Industrial Elites in Mexico

Industrial Elites in Mexico: Political Ideology and Influence
Author(s): Dale Story

Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Aug., 1983),
pp. 351-376
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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DALE STORY
Department of Political Science
University of Texas
Arlington, Texas
INDUSTRIAL ELITES IN MEXICO
Political Ideology and Influence
he socioeconomic behavior and belief systems of ind

elites in Latin America have received considerable attention from
social scientists, but research on the political ideology and
activities of these important groups has been surprisingly limited.
The socioeconomic literature has focused on the development or
underdevelopment of entrepreneurial attitudes and values among
Latin American industrialists. The major conclusions, docu-
mented by considerable quantitative research, are that industrial
entrepreneurship in Latin America has been inhibited by inter-
national and domestic structural factors. It is accepted that
national industrial elites in general tend to resist economic change
and innovation, prefer the maintenance of traditional values such
as family ownership, paternalistic labor relations, and labor-
intensive, low-technology means of production. National indus-
trial elites are furthermore dominated by "internationalized"
entrepreneurs and direct state investment. These findings were
first documented by the pioneer comparative studies coordinated
in Latin America by Fernando H. Cardoso in the early 1960s. In
approximately the same period, the North American social
scientists Frank Brandenburg (1964) and Albert Lauterbach
(1966) were confirming the Cardoso findings in cross-national
surveys of Latin American entrepreneurs.
Research on the political roles of Latin American industrial
elites has been limited to a smaller sample of countries and has not
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 25 No. 3, August 1983 351-376
? 1983 Sage Publications, Inc.
351
352 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
been as analytical or as theory oriented as the socioeco

literature. Micro-level analysis utilizing survey research has
especially sparse in this area. This relative lack of political s
has continued despite the fact that public policies have assu
critical position vis-a-vis industrial development and
industry relations have taken on increasing significance.
the small set of projects analyzing political ideology, onc
Cardoso (1974) shifted the focus to political variables w
comparative analysis of the political orientations of entrepr
in Argentina and Brazil. Additional case studies of industria
political values have been conducted for Argentina (Freel
Petras and Cook, 1972), Chile (Johnson, 1968-1969), and
zuela (Jongkind, 1979). These studies have made some v
contributions to the understanding of entrepreneurial p
roles, but the literature on political belief systems of
American industrial entrepreneurs continues to lag behi
concerning socioeconomic values. This article address
discrepancy by extending the analysis of political ideology
important nation of Mexico, and by testing relationships be
variables in addition to reaching descriptive (univariate
clusions from survey research. The results of this resea
then used to refine the comparative conceptualization
political role of Mexican industrial entrepreneurs.
The political role of Mexican industrialists is potentially s
icant because the private business sector remains indepen
the official political party the PRI, while most other ec
and social sectors-labor, peasants, and the popular secto
officially incorporated within the PRI. Given the stead
relatively rapid industrial growth in Mexico since World W
one might expect industrial entrepreneurs there to play
viable role than in many other countries of the region.
both the new class of industrial entrepreneurs said to have r
the 1940s and the strong and independent power represe
the Monterrey group of industrialists suggest that the indu
sector in Mexico may exert substantial and effective pressu
the economic and political systems. Hence, some evidenc
gests that Mexican industrialists may vary from the stereo
weak and dependent national entrepreneurs in Latin Am
Story / INDUSTRIAL ELITES 353
Two studies of note have been conducted on the economic

elites of Mexico that utilize survey research. Flavia Deros
(1971) completed a national survey of 143 Mexican entrepre-
neurs in 1969, and John Walton (1977), in a comparative analysis
of community power in Colombia and Mexico, interviewed 5
leaders of the private sector in Guadalajara and Monterrey i
1968 and 1969. The Derossi book mainly contributes to th
socioeconomic literature, although it does make some significant
strides in examining the interaction of political and econom
power. The Walton study is devoted to a political econom
perspective and focuses on structures of political power, thei
relation to economic elites, and the political orientations o
private-sector leaders in the two localities. In related works, both
Smith (1977) and Camp (1980) focus exclusively on the Mexica
political elite. Employing his extensive data on Mexican politic
biographies, Camp analyzes the relationship between education
and political recruitment and demonstrates the importance o
these topics for understanding Mexican politics. Smith examin
the relations between political and economic elite groups i
Mexico by comparing his data on political elites with the Derossi
data on economic elites.
Several findings from these studies relevant to the concerns of
this article can be cited: (1) The Mexican entrepreneurial class
contains some new, dynamic, and indigenous elements, though
certainly traditional, pre-Revolutionary sectors as well as "inter-
nationalized" sectors remain; (2) the industrial elites show some
signs of political efficacy; and (3) the relations between economic
and political power structures are generally competitive and
adversary. This article refines and focuses these conclusions by
examining whether industrial elites in Mexico exhibit a unified
ideology that represents a strong, relatively independent role for
industrialists in their relations with the state, foreign capital, and
other political actors.
Methodology
This analysis uses both quantitative and qualitative methods.

The qualitative information comes from secondary and primary
sources such as publications of industrial groups and from

ended interviews with officials of various industrial org
tions conducted in 1979 and 1980. The quantitative data are
mail surveys received in the summer of 1980 from 109
Mexican industrialists.
There are certainly various definitions of who constitute the
industrial elites in Mexico. Since all industrialists, except the
smallest, are required by law to join an industrial chamber and
are thereby represented in the single, national confederation, the
focus of this study of industrial elites is on the leaders of these
political interest groups. The questionnaires were mailed to a
sample of industrialists who are elected officers of the two most
important organized groups of industrial entrepreneurs in Mex-
ico: the Confederation of Industrial Chambers (Confederacion
de Camaras Industriales, or CONCAMIN) and the National
Chamber of Manufacturing Industries (Camara Nacional de la
Industria de Transformacion, or CANACINTRA). Most of the
qualitative material also concentrates on these two organiza-
tions. CONCAMIN is the national confederation that incorpo-
rates all regional and branch industrial chambers as well as most
of the private associations of industrial entrepreneurs. Strictly
speaking, CANACINTRA is simply one of 62 industrial chambers,
but its size of some 60,000 member firms concentrated in the
leading industries has established it as a separate and sometimes
rival force to CONCAMIN.
The survey is not scientifically representative of either the larg-
est or the most powerful-if that could be defined-industrialist
in Mexico. It does include those industrialists elected by thei
peers as the principal decision makers in and representatives o
the two most influential industrial trade assocations in Mexico.
These individuals are not the full-time employees (funcionarios
of the chambers and confederations but are the industrialists who
form the leadership cadre of the groups. CONCAMIN is the only
national industrial confederation in Mexico, and CANACIN
TRA stands above all other industrial chambers in its political
and economic importance and has assumed an identity inde-
pendent of CONCAMIN. Thus, this is a purposive or judgment
sample of Mexican industrial elites that includes leaders of the
major, organized groups of industrial entrepreneurs. The only

arguable omission in the sample is the lack of a specific subsam-
ple to represent the so-called Monterrey Group-the industrial-
ists who come from some 200 powerful entrepreneurial families
in Monterrey, Nuevo Le6n, northern Mexico. Since they are a
small, informal group without organized membership, no attempt
was made to include them as a subsample in this study. Yet
several chambers are included in the CONCAMIN sample that
encompass many Monterrey industrialists, such as the National
Chamber of Steel and Iron Industries, the Chamber of Manufac-
turing Industries of Nuevo Leon, the Textile Chamber of the
North, and the National Chamber of the Brewery Industry.
Numerous articles and books besides have previously analyzed
the influence and ideology of the Monterrey Group (Saldalia,
1965; Derossi, 1971:50-58; Balan et al., 1973; Andrews, 1976;
Walton, 1977; Vellinga, 1979).
The questionnaire includes 68 fixed-response questions
(Likert-scale items) pertaining to industrial political influence,
sectoral consciousness, views on foreign investment, opinions on
the economic role of the state, attitudes toward labor, evaluation
of specific economic policies, and impressions of various presi-
dential administrations. Additional questions, primarily open-
ended, solicit demographic or background data on education,
father's occupation, nationality, age and size of the company, the
firm's industrial branch, and its dependence on foreign capital.
The questionnaire was sent to the presidents of all 89 chambers
and associations in CONCAMIN and to 236 officers including
the president, vice-president, and officers of other elected posts of
the 77 active sections of CANACINTRA. The response rate was
34% for CANACINTRA (81 responses) and 31% for CONCAMIN
(28 responses). The respondents generally reflect the various
divisions in the two groups.
CANA CINTRA and CONCAMIN
A major theme in much of the literature on Mexican in

trialists has been that CANACINTRA's existence apart
CONCAMIN represents a successful state strategy of"div

rule" the private sector (Purcell and Purcell, 1977: 194-19
More specifically, CANACINTRA has been accused of
little more than a pawn of the state, while CONCAMIN h
recognized as a more legitimate force against governme
nomic intervention (Shafer, 1973: 54-58, 67-70, 107-11
146). CANACINTRA was formed in November 1941, les
three months after a new Chambers Law governing ind
organizations had been promulgated. Some suggest the g
ment of Avila Camacho (1940-1946) conspired with a
government controlled group of industrialists to pass t
Chambers Law as well as other legislation encouraging in
growth, and to create an industrial chamber-CANACIN
that could be manipulated by the state (Shafer, 1973: 54-
In its early years CANACINTRA certainly did enjoy a
ually accommodating relationship with the state. Its orig
member firms were newer industries that supported and ben
from the state's commitment to promote import-substi
industrialization in the early 1940s. In recent years, howeve
membership of CANACINTRA appears to have become
critical of the state's economic role.
The break between CANACINTRA and the state grew,
particularly during the Echeverria sexenio from 1970-1976.
President Echeverria alienated the private sector with his anti-
capitalist rhetoric and unpredictable populist policies, and
CANACINTRA was no exception in the antagonistic posture
taken toward Echeverria by the private sector. One of the leading
business critics of Echeverria was the president of CANACINTRA
from 1976 to 1978, Joaquin Pria Olavarrieta. Regional leaders of
CANACINTRA opposed Echeverria's expropriation of rich
farmland in 1976 and joined a one-day business strike to show
their displeasure. In this period, CANACINTRA also opposed
increased government involvement in the distribution of basic
commodities, increases in the minimum wages, the peso deval-
uations, and price controls.
In spite of these events, CANACINTRA continues to be
labeled more progressive or leftist than CONCAMIN, because
CANACINTRA's members are purportedly more critical of the
impact of foreign investment, favor a larger degree of governmen

intrusion into the economy, and adopt a much more conciliatory
attitude toward labor (Vernon, 1963: 19-20, 103-104, 167-174
Izquierdo, 1964:279-282; Zorrilla Gil, 1964: 97-98; Alcazar, 1970
54-57, 82-83; Derossi, 1971: 119-125; Shafer, 1973: 54, 67-68,
109-111, 120). Also, CANACINTRA is still reported to hav
suspiciously close relations with the state and with the dominant
political party, the PRI. For example, it is often rumored tha
presidents of CANACINTRA are assured important governmen
posts after their terms expire.2
The survey data from the leadership ranks of CONCAMIN
and CANACINTRA can be compared to test the theory that th
groups exhibit substantial differences and that CANACINTR
is especially left-leaning and supportive of the state. Two
statistical techniques are used to test the null hypothesis that thes
two samples have been drawn from the same population, or that
in a statistical sense, they are random samples from the sing
population of industrial elites. The alternative hypothesis is that
these two samples are from statistically different population
which is the hypothesis assumed in most of the literature. The two
techniques employed here are the Mann-Whitney U Test (M-W
and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (K-S). Briefly, the M-W Tes
involves a ranking procedure that is sensitive to any difference i
medians, while the K-S Test compares distribution functions and
is sensitive to all possible types of distributional differences, such
as dispersion, skewness, and the like (Siegel, 1956: 119, 13
Daniel, 1978: 82-86, 276-279). Together these two techniques
provide a comprehensive test of whether significant differences
exist between the CANACINTRA and CONCAMIN samples.
Of the 74 survey items tested-those with at least ordinal
measures-only seven items suggested that the CANACINTRA
and CONCAMIN groups are different. Of these seven items,
only three show the rejection of the null hypothesis (no differ-
ence) measured by both tests on items 7, 65, and 79. The actua
differences for these three items can be seen in Table 1, which
shows that even for these cases the distinctions between CON-
CAMIN and CANACINTRA are not great. For items 7 and 79,
the majority of cases for both samples are clustered in the top half
TABLE 1
Items Showing the Greatest Differences between
CONCAMIN and CANACINTRA
Item 7: I am an active participant in the affairs of my national indus-

trial association (in percentages).
SA A N D SD
CANACINTRA 37.0 55. S 327 1.2 . 2.5
CONCAMIN 71.4 21.4 7.1 0 0
Item 79: Do,you believe that the policies of L6pez Portillo have been
favorable or unfavorable to the industrial sector (in percentages)
VF MLF N MLU VU
CANACINTRA -3 58.9 .96 5 5 T.7
CONCAMIN 55.6 37.0 3.7 3.7 0
Item 65: What was the gross valu

(in million pesos)?
Mean Value Minimum Maximum
CANACINTRA 393 2 5000
CONCAMIN 689 6 3070
NOTE: SA = strongly agree; A

disagree. VF = very favorab
more or less unfavorable; VU
of the scale, indicating

items. The mean valu
provide the only confi
between CANACINTRA and CONCAMIN-that CONCAMIN
tends to represent larger firms. However, items measuring th
of the firm (item 63), and the number of employees (item 6
not prove a statistical difference.
The conclusion from these tests is that the samples of C
CAMIN and CANACINTRA are essentially drawn from
same population of industrial elites. This disconfirms the the
in the literature that suggests the industrial groups are dissi
in constituency, ideology, and links to the government
could argue that CANACINTRA has changed significantl
the last decade, especially during the Echeverria administrati
and that the existing literature correctly reflects pre-1970 di
tions. The populism or reformism of Echeverr'a might
instilled more unity and independence in the private secto
may especially have moved CANACINTRA in the conserv
direction. In any case, as of 1980 the leaders of CANACIN
and CONCAMIN are of essentially like mind, though certain

demographic differences (gross value of production) persist. This
unity adds some support to the thesis expressed in this article that
the ideology of Mexican industrial elites reflects their independ-
ent attitude and sectoral consciousness. The similarities between
CONCAMIN and CANACINTRA at least disprove theories
that the state or other groups are manipulating differences
among Mexican industrialists. Following sections examine the
demographics, ideological orientation, and the political influ-
ence of the total sample of industrial elites.
Background of Individual Industrialists

and Their Firms
The typical industrialist in this sample proves to be well-

educated, upper-class, and native born. Over 90% of the
respondents have a university education, and most are either
licenciados or ingenieros, both equivalent to master's degree
recipients. Their family background, as indicated by father's
occupation, is predominantly upper-class. The modal category of
father's occupation is industrialist (30%), followed closely by
professionals such as doctors and lawyers (29%) and large
merchants (28%). The remaining occupations are scattered
among landowners (6%), working-class laborers (6%), and small
businessmen (1%). Contrary to some impressions, the Mexican
industrial elites are overwhelmingly native Mexicans-94% were
born in Mexico. Even 76% of their fathers were born in Mexico.
Thus, a strong immigrant influence is not evident among
Mexican industrial elites.
Survey information about the firms of these industrialists
shows these are extremely large enterprises, established on the
average within the last three decades, and are generally inde-
pendent of foreign influence. The mean value of gross production
in 1979 is 469 million pesos, and the average number of
employees is 592. When compared to the 1971 industrial census
data showing a mean gross output of 0.98 million pesos

average number of employees of 13.4, these data demonstr
enormous size of the enterprises in this survey of industria
The average age of the industrial firms is 27 years, showing
of establishment in 1954, and over 75% have been esta
since the end of World War II. Finally, in measures gaugin
degree of dependence on foreign economic resources, most
prove to be reasonably self-sufficient (see Table 2). The qu
naire asks whether they depend on foreign companies for
(1) raw material and other inputs, (2) technology, or (3) cr
capital. In a procedure similar to that of Cardoso (1974:1
an aggregate measure of dependency was produced by addi
three responses. The value 0 for a "no" response and 1 for
response produced a scale from 0, least dependent, to
dependent. According to this total score, almost a third
firms are completely self-sufficient, and over 50% have ag
scores of either 0 or 1, indicating little international depe
In examining the interrelationships among the demog
variables for the industrial firms, three results are sign
First, the older firms are also likely to be the larger firm
correlation coefficients between the age of the firm and t
variables measuring size are both significant (0.27 for gros
duction with a significance level of .006, and 0.29 for num
employees with a significance level of .002). Of course,
firms in this sample of industrial elites are quite large com
to the total population of industrial establishments. S
industrial elite firms created since the mid-1950s are smaller than
those built prior to that time. Second, whether the industrial
branch of the firm deals with consumer, intermediate, or capital
goods has some relationship with both size and age (Table 3). In
particular, the capital goods firms are the youngest, while the
consumer goods firms are the oldest. This finding substantiates
the industrial progression from consumer to intermediate to
capital goods. Also, a slight tendency exists for the capital goods
firms to be the smallest, no doubt reflecting their more recent
establishment.
TABLE 2
Degree of Economic Dependency (in percentages)
Item 71: Does your firm depend on foreign companies for either:
Yes=l No=O
A. the purchase of parts, products or raw
materials? 47.5 52.5
B. technology? 47.5 52.5
C. credit or capital? 26.3 73.7
Aggregate Measure (addition of A, B, and C):

Self-sufficient "Internationalized"
0 1 2 3
30.3 28.3 31 3 10.1
The third set of signific

between economic depen
the importance often atta
the aggregate measure o
shows no discernible or
the firm's age, size, or
propositions relating th
degree of dependency on
this research.
Political Ideology
A number of political and economic questions are central to

the ideological orientations of industrialists throughout Latin
America. These questions for the industrialists include whether to
cooperate closely with other economic sectors such as agriculture
or commerce, whether to welcome new foreign investment, whether
to favor state economic intervention, and whether to support
efforts at class cooperation. One problem that has been identified
by much of the literature is that the ideology of Latin American
entrepreneurs is loosely defined and easily manipulated by the
state. For example, Polit (1968) maintains that Argentine indus-
trialists have been dominated by the landed elites and that the
industrial sector has not generated an independent and unified
TABLE 3
Industrial Branch, Age, and Size of Firms Compared
(in percentages)
Size
Age Gross Production No. of Employees
Industrial Branch Young Old Small Large Small Large
Consumer 773 4. 9 27.9 735T.- 25.0 34.0
Intermediate 22.4 26.5 20.9 28.9 25.0 26.0
Capital 61.2 28.6 51.2 35.6 50.0 40.0
100 100 100 100 100 00
NOTE: Industrial branch is an aggrega

the food, beverage, tobacco, textiles,
mediate goods include the rubber, ch
goods include the automotive, metallic
the comparisons, age, gross production
mized at their respective median value
ployees.
ideology. One of the strongest

Johnson (1968-1969), who ass
preneurs have a very weak id
trial subordination to other economic sectors and to the state. As
already stated in the Mexican case, Shafer (1973: 107) believes
that the ideology of CANACINTRA is heavily controlled by the
state.
In examining the ideological orientation of Mexican indus-

trialists, this analysis focuses on four principal dimensions: sec-
toral awareness, perception of foreign investment, attitude
toward the state economic role, and opinion of labor. Summary
scales are created from individual Likert items, utilizing reliabil-
ity coefficients to determine which items to use for the scales.
These coefficients demonstrate the extent to which items form a
reliable scale, which means how well they measure the same
concept.4 The specific items that form the most reliable scale for
each dimension, three items for sectoral awareness and four items
for the others, are enumerated in Table 4.
The thesis that the Mexican industrial class is weakened by
divisions was partly discounted in the comparison here of CON-
CAMIN and CANACINTRA. Another aspect of the question of
unity within the industrial sector is the issue of its relations with
TABLE 4
Items in Four Scales of Political Ideology
Sectoral Awareness
Item 11: The industrial sector and the agriculture sector have
different and at times opposing interests.
Item 13: The industrial sector and the commercial sector have
different and at times opposing interests.
Item 14: Agricultural stagnation is a great problem in Mexico.
Perception of Foreign Investment

aItem 15: The effects of foreign investment on the Mexican economy
have been generally favorable.
Item 16: Foreign capital should be permitted in Mexican industry
only with many restrictions and in certain industries.
aItem 17: Foreign capital in Mexico is very necessary for the
development of the nation.
Item 18: Foreign investors have too much control over the Mexican
economy and Mexican industry.
Attitude Toward the State Economic Role

Item 19: The economic policies of the state play an important
and positive role in the economic development of the nation.
aItem 20: Government intervention in the economy is excessive in
Mexico.
Item 21: The nationalization of enterprises is necessary in certain
industries.
aItem 22: Economic development would be best stimulated by more
private initiative.
Opinion of Labor
Item 23: The state should exercise more control over labor unions.
Item 24: Labor leaders in Mexico are only interested in increasing
their own powers.
aItem 26: Workers play a positive role in the industrial firm and
in industrial relations.
Item 27: Strikes have had a negative effect on economic develop-
ment in Mexico.
NOTE: The possible responses were strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree
strongly disagree.
a. These items have been coded in reverse to reflect the same direction of opinio
the other items.
other economic sectors. The common opinion is that Latin

American industrialists do not perceive their distinct sectoral
interests. This suggests the industrial sector has not broken from
the traditional dominance of the agro-export elites. Yet the revo-
lutionary upheavals in Mexico-particularly the changes in the
1930s-enabled the emerging industrial sector to develop a
strong role independent of the traditional elites.
In terms of its organizations, the Mexican industrial sect

historically pursued a course separate from commerce a
culture. In 1917, industry fulfilled its desire to be organiz
distinct sector with identifiable differences from other sectors.
The First National Congress of Industry met in that year to
consider legislative and other means of promoting industrial
development, and it soon evolved into the Confederation of
Industrial Chambers. Later, when it combined with commercial
associations in the 1930s, CONCAMIN and the industrialists
who were to form CANACINTRA successfully lobbied for
maintaining the separation of industrial associations from the
trade associations of other sectors. The lack of direct ties with
other economic sectors has also been evident in the control and
ownership of Mexican industrial firms. In the 1969 Derossi sur-
vey (1971: 106-107, 159-163), the industrial enterprises were
almost completely controlled by industrialists, and in only 23%
of the cases were bankers, who represented outside financial
backers of the firm, included on the board of directors. Also,
most new investment came from within the industrial sector
itself.
The sectoral awareness scale further confirms the independ-
ence of the Mexican industrial sector. The scale includes items
that show interests separate from, and opinions critical of, other
sectors. Though the summary scale has values ranging from 3 to
15, it is analyzed as a trichotomous distinction among those who
do not perceive distinct industrial interests (scores less than 12),
those who are exactly neutral (scores of 12), and those who do
perceive distinct industrial interests (scores greater than 12). In
overwhelming fashion, 78% of the respondents fall into the latter
classification of those exhibiting a strong sectoral consciousnes
within the industrial sector.
The Mexican industrial sector has always shown a degree of
nationalist sentiment toward foreign investment. At the First
National Congress of Industry, opposition was expressed to the
strong foreign presence in the mining sector (Shafer, 1973: 28).
Though few industrialists favored the total exclusion of foreign
capital, by the 1940s CANACINTRA was promoting policies to
control foreign investment and to protect domestic capital. Dur-

ing its formative period, this industrial chamber called for an end
to dependency on foreign funds, stated that past foreign invest-
ment had hindered Mexican development, and suggested foreign
investment be admitted only as a supplement to domestic invest-
ment and under certain conditions. However, in recent years
CANACINTRA has become more open to foreign investment,
as shown in its opposition to some legislation in the 1970s that
tightened the restrictions on foreign firms. At present, the mem-
bership of CANACINTRA even includes some subsidiaries of
transnational corporations, such as Pepsi-Cola and Ford.
The foreign investment scale created from the four items listed
in Table 4 substantiates this acceptance of foreign capital by the
domestic industrial elite. In the trichotomized version, 75% of the
respondents fall into the category of acceptance of the role of
foreign capital. These industrialists state foreign investment is
necessary in Mexico and its effect has been generally favorable.
They also do not believe foreign capitalists have too much con-
trol over Mexican industry.
The opinions of Mexican industrialists about the economic
role of the state have undergone similar changes. CANACINTRA
and, to a lesser extent, CONCAMIN have traditionally favored
state aid for industry. Particularly in the 1940s, CANACINTRA
vigorously supported state economic planning as well as state
promotion and protection of industrial development. It even
favored direct state investment, state intervention in other sectors
of the economy, and agrarian reform. However, by the 1970s, the
industrial sector was reasonably united against any further
encroachments of the state into the economic sphere. For exam-
ple, CONCAMIN and CANACINTRA joined other business
organizations in the mid-1970s to form the Entrepreneurial
Coordinating Council (CCE) to protect the interests of private
capital from the perceived threats of President Echeveria's poli-
cies. Again, the survey scale concerned with state economic role
shows this trend. On the aggregate scale, 82% of the respondents
are critical of the state's intervention in the economy. In particular,
nationalization of the industries is strongly opposed, more private
initiative is firmly supported, and government economic

vention is seen as overly excessive in Mexico at the present
The final ideological dimension here concerns the attit
industrialists toward labor. Until the 1940s, industrial entr
neurs generally opposed policies that brought organize
into the economic and political systems. The only positiv
ture by industrialists toward labor was at the 1925
National Congress of Industry, which discussed establi
social security system. By the 1940s most industrialists beg
support better labor relations, and CANACINTRA was
forefront of those industrialists who endorsed a more concilia-
tory attitude toward labor. CANACINTRA went so far as to
support labor-intensive industries, income redistribution, higher
salaries, and increased standards of living for workers. The sur-
vey data here do not provide such conclusive results as was the
case for the other dimensions. These industrialists show an
appreciation for a positive role for workers in the firm and in
industrial relations. Yet according to aggregate scale, a majority-
67%-feel organized labor has generally been a detrimental force
in Mexican economic development. In particular, the industrial-
ists demonstrate a distrust of labor leaders and a feeling that
strikes have hurt Mexican economic progress.
Political Participation and Influence
Latin American industrial entrepreneurs are generally not

considered active participants in the political process. This phe-
nomenon has been referred to as "low subject mobilization,"
which is common in authoritarian regimes. As a consequence of
their lack of commitment to political participation, industrialists
are said to have little success in influencing public policies. How-
ever, these conclusions do not strictly hold true in the case of
Mexico.
In the first place, the Chambers Law of Mexico recognizes
chambers and confederations of industry and commerce as semi-
official bodies with "legal personalities." As such, they are guar-
anteed representation on many state agencies, commissions, a

boards, and the state is required to consult with them on polici
affecting their sector. In interviews I conducted with offic
from various industrial groups, all of the officials stated that th
semiofficial status promoted their participation and enhanc
their influence.
In addition, industrialists seek to contribute to policy formul
tion through participation in electoral politics, political par
affairs, and, ultimately, decision-making in the executive branc
Financial contributions to the parties-usually either the PRI
the major opposition party, the PAN-are one way, in which t
industrial sector influences party politics. Some industrialis
have even run for public office, and in July 1979 an unusua
large number of entrepreneurs were elected to the 51st Legis
ture. Although industrialists themselves are rarely appointed
positions in the executive branch, they or their representati
frequently lobby cabinet secretaries or other policymaking offi
cials in that branch. Industrialists located in Mexico City oft
meet with ministerial officials through either individual contac
or forums arranged by their chamber. Those outside the cap
may maintain an office there in order to coordinate lobbyin
efforts, and may travel at least once a week to Mexico City
speak with personal contacts in the government (Derossi, 197
54).
Finally, industrial entreprenuers have even organized less tra-
ditional forms of political participation, such as one-day business
strikes. Examples include the 1976 general strike in the northwest
to protest Echeverria's land expropriations, a 1979 business
strike in Puebla arising out of a labor conflict, and a 1982
shutdown of some businesses along the U.S.-Mexico border in
opposition to the devaluations and the exchange control.
Comparisons of CANACINTRA and CONCAMIN suggest
that both organizations pursue high levels of political activity,
though CANACINTRA has adopted a higher profile through
more direct and well-publicized actions. In a typical year the
political activities recognized by CANACINTRA in its annual
report would include many meetings with the president of the
Republic and with ministers and department heads in the exe

tive branch, press releases and conferences on policy issu
various public functions for the discussion of economic polici
and reports on the work of 14 permanent commissions respon
ing to the political needs of member firms. A good example o
political involvement is the national debate conducted in 1
and 1980 over Mexico's possible adherence to the Gene
Agreement on Trade and Tarrifs (GATT). CANACINTRA t
a vocal leadership role among the opposition to the GATT,
its persistence contributed to the decision to postpone Mex
entry.
On the other hand, CONCAMIN has not been as visibly active
and prefers to appear to be "above politics." Though the con-
trasts should not be overstated, CONCAMIN tends to operate
more behind the scenes, through individual contacts. In the
GATT case, CONCAMIN as an organization took no stand,
although its leaders were involved in the consultations. The
differences between the two groups are not in level of participa-
tion or influence, but involve strategies and tactics, with CON-
CAMIN emphasizing more quiet diplomacy.
The survey results for the industrial elites in this sample solid-
ify the impression that Mexican industrialists are politically
mobilized. The respondents claim a high level of political partici-
pation, especially in their organized interest groups. For exam-
ple, 80% say they turn to their industrial association whenever
they want to influence a public policy decision.5 Significantly,
only 3 of the 109 industrialists say it is useless to even attempt to
influence policy by any means. The industrial leaders also reaf-
firm the political role of industrial trade associations in Mexico.
In some Latin American nations, especially the more repressive
regimes, trade associations are confined to service functions
such as conducting business seminars and publishing apolitical
pamphlets. However, in this Mexican sample, over 75% reject the
idea of limiting organized industrial groups to service functions.
They clearly prefer that the industrial chambers, associations,
and confederation continue to press the interests of their
members in the political sphere and to represent industrialists in
the policy process.
Though Mexican industrialists may be committed to political

participation, this does not guarantee success in influencing pol-
icy. The degree of influence industrial elites have in affecting
policy-either in terms of initiation, delay, defeat, or alteration-
is a separate question from the issue of mobilization. The focus
here is on the industrialists' self-perceptions of their political
influence. Even if survey instruments are not unobtrusive measures
of political influence, they are an important first step in under-
standing the impact of industrial elites on public policy.
Contrary to the results regarding political participation, the
responses to items concerning political influence do not affirm a
strong belief in the political power of the industrial sector. The
sample divides evenly on whether the industrial sector has
acheived much success in influencing postwar economic policies,
and a majority of 57% actually disagree that the interests of
industrialists are well represented in government policy. Some
limitations of industrial influence are indicated by widespread
beliefs that the industrial sector does not act as a unified political
force, even though this analysis confirms that the two major
groups of industrialists are ideologically similar, and that indus-
trial influence depends more on the actions of a few, principal
industrialists than on collective actions.
The industrialists in the survey were asked to rank ten political
actors in terms of their influence on policy and the benefits they
derive from public policies (see Table 5). Their answers support
the finding that a limited number of major industrialists wield
most of the political power within the industrial sector. Aside
from the expected (and probably cynical) attitude about politi-
cians, the most powerful actors prove to be bankers, large indus-
trialists, and workers. The bankers and large industrialists are
important elements of the private sector perceived to be particu-
larly successful in the political arena, while the high rating of
workers undoubtedly refers to the privileged position of organ-
ized labor within the ruling coalition. Because of the negative
evaluation of the role of organized labor discussed above, one
could infer that industrial elites deprecate the disproportionate
power wielded by labor unions.
Landowners and the military are given the lowest marks for
policy influence-no doubt a recognition of important historical
TABLE 5
Respondent Perceptions of the Policy Influence and Benefit of
Ten Political Actors (rankings on a scale from 1 to 10)
Influence on Policya Benefit from Policya

Bankersb 4.02 3.67
Merchants 5.48 4.46
Multinational Corporations 5.32 4.81
Large Industrialistsb 4.27 4.34
Small Industrialists 6.93 6.40
Landowners 7.72 7.69
Workersb 4.33 5.00
Peasants 6.32 7.41
Military 6.82 6.65
Politiciansb 2.83 3.14
a. Mean rankings with the lo

b. Those political actors with
factors in Mexico. Sin

ically stressed land r
ments, especially in th
cracy in the dominan
and 1917 Constitutio
priations by Presiden
ents also rank peasan
benefit. This perceptio
the agricultural secto
impression that land
grassroots demands o
American authoritar
postwar period have
to have an important
data present an image
is concentrated in th
actors who are able to
large industrialists, a
The image that littl
industrial sector is c
policy issues. The deg
appears to vary subs
tionnaire asks the re
terms of whether th
whether industry exercises any influence over the policies. Th

policy areas are credit, prices, protectionism, labor, pu
spending, and taxes. Only two are seen by a majority as favor
industry (credit and protectionism), and the industrial sect
believed to influence strongly only one policy (protection
Policies regarding prices, labor, and taxes are rated as be
unfavorable to industry, while public spending decisions recei
mixed response. Besides the strong industrial influenc
protectionism, credit and pricing policies are seen to rec
moderate industrial influence, but no industrial influence is s
to affect expenditure, labor, and taxation policies. These findi
at least show an improvement for industry in the last decade.
Mexican entrepreneurs in the Derossi survey (1971: 61) tak
1969 were asked to evaluate eight postwar economic polices
no policy received a majority of favorable responses.
State-Industry Relations
Despite evidence of state control and co-optation of industr

ists in other Latin American nations, one of the most import
aspects of the development of the Mexican industrial sector in
postwar period has been the emergence of an independent,
adversary relationship with the state. This is not to say politi
and economic elites have become so polarized that their differ
ces have the potential for destabilizing Mexico. However,
industrial sector has evolved into an important countervai
power to the state. The Chambers Law gives the state the p
to limit the autonomy of chambers and confederations, bu
actual degree of government control over entrepreneurial gro
has not been as great as these legal provisions suggest.
examples exist of the state's attempt to manipulate indus
organizations, and many officials of these groups convinci
stated in interviews that the government has not controlled t
activities, limited their influence, or interfered in their funct
Furthermore, while labor, campesino, and middle-class gro
have been controlled by the state through the PRI, indus
groups have remained independent of the party and ha

the rigors of party discipline.
The competitive nature of state-industry relation
stated before and is supported by these survey data. Sm
makes a strong argument substantiating what he co
social distance between entrepreneurs and the politi
his comparison of economic and political elites, he main
they belong to different social strata, frequently di
policies, and really are competing elites. He con
"entrepreneurs and politicians interact in an atm
uncertainty, distrust, suspicion, and even disdain"
Various results from this study confirm Smith's th
cussed above, industrial elites are quite critical of many
policies, particularly those involving prices, labor,
Also, their ideological orientation shows the gap be
state and industrial entrepreneurs. For example, ind
staunchly oppose the growing state role in the econo
sector intervention is viewed as an usurpation of the pr
the private sector. Industrialists are supportive of
investment in Mexico, whereas the state has traditiona
a more antagonistic view of foreign capital. Finally
trialists in this sample are critical of the role of organ
which has always been an important ally of the stat
been more easily co-opted and controlled by the sta
industrial leaders appear to disapprove of the self-serv
their labor counterparts.
The distance between the industrial sector and the state
increased greatly during the Echeverria presidency. Echever
alienated the industrialists as well as other private-sector
ments by his attempts to restore the populism of the 1930s. In
rhetoric and actions, the president seemed to take special aim
the business community. He frequently criticized entrepreneur
especially the Monterrey group, as being "profoundly reacti
ary and enemies of the people's progress", and even "bad Ch
tians." Specific Echeverria policies opposed by entrepreneu
groups include proposed fiscal reform, price controls, the exten
sion of public ownership and of the state role in distributing b
goods, and late in the administration, agrarian reform.
Besides public criticism (Purcell and Purcell, 1976; Analis
Politico, 1976, 1977) and even the business strike in 1976,
most important form of industrial opposition to Echeverria, was

the withdrawal of confidence by the private sector, followed by
refusals to invest and the growing problem of capital flight from
Mexico. As further evidence of industrial alienation, the leaders
of CONCAMIN and CANACINTRA in this sample show quite
negative evaluations of Echeverria. In a nearly unanimous voice,
94.5% stated they were not satisfied with the policies of Echeverria,
whereas only 36.1% said they were not satisfied with the Lopez
Portilo policies. As shown by reviews of presidents since 1934,
Echeverria is by far the least popular with the industrial elites.
Over 80% feel his administration was unfavorable to the industrial
sector, while to no other president, including Cardenas, has a
majority of the industrialists responded negatively.6 Though an
adversary relationship between industry and the state is not
unique to the Echeverria presidency, the greatest cleavages
certainly existed during his term.
Summary and Conclusions
This analysis of state-industry relations in Mexico and of

survey research from leaders of the two principal industrial
organizations in Mexico has produced several major findings that
in some instances vary from conventional wisdom. Contrary to
assertions that CANACINTRA is a tool of the government and
has a different viewpoint from CONCAMIN, leaders of the two
groups do not compare in a predictable pattern of either political
opinions or socioeconomic characteristics. Thus, both subsamples
are interpreted as equivalent and taken from the same general
population of industrial elites. A considerable degree of ideological
unity is shown in the areas of recognizing distinct industrial
interests, having a positive view of foreign investment, supporting
less government economic intervention, and criticizing the role of
labor.
The political mobilization of the Mexican industrial elites is

substantial, although their political influence is limited to the
policy areas of protectionism and, to a lesser extent, credit and
pricing policies. Although they may profess ideological unity,
industrialists recognize the inability of their sector to act as a
unified political force. For example, CANACINTRA and CON-

CAMIN differ little in their levels of political participation or
influence, but they do pursue different strategies for affecting
policy. In agreement with previous findings that the Mexican
private sector is often a countervailing force to the government,
the industrialists in this sample demonstrate an adversary
approach to the state. They are critical of most government
policies, their political opinions are generally in opposition to
official views, and they emphasize their particular alienation from
the Echeverria administration.
These conclusions affirm previous conceptions of the Mexican
industrial elites but suggest that some alterations are also neces-
sary. These refinements stress the potential for important varia-
tions in the political role and in the ideology of industrial entre-
preneurs across countries. Several characteristics of the Mexican
industrial elites do not fit the generalizations often applied
throughout Latin America. Although it is certain the public
sector and foreign capital play more important roles in Latin
America than in most developed nations, these Mexican indus-
trialists exhibit considerable economic and ideological auto-
nomy from both the state and foreign investment. Their percep-
tion of distinct sectoral interests, and their espousal of an
adversary relation with the state, are related to their relative
autonomy.
Finally, despite the generally authoritarian nature of the polit-
ical system, the Mexican industrial sector has remained politi-
cally active, with influence on some policies and a clear ideology
that cannot be ignored by the state. Some of these findings
contradict the usual depiction of Latin American industrialists as
a weak and divided class; however, this research emphasizes the
need to still recognize the potential for differences in political role
and ideology of industrial elites in all of Latin America.
NOTES
1. A number of reports in this series were published by the United Nations E

Commission for Latin America (ECLA, 1963) under the general title El Emp
Industrial en America Latina. The case studies included Argentina (by Eduardo A.
Zalduendo), Brazil (by Cardoso), Chile (by Guillermo Briones), Colombia (by Aaron
Lipman), and Paraguay (by Enzo Faletto). Some of the findings are summarized in
Cardoso (1967).
2. Several analysts and business leaders mentioned this to me; however, it has been
disconfirmed by a comparison of the list of CANACINTRA presidents with Camp's
(1976) extensive compilation of Mexican political biographies. See Story (1980: 8).
3. For the 1971 data, see Secretaria de Industria y Comercio (1971).
4. Reliability is one way to determine measurement error. It concerns the extent to
which measurements are repeatable and is defined as the ratio of the true score variance to
the measured score variance. See Nunnally (1967: 172-184). The reliability coefficient
used here is Cronbach's alpha.
5. The Derossi study(1971: 40,187) contains parallel information. In that 1969 survey,
50% of the industrialists chose to act through an organized industrial group when faced
with an adverse government policy, and 70% participated in their chamber in some
fashion.
6. The president seen as most favorable to industry is Miguel Aleman, President of
Mexico from 1946-1952.
REFERENCES
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---- (1976) March 29.
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Dale Story is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at

Arlington. His research has focused primarily on the relationships among indus-
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and on the Mexican GATT decision and a monograph on sectoral clash and
industrialization in Latin America.

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Industrial Elites in Mexico

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Industrial Elites in Mexico: Political Ideology and Influence

Author(s): Dale Story

INDUSTRIAL ELITES IN MEXICO

Political Ideology and Influence

he socioeconomic behavior and belief systems of ind

been as analytical or as theory oriented as the socioeco

Two studies of note have been conducted on the economic

This analysis uses both quantitative and qualitative methods.

sources such as publications of industrial groups and from

major, organized groups of industrial entrepreneurs. The only

CANA CINTRA and CONCAMIN

A major theme in much of the literature on Mexican in

CONCAMIN represents a successful state strategy of"div

impact of foreign investment, favor a larger degree of governmen

Item 7: I am an active participant in the affairs of my national indus-

Item 65: What was the gross valu

NOTE: SA = strongly agree; A

of the scale, indicating

and CONCAMIN are of essentially like mind, though certain

Background of Individual Industrialists

The typical industrialist in this sample proves to be well-

data showing a mean gross output of 0.98 million pesos

Degree of Economic Dependency (in percentages)

Aggregate Measure (addition of A, B, and C):

The third set of signific

A number of political and economic questions are central to

NOTE: Industrial branch is an aggrega

ideology. One of the strongest

In examining the ideological orientation of Mexican indus-

Perception of Foreign Investment

Attitude Toward the State Economic Role

other economic sectors. The common opinion is that Latin

In terms of its organizations, the Mexican industrial sect

control foreign investment and to protect domestic capital. Dur-

initiative is firmly supported, and government economic

Political Participation and Influence

Latin American industrial entrepreneurs are generally not

anteed representation on many state agencies, commissions, a

Republic and with ministers and department heads in the exe

Though Mexican industrialists may be committed to political

Influence on Policya Benefit from Policya

a. Mean rankings with the lo

factors in Mexico. Sin

whether industry exercises any influence over the policies. Th

Despite evidence of state control and co-optation of industr

groups have remained independent of the party and ha

most important form of industrial opposition to Echeverria, was

Summary and Conclusions

This analysis of state-industry relations in Mexico and of

The political mobilization of the Mexican industrial elites is

unified political force. For example, CANACINTRA and CON-

1. A number of reports in this series were published by the United Nations E

ALCAZAR, M.A. (1970) Las agrupaciones patronales en Mexico. Me'xico: E

JOHNSON, D. L. (1968-1969) "The national progressive bourgeoisie in Chile." Stu

VERNON, R. (1963) The Dilemma of Mexico's Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

WALTON, J. (1977) Elites and Economic Development: Comparative Studies on the

Dale Story is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at

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