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is “detrimental (or dangerous)
to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society” and not because
the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral
judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations
over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable” by law. After all, they might
also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling
influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of
society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible
secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. Otherwise, if a law has an
apparent secular purpose but upon closer examination shows a discriminatory and prohibitory religious
purpose, the law will be struck down for being offensive of the religion clauses as in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. where the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice of
the Santeria.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution’s religion clauses prescribe not a strict
but a benevolent neutrality.—Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence
of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution’s religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals
and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The distinction between public and secular morality as
expressed—albeit not exclusively—in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is
important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.—The
distinction between public and secular morality as expressed—albeit not exclusively—in the law, on the
one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar should
be understood only in this realm where it has authority. More concretely, should the Court declare
respondent’s conduct as immoral and hold her administratively liable, the Court will be holding that in the
realm of public morality, her conduct is reprehensible or there are state interests overriding her religious
freedom. For as long as her conduct is being judged within this realm, she will be accountable to the state.
But in so ruling, the Court does not and cannot say that her conduct should be made reprehensible in the
realm of her church where it is presently sanctioned and that she is answerable for her immorality to her
Jehovah God nor that other religions prohibiting her conduct are correct. On the other hand, should the
Court declare her conduct permissible, the Court will be holding that under her unique circumstances,
public morality is not offended or that upholding her religious freedom is an interest higher than
upholding public morality thus her conduct should not be penalized. But the Court is not ruling that the
tenets and practice of her religion are correct nor that other churches which do not allow respondent’s
conjugal arrangement should likewise allow such conjugal arrangement or should not find anything
immoral about it and therefore members of these churches are not answerable for immorality to their
Supreme Being. The Court cannot speak more than what it has authority to say.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Having distinguished between public and secular morality and
religious morality, the more difficult task is determining which immoral acts under this public and secular
morality fall under the phrase “disgraceful and immoral conduct” for which a government employee may
be held administratively liable, a line that is not easy to draw for it is like “a line that divides land and sea,
a coastline of irregularities and indentations.—Having distinguished between public and secular morality
and religious morality, the more difficult task is determining which immoral acts under this public and
secular morality fall under the phrase “disgraceful and immoral conduct” for which a government
employee may be held administratively liable. The line is not easy to draw for it is like “a line that divides
land and sea, a coastline of irregularities and indentations.” But the case at bar does not require us to
comprehensively delineate between those immoral acts for which one may be held administratively liable
and those to which administrative liability does not attach. We need not concern ourselves in this case
therefore whether “laziness, gluttony, vanity, selfishness, avarice and cowardice” are immoral acts which
constitute grounds for administrative liability. Nor need we expend too much energy grappling with the
propositions that not all immoral acts are illegal or not all illegal acts are immoral, or different jurisdictions
have different standards of morality as discussed by the dissents and separate opinions, although these
observations and propositions are true and correct. It is certainly a fallacious argument that because there
are exceptions to the general rule that the “law is the witness and deposit of our moral life,” then the rule
is not true; in fact, that there are exceptions only affirms the truth of the rule. Likewise, the observation
that morality is relative in different jurisdictions only affirms the truth that there is morality in a particular
jurisdiction; without, however, discounting the truth that underneath the moral relativism are certain
moral absolutes such as respect for life and truth-telling, without which no society will survive. Only one
conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the conjugal arrangement of a government employee whose
partner is legally married to another which Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both immoral and
illegal. Lest the Court inappropriately engage in the impossible task of prescribing comprehensively how
one ought to live, the Court must focus its attention upon the sole conduct in question before us.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; The case at bar being one of first
impression, we now subject the respondent’s claim of religious freedom to the “compelling state interest”
test from a benevolent neutrality stance—i.e., entertaining the possibility that respondent’s claim to
religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law.—The case at bar
being one of first impression, we now subject the respondent’s claim of religious freedom to the
“compelling state interest” test from a benevolent neutrality stance—i.e. entertaining the possibility that
respondent’s claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service
Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened.—In applying the test, the first inquiry is
whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing
between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one
hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts
a burden on her free exercise of religion. In Sherbert, the Court found that Sherbert’s religious exercise
was burdened as the denial of unemployment benefits “forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.” The burden on respondent in the case at bar is
even greater as the price she has to pay for her employment is not only her religious precept but also her
family which, by the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, stands “honorable before God and men.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in
her religious belief.—The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief.
Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the
Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less
only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her. The Declaration was issued to her
by her congregation after ten years of living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she
entered the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ practice of securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice. As
the ministers testified, the Declaration is not whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit
conduct but to make the “union” of their members under respondent’s circumstances “honorable before
God and men.” It is also worthy of notice that the Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge
annexed letters of the OCA to the respondent regarding her request to be exempt from attending the flag
ceremony after Circular No. 62-2001 was issued requiring attendance in the flag ceremony. The OCA’s
letters were not submitted by respondent as evidence but annexed by the investigating judge in explaining
that he was caught in a dilemma whether to find respondent guilty of immorality because the Court
Administrator and Deputy Court Administrator had different positions regarding respondent’s request for
exemption from the flag ceremony on the ground of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ contrary belief and practice.
Respondent’s request for exemption from the flag ceremony shows her sincerity in practicing the
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs and not using them merely to escape punishment. She is a practicing member
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Jehovah ministers testified that she is a member in good standing.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if the Court deems sufficient respondent’s evidence
on the sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided
using the “compelling state interest” test—the case at bar being of first impression, the parties were not
aware of the burdens of proof they should have discharged in the Court’s use of the “compelling state
interest” test.—In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondent’s evidence on the sincerity of
her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided using the
“compelling state interest” test. The case at bar is one of first impression, thus the parties were not aware
of the burdens of proof they should discharge in the Court’s use of the “compelling state interest” test.
We note that the OCA found respondent’s defense of religious freedom unavailing in the face of the
Court’s ruling in Dicdican v. Fernan, et al., viz: It bears emphasis that the image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the
lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of the courts of justice. It is apparent from the OCA’s reliance upon this ruling that the state
interest it upholds is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a
high standard of morality and decency. However, there is nothing in the OCA’s memorandum to the Court
that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious
freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent’s religious exercise.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person,
to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state—the burden of evidence should be discharged
by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General, who should be given
the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection.—Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to
present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged
by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the
issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit
and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a
passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state
interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to
discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s
religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first impression where we are applying the
“compelling state interest” test in a case involving purely religious conduct. The careful application of the
test is indispensable as how we will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the
respondent who stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God. Estrada vs. Escritor, 408
SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Imbong v. Ochoa

Constitutional Law; Separation of Church and State; Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal
affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another.—The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: Section 6. The separation of Church and
State shall be inviolable. Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and
dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other
hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country. Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another,
the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term “church” in its generic sense, which refers
to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the “Church” means the religious congregations collectively.

Same; Religious Freedom; Free Exercise Clause; Establishment Clause; The constitutional assurance of
religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.—In
short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The establishment clause “principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality
in affairs among religious groups.” Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the
use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the basis of the
free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious
freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of
one’s belief and faith.

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality; In case of conflict between the free exercise clause
and the State, the Supreme Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.—In case of conflict
between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006), (Escritor)
where it was stated “that benevolent neutrality-accom-modation, whether mandatory or permissive, is
the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.” In the same case, it was further
explained that: The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. “The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.”
“What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially
neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its ‘burdensome effect,’ whether by the legislature
or the courts.” In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest
test is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.

Same; Reproductive Health Law; Religious Freedom; While the Supreme Court stands without authority
to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the Reproductive Health (RH) Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.—In the case
at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one’s participation in the support of modern reproductive health measures is moral from a religious
standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom
and rule of a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters,
as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.

Same; Same; Same; The State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion.—In the same breath that the establishment clause
restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do
with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy
for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.

Same; Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; The conscientious objector’s claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the Reproductive Health Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important
secular objective.—In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government
legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court’s espousal of the Doctrine
of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector’s claim to
religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the
RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

Same; Same; Same; The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the Reproductive
Health Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.—The Court is of the
view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information
on modern reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience. Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out
clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do
indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets
the offensive act by indirect participation.
Same; Same; Same; In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals,
on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the
timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Supreme Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.—In case of
conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest
of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth
of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether
public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Same; Same; Same; The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Supreme Court
cannot allow.—The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be
toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is
a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

Same; Same; Same; The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all
medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.—The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers.
There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the
law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom
to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not
taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.—The Court finds no compelling
state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in
number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. Freedom of
religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one’s
belief or is prevented from acting according to one’s belief.

Imbong vs. Ochoa Jr., 721 SCRA 146, G.R. No. 207563 April 8, 2014