Ethics and Information Technology (2006) Ó Springer 2006

DOI 10.1007/s10676-006-9113-3

Ethical pluralism and global information ethics*

Charles Ess
Interdisciplinary Studies Center, Drury University, Springfield, MO, USA
E-mail: cmess@drury.edu

Abstract. A global information ethics that seeks to avoid imperialistic homogenization must conjoin shared
norms while simultaneously preserving the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples. I argue that a
global information ethics may fulfill these requirements by taking up an ethical pluralism – specifically AristotleÕs
pros hen [‘‘towards one’’] or ‘‘focal’’ equivocals. These ethical pluralisms figure centrally in both classical and
contemporary Western ethics: they further offer important connections with the major Eastern ethical tradition of
Confucian thought. Both traditions understand ethical judgment to lead to and thus require ethical pluralism – i.e.,
an acceptance of more than one judgment regarding the interpretation and application of a shared ethical norm.
Both traditions invoke notions of resonance and harmony to articulate pluralistic structures of connection
alongside irreducible differences. Specific examples within Western computer and information ethics demonstrate
these pluralisms in fact working in praxis. After reviewing further resonances and radical differences between
Western and Eastern views, I then argue that emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection laws in
China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Thailand in fact constitute a robust, pros hen pluralism with Western conceptions.
In both theory and in praxis, then, this pluralism thus fulfills the requirement for a global information ethics that
holds shared norms alongside the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples.

Key words: ethical pluralism, judgment, harmony, privacy, data privacy protection, ethical relativism, ethical
dogmatism, John Rawls, Charles Taylor, Confucius, Plato, Aristotle

The Master said ‘‘Is it not pleasant to learn with a
constant perseverance and application?’’
‘‘Is it not delightful to have friends coming from
distant quarters?’’
– Analects, I.1–2.
* This essay was first presented as a lecture at the 2nd Asian-
Pacific Computers and Philosophy Conference in Bangkok, Thai-
land (January 7–9, 2005); I am very grateful for the critical com-
ments of AP-CAP participants, including Lawrence Hinman. A
subsequent version, presented during a graduate course and faculty
workshop at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology
(May, June, 2005), likewise benefited from critical comments kindly
offered by Luciano Floridi, Bernd Carsten Stahl, May Thorseth,
and Johnny Søraker. Participants in the 2005 Conference of the
Uehiro Foundation and Centre for Practical Ethics and the Car-
negie Council (Oxford, December 8–9), including Luciano Floridi,
Tony Moss, and others, provided helpful criticisms. I am deeply
grateful to the Uehiro Foundation for the opportunity to develop
these ideas still more fully in the context of the 2005 conference.
Ethical pluralism
Ethics and politics in the global city
Pluralism in ethics begins with the encounter of
what appears to be the irreducible difference between
incommensurable values, approaches, normative
claims, etc. Such differences, of course, are especially
problematic in the face of the project of discerning
and developing ethical standards and norms intended
to hold legitimacy for more than a single individual
and/or particular group or ethnos located in a specific
time and place.
A first response, in the face of these irreducible
differences, is of that of ethical relativism. Such rela-
tivism, of course, pits itself especially against an
ethical dogmatism – the usually ethnocentric belief
that universal ethical standards indeed exist, that
these are known to a particular person and/or ethnos,
and that these standards must indeed be acknowl-
edged as universally legitimate, i.e., as normative for
all people in all times and all places. This dogmatism
simply condemns all different views, claims, approa-
ches, norms, etc., as wrong because they disagree with
the one set of putatively universal truths and values.
 CH A R L E S E S S
The resulting intolerance of all such different norms
and claims inspires precisely the relativist effort to
establish and justify tolerance towards a wide diver-
sity of views, beliefs, practices, and cultures. The rel-
ativist can do so, however, only at the cost of actively
denying the possibility of ethical standards and norms
that may be compelling and legitimate for more than
the individual and/or specific ethnos.
By analogy, in the face of apparently incommen-
surable differences between diverse ethical systems
apparent in contemporary computer and information
ethics, it may be tempting to take the relativist turn.
In the global village – better, in the global city, made
up of wildly diverse peoples and their distinctive
cultural norms1 – perhaps we should just shrug our
shoulders and say, to each his own, let and let
live, and abandon all hope for a genuinely global
Information Ethics.
The relativistÕs solution is limited on two grounds.
First, globalization means the ever-increasing
encounter and interconnectedness between peoples of
diverse cultures, traditions, and histories. ICTs both
facilitate and express this interconnectedness. Just as
their global use, i.e., their use beyond the boundaries of
a given ethnos, requires an extensive set of agreed-upon
technical standards in order to function – so their
global use seems to demand an ethos that will hold
among more or less all citizens of the global city. Fol-
lowing the analogy of the multi-ethnic city: however,
much diversity may be tolerated and enjoyed in the
city, such diversity further requires shared (but, I will
argue, not necessarily identical) agreements and ethics
in order for the city to function, rather than fragment
into the ethical equivalent of ghettos.
Second, the consequences of ethical relativism in the
20th century are equally well-known: in the absence of
shared norms, force – in political terms, fascism – seems
the only way to resolve differences between individuals
and peoples.2 On the scales of evil, the sins and
bloodshed of Western imperialism and colonization,
fueled by a smug dogmatism assured of the universal
truth and superiority of a single view, seem reasonably
balanced by the comparable bloodshed and sins of
20th century fascism. Whatever their philosophical
1
S. Hjarvard. (2002). Mediated Encounters. An Essay on the
Role of Communication Media in the Creation of Trust in the
‘Global MetropolisÕ. In G. Stald and T. Tufte, editors, Global
Encounters: Media and Cultural Transformation, pp. 69–84. Luton,
University of Luton Press; R. Madsen and T.B. Strong, editors,
The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on
Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World. Princeton University Press,
Princeton and Oxford, 2003.
2
Cf. Mussolini cited in H. Veatch. A Critique of Benedict. In
J.R. Weinberg and K.E. Yandell, editors, Theory of Knowledge,
p. 27. Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, New York, 1971; John
Weckert, email to the author, 23 June 2005.
strengths and deficits, the political consequences of
both ethical dogmatism and ethical relativism make
each untenable.
Ethical pluralism in the West
The political Scylla and Charybdis of ethical
dogmatism and ethical relativism provide primary
motives towards ethical pluralism. But pluralism – like
AristotleÕs to on, Being – is said in many ways, especially
as ethical and political pluralisms have enjoyed some-
thing of a renaissance in the late 20th century. I now turn
to important examples of these, concluding with what I
argue to be the most robust and fruitful version – one
rooted in Plato and Aristotle, but which further offers
distinctive connections with Eastern thought.
Alongside ethical relativism, an initial response to
the encounter with apparently irreducible difference is
a modus vivendi pluralism, one that simply lets these
differences stand and accepts that there is no further
common ground to be found between diverse views,
approaches, norms, etc. While prima facie better than
slaughter in the name of a single ethical Truth, such
modus vivendi pluralism seems woefully insufficient.
As Luciano Floridi points out,3 such modus vivendi
pluralism is pragmatically not to be found. Rather, in
the absence of some larger form of shared community
life and commitments, ethnic differences in ghettoized
contemporary cities (e.g., in the U.S. context,
between African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, etc.)
seem rather to sustain constant conflicts that need
very little in order to boil over into violent confron-
tation. Just as ethical relativism invites force to
resolve differences, so this sort of modus vivendi plu-
ralism thereby invokes repressive force to quell these
conflicts. As the basic conflicts and tensions are not
resolved, the resulting ‘‘peace,’’ is, of course, only
temporary; hence all sides wait simply for the next
cycle of violence. If there is to be an escape from this
cycle, what – besides force – might weave such frag-
mented views, norms, etc., into a more coherent
ethical and political order?
A first step beyond modus vivendi pluralism is
developed by Lawrence Hinman.4 Building on the
work of Bernard Gert and Amélie Rorty, Hinman
hopes to establish what he calls a ‘‘robust pluralism,’’
one that, in the face of different but not necessarily
contradictory values, hopes for compatibility – but
does not make compatibility ‘‘a necessary require-
3
E-mail to the author, 23 May 2006.
4
L. Hinman. Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory.
Fort Worth, Harcourt, Brace, 1998.
 ET H I C A L PL U R A L I S M AND
ment’’.5 Hinman thus takes us one step beyond a
minimal, modus vivendi pluralism of sheer differences.
To my knowledge, HinmanÕs work6 is the single most
extensive overview of classic and contemporary sour-
ces of pluralism in ethics, and presents a strong case for
what has become a somewhat common form of
pluralism.7
But more robust forms of pluralism – i.e., forms
that would move from the possibility of compati-
bility to various forms of connection and engage-
ment between diverse ethical systems – have been
proposed. So, for example, Madsen and Strong
point to the work of John Rawls as an effort to find
a shared set of ethical norms and standards, ones
that (more or less) all reasonable people can agree
upon as the ethical and political conditions of a
shared existence.8 But the ability of this form of
pluralism to incorporate genuinely different value
systems also remains limited: how does this liberal
pluralism incorporate the various global communi-
ties – e.g., variants of Islam as found throughout
the world, as well as those cultures deeply shaped
by Buddhist and Confucian traditions – whose core
values and beliefs do not and, at least prima facie,
cannot acknowledge its principles?9
Madsen and Strong identify a still stronger plu-
ralism in the work of Charles Taylor that overcomes
5
Hinman (1998, 66).
6
See especially Ch. 2, ‘‘Understanding the Diversity of Moral
Beliefs: Relativism, Absolutism, and Pluralism’’ (pp. 32–71) and his
extensive ‘‘Bibliographic Essay’’, also available online: <http://
ethics.acusd.edu/theories/Pluralism/index.html>.
7
See, for example, J. Boss. Analyzing Moral Issues, 3rd ed.,
p. 41. McGraw-Hill, Boston, 2005, and the work of business ethi-
cist Richard T. De George. Business Ethics. 5th ed. Prentice-Hall,
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1999. Hinman also sees his sort of
ethical pluralism in the work of eco-feminist Karen Warren, See
K.J. Warren. The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism.
Environmental Ethics, 12(2(Summer)): 123–146, 1990.
8 10
Göran Collste (Is Religious Pluralism Possible? In G. Collste,
editor, Possibilities of Religious Pluralism, pp. 48–61. Linköping
University Electronic Press, Linköping, 2005) points out that
RawlsÕ notion of overlapping consensus, as introduced in his
Theory of Justice. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass,
1973), and then developed in his Political Liberalism (Columbia
University Press, New York, 1993), may offset this apparent
insistence on shared identity.
9
In political terms, this is sometimes discussed as the problem
of ‘‘liberal fundamentalism’’ or ‘‘liberal sectarianism’’: see Madsen
and Strong (2003, 10f.); W. Kymlicka. Multicultural Citizenship,
pp. 153, 158–163. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995; W.A. Galston.
Liberal Egalitarian Attitudes Toward Ethical Pluralism. In
R. Madsen and T.B. Strong, editors, The Many and the One:
Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in
the Modern World, pp. 25–41, 34. Princeton University Press,
Princeton and Oxford, 2003. (I am grateful to my colleague in the
Applied Ethics Programme at NTNU, May Thorseth, for making
me aware of these resources.) Moreover, despite the dogmatism
of fundamentalists, religious communities – both Western and
GL O B A L IN F O R M A T I O N ET H I C S
this central limitation of a pluralism that insists on
connection through identity. This third model high-
lights instead connection in the face of irreducible
difference, i.e., a complementarity in which an active
engagement across these differences works to enrich
both participants. This pluralism does not concep-
tualize connection in the form of a sheer identity that
trumps difference: rather, its complementarity
understands relationship as a coherency between two
irreducibly different entities, where this coherency
(or, in other terms we will see, resonance or harmony)
emphasizes a positive engagement between these two
as one side enhances and expands on the character-
istics of the other.10
As Madsen and Strong point out, TaylorÕs notion
of complementarity means that the Other can stand
as the Other: in a relationship of complementarity,
his or her irreducible difference from me is preserved,
rather than compromised or erased by connection
through shared identity. In my terms: complemen-
tarity relationships preserve and enhance the irre-
ducible differences that define distinctive individuals,
cultures, and civilizations.11
Plato and Aristotle develop a still more robust
pluralism – one that simultaneously offers distinctive
ways of bridging the deep differences between
Eastern and Western norms, values, and traditions.
Footnote 9 continued
Eastern – are largely characterized instead precisely by a pluralism
that allows for more than one interpretation of received teachings
and traditions (e.g., on Islam, see D.F. Eickelman. Islam and
Ethical Pluralism. In R. Madsen and T.B. Strong, editors, The
Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical
Pluralism in the Modern World, pp. 161–180. Princeton University
Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2003). As I will argue with regard to
Confucian thought, the apparently rigid contradiction between
Western liberalism and traditional religious views may resolve into
a more flexible form of relationship – in part, through shared
pluralisms.
Madsen and Strong note that TaylorÕs approach, as rooted
in Gadamerian hermeneutics and DurkheimÕs sociology, ‘‘... would
not merely tolerate ethical difference but would engage it as a path
toward deeper forms of human community’’ (2003, 11; emphasis
added, CE). Taylor himself says: ‘‘The crucial idea is that people
can bond not in spite of but because of difference. They can sense,
that is, that their lives are narrower and less full alone than in
association with each other. In this sense, the difference defines a
complementarity’’ (Taylor 2002, 191, cited in Madsen and Strong,
2003, 11).
11
As Madsen and Strong put it:
Part of what justice requires may include not denying the
otherÕs presence to me. To overcome such denial we may
need to criticize the Rawlsian assumption that the other and
I could or do have common understandings of primary
goods. If we assume all reasonable people ought to share
such common understandings, then we easily dehumanize
those who in fact do not (‘‘Can you believe how they treat
women?’’ ‘‘They are animals and killers; they think abortion
is all right.’’ And so forth.) (2003, 12).
 CH A R L E S E S S
This complementary pluralism begins in the analogy
of the line in The Republic, as part of PlatoÕs
(putative) theory of ideas: just as a single object may
cast multiple shadows as it is illuminated by differ-
ent sources of light – so the singular Ideas, including
the Ideas of the Good, Justice, etc., allow for diverse
instantiations and applications in the material
world.12 As with previous pluralisms we have seen,
this understanding of the Ideas thus demarcates a
middle ground between ethical and epistemological
relativisms (that assert that diversity and difference
can only mean the lack of a single truth/value) and
dogmatisms (that insist on the homogenous appli-
cation of a single ethical value and/or epistemolog-
ical claim to truth – such that any different values
and /or truth claims must be wrong/false).13 This
understanding, moreover, does not construct rela-
tionship through a shared identity that erases dif-
ference. That is, in contrast with the insistence that
all members of a community share the same core
values and commitments – a sheer identity that, as
the problem of ‘‘liberal fundamentalism’’ makes
clear, runs the risk of overriding irreducible differ-
ences – in such interpretive pluralism (as I call it),
the interpretations of a single idea themselves remain
irreducibly different from one another, but none-
theless connected and coherent with one another
(not simply compatible) by way of their shared point
of origin and reference.
Aristotle makes this contrast between interpretive
pluralism and insistence on connection by way of
identity especially clear in his systematic account
of language and of the pros hen equivocals. The pros
hen – ‘‘towards one’’ – equivocals demarcate a middle
ground between homogenous univocation (a term can
have one and only one meaning) and pure equivoca-
tion (a term holds multiple meanings entirely
unrelated, sheerly different from one another). One
of AristotleÕs14 most central examples is precisely the
term ‘‘Being’’: ‘‘there are many senses in which a thing
is said to ‘be,Õ but all that ‘isÕ is related to [pros hen] one
central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not
said to ‘beÕ by a mere ambiguity’’ (Metaphysics
12
See 509d–511e; cf. PlatoÕs Republic (1974). G.M.A. Grube,
trans. Hackett, Indianapolis, 1974, ftn. 16, p. 164.
13
Cf. W.T. Jones. A History of Western Philosophy, Vol. I.
2nd ed. In The Classical Mind, pp. 126–136. Brace & World Jones,
New York, Harcourt, 1969.
14
Aristotle. Metaphysics I–IX (Vol. XVII, Aristotle in twenty-
three volumes). H. Tredennick, trans. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1968; Aristotle. Posterior Analytics, Topica.
H. Tredennick and E.S. Forster, trans. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass, 1960.
1003a33; BurrellÕs translation).15 This structure of
irreducible difference (diverse senses/ways of being)
and connection (unified through reference to one pri-
mary sense/mode of Being – not by way of a shared
identity) directly echoes PlatoÕs interpretative plural-
ism on both epistemological and ontological levels.
For both Plato and Aristotle, these pluralisms are
intended to hold together both unity and irreducible
difference, and thereby to establish a middle between
unity as sheer homogeneity and irreducible differences
thought to exclude all forms of connection and
coherency. Such pluralisms subsequently appear in
Aquinas and Kant, for example, who follow Plato and
Aristotle in seeking to exploit these structures of con-
nection alongside irreducible difference in their own
metaphysics.16
This interpretive pluralism is further allied with
phronesis, AristotleÕs notion of practical judgment.
Aquinas makes the connection between such practical
judgment and interpretive pluralism especially clear:
Practical reason ... is concerned with contingent
matters, about which human actions are concerned,
and consequently, although there is necessity in the
general principles, the more we descend to matters of
detail, the more frequently we encounter devia-
tions.... Accordingly, in matters of action, truth or
practical rectitude is not the same for all in respect of
detail but only as to the general principles, and where
there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is
15
D. Burrell. Analogy and Philosophical Language, p. 84. Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1973); Continuing here, Aristotle
identifies ‘‘healthy’’ as an example of such a pros hen equivocal:
‘‘Thus ... the term ‘‘healthy’’ always relates to health (either as
preserving it or as producing it or as indicating it or as receptive of
it ....’’ (1003b2–4; cf. 1060b37–1061a7). As he elaborates in The
Topics, ‘‘... ‘healthyÕ means ‘producing healthÕ and ‘preserving
healthÕ and ‘denoting health,Õ ... (I.xv, 106b35–37: 1960, 315).
Following AquinasÕ example of the pros hen equivocal (Summa
Theologiae 1A. 13, 5 (T. Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, Vol. 1: The
Existence of God: Part One: Questions 1–13, p. 208. Image Books,
Garden City, NY, 1969), a particular diet may be said to be
healthy(1) – and good kidney functioning may also be said to be
healthy(2): but the two terms do not have exactly the same meaning
– i.e., they are not univocals. Rather, we mean that a particular diet
contributes to the state of being healthy, while we further mean
that good kidney function is a reflection of this state of being
healthy. But these are not pure equivocals either: rather, healthy(1)
and healthy(2) derive their meaning through reference to or
‘‘towards one’’ (pros hen) the same ‘‘state of being healthy’’ as their
focal point.
16
C. Ess. Analogy in the Critical Works: Kant’s Transcendental
Philosophy as Analectical Thought. University Microfilms Interna-
tional, Ann Arbor, MI, 1983.
 ET H I C A L PL U R A L I S M
not equally known to all. (Summa Theologiae, 1–2, q.
94, a. 4 responsio).17
Judgment thus allows us to draw distinctively differ-
ent ethical conclusions as we seek to apply shared
but general principles to the specifics of diverse con-
texts. Again, in contrast with simple but only
potential compatibility (Hinman) and connection by
way of sheer identity (Rawls) – this form of pros
hen, interpretive pluralism, as inextricably tied to the
central facility of judgment, thus allows for a strong
form of connection that preserves irreducible
differences.
Indeed, it would appear that interpretive pluralism
and practical judgment are at the heart of Socratic
virtue ethics – and in a way of central importance for
those of us engaged with the projects of Information
Ethics. Plato uses the cybernetes – a steersman,
helmsman, or pilot – as a primary exemplar or ana-
logue of the just human being and just rulers
(Republic I, 332e–c; VI, 489c). The image of the cy-
bernetes is then taken up by Norbert Wiener as the
root concept of ‘‘cybernetics’’ (1948). But PlatoÕs
description of the cybernetes in the Republic (360e–
361a) underlines the central importance of practical
wisdom or judgment as a primary capacity of the just
man, one that makes possible an ethical self-direction
and (in case of error) correction – not simply infor-
mational self-direction, as ‘cyberneticsÕ later came to
mean.
Ethical pluralism East
Finally, this turn to ancient Western models of a
highly robust, cybernetic pluralism offers a distinctive
advantage in the project of discerning and developing
a global Information Ethics: these models of plural-
ism – and allied notions of harmony and judgment –
are strikingly similar to those found in at least one
major Eastern philosophical tradition, namely,
Confucian thought.
To begin with, Joseph Chan points out that
‘‘Insofar as the framework of ren [authoritative
humanity or co-humanity)]18 and rites remains
17
Cited in J.H. Haldane. Natural Law and Ethical Pluralism.
In R. Madsen and T.B. Strong, editors, In The Many and the One:
Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the
Modern World, pp. 89–114, 91. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2003.
18
R. Ames and H. Rosemont. The Analects of Confucius: A
Philosophical Translation, p. 30. Ballantine Books, New York,
1998.
AND GL O B A L IN F O R M A T I O N ET H I C S
unchallenged, Confucians are often ready to accept
a plurality of diverse or contradicting ethical
judgments’’.19 Indeed, ChanÕs description of how this
can occur closely parallels what we have seen in Plato,
Aristotle, and Aquinas – i.e., the same ethical stan-
dard (in this case, ren) can be interpreted, applied, or
understood in more than one way. Moreover, for the
Confucian, ‘‘If after careful and conscientious delib-
eration, two persons equipped with ren come up with
two different or contradictory judgments and courses
of action, Confucians would tell us to respect both of
the judgments’’ (2003, 137). This understanding of
possible diversity of judgments regarding the applica-
tion/interpretation/application of the same ethical
standard thus directly parallels the Platonic and
Aristotelian notions of practical judgment, phronesis.
So we see here a ‘‘meta-pluralism’’ between these
two traditions, i.e., precisely as both share an under-
standing of the possibility of ethical pluralism
within each tradition, as each recognizes the possi-
bility of an interpretive pluralism that applies
and interprets central ethical standards in different
ways.
Indeed, this pluralism between these two traditions
holds in still other central ways. Comparative phi-
losopher Rolf Elberfeld points out that notions of
harmony and resonance appear within Western tra-
ditions, beginning with the Pythagoreans and
including SocratesÕ comments about music and edu-
cation in The Republic, 401d (cf. 443d) and in East
Asian traditions, including precisely the central
Confucian notion of harmony [ = he].20 Both
traditions exploit the distinctive features of a musical
harmony or chord: each note in the chord remains
irreducibly different from one another, while each
together further constitute a distinctive unity. As
PlatoÕs Socrates in the Republic defines justice for
both the City and the psyche in terms of harmony
among its constituent elements, a harmony that
requires the proper music to attune the psyche as part
of its education (e.g., 398d–403a, 548b–c, 549b) – so
music and harmony, Elberfeld points out, are central
to education in China, as first traced out in the Liji
(Book of Rites – 3rd ct. B.C.E.). Harmony [ , he] or
resonance [ganying], as incorporated in education, are
19
J. Chan. Confucian Attitudes towards Ethical Pluralism. In
Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong, editors, The Many and the
One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the
Modern World, pp. 129–153. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
2003.
20
R. Elberfeld. Resonanz als Grundmotiv ostasiatischer Ethik
[Resonance as a Fundamental Motif of East Asian Ethics]. In
R. Elberfeld and G. Wohlfart, editors, Komparative Ethik: Das gute
Leben zwischen den Kulturen [Comparative Ethics: The Good Life
between Cultures], pp. 131–141. Edition Chora, Cologne.
 CH A R L E S E S S
a central means of perfecting – understood precisely
as harmonizing – the proper relationships first of all
between human beings. Ideally, such harmony will
then further extend between human beings and the
social order, and, finally, between earth and TÕian (the
encompassing order of things). Harmony [ , he]
among these multiple spheres is the fundamental
feature and goal of classical Confucian ethics – what
Elberfeld calls a ‘‘Resonance Ethics’’ [Resonanz-Ethik].21
These metaphors of resonance and harmony clearly
stand as structures of pluralism: they explicitly entail
structures of connection alongside/in the face of
irreducible difference. Specifically, the Chinese term
ying (resonance) means precisely ‘‘a conjunction
[Zugleich] of unity [Vereinigung] and division
[Trennung]’’ (2003, 132).
Finally, Elberfeld points out that these notions and
models of ethical goals are important not only
in Confucian thought, but also in Daoism and
Buddhism – for example, as they are taken up in East-
Asian Buddhist understandings of Enlightenment as
‘‘awakening’’ (2002, 137f.). And in contemporary
philosophy, no less a central figure than Nishida
Kitaro takes up the Japanese version of resonance
[hankyo] as key to our knowing one another as
human beings. For Nishida, such resonance is again
a pluralistic structure of connection that nonethe-
less preserves the irreducible differences essential
to preserving individual identities, one from
another.22
In both Western and Eastern traditions, then, these
notions of harmony and resonance serve as meta-
phors and analogues to the notions of ethical plu-
ralism, that is, precisely as structures of unitary foci
that include diverse, even contradictory, interpreta-
tions. These shared understandings of notions of
harmony and resonance thus constitute an interpre-
tive, pros hen pluralism between the two: both tradi-
tions, in ways that retain their irreducible differences
from one another, at the same time share a focus on
notions of harmony or resonance as analogues for the
21
Elberfeld (2002, pp. 132–137).
22
Elberfeld translates extensively from NishidaÕs early work I
and You (1930), which takes up the question, How do we know the
Other as absolute Other? In part, Nishida replies, ‘‘Through the
resonance [hanky o] of my personal behavior [with you] I can know
you, and you can know me through the resonance of your personal
behavior [with me].’’ This resonance, Nishida makes clear, is not a
simple identity or unification, but rather preserves the absolute dif-
ference between one consciousness and another, so that ‘‘The mutual
[gegenseitige] relationship of absolute opposites [Entgegengesetzter]
is a resonant [hanky o] meeting or response. ... Here we encounter a
unity of I and You and at the same time a real contradiction.’’
(Nishida Kitaro Zensh u 1988ff., Vol. 6, 391f., cited in Elberfeld, 2002,
138f. Translation from German to English by CE.)
structures of ethical pluralism at work in each. In a
self-reflexive way, then, these shared notions of har-
mony and resonance suggest that we can meaning-
fully speak of the harmonies and resonances between
these traditions as well: what is meant by ‘‘harmony’’
or ‘‘resonance’’ here is a structure of interpretive
pluralism that weaves together these irreducible dif-
ferences through a shared focal point, in relationships
of harmony, resonance, complementarity – but not
identity.
To sum up: such interpretive pluralism offers two
distinctive strengths over other forms of pluralism.
One, as it moves beyond minimal compatibility and
an insistence on connection by way of identity by
developing instead relationships of complementarity,
resonance, and harmony that preserve the irreducible
differences defining the Other as Other – interpretive
pluralism prima facie offers greater ability to incor-
porate radical difference. Two, as allied in Western
traditions (specifically Plato and the Pythagoreans)
with notions of harmony, interpretive pluralism
immediately resonates with similar Confucian (and,
indeed, Daoist and Buddhist) emphases on harmony
(he) in the human (and larger) community. This res-
onance between ancient Western and Eastern tradi-
tions (especially as further expanded in Part II),
I suggest, provides a central bridge between the two,
one that may be especially fruitful for a global
Information Ethics that seeks to ‘‘work’’ in both
Western and Eastern contexts.
So much for theory. Can such an interpretive
pluralism work in praxis?
Pluralism in praxis, theory, and praxis
I begin here with three examples of interpretive
pluralism that have emerged in Western countries. I
then address the larger divide between Western and
Eastern cultures. Here, alongside well-known com-
monalities and resonances established in compara-
tive philosophy between Confucian ethics, on the
one hand, and Aristotelian and feminist virtue
ethics and ethics of care, on the other – I will
further highlight some of the striking contrasts
between philosophical assumptions concerning
human nature and the human person, especially with
regard to the central issue of privacy. In the face of
these irreducible differences, however, I finally argue
that the conceptions of privacy and data privacy
protection laws emerging in such countries as
China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Japan nonethe-
less cohere and resonate with Western notions of
privacy and data privacy protections – and in ways
that compose a robust, pros hen pluralism.
 ET H I C A L PL U R A L I S M AND
Interpretive/focal (pros hen) pluralism
in Western ethics
Informed consent and Internet Research Ethics
In developing a set of ethical guidelines for online
research,23 we confronted a stubborn difference
between the United States and Norway concerning
the necessity (or lack thereof) for informed consent
when recording (e.g., audio and/or video) in public
spaces. In the U.S., because there are apparently no
expectations of privacy in public spaces, no informed
consent for such recordings are required.24 In
Norway, by contrast, informed consent for such
recordings is in fact required – precisely because
people do not expect such recordings without
consent.25 But, while expectations regarding privacy
differ between the U.S. and Norway – there appears
agreement here that these expectations are nonetheless
a primary starting point for ethical judgments as to
when informed consent is required. In Aristotelian
terms, expectations form the focal point for ethical
judgments – but these ethical judgments may differ
considerably, precisely as these judgments begin with
distinctively different expectations that reflect impor-
tant differences between these two cultural settings.26
Bernd Carsten Stahl
Bernd Carsten StahlÕs notion of reflexive responsi-
bility seeks to bridge the ethical traditions of German
deontologies (including Kantian rational autonomy
23
C. Ess and the AoIR ethics working group. Ethical decision-
making and Internet research: Recommendations from the aoir ethics
working committee. Available online: www.aoir.org/reports/
ethics.pdf. The Cathedral or the Bazaar? The AoIR Document on
Internet Research Ethics as an Exercise in Open Source Ethics. In
M. Consolvo, editor, Internet Research Annual Volume 1: Selected
Papers from the Association of Internet Researchers Conferences
2000–2002, pp. 95–103. Peter Lang, New York, 2003.
24
J. Walther. Research Ethics in Internet-Enabled Research:
Human Subjects Issues and Methodological Myopia. Ethics and
Information Technology, 4(3). Available online: <http://
www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/ethics_walther.html.
25
D. Elgesem. What is Special About the Ethical Issues in
Online Research? Ethics and Information Technology, 4(3): 195–
203. Available online: <http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/
ethics_elgesem.html.
26
A similar pluralism can be seen between U.S. and Norwe-
gian requirements for protecting confidentiality and anonymity of
research subjects. Both focus on these basic requirements of
Human Subjects protections in research – but the U.S. requires
such protections only for the individual subject, while Norwegian
research ethics requires such protections for both the individual
and his/her close web of relations (NESH (National Committee for
Research Ethics in the Social sciences and the Humanities).
Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences, Law and the
Humanities. <http://www.etikkom.no/NESH/guidelines.htm>,
2001, para. 40). Additional pluralistic structures can be seen in the
RESPECT projectÕs ethical guidelines for socio-economic research
GL O B A L IN F O R M A T I O N ET H I C S
and Habermasian discourse ethics), French moralism
(represented by Montaigne and Ricouer), and
Anglo-American utilitarianism and pragmatism. 27
Stahl accomplishes this in part by developing a strong
complementarity between these traditions – specifi-
cally, one that conjoins the emphasis in deontological
approaches on rights, duties, obligations, etc., with
more consequentialist and French moralist foci on the
telos of preserving social order and peace. Moreover,
Stahl incorporates the procedural approach of critical
theory and discourse ethics in his account of respon-
sibility, issuing in a focal or pros hen pluralism: the
formalistic procedures of discourse ethics facilitates
precisely the development of diverse understandings,
interpretations, and applications of a shared (focal)
notion of responsibility.28
Terrell Ward Bynum
Similarly, Terrell Ward Bynum has argued that in
these fields there is a convergence in the work of
Norbert Wiener and Luciano Floridi – one oriented
towards the central values of: contributing to human
flourishing; advancing and defending human values
(life, health, freedom, knowledge, happiness); and
fulfilling ‘‘the great principles of justice’’ drawn from
Western philosophical and religious traditions.
Bynum further sees agreement on these central values
in the work of such computer ethics pioneers as
Deborah Johnson, Philip Brey, James Moor, Helen
Nissenbaum, and my own emphasis on using com-
puter-mediated communication (CMC) technologies
in ways that preserve ‘‘thick’’ or local cultures.29 This
convergence thus stands as a pros hen pluralism, as
these divergent approaches nonetheless take up
human flourishing, etc., as their shared focal points.30
However clearly and broadly such pluralism is at
work in Western information ethics – the critical
question is whether structures of pluralism may emerge
between Western and Eastern cultures and traditions.
Footnote 26 continued
across the European Union (see <www.respectproject.org>). As
well, Paul Reidenberg discerns such a pluralism between E.U. and
U.S. approaches to data privacy protection, as these approaches
reflect diverse ways of implementing shared ‘‘First Principles’’ of
Data Protection (J.R. Reidenberg. Resolving Conflicting Interna-
tional Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 52:
1315–1376, 1331f, 2000).
27
B.C. Stahl. Responsible Management of Information Systems.
Idea Group Publishing, Hershey, Pennsylvania, 2004.
28
See especially: Stahl (2004, 153–215).
29
C. Ess. What is Information Ethics? <http://www.drury.
edu/ess/CAP04/cap04infoethics.html>, 2005b.
30
IÕm very grateful indeed to Terry Bynum for confirming this
account of his work: personal email to the author, 27 September,
2005.
 CH A R L E S E S S
East–West approaches to information ethics
Confucius and Aristotle as foundations for East–West
information ethics
The beginnings of a global but pluralistic information
ethics can be seen in the resonances and irreducible
differences between conceptions of human nature and
correlative aims of ethics and politics in Aristotle and
Confucius.31
To begin with, Aristotle and Confucius charac-
terize human beings as intrinsically interconnected
with one another in the human (and larger) com-
munity. Aristotle famously states: ‘‘man is by nature
a political animal,’’ so that ‘‘... he who is unable to
live in society, or who has no need because he is
sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a
god: he is no part of a state’’ (Politics 1943 54f./
1253a). Similarly, for Confucius, ‘‘Persons are not
perceived as superordinated individuals – as agents
who stand independent of their actions – but are
rather ongoing ‘eventsÕ defined functionally by con-
stitutive roles and relationships as they are per-
formed within the context of their specific families
and communities ...’’.32 Confucius thus directly
anticipates Aristotle: ‘‘...one cannot become a per-
son by oneself – we are, from our inchoate begin-
nings, irreducibly social’’.33
Confucius likewise anticipates Aristotle in his
ethics and politics as they emphasize harmony ( /
he) in the community, beginning with the family.34
In particular, the Harvard neo-Confucian scholar
Tu Wei-Ming points to a number of resonances
between Confucian ethics, AristotleÕs virtue ethics,
and contemporary feminist and environmental ethics.
Simply put: like a Western ethics of care that links
both the human and ecological communities, a
Confucian ethos emphasizes the virtues of fidelity and
31
C. Ess. Beyond Contemptus Mundi and Cartesian Dualism:
Western Resurrection of the Bodysubject and (re)new(ed) Coher-
encies with Eastern Approaches to Life/Death. In G. Wohlfart,
H.-G. Moeller, editors, Philosophie des Todes: Death philosophy East
and West, pp. 15–36. Chora Verlag, Munich; C. Ess. Moral Imper-
atives for Life in an Intercultural Global Village. In R. Cavalier,
editor, The Internet and Our Moral Lives, pp. 161–193. State Uni-
versity of New York Press, Albany, New York, 2004b; C. Ess. Can
the Local Reshape the Global? Ethical Imperatives for Humane
Intercultural Communication Online. In J. Frühbauer, R. Capurro
and T. Hausmanninger, editors, Localizing the Internet. Ethical
Aspects in An Intercultural Perspective (Volume 4, ICIE Series), 2005a.
32
Ames and Rosemont (1998, 29).
33
Ames and Rosemont (1998, 48).
34
Ames and Rosemont (1998, 30), My thanks to Profs. Zhang
Ning and Nakada Makoto for their help with the Chinese
characters at work here.
fiduciary responsibility to a community that begins in
family and finally encompasses the world.35
Irreducible differences: The matter of ‘‘privacy’’
Alongside these striking resonances, however, run a
number of central, irreducible differences. To begin
with, what may be characterized as a more collective
understanding of the human being in Confucian
thought generally and in China in particular contrasts
sharply with modern Western understandings of the
individual – first of all, as an atomistic reality, one
possessed of the rational capacity for self-rule or
autonomy (so Kant). This modern Western under-
standing of the primary reality of the autonomous
self-conflicts even more dramatically with traditional
Buddhist conceptions. Buddhism begins instead with
the insistence that the ego is pernicious illusion: the
ego-illusion is the source of our dissatisfaction and
suffering as human beings – and so, if we seek gen-
uine contentment, we will achieve it only through the
denial of self (musi or ‘‘no-self’’ in Japanese).36
As a result, in those cultures shaped by Confucian
and Buddhist traditions – including Japan, China,
Thailand, Korea, and Hong Kong – historical con-
ceptions of ‘‘privacy’’ have sharply contrasted with
those developed in the modern West around the
notion of the autonomous but atomistic self.37
35
W.-M. Tu. Humanity as embodied love: Exploring filial piety
as a global ethical perspective. In M. Zlomislic and D. Goicoechea,
editors, Jen Agape Tao with Tu Wei-Ming, pp. 28–37, p. 35. Institute
of Global Cultural Studies, Binghampton, NY, 1999.
36
See M. Nakada and T. Takanori. Japanese Conceptions of
Privacy: An Intercultural Perspective. Ethics and Information
Technology, 7(1: March): 27–36, 2005; R. Capurro. Privacy: An
Intercultural Perspective. Ethics and Information Technology, 7(1:
March): 37–47, 2005; C. Ess. ‘‘Lost in Translation’’?: Intercultural
Dialogues on Privacy and Information Ethics (Introduction to
special issue on Privacy and Data Privacy Protection in Asia).
Ethics and Information Technology, 7(1: March): 1–6, 2005c.
37
These modern Western conceptions are indeed modern – i.e.,
historically connected not simply with Lockean and Kantian ideals
and the Enlightenment, but further with industrialization, as
increasing wealth makes individual physical space – and thus
individual privacy – possible (cf. L. Floridi. Four Challenges for a
Theory of Informational Privacy. In C. Ess and M. Thorseth,
editors, Global Information Ethics: Cross-cultural Approaches to
Emancipation, Privacy and Regulation, special issue of Ethics and
Information Technology, forthcoming). In this light, the emergence
of positive, Western-like notions of individual privacy in China,
Japan, Thailand, and Korea over the past three decades parallels
the history of individual privacy in the West. In particular,
increasing material wealth and the creation of personal space now
allows young people in these countries to increasingly insist on
personal and individual privacy, in ways that are alien (not to
mention baffling and frustrating) to their parents and their parentsÕ
generation (e.g., Lin, Pei-Chun and Caroline Henkes. Privacy Re-
search: Privacy Sense in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Unpub-
lished MS: Universität Trier, 2004; Lü yao-huai.
 ET H I C A L PL U R A L I S M AND
As Deborah Johnson 38 points out, U.S. justifica-
tions for privacy begin with some sense of privacy as
an intrinsic good – i.e., a good in itself that needs no
further justification. But privacy further serves as an
instrumental good directly tied to the primary reality
of the autonomous self: privacy is important as a
means to develop a sense of self and personal
autonomy first of all – along with the intimate rela-
tionships, and other capacities and abilities important
to this singular autonomy. Thereby, privacy funds the
basic elements required for participating in a
democratic society – i.e., personal autonomy/freedom
and then the capacity for dialogue, debate, etc.
By contrast, earlier understandings of ‘privacyÕ in
Thailand, for example, i.e., prior to the influence of
Western ideas in the 19th century, were negative –
involving shame, disrespect, or losing face.39 In fact,
in the Thai example, where something like ‘‘privacy’’
held a positive value – it was the collective privacy of
the family, not the individual, vis-à-vis the larger
society.40 Similarly, especially JapanÕs Pure Land
(Jodo-shinsyu) Buddhist tradition has taken the
emphasis on Musi, ‘‘no-self,’’ to justify the practice of
what from a modern Western perspective amounts to
intentionally violating oneÕs ‘privacyÕ: in order to
purify and thus eliminate oneÕs ‘‘private mind’’ –
thereby achieving Musi, ‘‘no-self’’ – one should vol-
untarily share oneÕs most intimate and shameful
secrets.41
By the same token, finally, this negative posture in
Buddhism towards the individual and individual
privacy has its correlate in China, where historically –
both because of a long (especially Confucian) tradi-
tion of emphasizing the good of the larger society
Footnote 37 continued
Privacy and Data Privacy Issues in Contemporary China. Ethics
and Information Technology, 7 (1: March): 7–15). Moreover, Soraj
Hongladarom observes that these contrasts between Western and
especially Buddhist views run alongside important similarities.
Buddhism certainly has important understandings of the individ-
ual, first of all, as the entity responsible for his/her Enlightenment –
and Western thought, as exemplified in Aristotle, has communi-
tarian elements as well (S. Hongladarom, Analysis and Justification
of Privacy from a Buddhist Perspective. In S. Hongladarom and
C. Ess, editors, Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspec-
tives. Idea Publishing, Hershey, PA, forthcoming). HongladaromÕs
analysis of these coherencies thus provides a further example – but
from an explicitly Buddhist perspective – of resonance or harmony
between East and West.
38
D. Johnson. Computer Ethics, 3rd. ed. Prentice-Hall, Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey, 2001.
39
K. Kitiyadisai. Privacy Rights and Protection: Foreign
Values in Modern Thai Context. Ethics and Information Technol-
ogy, 7(1: March): 17–26, 2005.
40
P. Ramasoota. Privacy: A Philosophical Sketch and a
Search for a Thai Perception. MANUSYA: Journal of Humanities,
4(2: September): 89–107, 97f, 100f 2001.
41
Nakada and Tamura (2005).
GL O B A L IN F O R M A T I O N ET H I C S
collectively, along with long practice of strong gov-
ernmental control – individual ‘‘privacy’’ held only
negative connotations, i.e., of a ‘‘shameful secret’’ or
‘‘hidden, bad things’’.42
Hence, the resonances we have seen between
Aristotelian virtue ethics and contemporary feminist
ethics of care, on the one hand, and Confucian ethics
on the other, thus run alongside very deep differences
between especially modern Western conceptions of
the autonomous but atomistic individual as a primary
reality, along with highly positive valuations of
individual privacy, and historical Confucian and
Buddhist conceptions of the self as relational, if not
illusory, along with only negative valuations of
individual privacy.
Privacy in U.S./Germany/Hong Kong/China –
The emergence of a pros hen equivocal
In the face of these irreducible differences between
Eastern and Western conceptions of the individual
and privacy, it is all the more striking to observe a
pros hen pluralism nonetheless emerging in praxis
between Eastern and Western conceptions of privacy.
To take another Western example: German ratio-
nale for privacy begins with privacy as a basic right of
an autonomous person qua citizen in a democratic
society. Moreover, privacy is instrumental in the
protection of private autonomy, the freedom to
express oneÕs opinion, the ‘‘right to personality’’
(Persönlichkeitsrecht), and the freedom to express
oneÕs will. Finally, privacy protection – specifically,
data privacy protection – is seen as a means necessary
for the development of e-commerce.43
By contrast, emerging conceptions of privacy and
data privacy protections in Hong Kong and China
are not justified in terms of the rights of autonomous
citizens of democratic societies. But the rationale here
overlaps with the German justification of information
privacy as critical for electronic commerce. So Tang
points out that the rights to data privacy in Hong
Kong are necessary means for developing and
expanding e-commerce.44 By the same token, along-
side the emergence of more positive conceptions of
privacy in China, Chinese citizens enjoy some rights
to data privacy protection – if comparatively limited
42
Lü (2005).
43
J. Bizer. Grundrechte im Netz: Von der freien
Meinungsäußerung bis zum Recht auf Eigentum. In C. Schulzki-
Haddouti (Hrsg.), Bürgerrechte im Netz, pp. 21–29. Bonn:
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Available online: <http://
www.bpb.de/publikationen/UZX6DW,0,B%fcrgerrechte_im_Netz.
html>, 2003).
44
R. Tang. Approaches to Privacy – The Hong Kong Experi-
ence. <http://www.pco.org.hk/english/infocentre/speech_20020222.
html>, 2002.
 CH A R L E S E S S
as compared to those expected and enforced in many
Western countries. While there is emerging in China a
more positive conception of privacy – the rationale
for data privacy protection is primarily as a means
towards commerce and business efficiency.45
This matrix of privacy expectations and data
privacy protection laws thus marks out a pros hen
pluralism that holds together privacy as a shared
value alongside its different manifestations in diverse
cultural settings. Beyond the interest in some form of
privacy for the sake of e-commerce as a shared
(identical) point of agreement between specifically
Germany, Hong Kong, and China – ‘‘privacy’’ (and
with it, data privacy protection) is understood and
applied in ways that reflect the deep and irreducible
differences between Western and Eastern cultures. In
the case of China (and in Thailand),46 individual
privacy remains strongly limited by the interests of
the State, and in this sense, ‘‘privacy’’ remains a more
collective rather than individual good. By contrast,
U.S. and German understandings of privacy and
privacy rights remain thoroughly rooted in clearly
Western notions of the autonomous citizen of a
democratic state.
Concluding remarks: Pros hen equivocals
and pluralism
To paraphrase Aristotle on Being – ‘‘Privacy is said
in many ways.’’ Not surprisingly, we find that there
are different (and changing) meanings of ‘‘privacy’’ in
West and East. But, as we saw in Western examples
of pluralism in both theory (Stahl, Bynum) and
praxis (AoIR), so we see a similar pros hen pluralism
operate between Western and Eastern traditions,
cultures, and countries – first in theory (Aristotle,
Confucius), and then in praxis: through a shared
focus on ‘‘privacy,’’ this pluralism nonetheless pre-
serves what remain deep and irreducible cultural
differences with regard to the meaning of ‘‘privacy’’
as interpreted through the very different lenses of
what each culture presumes about human beings (i.e.,
more individual or more collective), and with regard
to the rationale for and implementation of data
privacy protection laws.
This interpretive pluralism thus meets the
requirements of a global information ethics as it
preserves distinctive cultures, histories, and traditions
of both East and West – while articulating shared
(but not always identical) points of ethical agreement
45
Y. Chen (2005). Privacy in China. Unpublished MasterÕs
thesis. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2005; cf. Lü
(2005).
46
See Kitiyadisai (2005).
required by an interconnected and interdependent
global society.
While all such cultural and ethical conflicts will
by no means be easily resolved in pluralistic fashion,
these central examples suggest the fruitfulness of
attempting to construct a global intercultural infor-
mation ethics that includes pluralistic approaches. In
this light, I suggest we take inspiration first from
PlatoÕs cybernetes – attempting what we can and
hoping that, should we also happen to trip (as we
surely will), we may be equal to correcting our
errors.
We may also take inspiration from Master Kong:
Zilu spent the night at the Stone Gate. The
morning gatekeeper asked him, ‘‘Where are you
from?’’ ‘‘From the residence of Confucius,’’ replied
Zilu. ‘‘IsnÕt he the one who keeps trying although
he knows that it is no use?’’ asked the gatekeeper?
(Analects 14:38)
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