RULE ON DNA EXAMINATION

PEOPLE VS YATAR

FACTS:
This is an automatic review after the accused, Joel Yatar, was sentenced to Death for the special
complex crime of Rapewith Homicide. Yatar, prior his separation to his wife, used to live with the
latter and the victim, Kathlyn Uba, in thehouse of his mother-in-law. On June 30, 1998, Yatar was
found by several witnesses acting strangely in and along thevicinity of the house of the victim.
Later that day, the victim’s lifeless body was found with stab wounds, her intestine protruding from
her stomach, and bruises. The victim’s clothes were likewise found near the cadaver. The post-mortem
report of the victim’s body revealed the presence of semen in her vagina. By DNA examination, it
was found that it matches Yatar’s DNA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on sperm specimen may be used as evidence
for Yatar’s conviction

HELD:

YES. DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one
from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault
would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left
on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or
furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence
is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly
collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to
place the suspect at the scene of the crime.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the court consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

HERRERA VS ALBA

FACTS:
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in
order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armi’s
allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid
) DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba.
However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet
 garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and
that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is
not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court,
the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to
the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was
the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the
other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme
Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data:

1. how the samples were collected,

2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
6. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by
courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test
inquires:

1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested,

2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be
had, the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is
the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a
100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming
evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case
Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable
evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the
biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against
self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no “testimonial
compulsion” in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-
incrimination.

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE vs.

THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS

FACTS:
This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold
relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs are sought on
the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of
the rape.

By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen
Mendoza when she was 12 years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusión perpetua and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the
rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, there was a question of Reynaldo de Villa’s
guilt or innocence. Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges
that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine
once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was
only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that DNA testing
could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for
petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and
DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape
and the relief was implicitly denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted and it was denied with
finality in a Resolution. Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges, for having been
informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator
asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza,
to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup and used as a sample. Petitioner-relator then gathered
samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to
conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren
of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of
the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report and showed that Reynaldo de
Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a
match between the pertinent genetic markers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas corpus and new trial?

HELD:
No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, is that the individual seeking
such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some the legal process, the writ of habeas corpus
is unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that review of judgment of conviction
is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in a very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation
of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess. This court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error,
and should not be thus used.

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trail even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence
is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.

Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was
concluded carries no weight with this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing
speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s counsel. In either
instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR.

Facts:
M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai
Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209. Petitioner filed
before the RTC a complaint for damages against Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages
caused on petitioner’s power barges. In the course of the proceedings, plaintiff was given the
opportunity by the trial court to present originals of the Xerox or of the photocopies of the
documents it offered but it never produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the
admission of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the
original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not photocopied materials can be admissible as evidence
HELD: Petition DENIED.
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right
is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It
includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these
Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data
message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be authenticated (Sections 1 and 2, Rule
5, Rules on Electronic Evidence), which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit
to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule
9, Ibid) was not executed, much less presented in evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside from their
being not properly identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals thereof was not
established by any competent proof.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may
be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight
or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any
other document, which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what
differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the
information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that
not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the
documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner
that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously
an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered
photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not
be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION

Facts:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of
its suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South
Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted
business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send
the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner; if the latter
conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the
respondent, again by fax.

Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached
their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for
the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2.

After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent
failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence
and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best
evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of
the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma
invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best
evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these
fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under
the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the
original fax transmittals.

Issue:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such?

Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to
reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to
be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule,
the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data
Message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy.

The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex
or telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law
on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While
Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR
reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.

Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same
meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term
“electronic data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is
in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the
“functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense,
“paperless,” but verily are paper-based.

[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data
that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of
the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the
law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
“electronic document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original
paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are
distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future
developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded
the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes,
which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine
transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data message.”

The terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an
original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.