Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 146364 Republic vs. Bagtas No.

L-17474

FACTS: FACTS:

In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo ("Pajuyo") paid ₱400 to a
certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio
Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light
materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979
to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra
("Guevarra") executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner
of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided
Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house.
Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on
Pajuyo’s demand.
On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the
Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red
Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a
Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7
May 1949 for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of
breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls.
Upon the expiration on 7 May 1949 of the contract, the borrower asked
for a renewal for another period of one year. However, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources approved a renewal thereof of only
one bull for another year from 8 May 1949 to 7 May 1950 and
requested the return of the other two.

In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the Bagtas then wrote a letter to the Director of Animal Industry that he
house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra would pay the value of the three bulls with a deduction of yearly
refused. depreciation. The Director advised him that the value cannot be
depreciated and asked Bagtas to either return the bulls or pay their
The petitioner then filed an ejectment case against Guevara with the book value. Bagtas neither paid nor returned the bulls. The Republic
MTC who ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal with the CA, the then commenced an action against Bagtas ordering him to return the
appellate court reversed the judgment of the lower court on the ground bulls or pay their book value. After hearing, the trial Court ruled in
that both parties are illegal settlers on the property thus have no legal favor of the Republic, as such, the Republic moved ex parte for a writ
right so that the Court should leave the present situation with respect to of execution which the court granted.
possession of the property as it is, and ruling further that the
contractual relationship of Pajuyo and Guevara was that of a Felicidad Bagtas, the surviving spouse and administrator of Bagtas’
commodatum. estate, returned the two bulls and filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution since one bull cannot be returned for it was killed by gunshot
ISSUE: during a Huk raid. The Court denied her motion hence, this appeal
certified by the Court of Appeals because only questions of law are
WON, the contractual relationship between Pajuyo and Guevara is that raised.
of a commodatum.
ISSUE:
RULING: NO
WON, the contract was commodatum. WON, Bagtas should be held
Based on the Kasunduan, Pajuyo permitted Guevarra to reside in the
liable for its loss due to force majeure.
house and lot free of rent, but Guevarra was under obligation to
maintain the premises in good condition. Guevarra expressly vowed in
RULING: NO and YES.
the Kasunduan that he would vacate the property on demand.
Guevarra’s refusal to comply with Pajuyo’s demand to vacate made
A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. Supreme Court
Guevarra’s continued possession of the property unlawful. The status
held that Bagtas was liable for the loss of the bull even though it was
of the defendant in such a case is similar to that of a lessee or tenant
caused by a fortuitous event. If the contract was one of lease, then the
whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues by
10% breeding charge is compensation for the use of the bull and
tolerance of the owner.
Bagtas, as lessee, is subject to the responsibilities of a possessor. He
is also in bad faith because he continued to possess the bull even
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another
though the term of the contract has already expired.
something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a
certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it
The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949.
is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the
The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end
thing belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor
on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until
cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of
November 1953 when during a Huk raid, it was killed by stray bullets.
the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the
Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the
commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of
appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value, to with: the
the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If the use of the
Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the Sahiniwal at
thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the
P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to
thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called a
fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt
precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.
from liability.
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo
to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did
not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the
property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the
Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the
Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on
ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is
akin to a landlord-tenant relationship.
Quintos vs. Beck L-46240
FACTS:
The defendant Beck was a tenant of the plaintiff and as such occupied
the latter's house on M. H. del Pilar street, No. 1175. On January 14,
1936, upon the novation of the contract of lease between the plaintiff
Quintos and the defendant Beck, plaintiff Quintos gratuitously granted
to the Beck the use of the furniture described in the third paragraph of
the stipulation of facts, subject to the condition that the defendant
would return them to the plaintiff upon the latter's demand. The plaintiff
sold the property to Maria Lopez and Rosario Lopez and on September
14, 1936, these three notified the defendant of the conveyance, giving
him sixty days to vacate the premises under one of the clauses of the
contract of lease. There after the plaintiff required the defendant to
return all the furniture transferred to him for them in the house where
they were found. On November 5, 1936, the defendant, through
another person, wrote to the plaintiff reiterating that she may call for
the furniture in the ground floor of the house. On the 7th of the same
month, the defendant wrote another letter to the plaintiff informing her
that he could not give up the three gas heaters and the four electric
lamps because he would use them until the 15th of the same month
when the lease in due to expire. The plaintiff refused to get the
furniture in view of the fact that the defendant had declined to make
delivery of all of them. On November 15th, before vacating the house,
the defendant deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture belonging to
the plaintiff and they are now on deposit in the warehouse situated at
No. 1521, Rizal Avenue, in the custody of the said sheriff.
ISSUE:
WON, defendant complied with his obligation to return the furniture
upon the plaintiff's demand. WON, the plaintiff is bound to bear the
deposit fees.
RULING: NO and NO
The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum,
because under it the plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the
furniture to the defendant, reserving for herself the ownership thereof;
by this contract the defendant bound himself to return the furniture to
the plaintiff, upon the latters demand. The obligation voluntarily
assumed by the defendant to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's
demand, means that he should return all of them to the plaintiff at the
latter's residence or house. The defendant did not comply with this
obligation when he merely placed them at the disposal of the plaintiff,
retaining for his benefit the three gas heaters and the four electric
lamps.
As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture
to the plaintiff, upon the latter's demand, the Court could not legally
compel her to bear the expenses occasioned by the deposit of the
furniture at the defendant's behest. The latter, as bailee, was not
entitled to place the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a
duty to accept the offer to return the furniture, because the defendant
wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps.
Chee Kiang Yam vs. Malik L-50550
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction. Petitioners alleged that respondent Municipal
Judge Nabdar J. Malik of Jolo, Sulu, acted without jurisdiction, in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he held
in the preliminary investigation of the charges of estafa filed by
respondents Rosalinda Amin, Tan Chu Kao and Augusto Sajor against
petitioners that there was a prima facie case against the latter and
undertook to conduct trial on the merits of the charges which were
docketed in his court as Criminal Cases No. M-111, M-183 and M-208.
Respondent judge is said to have acted without jurisdiction, in excess
of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because the facts
recited in the complaints did not constitute the crime of estafa, and
assuming they did, they were not within the jurisdiction of the
respondent judge. In the three criminal cases the respondents charges
the petitioner with estafa through misappropriation, however in the face
of the documents it state that the amount received was in the nature of
a simple loan. Commented [WU1]: In Criminal Case No. M-111,
respondent Rosalinda M. Amin charges petitioners Yam Chee
ISSUE: Kiong and Yam Yap Kieng with estafa through
misappropriation of the amount of P50,000.00. But the
WON, petitioners in this case can be charged of estafa when the complaint states on its face that said petitioners received the
obligation is said to be that of simple loan. amount from respondent Rosalinda M. Amin "as a loan."
Moreover, the complaint in Civil Case No. N-5, an
independent action for the collection of the same amount filed
RULING: NO by respondent Rosalinda M. Amin with the Court of First
Instance of Sulu on September 11, 1975, likewise states that
We agree with the petitioners that the facts alleged in the three criminal the P50,000.00 was a "simple business loan" which earned
complaints do not constitute estafa through misappropriation. interest and was originally demandable six (6) months from
July 12, 1973.
In order that a person can be convicted of estaffa, it must be proven
that he has the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods In Criminal Case No. M-183, respondent Tan Chu Kao
charges petitioners Yam Chee Kiong, Jose Y.C. Yam,
or personal property that he received. Petitioners had no such
Ampang Mah and Anita Yam, alias Yong Tay, with estafa
obligation to return the same money, i.e., the bills or coins, which they through misappropriation of the amount of P30,000.00.
received from private respondents. This is so because as clearly stated Likewise, the complaint states on its face that the P30,000.00
in criminal complaints, the related civil complaints and the supporting was "a simple loan." So does the complaint in Civil Case No.
sworn statements, the sums of money that petitioners received were N-8 filed by respondent Tan Chu Kao on April 6, 1976 with the
loans. Court of First Instance of Sulu for the collection of the same
amount.
The nature of simple loan is defined in Articles 1933 and 1953 of the
In Criminal Case No. M-208, respondent Augusto Sajor
Civil Code. charges petitioners Jose Y.C. Yam, Anita Yam alias Yong Tai
Mah, Chee Kiong Yam and Richard Yam, with estafa through
Art. 1933. — By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to misappropriation of the amount of P20,000.00. Unlike the
another, either something not consumable so that the latter may use complaints in the other two cases, the complaint in Criminal
the same for a certain time and return it, in which case the contract is Case No. M-208 does not state that the amount was received
called a commodatum; or money or other consumable thing upon the as loan. However, in a sworn statement dated September 29,
1976, submitted to respondent judge to support the complaint,
condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be
respondent Augusto Sajor states that the amount was a
paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum. "loan."
Art. 1953. — A person who receives a loan of money or any other
fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to
the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
It can be readily noted from the above-quoted provisions that in simple
loan (mutuum), in contrast to commodatum, the borrower acquires
ownership of the money, goods or personal property borrowed. Being
the owner, the borrower can dispose of the thing borrowed (Article 248,
Civil Code) and his act will not be considered misappropriation thereof.
People vs. Puig G.R. Nos. 173654-765.
FACTS:
That on or about the 1st day of August, 2002, in the Municipality of
Pototan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, the respondents Puig and
Porras, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, with grave
abuse of confidence, being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural
Bank of Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge and/or
consent of the management of the Bank and with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away the sum of P15,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said
bank in the aforesaid amount.
After perusing the Informations in these cases, the trial court did not
find the existence of probable cause that would have necessitated the
issuance of a warrant of arrest based on the following grounds: (1) the
element of ‘taking without the consent of the owners’ was missing on
the ground that it is the depositors-clients, and not the Bank, which
filed the complaint in these cases, who are the owners of the money
allegedly taken by respondents and hence, are the real parties -in-
interest; and (2) the Informations are bereft of the phrase alleging
"dependence, guardianship or vigilance between the respondents and
the offended party that would have created a high degree of
confidence between them which the respondents could have abused."
ISSUE:
WON, the 112 informations for qualified theft sufficiently allege the
element of taking without the consent of the owner and the qualifying
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence.
RULING: YES.
The RTC Judge based his conclusion that there was no probable
cause simply on the insufficiency of the allegations in the Informations
concerning the facts constitutive of the elements of the offense
charged. It is evident that the Information need not use the exact
language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court
to render judgment properly
It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other
employees of a Bank who come into possession of the monies
deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in them by their
employer. Banks, on the other hand, where monies are deposited, are
considered the owners thereof. This is very clear not only from the
express provisions of the law, but from established jurisprudence. The
relationship between banks and depositors has been held to be that of
creditor and debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil Code, as
appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as follows: Article
1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible
thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the
creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality. Article 1980.
Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning loan.
Jurisprudence involving Qualified Theft, this Court has firmly
established the nature of possession by the Bank of the money
deposits therein, and the duties being performed by its employees who
have custody of the money or have come into possession of it. The
Court has consistently considered the allegations in the Information
that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the
damage and prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to it as
owner of the money deposits, as sufficient to make out a case of
Qualified Theft.
BPI Family Bank vs. Franco G.R. No. 123498
FACTS:
On 15 Aug 1989 Tevetesco Arrastre-Stevedoring Co., Inc. opened a
savings and current account with BPI-FB. On 25th Aug, First Metro
Investment Corporation (FMIC) also opened a time deposit account w/
same branch of BPI-FB (San Francisco del Monte) in a series of
transactions. On 31st Aug, Franco opened three (3) accounts (current,
savings, and time-deposit) w/ BPI-FB. Total amount of P2M use to Commented [WU2]:
open these accounts is traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco Current: Initial deposit of P500k
allegedly in consideration of respondent Franco’s introduction of Eladio Savings: Initial deposit of P500kTime deposit: P1M w/ maturity
Teves (looking for a conduit bank to facilitate Tevetesco’s business date of 31 Aug 1990
transactions) to Jaime Sebastian (BPI-FB’s Branch Manager). The
P2M is part of the P80M debited by BPI-FB from FMCI’s time deposit
account and credited to Tevetesco’s current account pursuant to an
Authority to Debit allegedly signed by FMCI’s officers w/c appears to
be forged. 4th Sep, Antonio Ong, upon being shown the Authority to
debit, personally declared his signature to be a forgery. Tevetesco
already effected several withdrawals from its current account
amounting to P37,455,410.54 including the P2M paid to respondent
Franco. On 8th Sept, BPI-FB, through Senior VP Severino
Cornamcion, instructed Jesus Arangorin to debit Franco’s savings &
current accounts for the amounts remaining therein but the latter’s time
deposit account couldn’t be debited due to computer limitations. Two
checks drawn by Franco against BPI-FB current account were
dishonored upon presentment for payment & stamped w/ notation
account under garnishment. Meanwhile, Franco’s savings account he Commented [WU3]:
agreed to an arrangement as a favor to Sebastian where P400K from Garnished by virtue of an Order of Attachment issued by
said account was temporarily transferred to Domingo Quiaoits savings Makati RTC in a civil case filed by BPI-FB against Franco, etc.
account, subject to its immediate return upon issuance of a certificate to recover the P37,455,410.54 (Tevetesco’s total withdrawals
of deposit which Quiaoit needed in connection with his visa application from its account)
at the Taiwan Embassy. Sebastian retained custody of Quiaoits’
Dishonored checks were issued by respondent Franco &
savings account passbook to preserve respondent Franco’s deposits. presented for payment at BPI-FB prior to Franco’s receipt of
On 17May 1990, Franco pre-terminated his time deposit account, BPI- notice of garnishment. At the time the notice dated 27 Sept
FB deducted P63,189 from the remaining balance of the account was served on BPI-FB, respondent Franco has yet to be
representing advance interest paid to him. Several cases have been impleaded in said case where writ of attachment was issued.
filed and resolved pertaining to these transactions. BPI-FB’s refusal to It was only on 15 May 1990 that respondent Franco was
heed Franco’s demand to unfreeze his accounts & release his deposits impleaded. The attachment was subsequently lifted however
the funds were not released to respondent Franco because
gave rise to the latter’s filing a case with Manila RTC. RTC rendered
petitioner BPI-FB could not comply given that the money has
judgment in favor of respondent. CA modified ordering BPI-FB to pay already been debited because of FMIC’s forgery claim.
Franco the interest deducted from time deposit and damages. petitioner BPI-FB’s computer that branch indicated that the
current account record was not on file.
ISSUE:
WON, Franco has better right to the deposit accounts with BPI-FB.
RULING: YES
BPI-FB conveniently forgets that the deposit of money in banks is
governed by the Civil Code provisions on simple loan or mutuum. As
there is a debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and its depositor,
BPI-FB ultimately acquired ownership of Franco’s deposits, but such
ownership is coupled with a corresponding obligation to pay him an
equal amount on demand. Although BPI-FB owns the deposits in
Franco’s accounts, it cannot prevent him from demanding payment of
BPI-FB’s obligation by drawing checks against his current account, or
asking for the release of the funds in his savings account. Thus, when
Franco issued checks drawn against his current account, he had every
right as creditor to expect that those checks would be honored by BPI-
FB as debtor. More importantly, BPI-FB does not have a unilateral
right to freeze the accounts of Franco based on its mere suspicion that
the funds therein were proceeds of the multi-million peso scam Franco
was allegedly involved in. To grant BPI-FB, or any bank for that matter,
the right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it
supposes are derived from shady transactions, would open the
floodgates of public distrust in the banking industry.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals endeavored to meet their obligations, as shown by several receipts
issued by PBC acknowledging payment of the loan.
FACTS:

On July 13, 1982, respondents Continental Cement Corporation and

Gregory T. Lim obtained from petitioner Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation Letter of Credit in the amount of P 1,068,150.00 On the
same date, respondent Corporation paid a marginal deposit of
P320,445.00 to petitioner. The letter of credit was used to purchase
around 500,000L of bunker fuel oil from Petrophil Corporation, which
the latter delivered directly to respondent Corporation in its Bulacan
plant. In relation to the same transaction, a trust receipt for the amount
of P 1,001,520.93 was executed by respondent Corporation, with
respondent Lim as signatory. Claiming that respondents failed to turn
over the goods covered by the trust receipt or the proceeds thereof,
petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with application for
preliminary attachment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In
answer to the complaint, respondents averred that the transaction
between them was a simple loan and not a trust receipt transaction,
and that the amount claimed by petitioner did not take into account
payments already made by them. Respondent Lim also denied any
personal liability in the subject transactions. In a Supplemental Answer,
respondents prayed for reimbursement of alleged overpayment to
petitioner of the amount of P490,228.90.

ISSUE:

WON, the transaction between petitioner Consolidated Bank and

respondent Continental Cement Corp is a trust receipt transaction
instead of a simple loan.

RULING: NO.

Petitioner has also failed to convince us that its transaction with

respondent Corporation is really a trust receipt transaction instead of
merely a simple loan, as found by the lower court and the Court of
Appeals.

The recent case of Colinares v. Court of Appeals, appears to be

foursquare with the facts obtaining in the case at bar. There, we found
that inasmuch as the debtor received the goods subject of the trust
receipt before the trust receipt itself was entered into, the transaction in
question was a simple loan and not a trust receipt agreement. Prior to
the date of execution of the trust receipt, ownership over the goods
was already transferred to the debtor. This situation is inconsistent with
what normally obtains in a pure trust receipt transaction, wherein the
goods belong in ownership to the bank and are only released to the
importer in trust after the loan is granted.

In the case at bar, as in Colinares, the delivery to respondent

Corporation of the goods subject of the trust receipt occurred long
before the trust receipt itself was executed. More specifically, delivery
of the bunker fuel oil to respondent Corporation's Bulacan plant
commenced on July 7, 1982 and was completed by July 19, 1982.
Further, the oil was used up by respondent Corporation in its normal
operations by August, 1982. On the other hand, the subject trust
receipt was only executed nearly two months after full delivery of the oil
was made to respondent Corporation, or on September 2, 1982.

The danger in characterizing a simple loan as a trust receipt

transaction was explained in Colinares v. CA, to wit:

The Trust Receipts Law does not seek to enforce payment of the loan,
rather it punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the
handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of
whether the latter is the owner. Here, it is crystal clear that on the part
of Petitioners there was neither dishonesty nor abuse of confidence in
the handling of money to the prejudice of PBC. Petitioners continually