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The Rules, the first of its kind in the world, took effect on April 29, 2010.
Section 2. Scope. — These Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal
and special civil actions before the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts involving enforcement or violations of environmental and
other related laws, rules and regulations.
In addition, since this section covers ―civil, criminal and special civil
actions…involving enforcement or violations of environmental and other related
laws‖ (emphasis added), these Rules may apply in other suits not necessarily
based on environmental laws or laws containing environmental provisions.
Specifically, for example, if a defendant in a civil damages or defamation suit
(the case of which is governed by the regular rules of civil/criminal procedure)
invokes a SLAPP defense (see Rule 6 and 19 infra.), then these Rules shall
apply insofar as the SLAPP defense is concerned.
The provision on citizen suits liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws. Citizen suits have proven critical in forcing
government and its agencies to act on its duty to protect and preserve the
environment. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated
in Oposa v. Factoran (GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993). As a procedural device,
citizen suits permit deferred payment of filing fees until after the judgment.
Section 4. Who may file. — Any real party in
interest, including the government and juridical entities
authorized by law, may file a civil action involving the
enforcement or violation of any environmental law (Part II
Civil Procedure, Rule 2 Pleadings and Parties)
Similar to the writs of habeas corpus, amparo, and habeas data, the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan is immediate in nature. It contains a very
specific set of remedies which may be availed of by a natural or juridical
person, entity authorized by law, people‘s organization, non-governmental
organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or private individual or
entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The
petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan can be filed with the Supreme
Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals. Likewise, the
summary process leading to the issuance of the writ of kalikasan dispenses
with extensive litigation; this facilitates the prompt disposition of matters
before the court.
Since legal challenges may be mounted against those who seek to enforce
environmental law or to assert environmental rights, the Rules make available
a formidable defense to these by creating a rule on SLAPP.
SLAPP. The SLAPP provisions under these Rules are innovations of the
doctrine first introduced by Dr. George W. Pring, as well as doctrines and
practices in other jurisdictions. The main purpose of a SLAPP suit is to
harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse on any
person, including the government from enforcing environmental laws or
protecting or asserting environmental rights.
The provision on bail makes available to the accused the privilege of bail
from any court within and outside the jurisdiction of the court which had
issued the warrant of arrest. The immediate availability of bail is intended to
obviate long periods of detention.
Verification
At the outset, we note that the Petition has a procedural flaw that should
merit its outright dismissal. Through the Verification and Certification attached
to the instant Petition, petitioner states that the contents of the Petition ―are
true and correct of [his] own personal knowledge and belief and based on
authentic records and/or documents.‖ Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
provides that a pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on ―information and belief‖ or ―knowledge, information and belief,‖ shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading. A pleading, therefore, in which the
verification is based merely on the party‘s knowledge and belief – as in the
instant Petition – produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court
to allow the deficiency to be remedied (Vicencio v. Villar, G.R. No. 182969,
July 3, 2012).
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Supreme Court restates in
capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements respecting non-compliance
with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective verification,
and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective certification against forum shopping.
Only Questions of Law in Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45;
Exceptions
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law
may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the Supreme Court. An
inquiry into the veracity of the factual findings and conclusions of the CA is not
the function of the Supreme Court, for said Court is not a trier of facts. Neither
is it its function to reexamine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the
parties (Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Tentmakers Group, Inc., G.R.
No. 171050, July 4, 2012).
Preponderance of Evidence
Settled is the rule that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is available to an aggrieved party only when ―there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.‖ Otherwise, the petition will not prosper even if the alleged ground is grave
abuse of discretion (Bethel Realty and Development Corporation v. HLURB,
G.R. No. 184482, July 4, 2012).
This Court has held time and again that a final and executory judgment,
no matter how erroneous, cannot be changed, even by the Supreme Court.
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if such modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land (Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Mactan Rock
Industries, Inc., G.R.No. 172438, July 4, 2012).
Litis Pendentia
Litis pendentia is predicated on the principle that a party should not be allowed
to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same
cause of action. It is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter
should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that
possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights
and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous
suits.
With the two petitions then pending before the CA, all the elements of litis
pendentia were present, that is, identity of the parties in the two actions, substantial
identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties, and identity
between the two actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
To determine whether there is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, grounded on the same facts and bases, the following tests may be utilized: (1)
whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the second
causes of action, also known as the ―same evidence‖ test; or (2) whether the defenses
in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental
is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the
time of the filing of the first case (Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Mactan
Rock Industries, Inc., G.R.No. 172438, July 4, 2012). `
Void Judgment
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no
power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the
parties or both. In other words, a court, which does not have the power to
decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties,
will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice (Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No.
176556, July 4, 2012).
In Neypes, the Supreme Court modified the rule in civil cases on the
counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically
set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the
motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally
disposed of the issues involved in the case.
The raison d’être for the ―fresh period rule‖ is to standardize the appeal
period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the
15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is
no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal
period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to
the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to
appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
xxxx
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases
are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC
(in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases
under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated
differently (Yu v. Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9,
2011).
Res Judicata
Appeal
An appeal throws the entire case open to review, and that the Court has
the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by
the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of
the case (Carvajal v. Luzon Development Bank, G.R. No. 186169, August 1,
2012).
The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via Rule 65
or Petition for Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St.
Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission. This Court held
that the proper vehicle for such review was a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that this action should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.
Venue
The general rule on the venue of personal actions, as in the instant case
for damages filed by respondent, is embodied in Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court. It provides:
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant,
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
A trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue, thus:
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Payment of docket fees; failure to pay the docket fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2)
years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the
Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees required. Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v.
Ros, the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to
defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to
abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court,
the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict
regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court,
in several instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of
docket fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their
cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin, the Court
stated:
It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file
a pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended. The court‘s discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned
upon such motion‘s timeliness, the passing of which renders the court
powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after
the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend
(Posiquit v. People, G.R. No. 193943, January 16, 2012).
Amp/2012