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One World, Rival Theories

Author(s): Jack Snyder
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 145 (Nov. - Dec., 2004), pp. 52-62
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 ne orld,
RivalTeorie
relationsissupposedto tellus howtheworldworks.
Thestudjof international
fall short.Buttheycanpuncture
It'sa tallorder,andeventhebesttheories
illusionsandstripawaythesimplisticbrandnames-suchas "neocons"or "lib-
foreign-poliy debates.Evenin a radically
eralhawks" thatdominate
changingworld,theclassictheorieshavea lot to saqy. By Jack Snyder

he U.S. governmenthas enduredsev- approaches: realism, liberalism, and an updated

eral painful rounds of scrutiny as it form of idealism called "constructivism." Walt
tries to figure out what went wrong argued that these theories shape both public dis-
on Sept. 11, 2001. The intelligence course and policy analysis. Realism focuses on
community faces radical restructuring;the military the shifting distribution of power among states.
has made a sharppivot to face a new enemy; and a Liberalismhighlights the rising number of democ-
vast new federalagencyhas blossomedto coordinate racies and the turbulence of democratic transi-
homeland security.But did Septem-
ber 11 signal a failure of theory on
par with the failures of intelligence
and policy? Familiartheories about
how the world works still dominate
academic debate. Instead of radical
change,academiahas adjustedexist-
ing theories to meet new realities.
Has this approachsucceeded?Does
international relations theory still
have somethingto tell policymakers?
Six years ago, political scien-
tist Stephen M. Walt published a
0B much-cited survey of the field in
cr
these pages ("One World, Many
Theories," Spring 1998). He
0rr sketched out three dominant
CL
..J
O

0z JackSnyderis theRobertandReneeBelfer
rr,
U) professor of international relations at
ColumbiaUniversity.
NOVEMBER IDECEMBER 2004 53
52 FOREIGN POLICY
 One World, Rival Theories

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Hans?u s mt
lxne ed

Relism
-- -n
LibhemerriaelsomI
-a-
t -a-
-a--n--

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Stephen- G. Ikneryrh Finnmor
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ent Sowtr ot Bil Clinto ni.oaizto
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Theoryt
to Practice

tions. Idealism illuminates the changing norms of
sovereignty, human rights, and international jus-
tice, as well as the increased potency of religious
ideas in politics.
The influence of these intellectual constructs
extendsfar beyonduniversityclassroomsand tenure
committees.Policymakersand publiccommentators
invoke elementsof all these theorieswhen articulat-
ing solutions to global securitydilemmas.President
GeorgeW. Bush promisesto fight terrorby spread-
ing liberaldemocracyto the Middle East and claims
that skeptics "who call themselves'realists'....have
lost contactwith a fundamentalreality"that "Amer-
ica is always more secure when freedom is on the
march."Strikinga moreeclectictone, National Secu-
rity Advisor Condoleezza Rice, a former Stanford
Universitypoliticalscienceprofessor,explainsthatthe
new Bushdoctrineis an amalgamof pragmaticreal-
ism and Wilsonianliberaltheory.During the recent
presidential campaign, Sen. John Kerry sounded
remarkablysimilar:"Ourforeignpolicyhas achieved
greatness," he said, "only when it has combined
realismand idealism."
54 FOREIGN POLICY
Internationalrelations theory also shapes and
informsthe thinkingof the public intellectualswho
translateand disseminateacademicideas.Duringthe
summer of 2004, for example, two influential
framers of neoconservative thought, columnist
Charles Krauthammerand political scientist Fran-
cis Fukuyama, collided over the implications of
these conceptual paradigmsfor U.S. policy in Iraq.
Backingthe Bush administration'sMiddle East pol-
icy, Krauthammerarguedfor an assertiveamalgam
of liberalismand realism, which he called "demo-
cratic realism."Fukuyamaclaimedthat Krautham-
mer's faith in the use of force and the feasibilityof
democraticchange in Iraq blinds him to the war's
lack of legitimacy, a failing that "hurts both the
realistpart of our agenda, by diminishingour actu-
al power, and the idealist portion of it, by under-
cutting our appeal as the embodiment of certain
ideas and values."
Indeed, when realism, liberalism, and idealism
enter the policymaking arena and public debate,
they can sometimes become intellectual window
dressingfor simplisticworldviews. Properlyunder-
 stood, however,their policy implications are subtle
and multifaceted.Realisminstillsa pragmaticappre-
ciation of the role of power but also warns that
states will suffer if they overreach.Liberalismhigh-
lights the cooperative potential of mature democ-
racies, especially when working together through
effective institutions, but it also notes democracies'
tendency to crusade against tyrannies and the
propensityof emergingdemocraciesto collapse into
violent ethnic turmoil. Idealismstresses that a con-
sensus on values must underpinany stable political
order,yet it also recognizesthat forging such a con-
sensusoften requiresan ideologicalstrugglewith the
potential for conflict.
Each theory offers a filter for looking at a com-
plicated picture. As such, they help explain the
assumptionsbehind political rhetoricabout foreign
policy. Even more important, the theories act as a
powerful check on each other.Deployed effectively,
they revealthe weaknessesin argumentsthat can lead
to misguidedpolicies.
IS REALISM STILL REALISTIC?
At realism's core is the belief that international
affairs is a strugglefor power among self-interested
states. Although some of realism's leading lights,
notably the late Universityof Chicago political sci-
entist Hans J. Morgenthau, are deeply pessimistic
about human nature, it is not a theory of despair.
Clearsightedstatescan mitigatethe causes of war by
finding ways to reduce the danger
they pose to each other.Nor is real-
ism necessarily amoral; its advo-
cates emphasize that a ruthless Inliberaldemocracies,realismis thetheorythat
pragmatismabout power can actu-
ally yield a more peaceful world, if everyonelovesto hate.Itclaimsto beanantidote
not an ideal one.
In liberal democracies, realism tothenaivebeliefthatinternationalinstitutions
is the theory that everyone loves to
hate. Developed largely by Euro- andlawalonecanpreserve
pean 6migr6s at the end of World
War II, realism claimed to be an
antidote to the naive belief that international insti-
tutions and law alone can preserve peace, a mis-
conception that this new generation of scholars
believed had paved the way to war. In recent
decades, the realist approach has been most fully
articulated by U.S. theorists, but it still has broad
appeal outside the United States as well. The influ-
ential writer and editor Josef Joffe articulately
comments on Germany'sstrong realist traditions.
(Mindful of the overwhelming importance of U.S.
power to Europe's development, Joffe once called
the United States "Europe'spacifier.")China'scur-
rent foreign policy is grounded in realist ideas that
date back millennia. As China modernizesits econ-
omy and enters international institutions such as
the World Trade Organization, it behaves in a way
that realistsunderstandwell: developingits military
slowly but surely as its economic power grows, and
avoiding a confrontation with superiorU.S. forces.
Realismgets some thingsrightaboutthe post-9/11
world. The continued centralityof militarystrength
and the persistenceof conflict,evenin this age of glob-
al economic interdependence,does not surprisereal-
ists. The theory'smost obvious successis its abilityto
explain the United States'forceful militaryresponse
to the September11 terroristattacks.When a state
grows vastlymore powerfulthan any opponent,real-
ists expect that it will eventuallyuse that power to
expand its sphereof domination,whetherfor securi-
ty, wealth, or other motives. The United States
employedits militarypower in what some deemedan
imperialfashion in large part becauseit could.
It is harderfor the normally state-centricrealists
to explain why the world's only superpower
announced a war against al Qaeda, a nonstate ter-
rorist organization.How can realisttheory account
for the importanceof powerful and violent individ-
uals in a world of states?Realists point out that the
central battles in the "war on terror" have been
fought againsttwo states (Afghanistanand Iraq),and
peace.
that states,not the UnitedNations or Human Rights
Watch, have led the fight against terrorism.
Even if realists acknowledge the importance of
nonstate actors as a challenge to their assumptions,
the theory still has importantthingsto say about the
behaviorand motivations of these groups. The real-
ist scholar Robert A. Pape, for example, has argued
that suicide terrorism can be a rational, realistic
strategy for the leadership of national liberation
NOVEMBER IDECEMBER 2004 55
 One World, Rival Theories
movements seeking to expel democratic powers
that occupy their homelands. Other scholars apply
standard theories of conflict in anarchy to explain
ethnic conflict in collapsed states. Insights from
political realism-a profound and wide-ranging
intellectual tradition rooted in the enduring phi-
losophy of Thucydides, Niccol6 Machiavelli, and
Thomas Hobbes-are hardly rendered obsolete
because some nonstate groups are now able to
resort to violence.
Post-9/11 developments seem to undercut one
of realism's core concepts: the balance of power.
Standard realist doctrine predicts that weaker
states will ally to protect themselves from stronger
ones and thereby form and reform a balance of
power. So, when Germany unified in the late 19th
hassucha powerful
Liberalism that
presence
theentireU.S.political from
spectrum,
tohuman
neoconservatives advocates,
rights
assumesitas largelyself-evident.
century and became Europe'sleading military and
industrial power, Russia and France (and later,
Britain) soon aligned to counter its power. Yet no
combination of states or other powers can chal-
lenge the United States militarily, and no balanc-
ing coalition is imminent. Realists are scrambling
to find a way to fill this hole in the center of their
theory. Some theorists speculate that the United
States'geographicdistance and its relativelybenign
intentions have tempered the balancing instinct.
Second-tier powers tend to worry more about
their immediate neighbors and even see the Unit-
ed States as a helpful source of stability in regions
such as East Asia. Other scholars insist that armed
resistance by U.S. foes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere, and foot-dragging by its formal allies
actually constitute the beginnings of balancing
against U.S. hegemony.The United States' strained
relations with Europe offer ambiguous evidence:
Frenchand Germanopposition to recent U.S. poli-
cies could be seen as classic balancing, but they do
not resist U.S. dominance militarily.Instead, these
states have tried to undermine U.S. moral legiti-
macy and constrain the superpower in a web of
56 FOREIGN POLICY
multilateral institutions and treaty regimes-not
what standard realist theory predicts.
These conceptual difficulties notwithstanding,
realism is alive, well, and creatively reassessing
how its root principles relate to the post-9/11
world. Despite changing configurations of power,
realists remain steadfast in stressing that policy
must be based on positions of real strength,not on
either empty bravado or hopeful illusions about a
world without conflict. In the run-up to the recent
Iraq war, several prominent realists signed a pub-
lic letter criticizingwhat they perceivedas an exer-
cise in American hubris. And in the continuing
aftermath of that war, many prominent thinkers
called for a return to realism. A group of scholars
and public intellectuals (myself included) even
formed the Coalition for a Realis-
tic Foreign Policy, which calls for
a more modest and prudent
approach. Its statement of princi-
ples argues that "the move toward
empiremustbe haltedimmediately."
The coalition, though politically
diverse,is largelyinspiredby realist
theory.Its membershipof seeming-
ly odd bedfellows-including for-
mer DemocraticSen.GaryHartand
Scott McConnell,the executiveedi-
tor of the American Conservativemagazine-illus-
tratesthe power of internationalrelationstheoryto
cut through often ephemeral political labels and
carrydebate to the underlyingassumptions.
THE DIVIDED HOUSE OF LIBERALISM
The liberal school of internationalrelationstheory,
whose most famous proponents were German
philosopher Immanuel Kant and U.S. President
WoodrowWilson,contendsthat realismhas a stunt-
ed visionthatcannot accountfor progressin relations
between nations. Liberalsforesee a slow but inex-
orable journey away from the anarchic world the
realists envision, as trade and finance forge ties
between nations, and democratic norms spread.
Becauseelectedleadersare accountableto the people
(who bear the burdensof war), liberalsexpect that
democracieswill not attackeachotherandwill regard
eachother'sregimesas legitimateand nonthreatening.
Many liberalsalso believe that the rule of law and
transparencyof democraticprocessesmakeit easierto
sustain internationalcooperation, especially when
thesepracticesareenshrinedin multilateral
institutions.
 Liberalismhas such a powerfulpresencethat the
entire U.S. political spectrum, from neoconserva-
tives to humanrightsadvocates,assumesit as large-
ly self-evident.Outsidethe UnitedStates,as well, the
liberalview that only electedgovernmentsare legit-
imate and politicallyreliablehas taken hold. So it is
no surprisethat liberalthemesareconstantlyinvoked
as a responseto today's securitydilemmas.But the
last severalyearshave also produceda fiercetug-of-
war between disparate strains of liberal thought.
Supportersand criticsof the Bushadministration,in
particular,have emphasizedvery differentelements
of the liberalcanon.
For its part, the Bush administrationhighlights
democracypromotionwhile largelyturningits back
on the international institutions that most liberal
theorists champion. The U.S. National Security
Strategyof September2002, famous for its support
of preventivewar, also dwells on the need to pro-
mote democracy as a means of fighting terrorism
and promoting peace. The Millennium Challenge
program allocates part of U.S. foreign aid accord-
ing to how well countriesimprovetheirperformance
on several measures of democratization and the
rule of law. The White House'ssteadfastsupportfor
promoting democracy in the Middle East-even
with turmoilin Iraqand rising anti-Americanismin
the Arab world-demonstrates liberalism's emo-
tional and rhetoricalpower.
In many respects,liberalism'sclaim to be a wise
policy guide has plenty of hard data behindit. Dur-
ing the last two decades, the proposition that dem-
ocratic institutionsand values help states cooperate
with each other is among the most intensivelystud-
ied in all of internationalrelations, and it has held
up reasonablywell. Indeed, the belief that democ-
racies never fight wars against each other is the
closestthingwe have to an iron law in social science.
But the theory has some very important corol-
laries,which the Bushadministrationglosses over as
it draws upon the democracy-promotionelementof
liberal thought. Columbia University political sci-
entist Michael W. Doyle's articles on democratic
peace warned that, though democraciesnever fight
each other,they are proneto launchmessianicstrug-
gles againstwarlikeauthoritarianregimesto "make
NOVEMBER I DECEMBER 2004 57
 One World, Rival Theories

the world safe for democracy." It was precisely Nor is it clear to contemporaryliberal scholars
Americandemocracy'stendencyto oscillatebetween that nascentdemocracyand economicliberalismcan
self-righteouscrusadingand jaded isolationismthat always cohabitate. Free trade and the multifaceted
promptedearlyCold Warrealists'call for a more cal- globalization that advanced democracies promote
culated, prudent foreign policy. often buffet transitional societies. World markets'
Countriestransitioningto democracy,with weak penetration of societies that run on patronage and
politicalinstitutions,are more likelythan otherstates protectionism can disrupt social relations and spur
to get into internationaland civil wars. In the last 15 strifebetween potential winnersand losers. In other
years, wars or large-scale civil violence followed cases, universal free trade can make separatism
experimentswith mass electoraldemocracyin coun- look attractive, as small regions such as Aceh in
tries includingArmenia,Burundi,Ethiopia,Indone- Indonesia can lay claim to lucrative natural
sia, Russia, and the formerYugoslavia.In part, this resources.So far,the trade-fueledboom in Chinahas
violence is caused by ethnic groups' competing created incentives for improved relations with the
advanced democracies, but it has
also set the stage for a possible
showdown between the relatively
While thevirtues
advocating
aggressively of wealthy coastal entrepreneursand
the still impoverishedruralmasses.
democracy, hasshown
theBushadministration While aggressively advocating
the virtues of democracy,the Bush
forliberalism's
littlepatience emphasisonthe administration has shown little
patience for these complexities in
importance ofinternational
institutions. liberal thought-or for liberalism's
emphasis on the importance of
internationalinstitutions.Farfrom
demands for national self-determination, often a trying to assureother powers that the United States
problemin new, multiethnicdemocracies.More fun- would adhere to a constitutional order, Bush
damental,emergingdemocraciesoften have nascent "unsigned"the InternationalCriminalCourtstatute,
political institutions that cannot channel popular rejected the Kyoto environmentalagreement, dic-
demandsin constructivedirectionsor crediblyenforce tated take-it-or-leave-it arms control changes to
compromises among rival groups. In this setting, Russia, and invaded Iraq despite opposition at the
democratic accountability works imperfectly,and United Nations and among close allies.
nationalistpoliticianscan hijack public debate. The Recentliberaltheoryoffersa thoughtfulchallenge
violencethat is vexingthe experimentwith democracy to the administration'spolicy choices. Shortlybefore
in Iraqis justthe latestchapterin a turbulentstorythat September11, political scientist G. John Ikenberry
began with the FrenchRevolution. studied attemptsto establishinternationalorderby
Contemporary liberaltheory also points out that the victors of hegemonic struggles in 1815, 1919,
the rising democratic tide creates the presumption 1945, and 1989. He arguedthat even the most pow-
that all nations ought to enjoy the benefits of self- erfulvictorneededto gain the willing cooperationof
determination.Those left out may undertakeviolent the vanquishedand other weak states by offeringa
campaigns to secure democratic rights. Some of mutually attractivebargain,codified in an interna-
these movements directtheir strugglesagainst dem- tional constitutional order. Democratic victors, he
ocratic or semidemocraticstates that they consider found, have the best chance of creating a working
occupyingpowers-such as in Algeriain the 1950s, constitutionalorder,such as the BrettonWoods sys-
or Chechnya, Palestine,and the Tamil region of Sri tem after World War Ii, becausetheir transparency
Lankatoday. Violence may also be directedat dem- and legalismmake their promisescredible.
ocratic supportersof oppressiveregimes,much like Does the Bush administration's resistance to
the U.S. backing of the governments of Saudi Ara- institution building refute Ikenberry'sversion of
bia and Egypt. Democratic regimesmake attractive liberal theory? Some realists say it does, and that
targets for terroristviolence by national liberation recent events demonstrate that international insti-
movements precisely because they are accountable tutions cannot constrain a hegemonic power if its
to a cost-conscious electorate. preferences change. But international institutions
58 FOREIGN POLICY
The Leading Brands

Theories: Realism Liberalism Idealism

(Constructivism)

ofdemocracy,
Spread International isshaped
politics
Self-interested
states
compete economic
global ties,and bypersuasive collective
ideas,
Core Beliefs international will andsocial
forpower
andsecurity organizations culture,
values,
strengthen
peace identities

Key Actors in which

States, behave
similarly States,
Promoters
ofnewideas,
international
institutions,transnational
activist
networks,
International oftheir
regardless typeof
andcommercial
interests andnongovernmental
Relations government
organizations

Main Military andstate

power International
institutions
and
commerce andvalues
Ideas
Instruments diplomacy global

Doesn't
account
forprogress Failstounderstand
that
Theory's andchangeininternational democratic survive
regimes only Does
notexplain
which
power
Intellectual Blind relations
orunderstanding
that iftheysafeguard
military
power structures
and
social
conditions
canbeasource
of andsecurity;
someliberals
forget
Spots
legitimacy todemocracy allow
thattransitions forchanges
invalues
military
power aresometimes
violent

What the Theory WhytheUnitedStates Theincreasing

role
ofpolemics
to Why spreading has
democracy
responded
aggressively about theimportance
values; of
Explains About terrorist theinability
attacks; of
becomesuchanintegral
partof
transnational networks
political
the Post-9/II current
U.S.
international
secu-
international
institutions
to terrorists
(whether orhuman
restrain
military
superiority rity
strategy advocates)
World rights

What the Theory Thefailure

ofsmaller
powersto
balance
theUnited theUnited
States Whyhuman abuses
rights
militarily Why has
Fails to Explain theimportance
ofnon- failed
towork
with
other
democ- continue, intense
despite
States; activism
forhumanitarian
About the suchasalQaeda;
stateactors racies international
through
theintense
U.S.
focuson normsandefforts
for
organizations international
Post-9/I IWorld democratization justice

can nonetheless help coordinate outcomes that tutional order remainpowerful. Sooner or later,the
are in the long-term mutual interest of both the pendulum will swing back.
hegemon and the weaker states. Ikenberrydid not
contend that hegemonic democracies are immune
from mistakes. States can act in defiance of the IDEALISM'S NEW CLOTHING
incentives established by their position in the inter- Idealism,the belief that foreign policy is and should
national system, but they will suffer the conse- be guided by ethical and legal standards,also has a
quences and probably learn to correct course. In long pedigree.BeforeWorldWar II forced the Unit-
response to Bush's unilateralist stance, Ikenberry ed Statesto acknowledge a less pristinereality,Sec-
wrote that the incentives for the United States to retaryof State Henry Stimson denigratedespionage
take the lead in establishing a multilateral consti- on the grounds that "gentlemen do not read each
NOVEMBER IDECEMBER 2004 59
 One World, Rival Theories

other'smail."Duringthe ColdWar,suchnaiveide- Forconstructivists,internationalchangeresults

alismacquireda badnamein the Kissingerian cor- from the work of intellectualentrepreneurs who
ridorsof powerandamonghardheaded academics. proselytizenew ideasand "name and shame"actors
Recently,a new versionof idealism-called con- whose behaviordeviatesfromacceptedstandards.
structivism by its scholarlyadherents-returned to a Consequently, constructivists
oftenstudytheroleof
prominentplace in debateson internationalrela- transnationalactivistnetworks-such as Human
tionstheory.Constructivism, whichholdsthatsocial RightsWatchor theInternational Campaignto Ban
realityis created throughdebate aboutvalues,often Landmines-in promotingchange. Such groups
echoesthe themesthat humanrightsand interna- typicallyuncoverand publicizeinformationabout
tionaljusticeactivistssound.Recenteventsseemto violations of legal or moral standardsat least
vindicate the theory'sresurgence;a theory that rhetoricallysupportedby powerfuldemocracies,
emphasizesthe roleof ideologies,identities,persua- including"disappearances" duringthe Argentine
sion,andtransnational networksis highlyrelevantto military'srule in the late 1970s, concentration
the
understanding post-9/11world. campsin Bosnia,and the hugenumberof civilian
Themostprominent voicesin thedevelopment of deathsfromlandmines.Thispublicityis thenused
constructivist theory have been American, but to pressgovernmentsto adopt specificremedies,
Europe'sroleis significant.Europeanphilosophical such as the establishmentof a war crimestribunal
currents helpedestablishconstructivist theory,andthe or the adoptionof a landminetreaty.Thesemove-
European Journalof InternationalRelationsis oneof mentsoftenmakepragmaticargumentsas well as
theprincipaloutletsforconstructivist work.Perhaps idealisticones, but their distinctivepowercomes
most important,Europe'sincreasinglylegalistic fromtheabilityto highlightdeviationsfromdeeply
approachto international relations,reflectedin the held normsof appropriatebehavior.
process of forming the
EuropeanUnionout of a
collection of sovereign
states,providesfertilesoil
for idealistand construc-
tivistconceptionsof inter-
nationalpolitics.
Whereasrealistsdwell
on the balanceof power
andliberalson the power
of international tradeand
democracy, constructivists
believethatdebatesabout
ideas are the fundamen-
tal building blocks of
international life.Individ-
uals and groups become
powerfulif theycan con-
vinceothersto adopttheir
ideas. People's under-
standing of their interests
depends on the ideas they hold. Constructivistsfind Progressivecauses receivethe most attention
absurdthe idea of some identifiableand immutable from constructivistscholars,but the theoryalso
"national interest," which some realists cherish. helps explain the dynamicsof illiberaltransna-
Especially in liberal societies, there is overlap tionalforces,suchas Arabnationalismor Islamist
between constructivist and liberal approaches, but extremism.ProfessorMichaelN. Barnett's1998
the two are distinct. Constructivists contend that book Dialoguesin ArabPolitics:Negotiationsin
their theory is deeper than realism and liberalism Regional Order examines how the divergence
because it explains the origins of the forces that betweenstatebordersandtransnational Arabpolit-
drive those competing theories. icalidentitiesrequiresvulnerableleadersto contend
60 FOREIGN POLICY
for legitimacy with radicals throughout the Arab shared understanding highlights the need for dia-
world-a dynamic that often holds moderates logue across cultures about the appropriate rules of
hostage to opportunists who take extreme stances. the game. This prescription dovetails with liberalism's
Constructivist thought can also yield broader emphasis on establishing an agreed international
insights about the ideas and values in the current constitutional order. And, yet, the notion of cross-
international order. In his 2001 book, Revolutions cultural dialogue sits awkwardly with many idealists'
in Sovereignty:How Ideas Shaped Modern Inter- view that they already know right and wrong. For
national Relations, political scientist Daniel Philpott these idealists, the essential task is to shame rights
demonstrates how the religious ideas of the Protes- abusers and cajole powerful actors into promoting
tant Reformation helped break down the medieval proper values and holding perpetrators accountable
political order and provided a conceptual basis for to international (generally Western) standards. As
the modern system of secular sovereign states. After with realism and liberalism, constructivism can be
September 11, Philpott focused on the challenge to many things to many people.
the secular international order posed by political
Islam. "The attacks and the broader resurgence of
STUMPED BY CHANGE
public religion," he says, ought to lead internation-
al relations scholars to "direct far more energy to None of the three theoretical traditions has a strong
understanding the impetuses behind movements ability to explain change-a significant weakness
across the globe that are reorienting purposes and in such turbulent times. Realists failed to predict the
policies." He notes that both liberal human rights end of the Cold War, for example. Even after it hap-
movements and radical Islamic movements have pened, they tended to assume that the new system
transnational structures and principled motivations would become multipolar ("back to the future," as
the scholar John J.
Mearsheimer put it).
Likewise, the liberal the-
ory of democratic peace
is stronger on what hap-
pens after states become
democratic than in pre-
dicting the timing of
democratic transitions,
let alone prescribing how
to make transitions hap-
pen peacefully. Con-
structivists are good at
describing changes in
norms and ideas, but
they are weak on the
material and institution-
al circumstances neces-
sary to support the emer-
gence of consensus about
new values and ideas.
that challenge the traditional supremacy of self- With such uncertain guidance from the theo-
interested states in international politics. Because retical realm, it is no wonder that policymakers,
constructivists believe that ideas and values helped activists, and public commentatorsfall prey to sim-
shape the modern state system, they expect intellec- plistic or wishful thinking about how to effect
tual constructs to be decisive in transforming it-for change by, say, invadingIraq or setting up an Inter-
good or ill. national Criminal Court. In lieu of a good theory
When it comes to offering advice, however, con- of change, the most prudent course is to use the
structivism points in two seemingly incompatible insightsof each of the threetheoreticaltraditionsas
directions. The insight that political orders arise from a check on the irrationalexuberanceof the others.
NOVEMBER I DECEMBER 2004 61
 One World, Rival Theories

Realists should have to explain whether policies
based on calculationsof power have sufficientlegit-
imacy to last. Liberals should consider whether
nascent democratic institutions can fend off pow-
erful interests that oppose them, or how interna-
tional institutions can bind a hegemonic power
inclinedto go its own way. Idealistsshould be asked
about the strategic, institutional, or material con-
ditions in which a set of ideas is likely to take hold.
Theories of international relations claim to
explain the way international politics works, but
each of the currently prevailing theories falls well
short of that goal. One of the principal contribu-
tions that international relations theory can make
is not predicting the future but providing the
vocabularyand conceptualframeworkto ask hard
questions of those who think that changing the
world is easy. 1H

Wantto KnowMore?

Stephen M. Walt's "InternationalRelations: One World, Many Theories" (FOREIGNPOLICY,

Spring 1998) is a valuable survey of the field. For a more recent survey,see RobertJervis, "Theo-
ries of War in an Era of LeadingPower Peace" (AmericanPolitical ScienceReview, March 2002).

ImportantrecentrealistcontributionsincludeJohnJ. Mearsheimer'sThe Tragedyof GreatPower

Politics (New York:Norton, 2001) and FareedZakaria,From Wealthto Power: The Unusual Ori-
gins of America's World Role (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1998). Important realist-
inspiredanalyses of post-9/11 issues include "The StrategicLogic of SuicideTerrorism"(American
Political ScienceReview, August 2003), by Robert A. Pape; "The CompulsiveEmpire"(FOREIGN
POLICY,July/August 2003), by Robert Jervis; and "An Unnecessary War " (FOREIGNPOLICY,Jan-
uary/February2003), by John Mearsheimerand StephenWalt. Read about a currenteffort to inject
realism into U.S. foreign policy at the Web site of the Coalition for a RealisticForeignPolicy. For
a worriedlook at the realistresurgence,see LawrenceE Kaplan,"Springtimefor Realism"(TheNew
Republic,June 21, 2004).

Recentadditionsto the liberalcanon are BruceRussettandJohn R. Oneal'sTriangulatingPeace:

Democracy,Interdependence,and InternationalOrganizations (New York:Norton, 2001) and G.
John Ikenberry'sAfter Victory:Institutions, StrategicRestraint,and the Rebuilding of OrderAfter
Major Wars (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001). To read about the dangersof democra-
tization in countrieswith weak institutions,see EdwardD. Mansfield and Jack Snyder,Electing to
Fight: Why EmergingDemocracies Go to War (Cambridge:MIT Press,2005) and Zakaria'sThe
Future of Freedom:Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York:W.W.Norton & Co.,
2003). Charles Krauthammerand FrancisFukuyamatussle over strains of liberalismin a recent
exchange.Krauthammermakesthe case for spreadingdemocracyin "DemocraticRealism:An Amer-
ican Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World," an address to the American EnterpriseInstitute, and
Fukuyamaresponds in "The Neoconservative Moment," (The National Interest, Summer2004).
Krauthammer'srejoinder,"In Defense of DemocraticRealism" (The National Interest,Fall 2004),
counters Fukuyama'sclaims.

Read more on constructivismin AlexanderWendt,Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics (New

York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999). MargaretE. Keck and KathrynSikkinklook at construc-
tivismat work in ActivistsBeyondBorders:AdvocacyNetworksin InternationalPolitics (Ithaca:Cor-
nellUniversityPress,1998). More focusedworksincludeSikkink'sMixed Messages:U.S.HumanRights
Policy and LatinAmerica(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2004) and MichaelN. Barnett'sDialogues
in Arab Politics:Negotiations in Regional Order(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1998).

S)For links to relevantWeb sites, access to the FP Archive,and a comprehensiveindex of related

FOREIGNPOLICYarticles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.

62 FOREIGN POLICY