1

Delanty, Gerard, and Krishan Kumar. 2006. "Introduction." Pp. 1-4 in The SAGE
Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, ed. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

<http://www.sage-ereference.com/hdbk_nation/Article_n1.html>.

Nationalism, once thought by many intellectuals of both Left and Right to be a declining
or dying force, has seemingly returned with renewed vigour in recent decades. The most
spectacular examples have been in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, in
the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. But its
continuing vitality has been evident in many other parts of the world as well. There have
been powerful nationalist movements in the Middle East and in Asia, linked often to new
or revived religious currents in Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Nationalist
passions continue to be strong in Africa, leading to constant movements of secession and
more or less endemic civil war in several countries. Even in the West, the original
homeland of nationalism and the part of the world once thought to have experienced its
steepest decline, nationalism has shown a surprising capacity for survival and adaptation,
not least in the societies that make up the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.

Nationalism, it is clear, is a global phenomenon, demanding treatment in a global

perspective. It is happening everywhere; at the same time every expression seems in
some sense to feed off expressions elsewhere, leading one to suspect some common
source or sources that are fuelling the phenomenon. Nationalism may have had its origin
in a particular place and at a particular time - late eighteenth-century Europe, by general
agreement. But not only did its ideology then spread across the world, carried as often as
not by the European empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the world itself
has become increasingly unified, so that global structures and processes now play their
part in shaping the varieties and vicissitudes of nationalism.

2
In recent years, the study of nationalism has attracted growing attention from scholars in
a range of disciplines - sociology, anthropology, history, politics, even literature and
philosophy. General works by a number of scholars - Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson,
Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony Smith, John Breuilly Rogers Brubaker, Walker Connor,
Miroslav Hroch - have formed a core of theoretical approaches that has informed much of
the work in particular areas. There have been some outstanding studies of specific cases,
such as Eugen Weber's Peasants into Frenchmen (1976) and Linda Colley's Britons
(1992). What we have lacked is a volume that looks at the phenomenon of nationalism in
its full global dimensions. This has meant that not only have certain areas of the world
been neglected, it has also meant that existing theoretical approaches have not been
refined, or new approaches thought out, to fit the many new types of nationalism now
encountered on the world stage. Nationalism is both old and new. There is a distinct and
recognizable continuity with nineteenth-century European forms and ideologies. At the
same time there have been the inevitable mutations, as nationalism has adapted to or been
reconstructed by cultures with different traditions from the West. In addition, the world
has moved on; nationalism today arises in circumstances very different from those in
which it was invented, more than two centuries ago.

The emergence of modern nationalism in the period following the French Revolution was
on the whole connected with the formation of the modern nation-state, on the one side,
and on the other with the emergence of industrial society. Most nationalist movements
were shaped by one, or very often both, of these developments. While the crystallization
of nationalism and nationhood took many different forms it was inextricably connected
with statehood and with the centralizing and modernizing tendency towards the
homogenization of populations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that nationalism
and nationhood were projects of modernity and reflected the particularistic dimension of
modernity's universalism. Nationalism was a product of a world in which the nation-state
was the primary societal principle of organization. Today it is a different matter. The
nation-state, while far from being in decline, is no longer the only principle of societal
organization. Under the conditions of globalization there are many other contenders and
challenges to national sovereignty other than the demands of other states. This has had a

3
huge impact on nationalism, the resurgence of which can be linked to the turbulence of
the nation-state and the ever-changing global context. Many kinds of nationalism are
products of transnationalism. A particularly contemporary example of this is Islamic
nationalism. In the countries where it has taken root it has been because of global forces.
The political community in question is one shaped by the global imaginary of a trans-
civilizational diaspora rather than by a particular aspiration for a bounded territorial state.
It is a stateless kind of nationalism and indeed one that is often anti-statist.

The implication of this is that nationhood and statehood have become more and more
disentangled. Nationalism is taking a wide variety of forms and is more fluid than static.
This possibly explains why there has been a global increase in nationalism and why it
takes more oppositional forms. Globalized communication and movements facilitate
nationalism which is also driven by the relentless concern with meaning and identity that
is a feature of the present day. It is both a reaction and a product of globalization. Where
earlier forms of nationalism arose out of the process of modernization - as outlined by
Gellner and Deutsch and others - and were often linked to nations that were embarking
on imperialism, nationalism today is postmodern and post-colonial. When one looks at
the wider global situation it is evident that nationalism derives from the periphery rather
than the centre. This is strikingly the case of Europe, where most of the former
communist societies have experienced a rise in nationalism along with the recovery of
national independence that followed the end of communism. Paradoxically, this has
occurred at the same time as the movement towards European integration reached an
enhanced momentum. Post-communist countries have found in the European Union a
new way to achieve national autonomy.

The nationalism of the periphery is often a case of belated modernization, in the terms of
Gellner's analysis. But in such cases and especially so in the developed world nationalism
has an anti-statist tendency. Within the Western European states, nationalism has on the
whole been anti-statist, as is illustrated by the extreme-right and various populist
tendencies. It is difficult not to draw the conclusion that the state and the dominant
political elites do not control the discourse of nationhood. The nation has become more

4
and more disengaged by those social actors who in the past had a closer connection to
nationalism.

The resurgence of nationalism should not lead one to the conclusion that nationalism is
some kind of illusion or a dangerous myth to be dispelled by rational scholarship or
liberal temperament, as Ernest Gellner probably believed. The political and cultural
forms of the nation are multifaceted. Nationhood is part of the condition of modernity
and one of the most important expressions of political community. The tremendous
appeal of the idea of the nation is undoubtedly due to the fact that it is a social category.
In this it is a contrast to the idea of the state, which is a category of political rule and
unlike class is by definition inclusive. The idea of the nation encapsulates social issues,
such as solidarity and we-feeling, which are often eroded by the general tendency
towards the transnationalization of the state whereby the state disengages itself from the
nation. Again, this is an example of the recalcitrant nature of nationalism. In conditions
that are present in both highly developed and less developed societies, the state has
become more and more absorbed into transnational processes, on the one side, and on the
other there is an increase in social fragmentation. This is entirely different from the
period when nationalism arose in Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, when it was linked to a wider societal tendency towards integration and
citizenship.

The changed nature and function of nationalism today require a new approach to its study.
The classical literature did not take account of globalization and was generally concerned
with the rise of nationalism with modern society. The study of nationalism today, as is
reflected by the chapters in this Handbook, concerns a wider range of social phenomena.
One of the conclusions to be drawn from this is that nationalism is present in almost
every aspect of political community and social arrangements. It pervades the global and
the local dimensions and can even take cosmopolitan forms. If one were to seek the
defining feature of nationalism in all its forms, it might be the relation to agency.
Nationalism arose with the rise of political subjectivity and with modernity it
encapsulated the spirit of freedom which inspired the key doctrine of nationalism, namely

5
the notion of self-determination. Where individualism and liberalism gave expression to
one dimension of modernity, and which left its imprint on liberal nationalism, the other
romantic face of nationalism, with its characteristic emphasis on peoplehood and
collective consciousness, provided a powerful impetus to the other dimension of
nationalism. Few movements have been more successful in linking the projects of elites
with the masses, who were mobilized by nationalism in a way that cannot be so easily
said of the other social movements of the modern era. Moreover, there were relatively
few nationalist movements and few official nation-states in the formative period of
nation-state building. Mazzini, often considered to be one of the founders of modern
European nationalism, believed only countries of a certain size could be legitimately
deemed nations and a Europe of sovereign nations would have few nations.

Today, nationalism is neither liberal nor romantic, and nor is it a movement that is
distinct from other social movements. While other social movements - socialism,
communism, fascism - accommodated nationalism, which became the basis of the post-
war interstate system, nationalism has become normalized, taking „banal‟ forms as
Michael Billig has argued. Nationalism is no longer something that exists as a specific
social force but is rather embroiled in the public culture of the democratic state. This
makes nationalism particularly more challenging to investigate than was the case in the
past when nationalism became a subject of scholarly study. It is evident that nationalism
can mean many things - a movement, an ideology or discourse of nationhood - and there
are different traditions of scholarship. The way political philosophers treat the subject is
very different from the approach of historians.

This Handbook aims to fill the existing gap in the literature; to offer, within the compass
of a single volume, the most comprehensive view in existence - so far as we are aware -
of the phenomenon of nationalism. To this end we have drawn our contributors from
many disciplines and from many different parts of the world. The study of nationalism is
interdisciplinary, with contributions from history, sociology, anthropology, political
science, social psychology and philosophy. The coverage is truly global, incorporating
developments on all continents. We are convinced that for both professional scholars and

6
students alike this volume is unique in its scholarly breadth and geographical range. All
contributors, moreover, have been encouraged not simply to give an account of the main
developments in their specific areas but to state their own positions and to lay out their
views on the outstanding problems and future directions for research. This is a handbook,
not an encyclopedia.

The 45 chapters of the Handbook are organized into three broad sections. Part 1:
Approaches examines various concepts and theories of nationhood and nationalism.
These range from considerations of classic theories, such as those of Ernest Gellner (John
Hall) and other modernization theorists (Miroslav Hroch) and the work of historians
(Krishan Kumar), to questions of the ethics and justification of nationalism (Margaret
Moore) and the problems of comparative analysis (Johann Arnason). There are also
chapters on less studied aspects of nationalism, such as psychological (Lauren Langman),
socio-linguistic (Ruth Wodak) and gender (Sylvia Walby) approaches. The contributors
in this section are throughout sensitive to the shifting and protean forms and meanings of
nationalism, and the need to adapt or invent approaches to match its always-contested
terms and constantly changing character.

Part 2: Themes addresses certain broad themes and topics in the study of nationalism.
These include traditional subjects, such as the relation between race (Steve Fenton),
ethnicity (Anthony Smith) and nation, and the overlaps and differences between them and
their uses. There are also discussions of the relations of nationalism to religion (Mark
Juergensmeyer), region (David McCrone) and modernity (Liah Greenfeld) and
cosmopolitanism (Gerard Delanty), and of the connections and oppositions of
nationalism to ideologies of liberalism (Mark Haugaard) and of the radical Right (Mabel
Berezin). But there are also newer stresses on the role of nationhood and nationalism in
collective memory (Charles Turner and John Brewer) and in such areas as sport (Anthony
King) and global spectacles (Maurice Roche). There are also contributions that take up
the issue of the „dark side‟ of nationalism, and of its possible relation to genocide and
„ethnic cleansing‟ (Andreas Wimmer, Daniele Conversi).

7
Part 3: Nations and Nationalism in a Global Age looks in detail at nationhood and
nationalism in all the major countries and regions of the world. But, though necessarily
dealing with particular cases, contributors have generally wished to emphasize
comparative aspects, to show the similarities and differences between the specific
example and other cases elsewhere. If these many examples reveal a common pattern, it
is not one of uniformity or homogeneity but more of what one might call Wittgensteinian
„family resemblances‟ between cases. A common ideology of nationalism is refracted
through the prism of different traditions and different historical experiences. American
nationalism, for instance, shows the impress of the early experience of nationhood
(Susan-Mary Grant), as compared with „late developers‟ such as the African nations
(Benyamin Neuberger). But - and this is the other main focus of this section - the newer
and more intensified forces of globalization may today be stimulating some larger
similarities in nationalist responses. Nationalism in the global age, the age of
supranational organizations and transnational corporations, is, despite several statements
to the contrary, alive and thriving; but it is likely to show a very different face from that
of the age of the more or less autonomous nation-state.

8
 Part One
Approaches

9
Kumar, Krishan. 2006. "Nationalism and the Historians." Pp. 7-20

„Historians‟, says Eric Hobsbawm, „are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to
heroin addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market‟ (1996: 255). This calculatedly
malicious remark points up the evident link between history, historians and nationalism. A
nationalism that does not appeal to history is unthinkable. Whatever the differences of definition,
all concepts of the nation include some reference to the past, to history or tradition. A nation is
something that is formed in and by time; it „presupposes a past‟, as Ernest Renan says (1990
[1882]: 19). A social group that does not have, or cannot invent, a past is not and cannot be a
nation: „nations without a past are contradictions in terms‟ (Hobsbawm 1996: 255). It is difficult,
of course, to think of any social group other than the most ephemeral that does not have a past.
But the past of the nation is not simply deeper and longer than in the case of other social groups;
it is virtually constitutive. That is why historians have been central to the task of establishing
claims for nationhood, and in the elaboration of nationalist ideologies (Kohn 1960, 1961;
Deletant and Hanak 1988; Woolf 1996: 2-8; Hall 1997; Berger et al. 1999; Suny 2001b: 345-8;
Breuilly 2002: 84). Think of Karamzin in the case of Russia, Palacky in the case of the Czechs,
Hrushevsky for Ukraine, Treitschke for Germany, Michelet for France.

Even in the relatively „non-national‟ case of England, such definitions of national identity as there
are have come predominantly from historians, as in A. E. Freeman's powerful evocation of the
Anglo-Saxon character of English identity (Burrow 1983; Mandler 2002: 36), or Herbert
Butterfield's charting and eventual championing of „the Whig interpretation‟ of English history as
the bedrock of the English political tradition (Butterfield 1945,1951 [1931]; cf. Breuilly 2002: 56).

But historians have also played an equally important role in another way - not as nationalists or
the nourishers of nationalism, but as commentators on and critics of nationalism (cf. Smith 1999b;
Suny 2001b: 347). This follows, in a sense, from the very idea of the nation as a historically
formed community. For if such is the nationalist claim, who but historians are best equipped to
assess it? If the French nation, say, is seen by French nationalists as having its birth in the
struggle against the English in the Hundred Years War, or - equally and alternatively - as only
being formed much later, by the ideas and conflicts of the French Revolution, it becomes a matter
for historians qua historians to investigate these assertions and to report on their findings.
Whether their findings delight or disconcert French nationalists is not the historians' affair. Ernest

10
Renan famously said that „forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is an
essential factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often
constitutes a danger for nationality' (1990 [1882]: 11). For Hobsbawm this means that „no serious
historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed political nationalist‟, because
„nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so‟ (1992: 12). Certainly nationalist
commitment can get in the way of good history, as has been clear in the critical responses to such
works as Fernand Braudel's L'Identitéde la France (e.g. Noiriel 1996: 36-41; Suny 2001b: 357),
or the controversies surrounding Pierre Nora's grand project of nationalist historiography, Les
Lieux de mémoire (Englund 1992; Jackson 1999: 242-4). At the same time nationalism has been
the spur to some great works of history, as in Jules Michelet's History of France (1833-67) or
Theodor Mommsen's History of Rome (1856). At any rate there can be no doubt that, whether as
partisans or critics, the work of historians is central to the idea of the nation and to the evaluation
of nationalist claims.

There is a third way in which history and historians are crucial to nationalism. This is in the
narrative of nationalism itself, in the tracing of the origins of nations and the rise of the ideal or
ideology of nationalism. There was a time when, it seems, there was no such thing as nationalism,
and perhaps also no such thing as the nation, at least as we have come to understand that term.
That, at any rate, has been the claim of a powerful group of „modernist‟ theorists of nationalism,
as against the „perennialists‟ or „primordialists‟ who see nations and nationalism as having
existed since time immemorial (Smith 1998). Certainly sociologists and other social scientists
have weighed in on this question, as shown in the influential contributions of Karl Deutsch,
Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, Tom Nairn, Walker Connor and others. One
can even say that it is they, rather than the historians, who have raised the question in the first
place. But it is notable the extent to which all of them have had to engage with history in
grappling with it. If nationalism is a recent thing, how and why did it come into existence? What
was the state of things before nationalism, to which nationalism is the contrast and against which
it can best be measured? Can there be „nations before nationalism‟, that is, the existence of
national consciousness and national identity before the rise of the ideology of nationalism?

Clearly, since claims of priority and temporality are involved in these disputes, we are once more
in the province of the historian. Hence, one again, the prominence of historians, not this time as
nationalists or anti-nationalists, but as students of nationalism. No discussion of nationalism and
its problems could be considered adequate without taking into account the contributions of

11
historians such as Hans Kohn (e.g. 1944), George Mosse (1975), Hugh Seton-Watson (1977),
Eric Hobsbawm (1992), John Breuilly (1994) or Miroslav Hroch (2000). These have all
considered nationalism in the round, in the grandest, most comprehensive, perspective. To them
we would also want to add those historians whose accounts of particular cases or episodes have
had a significant impact on theories of nationalism. These would include Eugen Weber's
impressive study Peasants into Frenchmen (1976), with its emphasis on the lateness of French
national integration and the key roles played by the school and the army in this process; it would
also include such works as Peter Sahlins's Boundaries (1989), with its Barthian focus on the way
in which national boundaries influenced the creation and negotiation of French and Spanish
identities in the Pyrenees. Then there is Linda Colley's Britons (1992), which has sparked a whole
industry of reflections on British and English national identity and its problems. Nor can, or
should, one ignore the sparkling essays of the great historian Lewis Namier (e.g. 1958, 1964) on
the European revolutions of 1848, „the springtime of nations‟ and a key moment in the evolution
of nationalist thought and policies.

Creator, commentator/critic, narrator: here are three roles in which historians have shown the
importance of history to our understanding and assessment of nationalism. Let us look at these in
more detail.

HISTORIANS DEFINE THE NATION: THE CASE OF FRANCE

France affords us as good an example as any of the ways in which historians have shaped the
understanding of the nation. One could start with the assertion, one that set off a wide-ranging
historical controversy in eighteenth-century France, that the French nation was essentially
constituted by its nobility, and that this nobility was of direct descent from the original Frankish
„nation‟ of Charlemagne's empire. Such was the view, buttressed by a host of historical
arguments, of Henri, Comte de Boulainvilliers, a view enthusiastically endorsed by the
aristocratic parlements in their struggles with the crown (Ellis 1988; Bell 2001: 57-9). It was
countered first by the royalists, who reiterated the traditional view that the monarchy was the
embodiment of the nation; then, more emphatically and more dramatically, by the AbbéSeyès in
1789 with the claim that it was the „Third Estate‟ - in effect, the common people - that constituted
the nation. All sides necessarily resorted to history to support their arguments, such that „most
political discussions of the nation from this period took the form of… history (Bell 2001: 58).

12
The French Revolution staked out what was to become, in the end, the official definition of the
French nation as a secular republic of equal citizens. But this took a long time. Not until late in
the nineteenth century, during the Third Republic, did it achieve canonical status. Before then,
and even for some time afterwards, there were differences aplenty as to the identity of France,
and how best to represent the nation (Gildea 1996; Hazareesingh 1994: 124-50). History, once
more, was to be the guide and tutor. The historian and statesman François Guizot, in his History
of Civilization in Europe (1828), put the case for a French constitutional monarchy on the English
model, arguing that it was this - rather than Jacobinism or Bonapartism - that was in the true
tradition of European pluralism and individualism (Crossley 1999). The most crushing response
to this was Jules Michelet's monumental and coruscating History of France. Written over a period
of more than thirty years (1833-67), Michelet's history - especially in the separate volumes
published as the History of the French Revolution - aspired to show that „the people‟ were and
always had been the hero of French history, and that the republic of free and of equal citizens was
France's natural destiny (Mitzman 1990). Another historical work, Alexis de Tocqueville's The
Ancien Régime and the Revolution (1856), bravely conceded the point, even though it went
against the grain of Tocqueville's aristocratic temperament and even though he showed that the
French monarchy had as much part to play in that outcome as the French people. Cutting across
this divide was the current that wished to give due recognition to the Bonapartist strand in French
political culture, even if regretting the excesses to which Napoleon himself had pushed the idea.
Such was the position of the liberal Adolphe Thiers's History of the Consulate and Empire (1840-
62); while Victor Hugo, in his historical epic Les Misérables (1862), also found it difficult to
conceal his admiration for the achievements of the emperor.

The French Revolution remained, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
touchstone for national definition. What was the Revolution, and how far did it accord with the
deeper historical currents of French life? Was its legacy benign or malign? The answers to these
questions were meant to sum up the essence of France, to try to find in its past the elements, for
good or bad, that made up its character. For Hippolyte Taine, in his Origins of Contemporary
France (1875-94), the verdict was clear: the Revolution had been a disaster for France. Following
Edmund Burke, he argued that France had been misled by the abstract and utopian ideas of the
philosophes of the Enlightenment. Their nemesis was the Terror of the Jacobins and the
dictatorship of Napoleon. France had had to live with the consequences, one of which was a spirit
of revolution that expressed itself repeatedly in destructive bouts of frenzy, the latest of which
had been the Paris Commune of 1871.

13
Taine's work was enormously influential (Cobban 1968: 47; Jones 1999). Its rebuttal was to come
in Ernest Lavisse's massive enterprise, the 27 volumes of the History of France (1900-12).
Lavisse was „the evangelist of the Republic', the „nation‟s teacher' - teaching by means of history
(Nora 1984: 247; see also Nora 1986). Rallying the French after the crushing defeat of the
Franco-Prussian War of 1871, and following on the internal crises of the Third Republic in the
1880s and 1890s (Boulanger's attempted coup, the Dreyfus affair), Lavisse aimed at a
comprehensive rehabilitation of the French republican ideal. The histories written under his
editorship became the standard fare in schools and universities, reduced and adapted where
necessary in student textbooks. Here was a story that placed the Republic at the centre of French
national history. Everything in the past flowed towards it; everything in the future took its point
of departure from it.

French historians of the twentieth century continued the debate, in works mostly dealing with the
French Revolution, its causes and consequences. Left-wing versions - Jean Jaurès, Albert Mathiez,
Georges Lefebvre - jostled restatements of the orthodox or „bourgeois‟ republican positions -
Alphonse Aulard and his followers (Cobban 1968; Furet 1981; Lebovics 1992). In all this it was
clear to everyone, authors and readers alike, that what was taking place was a struggle for the soul
of the French nation. Even when the political passions stilled somewhat, the various histories
produced by writers such as Fernand Braudel and Pierre Nora were fundamentally attempts to
define the nation, as the controversies surrounding them showed (Lebovics 1992: 1-6; Jackson
1999: 241-4). Further controversies, again involving historians as much as sociologists, were
fuelled by the debate over immigration, and the extent to which France could be called a
„multicultural‟ or „immigrant‟ as opposed to a homogeneous nation (see e.g. Noiriel 1996;
Jackson 1999: 244-7). Historians could not avoid taking part in the public debates. Called upon to
explain and justify the nation, they willingly responded, even if they could not agree on its nature.

THE HISTORIAN AS CRITIC OF NATIONALISM

If historians, as public figures, have been central to the making of national consciousness, they
have also been among its sternest critics. An early counterblast - directed partly against his great
contemporary John Stuart Mill, who had championed nationality - came from the English
historian Lord Acton. Writing in 1862, he proclaimed that „the theory of nationality is a
retrograde step in history … Nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which
it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State.

14
Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may
prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind‟ (Acton 1996 [1862]: 36-7).

Such denunciations were unusual at the time, when nationalism was generally regarded,
especially in Britain, as a progressive force. But they gained in force in the first half of the
twentieth century, in the works of historians such as Arnold Toynbee, Johan Huizinga, Edward
Carr and Alfred Cobban (e.g. Carr 1945; Cobban 1945; Huizinga 1959 [1940]). Indeed, for
Anthony Smith historians have generally displayed „scepticism, even hostility‟, to nationalism.
They have portrayed it as „inherently absurd and destructive‟, culminating in the European case in
the excesses of fascism and Nazism (Smith 1999b: 45; cf. Breuilly 2002: 62-8). Against this is the
view of several historians that, in a certain sense, the opposite is true. The historical profession,
they point out, came of age at precisely the time, in the late nineteenth century, that nationalism
itself reached its apogee. History as a practice took the nation-state as its natural unit of analysis.
Historians have been complicit in diffusing the view that all history is essentially national history,
and that the important identities are national identities. In that sense the historians, not only as
public intellectuals but as professionals, have been on the side of nationalism (Potter 1962: 924;
Tyrell 1991; Woolf 1996: 2-3; Breuilly 2002: 73; Suny 2001b: 337; Sluga 2004).

There is no necessary contradiction between these views, of course; the difference may be largely
in the evaluation of the morality and „progessiveness‟ of nationalism. One can admit the reality of
the nation and the nation-state without admiring their ends. Historians, it might be argued, have to
accept the nation-state as the framework for their investigations because that form of organization
has been the dominant fact at least of the modern period. That still leaves them free to deplore the
consequences of nationalism. On the other hand, one can be highly sceptical of nationalist claims
while at the same time arguing for the necessity and functionality of nationalism. Two of the
leading theorists of nationalism, Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Anderson (1991), fall into
this camp. Nationalism, they would say, does not have to be true in its beliefs to be useful or
desirable. The „nation-state‟ may be a myth, in the sense of resting on a fiction; but it is a
necessary fiction.

Nevertheless it is true that historians have played a leading role in debunking nationalism, and
that whether this is their intention or not they have given much ammunition to those who regard
nationalism as an aberration at best and a poison at worst. Particularly effective has been the idea
of „invented traditions‟ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1984; see also Hosking and Schöpflin 1997). The

15
view here is that much of what nations and nationalists regard as sacred or essential to their
identity are historical myths and fabrications: the implication being that to explode the myth is to
undermine the claim to authenticity. Thus Hugh Trevor-Roper (1984) evidently derives great
enjoyment from showing that the kilt and the clan tartan, far from being the long-established
emblems of Scottish Highlands tradition that Scots nationalists claim, were in fact thought up by
a shrewd English manufacturer at the end of the eighteenth century. David Cannadine (1984)
shows how much of the supposedly ancient ritual and mythology of the English monarchy - the
coronation ceremony, the royal jubilees, the investiture of the Prince of Wales - was invented in
the late Victorian era by a handful of royal publicists. For Germany Alon Confino (1997) traces
how a powerful gemeinschaft expression of the traditional local community, the concept of
heimat, became the ideological basis of the newly unified Germany in the late nineteenth century
so that the new state could preserve the illusion of continuity with an idealized past. Paschalis
Kitromilides (1989) has analysed the nationalist myth which portrays the Greek nation as
surviving virtually unchanged since Homeric times and, suppressed for centuries, finally
achieving its liberation in the War of Independence (1821-28). „Greece‟ was a literary idea, he
shows; the reality was a backward region of the Ottoman empire split into semi-autonomous
mountain communities, ruled by local brigands, divided by scores of different dialects and even
different languages, and presided over by an ecumenical Orthodox church that was profoundly
hostile to nationalism. Only in the course of the nineteenth century were these disparate elements
welded into the semblance of a nation through the homogenizing agencies of a national army and
a national educational system (cf. Weber, 1976 on France). As an example of another kind we
could take the symbol of the battle of the White Mountain (bílá hora) (1620) in Czech national
consciousness (Petran and Petranova 1998). „White Mountain … was not a national conflict, but a
feudal one‟ (Zacek 1994: 174). But it was retrospectively baptized as a great national struggle,
and a great national defeat. What in historical reality was simply one of the many battles of the
Thirty Years War, involving the defeat of the Czech nobility and their incipient Protestantism by
the Catholic forces of the Holy Roman Emperor, was in the early nineteenth century turned into a
composite populist myth linking the White Mountain, heroic Hussite resistance, the medieval St
Wenceslas as the symbol of the Czech people, and the Czech vlast, the Czech homeland or patria
as conceived by the Czech nobility. The White Mountain became the messianic symbol of the
revival of the Czech nation and the throwing-off of oppressive Habsburg rule. Such a pattern of
nationalist ideology, involving the persistence of a defiant nation after a crushing military defeat
followed by centuries of rule by a „foreign‟ power, is to be found in several Central and East
European nations, as with the battle of Kosovo (1389) for Serbian mythology and the battle of

16
Mohacs (1526) for the Hungarians. What Armenians call the „Genocide of 1915‟ by the Turks
plays a similar role in the collective memory of Armenians (Suny 2001a: 884-5). Out of the
catastrophe of defeat will come regeneration and resurrection.

Such „beatified defeats‟ (Petran and Petranova 1998: 160) have often played a key role in the
collective memory of nations - Masada (AD 70) for the Jews, Hastings (1066) for the English,
Culloden (1746) for the Scots, Jena (1806) for the Germans, Sedan (1870) for the French,
Gallipoli (1916) for the Australians. They function as historical markers, announcing some
critical turning point, some founding moment in the life of the nation (see Charles Turner,
Chapter 17 in this Handbook). Even if, as they often are, they are episodes of extreme anguish
and even humiliation, in the narrative of the nation they serve as rallying points. They are
constant reminders of what must be avenged, what must still be striven for, what, as a common
experience of heroism or suffering, binds the members of the nation together. „Suffering in
common‟, said Renan (1990 [1882]: 19), mindful of the humiliation inflicted on France in the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, „unifies more than joy does. Where national memories are
concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common
effort.‟

„Collective memory‟ lends itself almost by definition to historical scrutiny and analysis.
Sociologists, spurred on by Durkheim and Halbwachs, may, once more, have given the lead in
pointing to the phenomenon (Olick 2003), but it is historians who have played the major part in
the accounting and interrogation of national memories (see e.g. Teich 1998; Jarausch and Geyer
2003; Confino 2004; Todorova 2004). Here once more they tend to appear in a critical role,
testing cherished memories against the cruel facts of history (cf. Nora, 1996). It is important to
stress though that historical debunking of this kind is not in every case tantamount to an anti-
nationalist stance. It is true that some historians - Marxists especially - have certainly seen their
work in this way. Their task, they feel, is to explode or „deconstruct‟ the nationalist myth,
considered often as the source of an obfuscating „false consciousness‟ that papers over more
fundamental divisions and antagonisms. But to dissect is not the same as to reject. It is quite
possible to show the historical inaccuracy of a remembered item or episode without denying the
legitimacy and efficacy of such collective memories in the life of a nation. Christopher Hill
(1986), for instance, is fully apprised of the amount of invented history in the myth of„the
Norman yoke‟, but that does not stop him from appreciating the enormously energizing force of
the myth in the struggles of the ordinary English people over several centuries.

17
In the historical critique of nationalist historiography, historian is pitted against historian. The
historian as creator encounters the historian as critic: Sir Edward Coke comes up against
Butterfield (1951[1931]), Michelet against Furet (1981), Palacky against Pekar (Zacek 1994: 178-
81). But this is not simply a case of the older, „uncritical‟, historian coming up against the modern
„scientific‟ historian, telling it „as it really was‟. Often it is simply one version of nationalist
historiography offering itself as a truer, more accurate, account than that of its rivals: Butterfield's
„Tory‟ interpretation of English history, for instance, opposing itself to Coke's „Whig‟ one,
Pekar's stress on the „aristocratic‟ component of Czech culture rebutting Palacky's „people‟s
history' of the Czech lands, Furet's conservative view of the French Revolution and its place in
French history setting itself up against Michelet's populist and radical portrayal. However much
historians might like to see themselves as the fearless defenders of historical truth against the
fabrications of nationalists, they too very often are players in the same game. The stakes are too
high for them to stay out.

NARRATING THE NATION

The nation exists in time. That by itself is enough to lend importance to historical study, in the
tracing of the evolution of particular nations and the development of national consciousness. This
can be done in celebratory mode, especially in the case of those nations - Eastern European,
African, Asian - that have lived for centuries under imperial rule. Their rise to national
consciousness can be portrayed as a story of a nation's discovery of itself and of its struggle for
liberation. Of such a kind are many Third World narratives of the nation, such as Jawaharlal
Nehru's The Discovery of India (1946) or the historical works on China of Sun Yat-Sen (Prakash
1990; Duara 1996: 159-60; Young 2001: 165-73).

Even where the mood is not celebratory, the nation can be elevated to the role of the principal
agent of history, its moving force and ultimate telos. The nation, in this account, is always present,
even if it does not always recognize itself. The historian's task is to show the structures beneath
the surface, to indicate the often slow process by which nations achieve definition and fulfilment
in the nation-state. „Nations‟, said Hegel, „may have had a long history before they finally reach
their destination - that of forming themselves into states‟ (in Gellner 1983: 48). This
understanding became the leitmotiv of a powerful school of nineteenth-century European
historiography, led by the great German historian Leopold von Ranke. Its truth was seemingly
confirmed by the very thing it took as its premise: the rise and triumph of the nation-state as the

18
most successful and apparently most natural form of political organization (Woolf 1996: 3; Suny
2001b: 344). Here, once more, in their very historiographical principles, historians willingly
offered their services as builders of the nation.

But there was also a different question, a different kind of narration, that called for the historian's
skill. It was a question, or a series of questions, usually posed by sociologists. Are nations in fact
„natural‟? Have they always been there? Do nations, as Gellner (1998: 90-101) rather
mischievously posed it, have navels? Must we concern ourselves with their real as opposed to
invented origins? For Renan (1990: 20), „nations are not something eternal. They had their
beginnings and they will end.‟ If so, how did nations originate and when and why did the belief in
the naturalness of nations arise? Why, in other words, nationalism? And if nations are not natural
or eternal, what came before them, and what might succeed them?

The sociologists could of course couch their answers to these questions primarily in theoretical or
general terms. The „primordialists‟, for instance, could try to point to certain constant biological
features of the human condition (e.g. van den Berghe 1981, 1995), the „perennialists‟ to the
simple fact of the antiquity and perhaps ubiquity of the national form (e.g. Armstrong 1982;
Grosby 1999), the „modernists‟ to the special and novel conditions of modernity (e.g. Gellner
1983; Taylor 1998). But even this strategy involved, as many recognized, historical
presuppositions - at least for the perennialists and modernists. If, for instance, nations in
something like our current understanding of them were shown to be in existence well before the
coming of modernity, then modernist theories of nationalism would be put severely in question. It
could then be argued that nationalism, perhaps, as an ideology, may be modern, dating from the
late eighteenth century; but nationhood and national consciousness must be much older,
demanding therefore a different explanation and account from those which attribute them to the
requirements of a modern social order (see e.g. Smith 2001: 22). If, on the other hand, attempts to
demonstrate the existence of „nations before nationalism‟ were unconvincing, modernists could
feel vindicated at the expense of perennialists and primordialists. Sociologists therefore were
forced to turn to history to sustain and test their theories, the result being some impressive
comparative inquiries into the history of nations and of the principle of nationality (e.g.
Armstrong 1982; Smith 1986, 1999a; Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992; Gorski 2000; Geopolitics
2002; Ichijo and Uzelac 2005; and see also Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 83-90).

19
It was inevitable that for historians, even more than for sociologists, the question of the antiquity
or modernity of nations and nationalism would become the central object of their inquiries.
Indeed Anthony Smith has argued that this debate „forms the core of historiographical discussion
and disagreements‟ in the study of nationalism (2000: 4; see also 2001: 14, 2003; Hastings 1997:
9). How could it be otherwise, given the nature of the historical enterprise and the significance of
timing and periodization in the dominant theories of nationalism. Here was a task that historians
could take to with relish, employing all their skills of unearthing and interpreting past phenomena.

This is not the place to attempt an assessment of the historians' contributions on this question, still
less to resolve the disputes between „perennialists‟ and „modernists‟ (these labels themselves
being a clumsy shorthand that hide a great variety of positions). All one can do is to indicate
some of the work that has been produced with a more or less conscious intent to stake out a
position. Most magisterially there are Eric Hobsbawm (1992,1996) and John Breuilly (1993,
1996: 149-54, 2002: 76-7) who state regularly and repeatedly that nations and nationalism are
modern - i.e. post-eighteenth-century - phenomena and that they must be distinguished,
conceptually and historically, from all manifestations of ethnicity. For Hobsbawm, nationalism is
a political programme - „in historic terms a fairly recent one‟ - that holds that „groups defined as
“nations” have a right to, and therefore ought to, form territorial states of the kind that have
become standard since the French Revolution‟. Ethnicity is neither programmatic nor political,
though nationalists will where possible appeal to an assumed common ethnicity in pursuit of their
political goals. They often, however, recognize that the desired ethnicity is lacking, in which case
they are quite prepared to go ahead in the spirit of Massimo d'Azeglio's famous statement
following the unification of Italy in the 1860s: „We have made Italy, now we have to make
Italians‟ (Hobsbawm 1996: 256-7).

For Breuilly, what distinguishes ethnicity from nationalism is that „pre-modern ethnic identity has
little in the way of institutional embodiment beyond the local level. Almost all the major
institutions which construct, preserve and transmit national identities … are modern: parliaments,
popular literature, courts, schools, labour markets, et cetera.‟ The only two pre-modern
institutions which could have played such a role - dynasties and churches - were in principle
transnational and in most cases regarded nationalism as a threat to their authority (Breuilly 1996:
154). The relative lateness of nation-building, even in those societies traditionally associated with
a strong sense of national identity, has been vividly chronicled by Eugen Weber (1976) for France.
Weber shows that it was only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the French

20
state, using the agencies of the school and the army, managed to forge Frenchmen and - women
into something like a French nation. In the process it had to overcome a host of obstacles based
on linguistic, cultural and historical differences. Such an awareness, of the relatively late period
in which a real sense of nationhood can be said to be present in even old European societies, has
been growing in recent historical work (see e.g. Schulze 1996; Zimmer 2003).

The work of these historians largely goes along with the views of social scientists such as Ernest
Gellner and Benedict Anderson on the modernity not just of the ideology of nationalism but of
the construction of nations. Such a position is stated even more strongly by a historian like
Patrick Geary (2002), who in a pioneering analysis of early medieval ethnicities in Europe shows
the illusory basis of many of the claims for the ethnic origins of nations - whether among „Celts‟,
„Franks‟, „Gauls, „Goths‟, „Huns‟ or „Serbs‟. None of these groups, he shows, was what we think
they are today. In many cases they took even their names from those given to them by Roman
observers, mostly hostile. Often loose coalitions of different tribes, their leaders appropriated, for
their own purposes, many of the genealogies constructed by Roman writers.

The history of European peoples in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages is not the story of a
primordial moment but of a continuous process. It is the story of political appropriation and
manipulation of inherited names and representations of pasts to create a present and a future. It
is a history of constant change, of radical discontinuities, and of political and cultural zigzags,
masked by the repeated appropriation of old words to define new realities. The Franks „born with
Clovis‟ are not the Franks of Charlemagne or those of the French people Jean Le Pen hoped to
rally around his political movement. (Geary 2002: 156–7; cf Reynolds 1983: 375–9; Schulze
1996: 100)

Such an account would not necessarily be regarded as threatening by those scholars, such as
Anthony Smith, who assert the reality of ethnicity and the importance of core ethnies to the
formation of nations. They have always recognized the role of myth and invention in the
evolution of ethnic as much as of national identities. But they, and other prerennialists, are
undoubtedly heartened by the work of other historians who have in recent years made bold claims
on behalf of the antiquity not simply of ethnicities but of nations. Here too sociologists have led
the way. Liah Greenfeld (1992,2001), for instance, has attempted to show that nationalism was
invented by the English in the sixteenth century, after which various Europeans took up the
challenge posed by this first powerful assertion of nationhood. Philip Gorski (2000) has made

21
similar claims on behalf of the sixteenth-century Dutch, in their struggle against the Habsburgs at
the time of the Dutch Revolt.

But the historians have gone even further. Colette Beaune (1991) and Bernard Guenée (1985)
have argued for the birth of French nationalism during the Hundred Years War against the
English; Bruce Webster (1997) has discerned the stirrings of Scottish nationalism in the struggle,
also against the English, of the „Wars of Independence‟ (1296-1371); while British historians
such as Patrick Wormald (1994), John Gillingham (2000) and Rees Davies (2000) have claimed
to discover the existence of a vigorous English nationalism at work in the creation of the „first
English empire‟ from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries - if not even earlier, in the time of
Bede (see further Kumar 2003: 60-88; 2005). A wide-ranging work by Adrian Hastings (1997)
synthesized much of this recent historical research to advance the view that „nation-formation and
nationalism have in themselves almost nothing to do with modernity‟, but are rather the product
of „a typical medieval and early modern experience of the multiplication of vernacular literatures
and of state systems around them, a multiplication largely dependent upon the church, its
scriptures and its clergy‟ (1997: 205). Echoing the view of the religious historian Steven Grosby
(1991,1999,2002), Hastings goes further in seeing an even more ancient origin of the concept of
nation, one found in biblical times. „The Bible … presented in Israel … a developed model of
what it means to be a nation - a unity of people, language, religion, territory and government …
[I]t was … an all too obvious exemplar for Bible readers of what every other nation too might be,
a mirror for national self-imagining' (1997: 18).

The belief in the biblical origin of nationhood has always had its adherents (see Smith, 2003),
though usually as an idea or ideal waiting to find its proper sociological form. It is certainly
difficult to sustain it as in any sense a practicable norm, given the overwhelming preponderance
of empires and other forms of dynastic and „universal‟ states for much of the ancient and early
medieval period. Ethnicity, perhaps; but „nation‟ sounds highly anachronistic. Hence it is not
surprising that for most historians concerned to discover an early origin of nations and
nationalism, it is the medieval period that has seemed most promising (Stringer 1994: 11-12;
Johnson 1995). This has been true for an earlier generation of historians as well as more recent
ones (see Tipton 1972; Connor 1994: 211-12). The most influential recent account of this kind
has come from Susan Reynolds (1983, 1997). While Reynolds herself is careful not to extrapolate
too directly from her findings to modern nationalism, she has lent much ammunition to those who
do wish to find nations before nationalism by emphasizing the existence of strong collective

22
identities among medieval peoples. In the medieval kingdoms or „regnal communities‟ of
England, France, Germany and even Italy, she argues, their peoples -gentes, populi, na í
l ones -
were normally thought of as social and political communities having high degrees of collective
solidarity, backed up by myths of common descent. Medieval peoples did not, as the modernists
like to think, live fragmented and localized lives, united only by the wider framework of
Christianity. On the contrary medieval solidarities were „much more like the different groups and
networks to which modern people feel they belong than the sociological stereotypes admit‟ (1997:
335).

„Regnal communities‟ were not, however, as Reynolds admits, modern nations. Moreover they
were, from the thirteenth century onwards, undermined by new descent myths that emphasized
the divisions of ranks or „estates‟ and so destroyed the unity of the regnal community (1983: 390).
All this goes to show the extreme complexity of tracing the history of nations and nationalism.
Like the grin of the proverbial Cheshire cat, nations appear to come and go. Of course much turns
on the definition of nation. A „civic‟ nation, one constituted by common citizenship, is likely to
turn up earlier in the historical record than the „ethnic‟ nation, where the criterion of belonging is
linked to membership of a group with strongly held beliefs about blood ties and common descent.
Thus one might argue that there was a British nation (civic) long before the idea of an English
(ethnic) nation took root (Colley 1992; Kumar 2003), just as it has been conventional to see „old‟
(civic) nations in France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands before the rise of „new‟ ethnic
nations such as Greece, Serbia and Germany (see, e.g. Seton-Watson 1977).

There is a certain paradox in this. Common citizenship, the citizenship of all classes, arguably did
not occur anywhere until the French Revolution or even, in the full sense, until the early twentieth
century. Ethnicity, by contrast, is taken as an immemorial feature of groups. But the claim that all
states should be based on the ethnic nation was a radically new one - an impossibility, if not an
absurdity, before the nineteenth century. Hence the plausibility, at least, of the view that the older
states with well-defined territorial boundaries, centralized rule and common systems of law came
closer to the national form than was possible in those communities lacking such features. In the
European case, this meant that „Western‟ civic nationalism came before Central and East
European ethnic nationalism. If, in the event, the ethnic concept of the nation seemed to win out
as the national ideal was diffused throughout the world, this only serves to underline the tortuous,
zigzag history of nationalism.

23
CONCLUSION

It is widely held today that the „nationalist narrative‟ has broken down, at least in the developed
societies of the West (e.g. Maier 2000; Mandler 2002: 94-103). History has lost not just its
authority but its ability to knit past, present and future together. History is now mainly „heritage‟,
a tourist pastime to be enjoyed for the pleasure of antique objects and exotic locations. It can no
longer give shape or meaning to national life or national identity. If history is at all relevant to
identity now it is the new „global history‟ that attempts to provide an historical framework for a
globalizing world.

That certainly is not how it appears in other parts of the world. Since the collapse of communism
and the break-up of the Soviet Union, nations throughout Central, Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe, together with many nations in Central Asia, have been busily ransacking their history to
provide, or invent where necessary, acceptable genealogies for their new states. History has
become a fiercely contested arena of competing claims (Kumar 2001; Suny 2001a). Nor is it only
the smaller nations that feel this need. Russia, for long the hegemonic power in the region, has
been no less deeply exercised by historical memory in the past decade as it struggles to find a new,
post-imperial, identity for itself (see Chapters 34 and 37 by Sakwa and Khazanov respectively in
this Handbook). And has it not been a marked feature of recent discussions of the American
empire' to appeal to competing versions of the American past (see e.g. Ferguson 2004; Gaddis
2004)? Throughout the world, as new nationalisms arise and old ones revive, history is the
indispensable resource in the construction of identities and the struggles with rivals. „Not only the
living, but also the dead speak in the national will‟, declares the Armenian nationalist Edik
Hovhannisian (in Suny 2001a: 886).

History has done without nations before, as Renan reminded us, and may well do so again
sometime in the future. But nations and nationalism remain central realities of the contemporary
world, whatever their future. So long as this is so, the past will remain a vibrant part of the
present. Nations may not need navels, in the strict sense of an authentic lineage. But nations
without history, real or imagined, are impossible to imagine.

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Hroch, Miroslav. "Modernization and Communication as Factors of Nation Formation." Pp. 21-
32

By way of introduction, and in the interests of clarifying my position, three preliminary

comments on the topic of „nation formation‟ will be made.

First, the following contribution purposely avoids the use of the term „nationalism‟, since I regard
it to be controversial and misleading - whether it is understood as an invariable entity of human
thought („a state of mind‟), or as an erratic sample of human activities. „Nationalism is typically
used both as political label and as scientific term, and in either case it has been defined in such a
controversial fashion that it has almost lost its explicative value. Rather then, in keeping with
modernizing approaches, I prefer the terms „nation formation, „national identity, „national
consciousness, and „patriotism. (This is not to disrespect the terminology of those authors I refer
to, who mostly use „nationalism‟, albeit in different senses from each other.)

Secondly, this contribution focuses on the nation-forming process, specifically trying to explain
the concepts of „modernization and „communication as factors of this formation. Within this
perspective, „contemporary‟ nationalism is only of derived importance, since it is operating in a
fully communicating and modernized (if not postmodern) society, and under rather different rules
of the game.

Thirdly, this contribution focuses on European history, since the phenomena of „nation‟ and
„nationalism‟ have to be regarded as specifically European (and North American), having been
exported and transplanted from our continent to entirely different social structures, traditions and
value systems.

In aspiring to comment on modernizing approaches, I am well aware of the fact that nation
formation (and „nationalism‟) cannot be accounted for by way of any monocausal form of
explanation. Certainly most authors - even those who have declared „the nation‟ as a pure and
simple cultural construct or illusion - include within their concrete analysis (insofar as one is
attempted) several factors, each with a different relevance attached to them. Indeed, it is my claim
that the emergence and existence of a nation and/or nationalism can be seriously explained only if
we take into account five connections (chains of circumstances): (i) the past - both as a sample of
relicts in institutions, buildings and monuments, and as a construct of „national history‟; (ii)

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 culture - including ethnic, linguistic and religious ties; (iii) modernization and communication;
(iv) nationally relevant conflicts of interest - social, professional and political; and (v) agitation -
based upon emotional factors, symbols and festivities.

By concentrating on the „modernization and communication‟ approach, this contribution intends

to examine:

 How strongly previous and present research has used various aspects of modernization as a
component of their explanatory models.

 How far, and under which conditions, these aspects are regarded as relevant in the process of
nation formation, that is, in the spread of a consciousness of „national belonging‟ in a given
nation.

Amongst these factors of modernization, the most frequently cited are: (i) bureaucratization-or
the modernization and rationalization of administration; (ii) political emancipation -including
political revolutions and constitutionalism; and (iii) social emancipation - including vertical
social mobility, intensification of market relations, horizontal social mobility and the
„democratization‟ of the school system. All these aspects can be regarded, in a general sense, as
more or less important constituents of increasing social communication.

THE MODERNIZATION OF STATE AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Most authors, when discussing the role of modernization, have overlooked the fact that the
process of modern nation formation in Europe has proceeded under two typologically different
conditions. (Breuilly's (1993: 9ff.) sophisticated model of six classes of „nationalism‟ is a rare
exception.) Generally, the most frequently studied of the two sets of conditions is that of a
continuous early modern state-nation, such as France, Sweden or England. The other (less
researched, but more frequently represented in European historical reality) concerns the
circumstances of national movements, in building up from non-dominant ethnic groups to fully
fledged modern nations and eventually to nation-states.

Ignoring the difference between these two basic roads towards the modern nation in Europe can
lead to serious misunderstanding. There is no doubt that in the case of Portugal, Spain, France,

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England and the Netherlands there was a breakthrough in state-building activities during the
eighteenth century, possibly earlier; as a result of bureaucratic absolutism (or established
parliamentary rule in England), the state became ever more important. The increasing number of
state officials (both civilian and military), bureaucrats and administrators meant that the exercise
of power, law-making and institution-building went to the state and became unified within state
boundaries. Particular patterns of modernization could thus be introduced in a uniform way and
contribute to the process of transformation from state to state-nation.

It is from this point of view that the state-nation formation has been analysed by many thinkers.
Tilly (1975) regards the early modern state, and its centralist and financial politics, as the decisive
point of departure on the road towards the nation-state. Rokkan (1975), meanwhile, tries to
explain this process by developing a sophisticated model of the relationship between centre and
periphery, while Puhle (1994: 13ff.) ascribes the role of bureaucratization above all to long-
established states of Western Europe. Breuilly confirms in the preface to the second edition of his
1993 book his earlier claim that it is necessary to study nationalism „in close association with the
development of the modern state‟ (1993: xii). Similarly, Giddens (1985: 83, 93ff.) bases his
concept of the „nation-state‟ on the contrast between traditional and modern states, regarding the
absolutist state as a traditional state which at the same time marks the transition to a modern state;
this transition is represented by two elements: (i) the centralization and extension of
administrative power; and (ii) the enlargement of legal sanctions of the state and the large scale
tax system: „What makes the nation integral to the nation-state … is not the existence of
sentiments of nationalism but the unification of an administrative apparatus over precisely
defined territorial bounds‟ (1985: 172). Some authors stress the importance of a newly introduced
notion of military service and war for the modernization of the nation-state. Smith, for instance,
speaks about „administrative and military revolution‟ (1986:132f), while Langewiesche (1995:
224f.) points towards „war-making‟ as a relevant factor in unification. Giddens also (1985: 112)
regards state modernization as a process which was accompanied by, or subordinated to, military
developments; and Mann stresses the importance of the emergence of„professional armed forces‟
in the process of nation-state formation (1992: 162). In this conjunction, war is considered to be
an almost-decisive factor concerning both: (i) the rise of absolutism; and (ii) in turn, the shift
from absolutism to state-nation.

From the perspective of these authors, the nation and „nationalism‟ appear as if they were always
a product of the state. I would contend that this is a mistake, however, as it neglects the

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aforementioned typological dualism of nation formation in Europe. A state-focused
generalization could be regarded as possessing some validity, but only in reference to the six
European state-nations listed above, and not in the case of the majority of European nation-
forming processes of the nineteenth century; such an approach makes the all-too-common error of
projecting the author's understanding of „nationalism‟ onto all nation-forming processes in
Europe.

Other authors, however, are well aware of the existence of a different path towards the modern
nation - that is, of the importance of national movements. Without downplaying the relevance of
modernization in the state apparatus and bureaucracy, they distinguish the impact of this process
in terms of the perspective from „above‟ and the perspective from „below‟. One such writer is
Hobsbawm, who, even while regarding the nation as being fully fledged „only insofar as it relates
to a certain kind of modern territorial state‟ (1990: 9), modifies this relation according to
„perspective‟, that is, there was a difference between those national movements operating minus
the state (and also, eventually, in opposition to its government) and those arising within already
pre-existing state-nations. Likewise, the difference between nationalism „in a world of nation-
states‟ and nationalism „in a world without nation-states‟ is the basic criterion used by Breuilly in
his comparative research on the relationship of nationalism and the state. Even though his
analysis is focused on the political activities of „nationalists‟, he demonstrates the ambiguity of
bureaucratization, which could play both an integrating and disintegrating role, according to the
situation; „bureaucracy‟ was an important instrument in the modernization of the ruling nations,
but endangered the position (and provoked the opposition) of national movements without states.

Considering the significance of military power and wars, we must also take into account the
conception of compulsory military service, which emerged after the French Revolution. Being
included within this system meant not only being subject to military training in the narrow sense,
but also to a certain brand of education. Horizontal mobility in itself opened new opportunities to
young men coming in, in most cases, from closed rural communities. The more the ideology of
war shifted in its content from „fighting in the interest of the King‟ to „fighting in the interest of
the state (or state-nation)‟, the greater the level of loyalty, or even „patriotism‟, that was
demanded of the soldier. Nevertheless, in respect of nation formation, the educational impact was
two-fold. The military service, under the conditions of a state-nation (for instance, France,
Sweden, Prussia, England, and so on), where the language of military training did not differ from
that of rank and file, prepared the soldier to fight for his fatherland (this defined as „nation‟),

32
strengthening national sentiments. Conversely, military service under the conditions of a multi-
ethnic empire offered descendants from non-dominant ethnic groups a confusing alternative: they
had to fight and die for a country, for a state, which they did not regard as „their own‟; this might
especially be the case if the language of training was alien to them. Under such conditions, and
given already existent national mass-movements, military service could even become counter-
productive, provoking degrees of non-conformist feeling.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EMANCIPATION

If we understand the nation as a body of equal citizens, the rights of „man‟ and sovereignty of the
people are regarded as some of the basic preconditions for nation formation. There exists a near-
consensus in meaning amongst all authors, who accept the understanding of „the modern nation‟
that is part of the heritage of the French Revolution. This notion features implicitly in Bauer's
(1907) perception of the fifth (capitalist) stage of the development of the nation, and is more
explicitly expressed by Shafer (1955: 100ff.), Conze (1964: 11ff.) and later Balibar and
Wallerstein (1991), Hobsbawm (1990) and James (1996). Nevertheless, authors differ in their
dating of the relationship between political emancipation and „nationalism‟. Most of them, like
Kohn and, more recently, Breuilly (1993), Guibernau (1996: 51ff.) and Hobsbawm (1990: ch. 1),
interpret nationally oriented political emancipation as the consequence of political revolutions
occurring since the end of the eighteenth century. Other authors, however, prefer a broader
conception of political emancipation, locating the road towards civil society as early as the
sixteenth century (Dann 1986:27ff.) or the early modern period (Llobera 1994: 221ff.). Naturally,
the timing of this process cannot be regarded as synchronous, as Greenfeld (1992) illustrates in
her differentiation of „progressive‟ nationalism, such as in England where this was conjoined with
earlier political modernization. Political emancipation included as its consequence the emergence
or spread of the „public sphere‟ (Habermas 1962), with the more-or-less free exchange of
information concerning the political opinions of individuals and institutions.

Political emancipation as a part of modernization also included a social component. The social
context of national movements should not be neglected, as there are obvious variances in such
movements across time and space; indeed, particular social groups and classes played quite
distinct roles in the course of nation formation (Coakley 1992: 1ff. Kiernan 1972: 110ff.). In spite
of such differences, one regularity in this process should be noted: while political emancipation
and democratization chronologically followed political revolutions or early modern reforms,

33
social emancipation usually preceded this shift. Usually, it concerned not so much the urban
sphere, as it did the peasantry. In countries where the peasantry had achieved their personal
liberation already during the early modern period (as in England or the Netherlands), this
connection is less evident. However, it seems to be of significance that in France the modern
nation was declared as being of the highest value immediately after the abolition of feudal duties
for the peasantry in August 1789. Most important for nation formation was social emancipation in
Central and Eastern Europe, which ran consecutive to the reforms of peasant liberation - from
achieving personal freedom (by abolishing serfdom), to eradicating feudal privileges. In relation
to national movements, then, some kind of pattern can be observed: national agitation started
usually one generation after the first stage of peasant liberation, that is, after the abolition of
serfdom, which was usually followed by school reforms and by the intensification of market
relations in the countryside. Perhaps this explains some instances of uneven progress in national
agitation - that is, in the asynchronous spread of a modern national identity. On the other hand,
the absence of serfdom in Western countries did not automatically mean that the national
identification of peasants would have occurred at a higher rate of movement.

Even though national movements developed their „nationalist‟ programmes often already under
the rule of an oppressive late-absolutist system, we cannot deny the decisive role of political
emancipation in the process of nation formation; this connection can even be expressed as some
kind of regularity. Cultural, social and political programmes in Central and Eastern Europe were
formulated very early, before political emancipation was fulfilled, but their success (their
acceptance by broad masses of the population) never preceded important moves towards civil
rights, equality and democracy. In the 1960s, this observation inspired the German historian
Schieder (1991: 65ff., 89ff.) to construct three stages of nation formation: the first was connected
with revolutionary struggle for emancipation; the second was focused upon national unification
and integration; and the third was represented by „secessionist‟ national movements.

ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

The fundamental nature of market relations and industrialization for both the modern nation and
the working class became a dilemma in the theoretical discussions led by social democrats -
above all those in multiethnic empires such as Russia and Austro-Hungary. The central political
problem concerned how far these two processes (nation and class formation) were compatible.
Bauer (1907) attempted to argue in favour of a cohesion of the two processes, using an

34
unambiguous temporal correlation between capitalism and modern nation formation as the
decisive criterion for his construct of a capitalist stage in the development of a national
community: capitalism created „national markets‟ as a basis for the modern nation and its ruling
class (the bourgeoisie); accompanying this, however, was the very potential for capitalism's
replacement by a socialist nation. This concept corresponded to the political goals of the Austrian
social democracy and found a critical epigone and vulgarization in Stalin („Marxism and the
National Question‟), whose historical explanation and definition of the nation - defined by five
„features‟ and decisively formed by the bourgeois struggle for national markets - was written in
exile in 1913 and published for the first time in 1914. His view was approved by Lenin, and later,
in an even more simplified version, became the official model for Soviet historiography until the
1970s (Kosing 1976: 27ff; Nimni 1991: 90ff.). Nevertheless, it would be an erroneous
simplification to regard this „national markets‟ perspective as specifically a Marxist one. Already
in the 1840s the German liberal Friedrich List argued that the creation of a modern (capitalist)
national market would be a vital condition for German nation formation (Szporluk 1988).
Moreover, one of the most prolific of present theories on nationalism, formulated by Gellner
(who regards himself as anti-Marxist), explains the spread of nationalism by the „social chasms
created by early industrialism‟ (1983: 121), that is, by the strengthening impact of
industrialization on traditional society.

In seeking to establish the fruitfulness of the Gellnerian industrialization model, we very quickly
find that it does not serve us well as a central tool of interpretation. According to Llobera,
Gellner's theory „fails completely to account for nationalist movements in Western Europe‟ (2000:
190) - and the same could be said about Eastern Europe. Only in certain cases did
industrialization support national mobilization; in others, industrialization could be regarded as
being but one amongst many preconditions of successful nation formation, and certainly not as
the starting point for the spread of „nationalism‟. Concerning other cases again, nation formation
was only indirectly influenced by industrialization: the Czech-speaking rural population in
agrarian regions were, via the exchange of goods with the industrialized (mostly German-
speaking) areas of Bohemia and Moravia, drawn into stronger market relations; and the national
integration of Belgium was only temporarily influenced by the industrialization of its southern,
Francophone part. Furthermore, in contradiction of a unilateral version of events, industrialization
in South Wales actually influenced the disintegration of the Welsh national movement. The
Gellnerian picture of Ruritanians who were nationally mobilized by the impact of
industrialization, then, appears to be of doubtful validity.

35
Nevertheless, such criticisms do not mean that we should deny the significance of economic
modernization in the process of nation formation. Rather, what is required is a change in
emphasis, with the focus shifted from industrial development to the importance of developing
market relations and urbanization for nation formation on the eve of the capitalist era - or „the
convergent rise of capitalism and the nation-state‟ (Giddens 1981: 191). As an aside, Gellner's
view is not as original as it is often supposed to be. We can find an analogical concept of
capitalist society in Bauer's highest stage of nation formation, and, later on, as the basis for
Deutsch's theory of the nation as a product of „complementary‟ communication; this was
formulated already by the beginning of the 1950s (1951, 1953), much earlier than Gellner's book
was published. Deutsch's approach, and his concept of the nation as „a community of
complementary habits of communication‟ (1953b: 81), will be discussed later. At this point,
however, it is important to note that Deutsch regards as necessary preconditions for sufficient
levels of social communication those processes which are connected with economic and social
modernization, such as social mobility, market exchange, urbanization and the uneven division of
capital investments.

The problem, however, is not as simple as it might seem to be. If we interpret the Gellnerian
model not in terms of traditional historiography, but rather those of anthropology, we find that his
understanding of industrialization does not necessarily mean the introduction of industrial
production with machines, the proletariat and so forth. Instead, it appears he intends changes in
production and in the way of life which are usually called „proto-industrialization‟, the
manufacturing period, commercial capitalism and so on, that is, the situation where traditional
production and the traditional way of life and values were eroded by intensifying market relations,
social mobility, home industry and a profit-oriented, rationalized, but not yet industrial, economy.
In this understanding of the term, national movements and the expanding modern national
identity seem to be interrelated with this economic and social component of modernization; and
the economic background of „nationalism‟ in this broader sense (without being limited to
„industrialization‟) is used as an interpretative tool in different modifications by authors like
Lemberg (1964) and McCrone (1998: 92), amongst others. In this context, Llobera (1994: 220)
distinguishes between capitalism (which he regards as irrelevant for nationalism) and
modernization (which he regards as relevant).

More important than the question of originality is, however, the question of the applicability of
this concept of „industrialization‟ as a tool of historical analysis. From this point of view, the

36
choice of typological perspective is decisive. If we choose the fully fledged nation and its
„nationalism‟ as the main object of our approach, the industrialism model seems to be workable:
almost all modern nations in Europe, except the Balkans, established themselves at some point at
the territory with one or more industrial cores; and this could be regarded as the stimulus for
intensifying its market relations with less developed peripheries. Nevertheless, if we turn our
perspective back towards the origin of nations, and towards the process of nation formations and
national movements, we soon see that most national movements in Europe started distinctly
earlier than the process of industrialization.

There is little doubt that it is difficult to imagine the immediate impact of capitalism upon the
spread of national mobilization without „mediators‟. There were above all three aspects which are
usually regarded as the consequence of socio-economic early-capitalist modernization and,
simultaneously, as the most important ties between a changing social reality and emerging
„nationalism‟: (i) social mobilization - both migration and social advancements; (ii) social
communication; and (iii) nationally relevant conflicts of interest.

SOCIAL COMMUNICATION AND MOBILIZED POPULATIONS

The intensification of social communication was first characterized by Deutsch (1953b, 1966) as
being the decisive factor in nation formation. In his interpretation, the nation consisted in „the
ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one
large group than with outsiders‟. This ability was conditioned by „complementarity of
communication habits‟ and acquired social and economic preferences. Both these conditions
of„complementarity‟ and „social preferences‟ expressed the fact that communication involved
contact among the potential members of the nation across social and professional barriers
(Deutsch 1953b: 71, 74f.). Deutsch understands communication very broadly, as an
anthropological notion of culture that integrates a given people (1966: 96f). To be able to
participate in the network of complementary communication, the population had, nevertheless, to
be at least partially mobilized. Such factors of mobilization, for Deutsch, included market
activities, school visits, newspaper reading, having a job outside of agriculture and the forest
economy, writing and/or receiving letters, and so forth; and for a person to „be mobilized‟, they
needed to be involved in, or informed by, at least two of these activities (1953b: 100).
Unfortunately, Deutsch overemphasizes the importance of social communication, and his belief
in the possibility of evaluating the dynamics of national identity by measuring the correlation

37
between the ethnic structure and the growth of social communication and mobility is arguably a
failure. Perhaps this is the reason why his concept, influential in the 1960s, was almost „forgotten‟
during the 1970s, being regarded as „unessential‟ by relevant authors such as Hobsbawm (1990:
3).

During the 1980s, however, the importance of social communication was „reinvented‟ as an
integrating factor of „nationalism‟ in influential theories, above all by Anderson, who (without
any reference to Deutsch) stresses the importance of books and the printed word. Combined with
economic modernization („print-capitalism‟), this is one of the most important factors which
helped the individual to imagine his or her community - or the nation (1983: 46, 122).
Nevertheless, the one-sided accentuation of book-culture had been criticized already by both
Bauer and, in more abstract form, Chartier (1985): the impact of the printed word was limited not
only at the level of alphabetization, but also by the degree of political engagement of the
population, that is, by political modernization. In this line of argument, a recurring theme is that
the role of social communication was circumscribed by the degree of achieved political
modernization, and by the emergence of the „public sphere‟ (Habermas 1962) as an essential
component of said modernization.

There are also other reasons why the role of social communication cannot be observed as an
isolated, all-embracing phenomenon. While the improving standard and number of roads and,
later, railways, the perfection of postal connections and the growing number of newspapers were
all important for the growth of a capitalist macro-economy and for its representatives, it was not
originally relevant for the broad population, including in terms of its collective imagination and
national identity. The masses were scarcely interested in intellectual journals, in sending letters,
or in using expensive railways. The importance of these means of communication for nation
formation was not an invariable entity, but rather grew with the progresses of national movements
and the intensification of national agitation. Within the context of the mass movement, they were
inevitable for successfully mobilizing people for national goals. The centre-periphery
communication inside of the national territory appears to be the most important one, but at the
same time, the communication network also received its regional „sub-national‟ spatial dimension.

At this point the two types of nation formation should be distinguished again. While the success
of national movements depended on the mass acceptance of national identity, in the case of state-
nations the transformation of ruling elites and urban middle classes was decisive in the first

38
instance. Understandably, under the conditions of a large state, the acceptance of a national
identity by masses of the rural population could be a rather belated development (as Weber (1976)
demonstrates in the case of France). Different from numerous state-nations, national movements
usually operated within much smaller territories, which corresponded to the size of a region at the
much larger scale of state-nation territories.

The phenomenon of an increasing intensity in social communication cannot, however, be reduced

to the appearance of new facilitators of communication, for example, journals, trains or telegraphs.
Also, the modern print-culture did not enter an „empty room‟. Until the end of the nineteenth
century, the largest volume of information was transmitted by traditional means of
communication, which had been established since the early modern period: first, this took the
form of the pulpit, and the permanent contact between the priest and community, both on working
days and during religious festivities; secondly, there was the informal contact between those who
frequented regularly the local markets; and thirdly, there was the contact with local and state
administration, due to increasing state regulations and tax pressure. Newly emergent sources of
information were increasingly represented by social mobility, through personal contact with those
members of the village community who frequented new centres of production, transport and trade
as qualified or unqualified workers, as students, or even as successful private entrepreneurs. An
inevitable factor in strengthening national identity and national imagination lay in meeting „the
other‟ - people who belonged to another ethnic community and used a different language, and
therefore could not be integrated into the network of „our‟ communication.

The role of increasing and innovating social communication as a nationally mobilizing factor
cannot be neglected, but its importance should not then be overemphasized. It was a conditio sine
qua non, but its impact on nation formation, on national integration, was not necessarily positive.
In several cases, high levels of social communication did not introduce national mobilization, but
on the contrary, supported linguistic assimilation of non-dominant ethnic groups; this occurred,
for example, in South Wales, the Basque lands, Eastern Ukraine and Northern Hungary.

Within this framework, the linguistic aspect of communication should be mentioned. While in the
case of long-established „state-national‟ cultures, it was obvious that language „created unified
fields of exchange and communication‟ (Anderson 1983: 47), and learning the literary language
was one of the conditions for achieving full possession of civic rights (Gellner 1983: 263), the
linguistic situation was different in the case of non-dominant ethnic groups. These groups usually

39
did not possess a continuous tradition of the printed word, and if they did, this differed from the
official state-national language. This was accepted as self-evident in the pre-modern diglottic
situation. Nevertheless, since modernization also opened up the possibility for social
advancement for the lower classes, this difference was increasingly perceived as a disadvantage.
Sometimes assimilation was used as a „way out‟ in individual cases; more frequent, however, was
another reaction, which corresponded to the group interests of the smaller nationalities - namely,
the elaboration or actualized revival of an alternative printed language. In this sense, the classical
Fishman model (1972: 135ff.) has to be modified: beside the H- and L-languages, which
corresponded to the situation of a mono-ethnic state, the alternative H-language (or languages)
emerged under the conditions of multi-ethnic states. Consequently, a linguistic competition
between central H-language and local H-languages began, and, in the case of most national
movements, this received a social (and eventually also political) dimension, which has usually
been neglected in recent research (Edwards 2000: 169ff.). Since real equality in social chances
and civil rights was, as a consequence of modernization, conditioned by equality of languages,
the struggle for introducing the „subordinated‟ language into schools and administration became a
part of the struggle for political emancipation and civic society (Hroch 2000: 65ff).

SCHOOL EDUCATION

A newly conceived, and very specific and effective, demonstration of exactly how social
communication could operate as a factor in nation formation was through school education. This
has been seen as happening upon two simultaneous levels: first, school education was the basic
instrument of literacy, which was indirectly a precondition for the acceptance of national agitation;
and, secondly, the school potentially offered a space for the spread of nationally relevant
information to the masses. At the same time, however, the school was also an instrument of social
discipline and moral education, serving in the interests of state integration. In this respect, its role
differed between state-nations (where it aimed to strengthen their coherence) and multi-ethnic
empires (where it tried to educate the young generation in the spirit of loyalty towards the state
and its ruling nation).

With regard to literacy, this depended on the speed of introducing obligatory school attendance
from the level of theory into everyday life. This important change was not dependent on the
degree of economic growth: in the more developed Western countries, compulsory attendance at
elementary school was introduced later than in Prussia and Austria; thus, during the nineteenth

40
century, the level of alphabetization was highest in Central Europe, lower in Western Europe, and
lowest in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The correlation, however, between this phenomenon
and regional differences in the timing of nation formation has remained neglected or been
reduced to a crude East-West dichotomy.

Literacy was not the only task of elementary schools. During the nineteenth century, the central
role of religious education was, as a result of political modernization, replaced by civic education
and political disciplination. Most authors are well aware of the importance of this factor, but they
neglect the fact that intrinsic to this programme was the education of the young in displaying love
for their fatherland, which was usually understood as the state. All pupils (and, analogically, also
all soldiers) were educated according to state patriotism. This was not problematic in the case of
such states as France, Portugal and Sweden, but it was an issue in respect of national movements
within the territory of multi-ethnic empires, for example, Austria, Russia and Great Britain. This
problem was obviously intensified in those situations where the language of education differed
from the mother language of the pupils.

Nonetheless, school education, in the context of the secondary school, played a decisive role in
national mobilization - not only because its programme usually included subjects related to the
nation (such as history, geography and literature), but more generally because of psychological
factors. According to modern pedagogical psychology, it is only when children reach the age of
11 or 12 that they are able to understand and use abstract terms like „nation‟. For this reason, only
pupils at secondary school level could assume an „operational personality‟ (Stokes 1982) - that is,
achieve the ability to partake in political activities in the name of abstract values, and to „imagine‟,
in such terms, their own community - their nation. Only then did school education become an
„entrance card‟ to participation in the cultural advantages of the nation.

NATIONALLY RELEVANT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The role of wars in the process of nation formation represents perhaps the most visible case of
nationally relevant conflicts. Almost all modern states that have defined themselves as national
ones have, against the backdrop of international relations and struggles, developed their
arguments „in the name of the nation‟: the interests of power-oriented politicians and the ruling
classes were presented as constituting the interests of all members of the nation; these conflicts
were already regarded as an instrument or the result of „integral nationalism‟ since the time of

41
Carlton Hayes, and can be described as a phenomenon of „abused modernization‟. This category
of conflict in the name of the nation has to be analysed in the context of international relations.
Above all, it concerns only the first type of nation formation, as it was limited to the sphere of
power-oriented conflicts between state-nations. Their peak point was reached in World War I.

However, there is another, both more complex and more prevalent, category of nationally
relevant conflicts of interest, which cannot be included as a part of international relations, but
rather proceeded inside of multiethnic states as an important factor of mobilization in national
movements. Under these conditions, a conflict of interest (or tension between groups with
different interests), could, perhaps without originally having any connection with nationhood,
become part of the national movement in cases when this interest conflict or tension was
connected with the ethnic (linguistic, national) differences between the two parties involved. A
system of transmission emerged, from the interest conflict to its articulation - its „translation‟ into
national terms. The effective functioning of the system of transmissions was conditioned first by
some degree of developed national ideas, and secondly by a certain amount of disruption in the
stability of the social and/ or political system. People in crisis situations resulting, in general
terms, from modernization tended to develop a heightened sensitivity concerning differences and
conflicts between social, or even professional, groups (GAP 1987: 90). This again increased the
capacity for conflicts of social or political interest to be understood in ideologized and
nationalized terms, and eventually took the form of a sharp rise in new needs which, in turn,
evoked new interest conflicts (Lemberg 1964: 203f.).

Many authors stress that this process has to be observed in connection with several other
important impacts of modernization. Most significant amongst these were: (i) the phenomenon of
uneven development - both within one country, and without various countries or regions; (ii) the
state policy of„internal colonialism‟; and (iii) distinct social stratification resulting from a new
system of labour division.

According to Rokkan's model, the increasing tension between centre and (an ethnically
differentiated) periphery strengthened national mobilization, and the more economic conflicts
could be used in nationalized form (1975: 564); the periphery „must command considerable non-
political power resources in order to challenge the political center‟ (Hooghe 1992: 32). Motyl
(1994: 383f.) limits the immediate impact of economic conflict to national mobilization, pointing
out the significance of the ways in which the peripheral population, and above all the elites,

42
perceived their position of disadvantage relative to the centre. Horowitz recommends combining
differences in „under-development‟ with differences in social structure (1985: 229ff), while
Connors indicates that the logical structure of arguments of uneven development „is challenged
by comparative data‟ (1994: 161). Williams (1979: 64) argues that sometimes the communication
ties were stronger than interest conflicts, which gradually took off and lost connection with their
economic, social and cultural context.

The abstract concept of uneven development received a more concrete form in Hechter's
discussion on „internal colonialism‟, introduced in his provoking (1975) analysis of increasing
internal tensions in Great Britain as a decisive factor in „secessionist‟ nationalisms in its periphery.
Nairn argues at the same time that uneven development plays an important role in nationalist
movements, and he also enlarged this concept to include „external colonialism‟, stressing the
importance of external oppression as a mobilizing factor (1975: 6ff.). Using the Catalan and
Basque examples, some authors, like Orridge (1982: 181ff.) refuse the generalization of the role
of „internal colonialism‟ and recommend instead the concept of uneven development, according
to which national mobilization could result not only from underdevelopment of the periphery, but
also, on the contrary, from the speediness of its economic growth.

In 1968, I first formulated a hypothesis on the significance of nationally relevant conflicts for the
formation of the modern nation, as a critical response to the one-sided emphasis placed by
Deutsch on the role of social communication and mobility (Hroch 1968:170ff.). Much later, the
thesis was taken up by Szporluk (1990: 137ff.) and Gellner (1994: 182ff), who, through selective
use of quotes, argue that I explain the nation merely in terms of class struggle. This is a complete
misrepresentation of my position: I do not believe nationally relevant conflicts can be reduced to
a conflict between the classes, as class conflict is but one of many types of conflict behind the
success of nation formation.

Even though nationally relevant interest conflicts corresponded to a myriad of changes introduced
into society by modernizing processes, the modern nation emerged not only as a part of the
modernizing transformation on the road to the civil society, but also, in some respects, as a
reaction to these self-same processes. In some cases, the protagonists of national movements
rejected the erosion of patriarchal ties in the very social spheres in which their support lay: they
took a sceptical view toward industrialization, the rationalization of administration and the
homogenization of culture and language - despite their interested connections with these spheres.

43
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Hall, John. "Structural Approaches to Nations and Nationalism." Pp .33-43

It is as well to comment immediately upon the character of a structural approach to the study of
any element of social reality. Such an approach suggests that life in society involves the „hard‟
realities that derive from economic and political power relations quite as much as upon „softer‟
cultural factors. Two separate dangers are seen in culturalist theories by those who stress the
importance of structural conditions. On the one hand, scepticism is shown to voluntarism, that is,
to the notion that human agents make up the world as they go along. On the other hand,
something like dislike is shown towards theories wholly opposite in character, namely those that
suggest humans act within the terms of meaning systems, being mere concept fodder of systems
of ideas. Structural theorists counter this, on the sensible grounds that changes in material
conditions often lead to complete ideological upheaval. Further, structural approaches may well
recognize an element of human agency for all that they stress the constraint of various sorts of
material conditions.

Of course most sociologists are sensible, occupying that middle ground staked out by Marx in
which human beings make history but in circumstances they did not choose. Accordingly, many
theorists of nationalism have something to say about social structure. But concentration here is on
two theorists, Ernest Gellner and Michael Mann, both of whom privilege social structural factors.
One reason for this concentration is obvious: these two thinkers are exceptionally distinguished in
intellectual terms. No other structural approaches carry such force. Another reason is that there is
something of a progression from one to the other. Differently put, it is quite proper to see Mann
as responding to Gellner, both formally and informally. Two elements are worth stressing here.
On the one hand, Mann can properly be seen as the heir of Gellner's view of nationalism at least
in respect of the historical record. On the other hand, Mann identifies rather different structural
factors at work in European history, and notes that the structuring conditions of contemporary
world politics are changing - and in such a way that the character of nationalism may yet be
affected. A final preliminary point is in order. This author endorses structural accounts and is
sympathetic to the view of nationalism propounded - as a reality in the historical record and, at
the least, as a continuing danger within our world. Accordingly, this chapter is not, so to speak,
written from the outside; it rather describes a viewpoint, and theoretical developments within it,
that is judged to be essentially correct.

MALIGN FATES

46
Intellectual history is likely to demonstrate the profound impact of Gellner in his early years on
later students of nationalism. Those lectures at the London School of Economics in the later
1950s and early 1960s that ended up as the celebrated chapter on nationalism in Thought and
Change (1964) were attended by such later luminaries in the field as Benedict Anderson and Tom
Nairn. This powerful initial justification for concentrating on Gellner is of course massively
reinforced by the best-selling status of his later Nations and Nationalism (1983). But herein lies a
problem. Some themes of that book are so well known that its central point has been somewhat
forgotten. Gellner's central vision is, however, of the greatest import, and it can be seen anew by
means of a biographical excursus - designed less, it should be stressed, to fully understand the
man than to take us to the heart of his understanding of nationalism.

The position of Czech Jewry was deeply problematical in the last years of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire (Kieval 1988, 2000). The social dominance of the German minority had been challenged
by the Czech majority, driven by industrialization into cities whose character changed once the
demographic balance tipped. Many Jews were part of or aspired to belong to the high culture of
the imperial centre, and accordingly made sure that their children were educated in German, then
distinctively a world language. But the Young Czech movement insisted that Jews learn Czech,
not least so as to undermine the salience of the „German minority. If this was a cross pressure,
further ambivalence was added by the fact that the Young Czechs did not really allow them into
the heart of the Czech nation. Thus was born the tricultural world of Kafka (and of course of
Hans Kohn, one of the great early theorists of nationalism), a world of dispossession which bred
varied longings - for inclusion in the German world, for inclusion in the Czech world, for the
recovery of simple Jewish roots, and for Zionism more generally, and endless oscillations
between them (Spector 2000). The break-up of the empire did not remove all ambivalence.
Loyalty to Germany became ever-more difficult given the rise of Nazism, but complete
integration into the Czech community remained problematic. Tomas Masaryk gave special status
to the Jewish community, allowing it to identify itself on the census returns by religion rather
than by nationality or language; this was in one sense a compliment, but it also indicated a
measure of distance. Still, in the inter-war years outmarriage from the Jewish community reached
very high levels, with the position of Jews in general being far better than was the case elsewhere
in the region.

This was the world in which Gellner grew up (Hall 2003, forthcoming). His parents were German
speakers of Jewish background, for all that they took the trouble to learn Czech. The family had a

47
German governess and a Czech maid and Gellner grew up bilingual. Loyalty to Masaryk's
republic was intense, not surprisingly given its liberal democratic success and stunning cultural
efflorescence. But there was always awareness of other identities. There is evidence of some
Zionist leanings in the mother, and certainly in an aunt. The father had had communist links, and
began to cultivate ties to England as fears of the Nazis increased. All the same, the family stayed
until 1939, and so witnessed the arrival of Hitler's troops in Prague. Escape to England was
difficult. It was also emotionally traumatic: Gellner viscerally missed Prague during his school
years. But his return to Prague in 1945 only brought disillusion. The tricultural world of Prague
had come to an end: most Jews, including many in his own family, had been killed, whilst he
witnessed the vicious if comprehensible ethnic cleansing of the Germans. Convinced that the
Czechs would accept communism given their experience at Munich, Gellner left in 1946 to
pursue an academic career in England.

Two summary points about the experience of this twentieth-century Central European intellectual
of Jewish background are obvious. First, modern life forced identity change whether one wanted
it or not. Second, welthis-torischer forces were destroying diverse and varied identities, and
inexorably replacing them with units based on a single culture. Not surprisingly, he came to stress
rule by one's co-nationals as one of the basic elements of the modern social contract (1964: ch. 2).

Gellner's thoughts about nationalism were further influenced by personal experience after the
seemingly final move to England in 1946. The loss of his early taken-for-granted identity
certainly led at an intellectual level to a desire to understand closed and meaningful worlds: this
was the emotional force behind Gellner's desire as anthropologist to work amongst Berber hill
tribes of the High Atlas (Gellner 1996: 679-80). The involvement in North Africa occasioned his
first forays into the study of nationalism, and they marked the initial theory - above all, in
demonstrating the invented quality of modern nationalism (Gellner 1961). But one has the clear
impression that the concern with belonging was initially as practical as academic. Gellner's
earliest academic papers show him to have been in part a member of the tribe of the then
dominant Oxford style of philosophy (Hall forthcoming), but he was unable to stay within this
rather confined world, as did Isaiah Berlin - of whose position Gellner was deeply critical. He
was thereafter marked down as an oddity, as Central European rather than British. There is a
sense in which he wanted to be let in, but was rejected for failing to follow the customs of the
country with sufficient diligence. This created a particular ambivalence within him - at once

48
interested in and attracted to belonging yet concerned that no social organization would ever be
able to contain him in such a way as to limit his freedom of thought.

In the later years of his life Gellner was forced by the tectonic shifts of world politics into
thinking further about nationalism. Visits to the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s seemed to
confirm his view that multinational political systems were doomed by the social pressures
released by modernity. But his return to Prague after 1989 made him reconsider matters. For one
thing, Prague itself was so utterly homogenized as to be boring - for all that this very condition
was what Gellner insisted the forces of modernity demanded. For another, he became very
conscious of the huge costs that had been unleashed when the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
empires had collapsed. The resulting power vacuum had encouraged war, which did much to
cover the practices - ethnic cleansing, politicide, population transfer and genocide - that sorted
European populations into more homogeneous entities. Arguing against himself, Gellner tried to
produce prescriptive ideals which would prevent the break-up of the Soviet Union, hoping to see
it liberalize and soften, and able to allow sufficient cultural autonomy to retain the passive loyalty
of its peoples under a single political roof (Gellner 1991). These hopes very largely came to
naught, but without the generalized disaster - Chechnya being the obvious exception - that
Gellner had expected.

THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

These personal experiences meant that Gellner thought about nationalism all his life. Complexity
lurks beneath this simple statement. For it is possible and necessary to distinguish three rather
separate theories of nationalism in Gellner's work. Despite the brilliance of Nations and
Nationalism, the earliest formulation is the most complete and the most powerful, with the final
thoughts being, in the last analysis, of lesser interest.

The theory in Thought and Change is essentially simple. A good deal of cultural consensus is
needed within political units if they are to prosper in the modern world. State education systems
typically choose to privilege one language in the interests of economic and military efficiency. If
this is to say that some of the world's linguistic cultures are too small to survive, nationalism
results from the fact that imperial systems are too large for the purposes of modernity. The key
explanatory argument that then follows concentrates heavily on the blocked mobility of the native
intelligentsia. Empires tend to send rulers to the peripheries from the metropolitan centre, thereby

49
disadvantaging the ambitious locals who had gained cultural capital by studying at the heart of
the empires. Second-class citizenship within a large polity - due to skin colour, religion, ethnicity,
or some other cultural marker - naturally suggested the sense of playing the nationalist card, of
becoming a first-class citizen within one's own state. Gellner's subtle initial theory suggested a
number of sources of support for such intellectuals - mostly sources, it should be noted, present in
North Africa. If the working class of newly created cities was an obvious and modern core
membership, equally important were traditional groupings - such as the tribes of the High Atlas -
irritated by imposition of non-customary law within their domains. Absolutely central to Gellner's
vision was the insistence that nationalists in power were social revolutionaries, creating a nation
where none had really existed before. Traditional groupings that had resisted imperial pretensions
were doomed to still greater disappointment at the hands of the new, modernizing elite.

What strikes one most about Gellner's second theory of nationalism, expounded in Nations and
Nationalism, is that it is written at a much higher level of abstraction. The benefit of this was the
introduction of a scheme of philosophic history which did much to justify his claim that
nationalism was modern. But there was a negative consequence of this very development.
Structural conditions at times came to be seen in purely abstract terms, above all in the insistence
that industrial society simply needs nationalism - on the grounds that culturally cohesive
community was a precondition of the proper working of a modern economy. This was
functionalism at its purest, a world bereft of human agents, and it represented a step backwards
from the earlier theory. Care needs to be taken at this point. Nations and Nationalism is a
marvelleous book, in which Gellner writes his life as if it were sociology. Accordingly, insights
of varied sorts abound. A measure of agency is restored in the long parable about Megalomania
and Ruritania which describes the move from cultural awakening to political demand on the part
of a national community of the imperial periphery. If job prospects might benefit from secession,
there are hints at a rather different psychology - at the feelings of humiliation that come from not
being able to operate within one's own language. Further, Gellner noted that not every ethnic or
national community makes it into the world of modern nation-states. A selection mechanism
seems to be at work, but it was not one that Gellner ever theorized. Finally, an ingenious typology
of nationalism was worked out, purportedly designed to go beyond Plamenatz's distinction
between Western and Eastern (in effect, civic and ethnic) forms of nationalism - but not in fact
much used by Gellner thereafter (Gellner 1983: 99; Plamenatz 1973).

50
The seismic shift of 1989, that is, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the hideous wars of the
Balkans, forced Gellner once again to confront the national question. An obvious shift in
Gellner's position has already been mentioned, namely that move from description to prescription
that saw him arguing against himself, so to speak forgetting his view that empires were doomed
in an effort to support a liberalized Soviet Union so as to avoid the bloodshed likely to follow
from secessions. But there were also subtle changes, mostly emphasizing either non-material
motives for nationalist mobilization or insisting that industrialism's „need‟ for nationalism was
put into action by entirely mundane desires of specific actors for power and influence. 1 Further,
Gellner turned slightly from abstract theorizing towards historical location, producing a scheme
mingling geographical zones with developments within the history of European nationalism
(Gellner 1997). But these changes are somewhat ad hoc (there being no link, for example,
between this historical scheme and the typology of Nations and Nationalism), and they are of
interest principally to specialists.

There is one constant throughout Gellner's work on nationalism, namely the insistence that
nationalism and industrialism are related, with the former very largely being seen as the child of
the latter. This is distinctively a structuralist account, as Gellner emphasized repeatedly. Little
attention needed to be paid to nationalist ideas, Gellner argued at all times, given the
predominance of causal necessity. This view came naturally to a thinker whose philosophy of
social science emphasized cause so much more than meaning (Gellner 1973).

WHAT IS WRONG WITH GELLNER'S VIEW OF NATIONALISM

An enormous amount of attention has been given to Gellner's work, most of it focusing on
Nations and Nationalism. A measure of agreement has been reached on four major criticisms
which can usefully be considered in turn. (Hall 1998 contains a series of papers, especially those
by Hall, O'Leary, Laitin and Brubaker, that make the following points.)

There is a virtual consensus in the contemporary philosophy of social science to the effect that
functionalist reasoning is meretricious. There is a great deal to be said in favour of this view.
Consequences should not be taken as causes. Differently put, history has never seen fit to
recognize my needs (of which there are many). But two points should be borne in mind to counter
any easy rejection of Gellner's view of nationalism on this count. First, it is not at all clear that
Gellner's work is functionalist. The initial theory most certainly was not, whilst that of Nations

51
and Nationalism can be saved - as Gellner himself stressed (1996: 627-28) - by adding to it
agents who homogenize national territories because they believe that this will aid the varied
workings of social, economic and political life. Second, a measure of scepticism is due towards
the anti-functionalist consensus. Much of life is drift rather than mastery, making the search for
agents - for smoking guns in control of events - highly unrealistic. One way of thinking of
functionalism is in terms of unintended consequences: this rich seam of social understanding has
been sidelined by social theory obsessed with the impact of rational actors. My own hunch is that
the social sciences will soon see some revival of functionalism. But this is essentially an aside.
Let us imagine that Gellner's theory is, so to speak, judged to be philosophically sound, and turn
to the remaining criticisms. The next two are related, and so can be taken together; they are the
most damning.

Gellner's work at all times suggests that there is a link - which must concern both timing and
location - between industrialization and the emergence of nationalism. This viewpoint is subject
to fairly obvious refutation. To begin with, several European nationalist movements
unquestionably predated the emergence of industrialization. This is true of the drive for Greek
independence, as Gellner himself realized (1996: 629-30), but it is even more strikingly so for
much nineteenth-century Balkan nationalism. There is simply no way in which the Balkans can
be seen as an area of industrialization until much later in the twentieth century. The same points
apply to the rise of nationalist sentiments within pre-existing states. Britain and France gained
such sentiments in the eighteenth century, before the onset of industrial organization (Mann 1992).
Still, a word of warning is in order here. The language of conjecture and refutation is of course
Popperian. It tends to extreme Puritanism: a single refutation means that a theory should be
dropped once and for all. One wonders if this attitude is really suitable for social science. It is
very rare for any theory to explain anything fully; often we rest content with theories that explain
perhaps half of the variation of any particular variable. In the case of nationalism, it is certainly
the case that Gellner's account does not explain everything, and I will argue that an alternative
view does rather better. But one should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. There are
cases where nationalism is linked to industrialization, albeit these are often intermingled with the
more political causes of nationalist mobilization that will be presented shortly. Further light can
be cast on this topic slightly later in this chapter.

A final point made about Gellner's viewpoint is that it is dangerous (Abizadeh 2002). To think in
terms of homogeneity is, according to this view, to encourage it. This is ridiculous. One can,

52
indeed must, recognize the power of nuclear weapons without thereby being a proponent of their
use. Further the attack is purely ad hominem in character, and it can be refuted on similarly
personal grounds. Gellner knew, then longed for, and always wished to find ways in which a
more plural world could work - stressing on many occasions that a repetition of the European
pattern of nation-building in Africa would cause disaster. The attempt to understand the world
should not be judged harshly, especially since much practical damage has been done in world
politics through the actions of the naïve, rushing into situations that they do not understand at all.
But this is a large issue of great complexity, and it must be dropped immediately, although it is
worth discussing on another occasion.

WHAT IS RIGHT ABOUT GELLNER'S VIEW OF NATIONALISM

The fundamental insight of Gellner's theory of nationalism that has been neglected is simple:
homogenization processes have been central to the history of nationalism. Quite properly, Gellner
himself had ambivalent feelings about this, at once hating the removal of a plural world whilst
insisting on the inevitability of a process that would likely bring economic and political efficiency
in its tail. The claim to be made here is very simple, namely that Gellner's key insight has much to
recommend it in descriptive terms. Let us consider some cases in turn so as to justify this claim.

The Czech case does indeed support Gellner's position. The tricultural world did collapse in
World War II, with further simplification - the secession of the rich Czechs from the poor Slovaks,
discrimination against gypsies - taking place in the years after 1989. Crucially, Czechia is part of
a larger European pattern. Mark Mazower's analytic history of Salonica makes this point for a
single city (2005). Crucially, the pattern applies throughout the continent. Before 1914 perhaps 60
million people lived in states not ruled by their co-nationals. This figure was much diminished,
perhaps to a mere 25 million, by the break-up of empires in 1918 (Mann 1999: 33). Still, the
messy intermingling of people within new and fragile states remained a cause of tension in the
inter-war years. The practices of Hitler and Stalin (genocide, population transfer, ethnic cleansing
and boundary changes, all covered by the fog of war) then created very homogeneous units in
most of Central and Eastern Europe. Everyone who reads this book will be able to bear witness to
the continuing homogenization of recent years: the break-up of multinational arrangements in
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia - with hideous ethnic cleansing being involved
in the latter case. There are rather few cases - Spain above all, with Great Britain currently
undergoing change, Switzerland having idiosyncrasies all its own, with Belgium almost having

53
ceased to exist - from Eastern to Western Europe in which one can speak of significant
multinationalism. Differently put, most countries are now fully developed nation-states, within
which a single ethnicity or culture dominates. There are of course minorities, sometimes
expanding, within such states, and there is much talk of multiculturalism. But multiculturalism is
not multinationalism, for one thing being much easier to manage politically.

Concentration to this point has been on European history, but the mention of multiculturalism
suggests turning attention briefly to the United States. It is important to note - whilst
remembering at all times the continuing disadvantage and discrimination faced by Afro-
Americans - that in crucial respects the United States is, as it always has been, a huge machine for
turning people into Americans (Hall and Lindholm 2001). What is noticeable, for example, about
the purported rise of ethnic politics is that this is so very general. Claiming an ethnic past is
almost an American right, but it remains American in that such ethnicities are symbolic rather
than real - not least because outmarriage rates from ethnic groups tend to be so very high. Perhaps
the key indicator of the Gellnerian, homogeneous character of the country is that the United
States is, and will remain, a monolingual entity. „If English was good enough for Jesus Christ‟, a
campaigning politician declared, „it‟s good enough for Texas.' In a nutshell, a fundamental reason
for the success of the United States is its lack of deep diversity.

A final general point is worth making. Gellner's functionalist account of the rise of nationalism
does deserve criticism. But this does not detract from the claim that presence of homogeneity has
functional benefits. Economic flexibility is often helped by the ability of a homogeneous
community to act together - because an external threat is seen as a common problem (Alesina and
Spolaore 2004). These generalizations hold true, for instance, for Denmark, whose success owes
much to the way in which it divested itself of territories and peoples due to its remarkable ability
to lose wars (Campbell et al. 2006). An extremely powerful and highly technical paper seeking to
explain the manner in which the Danes took over the English butter market from the Irish in the
nineteenth century makes the point especially forcefully. Homogeneity allowed the Danes to set
up cooperatives and to improve the quality of their butter, for this was where profits lay. In
contrast, the main avenue to advancement in Ireland lay in the courts - that is, in claiming land
from the English (O'Rourke 2006). Might it be that a background element to recent Irish success
(the emergence of the so-called „Celtic Tiger‟) is that of the creation of a homogeneous
community in the Republic? Gellner said less about two further functional matters, but each
deserves comment. First, welfare spending is certainly related to homogeneity, for the simple

54
reason that people are prepared to be taxed at high rates as long as monies go to people exactly
like themselves. Secondly, democratic politics also become easier in circumstances of
homogeneity. For one thing, an end to stalemate between competing groups allows decisions to
be made; for another, the regulation of differences at the heart of democratic politics is much
easier when the differences in question are bounded by shared identity.

CONDITIONS FOR HOMOGENIZATION

The processes by which homogeneity was established were often so repulsive that much effort
has gone into thinking about ways in which multinational arrangements can be maintained.
Though this is morally desirable, it can amount in intellectual terms to replacing analysis with
hope. But we must seek to explain what actually happened, not least so as to determine whether
the structure of modern politics has now so changed as to allow nationalism to somehow change
its colours. The social scientist who helps us most in regard to these questions is Michael Mann.
His important The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (2005) is the successor
to the work of Gellner in taking as the core fact to be explained processes of homogenization. Our
immediate task is to examine the conditions for homogenization in European history before then
seeing whether structural conditions have changed in ways that allow for hope or necessitate fear.

Before turning to Mann's particular contribution, some general points - taken for granted in his
work as much as explicitly spelt out - about European society at the end of the nineteenth century
need to be stressed. Crucially, this was a period of intense geopolitical competition. The character
of nationalism was massively affected by two elements then taken to constitute the strength of a
state, both of which can be illustrated with reference to the political views of Max Weber. First,
let us remember that Weber was a Fleet Professor - that is, a member of an elite convinced that
imperial possessions were necessary for the well-being of the state. Secure sources of supply
mattered quite as much as markets, for geopolitical autonomy depended upon the ability to feed
one's population and to have the raw materials necessary to produce a full complement of
weapons. Importantly, there was nothing peculiar about the German elite: all European states
patterned their industrialization so as to gain political autonomy, a development which led by the
end of the century to massive overproduction of steel (Sen 1984). But there is a second, less well-
known side to Weber's politics. It is neatly summed up in the nickname used by his friends -
Polish Max. This referred to his early research project on Polish labour on the East Elbian Junker
estates. The attitude that Weber took to such labour (that it would weaken the fabric of the nation)

55
was entirely typical of the time. The leading edge of power seemed to reside in monolingual
nation-states, not least as multinationalism was considered likely to undermine military efficiency
(Lieven 2000).

A general point about nationalism can usefully be made here. Nationalism is best seen in
Freudian terms, as a labile force, prone to take colour from its surroundings. In the late nineteenth
century nationalism was, as argued, closely linked to imperialism: a strong state needed (or,
rather, in order to be strong a state felt it needed) both peoples and colonies if it was to survive in
a hostile world. It is at this point that a key difference with Gellner's explanatory framework
emerges. His parable of Megalomania and Ruritania is subtly wrong, at least insofar as it sees
nationalism in terms of secession - that is, it suggests that the prime mover of nationalism was
Ruritania. But social movements characteristically take their character from the states with which
they interact. Politically conscious movements tend to arise when states act in an arbitrary manner,
whether in terms of taxation, repression, exclusion or conscription (Mann 1993). This most
certainly applies to nationalism. What many of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
wanted was recognition of their historic rights, something which would allow them to protect
their own languages and cultures. Masaryk sought such a liberal empire or constitutional
monarchy, perhaps even until the onset of World War I. Exit became a fully attractive option only
when voice was so denied that loyalties were destroyed (Hirschman 1970). Differently put,
secessionist impulses very often resulted from the drives of great powers - the Megalomanias of
the time - to homogenize their territories.

The emphasis on the social psychology created by state actions has always been at the core of
Mann's sociology, and it is no surprise that it features so much in his view of nationalism (1993:
chs 7 and 20). But he adds a set of factors, carefully constructed and skilfully deployed, which are
specific to his understanding of ethnic cleansing. Geopolitical conflict matters enormously, for it
provides the fuel from which vicious actions can understandably arise. The most dangerous
situations arise when rival national movements claiming the same piece of territory are backed by
powerful neighbouring states. The fear that help may come to one's rival from abroad encourages
pre-emptive cleansing, not least as those rivals can all too easily be dubbed a fifth column likely
to betray the state. In these circumstances democracy can be dangerous, for the people will be
seen as belonging to an organic ethnic nation rather than to a liberal polity based on civic
inclusiveness and the presence of institutional checks and balances upon the exercise of power.
But another fact, pointing in somewhat the opposite direction, needs also to be noted. Limits to

56
ethnic conflict can often be set by a strong state, able to control communal conflict of one sort or
another. It is no accident that the vicious side of nationalism was so very present in inter-war
Europe. Defeat in war led to a weakening of social institutions in Germany, whilst newer or
newly reconstituted states in Central and Eastern Europe had very limited state capacity.

It is as well at this point to highlight similarities and differences between the accounts of
nationalism offered by Gellner and Mann. Both stress that processes of homogenization have
been central to nationalism, and both insist that this is modern. But their views of modernity
differ. Gellner stresses industrialization, and thereby makes homogenization a necessary feature
of the modern world. In contrast, Mann concentrates his attention on the entry of the people on to
the political stage. It is important to specify what is involved in his claim that democracy has a
dark side, for the phrase is one that can easily lead to confusion. An initial claim is that white
settler populations behaved with particular viciousness towards the natives they encountered, it
being important to emphasize that this had nothing to do with industrialization. More generally,
Mann stresses that the moment of political modernization (that is, decompressions, aberturas, and
glasnosts) is always dangerous. His account of ethnic cleansing shows how danger leads to
disaster when fear is generated by geopolitical uncertainties. This account represents, in my view,
clear cognitive advance for it captures motivation and explains timing far better than do the
varied theories proposed by Gellner. But it is only fair to note that Gellner had a reply to Mann
(1996: 636) in which he stressed that he was merely operating at a higher level of abstraction, but
quite prepared to accept centralizing state construction as part of a generic model of
modernization. This does not really protect Gellner's position, but it most certainly does muddy
the waters.

Accordingly, the availability of another means of distinguishing the two accounts is welcome.
Mann is not claiming, as noted, that the people always defines itself in organic terms: very much
to the contrary, he highlights the capacity for inclusiveness of liberal states, and of their ability to
regulate conflict between social classes. This matters greatly. The flexibility of liberal regimes
allowed for their political form to remain unchanged despite the impact of industrialization, as
deals accommodated classes and even nations. 2 However, to a considerable extent this does not
challenge Gellner's metaphysic: these are largely instances in which state came before nation, in
which processes of homogenization, from religious unification to complete conquest, had taken
place earlier. This is utterly different from the pattern of the Tsarist, Ottoman and Austrian
empires in which nations were extant and conscious at the moment states sought to modernize

57
themselves. Nonetheless, there remains at least in potential a fundamental difference between the
two thinkers. Gellner offers us a general theory of nationalism in which rule by one's co-culturals
is an unavoidable necessity. Mann at least allows for the possibility that liberal regimes may
provide political roofs under which several nations can prosper, especially of course if the
structure of world politics diminishes levels of geopolitical conflict. Differently put, Gellner's
view of nationalism may be a product and sociology of European modernity rather than of
modernity per se.

OPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: OR, FROM DESCRIPTION TO PRESCRIPTION

Two cautionary notes should be issued immediately. First, it behoves us to remember that no
European empire was able to decompress successfully. The moment of modernization led to the
destruction of every multinational entity. Secondly, the spread of liberal political structures in
Europe in the twentieth century has a very great deal to do with ethnic cleansing. We are liberal
because the national question has been solved by ethnic cleansing, population transfer, border
changes and genocide. But the analytic question remains. Might liberalism solve the national
question rather than be the happy product of horror?

It is possible to begin with some good news. The structure of world politics has changed in ways
that help contain nationalism. Crucially, in much of the rest of the world the very high level of
geopolitical conflict that characterized European history is not present. As a consequence, the link
between nationalism and imperialism has to a large extent been broken. Many state leaders wish
to join the elite of world politics, to be part of global modernity, rather than to insulate themselves
from it. Further, in key areas of the world states have sufficient capacity to control ethnic conflict.
This is strikingly true of India, where frequent communal conflicts are brought to an end by the
power of the Indian army, the backbone of the state (Mann 2005: ch. 17). The mention of India
suggests a final point. National demands can be and are sometimes satisfied by the provision of
voice and cultural rights. David Laitin has quite properly made much of this in connection with
language (1992). In order to be a complete, fully functioning Indian citizen one needs, he claims,
three plus or minus one languages. Two of these languages, Hindi and English, are the languages
of the state, the latter still present because so many in the elite resisted its extirpation at the time
of independence given that it gave them cultural advantage. A third language is that of one's state,
and a fourth that of a minority within such a state. A situation of three minus one occurs when
one is a Hindi speaker within a state in which Hindi is the official language. Of course, this is but

58
an example of the possibilities inherent in federal and consociational arrangements of varied sorts.
The presence of such strategies returns us to the consideration raised at the start of this paragraph.
The absence of geopolitical conflict allows states to be less unitary.

Unfortunately, there is also bad news. The link between nationalism and imperialism is not
completely broken: Putin is not cognizant of the certain fact that retention of Chechnya will
hinder rather than help the Russian economy. More generally, many of Mann's variables apply
outside Europe (2005: ch. 17). There most certainly are areas in the world in which nations fight
over the same territory, as was recently the case in the ertstwhile Yugoslavia and in Rwanda,
making murderous homogenizing drives a potential reality in a significant number of places.
Further, illiberal policies of states towards national minorities exist in some abundance - notably
in Tibet, Southern Sudan, Kashmir, Aceh, Chechnya, Kurdistan and Palestine. In these
circumstances secessionist nationalism is likely to flourish quite as powerfully as it did within
European history. Mann also notes that many federal and consociational schemes have failed, it
being something of an open question whether the devolution of power appeases or abets
secessionist nationalism. Finally, Mann introduces three new structural elements within world
politics that may well reinforce the unpleasant face of nationalism (2005: ch. 17). The neoliberal
economic policies encouraged by the United States since 1989 do nothing to help state
construction, and at worst help to deconstruct states that had begun to gain some capacities. In
Africa some states have become so weak that they cannot see far outside their capitals. Ethnic
mobilization is all too easy in such circumstances, and its suppression well beyond the power of
states bereft of bureaucracies and merit-based armies. Secondly, the end of socialism means that a
major alternative meaning system to nationalism has gone. Third, the gap left by the decline of
socialism has been filled, especially in much of the Middle East, by Islamism. There is a
resonance here between Mann and Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order (1996). If nationalism has changed its character for the better in some
places as the link with imperialism has been broken, it may be that it will mutate once again into a
lethal brew linked on this occasion to religious fundamentalism. Hideous processes of
homogenization may come to haunt the developing world as much as they did the European past.

NOTES

1 For details of Gellner's last views, see Hall (1998: Introduction).

59
2 This is of course a large area, in which a good deal of caution is needed. The liberal regime of
Great Britain did accommodate workers and Scots, but it also expelled Chartists and cleared the
Highlands.

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Arnason, Johann. "Nations and Nationalisms: Between General Theory and Comparative
History." Pp. 44-56

The case for comparative perspectives on nations and nationalisms can be made at the most basic
level. Definitions of nationhood are notoriously disputed, but irrespective of controversies in that
regard, it is generally accepted that national identities involve mutual demarcation; the plurality
of nations - ultimately a „world of nations‟ (Bloom 1941) - is a defining feature of the field to be
explored, and comparisons of distinctive characteristics, types and trajectories are by the same
token essential to any research programme. The reference to nationalisms in the plural - and as a
subject of comparative inquiry - may seem less self-evident, but it is easier to justify if a broad
definition is adopted. For the purposes of the present discussion, nationalism will be equated with
the explicit and affirmative articulation of national identity. In that sense, it is a corollary of
nationhood. The connection is clearly envisaged in Max Weber's comments on the nation as a
„value-concept‟, an institutionalized meaning inseparable from a value-orientation. The same
point is made by one of the most prominent contemporary analysts of national movements and
formations: „There is no nation without national consciousness, i.e. an awareness of membership
in the nation, coupled with a view that this membership is an inherently valuable quality' (Hroch
2000 [1984]: 12). If nationalism is defined in such terms, it is more akin to broad and adaptable
orientations like individualism and collectivism, than to ideological currents like liberalism or
socialism. We can thus defuse the problem - frequently noted by writers on the subject - of
intellectual underdevelopment and doctrinal poverty. If nationalism is compared to the major
ideological alternatives of modern times, it will inevitably appear as a less structured and less
theorizable trend; but if the comparative focus is on broader orientations such as those mentioned
above, the nationalist substratum of multiple and often rival ideologies can be put in a more
balanced perspective. There is no denying that nationalism has in some contexts developed into a
more self-contained ideology than in others, but it never did so without inputs from other sources.
Both the superimposed ideological frameworks and the underlying varieties of nationalism call
for comparative study.

A further dimension of comparative inquiry will open up if we accept that it is legitimate to speak
of nations and nationalisms in pre-modern contexts. This is one of the most controversial issues in
current debates. Some specific arguments will be considered below; at this point, it should only
be noted that there is nothing a priori implausible about the suggestion. If it is now widely agreed

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that pre-modern forms of democracy and capitalism can be distinguished from modern ones, the
view that the same might apply to nations and nationalisms is not to be dismissed out of hand. It
does not amount to a denial of novelty: new characteristics and dynamics of national phenomena
in the modern world may be related to new forms and contexts of interaction with other historical
forces. If this perspective is adopted, contrasts and parallels between different paths to modernity
will be seen as a prime theme for further research.

OBSTACLES AND PRECONCEPTIONS

In view of these considerations, the limited and one-sided role of comparative approaches in
scholarly work on nations and nationalism seems all the more striking. The question of obstacles
to a logical and prima facie inviting option must be addressed. One obvious reason has to do with
uneven geohistorical coverage. Non-European experiences have been neglected, at least by
contrast with the vast and diverse literature on European developments, and two parts of that field
are especially relevant to the present topic. On the one hand, enough has been written on „Asian
forms of the nation‟ (Tönnesson and Antlöv 1996) to show that more work of that kind would
both open up broader horizons and modify the conceptual frame of reference for comparative
studies. Apart from the complex, inconclusive and still not very well understood processes of
nation formation in China and India, the Japanese case is of crucial importance. Historians of
modern Japan, as well as critical analysts of Japanese politics (especially Maruyama 1963) have
done much to clarify the distinctive features of Japanese nationalism (from the nineteenth-century
transformation to the post-World War II developmental state), but this work has not been
integrated into mainstream debates.

References to Japan as an early case of imitative or „transfer‟nationalism (Wehler 2004 [2001]:

52) are still common; they greatly underestimate the endogenous long-term processes that
preceded the encounter with the West and determined its outcome. On the other hand,
comparative analysis of nation formation in Europe and the Americas has not progressed very far,
and the absence of systematic work has made it easier to draw on American experiences in
selective and exaggerated ways. This applies to Anderson's portrayal of Creole nationalism in
Latin America as a forerunner of European trends (Anderson 1991), but also to the much more
widely shared vision of the United States as the archetypal civic or trans-ethnic nation.

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The latter claim links up with interpretations of the European background. If a Eurocentric bias
has affected the most influential scholarship on nations and nationalisms, this is not simply a
matter of overgeneralizing from specific European cases: rather, the problem is that basic
conceptual markers and typological models have been adapted to invidious distinctions rooted in
European history. In this way, idealizing conceptions of the modern nation, more or less
explicitly identified with specific cases, are built into a general frame of reference. Other aspects
of modernity have been transfigured in similar ways, but in this particular field, the projections
seem more resistant to criticism.

The reference to a broader modern context touches upon a further obstacle to comparative
approaches: the lack of an adequate conceptual framework for the analysis of changing
interconnections (and the failure to respond to theoretical innovations in related areas). Attempts
to theorize modernity can still draw on the insights of classical sociology, but in that context, its
grasp of nations and nationalisms was notoriously limited. When later analysts (especially
Gellner 1983) recognized the key role of the national factor in the formation of the modern world,
they tended to rely on oversimplified theoretical models that had already been left behind by
more critical interpretations of modernity. More recently, the unfolding debate on „multiple
modernities‟ has - so far - not had a major impact on the study of nations and nationalisms.
Theorists involved in this discussion - especially S. N. Eisenstadt - have signalled the need to
reopen the question of collective identities and their historical dynamics, but the challenge has not
been taken up by those more directly concerned with the themes at issue here.

It is not being suggested that closer contact with changing ways of theorizing modernity could
help to construct a general theory of nations and nationalism. As the following discussion should
show, there are good reasons to agree with Craig Calhoun's thesis: „grasping nationalism in its
multiplicity of forms requires multiple theories‟ (Calhoun 1997: 8; it seems obvious that the same
applies to nationhood). No comprehensive explanatory or interpretive model has withstood
criticism, and no plausible grounds for persisting in the search for such master keys can be
established. But a theoretical framework, in the more flexible sense of conceptual guidelines for
the analysis of multiple constellations, would not impose a uniform pattern. It could serve to
focus comparative approaches on the variety of relationships betweeen nations and nationalism
on the one hand, patterns of modernity and modernizing processes on the other. Selective views
on this problematic - the nation as a functional complement to other modernizing forces, as an
integrative counterweight to modern conflicts and tensions, or as a historical obstacle to the long-

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term globalizing logic of modernity - have proved more conducive to rival simplifications than to
productive discussion.

HANS KOHN: IDEAS, TRADITIONS AND TRAJECTORIES

In the whole literature on nations and nationalism, it would be hard to find a more seminal work
than Hans Kohn's Idea of Nationalism (1945). Its influence on the approaches and arguments of
later scholars in the field has been much greater than is now commonly acknowledged; and even
where direct connections are absent or unlikely, it can be argued that Kohn's survey of the whole
problematic anticipates the themes and directions of later debates in a more comprehensive
fashion than any other work on the subject. The following discussion will focus on specific
implications for comparative approaches. In that regard, four main analytical dimensions may be
distinguished. At the most basic level, Kohn's assumptions about the role of nations and
nationalisms in the making of the modern world gave a particular twist to the tasks of
comparative analysis. As noted above, this context is crucial but still undertheorized; both the
questions that Kohn singled out for preferential treatment and those that he conspicuously set
aside have figured prominently in more recent work and remain as controversial as ever. Moving
on to more sustained comparative history, Kohn adopts a typological distinction between two
kinds of nationalism, not simply identical with Western and Eastern versions, but easily
assimilable to that dichotomy (first defined in an intra-European sense, but adaptable to a global
arena). This is perhaps his most salient contribution to the debate on nations and nationalisms;
further inquiry into the origins of the distinction is beyond the scope of this chapter, but there can
be no doubt that Kohn's formulation of it is the most paradigmatic and significant - also in the
sense that its nuances and ambiguities suggest ways of problematizing the whole argument. The
enduring impact of this dichotomizing model will be analysed at some length below. Kohn used it
mainly to clarify and contrast divergent paths of modern history, but his more detailed case
studies could not but touch upon pre-modern antecedents that had left their marks on modern
identities and destinies. This third aspect of the problematic is marginal to the main line of
argument, but it prefigures issues that came to play a much more central role in comparative
studies. Finally, the reconstruction of links between modern and pre-modern phases raises
questions about the long-term processes of nation formation that encompass both stages.
Although this is, in Kohn's work, the least developed of the themes to be considered here, some
highly suggestive statements point to problems that are - as I will argue - of decisive importance
for further development of comparative approaches.

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The Idea of Nationalism was written during World War II and completed when the victory of the
Western - Soviet alliance was in sight. Kohn's comprehensive interpretation of modern history,
developed through an analysis of nationalism, is therefore comparable to other works of a
similarly ambitious character, written in the later stages or the aftermath of the war. As the title of
the book suggests, the history of ideas provides the main thread of the narrative; but the ideas in
question are of the kind that Max Weber had in mind when he referred to ideas channelling and
mobilizing interests. They are, in other words, what French historians have called „idées-forces‟.
This understanding of nationalism as an active world-historical force, rather than a reflection of
pre-existing nationhood, foreshadows influential ideas of later authors. But Kohn did not take the
extreme „constructivist‟ view that nationalism creates nations. As he puts it, „nationalities are the
products of the living forces of history‟ (Kohn 1945: 13); this is a first and strong indication of
the need to analyse processes of nation formation. „Nationality‟ is, in this context, synonymous
with what later authors would call nationhood or national identity, and definitely not to be
understood as something inferior to a nation. As products of history, nations or national identities
are ever-changing, under-determined and indefinable in strictly objective terms. Nationalism, as a
conscious attribution of meaning, gives them the profile and momentum needed for action on a
historical scale.

For Kohn, the nationalist infusion of meaning into group identities produced by history was one
of the three main currents of modern history. The others were democracy and industrialism. The
combination of these three irresistible forces had - since the late eighteenth century - transformed
Europe and was now transforming the rest of the world along the same lines. But if nationalism is
to be analysed as a distinctively modern and revolutionary movement, it is also true that adequate
understanding is impossible without tracing its pre-modern ancestry. As Kohn puts it: „Both the
idea and the form of nationalism were developed before the age of nationalism' (1945: 19). The
idea emerged in two cultures with more pronounced national characteristics than any other
peoples of the ancient world, Greece and Israel; the form is the centralized, sovereign state that
took shape under dynastic rule in late medieval and early modern Europe. Kohn did not clarify
the concepts of idea and form. But the implications of his statements are far-reaching indeed: if
the historical foundations of modern nationalism include the cultural and political legacies to
which he refers, and if pre-modern developments went far enough for both the ideological content
and the structural framework of nationalism to be clearly prefigured, the radical novelty of
modern trends becomes much less obvious. Moreover, the very different cultural and political
traditions of non-European civilizations could be expected to affect their respective versions of

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nationalism, even when the ideologies and movements in question drew on European sources.
This would open up a vast field for comparative studies.

Kohn did not pursue this line of inquiry. His prime theme was the emergence and ascendancy of
nationalism as a dominant force of the modern age, and its interaction with other such forces. But
when it came to specifics, industrialism was set aside: beyond general references to the
mobilization of the masses, the book has next to nothing to say on its relationship to nationalism.
The main emphasis is on the interrelations of nationalism and democracy. As Kohn saw it, this
was not a matter for general theorizing: it could only be tackled in historical terms. From an
overall historical perspective, it seemed clear that the period between the French Revolution and
the end of World War II had been an age of nationalism rather than democracy. On the other hand,
Kohn thought that the dynamic of triumphant nationalism pointed beyond itself, towards global
democratic forms of integration. Some nationalisms were closer in spirit to this future age of
democracy than others. The question of different trends and projects during the age of
nationalism was therefore critical, and Kohn was particularly interested in divergent patterns that
crystallized at relatively early stages. Such contrasts are the key subject of his comparative
historical analyses.

The dichotomy mentioned above is introduced in this context. Some of Kohn's formulations
define it on a strictly analytical level and allow for changing historical mixtures:

Two main concepts of nation … emerged in the intertwining of influences and conditions;
conflicting and fusing, they became embodied in currents of thought in all nations and, to a
varying degree, in entire nations. The one was basically a rational and universal concept of
political liberty and the rights of man [sic], looking towards the city of the future … It found its
chief support in the political and economic strength of the educated middle classes and, with a
shift of emphasis, in the social-democratically organized labor movements. The other was
basically founded on history, on monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries
of ancient times and of tribal solidarity. It stressed the past, the diversity and self-sufficiency of
nations. It found its support, above all, among the aristocracy and the masses. (1945: 574)

If the two types are to be found everywhere, in different and changing combinations, it would
seem advisable to avoid conflation with specific historical cases. Kohn was, however, strongly
inclined to equate the conceptual divide with a regional one:

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Nationalism in the West arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and the
struggle of the present without too much sentimental regard for the past; nationalists in Central
and Eastern Europe created often, out of the myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an
ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, and expected to become sometime a political
reality … While Western nationalism was, in its origin, connected with the concepts of individual
liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in the eighteenth century, the later nationalism in
Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia easily tended towards a contrary background. (1945:
330)

Kohn added that diffusion of nationalist ideas beyond the West tended to combine with
resentment against the West, and this aggravated the contrast between the two types.

In searching for an archetypal Western moment in the history of nationalism, Kohn seems to have
hesitated between alternative accounts. The book begins with a reference to the French
Revolution as the first great manifestation of nationalism, but a later chapter claims that English
liberal and universal nationalism reached full maturity in the seventeenth century (1945: 183). An
even more perfect embodiment of the English model then appears across the Atlantic, where the
American nation, instead of being „determined by “natural” factors of blood and soil, nor by
common memories of a long history‟, is „formed by an idea, an universal idea (1945: 324). The
disturbing presence of Blacks and Indians is barely mentioned. Kohn had no qualms about
describing the American experience as a case of nationalism; his initial focus on France is
understandable in the context of his overall picture of the age (this was the most spectacular
example of democratic aspirations channelled into national mobilization), but when it comes to
more detailed analyses, it is the New World that serves as a model for critical judgement on the
retrograde Eastern adaptations of the national idea. The journey into the East begins in Germany,
where Kohn stresses the enormous importance of the imperial legacy. His account of various
strands and junctures in the history of German nationalism is more balanced than other versions
of the same approach. But one major oversimplification should be noted: the vastly exaggerated
role of Herder‟s thought as a link between German and Slavic patterns of national particularism.
This claim has been widely and uncritically accepted by many later writers on the subject;
historical research has, however, shown that specific responses to and uses of Herder's ideas
varied from case to case, and were always shaped by indigenous experiences and interests
(Sundhaussen 1973). Kohn's analysis of particular countries in East Central and South-Eastern
Europe is perfunctory, but not without some insights into different historical backgrounds. His

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brief analysis of Czech nationalism (with which he was familiar) is significant for the whole
argument of the book: this special case alternated between the roles of an „eastern outpost of the
liberal West‟ and a „western outpost of the Slav East‟ (1945: 560). It might, by the same token, be
a privileged starting point for problematizing the dichotomy.

Kohn's dichotomy has had an exceptionally broad and enduring impact on comparative studies of
nationalism, and later authors have often reproduced it in simplified form (for the most extreme
version, see Plamenatz 1972). Its influence, direct or indirect, is evident in recent work, even
when Kohn is not mentioned. For example, Liah Greenfeld's (1992) comparative history of
nationalist „paths to modernity‟ is in all essentials aligned with Kohn's model, although it makes
no reference to his work. In view of this pervasive presence, it seems appropriate to digress and
summarize the main objections. The dichotomy is now most frequently stated in terms of Western
against Eastern and civic against ethnic conceptions of nationhood; a general delegitimation of
nationalism has led to its being linked, primarily if not exclusively, to the second category of each
conceptual pair. The conflation of analytical types with regional ones obscures the historical
combinations and changing balances at work in every case. The „unification nationalisms‟ that
triumphed in Germany and Italy had received very significant inputs from liberalism and the
Enlightenment, even if they later proved vulnerable to takeovers and reorientations from another
side. The vicissitudes and internal disputes of nationalism in East Central and South-Eastern
Europe reflect - among other things - the very specific interaction of Enlightenment and
Romanticism in these regions. On the Western side, the French version of integral nationalism
was strong and radical enough to give rise to the first fully recognizable form of Fascist ideology.
The picture is, in short, too complex for the contrast between a forward-looking Western model
and a regressive Eastern one to make any sense. But the analytical distinction as such is also open
to criticism. The „myth of the civic nation‟ (Yack 1998), as a more rational, liberal and
universalistic alternative to the ethnic one, tends to rely on restrictive definitions of ethnicity: it is
equated with an emphasis on descent (always to a large extent imaginary), linguistic particularism,
or a mythical past. But the key question concerns the relationship between cultural and political
aspects of nationhood. The cultural identities involved in the historical constitution of nations are
subject to conflicting interpretations, but they also impose specific frameworks on such conflicts.
A convincing case has yet to be made for the project of purely political nationhood. Those who
credit early modern England with that kind of breakthrough forget the cultural premises (and
ethnic sources) of English identity, not least the role of a readapted myth of the chosen people;
and those who celebrate the American creation of a civic nation overlook, among other things, the

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central role of imperial visions during the first formative phase of American nationalism (for a
succinct discussion, see Wehler 2004 [2001]: 55-61).

The two last topics mentioned above - pre-modern sources and formative processes - were more
marginal to Kohn's concerns, and their conceptual elaboration does not go beyond vague outlines;
but asides and allusions at successive stages of the argument hint at unexplored domains of
comparative history. Kohn makes no attempt to clarify the divide between the modern nation and
its antecedents. He refers, for example, to national characteristics of ancient Greeks and Jews. On
the other hand, these two exemplary cases show how complex the issue is: they represent
different combinations of innovative ideas and equally new constructions of collective identity.
Although Kohn never tries to theorize the latter aspect as such, it reappears in other contexts.
Roman and Christian traditions of universalism, both present in the medieval background to
modern nationalism, add other combinations of the same kind. At a later stage, when Kohn moves
to analyse Eastern variations on nationalist themes, the emphasis on attachment to the past does
not translate into closer attention to forms of identity inherited from the past. Kohn does, however,
note the differences due to varying impacts of European cultural currents - Renaissance,
Reformation, Enlightenment and Romanticism - on historical collectivities in the region. In brief,
the upshot of his reflections on the genealogy of nationalism is a clear indication of the multiple
factors and sources to which the nationalist turn relates in both positive and negative ways. As for
the concrete processes that culminate in the transition to a global age of nationalism, Kohn's
reference to the early modern state as a form is particularly suggestive: it points to processes of
state formation as decisive factors in the formation of nations. More generally speaking, if the
genesis of modern nationalism depends on the coming together of an idea and a form, the
different trajectories that lead to this encounter are an obvious topic for comparative analysis; and
so are, by implication, the divergences that develop when models derived from the encounter
spread to cultural regions where other ideas and forms have been inherited from the past. All
these considerations allow us to identify processes of nation formation as one of Kohn's
anticipated but undeveloped themes.

THE MODERNIST TURN AND ITS TROUBLES

If Kohn's Idea of Nationalism represents the high point and the most seminal results of
scholarship in its field during the first half of the twentieth century, Ernest Gellner's Nations and
Nationalism (1983) was probably the most challenging and provocative work produced in the

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 1
second half. Among the scholars who reopened the debate on nations and nationalism in the
early 1980s, Gellner was - implicitly - closest to Kohn's problematic, but he developed it in a very
different direction. He revived the question of connections between nationalism and industrialism,
left unexplored by Kohn, and proposed an answer that strengthened general theory at the expense
of comparative history. Gellner's key thesis is that nationalism, national culture and the nation-
state reflect the historical dynamics and fulfil the functional needs of industrial society. A socio-
economic regime based on an increasingly complex division of labour and a permanent growth of
applicable knowledge also requires high levels of social mobility; for all these reasons, a shared
and standardized literate culture based on a common language and an educational infrastructure
maintained by a centralized state, is essential to the industrial form of social life. Where political
organization is not in line with these structural principles, pressures for realignment will develop.
Nationalism is, in the first instance, the demand for a „marriage of culture and power‟, more
specifically a national culture and a centralized state. But in a more general and fundamental
sense, nationalism creates nations, rather than the other way around: it is synonymous with the
active (and inevitably selective) adaptation of cultural and political patterns to the objective logic
of industrialism.

This is the most ambitious general theory of nations and nationalism ever constructed, and it was
obviously meant to provide an alternative to more traditional views on the modern world. As
Gellner saw it, Marx and Weber had both been mistaken. The decisive world-historical force of
the industrial age was neither the class struggle, nor a self-perpetuating rationalizing dynamic: it
was nationalism, embodied in nations possessing or demanding a state. With regard to broader
historical horizons, it is worth noting that he considered Islam - the most „Protestant‟ of world
religions - likely to become a functional equivalent of nationalism. In the present context,
however, his comparative perspectives on nationalism as such are more relevant. His strong and
sweeping general theory set strict limits to comparative inquiry, but some notice had to be taken
of the changing constellations in which the supposedly universal logic of industrialism manifested
itself. In response to that problem, Gellner sketched two different typological schemes. In his
most systematic statement on the subject (Gellner 1983), the functional necessity of the
centralized state is taken for granted; the variable is the cultural configuration to which it has to
be adapted. On this basis, two main types can be distinguished, and Gellner adds a third more
specific case to the list. Nineteenth-century Germany and Italy exemplify the first type: a unifying
high culture with a common language exists, but political fragmentation and/or foreign
domination block the way to national statehood. The second is the well-known Habsburg pattern

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that pitted national demands for autonomy - radicalized by resistance - against an imperial centre.
Diasporic nationalism, represented by the Zionist movement and its successful bid for statehood,
is Gellner's additional case.

This typology is limited to European history, and even within that framework, some further
restrictions should be noted. The nationalism of states that achieved an early coordination of
cultural and political units - as in Western Europe - is simply disregarded. Only the conflictual
patterns count. In this latter case, Gellner screens out all questions about historical sources of
national cultures: nationalisms vary in regard to their pasts and their particular uses of them, but
this has no bearing on their self-contained modern dynamics. The lack of interest in legacies and
traditions is most evident in Gellner's treatment of the Habsburg Empire and its national problems.
His famous portrait of „Ruritania‟, the archetypal national community mistaking creation for
revival, is a facetious mix of features borrowed from various parts of the imperial domain.

The second typology, set out in a posthumously published reconsideration of central problems in
the theory of nationalism, takes a major step forward: it treats the state as a variable, and this
means taking the historical dynamics and contingencies of state formation into account. Gellner
now divides Europe into four zones (there is no explicit move beyond Europe, but the reader is
left with the impression of basic affinities between the eastern part of the continent and regions
further to the east). The first zone is the Atlantic seaboard, where states developed - as Gellner
would have it - in overall if not complete harmony with cultural boundaries. A brief glance at the
twists and turns of state formation on the Iberian peninsula is enough to raise questions about this
claim. But Gellner's main point is clear, and it modifies his earlier approach: he wants to argue
that a long-term pre-modern pattern of relations between political and cultural formations, no
more natural than any other historical trajectory, gives a specific direction to the problematic of
nationhood and nationalism. He then moves on to the second zone, an idio-syncratically defined
Central Europe (including Italy, but not Germany's eastern neighbours). Here the analysis comes
closest to the first typology: high cultures have reached the stage needed for nation-building, but
the corresponding state structures have to be created out of ultra-fragmented political regimes
inherited from the past. Since Gellner has taken a general turn towards more comparative history,
the failure to reflect on imperial backgrounds (much more directly involved in the German case,
but far from irrelevant in the Italian one) may be noted as a shortcoming on his own terms. More
serious problems emerge when the focus shifts to other parts of Europe. The Nordic region is
simply absent from Gellner's map. Its distinctive record of state and nation formation does not fit

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any of the patterns which he discusses. Collective identities began to crystallize around medieval
monarchies, but these states were absorbed into a late medieval composite state, which later split
into two such formations (Danish and Swedish); in due course, they gave way to the
contemporary pattern of nation-states.

Having bypassed the North, Gellner subsumes the two last zones under a broadly defined notion
of Eastern Europe. The difference between them is more historical than geographical: the fourth
is identified with Eastern Europe under Soviet imperial rule. For present purposes, the analysis of
the pre-1945 zone is more instructive. Its defining feature is the absence of both fully fledged
national cultures and states ready to match them. Although Gellner admits in passing that he may
have overstated his case, and that high cultures with a national profile did exist, he defends the
description of a „multi-coloured mixture of cultures and languages‟ (Gellner 1997: 96) as at least
approximately true, and makes no reference to historical forms of statehood. The main problem
with this model is that a diffuse picture of„Eastern Europe‟ obscures the historical experience of a
much more distinctive region, East Central Europe (centred on three historical kingdoms, Poland,
Bohemia and Hungary, and their successor states), as well as the problems which this case poses
for theories of nations and nationalism (for a forceful reminder, see Zernack 1994). In the region,
the interplay of states, empires and nations took forms that differed markedly from developments
elsewhere in Europe.

The substantive content of these typological constructs is slim; but their interest lies in the forced
retreat from general theory towards comparative history. This trend continues in critical
reassessments of Gellner's work. Those who try to use it as a guide to problems have found the
core of his theory wanting. The idea of a functional nexus between industrialism and nationalism
is, on this view, too simplistic to throw any light on the multiple and entangled paths of historical
nationalisms, but it may have served as a first step to map a field of inquiry: the impact of
modernizing processes, including industrial ones, on the interconnected pattern of state formation
and ethno-cultural stratification (Hall 1998).

There is, however, another side to the impact of Gellner's work and the reactions against it: it was
one - perhaps the most influential - of several attempts to establish a consistently modernist view
of nations and nationalisms. In this context, specific arguments mattered less than a general
affinity: scholars from different backgrounds converged on positions which critics have described
as a „modernist orthodoxy‟. Since this was a late-coming modernism, it lent itself to

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amalgamations with the postmodernist currents that gained ground at the same time. But apart
from concessions to the Zeitgeist, the historical substance of the modernist paradigm was derived
from European experience. Together with an a priori downgrading of long-term processes as
determinants of nationhood, this reinforced existing obstacles to comparative study. Conversely,
critics of the modernist orthodoxy have reopened questions that call for comparative approaches.
The most direct challenge to Gellner's version of modernism came from Anthony Smith, who
began with a reconsideration of links between modern forms and pre-modern sources of
nationhood. Gellner had not claimed that nationalism created nations ex nihilo, but he argued that
the modern imperatives at work were so uniform and unilaterally decisive that the infinite variety
of available raw materials could be disregarded. As Smith observed, modern nations are, at least
in the historically crucial cases, recognizable descendants of much older cultural collectivities for
which he adopted the term ethnie. They are „named units of population with common ancestry
myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and
some measure of solidarity at least among their elites‟ (Smith 1995: 57). If the concept of ethnie
is defined in this way, the nation becomes a more special category, adding three further elements:
a shared public culture, a common economy and a legal order of rights and duties.

Smith thus started from a basic fact of comparative history, left out of account by a theory intent
on closure and universal validity: the genealogical connection between ethnies and nations, easily
established in crucial cases and therefore plausibly regarded as a model for nation-building on
less clear-cut ethnic foundations. On this basis, he was at first inclined to restate the distinction
between Western and Eastern developmental paths: „It would indeed not exaggerate the matter to
say that what distinguishes nations from ethnie are in some sense “Western” features and
qualities' (Smith 1986: 144). The Eastern conception of nationhood (ideological and practical)
can then be portrayed as an attempted shortcut: instead of the more balanced and
multidimensional development that had occurred in the West, the addition of statehood to
ethnicity was to ensure the completion of other transformations. Both sides of Smith's basic
distinction - the ethnie and the nation - have been questioned by critics. The definition of the
ethnic community disregards the linguistic factor, its role in forming or reactivating identities
even when the factors mentioned are more or less underdeveloped, and the question of conditions
that allow other factors to replace it. On the other hand, the criteria used to distinguish the nation
seem imprecise. If public spheres can - as comparative studies have shown - develop in specific
forms and directions in different socio-cultural settings, it becomes by the same token difficult to
maintain a stark contrast between the absence and presence of a shared public culture. The idea of

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a common economy poses problems of another kind: the modern dynamic of economic
integration has a global dimension, and national unity on this level is therefore undermined by the
very processes that made it a plausible goal. If the economic criterion is redefined in terms of a
unified economic policy, it presupposes the same foundation as the legal order of rights and
duties: separate statehood. At this point, Smith's model invites the objection that it cannot account
for the existence of nations without a state. In such conditions, statehood may be achieved
through a long struggle, gained in a more abrupt manner through geopolitical upheavals, or
relinquished as an unrealistic goal. But if these historical outcomes are converted into defining
features, the nation becomes effectively synonymous with the nation-state. in Smith's most recent
writings, his position has - partly in response to critics - evolved in a way that seems to expose all
conceptual schemes to open questions of comparative history. He now sees it as „at least a moot
point whether some nations can be found among the many ethnies of premodern epochs‟ (Smith
2001:14); even a limited number of such cases would put paid to the idea of the nation as a
Western upgrading of the ethnie. Conversely, the persistence of ethnic identities in the modern
and contemporary world - which Smith also notes - suggests that modern transformations need
not be internalized in the manner assumed by the original definition of the nation.

NATION FORMATION: FORMATIVE PHASES AND LONG-TERM PROCESSES

As I have argued, implicit references to processes of nation formation appear in influential works
and in connection with more central themes, but without an adequate grasp of their importance
for comparative study. They have been overshadowed by dichotomizing conceptual schemes that
discourage closer analysis of historical constellations, trends and transformations - be it the
division between an age of ascendant nationalism and a prehistory of its disjointed potential
elements, between Western and Eastern archetypes, or between ethnies and nations. It seems clear
that the overall state of the field has evolved towards more explicit focus on nation formation and
its historical phases, but approaches to this problematic have been fragmented and ways to
integrate them have not been discussed at length.

The most decisive step to recentre the study of nations and nationalism on historical processes
was taken in virtual isolation from mainstream Western debates; it preceded the modernist turn
discussed above, but was not properly acknowledged by Western scholars until the critique of
modernism had made some headway. Miroslav Hroch's work on modes and phases of national
mobilization in Europe (Hroch 2000 [1984]) is based on research done in the late 1960s. His

75
decision to focus on „small nations‟, more precisely subordinate nations without an indigenous
ruling class, was already a move against established stereotypes: this category cuts across the
supposed divide between East and West, and it includes a whole range of cases that differ in
regard to structures and sequences. A common framework could, as Hroch argued, be based on an
obvious distinction between three developmental phases: the rediscovery of cultural legacies and
reactivation of languages by patriotic intellectuals; the stage of broader mobilization through
„national agitation‟; and the formation of nationalist mass organizations seeking political power.
Hroch's analysis dealt primarily with the second stage, „phase B‟, and the social context in which
it unfolded. Detailed examination revealed significant variations from case to case. As Hroch saw
it, the most salient conclusion was negative: no social group could be credited with a privileged
role in the process of „national revival‟, and there was „no “typical” combination of social groups‟
(Hroch 2000 [1984]) that could be identified as essential to a successful transition. The record
suggests that interest conflicts coinciding with national differences are of decisive importance,
but no central conflict emerges as an invariant factor.

In contrast to the emphasis on nationalism among Western scholars, Hroch rejected this - in his
view - levelling and nebulous category. His main concern was the formation, articulation and
diffusion of national consciousness. As noted at the beginning, it may be possible to define
nationalism in a way that does not conflate different levels of articulation. But in the present
context, this issue is less important than the broader implications of Hroch's research programme.
He explicitly linked the focus on national movements of non-dominant ethnic groups, more
precisely on contrasts and parallels during key parts of their trajectories, to a multi-level
perspective on processes of nation formation. A particularly intensive study of a closely
circumscribed process thus served to ground a more general reorientation. The three phases
mentioned above add up to a clearly demarcated episode in the longue durée of nation formation.
This does not mean that we are dealing with a self-contained story: it is linked to the more
comprehensive modern transformation of European societies. Hroch's conception of this macro-
historical transition has evolved far beyond the Marxian framework of his earlier writings, and
now allows for the autonomous role of political and cultural forces in shaping the multiple paths
from the European an d en régime to a spectrum of divergent but interconnected modernities (see
especially Hroch 2004). National movements differ not least because of their varying historical
relationships to the overall dynamics of modernization in general and capitalist development in
particular. Finally, the long-term process of nation formation can be traced back to pre-modern
sources and divided into „two distinct stages of unequal length and intensity. The first stage had

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an extensive character and began during the Middle Ages. The second, which was intensive and
decisive, took place during the nineteenth century‟ (Hroch 2000 [1984]: XIII). This periodization
is obviously tailored to the European record, and does not prejudge the question of comparable
long-term processes with different rhythms and chronological divisions in other parts of the world.

To conclude, possible connections with other comparative-historical approaches to processes of

nation formation should be briefly explored. Analysts of state formation in Europe have, for
obvious reasons, often touched upon issues related to the role and place of nations - or their pre-
modern antecedents - in that process. Stein Rokkan's work (posthumously systematized in Flora
1998) dealt with Western European patterns of political development in great detail and took
some note of different dynamics at work further to the east. The main emphasis was, however, on
links between long-term transformations of political power and modern forms of representative
government; within this frame of reference, nation formation as such can only play a marginal
role. Rokkan preferred the term „nation-building‟, and his most interesting reflections on that
topic had to do with the varying relationships between state structures and linguistic communities.
Here his work provides a useful corrective to other conceptions of ethnic origins, less attentive to
the linguistic factor.

The most convincing and decisive work on pre-modern phases of nation formation has been done
by medievalists, especially by German and East Central European ones (for a succinct summary,
see Seibt 2002; for a seminal programmatic statement, see Schlesinger 1978; Zientara 1997 is one
of the most representative works in this vein). 2 Their research on medieval forms, developments
and conceptions of nationhood has clarified several aspects of the problem. Ways of collective
self-identification, the vocabulary used to articulate them and the corresponding modes of
demarcation from other collectivities have been studied in detail. These analyses have, at the
same time, effectively refuted some frequent objections to the idea of medieval nation formation.
The relevant vocabulary is neither identical with the terms of modern discourse, nor a mere
prefig-uration of their meanings, but it has significant points of contact and reflects historical
trends that continued beyond the transition to modernity; in particular, the term natio may have
had fluctuating meanings in different contexts, but as has been shown, its medieval uses are more
meaningfully related to modern ones than the modernists have wanted to admit. The political
dimensions of medieval nationhood are, especially when linked to emerging states and dynastic
continuity, too important for a stark distinction between ethnie and nation to be applicable. And
as for the most fundamental objection, the contrast commonly drawn between the egalitarian self-

77
definition of the modern nation and the purely elite character of its medieval precursors, it must at
least be toned down. Medieval references to political nationhood did not have the same scope as
modern ones, but they were not rigidly limited to the social boundaries of ruling elites; even when
primarily made on behalf of nobilities, they involved some kind of appeal to a broader collective
identity, and this could be made more explicit in critical situations (in the late medieval phase, the
most far-reaching innovations of that kind occurred during the Hussite revolution in Bohemia).
Conversely, the more inclusive character of the modern nation manifests itself in transformative
processes that unfold in different ways and at a varying pace. There are epoch-making contrasts
between medieval and modern patterns, but they have to do with historical dynamics rather than
invariant defining features.

On the other hand, the broader civilizational setting of medieval nation formation differed from
modern conditions as well as from other parts of the pre-modern world. National identities and
collectivities emerged in the context of Western Christendom as a civilization, and more
specifically within the socio-cultural space provided by a very distinctive configuration: the
presence of two interconnected but inevitably rival embodiments of civilizational unity, the
papacy and the empire. National differentiation was one aspect of the structural and cultural
pluralism that developed on this basis. The reconstruction of medieval backgrounds is therefore
bound to raise questions that call for comparative civilizational approaches. This is a particularly
promising field for comparative studies, but very little has so far been done to explore it (for
reflections on Christianity and nation formation, not explicitly civilizational but to a certain extent
translatable into such terms, see Hastings 1997). Some preliminary distinctions may be suggested.
It seems clear that some civilizational patterns and traditions are more favourable to nation
formation than others: the European path stands out as a particularly salient case, with
implications and consequences no less complex and ambiguous than its other distinctive features.
But non-European examples of nation formation as a persistent and dominant trend, beginning
with the Japanese experience, are too obvious for the idea of a radical European exceptionalism to
be tenable. As the Japanese record also suggests, civilizational contexts may give rise to specific
forms of nationhood and nationalism.

Finally, this problematic should also be considered from the opposite angle: the civilizational
dimensions or aspirations that may be built into national identity. In the introduction to their
collection on Asian forms of the nation, mentioned at the beginning, Tönnesson and Antlöv (1996)
proposed the typological concept of a „civilizational nation‟, but without any explicit definition or

78
detailed illustration. However, the examples they mention in passing indicate what they have in
mind: India and China appear as civilizational nations, at least in the making, whereas Russia and
the United States are the major Western cases (Germany is tentatively described as a failed
civilizational nation). National identities can, on this view, develop in ways and on levels that
involve distinctively civilizational claims or visions. This idea seems to link up with classical
sources. Marcel Mauss had, in his seminal but very unsystematic reflections on the notion of
civilizations in the plural, noted the possibility of nations „singularizing‟ themselves within
civilizational contexts, and, by implication, through varying ways of appropriating, elaborating
and transforming a shared civilizational basis. This line of thought has yet to find adequate outlets
in comparative studies.

NOTES

1 It has often been suggested that the debate on nations and nationalism took a fundamentally
new turn in the last quarter of the twentieth century. To take a recent example, Wehler (2004
[2001]:8) argues that earlier analysts worked with an implicit „basis – superstructure‟ model of
the relationship between nation and nationalism, and that this was only overcome by the new
approaches of the 1980s. Kohn's argument is, as the above discussion should have shown, too
complex to be subsumed under any version of the basis–superstructure model (in fact, affinities
of that kind are much more evident in Gellner's work); and its thematic structure prefigures much
of the later discussion. For present purposes, Kohn's later work is much less important than The
Idea of Nationalism. A planned second book on the same scale, on developments during the
global age of nationalism, was never completed.

2 The English-language discussion has largely ignored German scholarship on nations and
nationalism. But some noteworthy older contributions have also been neglected by recent German
writers on the subject. A striking example is Ziegler 1932: the first systematic attempt to integrate
the modern idea of national sovereignty into Weber's unfinished theory of legitimacy and to adapt
Weber's concepts to this new field. Thanks are due to Andreas Anter for drawing my attention to
this forgotten book.

References

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Bloom, S. F. (1941) The World of Nations . New York: Oxford University Press
Calhoun, C. (1997) Nationalism . Buckingham: Open University Press
Flora, P. (ed., with S. Kuhnle , ed. and D. Urwin , ed. ) (1998) State Formation, Nation Building and Mass
Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan, Based on His Collected Works . Oxford: Oxford
University Press
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism . Oxford: Blackwell
Gellner, E. (1997) Nationalism . Washington Square, NY: New York University Press
Greenfeld, L. (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Hall, J. A. (ed.) (1998) The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism . Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Hastings, A. (1997) The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism . Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Hroch, M. (2000 [1984]) Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe . New York: Columbia
University Press
Hroch, M. „From ethnic group toward the modern nation: The Czech case‟ Nations and Nationalism vol.
10 (2004) p. 1–2, 95-108
Kohn, H. (1945) The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origin and Background . New York: Macmillan
Maruyama, M. (1963) Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics . London: Oxford University
Press
Plamenatz, J. (1972) „Two Types of Nationalism‟ , in E. Kamenka (ed.), Nationalism: The Nature and
Evolution of an Idea . Canberra: The Australian University Press. pp. p. 22–36
Schlesinger, W. (1978) „Die Entstehung der Nationen. Gedanken zu einem Forschungs-programm‟ , in H.
Beumann , ed. and W. Schröder (eds), Aspekte der Nationenbildung im Mittelalter (Nationes, Bd.
1) . Sigmaringen: Thorbecke. pp. p. 11–62
Seibt, F. (2002) „Nationalismustheorien und Mediaevistik‟ , in Deutsche, Tschechen, Sudeten-deutsche .
Munich: Oldenbourg. pp. p. 127–38
Smith, A. D. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations . Oxford: Blackwell
Smith, A. D. (1995) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era . Cambridge: Polity Press
Smith, A. D. (2001) Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History . Cambridge: Polity Press
Sundhaussen, H. (1973) Der Einfluss der Herderschen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der
Habsburger Monarchie Munich: Oldenbourg
Tönnesson, S. , ed. and Antlöv H. (eds) (1996), Asian Forms of the Nation . Richmond, Surrey: Curzon
Wehler, H. U. (2004 [2001]) Nationalismus: Geschichte - Formen - Folgen . Munich: Beck
Yack, B. (1998) „The Myth of the Civic Nation‟ , in R. Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Nationalism . Albany, NY:
SUNY Press. pp. p. 103–18
Zernack, K. (1994) „Zum Problem der kollektiven Identität in Ostmitteleuropa‟ , in H. Berding (ed.),
Nationales Bewusstsein und kollektive Identität II Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. pp. p. 176–88
Ziegler, H. O. (1932) Die moderne Nation . Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr
Zientara, B. (1997) Frühzeit der europäischen Nationen . Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag

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Segal, Daniel, and Richard Handler. "Cultural Approaches to Nationalism." Pp. 57-65

Broadly speaking, one can identify two distinct, even antithetical, „cultural approaches‟ to
nationalism. The first is the more established of the two and can be identified as „the study of
national cultures‟ or (in an older phrasing) „the study of national character‟; the second might best
be termed „the cultural analysis of nationalism‟.

The study of national cultures takes the idea of „nations‟, understood as fundamental groupings
within humanity, to be self-evident. Starting from this conceptual foundation, it proceeds to
catalog the distinctive properties of each grouping recognized as a „nation‟ or „people‟. It is a
study of what is French about „the French, Chinese about „the Chinese‟, Aussie about „the
Aussies‟, Tswana about „the Tswana‟, and so on.

The analysis of the culture of nationalism, by contrast, takes „nations‟ to be a distinctive cultural
form, and it seeks to recognize the contingent principles of this cultural form and to trace their
various uses in history. On this second approach, both the parsing of humanity into national units,
and the differentiation of those units, are results of what social actors have done with those
principles. To study nations and their differences without reference to this - as occurs in the study
of national cultures - is to accord nations and their distinctive qualities a misplaced stability and
concreteness. The obverse is also true. To foreground the contingent principles of nationalism
requires that our inquiry notbe restricted to some specific manifestation of these principles in a
particular sort of grouping or institution, as if that grouping or institution were a permanent type
within a finite and transhis-torical set of human possibilities. We thus cannot limit our inquiry to
examples that pass some „authenticity‟ test for nations, nor even to the larger set of phenomena
that have, by various criteria, been designated as a „nation‟ in various contexts. An important
concomitant of the recognition of the contingency of nations is thus the difficult notion that we
cannot bound off, or delimit, „the nation‟ as a discrete social form, but must grapple instead with
an untidy range of variants - including some designated as „races‟ and „ethnic‟ groups - that are
found within a selected swath of human history.

As a matter of convenience, one might speak of this larger range of variants as so many forms
of„identity groupings‟. It is important to keep in mind, however, that this larger set is an analytic
contrivance, albeit a motivated one, that has been set up to foreground and illumine the

81
contingency of the phenomena within it. Identity groupings should not, in other words,
themselves be mistaken for a universal aspect of social life, any more than nations. Indeed, the
very concept of „identity‟, as it is used in both sociology and psychology, is peculiar to modern
Western ideology (Gleason 1983; Handler 1994). So too, it is valuable to emphasize that the
swath of history from which we draw a given set of variants is not something dictated or given to
us by the phenomena, but is something that must be selected.

NATIONALISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMILITUDE

The contingent principles of nationalism (and of various related phenomena) can be seen as a
special case of commonsense tenets, prevalent in modernity, about what constitutes an individual
thing or unit. By these commonsense tenets, each thing of any sort is (i) bounded and (ii) defined
by a distinct trait, or trait-bundle, that is shared by any and all of the components of that thing. On
this view, an individual thing does not blur into other things and it has no components that lack a
core of sameness with its other components and, ultimately, with the thing itself. That is, each
thing „has‟ an identity; or, in other terms, it is „identical to‟ itself and distinct from all other things.
That „all the cells of our body share the same DNA‟ fits quite facilely into this everyday
philosophy of things. Yet this fit, however canny, should not be taken as proof of this general
ontological orientation, for not every formation „in nature‟ conforms so neatly or readily to it. The
mitochondria in our cells, for instance, have their own DNA, distinct from the DNA (we speak of
as being) „of our body‟. Were we to apply the general rule of thing-ness rigorously then, we
might even conclude that biological organisms are loci of hybridity, rather than individuated
entities.

Yet whatever the relationship of the everyday philosophy of things to biology (or other „natural‟
phenomena), what is important for our purposes is that the cultural principles of nationalism can
be recognized as transpositions of these same tenets to the domain of social collectivities. In
nationalist thought and practice, each nation is at once bounded and different from other nations
(and from any „people‟ not accorded the status of a nation) by virtue of a trait, or trait-bundle,
possessed by all persons within the nation and yet none outside itself. This is to say, each nation
is constituted on the basis of a principle of similitude of its components. It is the (purported) fact
of being alike - of „sharing‟ identity, culture, values, or whatever - that constitutes both
membership in and the boundary of the national group or collectivity.

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From this perspective, „like persons‟ objectively and self-evidently „go together‟ and, by virtue of
this, constitute a discrete collectivity that is distinguished from all other collectivities in some
essential way. In the phrasing of Louis Dumont - who in many ways pioneered the cultural
analysis of nationalism - nationalists imagine each nation as both a collection of like individuals
and as an individual collectivity (1970). The collectivity is understood to be composed of the
individual persons, and all of those persons are understood to partake, without exception, in the
identity of the latter. Put otherwise, the collective individual is figured as „possessing‟ distinct
features or traits - variously termed its „identity‟, „culture‟, or „character‟ - and those features are
imagined to inhere in and mark each human individual who „belongs to‟ the collectivity.

Something closely akin to this principle of similitude is also a commonplace of social science
models of collectivities or groups. True, there are prominent social scientific theories that
foreground conflict instead of consensus, hybridity instead of homogeneity. But in most of these
theories, the terms contrasting with sameness are nonetheless marked, in the sense that they are
seen as challenges to, rather than as the basis of, group formation and even sociality. The primary
exception to this generalization is arguably work in the French structuralist tradition that
identifies reciprocity or exchange - between two or more differentiated parties - as the very core
of sociality (Lévi-Strauss 1969: ch. 5; Mauss 1967), and it was from the perspective of this
paradigmatic tradition that Dumont fashioned his insights into the contingency of the nation as a
social form. But most social science and historical studies of nationalism have instead operated
from, and thereby offered, a nationalist perspective - as we have already indicated for the study of
national cultures. In other words, most scholarship on nationalism has taken up, if in highly
formalized terms, very much the same questions that nationalists themselves address and has
failed to ask questions about the presuppositions, or givens, of nationalism.

THE DISCURSIVE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL INDIVIDUALITY

Both nationalist proponents and their scholarly brethren know that the persons of a given
nationality differ in various ways. For one thing, a prevalent view in modernity holds that there is
a basic, even an essential, difference between male and female persons, cutting across all national
kinds. Yet as a rule, similitude in this particular dimension of personal differentiation („sex‟, let
us call it) is seen as providing a basis only for recurring sociality, and not for functional wholes or
social collectivities. Indeed, in modernity, it is sex complementarity, rather than similitude, that is
normativized as the proper foundation for „the family‟, while „the family‟, in turn, is construed as

83
essential for the moral health of the nation (as evidenced most strikingly by the stubborn
persistence of discomfort with „gay marriage‟). Sex differentiation is thus made so as to fit into,
rather than be in tension with, groupings designated as nations.

By contrast, what is consistently unsettling to the designation of a social grouping as „a nation‟ is

that modern ideology fetishizes the uniqueness of each individual person, at once in parallel and
tension with the nationalist view that each nation is a unique collectivity. Nationalists thus face
the discursive challenge of showing just how a particular grouping of persons, replete with their
distinctive selves, are nonetheless alike such that they constitute one and only one nation. In
general, responses to this challenge take the form of a claim that the individuals of each nation
share some „common denominator‟ of similitude. Such proclamations at once recognize
individual differences among co-nationals and posit a core set of features that establish the unity
and boundedness of the nation, however limited that set may be.

What is striking for our purposes is that even when the existence of a nation is least contested,
neither outside observers nor the nation's most patriotic proponents are ever able to reach closure
in their attempts to identify what trait, or trait-bundle, defines the shared national identity, or
character, of the nation. Nationalist movements are instead engaged in a ceaseless politics of
culture - an ongoing effort to identify, create, and maintain the purported common denominator of
their national identity (Handler 1988).

The approaches taken by nationalist movements to this open-ended project fit two broad types.
The common denominator of similitude is identified as either an objective or a subjective
phenomenon. When nationalists make objectivist claims, they define national identity in terms of
social and cultural traits that, they claim, members of a nation possess regardless of any sentiment,
belief, or consciousness of those persons. When nationalists make subjectivist claims, they define
national identity in terms of the consciousness of those within a nation, which is said to provide
the similitude necessary for collective existence, even if the consciousness has no grounding
outside or beyond itself, that is, outside of or beyond the very belief in national unity. In the flow
of social life, moreover, we find nationalists both alternating between and combining these two
strategies.

Proceeding in concert with nationalist discourse, scholarship on nationalism in the first half of the
twentieth century spilled endless ink in attempts to trace the objective features that united various

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sets of persons as a nation. Time and again, however, such attempts foundered in the face of
contrary evidence. If one scholar argued that such-and-such a nation was united by the possession
of shared political ideals, folkways, religious beliefs, or whatever, then another scholar would
point to the existence of socially significant persons within the same grouping who rejected those
ideals, or did not participate in the specified cultural practices, or whatever, but who asserted their
right to belong. So too, when scholars made general claims about the genre, or type, of features
that defined nations - claiming that, say, „language‟, „race‟, or something else was crucial for the
division of humanity into nations - some other scholar would point to some visibly contrary case,
in which that same feature (or bundle of features) was either common to many nations or
exhibited diversity within a given nation. Yet these scholarly revelations notwithstanding, the
objectivist vision persisted, and indeed persists to this day, in scholarship on nationalism, as well
as in nationalist ideologies and much everyday thought in our nationalized world.

In the second half of the twentieth century, as the study of„the new nations‟ of the decolonizing
world came to the fore, scholars gave ever-greater weight to the importance of subjective sources
of national unity. Again and again, they perceived the political boundaries that emerged in the
wake of decolonization to be „artificial‟ relative to indigenous social categories and boundaries.
This artificiality was understood to be a result either of a hypertrophe of heterogeneity in the non-
West („tribalism‟) or of „mistakes‟ made by colonial functionaries in setting political boundaries.
What was unrecognized - because it would have required stepping outside of nationalist discourse
- was that the sole reason that the (marginally) older nations of Europe were not also seen to be
artificial was because of the success of their nationalist movements in displacing and masking
difference, and not because these nations were intrinsically any less artificial or socially
fabricated than nations elsewhere (Segal 1988; Handler and Segal 1992). In his highly influential
work, for instance, Clifford Geertz promoted an „integrative revolution‟ for the new nations, that
is, he advocated the forging of subjective national sentiments in post-colonial societies in the face
of supposedly „primordial‟ ethnic, religious and cultural diversity (1973: 255-310). Thus, rather
than recognizing the inescapable contingency of nations per se, Geertz saw a need for
postcolonial states to create - by artifice - the unity and similitude he presumed had preceded,
rather than resulted from, nationalist movements in European history.

It was, moreover, Geertz's fellow Indonesianist, Benedict Anderson (1983), who coined the
phrase that has most defined the study of nationalism in the last two decades of the twentieth
century: „imagined communities‟. Anderson's focus on the ways in which societies could imagine

85
themselves as united decisively moved the debate (at least among scholars) from objectivist to
subjectivist conceptions of national unity. Scholars no longer expected to be able to define the
objective cultural features that all members of a given nation shared; but they understood that the
subjective „sense of belonging‟ that nation-states fostered in their citizens, coupled with a state-
promoted national imaginary (symbols and stories with which people learned to identify), was
enough to create and maintain nations. Indeed, in this perspective, there was no other means to do
it. We should not, however, draw the boundary too neatly between an earlier scholarship, in
which objectivist conceptions of nationhood were expected, and later work more focused on
subjective factors. On the one hand, many scholars from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries notably, Ernest Renan (1947 [1882]), wrote about the subjective underpin nings of
national identity. And there was plenty of visible „nation-building‟ in Europe leading up to, and
then following, World War I - social tur moil on a grand scale, in which scholars of nationalism
saw national cultures, languages and identities forged before their eyes. On the other hand, in the
most recent scholarship, Anderson's notion of the imagined community has all too often been
unwittingly subsumed within an objectivist framework. With all the recent enthusiasm for
„interpretive social science‟, „symbolic anthropology‟ and „the sociology of culture', it has been
easy for scholars to celebrate Anderson's notion of the imagined community, while going on to
treat such communities in epistemologically traditional ways - that is, as people who, because
they have come to share (subjectively, or intersubjectively) a national imaginary, have constituted
themselves (objectively) as a bounded, homogeneous group. Thus, even recent interpretive or
symbolic approaches to nationalism, inspired in particular by Anderson, have not broken
decisively with nationalist epistemology to attain the kind of cultural approach we sketch and
advocate here.

NATIONALISM REVEALED BY COMPARISONS WITHIN MODERNITY

The most reliable key to recognizing what is otherwise taken for granted - and for seeing the
contingency of what is absolutized by virtue of being presuppposed - is comparison (Bakhtin
1981; Sahlins 2004: 4-5; Segal 1999; Todorov 1984). Such comparison can take a variety of
forms. Dumont, as we have suggested, gained an important sense of the contingency of nations by
seeing their distinctiveness as a social form relative to the idea that the foundation of human
sociality was not similitude but exchange between differentiated parties („Self and „Other‟). This
view had emerged in French social thought in response to studies of such distant ethnographic
cases as the potlatch of Northwest North America and the kula trade of the Western Pacific

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(Mauss 1967). Radical incommensurability thus served to make visible the contingency of the
familiar - in this case, of the nation. Taking this social theoretical achievement as a „way in‟, we
can deepen our understanding of „the nation‟ as a cultural form with additional comparisons.
More specifically, situating the nation in relation to other manifestations of the principle of
similitude in social life can provide a finer-grained picture of nations and their contingencies.

Broadly speaking, the principle of similitude has been used to generate a range of social forms,
which have been given such names as „races‟, „ethnic groups‟, „peoples‟ and „nations‟. These
terms have never been used with formal rigor; rather, each term has been used for more than one
of these variant forms, just as different ones of these terms have been used in interchangeable and
overlapping ways at times. To give a concrete example, there are instances when a given
grouping has been called, say, „a nation‟ but in a fashion that has figured the grouping as „a race‟,
in the sense that the grouping's core of sameness has been figured as biological and inherited. In
addition, the very range of such forms has changed over time, as with shifts in notions of
inheritability in the wake of the Darwinian revolution, as well as the subsequent emergence of
knowledge of„genes‟. Finally, it is not uncommon that a given grouping has been accorded
different forms in different contexts. „Jews‟, for instance, were often positioned as a distinct race
in the first half of the twentieth century, with Germany being only the most remembered instance
of this. Yet in the wake of the Third Reich and its horrors, Jews have more often been designated
as a distinct ethnic group within a larger „white race‟ (Brodkin 1998; Jacobson 1998; Segal 2002;
and for a comparable discussion of the Irish, see Ignatiev 1995).

These three dimensions of complexity mean that there is no stable or objective fact about whether
a given grouping really is or is not a nation, a race, an ethnic kind, or yet some other form.
Nonetheless, a great deal of social-scientific analysis has lost itself in the mistaken task of making
definitive pronouncements about such matters. The correct approach, on our view, is to focus
instead on the range of social forms produced by social actors using and transposing the
underlying principle of similitude. The more general lesson here is that cultural analysis loses its
footing when it seeks to take terms from social life - such as „nation‟ and „race‟ - and establish
rigorous and fixed definitions for them, in effect treating them as analytic concepts, rather than as
terms from social life that must be mapped and analyzed. The job of the cultural analyst is to
probe the contingent meanings and uses of such terms, not to fix their meaning. In other words,
rather than seeking to adjudicate what a nation or a race or an ethnic kind really is, the cultural
analyst should instead ask: what is it that social actors have done when they have constructed a

87
grouping as a nation, rather than a race or an ethnic kind or something else? In addressing such
questions, however, we must keep in mind that they are irreducibly historical, which is to say that
the meaning of nationness at a given historical moment is at once rooted in, but never simply
determined by, precedents. Thus, the answers we provide can never pin down the truth or
essential core of nation-making, race-making, or ethnogenesis (the making of an ethnic kind);
rather, we can do no more or less than analyze the precedential uses of these terms, as they inform
the present.

If we look backward from the present to the late eighteenth century, for instance, we can observe
that throughout this period, designations of nationhood have been used to further „political
independence‟ for a given grouping, and more specifically, to further political independence in
the form of „statehood‟. At the same time, the obverse has also been true: designations of the
existing population of a state (exclusive of any internal „minority‟) as „a nation‟ have been used to
further the legitimation of states and their institutions.

Statehood, in turn, has entailed a prominent (though never a singular) linkage with the project of
„development‟ or „modernization‟. This transitive articulation of nationhood with development -
through statehood - can be observed as early as the first decades of the eighteenth century,
notably in the nationalism of Peter the Great, but it grew in prominence in the second half of the
nineteenth century and, even more so, in the second half of the twentieth century, with global
decolonization.

One marker of the rise in prominence of development as an aspect of the fulfillment of

nationhood can be found in another collateral idiom - that of„civilization‟. Through the end of the
nineteenth century, „Christian‟ was the most common adjective preceding, and thereby
identifying the proper form of, civilization; this understanding of civilization did not give
prominence to science, technology, or economic growth. By contrast, the early twentieth-century
shift to „Western‟ as the default adjective before civilization registered a vision of civilization
defined in terms of technological innovations, scientific progress and sustained economic
expansion - which is to say, in terms of development. It also defined the propensity to initiate and
pioneer development as a distinctive trait of the societies and peoples of„the West‟.

The constellation of articulations has had at least two important effects. First, the identification of
the propensity for development as Western, combined with the identification of development as

88
an ideal of nationhood, produced judgments that various non-Western peoples were not national
in stature - and hence could not be expected to govern themselves. In other words, the ostensible
absence of development outside the West has been used to distinguish between national and less
than national peoples. This played a particularly important role in legitimating colonialism in the
first half of the twentieth century.

Second, and consistent with this first effect, for all peoples identified as non-Western, claims to
nationhood have entailed a contradiction, since their pursuit of development is seen as precisely
contrary to the ideal of living in accord with their distinct national character (that is, to being true
to one's own national Self). Japanese modernity, for instance, is often figured as imitative and
soulless - as something it borrowed from the West - while the modernity of the United States is
registered as a self-evident manifestation of „the American spirit‟, itself construed as a specific
instance of a distinctively Western spirit or tradition. Indeed, the very success of the pursuit of
development in Japan since the Meiji era has meant that a talent for „mimicry‟ has come to be
recognized as fundamental to Japanese national character.

One does not find, however, a parallel perception that industrialization's „spread‟ from England to
America was due to an American propensity for mimicry. Precisely because the United States is
identified as a component of Western civilization, and for no other reason, industrialization in late
nineteenth-century America is registered as American' and hence authentic, rather than as
something borrowed. To note one more illustration of this point, Nobel laureate Vidia Naipaul
has famously disparaged postcolonial leaders in Africa and the Caribbean as „mimic men‟ whose
policies of modernization failed precisely because they „aped‟, without having internalized, the
institutions and values of the West (Naipaul 1967). For our purposes, what is significant is that in
Naipaul's formulation, the propensity for development and modernity is figured as the distinctive
cultural property of the West and, by extension, its nations.

Over this same historical span, designations of various groupings as „a race‟ have diverged, in
their meanings and uses, from designations of nationhood in at least two important ways. First,
racial designations have much more consistently figured the core of sameness of a given grouping
as something biological and inherited. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind, however,
that notions of biology and heritability have undergone significant revision and alteration over
time, as a result of semi-autonomous processes of change in the history of science. Many
nineteenth-century designations of racial status, for instance, did not presume a sharp division of

89
nature and nurture, inherited and acquired traits. Instead, such designations treated racial traits as
inherited and subject to alteration by the environment, including by learning, though at some
unspecified, if presumably quite slow, rate (Stocking 2001).

It is also important to remember that this key dimension of racial designations - that the core of
sameness is construed as biological and inherited - was also present in many national designations
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. National designations over this span of time exhibit
greater variety in terms of how similitude is accounted for than do racial designations, but they
include the recourse to biology and inheritability that is characteristic of the latter.

Where there has been much greater, though not complete, divergence between national
designations and racial designations has been in their social uses, that is, in the projects that they
have been made to serve. In the case of national designations, as we noted, the most characteristic
project has been to further claims to political independence, and concomitantly, the building of
states and the pursuit of development. In the case of racial designations, the most characteristic
project has been to place persons into the system of production or, in simple terms, into class
positions. Racialized and specifically „Africanized‟ slavery in the plantation system of the
Americas is only the most obvious instance of this. But it is important to recognize that basing the
assignment of class positions on racial designations has meant doing something more than
distributing a given population of persons into a set of pre-existing or autonomous class positions.
Rather, filling such positions by racial designations has played a profound role in the making of
those positions and, in consequence, in shaping the overall system they compose - that is, in
shaping the very system of production itself. Most generally, filling positions in the system of
production by racial designations has produced class positions that are naturalized, and this in
turn has supported greater stratification, differentiation and separation of class positions than
would otherwise be the case (Holt 2000; Segal 1993,1998).

Yet that racialization has amplified class stratification and differentiation - or even that it has
amplified class domination - does not mean that racialization is functional for class domination or,
say, for the extraction of surplus value by dominant classes. Rather, as the history of slave
plantations makes dramatically clear, the amplification of class stratification is often anything but
functional, precisely because amplified domination often fuels resistance. In other words, while
there are certainly historical moments when racial designations have served class domination, it is

90
also the case that at other moments the very articulation of racial designations with class
differentiation has made class domination more, not less, contested - less, not more, stable.

So too, it would be a mistake to think that racialized designations are a necessary feature of
extreme class stratification and differentiation. Instead, and quite sadly, it appears as if beliefs in
natural differences between individuals - in, say, „intelligence‟ - can well replace racialized
designations in supporting quite fantastic degrees of class stratification and differentiation.

A close variant of the use of racial designations to assign persons class positions has been their
use to keep various social groupings subordinate in status and/or political power. In the context of
late nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonialisms, for instance, racial designations (typically
linked to claims about a grouping's propensity for development) were used to distinguish between
peoples who did and did not have a legitimate claim to nationhood and, thus, political
independence. In this usage, „race‟ did not so much differentiate among „nations‟ as it
differentiated between fully „national‟ peoples and those who were „backward‟ or merely „tribal‟.

We turn, finally, to „ethnicity‟ as a designation of a form of collectivity. That ethnicity emerged

as a distinct designation for social groupings (that is, in contrastive distribution with „race‟ and
„nation‟) only in the twentieth century is itself an indication that its distinct meanings and uses
crystallized in response to prior uses of race and nation.

For example, whereas racial designations have most often been used to affix stigmatized
groupings to subordinated class and status positions, designations of ethnicity have often been
used in attempts to valorize and reposition these very social groupings (Urciuoli 1996: 15-40). At
the same time, designations of ethnicity typically differ from those of nationality in that the
former are often used to fit diversity into an encompassing nation, rather than to designate a
group meriting „independence‟. The terms in such hyphenated phrases as Irish-American and
African-American cannot be interchanged, for the first term specifies a type of the second. In
short, a key element of the uses and meaning of ethnicity is that it sub-cedes nationality, thereby
providing an important means for nations to contain „diversity‟. Notwithstanding the distinct
meanings and uses of some ethnic designations, many ethnic designations overlap in their
meanings and uses with racial and/or national designations. The term „ethnic‟ operates much like
a racial designation when social actors speak of „ethnic cleansing‟, meaning mass killing; and it

91
operates much like nationalist designations in „ethnic separatist movements‟. Put otherwise, not
everything „ethnic‟ is a festival.

„Ethnicity‟ is, in sum, the most multivocal and chameleon-like of these three related designations
of groupings. It is, in a sense, the repository of the capacious range of variants that, to date, have
emerged from uses of the principle of similitude applied to social groupings. Were there no
element of tragedy in the meanings and uses accumulated in this term - were there not so many
atrocities in the name of „ethnic kinds‟ - one might even say that the term's fantastic polysemy
was Borges-esque (see, for instance, Borges 1966, famously cited in Foucault 1970).

Along with noting the range of variation represented by national, racial and ethnic designations, it
is also fruitful to recognize what these designations have in common, given that all are structured
by the principle of similitude. One important effect of all three designations, for instance, is that
they have served to allot portions of the past differentially to the living. This in turn has meant
that earlier conflicts have become, in retrospect, precedents for highly refractory cycles of
violence (Naimark 2001). What is responsible for this outcome is not that the past is remembered,
but the particular manner in which it is remembered. More specifically, the linking of subject
positions in past traumas to present-day identities typically makes those traumas charters for
continued social divisions and struggles, rather than cautionary tales about how easily any of us
could become either a victimizer or a victim.

A related though more subtle ramification of the propensity of identity designations to allot the
past differentially to the living is that representations of the past, when they are organized in
terms of contemporary identity terms, serve to differentiate, and project social divisions into, their
audiences - as, for example, with representations of African-American slavery at Colonial
Williamsburg (Handler and Gable 1997) or public commemorations of Nazi atrocities (Koss
2004). The other side of this same coin is that when the past is not figured in these terms, it is
typically received as if it is mere history and not something contiguous with the present. For
American undergraduates, for example, a lecture about an early modern massacre of peasants is
generally taken as dry fact, until and unless an ethnic or national or racial designation takes the
place of „peasant‟ in the narrative, however anachronistically

CONCLUSION

92
Our analysis of „national‟ designations has located them in a messy and open-ended field of
variants, variants that have been constructed by social actors working with and transposing the
contingent principle of constituting collectivities on the basis of similitude. Our approach has, in
effect, dissolved „nationalism‟ as a distinct phenomenon, very much as Lévi-Strauss at an earlier
moment dissolved „totemism‟ as a distinct phenomenon (1963). We have proceeded in this way
to resist the widespread practice of trying to refine and clarify the concept of nation for analytic
or social scientific uses. That practice, we have argued, masks the contingency of nations and
thereby makes it impossible to go beyond the nationalist misrecognition of nations as objective,
rather than socially forged, groupings of persons. The best way to understand nations and
nationalism, in our view, is to abandon the practice of using these terms to delimit a discrete
subject of social scientific inquiry. The analysis of the culture of nationalism thus displaces its
very subject matter.

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Brodkin, K. (1998) How Jews Became White Folks and what that Says about Race in America . New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press
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Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures . New York: Basic Books
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Handler, R. (1994) „Is “Identity” a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?‟ , in J. Gillis (ed.), Commemorations:
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Handler, R. and Gable, E. (1997) The New History in an Old Museum: Creating the Past at Colonial
Williamsburg . Durham, NC: Duke University Press
Handler, R. and Segal, D. How European is Nationalism? Social Analysis vol. 32 (1992) p. 1–15
Holt T (2000) The Problem of Race in the 21st Century . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Ignatiev, N. (1995) How the Irish Became White . New York: Routledge
Jacobson, M. (1998) Whiteness of a Different Color . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Koss, J. Coming to Terms with the Present Grey Room vol. 16 (2004) p. 116–34
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1963) Totemism . Boston, MA: Beacon Press
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Mauss, M. (1967) The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies . New York: Norton
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Harvard University Press
Naipaul, V. S. (1967) The Mimic Men . London: Deutsch

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Renan, E. (1947 [1882]) „Qu‟est-ce qu‟une nation?‟ , in Oeuvres Complètes , Volume vol. I Paris:
Calmann-Lévy. pp. p. 887–906
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(ed.), Trinidad Ethnicity . Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press
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Segal, D. (1999) „Ethnographic Classics, Ethnographic Examples: Some Thoughts on the New Cultural
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Segal, D. Review of Brodkin 1998 American Ethnologist vol. 29 no. 2 (2002) p. 470–73
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Langman, Lauren. "The Social Psychology of Nationalism: To Die for the Sake of Strangers." Pp.
66-83

There are many reasons why elites initiate wars: for wealth, power, glory, or perhaps as Homer
tells us, for the love of a beautiful woman. 1 But how and why do „ordinary‟ citizens passionately
lend support to revolutions against kings or national wars against „hated‟ enemies for reasons they
may little understand and about whom they often know very little - save what they hear from
leaders. Nationalism allows modern nations to willingly send, indeed sacrifice, their young in
battle, while these young eagerly and proudly kill or die for unknown members of their
communities and causes that may be contrary to their class interests, if not their very lives. 2 The
power of nationalism comes from its power to create an identity based on emotion and the
irrational; it is the ruling passion of our age (Guibernau 1996; Kecmanovic 1996). Nationalism, as
a loyalty to other members of one's nation, has been intertwined with subjective factors of self,
desire and intense passions that have led citizens to perform noble deeds of self-sacrifice as well
as brutal torture and murder of „enemies‟. Nationalism, as a political sentiment seeking to
establish self-determined nation-states, as social mobilizations to realize or defend nations, and as
passionate loyalty and devotion to one's nation, as an identity granting cultural community, may
have been the most important determinant of social and personal life in recent history 3 It has led
to a vast expansion of civil and human rights, democracy, brotherhood, freedom and creativity.
But the other side of its Janus face has been bloody civil, revolutionary and world wars and mass
4
devastation. Technologies of death production annihilated millions of civilians in London,
Auschwitz, Warsaw, Nanking, Dresden and Hiroshima. Nationalist follies in Algeria, Vietnam,
Cambodia and recently Iraq added more millions. Most social or cultural explanations depend on
or allude to social-psychological factors ranging from conceptions of self, identity and Other, to
primordial needs for communities, unconscious desires and attachments, passions and emotions.
But in most such cases, while the structural, economic, or political „determinants‟ are evident, the
5
implicit social psychology is more often assumed or invoked than carefully theorized.

Most „explanations‟ for the rise of the modern nation-state as an „imagined community‟ consider
the importance of printing, the rise of a bourgeois class, Enlightenment ideas of popular
sovereignty, imagined peace between republican nations and/or industrialization (cf. Gellner 1983;
Anderson 1991). These factors inspired bourgeois challenges to the legitimacy of dynastic elites;
they claimed to „represent‟ heretofore suppressed „people‟ with inalienable political rights who

95
now clamored for self-determination and control of the state to realize the cultural; the „national
principle‟ held that the „people‟ would now control the political (Gellner 1983). 6

The central claims of nationalism are that: first the „people‟ in politics are best understood as a
defined and bounded group with a common history, language and tradition; and, second, that a
„nation‟ has a unique claim to be considered a legitimate political basis for sovereignty - greater
than older bases such as „empire‟, „dynastic right‟, „theocracy‟. 7

The triumphant bourgeoisie would rule in the name of the „people‟, even as they created that
„people‟ whose heretofore „submerged‟ history, culture, traditions and unique identity now
demanded articulation and celebration. The subsequent economic and political power of
bourgeois nations inspired fear, ressentiment and subsequent emulation by various aristocrats,
8
colonial elites, Greek students, Finnish scholars and Turkish and Japanese warriors etc. Their
nationalisms were not always so benign.

To understand why people first yearned for the realization of nations, then internalized national
citizenship as an identity and subsequently showed passionate loyalty and devotion to their
national community, requires considerations of the national subject, understood as a constellation
of self-identity, values, motives, desires and feelings typical of members of „imagined‟ political
communities as they are shaped by and in turn impact inter-group relations and political life. A
national identity that becomes seen and experienced as an immutable essence within the modern
subject, links him/her to the history and destiny of his/her „imagined political community‟. How
and why did that subject emerge and nationalism become its moral imperative (Poole 1999)?

PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

Freud (1961 [1930]) wrote on civilization, not nationalism per se. Yet he provided a starting point
for considering character, underlying desires, emotions and defenses that often kept motives from
awareness. The most important desires, sex and aggression, prompted attachments to some people,
desires to hurt or destroy Others. Civilization demanded that such sexual or aggressive desires be
held in check; people needed internalized controls so that they might get along with each other,
sublimate desires into work and build civilization. This occurred through identification, the basic
process of character development. Caretakers, as role models, were internalized as templates
within the ego and super-ego. The ego was the more conscious, reflexive moment of character

96
that dealt with reality. Such identification was a defense against separation anxiety and primordial
fears of abandonment when infants were helpless and powerless to control the world. The self,
the reflexive moment of the ego, has its own desires for recognition and esteem, narcissism. The
super-ego, internalized social dictates, conscience, emerged as a defense against fear of harm and
annihilation (castration). Deeds, or even wishes for the forbidden, evoked guilt - the basis of
misery and often self-destructive behavior. While we are motivated by sexual and aggressive
desires, we also seek to avoid harm and danger, to allay fear and anxiety and to avoid shame so as
to secure pride and self-esteem.

Freud offered suggestive insights on internalization and identification, group dynamics, and the
lure of charismatic leaders as unconscious parent figures who embodied group values and secured
the bonds that held people together. As Freud argued, human desire could attach itself to symbols
and enable attachments to abstract entities like nations. Identification with groups like nations
provides gratifications and assuages fears. People often exaggerated slight differences with
Others to enhance self-esteem through disdain of the Other. Freud did not really concern himself
with nationalism per se, save the unlikelihood that socialism would allay aggression and war that
he saw were biologically based and inevitable. Yet his insights influenced others, especially with
the rise of Fascism when leaders manipulated fear and hatreds to mobilize support for their
policies.

Wilhelm Reich's (1946) analysis of the „mass psychology of fascism‟ argued ideology, once
internalized, acted as a material force. Capitalism required passive workers, rendered compliant
through early sexual repression that fostered a punitive super-ego; and hence an „authoritarian
personality‟, subservient to authorities above, dominating those below, and hatred to „Others‟
who were different. Such character types, frequent in the lower middle classes, embraced
reactionary nationalisms led by „powerful men‟. Such dynamics led many, including segments of
the working classes, to embrace Hitler.

The Frankfurt School, incorporating Freud into the „immanent critique‟ of domination,
illuminated the characterological factors that led people to embrace Hitler and National Socialism.
Freudian theory offered important insights on character, repression, authoritarianism, leadership,
mass media, propaganda and „rabble rousers‟ disposing fascism. Fromm (1941) suggested that in
face of major social changes, when social ties were attenuated and individuals set „free‟, they
faced anxiety, powerlessness and meaninglessness. They sought to „escape from freedom‟

97
through social movements demanding submission to powerful, charismatic leaders who promised
love in exchange for obedience and compliance. Following the defeat of World War I, burdens of
reparations and a depression with millions of people facing unemployment, Hitler's charismatic
demagoguery enthralled vast numbers of Germans. National Socialism, demanding total loyalty
and subjugation to the state, promised pride, prosperity, renewed greatness and retribution to
those responsible for duress - especially the hated Jews and communists.

Fromm suggested that nationalism depended on needs to belong to a group that provided
community, pride in membership and a framework of meaning. Positive evaluations of one's
group, „social narcissism‟, can be benevolent or benign. In face of stress and conflict, it can lead
to certain pathologies - depression, anxiety, a collective lack of judgment and reason, and hatred
to dehumanized, „evil‟ Others that justify whatever heinous acts are undertaken. Given the
enfeeblement of the modern ego, people found narcissistic compensations through identifications
with valorized and powerful nation-states that were often personified in a particular leader who
offered utopian promises for the future and passion contra the rational state that is the dialectal
partner of nationalism.

These concerns with subjective, emotional, often unconscious aspects of nationalism, suggested
how and why modern subjects were constituted and motivated to embrace the most odious forms
of nationalism and genocide. Koenigsberg (1977) offered some psychoanalytic insights on the
subjective aspects of the nation, in terms of attachments to Father/ Motherlands, narcissism,
aggression and self-defeating behavior such as national death wishes and so on. For Bloom
(1990), identification was the critical process linking the individual to the nation. These legacies
informed the recent integrations of Kecmanovic (1996), who, like Finlayson (1998), argued that
psychoanalytic perspectives still provide valuable insights. Yet there have been very few
systematic attempts to develop a social psychology of nationalism that considers the historical
and politically based constitution of the subject, for example, self, identity, desire, the role of
unconscious motivation and conflict as well as cognitive processes like imagination,
categorization and so forth. As will be shown, the historically situated ideological constructions
of nations and national identities, seemingly essential and primordial, colonize the individual self
to willingly assent to and find emotional gratifications in nationalism from its everyday banalities
to its episodic wars.

TOWARD A GENERAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALISM

98
The early nationalisms, culminating in democratic nation-states, served the economic, political
and cultural interests of the bourgeoisie. Their new authority to rule enhanced their profits,
celebrated their „modern‟ culture and enabled them to disseminate their worldviews. But nations
and nationalism served psychological interests of elites as well as masses. The very emergence of
nationalism rested on social-psychological factors, the emergence of new kinds of selfhood,
national identities and desires.

The rise of political subjectivity

Cultures, as values, meanings and ways of life of a community, provide members with an identity,
a reflexive sense of self, an interpretation of who one is, a basis for choices and relationships with
others. In feudal societies, cultural identity, as a sense of common origins, continuity over time,
shared values and difference from others, was fairly fixed by lineage within a class or occupation
(Baumeister 1986). In gemeinschaftsocieties, behavior, manner and demeanor, dress and even
selfhood, showed little variation between people of the same status. But in the eleventh century,
with the institutionalization of confession, the person was held responsible for his/her own sins or
virtues and thus the roots of individualism were planted. At about this time the institutionalization
of formal legal training to administer Church property revived debates over „natural law‟ and
inalienable rights. This established the groundwork for juridical individualism and, eventually,
the „rights of man‟. Within a short time, students at then new universities were sorting themselves
on the basis of „nations.‟ Further, we can note the early emergence of a sense of territorial bound
communities beyond the manor that while not polities, were surely „publics‟. 9
(See Gorski,
Chapter 12 in this Handbook, on pre-modern nationalisms.)

As trade with the Levant began to flourish in Italy, the emergent market encouraged a more
individualized subject among the merchant classes. Cities and commercial centers, with greater
division of labor further encouraged a more individualistic orientation to the world (Durkheim
1984 [1897]; Simmel 1950). Identity, individually or collectively, became problematic. The more
successful merchants wished to establish a unique identity to clearly distinguish themselves from
the landed nobles or peasants. They would „find‟ that „identity‟ as „descendants of Rome‟ based
on the recovery and rebirth of Greco-Roman culture. Renaissance art and culture provided them
with „cultural capital‟ that differentiated them from others. Individual artists were recognized and
perspectivism (attempts to indicate depth) individualized the viewer. Secular portraiture
attempted to valorize the uniqueness of the newly affluent bourgeoisie. This era led to humanism

99
casting the person an as autonomous subject. Moreover, we also began to see the emergence of
armed militias of burgher notables loyal to the city, maintaining social order (see Rembrandt's
Night Watch). This was hardly nationalism, but it was a step. As the bourgeoisie grew, the rise of
printing encouraged literacy, the explosion of knowledge and multiple perspectives of truth.
Some people began to question the teachings and practices of the Church. Eventually, merchant
classes found an „elective affinity‟ with rational, individualistic Protestantism.

Meanwhile, as the social structure demanded a more autonomous, self-controlled person,

bourgeois childhood eventually became recognized as a clearly demarcated stage in the life cycle,
apart from, yet preparatory for adulthood (Ariès 1962). The bourgeoisie, living in more spacious
houses with separate bedrooms, fostered a separation of public and private spheres that in turn
engendered a private, individuated self (Zaretsky 1976). For Elias (1978), this „invention of
childhood‟ and systematic child-rearing were part of a long drawn out „civilizing process‟ in
which manners and etiquette led to progressively greater repression and control over bodily
desires and impulsivity. Internalized controls of shame and guilt over „dangerous impulses‟ were
essential factors in fostering the individualized, self-controlled subjectivity and behavior
demanded by a „civilized modernity‟. Child-rearing became a systematic activity to foster a self-
controlled, individualistic subject who would „defer gratification‟ to prepare for an education and
subsequent trading career. While elites had been educated by clerics, tutors or in the few
universities, with industrialization, public schools educated wide segments of the people. This
character pattern, in which impulse control came from within, a growing market economy
without, and waning aristocracy, facilitated the rise of nations of self-regulating, self-governing
citizens with some formal education.

THE RISE OF NATIONS

The growth of Protestantism led to the bloody Eighty and Thirty Years wars that ended with the
Westphalia treaty in 1648, recognizing the end of the Holy Roman Empire, territorial sovereignty
within fixed borders, and equal rights to Protestants and Catholics. With the growing market
economy coupled with demands of the psyche from within, bourgeois merchants became more
and more resentful and critical of the often mediocre talents of dynastic rulers and their
squandering state fortunes. Given the changing nature of the political economy, changing class
relationships, and subjective changes in character, identity and desire, the existing feudal political
arrangements did not serve the class interests, nor the political goals, nor the ideological values,

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nor the emotional interests of the bourgeoisie as the vanguard class of modernization. Political
and economic pressures for changes grew; so too did the emergent forms of subjectivities
experience increasing emotional frustrations and anger with dynastic rule and hopes for a new
kind of polity. As the growing rational market society became more and more incongruent with
the existing state of affairs, so too did these existing social relationships frustrate new longings
and desires and hence warranted discarding (see Kumar, Chapter 1 in this Handbook.)

The bourgeoisie became a receptive audience for the emancipatory ideas of the Enlightenment, its
critiques of aristocracy and notions of human rights. Republican ideas were discussed and
debated in the newly emergent „public spheres‟ of civil society, „ideal speech situations, where
shared grievances were aired, alternative imaginaries articulated, agendas formulated and leaders
emerged that would lead social movements to realize a new political imaginary, the nation (cf.
10
Habermas 1989 [1968]). The progressive ideas of popular sovereignty, democratic nationhood,
and even universalism and tolerance envisioned by intellectuals like Kant, Fichte and Herder,
became aspects of a shared vision and inspiration promising a peaceful, diverse world
encouraging human freedom. The realization of the „spirit of the people‟, the „volk‟, a community
based on blood ties with an identity granting common culture, required physical, intellectual and
11
political freedom. Soon the ideas of popular sovereignty joined objective political grievances
from taxation to poverty to inform the American and French Revolutions with subjective
discontents.

The image of the political nation as a „people‟, as citizens with a shared culture, language and in
turn identity, served mobilizing functions for the rising bourgeoisie, enlisting allies against
12
dynastic crowns and subsequently securing assent to their rule. The bourgeoisie spearheaded
the „nationalist principle‟; they would be the „democratically‟ elected representatives of the
„people‟ who would control the state to realize the culture. Citizens, sharing a political identity
based on national membership, as „equals‟ in political crowds, „equals‟ before the law, would
„equally‟ serve in national armies where the ruling classes of citizens would send ruled classes of
conscripted citizens to war in order to increase national wealth. Further, citizen identities
obscured class-based identities at a time when industrialization fostered class conflicts and
challenges from growing populations of urban proletariat led by various socialist and communist
parties. When „workers‟ challenged their conditions, they often faced strikebreakers, police and
armies. When however „citizens‟ accepted membership in the nation, national identities and
bourgeois leadership, they received various material benefits, entitlements (unemployment

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insurance, health care, retirement etc.). And imperialism often meant jobs. Nationalist passions
dulled revolutionary fervor.

Whether we start with the English Civil War or the American and French revolutions, forces were
set in motion that would foster various kinds of nationalisms, bourgeois, military and imperial.
The Napoleonic wars attempted to create an integrated, rational, bourgeois French dominated
European market, but reactionary forces of God and Throne joined to defeat Napoleon.
Nevertheless, the nationalist genie was loose and indeed marshalling armies to fight him fostered
the feared secular nationalisms. Once triumphant, the economic, political and indeed military
superiority of (industrial) nation states led to fears, envy and ressentiment among various sub-
elites in traditional states, such as intellectuals, military classes, landed nobles or independence-
oriented colonial officials who then initiated their own nationalisms (Calhoun 1997). There was
no single course from dynastic states to modern nations. The kinds and directions of nationalist
movements were prefigured by objective factors such as the pre-modern class and property
relations, contractual relations, the power of agrarian elites and limits, if any, on their power (cf.
13
Moore 1966). Early bourgeois, civic nationalisms were based on inclusion, hope and promises
14
of individual freedom. Subsequent nation-states varied by democratic-authoritarian rule,
15
inclusion based on language and culture, or exclusion based on blood. Many of these later
integral, nationalisms, especially those led by traditional military classes, were more typically
impelled by ressentiment and/or fear. For example, German and Japanese aristocratic militarists
embraced exclusionary, authoritarian ethnonationalisms extolling the state, demanding
subjugation of the people.

Among the underlying factors shaping the goals and directions of nationalist movements were
emotional considerations, often reactions to social circumstances. The Frankfurt School had
suggested that strict, indeed punitive socialization disposed authoritarianism, submission to
superiors, while demanding submission from those below. This in turn led to preferences for
strong leaders with unambiguous policies, who were comfortable with power, harsh on
subordinates or deviants, and punitive to out-groups. Lakoff (2002) suggested that families varied
along a „strict father‟, „nurturant mother‟ polarity that becomes internalized as aspects of political
selfhood and identity disposing affinity for either „tough leaders‟ or nurturant ones. In times of
fear, people prefer strong, assertive, if not aggressive leaders to defend them and press for their
rights. In times of peace and calm, people prefer more nurturant and caring kinds of generous,
tolerant leadership. Feshbach (1987), using attachment theory, suggested that early ties to

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caretakers influenced a person's later political ideology and the parameters of his/her nationalism
and patriotism. Patriotism, as love of one's nation, tends to be correlated with positive
attachments to parents, while nationalism seemed more associated with asserting power and
control. Caretakers who valued allocations of social resources to children's needs, tend to support
disarmament and negotiation. Anxious and insecure attachments seemed to foster bullying
behavior in childhood and support for the use of force in asserting national rights.

NATIONAL IDENTITIES

With the emergence of bourgeois modernity, collective identities became problematic, local
family-based identities became fragmented; religion was far too general to provide relevant
identities. While elites spearheaded nations, once established, it was not only necessary for the
nation to foster the realization of the „suppressed culture‟ of the „people‟, but to fashion that
culture, create its „people‟, its narratives of identity, spread their „common tongue‟ and a
universal idiom and „high culture‟; these converged in the creation of a national identity (cf.
Gellner 1983). National elites, with allied intellectuals, created educational institutions to foster
mass literacy through common texts teaching the intentionally constructed „proper‟ form of the
national tongue; dialects and argots had limited communication to nearby people (cf. E. Weber
1976). The Israelis resurrected Hebrew as their national language to overcome diverse European
roots and create linguistic unity with Jews from the Middle East to Ethiopia. National tongues
enable national identities.

But how did national identities move from the imaginations of economic and intellectual elites to
the banalities of the masses. This has been termed nation-building, fostering identification with
and loyalty to the nation. Schooling teaches the „invented‟ histories, ersatz continuities, legends
and traditions of a „people‟ that inscribe a distinct, national identity linked to a common history, a
shared culture, common fate and destiny that valorizes uniqueness (cf. Hobsbawn and Ranger
1983). Students learn pledges of allegiance, patriotic songs, anthems and rituals of
commemoration that celebrate heroes, leaders, patriots and martyrs whose iconic characteristics
exemplify, celebrate and shape the „national character‟. This involves visits to capitals, „hallowed
grounds‟, tombs, cemeteries and museums. Further, schools teach the nation's cultural or
scientific attainments and appreciation of the distinct art, music, dance and literature of a „people‟.
The well-studied student will not only know his/her nation's history and geography, but how

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his/her nation is a little different, and perhaps a lot better than Others, especially those on the
border. 16

Nationalism, like a religion, is a set of beliefs of common origins, specialness and destiny, and
rituals, patriotic pledges, songs, anthems and celebrations that unite a „people‟ into an identity
granting „imagined [political] community‟ that creates „citizens‟. Flags and anthems, much like
totems, celebrate identities, prompt reverence and awe to a national community, inspire pride in
17
national identities, and loyalty to the nation. Indeed, celebrations and rituals create identities
and unite heretofore disparate masses (Spillman 1997). National solidarity means fellow nationals
feel good around those like themselves, with whom they can see aspects of themselves, and who
confirm and ratify each other's views. Finally, people learn about the rights, rewards and
18
obligations of civil, political and social citizenship. As a result of socialization, schooling and
mass media, national identities become an internalized part of the self and are experienced as
fundamental means of self-expression and communication (Poole 1999).

Following Poole (1999), identities exist in frameworks of interpretation and meaning provided by
language, cultural symbols and values through which we become aware of ourselves and others.
A national identity, as part of the new moral order, accepts certain values and commitments to
underline and inform all other identities, and in case of conflict, takes priority over class, gender,
race, religion or occupation. Durkheim argued that society as a moral order could demand the
sacrifice of one's very life - altruistic suicide. Nations too, can and often do demand such
sacrifices of their people. Since nations provide meanings, pleasures and rewards beyond those
found in individual lives, by dint of socialized character, attachments to brethren citizens and felt
moral obligations, people willingly comply with such demands.

While „print-capitalism‟ enabled modern nationalism, today, mass media now plays an extensive
role in celebrating national holidays and commemorations. Mass media, often in collusion with
political elites, can be used for propaganda purposes. Highly charged negative images and
portrayals of impure, dangerous Others with evil intents evoke fear, hatred, loathing and/or anger,
mobilize nationalist sentiments and support for elite policies that demand national sacrifice such
as war. Governments often justify planned aggression through an „invented‟ casus belli like the
Reichstag fire, the Tonkin Gulf attacks, imminent hardship to medical students in Grenada, or
claims of WMD in Iraq.

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SELF, IDENTITY, DESIRE AND EMOTION

The development and structuring of the individual self, an aspect of the ego, as the locus of
reflexivity, marks the intersection between underlying, socialized motivation and consciousness
and behavior. The self is initially shaped in the family through both direct socialization and
internalization of the parental role model. Identification, as both attachment and internalization,
links self to group, whether family or community. In order to find certain emotional gratifications
and/or allay suffering, the self assumes a number of identities and locations that link subjectivity
and self-awareness to the patterned routines of everyday social life in late modernity (Giddens
1991). With the internalization of a national self-identity, we can talk about a national „collective
consciousness‟. 19
A national self-identity is impelled to seek or avoid certain kinds of outcomes
and resulting emotional experiences by virtue of citizenship. Moreover, as noted, class location
and family experiences impact character to dispose political stances regarding nationalism.

Desire as impelling action

What motives and feelings foster the embrace of nationalist movements, loyalties to the nation, or
the emergence of reactionary nationalisms? Freudian theory was suggestive but not definitive, nor
did it consider historical factors and group struggles over the contested terrains of political and
cultural power that gave rise to nations in general and particularities of each. Recent sociological
approaches to emotion suggest a sociological model of desire based an biologically rooted affects
that become subjected to social cues and controls and in turn foster certain social behaviors
(Hochschild 1986). If people are universally capable of certain basic affective responses, so too
do they have capacities for consciousness, which, as a social product, becomes the means through
which affects become socialized, beginning with their evocation through symbolic as well as
physical cues. Tompkins (1962) suggested that there are certain universal affective responses, joy,
love/acceptance, fear/anxiety/ distress, shame, sadness, disgust, contempt, anger, and
interest/anticipation. These basic affects, like primary colors, can be shaded or joined together
through socialization. Affects once socialized, nuanced and controlled become a vast array of
„emotions‟ that may or may not be experienced as feelings and/or expressed directly or in actions.

Desire can be theorized as what impels seeking certain positive emotional states, or avoiding
unpleasant emotions. To understand the longing for and/or devotion to a nation and the emotional
basis of a national self-identity we need to consider how certain desires are linked to emotions;

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people embrace identities and choose to enact behaviors to gain certain experiences and avoid
others. Thus self-identities are not simply conceptions, but are means through which social
behavior and interaction from work to play to political participation provide or evade emotional
experiences. But no matter how we approach individual motivation, it must be institutionally
channeled into social behavior. Nationalism is a shared motive, embraced by groups, but for
individuals, a collective motive may provide various emotional gratifications. National goals
cannot be reduced to individual motivation per se. Thus the pleasures of aggression may explain
why individuals disdain, hate or fight each other. But collective interests from national self-
determination to geopolitical influence or even war cannot be reduced to individual desires.
Individual desires for aggressive responses must be mobilized, channeled and directed by
nationalist leaders to gain popular support for collective responses to avenge real or imagined
insults. Nationalist leaders intuitively understand their followers and know how to use the
language of emotions to mobilize people to willingly bring death, destruction and human misery
in the name of a higher principle - the national good.

POSITIVE EMOTIONS

Community and engagement vs. loneliness

For Aristotle, people as political animals, zoon politicon, sought friendships, connections,
relationships and communities. People generally find comfort in being with those who are similar;
group membership becomes an antidote to loneliness, nothingness and anxiety, which is
ultimately based on fear of death (Becker 1973; Kecmanovic 1996). There is a fundamental need
for attachment that is part of normal psychological functioning, starting with „attachment
behavior‟ (Bowlby 1969-73). As feudal society waned, individualism attenuated social bonds
while Reason undermined religious-based meanings and understandings. Yet people need ties and
meanings. The ground was fertile for the emergence of new forms of community and values.
Romanticism promised an „authentic‟ life and small communities where genuine self-realization
stood apart from urban life dominated by the rational market. But that response was only
available for an elite few. The broader nation-state enabled an integration of romantic resistance
to fragmentation and meaninglessness with the rationalization of governance of a „national
community‟ with a shared history, „authentic‟ identity and „special mission‟ that linked „chosen
people‟ together and provided „ultimate meanings‟ in a secular world (cf. A. Smith 2003).
Nations thus provided community, identity and meaning. However „imaginary‟ that community

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or mediated the ties, nations, as forms of comradeship, served solidarity functions that assuaged
anxiety, much as had the Church (cf. Anderson 1991). Other kinds of belonging, such as Church,
family or work, do not provide feelings of security, unless these institutions are themselves
protected by the nation. Loyalty and belonging to a nation, as a sentiment rather than a rational
calculation, provides the safety and security (Ignatieff 1993). This loyalty to one nation makes it
20
possible to hate and brutally kill Others who might threaten its interests.

Recognition/dignity vs. shame

For Hegel, the quest for recognition by the Other [Slave] was a fundamental moment for the
emergence of self-consciousness. More recent considerations of recognition, in such varied forms
as respect, honor, distinction or self-esteem, self-worth, pride or dignity, have informed a variety
of sociological discussions (cf. Honneth 1995; Sennett 2002). In a modern society, where status is
problematic and ephemeral, especially for those in the lower echelons, membership in and
identification with a valued national community, even if „imagined‟, brings a person enduring
pride and dignity through identification with the nation and national qualities or accomplishments
- one reason for the „narcissism of petty differences‟.

Agency vs. passivity

Humans, able to anticipate consequences of their actions, seek to impact their environments, to
have power and control over their lives. This is evident in the earliest moments of infancy when
children explore and manipulate their environments. Piaget called these actions „intentionality‟.
With literacy and the empowering values of modernity, people sought to transform the world, yet
between „estranged labor‟, if not rationalized work in „iron cages‟ and the „disciplining of docile
bodies‟, most people had few spaces for the joys of agency. Thus a national self-identity, linked
to a valorized and idealized nation-state, provided the person with a sense of agency and
empowerment in realms apart from work, rather than powerlessness and submission. People feel
empowered, if not emboldened in crowds, and especially so in patriotic rallies (Kecmanovic
1996). Indeed, as noted, for Fromm (1941), powerlessness, vulnerability to pain, hurt and perhaps
exposure to danger, prompted authoritarian submission to powerful leaders and/or nationalist
causes that would seemingly overcome powerlessness.

Meaning vs. anomie

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Most people need goals, purposes and values to make their lives meaningful - as well as assuage
the fears and anxieties of everyday life. Value systems give life meaning that often extends
beyond mortal life. One of the main consequences of modernity qua disenchantment was the
erosion of myths, yet people needs myths to give their lives meaning, direction and purpose. For
Durkheim, religion was an indirect self-celebration of the social; nationalism, without gods or
spirits, made this celebration direct. As Fromm (1973) put it, people have a fundamental need for
a framework of „ultimate concerns‟, meanings and devotion, to integrate their energy in a single
direction and elevate themselves beyond an isolated existence with its doubts and insecurities.
Devotion to national goals beyond the isolated ego allows transcendence from egocentricity Thus
the crafting of a national history, replete with mythologies and hagiographies, may well be a lie,
as Renan put it. But as noted, a national identity is located in a moral order that is ultimately
based on myths of origin, history and destiny.

People fear death and yearn for immortality. For Becker (1973) human beings create individual
character structures and collective meaning systems to deny the ultimate reality of death - the
most fundamental human fear. Nationalism, sacralizing the nation that endures beyond the
individual's life, grants a transcendental meaning to the nation whose „permanence‟ makes it
immortal. 21 Indeed, some of its prophets, when speaking of the „volk‟ as the spirit of the „people‟,
gave it a „transcendental‟ quality. Baumeister (1992) suggested that in order to find life
meaningful, people need feelings of efficacy (agency), self-worth (dignity), and value and
purpose. From what has been argued, a national self-identity not only provides such gratifications,
but further, for many people in modern societies, for whom work is often alienating, religion less
salient and social relationships more transient, national identity becomes the primary basis of
finding life meaningful and with a purpose that transcends mortality and comforts our awareness
of our personal finitude.

Avoiding adverse emotions

The nation became an identity granting community of meaning that provided its „citizens‟ with a
number of emotional gratifications. But given how certain events and conditions impact
nationhood, members of national communities can experience adverse feelings: (i) fear and
anxiety, as responses to impending loss of life, self or community; (ii) ressentiment, envy, shame
and humiliation via attacks on the national self that typically evoke anger and rage; and (iii) anger
and hatred to those who have or will cause harm or humiliation. Individuals may respond with

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aggression, but for the polity, aggression has different meanings, asserting a collective interest.
More often than not, elite policies that serve geopolitical ends depend on fostering collective
emotions to secure legitimacy. The anger, and perhaps shame, following the 9/11 attack was used
by the Bush administration to justify a long-planned invasion of Iraq to secure American control
over oil and foster „democratic governance‟ in the Middle East.

Fear, anxiety and powerlessness

Fear, a response to a clear threat, and anxiety, a response to a threat not clearly evident, among
the most archaic and powerful emotions, are rooted in the fear of annihilation, death. Thus threats
or attacks from within or without typically evoke fear and uncertainty that in turn usually foster
greater loyalty and support for the nation. „When two groups are in conflict, identification with
one‟s own nation or group enhances negative feelings to the other group, especially if it is
perceived as a source of frustration or as an enemy. Preservation of the group's resources, or the
integrity of its territory, as well as fear for one's own safety, may be seen as reasons for defense -
with attack seen as the best means of defense' (Hinde, n.d.). While early nationalisms emphasized
the politics of belonging and hopes for a better future, today, reactionary nationalisms are more
often based on politics of exclusion and fears of demise from without, for example, enemies or
immigrants. Thus, for example, many ultra-nationalist movements in Europe tend toward
xenophobia, especially when the immigration of clearly different Others takes place at times of
other major social changes.

Ressentiment, envy, shame and humiliation

Self-esteem is often fragile; political or economic defeats, reversals or comparisons may evoke
intense passions. For Greenfeld (1992), the superior power of nations, fostered ressentiment and
compensatory efforts at emulation. Scheff (1994) argued that humiliation, individually or
collectively, as a denial of recognition of one's self and severing social bonds, fosters an
unacknowledged alienation and shame which prompts an intense, destructive anger that loathes
and denigrates the Other and protects one from facing one's own shame, inadequacies and
insecurities. „Hatred is the commonly used word for hidden shame/rage sequences, humiliated
fury.‟ Following national defeats or insults, people experience national shame and humiliation as
personal attacks on their self that demand revenge or retribution. This dynamic fosters some of
the bloodiest national conflicts. Elites in control of „information‟ can find, if not create, threats

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and challenges that mobilize national sentiments and feelings to secure assent to economic or
political agendas. German humiliation at Versailles was said to inspire a collective desire for
retribution to „settle accounts‟. Much evidence suggests that the British fire bombings of Dresden
and US nuking Hiroshima and Nagasaki were more inspired by revenge rather than military
necessity. The US humiliation in Vietnam was an element in mobilizing massive support for Gulf
Wars I and II.

Anger, hatred and disgust

When a person's goals are blocked or denied, the typical response is anger as the initial stage of
aggressive reaction. So too with nations, when national goals are frustrated, or imagined
threatened either from within or without, people respond with anger that is often transformed by
elites into hatred of the Other who is then constructed as vile and disgusting in character as in
deed. As noted, insults to dignity and self-esteem evoke irrational rage and hatred that leads
people to wish to hurt or destroy those responsible for current adversities and/or future intents.
And leaders often manipulate real or imagined fears and humiliations to mobilize anger and
popular support for their agendas.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 22

Early discussions of national social psychology focused on motivation and emotion, legacies of
Freudian psychology and attempts to understand reactionary nationalism. But people think,
evaluate and communicate through symbols, and they can have powerful emotional attachments
to symbolic representations. Therefore we should also consider cognitive functions such as
perception, judgment, abstraction and imagination in more general theorization. An „imagined
community‟ is a cognitive representation (Anderson 1991), yet at the same time implies
normative judgments. Moscovici (1993) has argued that „social representations‟, including
„collective memories‟, are legitimate objects of study for social psychology, recognizing that
concern with the nation, as a representation of the „people‟ and a historically specific form of
governance, is a place where sociological and social psychological concerns intersect. For Tajfel
and Turner (1986), „social identity‟, that part of an individual's self-conception based on group
membership, whether gang or nation, mediating social change, as an aspect of group process, has
depended on categorization, identification with a group (for both collective and personal identity)
and comparison with others. They suggest that people gain a sense of worth and esteem through

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belonging to a group and favorably comparing their group to Others, especially when that Other
is more likely known through derogatory stereotypes. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have drawn
upon this tradition to suggest a cognitively oriented social psychology of an ideologically
constructed national selfhood, itself a process in flux, mediating changing structural and
contextual factors with individual thoughts, feeling and action.

CATEGORIZATION

For Kant, categorization was an a priori dimension of understanding; all people differentiate
themselves as an „us‟ different from „them‟, Others, whose languages, values, customs and ways
of life were different. For Durkheim, categorization began when membership of a clan, a descent
group, was designated by a totemic identity linked to a common progenitor that differentiated
them from others. Moreover, this self-reflexive narrative of collective identity was celebrated in
rituals that dramatized common roots and identities and reaffirmed their social bonds. Durkheim's
analysis yet provides a useful framework for a religion or a nation. Modern nations yet
differentiate themselves from others in terms of an often-mythical common past or ancestry,
whether of Rome, a Teutonic Valhalla or a „lost tribe‟ of Israel.

Attempts to delineate the „typical features‟ of a category of people can be traced to Herodotus.
This categorization and comparison (below) led to „national character‟ studies, rooted in the
„culture and personality‟ tradition in anthropology. This research attempted to delineate, if not
„naturalize‟, the modal character patterns found among the adults of a society (Inkeles and
Levinson 1969). These studies included Americans, Russians, Germans and Japanese. This
research ran into many problems, not the least of which were recreating stereotypes, ignoring the
distribution of types, changes over time and attempts to link political action to „underlying
character‟ while ignoring cultural processes through which self and identity are shaped and/or
mediating processes. Yet it did encourage useful research into how peoples perceive each other.

Categorization is essential for defining and policing boundaries of self, parties, movements, as
different from Others; the audience of „we‟ is the core of national politics. For Reicher and
Hopkins (2001), national identities, as aspects of categorization, are systematically constructed
and make collective behavior possible. Categorization itself depends on context, the kind of
audience fosters certain self-presentations. Identities are constantly in flux in relationship to
changing circumstances; they are in the process of becoming rather than being, and as such, vary

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in intensity, saliency and form at different moments. For E. Smith (1993), self-categorization as a
group member means the information relevant to that group has emotional and motivational
impact on the individual; differentiation of„us‟ from „them‟ becomes a basis for in-group
solidarity, for example, strong bonds between members are usually associated with the positive
and negative feelings.

IDENTIFICATION

People identify with the groups to which they belong that constitute the self-defined category of
„we‟, those whom they feel are more or less similar to themselves, and thus feel loyalty and
devotion to them. Identity is the fundamental link of nation and self (Bloom 1990). The noted
changes in identity, together with growing mass literacy, were crucial aspects of the
transformation of selfhood and consciousness that enabled people to envision and identify with a
social representation such as a nation, an „abstract imaginary‟ as a „people‟ with a history and
destiny divorced from the concrete. The magic of the nation has been the capacity of people to
identify with a symbolic construct, an idealized „imaginary group‟ that exists only in their minds,
yet that membership provides the person with a variety of gratifications and demands. Members
of nations can bask in the „reflected glory of the attainments of other group members‟ (Tesser
1988). Nevertheless, the existence of the national group was a systematic product of national
education systems. But it is also a result of the colonization of the life world by nation-specific
objects and qualities (see discussion of „banal nationalism‟, in the facticity section below).

COMPARISON

People in groups compare themselves to others; they typically valorize differences, they see
themselves in positive terms and take pride in their group, its qualities and accomplishments, real
or mythic, that become the basis of comparison and status competition (Greenfeld 1992; M.
Weber 1958 [1946]) Membership in „valued‟ groups gives a sense of well-being and narcissistic
gratification by being superior to similar Others. Disdain to a neighbor serves compensatory
functions for an enfeebled ego under threat. How nations construct, regard and compare to the
Other is rooted in emotional considerations, beginning with the extent to which self-esteem is
based on belonging to a valorized, dignity-granting community, but the corollary is often
denigration of the Other.

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Perceptions of out-group Others, shaped by one's ingroup, vary by the extent to which the parties
have similar backgrounds and compatible or conflicting goals and values. The Americans and
British see each other as „good buddies‟ or „jolly chaps‟. Conflicts over material or social
resources or political goals adversely impact the ways the people see each other. The enemy is
always seen as vile, despicable and devoid of all humanity deserving only a swift, painful death.
And given the behavior of soldiers in war, in which rape, looting and murder have long been
„perks‟, such perceptions have a grain of truth, but on the other hand, such perceptions ignore the
humanity of the Other and the wide variations found in any group.

The perceptions of out-group „stereotypes‟ have been studied in terms of how belief systems
distort images and filter information of the Other in ways that confirm the constructed images to
elevate the status of the prejudiced. Most of this research has been concerned with racial, ethnic
and religious prejudices, but the same logic applies to how nations perceive each other. The
negative qualities of the Other are emphasized, while „admirable‟ qualities become either
transformed into negatives and/or sources of ressentiment. An important corollary to stereotypy is
„groupthink (Janis 1982), the tendency of cohesive groups to have rigid, shared perceptions of the
world that may be inaccurate and systematically exclude dissenting views. No one could tell
Hitler that with Jewish soldiers and scientists he would have won the war. Kennedy was under
considerable pressure by most of his advisers to attack Cuba and likely start World War III.
Nothing could deter George W Bush from invading Iraq.

FACTICITY

Nationalism is not simply an episodic moment of identity at times of celebratory rituals, or a

momentary response to a geopolitical event. It is a „daily referendum‟, part and parcel of the lived
environment experienced in everyday life that Billig (1995) has called everyday „flagging‟ of
„banal nationalism‟, which can be seen as the ideological habits evident in linguistic practices
and/or markers such as dress styles, food preferences and even such things as the daily weather
map that uses the contours of the nation. These serve as everyday reminders of a homeland-based
national identity found in the embodied habits of everyday life. Leaders and citizens alike often
use „national‟ dress as a marker and link to a national identity, for example, bowlers, berets,
sombreros or ten-gallons, lederhosen or chaps, Doc Marten's or cowboy boots. This secures a
„latent‟ national identity that can be quickly mobilized by leaders when Others identified as vile

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and heinous commit acts like claiming unimportant islands in the South Atlantic
(Falklands/Malvinas) or possess WMD with nefarious intents.

NATIONALISM TURNS DANGEROUS

The early theorists of the nation envisioned progressive, benign civic nationalisms; emancipated
„peoples‟ would create a better, more democratic world. Bourgeois nationalists were the carriers
of the emancipatory project of modernity, extolling human rights, liberty, fraternity and equality.
They did not envision the irrational, integral populist, reactionary nationalisms and
ethnonationalisms of„brotherhood within - warlike without‟, with „justifiable‟ hatred of a
dehumanized Other whose heinous acts, often many generations ago, demanded revenge and
23
retribution. This can render genocide banal (cf. Berezin, Chapter 23 in this Handbook).
Adverse social conditions such as economic crises, social displacements, dislocations, competing
nationalisms, or military defeats and the like, foster uncertainty and emotional reactions, fears,
anxieties and humiliations. Following the military defeats of Imperial Germany, or Tokugawa
Japan, militarists embraced integral ethnonationalisms. Such nationalisms were often born of the
ressentiment of the greater power of industrial nations after either defeats or fears they might be
conquered and humiliated. But so too do character patterns matter; authoritarians, already
disposed to anger, hatred and xenophobia, typically embrace reactionary nationalisms. Self-
serving leaders valorize and mobilize essentialist national identities and promise „restoration‟ of
community, dignity, agency or meaning, and/or assuaging shame and fear through nationalist
political agendas of assertion, if not retaliation, that benefit the nation, to the detriment of most
„supporters‟. When typically joined with „groupthink‟, nationalism becomes impermeable to
reason.

When former Yugoslavia faced severe fiscal crises, a few years after the death of Tito and the
demise of communism, fear, uncertainty, humiliation and anger disposed to compensatory
24
reactionary ethno-religious nationalisms led by charismatic leaders like Tudjman or Milosevic.
As noted, in many other parts of Europe - France, Holland, Austria, Italy - between rapid social
changes and the twin impacts of neoliberal globalization, economic stagnation and job losses and
retrenchments of government mandate welfare state programs, for example, have coincided with
immigration of darker visible Others deemed responsible for both job losses and high crime.
Irrational fears, if not hatred of scapegoated (Muslim) immigrants, allowed nationalists like Le
Pen, Berlusconi or Haider to thrive (Delanty and O'Mahony 2002). Such nationalisms provide

114
stable, valorized identities within cohesive groups with clear-cut values in an unstable, changing
world.

Similarly, throughout the Islamic world, rapid urbanization has attenuated social cohesion, while
economic stagnation and poverty, in contrast to affluent Western nations, have fostered
ressentiment to those deemed responsible for that stagnation and support of despots. Such
accusations often have foundation. While the West provides little in the way of job-creating
economic investments, its hedonistic, narcissistic, erotic popular culture is experienced as an
affront to more traditional moralities. These factors dispose to fundamentalisms, much like
reactionary nationalisms, and provide cohesive communities and stable identities with virtue-
based dignity and a meaningful ideology. Thus radical mosques assuage the pains of modernity.
Some groups, often with legitimate grievances toward the West for its support of Israel and the
recent invasion of Iraq, embrace unrealistic goals to re-establish the Caliphate through resort to
terrorism and martyrdom as techniques (see Langman and Morris 2002.)

Finally, given the nationalist principle, that the state, the nation and „people‟ are one, nations, as
groups, are often personalized and imbued with individual qualities, the US and the UK are
friends, Israel and Iran distrust each other (Bloom 1990). The same „psychology‟ that we would
use to understand nationalism is itself often employed to judgmentally categorize and thereby
psychologically denigrate the Other as psychotic, paranoid, sadistic, impulsive or immature. Thus
nationalism can falsify, misrepresent the real relationships of groups, distort the intentions of
Others and promote a valorized „us‟ vs. dehumanized, psy-chopathically dangerous „them‟
mentality that promotes cohesion and support for leaders. Leaders, especially in control of mass
media, often garner support for policies based on such misrepresentations that suggest that the
Other is an „imminent danger‟ to the „people‟, their well-being, honor and dignity. Such Others
deserve death. As has been argued, given the foundational power of national identities and their
25
moral justifications, we have seen centuries of bloody warfare. Today, when many nations have
nuclear weapons, nationalism is even more dangerous.

CONCLUSION

Nations, as communities, consist of agents who are not simply amorphous masses of „cultural
dopes‟, passive vessels of social structure through which social processes operate. But how do we
explain the mediating processes between national communities and the thoughts, feelings and

115
actions of individuals and/or their impact on social structures. All too often, explanations of
nationalism invoke the social psychological as causal or consequential, but with little concern for
carefully defining terms, locating concepts within actual research and/or theoretical frameworks
of self, identity, motives, desires, and/or cognition. The Frankfurt School initiated social
psychological studies of nationalism, especially reactionary forms. They called attention to the
dangers of „one-dimensional thought‟ that would ignore the emotional and irrational aspects of
subjectivity - especially tendencies for blind compliance to leaders. More recent social
psychological theorizing has focused on identities, cognitive processes and inter-group
perceptions and relations. These positions are complementary and suggest a synthesis. Nations
consist of political communities of meaning in which historically and structurally constituted
reflexive citizen subjects are endowed with cognition, consciousness and imagination, as well as
desires, feelings and emotions. The contexts and ways in which citizens are socialized, the social
conditions they emotionally experience and the interpretations they make and/or receive from
their leaders, can direct nationalism to the loftiest goals of freedom and democracy. But
nationalism can also foster death, destruction and devastation. Studies of nationalism that attend
to its emotional underpinnings may play some role in the directions it takes.

EPILOGUE: WITHER NATIONALISM?

With globalization, integrated world markets, deterritorialized flexible capital, regulation by

supranational organizations such as the WTO and IMF, universalized Western (American) mass
media and proliferation of ideologies of consumption, many have argued that nation-states no
longer play significant roles (see Ohmae 1995; Sklair 2001). National identities have been
challenged by consumer-based „branded‟ identities, cosmopolitanism, fan-doms of popular
culture „stars‟ and retreats to „lifestyle enclaves‟ within gated communities. More recently,
various Web-based „virtual communities‟ provide alternative identities ranging from online game
players to sex chat lines and social movements devoted to Global Justice (Langman and Morris
2005). Each represents an alternative to nation-based communities and identities. In the case of
cosmopolitanism, perhaps most advanced in Europe, the integration of the EU, common currency
and ease of travel enabled the emergence of an identity based on the kinds of „cultural capital‟
available to the higher educated, often multilingual classes. Certain groups of cultural specialists
(performing artists, journalists) capitalist elites, and often academics with memberships in
international scientific communities, may participate in „art worlds‟ or leisure activities (skiing,
sailing, cuisine). Professional identities, aesthetic tastes and leisure activities may not only

116
provide them with greater saliency and pride than citizenship, but become ways of differentiating
themselves from less sophisticated, often more nationalistic classes such as British soccer
hooligans or Yankee cowboys.

But this is only half of the story. In many places of the world, nationalism remains a potent force.
National identities ameliorate the doubt, uncertainty and fragmentation of rapid social change in
the global age (Guibernau 1996). Many former republics of the USSR, Georgia, Ukraine and
Chechnya have seen flourishing nationalisms demanding autonomy and self-determination, and a
willingness for some to die for their causes. In China, with the demise of Communist
internationalism, nationalism emerged as the inclusive ideology. At the time of this writing, the
US, fearful, apprehensive and angry after 9/11, supported George W Bush and a reactionary
nationalist agenda that has discarded international agreements and backed a unilateral peremptory
invasion of Iraq. While globalization has in some cases attenuated national self-determination and
has offered alternatives to citizenship-based identities, in other cases these same conditions have
fostered or revived the vilest integral nationalisms. The death of the nation-state and demise of
nationalism thus seem a bit premature. Until that happens, there remain many challenges for
scholars. A comprehensive social psychology of nationalism remains wanting. Perhaps this
chapter can be seen as an invitation for such examinations and suggestions for future research
directions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Gerard Delanty for his suggestions and
encouragement, to Lyn Spillman for her insightful comments, Meghan Burke for her most
thorough research and Andrew Fraker for his editorial assistance.

NOTES

1 Troy commanded very important trade routes.

2 Hobsbawm (1990) said that no one who supports nationalism should study it. So that this
author's position is clear at the start, my approach to nationalism is rooted first in the Frankfurt
School, then informed by Gramsci, sees its earliest origins in bourgeois struggles for hegemony,

117
and considers that nationalism became the vehicle for gaining the emotional support of the
masses in elite struggles.

3 Kecmanovic (1996) provides an extensive review of definitions of nationalism. NB:

nationalism involves one's identity, patriotism is simply love of one's nation.

4 Most scholars of nationalism have tried to deal with its individualistic-libertarian forms as well
as its collectivist-authoritarian forms. For a review of this debate, see Kecmanovic (1996).

5 See Searle-White (2001), Tyrrell (1996), Finlayson (1998), Kecmanovic (1996) and Bloom
(1990).

6 Gellner's (1983) formulation is fundamentally materialistic, and while a good analysis, he gives
little attention to the emotional and more psychological aspects of nationalism.

7 http:/ / www.fordham.edu/ halsall/ mod/ 1784herdermankind.html We might note, however,

that nationalism, more so than many other topics, is filled with exceptions; thus there are
multilingual nations like Switzerland or Belgium, nations without states, for example nineteenth-
century Poland etc.

8 Cf. Calhoun (1997).

9 Bloom (1990) argued that, at least in the case of England and France, a „consciousness of kind‟
beyond the elites was emergent by the late medieval period. Thus with the Magna Carta and Joan
of Arc came a shared sensibility that would eventually become transformed by elites into nations.
In Shakespeare's Henry V, the exhortation to „We few, we happy few, we band of brothers‟
(IV.iii.60) foreshadows the nation as brethren.

10 That „new‟ imaginary, the democratic republic, had origins in Athens and Rome, for „free‟
affluent males. So too did early, „inclusive‟ bourgeois nationalisms exclude women, the poor and
minorities.

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11 The extent to which early nationalists impacted later Fascism has long been debated, but most
would argue that the nationalisms of Kant, Fichte and Herder, embracing freedom and democracy,
were fundamentally opposed to the authoritarianism and repression of the Nazis.

12 Cf. Poole (1999).

13 See also Downing (1992) on the role of constitutionalism.

14 Many colonials, coming to Europe for medical, scientific or technical educations, also learned
about liberal democracy as well as Marxist revolutionary agendas which shaped independence-
minded nationalists as different as Ho Chi Mihn.

15 See Part III for the many trajectories of nationalism.

16 As many have noted between the rise of the EU and an emerging European identity, in which
rivalries, if not animosities between Spanish and French, or French and German, wane with the
ascent to a post-national, constitutional patriotism, Habermas's suggested alternative to
nationalism. This debate is beyond this chapter. See Delanty (1996).

17 Guibernau (1996) used the Durkheimian trope to illustrate relations of national culture,
identity and ritual as much like religion.

18 T. H. Marshall (1950).

19 Cf. Bloom (1990) for an extensive analysis of Freud, Mead, Erikson, Parsons and Habermas
on the role of identification mediating national identities.

20 Thus as noted, wars, whether dynastic, modern or for independence of colonies, are based on
group interests, that are not reducible to aggression which may, however, impel the individual to
support elite agendas.

21 Durkheim suggested that the belief in the immortality of the individual soul reflected its being
a force and/or representation of the society that seems immortal, predating us, outlasting us.

119
22 As noted, such theories focus on individuals rather than the historical nature of nationalism.
For an excellent review, see Stephen Gibson http:/ / www.sociologyed.ac.uk/ youth/ docs/
Gibsons_lit_rev.pdf.

23 For a fuller discussion, see Kecmanovic (1996).

24 With Tito as the West's communist, the Yugoslavians were extended credit and travel visas for
workers and Yugoslavia was a popular tourist destination. But following the death of Tito, a
charismatic leader who fostered a sense of community between its ethno-religious groups, demise
of communism, with the severe economic retrenchments, led to massive dislocations.

25 Bloom (1990) reviewed a number of perspectives of the impact of social psychological factors
on international relations.

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Hechter, Michael, Tuna Kuyucu, and Audrey Sacks. "Nationalism and Direct Rule." Pp. 84-93

The rise of nationalism and the creation of the nation-state have been among the most striking
political developments of the past two centuries. Emerging in the late eighteenth century, the
nation-state came to supplant both petty, homogeneous principalities and grand multi-ethnic
empires in attempting to merge the boundaries of nations and states (Gellner 1983). Making sense
of a phenomenon as pervasive and varied as this is far from an easy task: the burgeoning
literature on nationalism is rife with conceptual, epistemological and theoretical disputes. Despite
this apparent disarray, this chapter argues that a small set of social mechanisms is responsible for
the emergence, persistence and evolution of various types of nationalism.

Nationalism is collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation, a territorially
concentrated and culturally distinctive solidary group, congruent with those of its governance unit,
the agency responsible for providing the bulk of public goods within the nation's territory
(Hechter 2000: 7). Since it is all about nations seeking self-determination, any theory of
nationalism must begin by first considering mechanisms of group formation and group solidarity
(Hechter 1987; Brubaker 2002). Rational individuals form groups to gain access to jointly
produced goods that they are unable to provide for themselves. Once formed, however, the
resulting groups will have varying levels of solidarity. The greater the proportion of members'
resources contributed to the group's ends, the greater its solidarity.

Group solidarity increases with members' dependence on joint goods and on the group's control
capacity (Hechter 1987). The more dependent members are on their group, the greater their
willingness to contribute to it. Dependence alone does not guarantee solidarity, however, because
no matter how much they value their membership, rational members still may be tempted to profit
from it without contributing to the group. This is where control capacity comes in. A group's
control capacity consists of its ability to monitor members' behavior and levy sanctions in the
event of inadequate contributions.

Group solidarity is necessary for the development of nationalism, but it is insufficient. Just
because a nation is highly solidary, it need not be nationalist For example, although the Swiss
canton of Jura is relatively solidary, at least compared to other cantons, it has no nationalist
movement at the present time (see Jenkins 1986 for an account of earlier Jura nationalism).

123
Nationalism only arises when a substantial, but indeterminate, proportion of the members of a
nation demands sovereignty. This demand is variable rather than constant.

Since both individuals and groups prefer to be ruled by themselves rather than by others, why
does the demand for sovereignty vary at all? On the one hand, the expression of the demand is
affected by a variety of institutions. On the other, the intensity of the demand can be trumped by
alternative collective goals. The expression of the demand for self-determination is influenced by
several institutional factors. Some factors, like democratic institutions, affect a group's ability to
engage in collective protest; no political demands of any sort are usually voiced in repressive
regimes (Scott 1985; Kuran 1996). Other factors, like the electoral system, affect a group's ability
to articulate its distinctive interests. No matter how great a nation's demand for sovereignty may
be, this demand is unlikely to be articulated in a two-party majoritarian electoral system
(Zielinski 2002).

The intensity of the demand for self-determination, however, hinges on the dependence of the
nation on its host state (Jenne 2004). The more that the members of distinctive nations profit from
their allegiance to the host state, the less the allure of self-determination. Hence, the less
dependent a nation is on its host state, the greater the demand for self-determination.

As many analysts have argued, nationalism is a modern phenomenon (Tilly 1975, 1990; Hechter
1975, 2000; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1992; Mann 1993; Brubaker 1996; Marx
2004). The rise of direct rule leads to intense struggles between central and local authorities over
the right to govern. This chapter explains how the rise of direct rule led to the emergence of
different types of nationalism, beginning in the eighteenth century. This account can also be read
as a critique of explanations that assign nations a timeless existence (Smith 1983, 1986;
Hutchinson 2000; by contrast, see Ozkirimli 2003). Whereas the national identities that
crystallized during the rise of direct rule may have had roots in the distant past, this cannot
explain either the timing or the forms of the resulting nationalist movements.

The following section discusses the impact of direct rule on the levels and forms of solidarity of
local cultural groups. Then we examine how the emergence of direct rule fosters both state-
building and peripheral types of nationalism. Finally, to illustrate the theory, we apply it to the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of Kurdish peripheral nationalism in its
aftermath.

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WHY INDIRECT RULE THWARTS NATIONALISM

Previous to the advent of modern communications technology, central rulers were compelled to
rely on indirect rule to control their far-flung territories (Boone 2003). Under indirect rule, the
bulk of governance is delegated to local authorities. Indirect rule assuages local authorities by
affording the bulk of governance rights in their domain. These authorities usually share a
common culture with their subjects (Hechter 2000). Since subjects tend to be ruled by their own
kind, their political demands are unlikely to be about sovereignty. Since local authorities in
indirect-rule regimes are virtually sovereign they, in turn, have little to gain by seeking greater
self-determination - unless the center rapidly increases its demands on them for taxes and other
resources.

By minimizing the demand for sovereignty among local authorities and their subjects, indirect
rule thwarts nationalism in culturally distinct regions. Even if indirect rulers are alien, cultural
conflict is unlikely to persist because local authorities, unlike their central counterparts, have high
control capacity. Moreover, alien indirect rulers tend to assimilate to their subjects' culture over
time (as did the Old Irish following the Cromwellian Settlement). Once indirect rule is
undermined, however, a potential for nationalism exists. The leading causes of the undermining
of indirect rule are the rise of direct rule, on the one hand, and the collapse of the center in a
multinational state, on the other.

DIRECT RULE AND STATE-BUILDING NATIONALISM

Direct rule consolidates power and monopolizes the right to rule in a single center at the expense
of alternative loci of authority. One of the fundamental determinants of national dependence is
direct rule. Direct rule is a variable that consists of two elements: scope and penetration (Hechter
2004). The scope of a state refers to the quantity and quality of the collective goods that it
provides. Welfare benefits, government jobs, police, state-sponsored schools and hospitals and a
functioning system of justice are examples of such goods. Socialist states have the highest scope;
laissez-faire ones have the lowest. Scope induces dependence: where state scope is high,
individuals depend primarily on the state for access to collective goods (see Hechter 2004 for a
discussion of the preconditions of direct rule).

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In contrast, penetration refers to the central state's control capacity - that is, the proportion of laws
and policies that are enacted and enforced by central as against regional or local decision-makers.
Penetration is at a maximum in police states in which central rulers seek to monitor and control
all subjects within their domain. Polities relying on local agents to exercise control (municipal
police forces, for example) have lower penetration. Scope and penetration often co-vary, but not
necessarily. For example, federal states with similar scope have less penetration than unitary
states.

Instituting direct rule poses a daunting challenge to central authorities because it can only be
attained by destroying the pre-existing social order. Not only do local elites have to be weaned
from their own pre-eminent social position, but the loyalty of culturally distinctive groups must
also be secured (Hechter 2000: 60; Marx 2004). To this end, direct-rule regimes in multicultural
polities must invest substantial resources to transform a diverse population into a culturally
homogeneous one. State-building nationalism extends the regime's scope and penetration via the
establishment of centralized taxation, banking, military, welfare and educational systems, among
other administrative innovations. The attempt to create a nation out of a multitude of local
cultural groups in post-Revolutionary France is the archetypical example of state-building
nationalism (Weber 1976). Overall, the direct-rule state assumes a historically unprecedented
intrusion into the daily lives of its subjects (Foucault 1991; Bourdieu 1994).

As the scope and penetration of the nationalizing state (Brubaker 1996) increases, subjects come
to focus their political demands on central as against local authorities. Historically, this led to the
development of legally circumscribed and institutionally enforced citizenship rights (Lipset 1963;
Marshall 1964; Bendix 1966; Tilly 1975). Moreover, those individuals and groups who have been
disadvantaged by direct rule will tend to resist it by creating peripheral nationalism (Hechter
2000).

DIRECT RULE AND PERIPHERAL NATIONALISM

Peripheral nationalism occurs when residents of a culturally distinctive territory resist

incorporation into a centralizing state by attempting to secede (as in Quebec, Scotland, Turkish
Kurdistan and Catalonia). It emerges when the institutions of direct rule fail to erase cultural
distinctions in a state. Local authorities instigate peripheral nationalist movements to preserve

126
their own privileged positions in the periphery. More puzzling is the motivation of the governed
to support nationalist movements that are instigated by local rulers.

A common by-product of direct rule is a cultural division of labor (Hechter 1978) which relegates
the members of cultural minorities to distinctive - often subordinate - positions in the
occupational structure. Because a group's position in the cultural division of labor affects the life
chances of its members, this kind of stratification system affords psychic and political salience to
cultural distinctions. If cultural minorities perceive that they are disfavored by the center's
provision of collective goods, they are at heightened risk of mobilization by nationalist
entrepreneurs (Hroch 1985). Such nationalist resistance will be greatest in territories where strong
patron-client ties and organized community relations allow local authorities to mobilize a
dependent populace (Hechter 2000: 67-71).

When groups having low rank in a hierarchical cultural division of labor are territorially
concentrated (as in Quebec or South-East Turkey), this provides optimal conditions for the
development of peripheral nationalism. Since both hierarchical and segmental cultural divisions
of labor favor the establishment and maintenance of separate social identities, they provide an
important social base for the development of nationalism if the relevant groups are territorially
concentrated. In contrast, peripheral nationalism is less likely to emerge in the absence of a
cultural division of labor, and in societies where culturally distinctive groups are not spatially
concentrated. Whereas stable cultural divisions of labor are responsible for the salience of cultural
distinctions in a society, rapidly shifting cultural divisions of labor - typically the outcome of
conquest or revolution - are often responsible for the outbreak of violent intergroup conflict
(Petersen 2002).

This theory has straightforward implications for the consequences of the disintegration of multi-
ethnic empires in Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Nationalism was conspicuously absent in multicultural pre-modern empires until their governing
structures transformed from the late eighteenth century onward (note, however, Gorski's [2000]
claim that Dutch nationalism arose in the sixteenth century). This points to the inadequacy of
primordialist theories of nationalism. To illustrate the theory in greater detail, the chapter
analyzes the disintegration of one of the most important of these pre-modern polities, the
Ottoman Empire, and identifies the factors responsible for its disintegration along ethnonational

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lines. It holds that the transition to direct rule - itself a response to the growing economic and
military decline of the Empire - paved the way for the emergence of state-building nationalism (in
Turkey) and peripheral nationalism (in the Balkans and Arab lands) in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Emerging first as a small principality in northwest Anatolia, the Ottoman Empire expanded into a
vast world empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It ruled over much of today's
Middle East, North Africa and the Balkan peninsula until its demise following World War I and
the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-22. The Ottomans devised a particular form of indirect rule to
maintain control over its extensive territories. Under the timar system, central authorities gave to
non-hereditary tax-collecting administrators the right to control and exploit the peripheral
territories in return for a steady flow of revenues to the center and the provision of troops during
military campaigns (Keyder 1987; Inalcik 1995). This gave the timar holders responsibility for
the maintenance of social order, collection of taxes and raising of soldiers in their respective
domains. So long as the center could control the timar holders, this system functioned efficiently
(Keyder 1987: 30).

If the timar system enabled the Ottomans to control distant territories, the millet system allowed
them to rule over an extremely multicultural population. Under this system, the state granted a
degree of self-determination to different confessional units, the millets. The heads of these quasi-
independent units (millet bashi) were primarily responsible for maintaining social order in their
own communities. The center did not intervene in the internal affairs of the millets: for example,
there was no uniform education system in the Empire, and the respective millets had the right to
operate their own religious schools. Similarly, each millet had its own unique legal structure; this
gave the Empire a legal pluralist structure that would be unthinkable in direct-rule states. As the
empire was Islamic, the Muslim millet- consisting of many different ethnic groups - held a
privileged position with respect to Christians and Jews. Until the nineteenth century, the millets
had no ethnic or national connotations; they were purely based on religious affiliation (Karpat
1982: 141-69). The millets only began to acquire ethnonational consciousness after direct rule
began to be implemented in the nineteenth century (Augustinos 1992; Rodrigue 1995).

128
Why did this two-tiered system of indirect rule collapse and spur nationalism among the
ethnically diverse millet communities? the growing economic and military power of direct-rule
Western European states served to limit the Ottomans' territorial and economic expansion (Karpat
1972; Keyder 1987; Barkey 1997). Since expansion provided the life-blood of the Empire, the
center's decreasing returns provided an opportunity for peripheral notables (the ayans, the
primary holders of tax farms) to assume much greater power than had been permitted under the
classical timar system (Karpat 1972; Haddad 1977; Keyder 1987; Pamuk 1987; Barkey 1997;
Khoury 1997; Toledano 1997; Aksan 1999).

Especially in the Balkan territories closest to the European markets, the same process also led to
the emergence of merchant groups, new urbanites and an educated middle class. In contrast to the
timar-holders, these new groups were far less dependent on the center, and far more dependent on
European markets. They all played leading roles in the rise of nationalism because the conditions
that had maintained the mutually beneficial coalition between local and central authorities were
eroding. Moreover, various European states gave open protection and support to these newly
enriched groups, further improving their relative position vis-à-vis the center (Keyder 1987: 33).
These local, regional and international dynamics led to the emergence of nationalist movements
in the Balkan territories (Karakasidou 1997).

As peripheral authorities began to challenge state authority, the Ottomans did not stand idly by.
To counter this threat in the westernmost provinces they instituted direct rule. This is principally
why nationalism first arose in the Balkans. Serbia was the first Balkan province to develop
nationalism. After enjoying considerable autonomy under a benevolent governor of Belgrade,
Serbia was besieged by Istanbul's crack troops, who killed the governor and many village chiefs.
Local notables fought back in the first Serbian insurrection in 1804 (MacKenzie 1996: 210).
What began as a series of revolts by local leaders against the janissaries soon acquired the larger
goal of national independence as local notables sought to secede from the Empire. Independence
was only attained after the defeat of the Ottomans in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78. Greece
was the second Balkan province to become nationalist. As in the Serbian case, the immediate
cause of the Greek war of independence (1821-27) was Sultan Mahmud II's attempt to institute
direct rule in the peripheral lands of the empire. After long years of fighting between the Ottoman
army and Greek insurgents, an independent Greek state was founded in 1832.

129
The Tanzimat reforms (1839-76) attempted to create a unified nation out of the ethnically and
religiously heterogeneous population. To this end, the state implemented legal and administrative
reforms to undermine the power of the millet communities and incorporate them into the new
Ottoman polity based on a unitary legal system (Berkes 1964: 90-9).

Direct rule had varying levels of success in different parts of the empire. Whereas the ayans in
most of the Anatolian peninsula and in the Balkan territories closest to Istanbul (such as Thrace)
were decisively defeated, the process unfolded in a different way elsewhere. Direct rule spurred a
second round of peripheral nationalism in the remaining Balkan provinces under central control.
Uprisings and anti-center revolts occurred in many provinces in the Rumelian territories,
including Bulgaria and Romania. These hostilities took on a religious-national form as Christian
subjects attacked Muslims, attempting to drive them out of their provinces. Rather than
dismantling the traditional millet system, the move towards Ottomanism via direct rule was
leading to the nationalization of the ethnically heterogeneous millet communities (Karpat 1972).
The decisive moment for the final failure of direct rule in the Balkans was the Russo-Ottoman
War (1877-78) and the ensuing Treaty of Berlin (1878) which gave independence to Bulgaria,
Serbia and Romania.

Direct rule was implemented last of all in the Arab lands. Local Arab notables retained much of
their political and economic power (Haddad 1977; Kayali 1997; Khoury 1997; Toledano 1997).
The Ottoman state had proved to be adept in its relations with these local power-holders
(Toledano 1997: 155-6); as a result, there was no whiff of nationalism in any of the Arab
territories until the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power in 1908.

In order to save the empire from total collapse, the CUP implemented policies that were directed
at creating a unified and secular state structure with universal norms of citizenship. Arabs were
removed from key provincial posts, and the Turkish language was imposed in government
schools, the judicial system and local administration. Naturally, these moves toward direct rule
met with strong resistance from local Arab notables. As the CUP switched to even more
authoritarian rule in the Arab provinces following territorial losses during the Balkan Wars and
World War I, Arab notables (most notably, Sharif Husayn of the Hijaz) decided to „pursue
opportunities other than those emanating from a close identification with Istanbul that would
enhance [their] personal power and prestige‟ (Kayali 1997: 172). Thus the emergence of
nationalism in the Ottoman Empire was a consequence of direct rule.

130
STATE-BUILDING NATIONALISM IN TURKEY AND THE EMERGENCE OF
KURDISH PERIPHERAL NATIONALISM

The Ottoman Empire devolved from an immense multicultural, multinational Empire stretching
from Europe to the Middle East into modern-day Turkey. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal,
the Young Turks and their successors undertook a vigorous course of state-building nationalism.
Non-Muslim minorities were considered enemies of the Turkish state: the Armenian population
was ethnically cleansed, and the Greeks were expelled.

By contrast, the non-Turkish Muslim population - comprised predominantly of Kurds - was

designated a legitimate part of the new Turkish nation. Turkey's leaders hoped that Kurdish
incorporation would eliminate the nationalist threat responsible for the demise of the Ottoman
Empire. To this end, they imposed direct rule in South-East Turkey (Poulton 1997). The Kurdish
language was banned; in the 1930s, for example, people who spoke Kurdish in public were fined
five kurus per word (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 19 fn18). Compulsory education was to be
conducted entirely in Turkish, and conscription required Kurdish men to spend at least 550 days
of their lives in an all-Turkish environment (Kocher 2002: 11). The center passed laws displacing
Kurds from their traditional territories to parts of the country where they were in the minority
(van Bruinessen 1990:45; McDowall 1997:199-201). In response to these measures, sporadic
Kurdish revolts broke out during the period from 1924 to 1937. Ankara responded to these by
continuing to exile large numbers of Kurds to Turkish cities (McDowall 1997: 194–202).

This increase in penetration was not matched by a corresponding extension of state scope,
however. Ankara never provided the collective goods required to wrest the Kurds' dependence
from local to central authorities. Most Kurds remained dependent on their tribes. Not
coincidentally, they spoke many different sub-dialects and adhered to a number of religions. For a
short period following the 1960 coup, Turkey's political structure opened. The government - the
National Unity Committee - enacted one of the most liberal constitutions in Turkey's history,
which allowed for freedom of expression, association and publication (McDowall 1997:405). For
the first time the Kurds were able to express their demands in Parliament.

During this period, Kurdish youth began to migrate in large numbers to cities in the west,
especially Istanbul and Ankara, in search of increased employment and educational opportunities
(Laizer 1996: 102). While economic development transformed Turkish cities in the 1960s and

131
1970s, living conditions in the Kurdish South-East were steadily declining (Barkey and Fuller
1998: 14). In addition, Kurdish peasants suffered at the hands of exploitive aghas, who
collaborated with the State to keep the Kurds in a subordinate position (McDowall 1992: 19). In
these western cities Kurdish migrants formed organizations based on regions of origin rather than
tribal affiliation. They came to connect their unfavorable position in the cultural division of labor
with their Kurdish origins (McDowall 1997: 423). The PKK was formed in 1977 with the intent
of releasing the urban and rural Kurdish proletariat from the fetters of the exploitive aghas,
merchants and the ruling establishment (McDowall 1997: 423).

The PKK's mobilization activities were confined to Kurdish migrants in the cities throughout the
West. Since they lacked the support of the Kurdish peasants, their uprisings in the late 1970s and
early 1980s were easily defeated (Imset 1987-88:26). Nonetheless, this cycle of violence
provoked the state to expand its penetration. Approximately 300,000 soldiers and 95,000 „village
guards‟ - Kurds and Turkish paramilitaries who are financed and armed by the state (cited in
Bozarslan 2000: 47) - were sent to the Kurdish lands. This provoked a reactive mobilization. By
the early 1990s the PKK was engaged in a guerilla war, now with the participation of a large
number of Kurdish peasants.

Violence increased apace with the solidarity of the PKK. Human rights violations were
committed by soldiers, „village guards‟, the Islamist group Hizbullah and intelligence services
(Laber 1988; Randal 1999: 259; and Bozarslan 2000). PKK fighters killed entire families
believed to be serving the state (Gunter 1990: 75; White 2000: 145). By 1990, a super-governor
in Diyarbakir was empowered to ban publications and seize Kurdish printing presses, displace
civil servants, evacuate villages and deport Kurds at will (Randal 1999: 256). By the end of 1994,
the fighting and insecurity had emptied more than 2600 hamlets and villages, sending an
estimated two million rural Kurds into cities (Randal 1999: 257).

Sheltered in the mountains, the PKK erected a parallel government providing education and food
(Ignatieff 1993). The organization compels Kurdish families to pay a monetary fee if their sons
fail to report for military service (cited in Kocher 2002: 12). The PKK also provides its members
with cultural symbols (i.e. history, language, myths and notions of sacredness) as a means to
unify Kurds and challenge the state's legitimacy.

132
The PKK offered private goods, which increased the Kurds' dependence on the PKK, and
invested in monitoring and sanctioning to promote its solidarity (Imset 1996: 30). The PKK does
not tolerate criticism of party policies and has severely punished dissenters (Gunter 1990: 75;
Imset 1992: 83; White 2000: 145). Torture seems to have been widely applied against members
accused of betrayal (Bozarslan 2000: 52).

Despite this extension of direct rule, however, there was little evidence of Kurdish nationalism in
the South-East until the late 1970s. What accounts for this half-century delay? The answer is that
Kurds were internally divided. Prior to the twentieth century, few among them regarded the
Kurds as a distinct cultural group with common interests (Mardin 1989; van Bruinessen 1992).
Individual Kurds were dependent on their tribes, villages, millets, or shaykhs for access to
collective goods. Because the Ottomans divided their subjects according to religion, Kurds were
among the privileged subjects of the Sultan. Sunni Kurds could and did pursue political careers
without shedding their Kurdish identity. Although some Kurdish voluntary associations were
established during the Ottoman period, they did not promote Kurdish nationalism (van
Bruinessen 1992). Tribal and religious leaders looked upon nationalists with suspicion and
hostility. These social divisions continue to hamper the PKK's mobilization efforts at the present
time.

CONCLUSION

Nationalism is a complex modern phenomenon that has assumed a variety of forms - from benign
to malevolent - across geographic space and time. Since nations are solidary groups whose
members perceive that they share a distinctive culture and history, processes of group formation
and solidarity are key to explaining variations in the timing, strength and forms of nationalism.
This chapter argues that these processes, in turn, are decisively affected by the rise of direct rule,
which replaces dependence on local notables with that on central authorities. By enacting
culturally exclusive policies, central authorities in direct-rule states provide an impetus for nation-
formation and nationalist collective action.

Although two centuries have passed since the first pillars of the Ottoman Empire began to
crumble, its legacy lives on. Perhaps the signal achievement of the long-lived multi-ethnic
empires lies in their success in maintaining an often precarious equilibrium between central and
local power. Despite the massive social changes of the last three centuries, contemporary policy-

133
makers continue to turn to federalism and other forms of indirect rule to reduce the stakes for
nationalist conflict. Today Nigeria, Belgium, Bosnia and Iraq, among other states, are home to
on-going experiments in constitutional engineering. Yet as the emperors of yesteryear were so
keenly aware, finding the optimal balance between local and central power is no easy task.

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Moore, Margaret. "Nationalism and Political Philosophy." Pp. 94-103

Prior to 1989, political philosophy largely ignored issues connected with nationalism. Liberals
and socialists were primarily interested in issues connected to the production and distribution of
economic goods. Socialists argued against the private ownership of the economic resources of
society, while liberals accepted private ownership principally as a means to the creation of wealth,
which, they argued, could then be subject to some redistribution by the state. Liberals argued that
it was possible to justify certain kinds of inequalities, either on the basis of desert, or as a
necessary component to the efficient organization of society. Those of a more egalitarian bent, by
contrast, argued that inequalities of income and wealth, and the class divisions to which they gave
rise, were unjustifiable. In spite of these differences, both types of theories agreed that the
fundamental hierarchy was class, and the fundamental questions of social justice revolved around
the appropriate modes of producing and distributing goods.

Since 1989, there has been a different type of challenge to the contemporary unequal order,
variously called „the politics of difference‟, „the politics of identity‟, „the politics of recognition‟
or multiculturalism. Theorists classified under this rubric challenge the status hierarchies of
contemporary Western societies - hierarchies of sexual orientation, race, gender, national or
ethnic identity. They tend to question the ways in which contemporary liberal-democratic
societies privilege one group over another, the ways in which one group's experiences are deemed
„normal‟, and therefore as the benchmark according to which state expectations, practices and
policies are measured.

The philosophical treatment of national identity and nationalism is closely related to this general
critique of status hierarchies. At one level, of course, the increased discussion and debate in
political philosophy after 1989 can be directly related to the collapse of communism, and the
emergence of secessionist struggles and explicit national consciousness throughout the former
communist bloc. On this view, philosophical debate about nationalism was a response to
developments in the political arena. However, in addition, the arguments that minority
nationalists deployed against the state were on all fours with other theories in the multicultural
camp, and can be viewed as part of a general concern with the distribution of non-economic
goods in society. Minority nationalists' main argument against the contemporary state focused on
the fact that they were disadvantaged and marginalized by the (state's) nation-building policies,

138
which tend to privilege the majority national community on the territory. In this respect, they
pose a challenge to the status hierarchy of their societies, and in particular to the way in which the
state is infected by the norms and culture of the privileged (usually, majority) national community
on the territory.

Theorists interested in „identity politics‟ or the „politics of recognition‟ are struggling for equality
or equal treatment, but this is mainly pursued not through the acquisition of economic resources,
but by challenging the assumptions, practices and rules in societies that tend to reinforce these
hierarchies. Despite the temptation either to prioritize or reduce class hierarchies to status
hierarchies, or vice versa, it is now generally accepted that the two types of hierarchies operate
along different dimensions, and not only do not overlap fully but sometimes cut across one
another, or even possibly undermine each other. Although women as a whole, for example, do
worse than men as a whole, some women do much better than some men; yet a woman may still
face some discrimination or disadvantage that her similarly situated male counterparts do not. In
some cases, such as that of homosexual men, the group as a whole may be better off in economic
terms than heterosexual men as a group, but are worse off in the sense that the rules and practices
of the society rest on the assumption of heterosexuality Homosexual people are still subject to
general disapprobation and discrimination in society, and are legally barred from marrying,
adopting and other practices open to their heterosexual counterparts in most jurisdictions.

Political philosophers dealing with national identity have mainly focused on the questions of what,
morally, one should think of national identities and claims to institutional recognition of this
identity, either in the form of exemptions to state-wide rules and practices, or a right to secede
from the state. This chapter will disaggregate the question of the value of the identity from the
questions about the appropriate forms that institutional recognition of the identity might take.

The question of what one should think about national identities raises the question of the
normative status of identity in general, and national identity in particular. Those who think that
there is little value in nations or national identities tend to make the point that merely having an
identity of a particular type does not constitute a moral argument for institutionalizing it in the
state, and they therefore respond negatively to the issue of institutional recognition.

Those who argue for the institutional recognition of national identity, by contrast, tend to make
the point that national identity is not withering away under the glare of globalizing capitalism, but

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it is a force to be reckoned with. From this empirical claim, they then tend to raise concerns about
the extent to which state policies and practices marginalize or disadvantage members of a
minority nation. This can take two forms: the first is for fair treatment by the state, or fair
inclusion in the state, and raises concerns about the legitimate limits of the state's nation-building
on behalf of the (majority) national community. The second is the claim that nations have a right
to self-determination or right to secession. This is frequently raised also in the context of fairness,
with the point that the current, over-holding state is identified with a particular national group,
and the only fair remedy for the disadvantage that national minorities experience is to have a state
of their own. Unfairness is usually associated with the particular policies and practices of the state,
but sometimes it is also claimed that, under the current arrangements, some groups are permitted
to be collectively self-determining while other, structurally similar groups are not.

To some extent, then, these two aspirations to institutional recognition are tied to the two projects
that characterize nationalist mobilizations. Nationalists typically have both a nation-building
project, by which I mean policies aimed at facilitating the creation of a common national identity,
and a national self-determination project, by which I mean a political project aimed at securing
increased political autonomy or independent statehood for national minorities. Minority
nationalists (members of nations without states) tend to seek increased political autonomy (the
second project) and majority nationalists (nations with states) tend to be more concerned with
how the political authority should exercise its powers and authority (the first project). The two
projects are, to some extent, complementary in so far as political autonomy is necessary to the
implementation of a nation-building project. They are also, of course, potentially conflicting, as
when the majority nation seeks to extend its nation-building agenda to a minority national group
within its borders.

This chapter will discuss the three main debates in political philosophy generated by this new
attention to nationalism. The first section deals with the philosophical debate about the value of
national identities. The second section deals with legitimate forms of nation-building. Here the
central question is whether, and how, the state can create a unified body politic without
demeaning or discriminating against certain people within the community - people from a
different ethnic or religious community, for example. The third section deals with the aspirations
for collective self-determination that are felt by territorially concentrated minority national
communities who are encapsulated within a state territory, those nations who do not have states.
There has recently been a great deal of work on the ethics of secession, which primarily concerns

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the conditions under which a national group can justifiably secede to form its own state, although
of course self-determination can occur within a state context.

IS NATIONAL IDENTITY AN ACCEPTABLE FORM OF IDENTITY?

One recent debate in the philosophical literature on nationalism centres on the question of
whether any value should attach to nations, or to the sentiment that people sometimes feel that
nations, or their nation, are an important source of value. in the immediate post-war period,
nationalism was inextricably linked with the aggressive expansionism and racism of Nazi
Germany. Nationalism was regarded almost universally in negative terms, which progressive
people should eschew, where possible, in favour of more universalist, cosmopolitan sentiments.
In cases where cosmopolitanism was not an option, the idea was that nationalism was bad, but
that patriotism, or fidelity to constitutional principles, was acceptable.

Since that time, and especially following the demise of communism, the kind of nationalism that
has been defended has been principally minority nationalism, which is justified in defending itself
against the homogenizing expansionism of American capitalism and statist coercion. The „nation‟
is not conceived in racist or strictly ethnic terms by its defenders; rather, it is defined in relatively
neutral terms as „a community (1) constituted by shared beliefs and mutual commitments, (2)
extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked
off from other communities by its distinct public culture‟ (Miller 1995: 27).

Two recent lines of argument have been developed that suggest that value attaches to national
communities. Interestingly, neither argument suggests that the value is inherent nor indeed that
the sentiment ought to be cultivated in the virtuous person. The question is not the existential
question of what constitutes a valuable way of life, or whether nationalism is a sentiment that one
ought to cultivate as a component of „the good life‟. Rather, the attachment that many people feel
to their particular nation is viewed as an empirical „given‟ and the question is how that attachment
and that sense of value should be viewed by others.

Drawing on the central ideas of the liberal-communitarian debate, Miller has argued that the
nation is a political instantiation of the idea of the community, which unites individuals by a
common identity and conception of value. Like more conventional communitarians, Miller
emphasizes liberalism's reliance on communitarian ideas of territory and membership.

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Specifically, he argues that liberal theories of (redistributive) justice, as a matter of empirical fact,
will need the social cement of nationality, so that people are prepared to contribute to their
society and have the requisite trust to engage in redistributive practices. In some respects, his
argument here echoes J. S. Mill's argument in Considerations on Representative Government that
democracy can only flourish where there is a shared national identity. According to Mill, „Among
a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united
public opinion necessary to the workings of government, cannot exist‟ (Mill 1993 [1861]: 394).
Although Miller discusses the „good‟ of democratic governance, his main emphasis is on social
justice and the role that shared national identity (in Mill's terms, „fellow-feeling‟) plays in
facilitating it.

Miller's mainly instrumental argument has been criticized on the grounds that its view of human
motivation is too unidimensional. Liberal commitments can be defended in terms of reasoned
commitment to social justice, and do not require an emotional commitment to a particular
national community. Critics have pointed out that many people are prepared to redistribute as
citizens of the world (Jones 1999). An opposite line of criticism accepts Miller's empirical claim
that, in fact, human motivation is limited, but argues that liberal justice should be understood as a
corrective to limited altruism or suspect motivations, not grounded in it (Weinstock 1996: 87-
100). in fact, however, Miller's mainly instrumental argument extends the familiar liberal idea of
the „burdens of commitment‟, by which is meant the idea that liberal justice shouldn't be so
burdensome that it would presuppose altruistic or angelic motivations. Miller would deny that this
idea is undermined by empirical examples of deviation; indeed, he would probably admit that
there are both cosmopolitan universalists and people who hate their own national community. The
question he poses is whether liberal redistributive practices are supported or undermined by these
relations of trust and identity. The empirical evidence supporting Miller's claim that shared ties of
national identity facilitate social justice is unclear, at best. If we think broadly and comparatively
about societies that have strongly felt national identities and try to correlate this with levels of
redistribution, it is not at all clear that there is any evidence for this proposition, or, at least, that it
is certainly not apparent that any relationship between the two is straightforward. On the other
hand, Miller's argument has a certain ring of plausibility and may be defensible in a weakened
form. For example, there is some evidence that, when there is no shared identity, as in the case of
British sentiments towards Northern Irishmen from the late 1960s, there will be a general desire
to dissociate from the territory, in legal, juridical, territorial and public policy terms (Moore 2001:
82-4). This suggests that the instrumental nationalist argument cannot be dismissed, that, where

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there is a persistent feeling of non-shared identity and substantial one-way redistribution - that is,
the relationship cannot be argued for in reciprocal terms, as mutually beneficial - the long-term
continuation of a redistributive practice may be in jeopardy, for the political will is not there to
discharge these obligations in the long term.

A second line of argument deployed by minority nationalists, in defence of national communities,

involves linking national identity with both personal autonomy and cultural communities. This is
the most common argument deployed by liberal nationalists to reconcile liberalism with (non-
aggressive) nationalism. This argument works by stressing the close relation of liberalism with
the idea of personal autonomy and then examining the conditions under which individuals can be
said to be autonomous. A central move in this argument is the claim that culture provides the
context from which individuals' choices about how to live one's life can be made. According to
Kymlicka (1995: 8), „individual choice is dependent on the presence of a societal culture, defined
by language and history.‟ Miller (1995: 85-6) follows the same line: A common culture … gives
its bearers … a background against which meaningful choices can be made.' Culture provides the
options from which the individual chooses, and infuses them with meaning, so that self-forming
autonomous beings have some conception of value with which to guide their choices.

The next step in the argument is that claim that, since a rich and flourishing culture is an essential
condition of the exercise of autonomy, liberals have good reason to adopt measures that would
protect culture. At this point, the argument has only shown that the existence of a (or some)
flourishing cultural structure is necessary to the exercise of autonomy, but not a particular culture.
However, liberal nationalists also make the empirical point that „most people have a very strong
bond to their own culture‟ (Kymlicka 1995: 8). This supports liberal nationalists in their
conclusion that different national (or societal) cultures should be supported as a context in which
personal autonomy is exercised, and this might involve some protections for culture within the
state context, or secession from the state to ensure that the group has the jurisdictional authority
to protect its own culture.

This second argument does not use the language of identity, but it does deploy the idea that
people generally, as an empirical fact, identify with their own culture. Sometimes that is
combined with the idea that there are serious costs involved in leaving one's own culture and
adopting another, which many people might be prepared to bear (immigrants, for example) but
which it might be unfair to force people to bear. It is interesting, though, that there is some

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ambiguity concerning the empirical claim that there are costs attached to changing cultures. It is
unclear whether the costs in question are of the more material sort, the kind involved in learning a
language, adopting a new cultural repertoire, and so on, or are related to the difficulties involved
in changing identities. The idea here is that many identities are formed relation-ally, so that part
of what it is to have a Scottish identity, say, is to have a non-English identity, or to have a
Canadian identity is to be not American. This means that, as an empirical fact, it is difficult to
move from one identity to another, as if one were changing hats. It would not be devastatingly
dislocating, in a cultural sense, to leave Canada to live in the United States, or to leave Scotland
to live in England, and would not involve the traditional costs involved in learning a new
language or new symbolic repertoires. But it may be profoundly difficult for the Scot to think of
herself as an Englishwoman, or the Canadian to think of himself as an American. Indeed, the very
idea of having an identity of a certain kind suggests that it is conceptually not easy to change
one's identity, and some identities are simply not amenable to being nested in the appropriate way.
Interestingly, throughout this argument, there is considerable ambiguity over whether the work is
being done by „culture‟, or cultural difference; or by the fact that people have an identity of one
sort or another.

Neither the Miller-type instrumental argument nor the cultural-autonomy argument for valuing
national identities confers inherent value on those identities. In both cases, they are conceived as
valuable either in terms of the support for the goods that the state can produce (like redistributive
justice) or as an important component of the autonomous life. Both arguments proceed fairly
abstractly, and the first argument would seem to support only those national identities that
facilitate just states, and deny any worth to those identities that facilitate vicious or aggressive
states. Similarly, in the second argument, the link between autonomy and culture is obviously a
contingent one, and one can imagine that in some cases the culture is so autonomy-undermining
that autonomy liberals could not give it any protection.

IS NATION-BUILDING LEGITIMATE?

Another important recent debate in the philosophical literature on nationalism concerns the type
of nation-building policies that the state is justified in pursuing. In the nineteenth-century nation-
building typically involved the use of repressive state power to eradicate cultural, ethnic and
religious identities. Today, there is almost unanimous assent that policies of coercive assimilation
are unacceptable, and increasing recognition that the creation of a unified national community

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will not occur „naturally‟ (without the state making any decisions bearing on these issues), simply
as a corollary of modernization. Indeed, the burgeoning of identity groups is testimony to the
increased mobilization and politicization of a number of minority cultural and other
disadvantaged groups within the state. Yet, the state typically seeks to create some kind of shared
identity within its territory; and, if the argument above is correct - that this facilitates either liberal
justice or the exercise of personal autonomy - may well be justified in doing so. National groups
that have some institutional instantiation either in the state or in a self-governing unit (e.g. a
province) within the state also typically aspire to using the state apparatus to express the cultural
life of their particular national community. Part of the philosophical debate on nationalism is
centred on the question of the extent to which this is legitimate.

The legitimacy of nation-building is raised by two different types of groups within the state.
Following the basic distinction between two types of diversity, developed by Will Kymlicka in
his book Multicultural Citizenship (1995), these can be classified as (1) multiculturalism and (2)
multinationalism. A society is multicultural (in a sociological sense) when it is comprised of
various - ethnic, gender, religious, sexual orientation, racial - identity groups. A society is
multinational when the state is comprised of different national communities, that is, historical
communities on what they perceive to be their ancestral territory, who aspire to be collectively
self-governing. Obviously, many societies contain both kinds of diversity, but the distinction is
still relevant, since, according to Kymlicka, the two types of groups aspire to different kinds of
rights. In much of the literature, this distinction is collapsed into a distinction between immigrant
and non-immigrant societies. Immigrant societies are characterized by the first kind of diversity
(although obviously women and sexual orientation groups are not the product of immigration).
Non-immigrant societies are typically characterized by nationally mobilized communities,
ensconced on their own territory, with the demographic basis for self-government, but who are
encapsulated within a larger state that is comprised of at least one other national community.

There is often a tension between the nation-building policies that the state employs to create a
single unified national community, on the one hand, and multicultural groups, on the other, who
claim that those policies have the effect of disadvantaging or marginalizing them.

This problem is particularly acute when the majority national group in the state is strongly
identified with a particular „thick‟ culture or religion, and seeks to create unity by extending that
cultural expression across the territory. in general, there is no argument for privileging national

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identity groups over other kinds of identity groups. After all, nationalists (majority and minority
varieties) no longer argue that the nation is natural or organic or primordial; their claims are
framed in the language of identity, and in the case of minority nationalists, in terms of the
unfairness of the policies and practices of the state. This is structurally similar to the claims of
other minority groups - gay people, minority religious, ethnic and linguistic communities, as well
as women - who have legitimate concerns about how the exercise of political power will affect
(disadvantage or marginalize) them. It would be contradictory (unprincipled) to appeal to the
norm of fairness in advancing one's own case (or that of one's national group) but reject the very
same appeal when it is advanced by some other group. At the very least, there would have to be a
good argument for doing so.

On the other hand, one of the main criticisms of multiculturalism and indeed identity politics of
all kinds has emphasized that such policies are divisive and reify difference. According to Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr, in his book The Disuniting of America (1992: 102): „The cult of ethnicity
exaggerates differences, intensifies resentments and antagonisms, drives ever deeper the awful
wedges between races and nationalities. The endgame is self-pity and self-ghettoization.‟ Brian
Barry (2001) argues, from an egalitarian perspective, that equality of results (which is
presupposed in the claim to rectify the kinds of marginalization associated with the uniform
application of rules) is not attainable. The best we can hope for in our diverse and complex
society is equal rights, equality under the law and redistributive justice. Multiculturalism
threatens all these, first by arguing for exemptions from the only kind of equality that is attainable,
namely, political/ juridical equality; and, second, by distracting us from the real problem, which is
poverty or economic disadvantage.

This line of criticism is greatly exaggerated, but there may be some truth to the claim that the
normative limits to cultural (or multicultural) recognition are reached when the policies have the
effect of undermining the society's political framework. There is obviously room for
disagreement on whether a particular form of„recognition‟ simply rectifies an unfair disadvantage
or whether it potentially undermines a system of universal results, but it is probably true that there
are limits to cultural recognition, dictated by the imperatives of a modern state, capable of being
governed justly and democratically.

There is no evidence of disagreement on this by either multiculturalists or their critics - for

example, Iris Young (1993), one of the most prominent exponents of the politics of recognition,

146
seems to presuppose the existence of a common arena in which differences and commonalities
can be recognized and discussed. Nevertheless, she does not address the tension between the two
in specific cases. For example, it is undoubtedly the case that speakers of minority languages
encounter certain kinds of disadvantage. Yet, at the same time, it is not possible to have a modern
state and give equal recognition to every language spoken in the community. Public education,
public debate and commercial activity have to be in one or two or three languages - possibly, the
upper limit is higher than this - but it is certainly lower than the number of languages typically
spoken in a diverse political community. The modern bureaucratic and democratic state, with
mass literacy and increasingly standardized modes of interaction, requires for its smooth
functioning a limited number of common languages in which different people are able to discuss
their differences and commonalities. Significantly, most forms of multiculturalism may talk the
language of equal recognition but do not actually propose policies that embrace absolutely equal
treatment. Iris Young (1993: 175-81) proposes bilingual education for Hispanics, which, in
Patten's (2000) terminology, is a form of norm-and-exemption approach. It assumes some
accommodation for non-majority language speakers in dealing with the state (some educational
accommodation, translation services or bilingual agents in dealing with public agencies and so on)
but also assumes that this will occur in the context of a public culture operated in a common
majority language.

The normative goal suggested by the accommodation of these dual concerns - non-oppression of
minority groups on the one hand and the viability of a just and democratic political society on the
other - suggests the need for a thin, political identity. It suggests forms of political
accommodation where it will be possible to think of oneself as both Italian and American,
Muslim and British, Jewish and Australian. It suggests forms of accommodation that will enable
people to develop various forms of nested identities, and repudiate policies and practices that set
these identities in unnecessary opposition.

The problem with respect to national groups is somewhat different, since what is at issue is not
simply the particular laws or policies of the state, but the very jurisdictional authority of the state
itself. This arises because minority national groups typically aspire to be collectively self-
determining and question the jurisdictional authority of states in which they are encapsulated,
whose borders and structure prevent them from being collectively self-governing. In these cases,
the only way to be fair to national identities - as distinct from other types of identities that are
typically considered under the rubric of „multiculturalism‟ - is through creating the institutional or

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political space in which members of the nation can be collectively self-governing. In cases where
the state is dominated by a majority national group, and political autonomy for the minority
national group is both possible (demographically) and desired by the group itself, fair treatment
would seem to require political recognition of this aspiration to be collectively self-governing.
This does not necessarily mean secession but it does mean the transformation of the state into a
genuinely multinational state, a state not associated with a particular national group, but one in
which the thin political identity can encompass the different national communities on the territory.
The goal here is to ensure that it is possible to be both aboriginal and Australian, Quebecois and
Canadian, Scottish and British, Catalan and Spanish, Kashmiri and Indian, Kurdish and Iraqi. All
of this suggests that justifiable nation-building policies are considerably more limited in scope,
and more deferential to the identities and commitments and culture of the members, than was ever
the case in the past. It is no longer possible to create unity in the same way as nineteenth-century
nationalists did; indeed, the only justifiable method of creating a unified political community is
by being inclusive of the legitimate diversity of the society.

IS A NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION PROJECT JUSTIFIED?

The third area of debate among political philosophers concerns the justifiability of secession. This
debate is relevant to nationalism, since collective self-determination is an important - indeed,
some argue, central - goal of nationalist movements. Political philosophers interested in the ethics
of secession have largely ignored nationalist aspirations, identities and feelings, but focus on the
legitimacy of the state, and the conditions under which it would be justifiable for a group to
secede (Buchanan 1991).

The two main lines of argument are developed from liberal justice theory and liberal democratic
theories of legitimacy. These are widely referred to in the literature as just-cause theories of
secession and choice theories of secession. On the first line of argument, the question is whether
the state is a just one, and the answer to that question requires an assessment of past state
behaviour. Has the state engaged in egregious violations of human rights, systematic suppression,
ethnic cleansing or genocide of a particular population group? The answers to these questions are
relevant to the question of the legitimacy of the state, for if the state has engaged in practices of
this kind, it has no right to government, no entitlement to have its territorial integrity protected.

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This line of argument is developed directly from liberal theory, and particularly from liberal
accounts of state legitimacy. One problem with this line of argument is the widespread difficulty
in distinguishing between the legitimacy of the state and the legitimacy of the government
(Buchanan 1999,2003; Naticchia 1999). Even in cases where there is a proven record of human
rights abuses perpetrated by the government or its agents, it is not clear that the correct remedy is
secession rather than a change of government, and especially the installation of a legitimate,
human rights-protecting government. To make the case for secession as an appropriate remedy, it
would seem to require that the state is illegitimate; that the state (and not just the government) is
thoroughly infected in its structures and overall design with discriminatory and unjust practices.
This is a high bar to set, and seems to presuppose a static view of the role of governments in
effecting change, and reforming the state itself.

This problem also makes it evident that the liberal case for legitimacy does not map completely
on to nationalist disaffection for the state in which the group is encapsulated. Once a group has
become mobilized in favour of collective self-determination, it is doubtful that its members will
be satisfied with reforms to ensure that the state is respectful of human rights and non-
discriminatory This is so even if the impetus behind the initial nationalist mobilization was the
exclusion and marginalization of the group from the state. Yet, this line of argument is able only
to deal with the justice or injustice of the current state and/or government.

Another line of argument, which, to some extent, deals with this problem, focuses on the
democratic legitimacy of the state. This is derived from standard liberal consent theory, but it is
modified to suggest that consent is not actually required. Nevertheless, if there is evidence of
widespread rebellion and/or lack of consent in the state by a minority population, the legitimacy
of the state in governing over these people is brought into question. In both Harry Beran's (1984)
and Daniel Philpott's (1995) formulations of this basic position, the device of a referendum is
proposed to ascertain the preferences of the people living there.

The appeal to consent cannot be directly derived from individual consent, since that would render
the state illegitimate unless it gained unanimous consent (which would make all states in the
world today illegitimate). If the consent is that of the community, the question is raised: which
community?, and relatedly, over which territory?

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One problem with this account is that it is not clear how to draw the border within which majority
consent is necessary. If the state as a whole is the domain in which (majority) consent is needed,
then this fails to fully consider the feelings of the minority population, or to address the problem
of minority nationalist disaffection. If only the latter is necessary, this raises the question - which
theorists in this camp do not adequately address - of why the national group should have a
corporate character of that kind. The problem here arises because appealing to liberal-democratic
theory does not map perfectly on to nationalist mobilization and sentiment, which is the impetus
behind all secessionist movements. This line of argument tries to justify a right to secede under
certain conditions, but does not explain or justify it in nationalist terms. This is understandable, in
light of the discussion in the first part of this chapter concerning the morally suspect character of
nationalism, but it creates a curious gap between the political philosophy of secession and the
dynamics of actual secessionist movements.

Both just-cause and choice theories, of course, are normative theories and have an
implementation problem in the sense that in large swathes of the world - most of Africa, Asia and
the Americas - state elites are very unlikely to agree to anything that might lead to the
„dismemberment‟ of the state. Indeed, most successful secessions are the result of the implosion
of the central government - for example, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia - rather than
the voluntary relinquishment of parts of the territory, and groups of people, who have proved
indigestible to the modern state. This is not a serious criticism of these theories, for it would be
unfair to criticize a justice theory on the grounds that many people continue to be unjust, or a
democratic theory for the fact that dictators are not likely to implement it. In some cases,
proponents of these theories have argued that these normative principles should be included in a
domestic constitution, to manage the otherwise often violent process of „divorce‟ (Norman 1998;
Weinstock 2001) or in international law, where principles and institutions could be designed to
bring these processes under the rule of law (Moore 2001; Buchanan 2003). Others argue that, in
the absence of institutional rules, it is still necessary to develop normative principles to help guide
us in particular cases about whether or not secession is justifiable (Miller 1998).

CONCLUSION

The three areas of debate in political philosophy - concerning the value of national identities, the
legitimacy of state nation-building and state break-up (or national self-determination) - fail to

150
take issue with the postmodernist critique of identities as fluid and relational. All are potentially
vulnerable to the critique that they „essentialize‟ nations and national identities.

Most proponents of these arguments concede that nations are socially constructed and that it is
important to be aware of the political mobilization (or construction) of political identities in
designing public policies and institutional arrangements. However, they also argue - contra the
postmodernist critique - that the mere fact of being socially constructed does not mean that they
are easily deconstructed. Walker Connor, writing in the late twentieth century, has argued that
nationalism has become such a powerful source of identity that he can think of no case in the
twentieth century where territorially concentrated national minorities, on their own territory, have
voluntarily assimilated. Indeed, he claims that assimilationist measures directed at national
minorities tend to backfire, and almost always lead to increased consolidation of the minority
identity (Connor 1994: 51-5). There are many examples of groups - Crimean Tatars, Kurds - that
have struggled to resist assimilation, often at great cost to themselves (McGarry 1998: 613-38).
The empirical evidence suggests that once a group has become successfully mobilized - by which
is meant that the population has generally accepted the description of itself as a separate political
community - modernization policies, state nation-building and coercive assimilation are unlikely
to work. This is why the three issues above, considered only very recently by political
philosophers, are of pressing importance.

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Philpott, D. In Defence of Self-determination Ethics vol. 105 no. 2 (1995) p. 352–85

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New York: W.W. Norton

Weinstock, D. Is there a Moral case for Nationalism? Journal of Applied Philosophy vol. 13 no.
1 (1996) p. 87–100

Weinstock, D. Constitutionalizing the Right to Secede Journal of Political Philosophy vol. 9 no. 2
(2001) p. 182–203

Young, I. (1993) Justice and the Politics of Difference . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

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Wodak, Ruth. "Discourse-analytic and Socio-linguistic Approaches to the Study of
Nation(alism)." Pp. 104-117

Vaclav Havel, Czech president, famous poet and hero of the Prague Spring of May 1968, gave a
widely acknowledged speech in Germany, on 24 April 1997, in the Deutscher Bundestag, the
German National Assembly. This marked a new phase in European integration. Havel started his
speech, after some introductory greetings, in the following way:

After some initial agonizing I decided not to think about what is expected of me, to set aside all
lists of politically appropriate remarks, and not to experience this responsibility as a trauma but
to make the most of this opportunity to concentrate on a single theme, one which to my mind is
exceptionally significant and topical. This theme is nothing more nor less than our perception of
one's homeland. I have made this choice for two reasons: the first is that the Czech Republic and
the Federal Republic of Germany have one important thing in common. In their present form they
are very young states that in many ways are still looking for their identity and are consequently
redefining what makes them the homeland of their citizens. And yet, paradoxically enough, both
our countries have a long tradition of investigating the nature of their national identity and of
cultivating or criticizing different forms of their patriotism. The second reason is the ongoing,
unprecedented process of European integration, which compels not only you and us but all
Europeans to reflect again on what, in this new age, their homeland means or will mean to them,
how their patriotism will co-exist with the phenomenon of a united Europe and, principally, with
the phenomenon of Europeanism. To what extent is it still true that our native land means simply
the nation-state in the classic sense of the term and patriotism merely love for our nation?
(Protokolle des Deutschen Bundestages 1997)

In this speech, taken as a first example for the discursive construction of national identities
through persuasive rhetoric in a political speech, Havel alludes to the past, present and future of
the two countries and of Europe. The tensions between the traditional nation-state and new
supranational entities, like the EU, are mentioned as relevant for such a construction. At the same
time, Havel also characterizes the most important components of identity construction: the
function of being the same or being different than others (see Ricoeur 1992; Benhabib 1996).
Thirdly, the past is talked about, a most difficult past for the joint history of these two countries
and the respective past of both states, implicating the Nazi past, the communist past and the
1
attempt of both states to face and confront these memories. Fourthly, Havel discusses the

154
tensions between „homeland‟ and „global entities‟ which we find manifested in many political
texts through „globalization rhetoric‟ on the one hand, „homeland rhetoric‟ on the other hand (see
Stråth 2000; Weiss and Wodak 2000). All these topoi which Havel refers to are important in the
attempt to construct a new „European identity‟, along the frontiers of a New Europe. In the
attempt to create this New Europe, new borders have been drawn, mainly on an economic level,
with other European countries, and we hear the slogan of „fortress Europe‟ over and over again.

Havel's thoughts recur throughout the EU countries and also scholarly disciplines. Thus, starting
off with Benedict Anderson's (1988) notion of the „imagined community‟ through to Stuart Hall's
concept of „narratives of identity‟ (see Hall 1996a, b), the study of a „New Europe‟ has become
mainstream research for many and politically relevant for others. Remi Brague (1992, 1993)
distinguishes between several dichotomies that characterize Europe; a Europe, which, as he writes,
carries a „face full of scars‟: dichotomies that are geographical (East-West, North-South),
religious (Catholicism and reformism) and finally dichotomies that belong to the past (the roles of
the Third Reich and the Allied Forces), and so forth. As Brague summarizes, „to retain the
memory of such ruptures can avoid confusion‟ (1992: 16). Such dichotomies manifest themselves
in all discourses on European identities; simultaneously, these dichotomies are also reproduced
through discourse, in manifold ways, depending on the specific genre (press releases, printed
media, visual media, speeches, policy documents, parliamentary debates, interviews and so forth)
(see Muntigl et al. 2000).

The quote from Havel's speech indicates the „power of language‟ in constructing (national)
identities by defining in- and out-groups. The discursive construction of social groups has to be
viewed as the fundamental process or macro-strategy to create sameness and difference (between
Us and Them) and thus precedes all other textual/visual devices to produce or reproduce national
identities. Hence, the explicit analysis of positive self-presentation and negative other-
presentation (see below) constitutes the first methodological step when investigating discourses
of national identities. 2 However, not only political elites are involved in this discursive process;
as Michael Billig suggests in his seminal book Banal Nationalism (1995), „the term “banal
nationalism” is introduced to cover ideological habits which enable the established nations of the
West to be reproduced. It is argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some
observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or „flagged‟, in the lives of its citizenry.
Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in establishing nations, is the endemic
condition' (Billig 1995: 6).

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In the following, I discuss relevant concepts used in investigating the discursive construction of
national identities within different socio-linguistic and discourse-analytic frameworks, focusing
inter alia on the discourse-historical approach in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed in
the Research Center „Discourse, Politics, Identity‟ in Vienna (see http:/ / www.univie.ac.at/
discourse-politics-identity). In this chapter I will, however, have to neglect the research on socio-
linguistic macro-topics, such as prescriptive/overt language policies and aspects of minority
3
languages as relevant components of the construction of national identities as well as the
massive literature and on-going debates on terminology (for example, the use of
„collective/multiple/fragmented/ transported identities‟; see Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2003 for
an extensive overview).

Illustrative examples in this chapter are taken from two genres (focus group discussions and
political speeches [see above]) which were conducted in the context of several studies on the
4
discursive construction of national and transnational identities. Of course, the examples are
always located in a specific national/transnational context (EU, Austria, Germany, Czech
Republic, and so forth); however, the focus in this chapter is oriented towards the discursive
(rhetorical/argumentational/strategic) patterns of language use which can be generalized and
applied elsewhere. 5

RELATING DISCOURSES AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES: BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 6

The first relevant claim for assuming a dialectic relationship between discourses and nationalism
is that we must understand Benedict Anderson's (1988) notion of imagined community to mean
that national identities are discursively produced and reproduced.

The second assumption draws on Pierre Bourdieu's (1993, 1994) notion of habitus. National
identity has its own distinctive habitus which Bourdieu defines as a complex of common but
diverse notions or schemata of perception, of related emotional dispositions and attitudes, as well
as of behavioural dispositions and conventions - practices - all of which are internalized through
socialization. The schemata in question refer to the idea of a „homo nationalis‟, a common culture,
a common history, present and future, as well as to a type of „national corpus‟ or a national
territory. Moreover, the stereotypical images of other nations, groups of „the others‟ and their
culture, their history, are included in such schemata, marking differences and distinctions which
allow for constituting the ingroup.

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A further premise - and this is the third central assumption - is that there is essentially no such
thing as one national identity, but rather that different identities are discursively constructed
according to context, that is, according to the audience to which narratives or speeches or written
genres are addressed, the setting of the discursive act, the topic being discussed, and the functions
of the utterances, etc.

The fourth claim proposes that constructions of national identities encompass material practices
as well as discursive practices. Often enough, tensions and contradictions relate these dimensions
to each other (that is, the ideological narratives differ from economic, institutional and legal
practices).

It should be emphasized that national identities constructed in this way are dynamic, vulnerable
and ambivalent. Moreover, systematic relations exist between the models of identity offered by
the political elites or the media (the system-world) and „everyday discourses‟ (the life-world).
This is why a multi-genre and multi-methodical approach that considers different corpora and
genres from public, semi-public and private areas allows for the in-depth investigation of
differing and conflicting narratives of nationhood.

DISCOURSE, TEXT AND CONTEXT

According to the underlying theoretical approach, the notion of „discourse‟ is frequently defined
in many different ways. Since the 1970s and 1980s this notion has also been subject to manifold
semantic interpretations and is used in an inflationary manner in many disciplines (see Reisigl
2004 for a most recent discussion of various notions of „discourse‟). These vague meanings have
also become part of everyday language use, a fact highlighted by Ehlich (2000), who presents
differing definitions of the notion of „discourse‟ linked to the British, French and German
research traditions. For example, in British research, the term „discourse‟ is used frequently
synonymously with „text‟, that is, meaning authentic, everyday linguistic communication. The
French „discours', however, focuses more on the connection between language and thought, for
example, meaning „creation and societal maintenance of complex knowledge systems‟ (Ehlich
2000: 162). In German pragmatics „Diskurs denotes „structured sets of speech acts‟. In the
analysis of discourse and national identities, the meaning of the notion of discourse is therefore
closely linked to the respective research context and theoretical approach. I endorse Lemke's

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 definition which distinguishes between „text‟ and „discourse‟ in the following way (Lemke 1995:
7ff):

When I speak about discourse in general, I will usually mean the social activity of making
meanings with language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or
setting. … On each occasion when the particular meanings, characteristic of these discourses are
being made, a specific text is produced. Discourses, as social actions more or less governed by
social habits, produce texts that will in some ways be alike in their meanings. … When we want to
focus on the specifics of an event or occasion, we speak of the text; when we want to look at
patterns, commonality, relationships that embrace different texts and occasions, we can speak of
discourses.

Furthermore, it is important to define the social domains and the textual genres which are relevant
when investigating the discursive construction of national identities. For example, the most
important domains and related genres in the field of politics can be summarized in Figure 9.1.

Furthermore, the co-texts and contexts of utterances have to be taken into account when analysing
texts as they fundamentally determine meanings and functions of the respective text. The
triangulatory discourse-historical approach distinguishes between four levels of context in a
systematic way; the first one is descriptive, while the other three levels are part of theories
necessary to understand and explain the respective socio-political, structural and historical
contexts:

1. The immediate language or text internal co-text.

2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses.

3. The extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific „context of

situation‟.

4. The broader socio-political and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded
in and related to.

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Thus, every text is embedded into layers of context which are seen to be analytically distinct from
each other but which are, of course, interdependent.

SOCIO-LINGUISTIC AND DISCOURSE-ANALYTICAL APPROACHES AND

METHODOLOGIES

Socio-linguistic and discourse-analytical methodologies of relevance to the analysis of national

identities fall roughly into three groups, those using ethnomethodological/ conversation analytic
approaches to charting iden tity; 7 studies using a discourse-socio-linguistic/ historical approach,
8 9
and those drawing on con cepts such as footing, framing and positioning, or focusing on
pronouns or person deictics. 10

Co-constructing and negotiating (national) identities

According to the ethnomethodological/conversation analytic perspective, (national) identity is not

something static that people are or that they have, but is something that they can orient to and use
as a resource in the course of interaction. As Widdicombe (1998: 191) puts it, „The important
analytic question is not therefore whether someone can be described in a particular way, but to
show that and how this identity is made relevant or ascribed to self or others.‟ In other words,
although a person may be potentially classifiable by gender, ethnicity, class, language, or age, or
as a doctor, mother, sister and so on, these particular identities are not automatically relevant in
every interaction she or he engages in. A person may invoke any number of identities depending
on the contingencies of a particular conversation, or one may be positioned by one's interlocutors
in a particular way. The main point is that rather than using identities as „demographic facts,
whose relevance to a stretch of interaction can simply be assumed‟ (Widdicombe 1998: 194-5),
the analyst should „focus on whether, when and how identities are used … [C]oncern is with the
occasioned relevance of identities here and now, and how they are consequential for this
particular interaction and the local projects of speakers‟ (Widdicombe 1998: 195). To sum up,
national/regional/local/ personal identities are interactively constructed and are resources „used in
talk.‟ (Antaki and Widdicombe 1998: 1).

Example 1, taken from a focus group discussion in Austria (Wodak et al. 1999: 120ff.), illustrates
the interactive co-construction of local/ regional/national identities through pronouns, positive

159
self- and negative other-presentation, specific contextual cues and so forth, in a very detailed and
explicit way.

EXAMPLE 1

F4:

…[W]ell for the first time I somehow: realized that Austria somehow is something different when
I was in France for the first time then I was eighteen - and when I was working in a French family
and: they then - / the first question was „are you German?‟ and I „no no I am Austrian‟ and the
others „thank God‟ you know? - and then it somehow happened -„aha: thank God:‟ yes - just like
that - see? - so. that / I / I can somehow only describe experiences in this way: umm - so. „well so
there must be something‟ you know? - and umm I now simply think on my part / I mean it is / I
live in this country and what now maybe makes me so: consciously Austrian after all is simply
this - that I / it's not only politics and the culture which influence me in this country where I live
but that I also try: to stick my oar in the politics and culture of this country and to get critically
involved, you know?

M0:

mhm

F4:

I don't know that is - now just a first somehow / I don't know / theoretical: definition for myself
and I also have a lot of that - emotional stuff as well

M0:

umm - okay

F5:

My: my name is XXX [name of F5] - now comes the first now I think / yes some say what kind
of a Carinthian one is. yes and what kind of Carinthian am I? right? am I: am a Slovenian:-

160
speaking Carinthian? well I would say - Slovenian / I am a Carinthian Slovene, right? - and
then:/really a Slovenian-speaking Carinthian - but I also speak German, don't I? - only, you're
already defining yourself this way

M0:

why?

F5:

right? - because - if someone says just Carinthian: one thinks that he can only speak: German
„only‟ in inverted commas now

MO:

mhm

[…]

F5:

really and as to my being Austrian - umm - I'd say I am / well I like to be Austrian - I have been
fed on it - since I was a small child one is taught that in primary school: Austria this is my
country dadada' well: that's because - really I am Austrian that's what I like to be it is completely
natural for me – – really.

[….]

F5:

I could add - umm - the idea of delimiting from Germany which: has been mentioned - I've never
really thought about this problem in this way - well I'd say - the delimitation German not:-
Germany that for me is further away - well Austria right. - it is interesting

Ml:

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the delimitation is only / - it's / is only arbitrary or that is

F5:

well well

Ml:

only an arbitrary delimitation: from Germany I'd say

MO:

yes? - mhm

F5:

well what I mean now in my mind well - mhm

Ml:

because I myself as: - / well because I see / I see Austria rather - so as a whole it is a political
construction - nothing more - because I can't / for instance if I take the delimitation from
Germany I can also: easily: include Bavaria in Austria can't I? I could also: add South Tyrol to
Austria - but only: bec / well because of the: present borders this is not the case - but this doesn't
intrinsically make any sense for me: why a border is in a certain place or if there is no border

MO:

could one also say that Slovenia for example could also: be added to Austria?

Ml:

yes o / of course and also: I don't know

[…]

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M3:

umm but there you have - you'll instantly have / umm I think a very big problem that's the
problem of borders: principally the question is also: how did a border come about and how did
they actually come into existence - I mean if you look at the history of Austria - then it happens
like this doesn't it? Well in one place it separates in another it converges and meanders here and
there and at the moment it is where we have it now

[…]

This passage is an extract from a focus group discussion recorded in Carinthia, one of the nine
Austrian regions. Two participants explicitly express their perception/definition of Austria. F4
previously talked about the difficulties she had feeling primarily „Carinthian‟, although „rationally
being of course … primarily an Austrian‟. She defines her Austrian identity in terms of
delimitation/distinction from Germany and in terms of political and cultural socialization. She
introduces the element of active political participation as a constitutive component of her
Austrian identity. Participant 5 starts by clarifying her regional (Carinthian) identity. However,
she is not at all sure whether she is primarily „Carinthian‟ or „Slovene‟, and finally decides on the
order „Carinthian Slovene […] and then […] Slovenian-speaking Carinthian‟. She argues that
bilingualism is an essential factor for her, as „just Carinthian‟ means that one „can only speak
German‟. Here, the lexical/conceptual differentiation made between differing Carinthian
identities such as „Carinthian Slovenes‟, „Slovenian-speaking Carinthians‟ and „just Carinthians‟
is constitutive for the possibility of co-constructing a new self-definition. F5 defines her Austrian
identity on the basis of emotional attachment and socialization through school. At the same time
she denies that the distinction between Austria and Germany might be a problem for her, if she
considered it rationally. M1, taking this up and interpreting it literally, comments on the
ostensible arbitrariness of the Austrian-German borders (topoiof history and definition) and
claims that both Bavaria and South Tyrol should also be added to Austria. This sequence could be
interpreted ironically as well; however, M1 positions himself in contrast to F5. The criteria for
defining borders or nation states cover aspects of language use as well as historical roots and
cultural characteristics. Finally, M3 generalizes the issue of identity as a completely abstract and
imposed „problem of borders‟.

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This extract illustrates how, in focus group discussions, group members co-construct relevant
concepts such as national and ethnic identities. It also shows, however, that potentially
controversial positions may be negotiated through group intervention. A potential conflict
between the concept of state-based nationalism and a cultural/linguistic nationalism, which, inter
alia, is propagated in the shape of regionalism, is prevented by group control. Linguistically, this
passage is characterized by frequent use of mitigation strategies and many argumentative frames,
such as topoi of definition, authority, history etc. It is also obvious that a co-constructing process
is under way, because no explicit „we‟ occurs in this extract (only M3 uses „we‟, which once
refers to the discussion group and once to the Austrians). This usage points to possibly expected
debates and compromises.

Zimmerman (1998: 90ff.) makes a useful distinction between three types of identity found in talk:
discourse (e.g. speaker, listener, narrator), situated (e.g. shopkeeper, customer) and transportable
(e.g. African-American, European, female). The concept of transportable national identities
means those that

travel with individuals across situations and are potentially relevant in and for any situation and
in and for any spate of interaction. They are latent identities that „tag along‟ with individuals as
they move through their daily routines … Thus, a participant may be aware of the fact that a co-
interactant is classifiable as a young person or a male without orienting to those identities as
being relevant to the instant interaction. (Zimmerman 1998: 90–91)

Among the transportable identities we could imagine as potentially relevant for individuals and
social groups is that of nationality, or even supra-nationality, for example a particular European-
ness. Following Zimmerman, we could argue that, in the extract above, the transportable
identities, such as „Slovenian, Carinthian, Austrian‟ were being negotiated. However, a caveat
should be stated here that the notion of„transportable identities‟ does not reify or essentialize
national identities as holistic or static.

The second example is taken from an interview with a Swedish member of the European
Parliament. It illustrates how people „carry‟ their multiple regional/national/transnational
identities with them: 11

EXAMPLE 2

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MEP10:

First I feel like I come from Västerbotten in the North of Sweden. I feel like a Västerbotten. I
don't live there, but I feel like that. I feel like a Swede. I feel like a Scandinavian. I feel like a
European and I feel like a world citizen.

Framing and footing

When analysing specific communicative interactions or even speeches such as above, the
question arises when and how certain identities are achieved and oriented to, in particular those
„transportable‟ types described above. These can be uncovered by locating changes in participant
framing and footing in general and by looking at one specific aspect of footing, person deictics
(see Figure 9.2). Footing, as introduced by Goffman (1981) and elaborated by Levinson (1988)
and others, refers essentially to instances in talk where „participant‟s alignment; or set; or stance,
or posture, or projected self is somehow at issue' (Goffman 1981: 128), in other words, any of the
variety of roles that an individual may be taking on at a given moment in talk.

On the one hand, footing can be an indicator for a particular interactive frame, that is,
„participants‟ sense of what activity is being engaged in' (Tannen and Wallat [1987] 1993: 60),
whether story-telling, joking, giving a professional opinion, etc.; on the other hand, footing
signals speakers' discursive identities (Davies and Harré1990). The interlocutors develop their
story lines or position themselves or others in certain ways, for example as being active agents or
passive victims in the stories they tell, or - if one returns to the extract above - as being
„Carinthian, Austrian or Slovene‟ or „German‟ or „Italian‟. The way we identify these changes in
footing that signal interactive frames or positions is by noting patterns in any number of linguistic
features, including what Gumperz (1982) refers to as contextualization cues (e.g., changes in
prosody, pitch, stress), shifts in register (e.g., formal or casual speech), linguistic code (e.g.,
dialect or standard variety), change in deictics (e.g., using inclusive use of pronoun „we‟ to signal
solidarity), grammatical position (e.g., as subject of an active verb) and so on. While many
changes in footing index changes in discourse identities (e.g., animator, author, principle, as in
Goffman 1981), others are more aptly seen as signalling transportable identities. Furthermore,
narratives (or personal examples and anecdotes that may or may not follow the „canonical‟
narrative form, that is, consisting of abstract, orientation, complicating actions, evaluation, coda,
as described by Labov (1972; Labov and Waletzky 1967), are particularly fruitful sites for footing

165
changes that are related to transportable identities. A narrative is among other things „a tool for
instantiating social and personal identities‟ (Ochs 1997: 202). 12 Schiffrin argues that

narratives can provide … a SOCIOLINGUISTIC SELF-PORTRAIT: a linguistic lens through

which to discover people's own views of themselves (as situated within both an ongoing
interaction and a larger social structure) and their experiences. … these self-portraits can create
an interactional arena in which the speaker's view of self and world can be reinforced or
challenged. (Schiffrin 1997: 42; emphasis in original)

Example 3 provides a narrative of a young Turkish woman with Austrian citizenship. In this story,
13
the role of the national language (German) in constituting national identities is focused upon.

EXAMPLE 3

SCH-F6

one day here in school I went into this room because I had to do some ironing (.) and a girl who
was standing vis àvis of us said ahm (.) I was talking to her [F2] (.) hey start speaking German (.)
hey that's none of your business what I am talking (.) I really wanted to kill her (.) it's none of her
business what I am talking

As some of the migrants stated, without a proper knowledge of German it is almost impossible to
acquire a decent job, as well as to get through the Austrian educational system („speak as we do,
and you will survive‟). The bilingualism of migrants is seen as a janus-faced feature which
especially depends on the languages concerned. Furthermore, bilingualism is often reflected in an
intermixed use of German and the mother tongue which generally is assessed negatively by
Austrians („speak as we do and you will belong to us‟). The language of the majority in European
nation-states is perceived as one of the main factors of national identity; across EU-countries,
legal provisions of various kinds have been established either to assist or to force migrants to
acquire the national language if they want to stay in the respective country and work.

In addition to narratives, focused attention on participant deictics, or pronominal reference has

been successfully used to unlock the dynamics of a particular interaction. Most relevant to the
discursive construction of national identities, Wortham (1996), using the term „deictic mapping‟,

166
and both Ensink (1997) and de Fina (1995) in the analysis of politicians' speeches and conference
papers, respectively, show how by charting pronouns, their referents and occasionally other
contextual information (such as verb tense) in a particular interaction, patterns are revealed that
index participants' footing and, in turn, (a) particular identity or identities achieved in talk. These
studies are similar to research by Wilson (1990), who has analysed pronoun distribution in
political discourse and found that the broad range of personal pronominal choices were indicative
of how the individual politician viewed the world, and how that politician manipulated the
meaning of pronouns in order to present a specific ideological perspective (1990: 56). In other
words, consistent patterns of pronominal use may be used as markers for both identities
instantiated by individuals in particular discourses as well as for particular
social/collective/ethnic/national collectives.

In this context, the personal pronoun „we‟ is judged to be the most important and complex one.
Figure 9.2 lists some of the potential meanings used in the discursive construction of identities.

In the linguistic literature, we usually find the distinction between addressee-inclusive and-
exclusive „we‟, and between speaker-inclusive or - exclusive. This is not differentiated enough,
hence, the cases (e), (f), (g) are included in Figure 9.2 to illustrate that also the second and third
persons singular or plural can be referred to by „we‟. Employing rhetorical tropes, such as
metaphors, metonyms, or synecdoches (pars pro toto or totum pro pars) create more meanings
and uses of „Us‟ and „Them‟ which I cannot elaborate in this chapter but which are important
linguistic devices for the discursive construction of national identities (see Reisigl 2004; Reisigl
and Wodak 2001).

The discourse-historical approach

The discourse-historical approach is affiliated with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which
perceives both written and spoken „discourse‟ as a form of social practice (Fairclough and Wodak
1997). It assumes a dialectical relationship between particular discursive events and the situations,
institutions and social structures in which they are embedded: on the one hand, the situational,
institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, on the other, discourses influence
social and political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same
time constituted by it (see Wodak 2004a for an extensive overview of CDA).

167
Through discourse social actors constitute knowledge, situations and social roles as well as
identities and interpersonal relations between various interacting social groups. This means that
discourses serve to construct national identities. Second, they might restore or justify a certain
social status quo. Third, they are instrumental in perpetuating and reproducing the status quo.
Fourth, discursive practices may have an effect on the transformation or even destruction of the
status quo. According to these sociological macro-functions we distinguish between constructive,
perpetuating, transformational and destructive macro-strategies ofdiscourse in the study of the
discursive construction of national identities (Wodak et al. 1999). Analytically, we distinguish
between three interrelated dimensions of discourse and text analysis: (1) contents, (2) strategies,
(3) linguistic means and forms of realization.

Constructive strategies encompass those linguistic acts which serve to „build‟ and establish a
particular national identity. These are primarily linguistic utterances which constitute a national
„we-group‟ through particular acts of reference, for example by using the pronoun we' in
connection with the toponymical labelling Austrians', that is, „we Austrians‟, which, directly or
indirectly, appeals to solidarity (see Figure 9.4). Expressions such as „to take on something
together‟, „to co-operate and stick together‟ frequently occur in these contexts. Components of
constructive strategies are all linguistic events, which invite identification and solidarity with the
„we-group‟, which, however, at the same time imply distancing from and marginalization of
„others‟.

Strategies of perpetuation and justification attempt to maintain, support and reproduce a national
identity perceived to be under threat - for example, the fact that immigration is experienced as a
threat by many Austrians. Justification and legitimization primarily refer to controversial events
of the past, which may influence the narratives of national history. They attempt to justify a social
status quo ante, as for example Austria's highly problematic handling of crimes of the Nazi
regime. Naturally, political decisions concerning the present and future can also be justified and
legitimized in this sense. These strategies are often realized through individual or collective,
public or private, narratives or accounts.

Strategies of transformation attempt to transform a relatively well-established national identity or

parts of it into another. For example, a redefinition of Austrian neutrality, which would integrate
the modified geopolitical conditions whereby neutrality would not altogether be lost (see Kovács
and Wodak 2003 for an extensive discussion).

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Finally, destructive strategies serve to demolish existing national identities or elements of them.
For example, the possible dismantling of Austria's neutrality, which was dictated from outside (by
the allied occupants) and should therefore be relinquished.

Embedded in these macro-strategies, several sub-strategies constitute „Us‟ and „Them‟ and thus
deserve special attention. When analysing texts related to nationalism or national identities, one
can orient oneself to five simple, but not at all randomly selected questions (Figure 9.3).

According to these questions, five types of discursive sub-strategies are relevant, which are all
involved in positive self- and negative other-presentation. Through these strategies, the
fundamental construction of ingroups and out-groups is achieved, linguistically realized in
various ways, according to the specific genre under investigation. These discursive strategies (and
also others elaborated in Wodak et al. 1999: 35ff.) serve the justification/legitimization of
inclusion/exclusion and the construction of national/regional/local identities (see below for a few
examples). 14

I would like to illustrate these distinctions (without going into detailed linguistic analysis) with
some examples that are frequently employed in the discursive construction of national identities
(examples taken from Wodak et al. 1999). Positive self-presentation is achieved through
presupposition of, or emphasis on, intra-national sameness or similarity, as, in the following
example.

EXAMPLE 4

that our mentality is - umm - on the one hand very broad: I think we are quite hard-working: but
then on the other hand we also like umm to get together and have a good time in Austria

Example 5 illustrates negative other-presentation, with its emphasis on the difference between
Austrians and foreign residents and stereotypical prejudice.

EXAMPLE 5

there are really bas … /these basic - umm mentalities and because of the different ways of life I
mean this is because - umm - simply because probably people from the South - because of the

169
heat down there are used to during the day - umm taking a siesta and lying around and really only
waking up in the evening. Don't you think? Of course those are differences that: -automatically
lead to conflict.

The latter example addresses a central problem for Austrians, the problem of feeling distinct from
their powerful neighbour, Germany. Both Examples 4 and 5 manifest the use of „Us‟ and „Them‟
in powerful ways.

Finally, Example 6 illustrates positive self-presentation employed for constructive and

perpetuating aims.

EXAMPLE 6

here simply everything: so - umm uncomplicated is umm much - simpler let's say easier to
understand - it is / there is not as much - hypocrisy but everything is so somehow - obvious and
simple you understand it right away and it's not as rational - less complicated and so absolutely
classified and: categorized, umm - in politics/in politics - or so in - everyday life that you / - that
you - can have a certain distance - umm you feel emotionally closer and: you can - understand it
more with your heart /so to say mm umm/ more than with your mind.

In this example the role of the emotions is emphasized and it is claimed that there is less distance
between everyday life and the system compared with elsewhere (this example also illustrates
predication and argumentation strategies explicitly, see Figure 9.4).

PERSPECTIVES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Although socio-linguistic and discourse-analytical approaches have been adapted and applied to
15
other cultures and the study of national identities elsewhere, more interdisciplinary research is
needed that would make the historical and contextual specificities of each social
group/collective/community under investigation more explicit. Moreover, the interdependence of
local, regional, national and global dimensions has to be studied in their vast complexity.
Nowadays, the borders between all these - on the one hand - imagined communities have become
more fluid, on the other hand the impact of specific political interests, ideologies and economic
(material) factors has to be taken into account as well. As can be experienced nowadays and in

170
the last two decades of the twentieth century, such tensions and contradictions have led to the
reconstruction of rigid borders and to nationalistic/ chauvinistic ideologies with severe and
violent implications. Even though Sheyla Benhabib (1996: 3) states that the division into „Us‟ and
„Them‟ might be viewed as atavistic, the discursive formation of in- and out-groups has not lost
its identity-constituting functions.

NOTES

1 See Ensink and Sauer (2003), Heer et al. (2003), Martin and Wodak (2003), Dedaic and Nelson
(2003), Wodak et al. (1994) and Anthonissen and Blommaert (2006) for discourse-analytical and
interdisciplinary studies on „the discursive construction of narratives of the past‟ in various
nation-states (Poland, Hong Kong, Australia, Austria, Germany, Congo, South Africa).

2 See Wilson (1990), Chilton (2004), Chilton and Schäffner (1997), Woodward (1997), van Dijk
(1984, 1998) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001), for precise analyses of pronouns, metaphors,
contextual cues and social actors constituting the salient distinction between „Us‟ and „Them‟.

3 See Ricento (2003), de Cillia (2003), De Cillia et al. (2001, 2003) for the most recent
theoretical and methodological approaches in this area.

4 See Kovács and Wodak (2003), Weiss (2002), Wodak and Weiss (2004, 2005), Reisigl (2004)
and Wodak et al. (1999) for the detailed analyses.

5 See Ricento (2003) and Heller and Labrie (2004) for applications of the methodology to other
national contexts, such as the United States and Canada.

6 For detailed argumentations on the complex relationship between discourse and (national)
identity, starting out from Anderson (1988), see for example Reisigl (2004), Confino (1997),
Martin (1995) and Hall (1996a).

7 See Antaki and Widdicombe (1998), Widdicombe (1998) and Zimmerman (1998).

8 Wodak et al. (1999), De Cillia et al. (1999), Reisigl (2004), Weiss (2002) and Wodak and
Weiss (2004, 2005).

171
9 See Goffman (1981), Tannen and Wallat (1993 [1987]) and Davies and Harré(1990).

10 See Wilson (1990) and Wortham (1996).

11 The whole set of 28 interviews was collected by Carolyn Straehle and Gilbert Weiss during
fieldwork 1998, in Brussels and Strasbourg. See Muntigl et al. (2000), Straehle (2000) and
Wodak (2004b).

12 See also Schiffrin (1996, 1997), Linde (1993), Mumby (1993), Ochs (1997) Benke and Wodak
(2003), and Jones and Krzyzanowski (2006), Narratives often state the belong ing or non-
belonging to a certain culture/region/nation in ambivalent and hesitant ways which become
manifest in narratives of migrants analysed in the research of the EU project XENOPHOB
(Delanty, Jones and Wodak, 2006).

13 A set of seven focus groups in eight EU countries were conducted in the framework of the EU
funded project XENOPHOB. The focus groups in Austria were moderated by Michal
Krzyzanowski and Fleur Ulsamer.

14 By „strategy we generally mean a (more or less inten tional) plan of practices (including
discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic
goal.

15 For example, Heller and Labrie (2004), Ricento (2003), Kovács and Wodak (2003), Weiss
(2002), Wodak and Weiss (2004, 2005) and Reisigl (2004).

172
Figure 9.1 Selected dimensions of discourse as social practice (see Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 68).

Figure 9.2 The use of the personal pronoun „we‟ (Wodak et al, 1999: 44)

173
Figure 9.3 Relevant questions for the analysis of„Us‟ and „Them

Figure 9.4 Discursive strategies for positive self- and negative other-representation

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Walby, Sylvia. "Gender Approaches to Nations and Nationalism." Pp. 118-128

Nations and nationalism are gendered in complex and varied ways. The relationship between
gender and nations is a two-way process in which each partly constitutes the other. Nations and
nationalism have traditionally been seen as a gender-free zone, a site of the intended unity of the
people, who share a common goal and culture (Gellner 1983; Kedourie 1966; Smith 1986). A
wave of new scholarship has challenged this position, arguing for the significance of gender for
nations and nationalism (Enloe 1989; Jayawardena 1986; Walby 1992; Yuval-Davis and Anthias
1989; Yuval-Davis 1997).

The inclusion of gender means not only noting the existence of gender divisions and the presence
of women as actors in national processes, although these are important. It requires, in addition,
the identification of the specific forms of gender relations that are at stake. While some writers
have implied an almost limitless variety of discursive forms of gender relations, my view is that
different patterns of gender relations are constituted within different forms of gender regime.
There is not just one form of gender relations, nor do they vary merely as to whether there is
greater or lesser gender inequality, but rather there are a variety of actual and potential forms of
gender regime which vary along specific dimensions. A key dimension along which gender
regimes vary is that of the extent to which women are contained and valued within the domestic
sphere on the one hand and the extent to which they are present and welcomed in the public
sphere of employment, politics and education on the other (Walby 1997, forthcoming). Any
assumption that gender politics means feminist politics in the conventional sense must be
abandoned. Gender politics can include the positive promotion of the domestication of women,
with models of motherhood that segregate the appropriate sphere of action of women from that of
men. Different nations and nationalisms often have different models of preferred gender relations.
This process of the selection of the preferred model of womanhood, of gender regime, can appear
to be consensual, but may well be highly contested. These contestations over the development of
one preferred model of gender relations or another are entwined with the development of nations
and nationalism. The under-reporting of this contestation in analyses of the formation of national
ideals is challenged by the new gender literature.

Recent feminist theory has embraced the analysis of difference in a determined effort to counter
any essentializing approach to the conceptualization of gender. The focus is resolutely on the

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multiplicity rather than singularity of models of gender relations. The intersection of gender
relations with other sets of social relations, especially ethnicity and nation, is seen to create new
diverse forms of gender relations. Nevertheless, within the literature on gender and nation there is
variation in the extent to which there is a focus on a single model of womanhood within a
particular national project, or if the text investigates the possible adoption of one of a wide range
of forms. However, whichever analytical strategy is chosen, there is a constant background
assumption of the socially constructed and malleable nature of gender relations. This
understanding is often posited in contrast to the strategy of nationalists, who are often portrayed
as trying to sediment one preferred vision of womanhood into their conception of national
identity.

Contributions to the gendered analysis of nations and nationalism have not infrequently included
these forms of difference alongside others, especially those of ethnicity, „race‟ and religion.
Within these analyses the concept of ethnicity is often used alongside that of nation (Anthias and
Yuval-Davis 1992) and may even be used in preference even though others might consider the
categories at stake to be those of nation, for example, see Medaglia (2000) on Italian and English
ethnicity and Racioppi and O'Sullivan See (2000) on Irish ethnonationalism and ethno-gender
regimes. Hence a mapping of the field of „gender and nation‟ needs also to consider overlaps with
the literature on gender and ethnicity. Nations exist in the context of other polities, such as states
and organized religions, as well as many other ongoing political projects. Nations may be actively
sought, as in nationalist movements, or be ongoing political projects, as well as stabilized with
state institutions. The analysis here refers not only to nations and nationalism, but also to national
projects. By national project is meant a range of collective strategies oriented towards the
perceived needs of a nation, which include nationalism, but which may include others as well.

The relationship between gender and national projects is mediated by the associations that each
has with other phenomena, for example, the association between nationalism and militarism, and
that between nationalism and democracy. These associations affect the kind of gender projects
that may be compatible with specific national projects. The extent to which there is an affinity or
contestation between different models of nationhood and gender regime is a constant theme in the
literature.

The analysis of the relationship between gender and nation in relation to womanhood as a key
symbol of nation depends on an assumed identity of interest between women and men in the same

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national project. However, this is not necessarily the case; indeed it may seldom be the case.
Since women and men typically occupy different social positions, it is likely that their
experiences of the world will be different, and hence that their preferences may diverge. Indeed,
since gender relations are often unequal, the perceived interests of women and men may be
expected to vary. In the context of the construction of a national project, this may mean that
women and men, or more accurately, gendered people, will attempt to inflect the project with
their own potentially divergent preferences. There may be a struggle to determine what
constitutes the national project. Since women typically have less power than men in the political
domain, it may mean that any given national project may represent the interests of men more than
women. It may also mean that gender affects the degree of commitment and enthusiasm of people
to a national project, since where the national project does include women's interests then women
may be more likely to support it.

Since nations and national projects are gendered, the contestations between national projects are
gendered conflicts. A further set of the literature examines the implications of gender relations for
the relations between nations (Enloe 1989; Sylvester 2001) and the implications of the relations
between nations for gender relations (Walby 2004).

VARIETIES OF GENDER AND NATIONALIST IDEALS

The creation of a nation often looks backwards towards a myth of common origin (Smith 1986);
it is an imagined community (Anderson 1983), which draws on collective memories of perceived
common experiences (Gellner 1983) and invented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The
selective interpretation of the past is a potent method of legitimating present political projects.
The choice of the model of gender relations that is included within this cultural assemblage to
support national identification and renewal has been subject to much analysis. Out of the range of
available gender ideals, which ones are selected and why?

Gender relations in the contemporary world are undergoing radical transformations. The domestic
gender regime in which women's primary role was assumed to be in the family caring for others
is being transformed into a public gender regime in which women are additionally present in
public domains of employment, politics and education (Walby 1990, 1997, forthcoming). The
process of transformation takes place unevenly, with many path-dependent variations, though it is
often associated with or a little later than industrialization and the development of a capitalist

180
market economy, that is, during the transition to modernity. Developing nationalist movements
have a range of models of preferred gender relations from which to select. Those that are
backward-looking may be more likely to find affinity with a domesticated version of womanhood
(Carbayo-Abengózar 2001). Those that are seeking to speed the process of modernization as part
of their national project may be more likely to find affinity with a vision of women as active
participants in the public sphere of employment, politics and education (Kandiyoti 1991a). There
may be tension between the role of women as co-citizens and as symbols of national heritage
(Kandiyoti 1991b). There is often contestation over the appropriate model of gender relations
within nationalist movements (Jayawardena 1986; Ward 1995). Much of the rich literature on
gender and nation explores these tensions between different ideals of womanhood and specific
national projects.

Womanhood and motherhood as symbols of nation

Early writings on gender and nation often focused on the use of women as a symbol of
nationhood (Anthias 1989; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989;
Yuval-Davis 1997), and this has remained a continuing theme in the literature (Carbayo-
Abengózar 2001; Echeverria 2001; Moghadam 1994). Anthias (1989), Anthias and Yuval-Davis
(1989), Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) and Yuval-Davis (1997) suggest that women are central
to the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and to the reproduction of the boundaries
essential for ethnic and national differences. For example, women, in their role as mothers, are
seen as producers of the nation by having and socializing children (Anthias and Yuval-Davis
1989; Yuval-Davis 1997). While they also suggest that women are not only a symbol of nation
but are also active participants in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic and
national categories, the extent to which women are manipulated as symbols rather than
controlling the representations and use of their own identity has been subject to some debate.
Afshar (1989) and Kandiyoti (1989) argue that women are not passive symbols, but have their
own interests, which they promote in national processes. Rather than seeing women as primarily
manipulated by others, they suggest that they are active in the protection and development of their
own interests.

While some nationalisms made women visible as a symbol of nation, other nationalisms make
women invisible, prioritizing the role of men in the national project. Echeverria (2001) provides
an account of the privileging of masculinity in the social construction of Basque identity through

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an analysis of education and language. She shows that women's contributions to Basque culture
tend to be erased in the textbooks used to inform young Basque people about their heritage.
Further, the construction of the Basque language privileges male speakers by its preferred forms.
She notes that women have challenged this exclusion, hereby suggesting that they are not willing
participants in this masculinization of Basque national identity.

When the purity and chastity of womanhood is a key symbol of nation, then this symbol can
become a target in wars between nations. The systematic rape of women in national and
ethnonational conflicts is the most horrific example of the negative aspects of this symbolism
(Seifert 1996). The combination of extreme masculinity in armies, the lack of a state authority
and national hatred provides the context in which this can occur.

The relative closure of formal politics from women is a further dimension of the exclusion of
women from the construction of the national project. The concept of formal politics may be
contrasted with that of informal politics, where it is suggested that women may be more likely to
cross national divides (Cockburn 1998, 2000, 2004; McWilliams 1995; Racioppi and O'Sullivan
See 2000). Racioppi and O'Sullivan See (2000) analyse the exclusion of women from leading
positions in the politics of unionism in Northern Ireland. They show not only that Northern
Ireland unionist politics can be understood in terms of ethnonationalism, but also that this
additionally takes the form of an ethno-gender regime. Women are traditionally seen as being
confined to the role of„tea-makers‟ in these political organizations. Racioppi and O'Sullivan See
argue that formal politics are not the only form of politics, and that it is important to consider the
role of informal politics, in which women are much more active. These political spaces tend to be
slightly less sectarian than those of formal politics. It is suggested that it is in these political
spaces that women might make a distinctive contribution to the nationalist-based politics of
Northern Ireland, while recognizing that unless these impact on the formal politics, their impact is
likely to be limited.

Cockburn's (1998,2000,2004) analysis shows the importance, when analysing the relationship
between nationalism and feminism, of looking beneath the surface of summary representations of
each. Cockburn works with women in civil society, in non-governmental organizations,
uncovering a world of informal politics with a rich and varied texture. It is within this world that
Cockburn finds women who cross the divides between national and ethnic communities, and also
cooperation between women who identify with feminism and those who do not. She works in

182
conflict zones where the disputes between national and ethnonational groups are or have recently
been hot, including Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Cyprus. While nationalist movements could be
seen as having a preferred model of womanhood, the women she interviewed within national
projects had a plurality of views about both the nature of the national project and the nature of
womanhood. Cockburn refers to their holding of„anti-essentialist‟ views of each phenomenon and
regards this as important in explaining how feminism and nationalism could sometimes be
compatible. In this way Cockburn develops in a striking manner the general insight from much of
the literature on gender and nation, of the importance of looking at the plural and competing
interpretations of womanhood and nation that are ever-present as a counterbalance to the rhetoric
of some nationalists who promote the never-achievable purity of nation and womanhood.

Feminism and nationalism

Gender struggles over the constitution of the national project have perhaps been most fully
documented and analysed in the context of the relationship between feminism and nationalism
(Afshar 1989; Jayawardena 1986; Ward 1995; West 1997). Feminism and nationalism are here
conceptualized as independent sociopolitical struggles, with the relationship between them being
the focus of the analysis.

A key work on the significance of feminist actions in the shaping of nationalist projects is that of
Jayawardena (1986). She shows how feminists were active in pushing for the inclusion of the
emancipation of women within nationalist movements in the Third World at the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Such nationalist movements included
feminist issues as key components of their programmes, with women involved as wings or
subsidiaries of male-dominated nationalist groups rather than in separate organizations. Her
analysis covers Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines, China,
Vietnam, Korea and Japan. In many of these countries nationalism was forged in opposition to
imperialism and colonialism. A key issue in Jayawardena's analysis is that of the extent to which
feminism is seen and best understood as an indigenous phenomenon or as derivative from the
West. If it is positioned as Western, then it is likely to be dismissed by nationalist movements; if
it is indigenous, it is harder for male elites to reject. Jayawardena's analysis carefully balances the
roots of feminism in the specific experiences and mobilization of women in Third World
countries with additional contributions provided by Western political thought, practice and
capitalist expansion.

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There are many examples of case studies conducted in a single country, analysing the productive
and destructive tensions between feminism and nationalism. A good example of this genre is the
work of Ward (1995), who analyses the struggle of women in Ireland simultaneously for both
Irish independence and for the inclusion of women's preferences within the nationalist movement.
She compares three different Irish women's nationalist organizations in order to assess the
implications of different strategies and ways of balancing and integrating women's and nationalist
aims. During the period of nationalist struggle women played important roles; when
independence was won, however, women, while legally included as political citizens with the
franchise, were excluded from the practical exercise of political power.

Right-wing nationalism and women

While traditionally it was assumed that when women mobilized politically it would be around a
feminist agenda that promoted women's independence and greater participation in the public
sphere, women have also been mobilized around a defensive protection of the domestic space for
women and against the excesses of gender inequality and degradation in the public sphere. The
protection of a domestic form of gender regime can be a woman-led project. But it may also be
one that is inflected by or developed in association with other right-wing projects. There are
several studies that look at the relationship between right-wing nationalism and a domestic gender
politics.

Carbayo-Abengózar (2001) provides an account of the development of an image of Spanish

femininity in the service of the national project at the time of Franco as one that is domesticated,
which describes women as „indoor heroines‟. The Spanishness of this model of womanhood is
drawn in contrast to that of other so-called „liberated‟ women in Europe, whose practices are
experienced through increased tourism to Spain. Carbayo-Abengózar argues that this is a
manipulative discourse, intended to confine women indoors, at the same time as elevating them to
the role of metaphor or symbol of the nation. In this account, nationalist priorities shape gender
discourses and are intended to shape gendered practices.

Koonz (1987) investigated the relationship of women to Nazi politics in Germany, investigating
the range of politics and practices of women during the development of fascism. Some women
were part of the Nazi project and supported its promotion of the domestic gender regime
alongside its other policies. The domestic gender regime provided some comforts to some women.

184
Koonz draws attention to the inconsistencies in Nazi practices towards gender relations. Although
in the early stages of Nazi development women were removed from public positions as part of the
re-domestication of women, at the height of the war effort women were pushed into paid work in
factories in order to support the war.

Maarten (2005) examines the gender rhetoric and practice of two women's nationalist
organizations of the far right in Belgium in the European Fascist period between the wars. While
these right-wing nationalist movements appeared to denigrate traditional conceptions of women's
rights as individuals, nonetheless they provided spaces for the active participation of women. The
women in these right-wing nationalist movements promoted motherhood and married life, while
defending their activity in the public world of politics in order to achieve this. Maarten argues
that the apparent contradiction between active women's politics and the far right is bridged by
noting that some forms of women's politics - those that are relational rather than individual (see
Offen 1988) - see the family as non-hierarchical and a positive force in society. She also notes the
variety rather than singular nature of the discourse on women produced by these women's
organizations. Nonetheless, there remained a tension between the women's organizations and
their male counterparts in the nationalist movement over the promotion of a public role for
women.

MEDIATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATION AND GENDER

The relationship between gender and national projects can be mediated by their association with
other political projects. The relationship varies depending on whether the national project is
associated with other projects such as democracy, militarism and specific religions.

In the analyses of feminism and nationalism provided by Jayawardena (1986) and Ward (1995),
the nationalist project is associated with anti-imperialism and pro-democracy as was typical of
their period. At this time, the demand for an independent nationhood was often articulated
through a discourse of democracy-seeking, in that national independence would be the route to
democracy for this particular people. In the context of a pro-democratic anti-colonial political
environment, the demands for votes for women as well as men were consistent with the dominant
political vocabulary.

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At other times and places, national projects have been associated with militarism. In these
contexts the relationship of feminism to nationalism can be more distant, if not hostile, though not
uniformly so. Insofar as national projects are associated with militarism, then women tend to be
less enthusiastic about engagement with national projects and more interested in internationalism.
The most widely noted linking of these themes is by Virginia Woolf (1938: 109) in The Three
Guineas, where a female pacifist makes the statement: As a woman I have no country. As a
woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world.' Woolf linked nationalism
and militarism at the time of the rise of Fascism in Europe and the use of military force to push
forward national claims by Germany.

Women are frequently, though by no means universally, more pacifist and less militaristic than
men; they are more likely to support peace movements and to oppose war than men (Oldfield
1989), for example the Greenham Common protest, and to support political parties that oppose
military adventurism, such as the Greens in Europe.

There is a body of historically informed literature on women's internationalism in the early

twentieth century, during and after World War I (Sinha et al. 1998; Sluga 2000; Rupp 1997;
Wiltshire 1985). Sluga (2000) provides a detailed mapping of feminist attempts to intervene in
the politics of nationalism, arguing that the historical moment that Hobsbawm (1991) considers to
be the „apogee of nationalism‟ is in fact the time of a key struggle over internationalism in which
women played a significant role. The erasure of these women from history produces a misleading
account of the history of nationalism and internationalism. Key women's organizations included
the Women's International League of Peace and Freedom, the International Council of Women,
and the Allied Women's Suffragists, which fought simultaneously for internationalism, suffrage
for women and for women's right to determine their own nationality. They engaged in „high
politics‟, meeting and petitioning international political leaders; however, they were frequently
ignored, marginalized, or excluded. Hence the account is one of considerable feminist activity,
but of perhaps limited success.

A further mediator of the relationship between national projects and gender is that of religion
(Inglis 1987; Scannell 1988; Smyth 1992). Organized religions differ in their internal
organization from nations and modern states as to the basis of their authority and power. Modern
states and nations tend to legitimate their authority over their citizens by appeal to a
democratically supported mandate. In the case of religion, authority is usually exercised by a

186
male „priesthood‟ with reference to divine texts, and not to a democratic order in which women
can participate. National projects that are closely linked to religious rather than democratic
projects have tended to support a preferred model of womanhood that is associated with a
domestic rather than public form of gender regime. The extent to which women are drawn to and
support such a national project may depend on the extent to which civil society and the economy
have made a transition from a domestic to a public form of gender regime, or not. If the
religiously endorsed view and the life-experiences of women converge then there is likely to be
more support for this project than if civil society has moved and the religion has not. In practice,
there may be deep divisions within civil society over such a transition in gender regime and over
the preferred model of womanhood. Fundamentalist projects may sometimes be engendered in
such circumstances (Moghadam 1994).

A national project is forged in relation to many other types of political project. At the turn of the
twentieth century a strong international feminist movement engaged in positive relations and
much synergy with nationalist movements that were seeking independence from colonial powers
using democratization as a key source of legitimation. However, nationalist projects have been
associated with many other types of project, whether or not they are sympathetic to
conventionally defined feminist claims.

CONTESTED RELATIONS BETWEEN GENDERED NATIONS AND OTHER

POLITIES

Since nations and national projects are gendered, the relations between nations and national
projects are also gendered. Competition and contestation between nations and other polities is
thus often a gendered contestation in that changes in the dominance of one nation or polity over
another can have implications for the gender regime in those nations and polities. The preferred
gender model of an increasingly powerful nation is likely to have implications for the gender
regimes in those nations that are relatively weaker. The implications are diverse, possibly
including successful pressure to modernize the domestic gender regime or the generation of a
backlash as the weaker nation seeks to defend its preferred values with greater vigour. There are a
number of examples of these and other scenarios in the literature.

Enloe (1989) examines the hierarchical relationship between an imperial power and a colonized
nation through an examination of their gendered cultural forms. She finds that images of women

187
in countries colonized by the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were often
constructed in a manner that eroticized and exocitized them, providing a rationale for imperial
domination in the name of the protection of „Oriental‟ women. Civilized protection of such
women was a source of legitimation for colonial domination.

The changing relations between nations and the European Union (EU) provide a further example
of the possible implications of the transformation of national projects for the nature of gender
regimes. The integration of the EU has involved the increasing preeminence of the European
level over that of member states in a widening range of domains. The preferred gender regime of
the EU is more public and more egalitarian than that of many of the member states, with the
exception of the Nordic countries. The regulation of employment by the EU in the context of the
development of the Single European Market and the European Employment Strategy has
involved prioritization of the narrowing of gender gaps in employment and pay. Member states
have been obliged to implement the Directives of the EU on the equal treatment of men and
women in employment and to revise domestic law in order to do this. Resistance by member
states, for example, that of the Thatcher government to the deepening of the principle of equal
pay from the same work to work of equal value, is usually unsuccessful since the Commission
takes the recalcitrant member states to the European Court of Justice. In this way the more public
gender regime of the European Union, at least in the area of employment, is becoming
increasingly important at the expense of the more domestic gender regimes of member states
(Curtin 1989; Hoskyns 1996; Pillinger 1992; Walby 2004; Whyte 1988).

NATION AND STATE FORMATION

The inclusion of gender makes a difference to the analysis of nation and state formation. The
traditional approach to state formation has suggested that there is a single critical moment at
which key institutions are forged, which then remain in place for a considerable period of time.
For example, this may be presumed to be the moment at which men win suffrage and political
citizenship (Turner 1990). However, in the old industrialized countries of the North, women
typically won the vote several decades after men, and minority ethnic groups sometimes later still.
For example, Turner suggests that in the United States citizenship and democracy were won in
the 1840s, when white men won suffrage. However, women in the US did not gain the franchise
until 1920, and African-Americans, in practice, not until after the civil rights movement of the
1960s. Given the significance of the creation of a state for a nation, this series of critical moments

188
of winning political citizenship, rather than a singular one, is of some import. The availability for
men, but not women, of a formal electoral route for the expression of political preferences during
the early stages of nation and state formation when key institutions are being formed has
implications for the gendered characteristics of these national institutions. Later rounds of nation-
and state-building when women and minority ethnic groups win the suffrage have further
gendered impacts on the nature of national institutions.

This dislocation between the political citizenship of men and women found in the North is less
common in the South. This is because political citizenship was often granted simultaneously to
men and women at the point of national independence from colonial rule. This applies to those
countries that gained independence after 1920 (the date around which women in a group of
countries in the North won the vote), especially in Africa and Asia, but not those that gained
independence before then, such as in Latin America (data on suffrage dates from Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 1995). The granting of simultaneous political citizenship to men and
women may be expected to have implications for the development of national institutions,
although this must be qualified by the caveat that this depends upon the extent to which effective
political representation, especially of women, actually occurs.

GENDER, NATION AND GLOBALIZATION

Global processes reposition nations and the key spatial locations and nodes of gender relations
(Castells 1997; Peterson 1996). Traditionally, it was thought that women were more likely to
access formal political arenas at the local rather than the national level. Evidence for this was
seen in the higher proportion of women elected to local councils than to national parliaments. The
strength of the development of transnational feminist networks (Moghadam 2000) has led to
some reassessment of this view. Feminist politics have drawn strongly on the power of the
legitimation of the discourse of universal human rights and have accessed global political spaces,
such as UN conferences, with success (Meyer and Prügl 1999; Peters and Wolper 1995; Pietilä
1996;). This has led to a more complex analysis of the relationship of gender to local, national,
regional and international politics (Walby 2002). In particular, there is interest in the way in
which grassroots feminists access regional (e.g. EU) and global political arenas in order to put
pressure back on national-level governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This suggests that rather
than a simple gradient in which the more local the more women and the more international the

189
fewer women, it is the middle level of the nation where it might appear that women's interests are
the least well represented.

Global processes have altered the balance of power between social forces so as to lead to some
diminution of the capacities of some nations to provide welfare and public services for their
citizens. This has usually been considered as a class-led process, but there is a significant gender
dimension to this (Peterson and Runyan 1999). In the rich North this process is associated with
the election of governments that seek to curtail welfare expenditure and the privatization of
provision of services that were previously public. In the South these same processes have more
typically been the result of the conditions placed by the International Monetary Fund on loans in
the process known as structural adjustment (Sparr 1994). In both cases, these are processes that
have a disproportionate effect on women, since women are more often the users and employees in
welfare and public services. In this way global processes restructure some of the capacities of
nations to deliver gendered welfare and public services (Haxton and Olsson 1999). However, in
some instances, such as the European Union, the outcome of the restructuring of nations and
polities in the context of rising to the challenge of global pressures has not had such an effect on
the circumstances of women, because of the EU commitment to women's employment (Walby
2004), although this assessment is subject to much debate (Hoskyns 1996; Young 2000).

CONCLUSION

One of the major contributions of these analyses of gender to the wider field of nations and
nationalism is to draw attention to the variety of social activities and discourses within any given
national project. It warns against a too ready homogenization or essentializing of the content of
any national project, pointing up the internal divisions and struggles over its meaning and purpose.
National projects are rarely unified, based on a simple consensus, even if they attempt to appear
to possess unity. They can often be projects that attempt such a purification of the collectivity,
even though this is never fully achieved. The literature on gender, nation and nationalism
explores the implications of varied interactions between a range of forms of gender regime and of
national projects, interactions mediated by a wide range of political, social and economic contexts.

There has been considerable development within gender approaches to nations and nationalism
during the past few years. Early literature tended to focus on the congruity of a specific image of
womanhood with a specific national project, even while emphasizing the diversity of such images.

190
This approach has been rightly challenged because of the contested nature of preferred models of
both womanhood and national projects, with much ensuing work investigating the tensions,
struggles, compromise and accommodation between differently gendered visions of national
projects. These different visions were linked, but not in a simple way, with interests associated
with different positions in gender regimes, not only between women and men, but also according
to the type of gender regime, that is, more domestic or public. The contestations between these
different visions of a gendered nation draw not only from discursive resources, but also from
resources that are economic and political. In early work there seemed to be a view of an almost
endless variety of models of gender relations that could potentially be associated with national
projects. My view is that rather than infinite variety there is a tendency for these models to tend to
cluster along a continuum from domestic and public gender regimes. At one end, there is a cluster
around the valorization of women as mothers, and at the other, there is a tendency to welcome a
modern emancipated woman into the public sphere.

At the heart of modern nations is often a tension between their attempt to be inclusive of all
members, which draws on the democratic impulse that is a key legitimation of a contemporary
national project, and a desire to purify the group, so that it lives up to the unique and singular
ideal that is a key source of legitimation of the national project. Debates over the preferred model
of gender relations can forcefully articulate this tension. A backward-looking nationalism may
draw inspiration from a model of gender relations from an era when a domestic form of the
gender regime was typical, while the practical inclusion of women as nationalist activists in the
public domain contradicts this ideal. By contrast, other nationalisms have embraced a model of
modernity that includes public life for all citizens, including women. The ongoing if uneven
transformation of the gender regime from a domestic to a public form in many locations
experiencing a national movement produces a variety rather than a uniformity of models of
existing gender relations, generating further tensions. Thus the relationship between nation and
gender is likely to be uneven, varied and contested, rather than taking a settled form.

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Yuval-Davis, N. , ed. and Anthias, F. (eds) (1989) Woman-Nation-State . London: Macmillan
Young, B. Disciplinary Neoliberalism in the European Union and Gender Politics New Political Economy
vol. 5 no. 1 (2000) p. 77–98

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Chernilo, Daniel. "Methodological Nationalism and Its Critique." Pp. 129-140

The theoretical, historical, cultural and indeed geographical diversity to which this Handbook
bears witness reflects at least some of the complications faced by the social sciences when trying
to come to terms with the nation-state. During the past century-and-a-half, the nation-state has
been treated as a god and a demon; been declared born and dead many times; been regarded as a
modern as well as a primordial form of social and political community; been conceived of as both
a rational structure and an imagined/imaginary community; created as much welfare as misery;
been equally a source for political democracy, cosmopolitanism and ethnic cleansing; co-existed
with empires, colonies, blocs, protectorates, city-states and other forms of socio-political
organization; gone through experiences of unification, totalitarian terror, occupation, division and
then re-unification; and been legitimized around ethnic, racial, republican, monarchic, liberal,
multicultural, federal and even class principles. Yet, despite - or more possibly owing to - all this
variation, the nation-state has somehow managed to present itself as a solid, stable and ultimately
the necessary form of social and political organization in modernity. Again in this case, the
sources of this alleged solidity have proved difficult to identify: increase in the state's control over
„its‟ population through nationalization policies such as literacy campaigns, schooling, taxation
and military recruitment; the use and abuse of sentiments of belonging to emphasize cultural
and/or ethnic differences; the rise of a „system of nation-states‟ composed of a growing number
of at least formally equally sovereign members; the development of a capitalist class structure at
the national level and the expansion of capitalism at the global level; the „universalistic‟ appeal of
popular sovereignty and democracy. The nation-state is, in all certainty, one of modernity's most
complicated themes.

On the face of this obscurity, then, it is puzzling that the most common argument on how social
theory has tried to account for the main features of the nation-state in modernity emphasizes
precisely all that is opposite to these doubts and uncertainties. This argument, which has become
known as methodological nationalism, can be defined as the all-pervasive equation within the
social sciences between the concept of„society‟ and the nation-state. Methodological nationalism
presupposes that the nation-state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity and
that the nation-state becomes the organizing principle around which the whole project of
modernity coheres.

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My own view is that methodological nationalism must be rejected because it is unable to grasp
the ambiguities that were presented in the introductory paragraph and also because it distorts and
misrepresents the history of social theory in relation to the nation-state. This chapter aims to
contribute to our understanding of what methodological nationalism actually is and how it can be
overcome, so it begins by briefly revisiting some key arguments in the debate on methodological
nationalism. It then unfolds some of social theory's arguments on the history, main features and
legacy of the nation-state in order to outline what may be called a „social theory of the nation-
state beyond methodological nationalism'. My thesis, set out in the three sections that follow, is
that, in modernity, the nation-state has been historically opaque, sociologically uncertain and
1
normatively ambivalent. For all these three cases I will deploy my arguments with examples
taken from classical as well as contemporary social theory and conclude that social theory has not
portrayed the nation-state as the necessary final stage of modernity but rather has struggled
throughout with trying to grasp the ambivalent position of the nation-state in modernity.

METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM: A DEBATE IN TWO WAVES

A first wave of discussion on methodological nationalism commenced in the 1970s. Its main
claim was that the social sciences at large would have regarded the nation-state as the necessary
container of modern social relations (Martins 1974), conceived the nation-state as the natural
representation of the modern „society‟ (Giddens 1973, 1985) and neglected the role of
nationalism as a political force (Smith 1983). The key feature of this early debate was that the
historical record seemed to buttress a certain view of a modern world as increasingly organized
2
around nation-states. These writers were not preoccupied with whether or not the nation-state
was a determining feature of the modern word - it seemed clear to them that it was - but they were
concerned with the ways in which the nation-state was being conceptualized at the time. They
saw a problem with the tendency to theorize the nation-state as though it were a monad that
evolved and behaved autonomously and, because of that, to regard the international system of
nation-states as a mere reflection of the behaviour of its individual members. In fact, the key point
of these early critiques of methodological nationalism was the dissatisfaction with a certain
internalist emphasis in the explanation of those social forces which contributed to the creation of
individual nation-states and, in the long run, of a worldwide nation-state system. 3

A second wave of scholarly discussion on methodological nationalism has started at the turn of
the new century (Beck 2002, 2004; Wimmer and Schiller 2002). Usually, the reasons given to

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explain this re-emergence are two-fold. On the one hand, there is the historical thesis that the
nation-state can no longer be regarded as though it is the final representation of society in
modernity. Indeed, a key historical argument in recent debates on the rise of globalization is
precisely that the nation-state was the most relevant actor of previous historical constellations
4
within modernity but that now its time is over. It would be precisely this change in historical
circumstances that would create a critical space for realizing the problems involved in the
equation between society and the nation-state - the view that the nation-state was the natural
5
representation of society in modernity On the other hand, this new wave of discussion on
methodological nationalism has been linked with a particularly sociological reaction to the
postmodern debate in other social sciences (Shaw 2000: 2-14; Wagner 2001: 75). In this second,
more theoretical, argument the key theme is an increasing scepticism towards the permanence of
the project of modernity and the use of general or universalist concepts in the social sciences - the
idea of society crucially being one of such concepts. There is then a mixture of historical
arguments - the rise of globalization and fall of the nation-state - and theoretical arguments - the
exhaustion of modernity and futility of universalist concepts such as society - which ends up
configuring a new scenario of radical epochal and conceptual change. The claim is that the
historical references and the theoretical coordinates with which we used to comprehend the world
are quickly becoming obsolete.

The understanding of the implications of this new debate on methodological nationalism needs to
focus on three sets of issues (Chernilo 2006). First, there is the widely shared argument that
methodological nationalism must be rejected and transcended. Twenty-first-century social science
cannot regard the nation-state as the natural and necessary representation of society in modernity
so it needs to move beyond methodological nationalism. 6 Secondly, there is the assessment of the
extent to which methodological nationalism is in fact a defining feature of the history of the social
sciences in general and social theory in particular. The new orthodoxy's claim here is that these
disciplines are so fully impregnated with methodological nationalism that social theory's
methodological nationalism would be responsible for its inability to capture the radical epochal
change supposedly brought about by the current globalization process. There is, however, a third
proposition in this debate - and this is the one to which I feel closer. The argument here is to
accept that methodological nationalism must be rejected and transcended but to argue this from
two different standpoints. In relation to social theory, I argue that the thesis of social theory's
immanent methodological nationalism says more about the deficiencies of those who make the
claim than it tells us from the canon of social theory itself. More broadly, it is maintained that the

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use of concepts with a universalist intent, such as „society‟, does not have to be given up (Archer
2005; Chernilo 2007; Fine 2003; Outhwaite 2006; Smelser 1997; Wagner 2001). In relation to
the nation-state, it is claimed that methodological nationalism has never been able to account for
its history and main features - neither in previous constellations of modernity nor nowadays
(Calhoun 2002; Rosenberg 2000; Webster 2002) 7 In other words, even if the claim of a radical
epochal change were true, the consequence of social theory's inability to come to terms with this
epochal change would still be rejected. In order to substantiate this position, I would now like to
introduce the key arguments which I think constitute the outline for a social theory of the nation-
state beyond methodological nationalism.

THE HISTORICAL OPACITY OF THE NATION-STATE

The question of a concise periodization of the development of the nation-state in modernity has
remained elusive for the social sciences at large (see, for instance, Chapter 31 by Paul James in
this Handbook). A certain historical opacity of the nation-state has consistently accompanied
scholars interested in the field - both within and outside social theory. Take, for instance, the case
of Karl Marx's - certainly sketchy - conceptualization of the nation-state. His reflections on the
subject are framed within his thesis that, in capitalism, all forms of social relations „become
antiquated before they can ossify‟: nation-states are being constituted and pulled apart, formed
and dissolved, as part of the contradictory dynamic of capitalism (Marx and Engels 1976: 487). In
Marx's analysis, the nation-state is dissolved in the tension between empires, nations and
communes, between world capitalism and the internationalism of the proletariat. Marx's idea of
the nation-state is that of a type of social and political organization that emerges from, but cannot
8
deal with, the contradictory character of capitalist social relations. Marx (1973: 172-228)
realized well that nation-states are always under immense pressures that they can handle only just:
the global accumulation of capital, colonialism, internationalist movements are all forces at work
that create contradictions that escape from the nation-state's control. Yet, even if Marx clearly
appreciated that the nation-state was not such a solid and stable form of socio-political
organization as methodological nationalism would have it, he equally exaggerated the extent and
speed of its possible disintegration.

A social theory of the nation-state does not ask for the birth certificate of the nation-state as a
modern form of socio-political organization. For instance, Hannah Arendt (1994 [1958]: 267-
302), still under the shock of the events of the Holocaust, could declare the breakdown of the

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nation-state system by the end of World War I. She understood the rise of totalitarian regimes in
Europe in the following decades as a rejection of the nation-state Weltanschauung; totalitarianism
represented the empirical and normative collapse of a whole set of social relations which tried to
cohere around the nation-state. Empirically, the principle of national self-determination proved
unable to check the advancement of overseas imperialism, first, and the rise of totalitarianism,
later on. Normatively Arendt regarded the rise of totalitarian regimes as evidence of the dramatic
futility of trying to found political democracy and the rule of law on the basis of belonging to a
national group. She witnessed and indeed suffered personally with the collapse of the faith in the
nation-state's ability to control and conduct modernization processes peacefully. From a different
standpoint, then, Arendt not only advanced further Marx's thesis of the somewhat „premature‟
dissolution of the nation-state but equally pioneered, though in soberer fashion, current arguments
on the „decline of the nation-state‟. The fact that Arendt was neither the first nor has been the last
commentator to declare the obsolescence of the nation-state is not meant as a criticism of her
assessment of the destiny of the European nation-state. Rather, the point is that the nation-state
remains elusive when it comes to the question of its decline: we shall not look for death
certificates of the nation-state.

A certain form of methodological nationalism seems to be inscribed, however, into social theory's
typological constructions such as Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). At least
some of the difficulties in grasping the historicity of the nation-state may be explained via this
type of dichotomous reasoning, which is found throughout the history of social theory. As we
know it, in some classical sociology the concept of Gemeinschaft was used to describe those
forms of communal life that would not be mediated by abstract forms of social coordination. The
market and monetary exchanges via money, conversely, were taken as the paradigmatic
representations of Gesellschaft; a fully developed nation-state, as both a national market and a
national political community, was the closest we could get to that version of Gesellschaft. This
mode of thinking is perpetuated in modernist social science in the form of the transition from
„tradition‟ to „modernity‟. Indeed, these dichotomies have not disappeared from our intellectual
landscape although there have been for a long time serious criticisms raised against them
(Gusfield 1967). In its newest version, the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft antinomy takes the nation-
state, which would be in its final crisis, as the new representation of Gemeinschaft, whereas the
new Gesellschaft is now presented with the different names given to the sociopolitical formations
that allegedly are coming to replace nation-states: global society, network society, world risk
society, among others. The new Gesellschaft is thought to be radically different from the nation-

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state community, so radical as to make obsolete all previous forms of social theorizing (Fine and
Chernilo 2004: 36-7). The difficulty here lies in the thesis that the radical historical break we now
seem to experience is presented as something new, whereas in fact that type of claim is at the
very core of all types of Gemeinschaft - Gesellschaft formulations. The problem is that of a
„fallacy of presentism‟ (Webster 2002: 275): there is nothing less radical and novel than claiming
the „newness‟ and „radicalness‟ of social change. The same naivety with which previous social
theory looked at Gemeinschaf - E. Gellner's (1996) „romantic fallacy‟ of previous types of
communal life which allegedly were free of conflict - is now found in the assessment of the
nation-state's current crisis. In paraphrasing Reinhardt Bendix (1967: 320), if classical as well as
modernist social theory reconstructed historical transitions „by contrasting the liabilities of the
present with the assets of the past‟, we can now say that the current mainstream echoes this by
contrasting the liabilities of past and present - the nation-state - with the assets the future should,
hopefully, provide - the new global society.

Instead of yet another version of this antinomy, I propose we try a different path. I would hold
that there are multiple concepts of the nation-state and that this constitutes a key feature of the
historical opacity of the nation-state on which this section focuses. The historical record lends
supports for the thesis that the meaning of what constitutes a nation-state has proved historically
unstable (Cobban 1969). Instead of discussing the historical formation of the nation-states in
terms of beginnings and endings - between old communities and new societies - I propose we
think on the relationships between the prevailing conceptualization of the nation-state at
particular moments in history so that we trace major shifts in the concept of the nation-state from
its early Enlightenment formulations, through experiences of imperialism, anti-imperialism,
welfare state, to current multicultural, post-national or cosmopolitan formulations. Instead of
methodological nationalism, that is, a fixed relationship between social theory, the concept of
society and the historical formation of the nation-state, I propose that there is a changing
relationship between the nation-state's self-understanding and social theory's conceptualization of
the nation-state. By acknowledging the existence of different conceptualizations of the nation-
state we already start disentangling the equation between the nation-state and society and
therefore the nation-state stops being the natural and rational form of society in modernity. The
first of social theory's antidotes against methodological nationalism, the recognition of its
historical opacity, points in the direction that the nation-state is a modern form of socio-political
organization but is not the necessary product of modernity.

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY OF THE NATION-STATE

The main argument for this section is that there is permanently an important level of uncertainty
with regard to the nation-state's capacity to deal with its continuous crises. The question of the
nation-state's ability to sort out these crises creates, for those living traumatic events in the
present, a level of anxiety that is usually lost when the crises are normalized as just (more or less
important) episodes of the national history. Despite its crises, however, the nation-state has
proved particularly successful in presenting its solidity and stability as something as transparent
as it is self-evident. The canon of social theory may help us transcend methodological nationalism
at this sociological plane as long as we recognize the importance of this ambivalence between
solidity and instability in the nation-state's self-presentation.

To take an example from classical sociology, we may remember how Max Weber tried to come
to terms with the problems of defining the nation. For Weber (1978: 395), the nation is „one of
the most vexing, since emotionally charged concepts‟ to be found in the sociological lexicon and
he was sceptical as to whether the nation could be truly formalized as a concept. He understood
well that „the people‟, language, ethnicity, class and culture all can and have been taken as the
nation's true core and yet none of them was really so. „If the concept of “nation” can in any way
be defined unambiguously‟, he says, it can just refer to „a specific sentiment of solidarity‟ of a
certain group of people „in the face of other groups‟ (Weber 1970: 172). He was at pains in trying
9
to find an appropriate definition of what a nation is. Weber was aware of the fact that nations
and states hardly ever coincide in historical reality so the idea of the nation-state was hardly the
natural form of politics in modernity. When powerful and strong, states expand beyond the
nation's limits and become multinational Empires. When states are weak and „forsake power‟,
peoples living within these states cannot be conceived of as nations at all (Weber 1978: 395-7).

Scholars working within the field of historical sociology have proved that there is an „elective
affinity‟ between class and national politics. According to Michael Mann, both classes and
nations were equally able to convey an abstract sense of community in analogously universalistic
ways: „if the nation was an imagined community, its main ideological competitor, class
consciousness, might seem to have been even more metaphorical, an “imaginary community” …
we shall see that the two imagined or imaginary communities arose together, conjoined, in the
same process of modernisation … over matters of political representation and state reform, class
and national consciousness developed and fused' (Mann 1992: 141-2). A nation-state is thus

200
formed when all classes find a way of attaching their identity and interests to the idea of the
nation. The core of this „co-originality‟ between class and nation argument is that it allows us to
keep in mind that far from a harmonious and free-of-conflict form of socio-political organization,
the nation-state is a conflictive form of socio-political organization whose social, political and
symbolic structure is constantly an object of struggle (Fine and Chernilo 2003). For our purposes
here, the thesis of the co-originality is important on three different grounds. First, because it
demonstrates that the rise of the nation was accompanied with the rise of classes - the nation did
not emerge unchallenged as the key form of political or cultural identity in modernity. Secondly,
because it sets the tone for the more general argument that the nation is in permanent competition
with alternative forms of identity. Thirdly, because it reinforces the argument we introduced at
the beginning of this section. The degree of urgency with which the nation felt threatened by class
politics at the time of the widening of the franchise is lost when that particular challenge to the
nation's unity is lost. Yet, the nation-state constantly faces new threats.

A good example of this is found in Talcott Parsons's investigation on the rise of Fascism. To
Parsons, the idea of the Western society as a „democratic nation-state‟ was set in negative contrast
with the regressive utopia represented by Fascism and totalitarianism (Gerhardt 2002). Parsons
compared the nation-state with totalitarian regimes and saw the two as radically different, but
equally real, types of society. He did not have to look very far to realize that nation-states shared
the world with alternative forms of socio-political organization that have all arisen from within
Western civilization. Writing in 1942, Parsons (1993: 203) regarded Fascism as „deeply rooted in
the structure of Western society as a whole‟. Fascism arose from within the Western society and
Parsons (1993: 215) saw its development as a particular combination of institutional structures
(rapid urbanization and economic change), ideological definitions (nationalism and mass politics)
and patterns of psychological reaction (growing individualism and consumerism). He equally
realized that there was no peaceful co-existence between nation-states and totalitarian regimes; in
the case of Nazi Germany nation-states had to engage in a total war against it. Parsons was well
aware of the uncertainty of the nation-states. His view was that the nation-state could be dissolved
from within (Weimar Germany being turned into Nazi Germany), or as a result of war defeat (the
Nazis taking over Europe) and he could of course have no certainty on whether the nation-state
would at the end prevail. In the same way as he did not see the nation-state as the natural or
necessary representation of society in modernity during World War II, by the time of the Cold
War period Parsons's view was that the Western and Communist blocs were as „sovereign‟ units

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 10
as individual nation-states. Despite problems and shortcomings in his sociology, Parsons's
portrayal of modernity is closer to a critique than to an example of methodological nationalism.

More recently, we experienced or at least witnessed all sorts of different reactions on the threats
that so-called global terrorism poses to Western life as it is known so far. Indeed, strong reactions
on this were found not only among the general public and politicians but they were equally
11
present among some critical intellectuals. The point I am trying to make here is not to diminish
how strongly people feel about the dangers posed by these threats nor, for that matter, to assess
how accurately or insightfully these intellectuals are interpreting the threats to our world and age.
Rather, this section on the sociological uncertainty of the nation-state tries to demonstrate that
challenges and threats of this sort are a common occurrence throughout the history of the nation-
state in modernity.

A constitutive part of the rhetoric of the nation-state is that of its strength and stability - its ability
to impose order and provide welfare. At the same time, however, we have briefly reviewed that
the nation-state faces constant crises which threaten to divide the nation and weaken the state.
The nation-state is an unfinished project which paradoxically presents itself as an already
established form of socio-political organization. The question of why and how this strong image
has become so prevalent seems to be related to the fact that nation-states themselves are
interested in being portrayed in this solid way and the important extent to which they have
succeeded in doing that. If the first of social theory's antidotes against methodological
nationalism was the recognition of its historical opacity, the second is to acknowledge this
sociological uncertainty as another of the nation-state's permanent features. I have hinted in this
section that, at all times, the nation-state faces its current crisis as the most urgent threat - almost
a death-threat. Yet, it was also noted that these death-threats are only felt as such in the present
and it is by no means certain or necessary that the following generations will remember these
threats so dramatically (on the nation and commemoration, see Chapter 17 by Charles Turner in
this Handbook). This is why the question is one of sociological uncertainty: we neither surrender
to the image of solidity, historical continuity and social-cultural homogeneity of the nation-state
nor underestimate the strength and capacity with which the nation-state resolves its crises and
finds ways of recreating itself.

THE NORMATIVE AMBIVALENCE OF THE NATION-STATE

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I have already introduced the historical and sociological dimensions on which a social theory of
the nation-state beyond methodological nationalism needs to concentrate. In this section I shall
add a third normative element to these two and hold that the ambivalent normative legacy of the
nation-state in modernity results, to a great extent, from the opacity and uncertainty that were
described in the previous sections. As the opening paragraph of this chapter makes apparent, the
internal normative basis of the nation-state can be and has been based on many different sources.
Equally, externally, the understanding of the connections between the nation-state,
12
internationalism and cosmopolitanism remains largely an open question.

In continuing our references to classical sociologists, some of Emile Durkheim's reflections on

the state and politics are an interesting case in point here. Durkheim supported throughout all his
life a substantive idea of humanity although he was convinced that the French Third Republic had
become an incarnation of that idea of humanity. Durkheim (1915) considered that Germany's
„bellicose spirit‟ was the main cause of the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 and this made
France's role quite unique; Durkheim took the defence of France's national identity as a „moral
duty‟ precisely because he regarded it as universal as well as national. The normative tension
between both sides is apparent in Durkheim's (1992: 72) conceptualization that national
patriotism and „world patriotism‟ were „equally high-minded kind of sentiments‟. He understood
that abstract moral ideals such as world patriotism have to be anchored in „real‟ communities and
13
states - national patriotism. Durkheim's greatest insight is the seriousness of his attempt to
combine normative and sociological arguments. Despite all the shortcomings of his anti-German
chauvinism and a certain naivetéin his ideas of humanity and moral individualism, Durkheim did
not surrender in his effort to make normative and sociological arguments work together. A sound
idea of the nation-state requires the firmest possible moral ground, which only cosmopolitanism
can provide.

The normative ambivalence in which I am interested here is subtly captured by the differences -
at least in tone - of some of Jürgen Habermas's public interventions about recent international
events: his cautious but decided defence of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and his open
14
condemnation of the war in Iraq in 2003. For the former Habermas argues that, despite the fact
of the legal gaps in the justification for an international military action in a sovereign state's
internal affairs, the intervention was right; on the one hand, empirically, owing to the urgency of
stopping genocide and, on the other, owing to its normative basis, the „leap from the classical
international law of states to a cosmopolitan law of a global civil society‟ (Habermas 1999: 264).

203
Habermas was seriously concerned, however, with the lack of an explicit UN Security Council
resolution to back the use of military force but he none the less regarded the situation in Kosovo
as so grave that the intervention was justified as an exception: „NATO‟s self-authorization should
not be allowed to become the general rule' (Habermas 1999: 271). The ambivalent relationships
between international law based on the principle of national self-determination and an emerging
cosmopolitan legal order led Habermas to the conclusion that the risks of waging a morally
justified war on grounds that are not fully legalized were tremendous at all levels. He thus put,
hypothetically, the following question „What do we say when one day the military alliance of
another region - for example, in Asia - pursues the politics of human rights with military means in
accordance with a very different interpretation of international law or the UN Charter?‟
(Habermas 1999: 270). The problem the world faced in 2003 with the war in Iraq confirmed
Habermas's worst fears. This „very different interpretation of international law‟ has indeed arisen
but from within the West: „normative dissent has divided the West itself (Habermas 2003: 366).
The war in Iraq marks a change because: „For half a century the United States could count as the
pacemaker for progress on this cosmopolitan path. With the war in Iraq … the normative
authority of the United States of America lies in ruins‟ (Habermas 2003: 365).

Habermas's argument is that the novelty in this most recent Anglo-Saxon military campaign lies
in its claim that „if the regime of international law fails, then the hegemonic imposition of a
global liberal order is justified, even by means that are hostile to international law' (Habermas
2003: 365). In his view, this signals the reappearance in a new context of deep-seated legal and
political traditions in the UK and the US in which the tensions between national and
cosmopolitan interests and values are resolved in the form of national liberalism. Habermas (2003:
366) is therefore forced to face the upsetting fact that „in hindsight‟, even during the Kosovo
crisis, Britain and the US „satisfied themselves with the normative goal of promulgating their own
liberal order, through violence if necessary‟, so that what in 1999 could be counted as „the
undisputed democratic and rule-of-law character of all the members of the acting military
coalition‟, even if it remains true, it certainly adopts a much less cosmopolitan flavour.

More than an assessment of Habermas's arguments, I am interested here in how the normative
ambivalence which is expressed in these two pieces helps us think beyond methodological
nationalism. The kind of „normative optimism‟ that is found in his Kosovo paper seems to have
been widely shared at the time and yet, less than five years later, this optimism is severely
weakened. Habermas's normative claims have indeed remained the same but their relationship

204
with historical and sociological facts is now less apparent: his own view of the institutionalization
of an embryonic cosmopolitan legal order seems, if anything, more distant in 2003 than it looked
in 1999. Had Habermas (1969) applied more consistently some key lessons of his own view of
the history of sociology on this particular problem - the progressive and conservative forces that
shape modernity are deeply rooted in the history of social theory - he would have realized that
neither the principle of national self-determination nor cosmopolitan ideals are naturally or
automatically attached to any particular politics. The illusion of methodological nationalism is
here that of a nation-state which successfully manages its own affairs internally whilst at the same
time it unproblematically finds its place in a neatly divided world composed only of formally
equivalent nation-states. There is no clear-cut solution to the question of the autonomy and self-
determination of the nation-state, on the one hand, and its position within the global and/or
cosmopolitan context, on the other. The question for this section, the third antidote against
methodological nationalism, is that of normative ambivalence: the problematic internal and
external legitimacy on which the idea of the nation-state rests.

CONCLUSION: THE AMBIVALENT POSITION OF THE NATION-STATE IN

MODERNITY

In his reconstruction of political thought, philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1955) convincingly

demonstrated that there is a certain mythical element in all political doctrines. In modernity, these
myths do not disappear but rather find in the state a privileged place to hide and re-emerge.
Cassirer discusses how natural rights, social contract, popular sovereignty and race, among others,
are all sources on which a claim to the state can be made; he reconstructs how these different
doctrines were held predominantly at different moments in modern history and demonstrates that
these myths are an immanent feature of modern politics. If we see things this way,
methodological nationalism becomes the highest - or just another one, if you prefer - of the
modern state's myths. Methodological nationalism must then be rejected because the history and
main features of the nation-state are made artificially to coincide with the history and main
features of modernity itself. Methodological nationalism needs to be transcended because, rather
than allowing us to capture the actual complications of the history of the nation-state in modernity,
it turns the nation-state into the natural organizing principle of modernity.

As a contribution to moving beyond methodological nationalism, this chapter has attempted to

reconstruct some of the main arguments in this debate and then advanced three claims on which a

205
social theory of the nation-state can develop further. Each of these arguments pointed in the
direction of one particular aspect of the historical, sociological and normative features of the
nation-state in modernity. Historically, the opacity of the nation-state shows us that its alleged
„rise and fall‟ is a normal occurrence within modernity. Sociologically, the opacity of the nation-
state becomes apparent in the way in which situations of alert or crises seem as much the norm as
its alleged normality, solidity and stability. Normatively, the key issue remains - for us as well as
in the past - finding the ways to connect the nation-state with cosmopolitan ideals. The tension
between internal and external sources of legitimization for the nation-state will surely not fade
away. This chapter has thus tried to refute the thesis that the whole edifice of social theory is so
contaminated with methodological nationalism that it is this very feature which incapacitates it to
make sense of the nation-state beyond methodological nationalism. Social theory's strengths and
weaknesses in understanding the nation-state seem, above all, to reflect the nation-state's own
ambivalent position in modernity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was made possible by financial support from the Chilean Council for Science and
Technology (Grant 3040004). I should like to thank Margaret Archer, Craig Calhoun, Robert Fine,
Jorge Larraí
n, Aldo Mascareño, William Outhwaite, Guido Starosta and Marcus Taylor for help,
comments and criticisms at different stages of this research. They do not necessarily share all my
arguments here, however, so I am solely responsible for any errors contained in this chapter.

NOTES

1 For a detailed account of this „social theory of the nation-state beyond methodological
nationalism‟ see D. Chernilo (forthcoming).

2 See, for instance, A. D. Smith (1979: 191): „[T]he study of “society” today is, almost without
question, equated with the analysis of nation-states … There are very good reasons for
proceeding this way … the world nation-state system has become an enduring and stable
component of our whole cognitive outlook, quite apart from the psychological satisfactions it
confers' (emphasis added).

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3 The term „methodological nationalism‟ was coined by H. Martins (1974: 276) and was
modelled on the idea of methodological individualism: „In the last three decades or so the
principle of immanent change has largely coincided with a general presumption – supported by a
great variety of scholars in the entire spectrum of sociological opinion - that the “total” or
“inclusive society”, in effect the nation-state, be deemed to be the standard, optimal or even
maximal “isolate” for sociological analysis … a kind of methodological nationalism … imposes
itself in practice with national community as the terminal unit and boundary condition for the
demarcation of problems and phenomena for social science' (emphasis added).

4 This is social theory's new orthodoxy on globalization. See M. Albrow (1996), Z. Bauman
(1998), U. Beck (2000), M. Castells (1996), J. Scholte (2000) and J. Urry (2000).

5 In Beck's formulation (2002: 51–2), the „national organization as a structuring principle of

societal and political action can no longer serve as a premise for the social science observer
perspective. In this sense, social science can only react to the challenge of globalization
adequately if it manages to overcome methodological nationalism, and if it manages to raise
empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research and thus
elaborate the foundations of a cosmopolitan social and political science‟. See Chernilo (2006) on
the problems of Beck's critique of methodological nationalism.

6 See, however, L. Greenfeld's chapter in this Handbook where she strenuously defends precisely
the opposite argument, namely, that nationalism must still be regarded as the very incarnation of
modernity.

7 An interesting critique of methodological nationalism is found in Andreas Wimmer's work

(Wimmer 2002; Wimmer and Schiller, 2002). For him, the nation-state is at the centre of
modernity and social theory's methodological nationalism has to do with the fact of having
neglected the actual extent to which this has been the case. The subtlety of his critique lies,
however, in the fact that he focuses on nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict so the nation-state
incarnates the project of modernity with its lights (democracy) as well as its shadows (ethnic
cleansing).

8 In The Civil War in France, Marx argues that the nation-state fails to become the organizing
centre of modernity as it was quickly fading behind the struggle between the French Empire and

207
the Commune. His argument was that in opposition to the Empire did not stand any form of
nation-state; rather „[t]he direct antithesis to empire was the Commune‟. For the middle classes,
in fact, „there was but one alternative – the Commune, or the Empire – under whatever form it
might reappear‟ (Marx 1978: 636). Marx argued as though the nation-state is being formed and
dissolved, constituted and pulled apart, in the same process of capitalist development – as though
the nation-state had already passed away in 1871!

9 In Weber's view nations do not have „an economic origin‟; they are not „identical with the
“people of a state‟'' neither are they „identical with a community speaking the same language‟ and
indeed „one must not conceive of the “nation” as a “culture community‟''. Furthermore, „a
common anthropological type … is neither sufficient nor a prerequisite to found a nation …
“national” affiliation need not be based upon common blood‟ so that „the sentiment of ethnic
solidarity does not by itself make a “nation‟'' (Weber 1970: 171–8).

10 Thus Parsons (1969: 301): „Whether by formal contractual agreement or in various other
ways, the inter national system is clearly not simply an aggregate of atom istic sovereign units;
rather, these units are organized in complex ways into various kinds of “communities of inter ests”
and the like. The British Commonwealth, the West European combinations … NATO, SEATO,
and – by no means least – the Communist bloc, are familiar examples.'

11 See, for instance, Z. Bauman (2002), U. Beck (2002) and J. Urry (2002) on the terrorist attack
on the Twin Towers in New York.

12 On the nation-state's internal normative difficulties see M. Moore's and A. Wimmer's chapters
in this Handbook. For accounts of the relationship between nationalism, internationalism and
cosmopolitanism see P. Anderson (2002), C. Calhoun (1997: 86–97) and chapter 30 by G.
Delanty in this Handbook.

13 In Durkheim's (1992: 74–5) own words:„If each State had as its chief aim, not to expand, or to
lengthen its borders, but to set its own house in order and to make the widest appeal to its
members for a moral life on a ever higher level, then all discrepancy between national and human
morals would be excluded. If the State had no other purpose than making men of its citizens, in
the widest sense of the term, the civic duties would be only a particular form of the general
obligations of humanity. It is this course that evolution takes, as we have already seen. The more

208
societies concentrate their energies inwards, on the interior life, the more they will be diverted
from the disputes that bring a clash between cosmopolitanism – or world patriotism, and
patriotism … societies can have their pride, not in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in
being the most just, the best organized and in possessing the best moral constitution.'

14 See R. Fine and W Smith (2003) for a discussion of the tensions in Habermas's
conceptualization of the relationships between cosmopolitanism and the nation-state.

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Part Two
Themes

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Gorski, Philip. "Pre-modern Nationalism: An Oxymoron? The Evidence from England." Pp. 143-
156

Until fairly recently, the consensus view among scholars of nationalism was that nationalism was
specific to the modern era. Following Anthony Smith, this is often referred to as the „modernist‟
view. According to the modernists, nationalism was modern not just in the weaker, temporal
sense that it happened to be invented after 1750 or so (like the zipper) but in the much stronger,
developmental sense that it could not possibly have been invented before 1750 (like the railroad),
insofar as it presumed a whole host of other prior developments, such as democratization,
secularization, industrialization, the existence of strong, national states, and the emergence of
mass, reading publics, to name just a few of the commonly cited prerequisites. The emergence of
nationalism, in other words, was part and parcel of the transition from tradition to modernity.
Hence, it was not incidentally modern, but inherently so. From this perspective, the phrase „pre-
modern nationalism‟ is an oxymoron.

Not everyone would agree. Since the early 1990s, the standard modernist refrains have met with a
swelling chorus of criticism. Most of the voices in this chorus belong to European historians, who
claim to find evidence of full-blown nationalism in the pre-modern era. Let us call this group of
critics the „premodernists‟. The premodernists do not agree about when or where nationalism first
arose. Not surprisingly, perhaps, they often argue that it initially arose in the countries and
periods in which they themselves specialize. Candidates for the birthplace of nationalism include
eighteenth-century England, the early modern Netherlands, medieval France and even the Dark
Age kingdoms, to name some of the many contenders. In support of their views, the
premodernists point, inter alia, to various source materials, including histories and chronicles of
particular peoples or nations; popular pamphlets and other forms of political propaganda that
speak of, or appeal to, a nation, or nations; and scholarly discussions of „national character‟ and
its relationship to language, customs and climate that long antedate the French Revolution or
German Romanticism. The modernists have not fled the attack. Most (though not all) have stood
their ground, arguing that pre-modern nationalism is not genuine nationalism, but something
different or lesser: „national identity‟, „national consciousness‟, „national sentiment‟, or
„nationalist discourse‟ perhaps, but not nationalism in the strict sense. The premodernists counter
that pre-modern nationalism is neither different nor lesser and that it meets the very definitional
criteria laid out by the modernists themselves.

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It is not possible to settle the modernist/ premodernist debate in this chapter; that will take more
time and more dialogue. Rather, the goal of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the issues
raised by the modernists and the evidence advanced by the premodernists. I begin by way of
background with a brief summary of the modernist position and its key variants. This will make it
easier to understand and assess the premodernists' evidence, samples of which will be presented
in the sections that follow, and in reverse chronological order. Thus, I open the discussion with
several recent works on the eighteenth century, then move on through the early modern and
medieval periods and conclude with the Dark Ages. I have chosen this somewhat unorthodox
format in the hope that it will make it easier for readers to judge for themselves just when it
becomes reasonable to speak of nationalism. Another note on the presentation: throughout, the
focus will be mainly, if not exclusively, on England. I have chosen this narrower focus for two
reasons: first, because it makes for a shorter and more readable essay; and second, because the
debate about English nationalism has been particularly pointed and extensive, and raises most of
the key theoretical and interpretive issues. While I will suspend my judgement during this
presentation, I will not expunge it from the chapter. I find the premodernist critiques fully
convincing, and in the conclusion, I will argue for an approach to nationalism that is not so much
premodernist as postmodernist, in the dual sense that it rejects the claim that nationalism is
inherently modern, and that it is suspicious of all efforts to fix the origins of nationalism in a
particular place or time. In my view, scholars of nationalism would be better served by a more
genealogical and con-junctural approach that seeks to identify and account for changing types and
degrees of nationalism.

THE MODERNIST POSITION: DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERGENCES

What is nationalism? Why does it arise? And when does it first arise historically? These are three
cardinal questions in the study of nationalism. There is some agreement about the „when‟
question. All modernists agree that nationalism first arose during the modern era, even if they
disagree about exactly when. There is far less agreement about the „what‟ and „why‟ questions.
The modernists advance many different and competing definitions and explanations of
nationalism. This can sometimes make it difficult to follow and evaluate premodernist critiques of
the modernist position, which often focus on only one or two modernist authors. Before analysing
the modernists' arguments in greater detail, it may be useful to survey the historical development
of the literature on nationalism, and the key variations of the modernist position.

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Looking back, we can discern (at least) four successive and overlapping waves in twentieth-
century scholarship on nationalism. The first wave began in the 1900s and crested in the 1960s
(e.g. Meinecke 1970 [1907], Kohn 1967 [1944]; Kedourie 1994 [1960]; Minogue 1967; Berlin
1980). It was propelled by intellectual historians and political theorists and focused mainly on the
works of French philosophes (e.g., J. J. Rousseau and the AbbéSieyès) and German Romantics
(e.g., Fichte and Herder). The second wave began in the 1950s and subsided in the early 1980s
(e.g., Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991 [1983]). It was propelled almost exclusively
by social scientists and tended to focus on the impact of„modernization‟ (that is, industrialization,
democratization, secularization and kindred processes). The third wave began in the 1970s and
has not yet fully subsided. Its driving force was supplied by social historians and historical
sociologists (see e.g. Tilly 1975; Brass 1997, 1991; Breuilly 1982; Hroch 1985; Wallerstein 1991;
Mann 1993). Its chief inspirations were Marx and Weber. Its focus was on capitalism and states,
rather than on nationalism per se. In these accounts, nationalism was usually seen as the
consequence of expanding markets and/or of centralizing states. The fourth wave began in the
early 1990s and is still going strong (see e.g. Brubaker 1996; Laitin 1998; Porter 2000).
Politically, it was inspired by the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,
which brought an unexpected resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe and throughout the
world. Theoretically, it was informed by the „cultural turn‟ in history and the social sciences. In
contrast to first- and second-wavers, who typically portray culture as consensual (that is, as
„social norms‟ or „shared values‟), the fourth-wavers usually tend to see it as conflictual (that is,
as itself a site and source of struggle). The fourth-wavers' great shibboleths are thus „contestation‟
and „construction‟ - of nations, identities, traditions.

As should be clear even from this brief survey, the modernists are a heterogeneous lot. Consider
their answers to the „what‟ question. First-wavers typically defined it as an „ideology‟, but in the
non-evaluative sense of „creed‟ or „doctrine‟ (e.g. Kedourie 1994 [1960]: 1). Second-wavers, on
the other hand, are more apt to portray it as a form of political community (e.g., Anderson 1991
[1983]: 12). Third-wavers also speak of nationalism in terms of ideology and integration, but
more in the sense of „ruling class ideology‟ and „market integration‟ (see e.g. Hroch 1985: 5-9).
For them, nationalism usually connotes a social or political movement that seeks to build or
capture a state (e.g. Breuilly 1982: 3). Most fourth-wavers would accept Breuilly's definition, but
they would emphasize that the nationalists not only argue for the nation, but about the nation - its
history, its mission, its members, its borders - and that they not only seek to capture or create
states, but to make and remake nations, that is, to actively transform existing identities and

214
communities (e.g. Bell 2003: 3). In sum, modernist scholars generally define nationalism in terms
of at least one of the following families of concepts: (1) ideology (alternatively: doctrine, creed or
principle); (2) identity (alternatively: consciousness, community or integration); (3) movement
(alternatively: party, state or fraction); (4) discourse (alternatively: categories, symbols, narratives,
rituals).

Not surprisingly, the answers modernists give to the „why‟ question are also quite diverse.
However, they can be organized under two general headings: those that emphasize structure, and
those that emphasize agency. In more structural accounts, nationalism is seen as a consequence,
often unintended, of other processes of large-scale social change, such as secularization,
industrialization or state-formation. Second-and third-wave accounts tend to emphasize structure
much more than agency. First-wave accounts privilege agency, if only implicitly. They imply that
nationalism is the creation of great minds. Fourth-wave accounts also give attention to agency,
but in a more explicit and systematic way. They emphasize the role of intellectual strata -
including lesser-known publicists and propagandists - as opposed to individual geniuses. This is
not to say that fourth-wavers ignore structure. They are aware of how social context - geopolitics,
electoral politics, class structure and so on - can constrain or enable would-be nationalists.
Nationalist discourses and movements are not constructed ex nihilo.

Having briefly surveyed the scholarly literature on nationalism and catalogued the various
definitions and explanations that are on offer, let us now turn to the premodern evidence.

SOCIO-CULTURAL RIVALRY OR RELIGIO-POLITICAL UNITY? TWO

ARGUMENTS ABOUT EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

Until quite recently, the standard view was that England had never experienced nationalism -
patriotism perhaps, but not nationalism (Smith 1976; Seton-Watson 1977). The Irish had
nationalism, as did the Scots or the Welsh, but not the English; they had imperialism instead
(Kumar 2003). The origins of nationalism were to be found across the Channel, in France, or
even further east, in Germany. In this section, I discuss two influential and widely read challenges
to this view: Gerald Newman's (1987) The Rise of English Nationalism and Linda Colley's (1992)
Britons. Both locate the birth of English nationalism in the eighteenth century.

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In Newman's account, the rise of English nationalism begins around 1740. Its roots, he says, are
to be found in socio-cultural rivalry between the English aristocracy, which was cosmopolitan
and Francophilic in outlook, and an emerging English intelligentsia, which felt marginalized and
underappreciated. By the middle of the eighteenth century, argues Newman, the English
aristocracy had achieved a position of complete dominance in English society. It not only owned
the land, but effectively owned the state and the church as well. It also set the tone, the standards
of what was admirable and coarse, sophisticated and ordinary, in short, high and low. This
cultural dominance, Newman argues, was not secondary or epiphenomenal; it was primary and
fundamental: „cosmopolitan taste was to aristocratic power what invisible guy wires are to a
trapeze act. The ultimate source of the elite‟s authority, protecting its property and privileges, was
something immaterial, its “cultural hegemony” - its style' (Newman 1987: 39). The extreme
Francophilia of English „Society‟ led it to denigrate and ignore its own artists and intellectuals.
Hogarth, Fielding, Burke, Wollstonecraft - revered and canonized in our day, they were reviled or
belittled in their own. They responded, in part, by constructing a counter-ideal, a vision of
English national identity, whose central value was „sincerity‟. Unlike the French, and their
English minions, who were portrayed as „dishonest‟, „debauched‟, „conformist‟ and, in short,
insincere, true Englishmen and - women - were „frank‟, „upright‟, „independent‟ and, in sum,
everything that the French were not. Artists and intellectuals may have sown the seeds of English
nationalism, but it was the Seven Years War that ploughed and fertilized the soil, by stirring up
popular „patriotism‟ and „Gallophobia‟. The harvest was reaped by political leaders such as Pitt
the Elder and John Wilkes, who used popular nationalism as a weapon against aristocratic
dominance. By the 1780s, the nationalist genie was out of the historical bottle and there was no
putting it back in. For Newman, then, England was not the exception to the nationalist rule; it was
a textbook example which closely adhered to the Continental script: nationalism is first
enunciated by artists and intellectuals and gradually gives rise to a mass movement against
aristocratic oppression and foreign domination.

In Britons, Linda Colley tells quite a different story. First, the protagonist is different: as the title
of her book suggests, she is interested in British nationalism rather than English nationalism. Also,
the action begins a good deal earlier: Colley argues that British nationalism was „forged‟ in 1707;
this is the year of the Act of Union, that joined Scotland with England and Wales. For Colley, the
genesis of British nationalism involves the emergence of a new political community. How, she
asks, did the various peoples and classes who inhabited the British Isles come (with the exception
of the Irish) to see themselves as (among other things) „British? Her answer essentially boils

216
down to this: common subjective identities and common material interests. At the „core‟ of their
identity, she argues, we find religion and, more specifically, Protestantism. Given the fractured
and fractious character of British Protestantism, one might fairly wonder why it acted as a form
of„social cement‟, rather than a kind of social solvent (Black 1999: 59). One reason, certainly the
most important in Colley's telling, is war, specifically the wars against the Catholic French. These
wars helped to unite the British, or many of them at least, around a common vision of themselves,
as a New Israel, a chosen people, from whom God expected much, and to whom much was
granted - liberty, prosperity and true religion. If the cement of religion took hold, this was partly
because the clamps of interest were applied as well. It not only felt good to be a Briton, it also
paid. Britain's successes against the French brought new opportunities for its people - as soldiers,
traders and administrators. Meanwhile, this very service to Britannia reinforced mass
identification with Britain. In Colley's account, British nationalism was primarily the product of
Protestantism, Anglo-French rivalry and overseas empire.

What kinds of general, historiographical and theoretical conclusions might we draw from these
two studies? On the historiographical side, both studies certainly raise doubts about the
uniqueness of French revolutionary nationalism. Indeed, one cannot but be struck by the
developmental parallels - and cultural connections - between French and English nationalism.
These parallels and connections are particularly clear in David Bell's (2001) book on French
revolutionary nationalism, which departs from the received interpretations in two main ways: first,
in its emphasis on the religious roots of French nationalism (particularly in Calvinism and
Jansenism) and second, in its attention to Anglo-French rivalry, and the role of the English as
France's national other. This is not to deny that there were differences, of course. Certainly, the
level of violence and conflict was much greater in France than in England; perhaps for that reason,
it was France, rather than England, that became the exemplar and the touchstone for nationalist
ideologues and activists. Still, Newman and Colley's work makes it harder to defend the claim
that nationalism was „born‟ or „invented‟ during the French Revolution. On the theoretical side,
we see that there were multiple definitions and discourses of the nation in play. For some, „the
nation‟ was England (or Scotland or Wales or Ireland); for others it was Britain; and for most,
suggests Colley, it was both Britain and England (or Scotland or Wales or even Ireland). After all,
she notes: „Identities are not like hats. Human beings can and do put on several at a time‟ (1992:
6). Similarly, representations of the English nation drew on several different sources: the Bible,
the Classics and ambient notions of patriarchy. If these definitions and discourses had originated

217
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we could end our analysis here. But they did not, so we
now turn back the clock another few centuries.

IN SEARCH OF ENGLISH NATIONALISM: FROM THE PROTESTANT

REFORMATION TO THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION

While Newman and Colley trace Anglo-British nationalism back to the eighteenth century, other
scholars push its birthdate back even further. In this section, I will review several well-known
works by scholars of England, who argue that „modern‟ nationalism can be found in early modern
Britain.

In an important essay, which previews his forthcoming book, Steven Pincus argues that the
Glorious Revolution of 1688/9 was „England‟s first nationalist revolution' (Pincus 1998). This
interpretation might seem an unlikely one. After all, the Glorious Revolution did not usher in a
republican regime, nor did it bring about any fundamental change in class or property relations.
Hence, it fails to meet one standard definition of revolution (Skocpol 1979). Nor is it immediately
clear in what sense it was nationalist either. After all, the central event of the Glorious Revolution
was an invasion by a foreign prince (William III of the Netherlands), and the deposition of the
native monarch (James II). So why does Pincus label the Glorious Revolution a „nationalist
revolution‟ instead of, say, a „military coup‟? The central exhibit in Pincus's case is the pamphlet
literature of the period. The arrival of William III, he shows, was preceded by a vigorous, public
debate about the il/legitimacy of James II. James's opponents portrayed him as a tool of Louis
XIV, a man of Catholic sympathies and French connections, who was imposing a foreign brand
of Christianity and a foreign style of governance on the people of England. Fears of a French
invasion were widespread. Against this background, Pincus shows, many saw William III - a man
of Protestant beliefs with an English wife - not as a foreign invader, but as a national saviour, who
restored the autonomy and sovereignty of the English people. If we define nationalism as „an
ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a
population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation‟ (Pincus
1998: 78 quoting from Smith 1991: 73), then the Glorious Revolution was indeed a nationalist
revolution. Did it also mark the origin of English nationalism? Pincus does not squarely address
this question. He does say that an English „national identity‟ had certainly taken shape by the
middle of the sixteenth century. But he does not say whether national identity and nationalism are
equivalent. Thus, he rejects the modernist position, without entirely clarifying his own.

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Others are not so hesitant about pushing back the beginnings of English nationhood even further.
Some see strong connections between Protestantism, anti-Catholicism and nationalism in the
Elizabethan era (e.g. Cressy 1989). Others emphasize the secular discourses of national identity.
The best-known work in the latter genre is probably Richard Helgerson's Forms of Nationhood:
The Elizabethan Writing of England (1992). As the title of his book suggests, Helgerson argues
that the transition from a „dynastic identity‟, centred on the monarchy, to a „national identity‟,
built on other foundations, occurred, or at least began, during the Elizabethan era (1558-1603).
Helgerson identifies six men, whom he considers the chief architects of this new identity, some
well-known, others less so, and subjects their lives and works to close social and literary readings.
In the first chapter, he focuses on Edmund Spenser, author of The Faerie Queene, and his quest to
achieve „the kingdome of his own language‟ - to create an English-language verse in the Graeco-
Roman style and to achieve a place for that literature in a society obsessed with classical and
continental literatures. In the second chapter, he turns to Edward Coke, the famed English jurist,
and his efforts to define and defend an English tradition of common law distinct from Roman law
and its continental adaptations. The subject of the third chapter is a lesser-known figure named
Christopher Saxton, the Elizabethan cartographer who prepared the first comprehensive
collection of county maps for the English kingdom. Chapter 4 analyses Richard Hakluyt's
Principal Navigations of the English Nation, an English contribution to the burgeoning literature
of overseas exploration, conquest and colonization. Helgerson argues that Hakluyt's work is
distinctive in two ways: first, insofar as it makes the English nation into the agent of exploration,
and second, insofar as it proposes a peaceful form of merchant empire, quite different from the
„rapacious‟ and „tyrannical‟ empire of the Spanish. Chapter 5 returns the reader to more familiar
territory: the history plays of William Shakespeare. While the texts of these plays might seem to
fit squarely into the dynastic form of the chronicle, with its tales of great men and great deeds, the
actual performances involved the middle and lower classes, both as actors and auditors, and the
audiences were quite inclusive in their composition. A similar tension can be found at the heart of
John Foxe's Book of Martyrs - the subject of Chapter 6 - which chronicles the Christian martyrs
from Roman through Tudor times. Insofar as it is written in chronicle form, and divides English
history by reigns, it is a „dynastic‟ work. But insofar as it inserts English dynastic history into
apocalyptic history, recounts the heroism of ordinary believers, and gives England a special place
in the story of salvation, it is also a „national‟ work. In sum, Helgerson argues that some of the
most prominent intellectuals and artists of Elizabethan England were inventing and deploying
forms of representation that made it possible to think in national terms - to think of the language,
the land, the people, the history and the church of England.

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The work of Pincus, Helgerson and other like-minded scholars gives a good sense of the kind of
evidence that premodernists can muster against the modernists. First, there were both discursive
and non-discursive representations of „the nation.‟ Second, there were both religious and secular
ways of conceiving the nation. Third, while these conceptions were generated by intellectuals and
artists, broadly understood, they were sometimes directed at, and no doubt consumed by, a
broader audience. Fourth, nationalist discourse did contain implicit and explicit aspirations to
national autonomy and sovereignty. Fifth, these aspirations did sometimes give rise to political
movements and programmes. Thus, while early modern English nationalism was certainly not
identical to modern nationalism, of either the civic or ethnic variety, it definitely did have many
of the basic features of modern nationalism, including some that are widely believed to be
„distinctly‟ or „uniquely‟ modern, such as a secular component, a mass following, political
content and movement organization.

MODERN NATIONALISM IN PREMODERN ENGLAND? FROM THE VENERABLE

BEDE TO THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

While early modernists have sought to push back the birthdate of English nationalism by a
century or two - to 1688/9 or to the 1580s - some historians of medieval and Dark Age England
wish to push it back yet further - to at least the fourteenth century. Perhaps the best-known
interpreter of the medieval evidence is R. R. Davies (Davies 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b, 2000).
Davies's central thesis is that the cultural and territorial boundaries between the peoples and
polities of the British Isles became more and more sharply drawn during the Middle Ages. By
1400 there were really only four recognized peoples (English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish) and two
viable kingdoms (English and Scottish). Within this configuration it was the English people and
the English king who were hegemonic. Though he does not use this language, Davies is
essentially arguing that medieval England was a nation-state. Few would contest Davies's claims
about English stateness. England has long been seen as a particularly prodigious example of state
formation. More controversial, of course, are his arguments about peoplehood and nationness.
Davies begins by pointing out, quite correctly, that the term „people‟ (gens or kind) was quite
common in medieval discourse, and that it was used interchangeably with the term „nation‟
(natio). As their etymology suggests, both terms denoted communities of descent or birth,
understood in a biological as well as cultural sense. Medieval writers employed two rhetorical
strategies to establish peoplehood, one historical, the other ethnographic. The historical strategy
involved a collective genealogy based on biblical and classical sources. One variant was to trace

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the lineage back to Noah. Another was to link it to the Trojans. And still another to the writings
of Roman authors. Often these three discourses of descent - the Noachic, the Trojan and the
Roman - were combined in clever, if implausible, ways. All three discourses can be found
throughout the British Isles (and, for that matter, throughout Continental Europe as well). The
ethnographic strategy involved catalogues of cultural peculiarities. Relevant peculiarities included
„language, law, lifestyle, dress, personal appearance …, agricultural practices, codes of social
values and what can only be described as national character and national temperament‟ (Davies
1995a: 11). The real question for Davies, then, is not how the various peoples of the British Isles
came to conceive of themselves as peoples, bur rather how it is that they came to be divided into
the four peoples we know today instead of some other number and/or nomenclature. Why, he
asks, did the people of the British Isles come to think of themselves as English (or Welsh,
Scottish, or Irish) rather than as, say, Saxons (or Britons, Picts, or Féni)? Davies's writings
suggest a number of possible answers. One is state formation. As the kings of England and
Scotland expanded and consolidated their rule over the British Isles, they invented and
propagated national categories and boundaries that coincided with the state. Another explanation
is geopolitical competition. Rivalry and warfare within the British Isles and, even more, between
the English and the French, brought a decline in the use of French and identification with the
Normans at court and a heightened emphasis on, and identification with, English and Englishness.
The third explanation is ideological rivalry among intellectuals. For this project of Anglicization
was anticipated and abetted by men of letters. During the first half of the twelfth century, for
example, a group of historians rewrote the history of the British Isles as a history of the English
monarchy, insisting on the antiquity of the English nation and state, the distinctiveness of the
English law and the barbarity of the non-English peoples. Their work can be seen as a riposte to
contemporaries whose narratives were built around different categories like „British or „Saxon‟.

The question remains, however, as to why the category „English won out over these and other
alternatives. Here, Davies actually points back to the Dark Ages and cites the work of Patrick
Wormald (Davies 1995b: 7 and n. 25). In essence, Wormald argues that an English national
identity had already crystallized by the tenth century and in a form that would later find imitators
throughout Europe, namely, as a claim to be a „chosen people‟ or „elect nation‟, the true,
historical successor to the Ancient Israelites (Wormald 1983, 1992, 1994). The causal
mechanisms that drive Wormald's account are the same ones that underlie Davies's: intellectual
rivalry, state-formation and warfare, in that order. The intellectual rivalry in question was
between Christians and pagans. The Christianization of the British Isles had begun in the second

221
century during Roman rule. Following the collapse of Roman Britain and the subsequent invasion
of the Anglo-Saxons, the British peoples reverted to Germanic religion. The Christianization of
the Anglo-Saxons began in the late sixth century, during the papacy of St Gregory I (the Great).
Gregory's accounts referred to the Christianization of the „English people‟ (gens anglorum) - not
the „Saxon‟ or „British‟ people (though these would have been plausible alternatives). A century
later, Gregory's language was adopted and immortalized in Bede's Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis
Anglorum (Ecclesiastical History of the English People, published 731). Bede, himself, was an
Angle. More importantly, he was a scholar of the Old Testament. His history begins with a
geographical survey of the British Isles that likens them to a land of milk and honey. It then turns
to the arrival of the Angles, whom he portrays as a „chosen people‟, whose Exodus leads them to
Britannia, whose native people, the Britons, had turned their eyes from God, and fallen into
idolatry. Hence, God took their lands away and gave them to the Angles. Some two centuries
later, Bede's text was translated, and his narrative reactivated, by King Alfred the Great, one of
the line of Wessex rulers who repelled would-be invaders from Denmark during the late ninth and
early tenth centuries and gradually and forcefully created the kingdom of England. Alfred was a
pious man, something of an intellectual, originally destined for an ecclesiastical career. Though
himself a Saxon, he sought to propagate an English identity and the English language, both within
his court and, insofar as possible, beyond it as well. In this, he received considerable aid from the
churchmen of Canterbury. The story which they jointly told of England picked up where Bede's
left off. It was the story of a chosen people whose sins had provoked divine vengeance in the
form of invading armies and whose salvation lay in a renewed covenant with God. While
Wormald himself does not address the question of whether this constituted nationalism in the
modernists' sense, Sarah Foote does - and answers in the affirmative. Citing Ernest Gellner, she
further argues that Alfred's wars were also nationalist wars, aimed at assembling the English
people into an English state (1996: 33). Later, citing Benedict Anderson, she argues that Alfred's
translation of Bede, along with his other efforts to promote the English language and English self-
understanding, were part of a concerted effort, not simply to Anglicize the court, but to invent an
English political community, if not by means of „print-capitalism‟, then at least by means of the
written word (1996: 36-7). By her lights, then, the phrase „Dark Age nationalism‟ is not an
oxymoron, at least not in England.

The work of Davies, Wormald and Foote demonstrates that the kinds of evidence uncovered by
the early modernists can also be found before the early modern era, if not in printed form, or in
the same abundance. There are discursive representations of „peoples‟ and „nations‟. The

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examples we have are mainly religious, but not exclusively so. The terms themselves are used in
ways that are quite recognizable to modern eyes. And they were occasioned by and deployed in
cultural and political struggles of various kinds. What is less clear is the social scope of
nationalist discourse and conflict. That it touched the elites, we can be certain. Whether it reached
the common people is hard to say, because there are so few source materials that could shed light
on this problem. There is some evidence of popular nationalism during the Hundred Years War
and the Middle Ages more generally, though it is scarce indeed. It is even scarcer for the Dark
Ages. But we must be careful about drawing bold conclusions from the mere absence of sources.
There was an oral culture in Dark Age England, and oral cultures can be remarkably vibrant. It is
hard to make a compelling case for Dark Age nationalism. But it is also hard to make a
compelling case against it. In the end, we can only speculate.

HOW SPECIAL WAS ENGLAND?

Could it be that England was the exception that proves the rule, an isolated case of precocious
nationalism that diverged from the normal trajectory of political modernization? Certainly, the
English case has been exceptionally well researched. Whether it was otherwise exceptional may
well be doubted. For example, my own research on Dutch nationalism in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries (Gorski 2000) reveals striking parallels with the English case. There, too,
political pamphlets and other sources provide rich evidence of pre-modern nationalism, with
repeated eruptions of debate and contention about membership and mission. The sources of
collective representation are also remarkably similar. First, there is a Hebraic discourse, in which
the Dutch are portrayed as a „chosen people‟ or „New Israel‟ bound to God by a sacred covenant.
Then, there is a classical discourse, in which the people of Holland and Zeeland, and sometimes
of the Netherlands as a whole, are treated as the lineal descendants of the ancient Batavians, a
proud and warlike people who defended their liberty against the Romans. Third, there is a
patriarchal discourse that likens the Dutch to a family, with the Princes of Orange cast in the role
of benevolent fathers. Though separable in theory, these representations could be combined in
practice. Thus, during the Dutch Revolt, it was not uncommon for the „father of the fatherland‟,
William of Orange, to be likened to Moses, with the King of Spain cast in the role of Pharaoh.
However, these representations could also be used against one another, and once the
independence of the Republic appeared secure, they often were. The chief carriers of the Hebraic
discourse were the orthodox Calvinists, who advocated a strong central government, reconquest
of the Southern Netherlands (present-day Belgium), which remained under Spanish control, a

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strong and autonomous system of ecclesiastical discipline, and the imposition of a strict moral
code within Dutch society. Their arch-enemies were the „libertine‟ regents of Holland, who
advocated a federal system of government (which Holland could dominate), continued separation
from the South (which might have threatened Holland's economic preeminence), an „erastian‟
system of church governance, in which the state governed the church, and a laxer moral code, at
least as regards their own conduct. The libertines were the main carriers of the classical discourse
about the Ancient Batavians. By arguing that Batavia was more or less co-terminous with
Holland, and that its chief heritage was liberty, they aimed to fend off the Calvinists' programme
of state-building, national re-unification and moral regeneration. The House of Orange tended to
ally with the Calvinists, at least in times of political crisis, and its monarchical aspirations can be
seen in a shift from Mosaic to Davidic and Solomonic forms of self-representation. This
constellation of ideologies and alliances remained relatively stable until the late eighteenth
century, when populist patriots laid claim to the Batavian mythology, and used it against its
progenitors: the regents of Holland. The battle between these three discourses and their carriers
was not a battle between nationalists and anti-nationalists, as has sometimes been supposed, but a
battle to define the nation, whose victor would win both material and symbolic spoils.

Evidence of nationalism can also be found in other times and places. Consider medieval France.
There, too, we find examples of the three discursive formations that I identified in the early
modern Netherlands: Hebraic, classical and patriarchal. In the early fourteenth century, for
example, Guillaume de Sauquerville argued that „God chose the kingdom of France before all
people‟ (cited in Beaune 1991: 176). As for the classical discourse, genealogies linking the
French to the Franks, and the Franks to the Trojans were „everywhere in medieval French
literature‟ (Beaune 1991: 226). Nor was the patriarchal discourse absent. In France, and
elsewhere, „kings were kings of peoples not of regions … [and] [k]ingship was like kinship,
primarily personal …‟ (Strayer 1970: 300). and what shall we make of the following extract from
the Salic Law, written in the fifth century, which speaks of the Franks as „the nation that with
strength and bravery has shaken off the hard yoke of the Romans, and after its acceptance of
Christianity has enshrined in buildings decked with gold and precious stones the bodies of the
holy martyrs burnt, beheaded and thrown to the wild beasts by the Romans‟ (quoted from
Huizinga 1972: 15-16)? Does this not anticipate both the classical and Hebraic discourses in
important ways?

MODERNIST DEFENCES AND PREMODERNIST REJOINDERS

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Having surveyed some of the evidence advanced by the premodernists, let us now review the
counterarguments developed by the modernists. There are at least four, common lines of defence.
The first and oldest focuses on sociological and/or geographical scope. While there was certainly
a premodern discourse about the nation, so this argument goes, it was confined to certain elite
strata, usually urban intellectuals, and never really touched the rural masses. And an elite, urban
discourse does not a social and political movement make. Of course, this line of defence is of
little use for modernists who define nationalism as an ideology. They usually emphasize
discursive or ideological content. Eric Hobsbawm offers a good example. He proposes the
following litmus test: the equation „nation = people = state‟. In other words, where claims to state
sovereignty are made in the name of the nation, and the nation is defined as a territorially
bounded community of descent, there you have nationalism (1992: 16-18, 46-7, 73). A third line
of defence emphasizes the discursive purity of nationalist discourse and/or the categorical
exclusivity of national identity. In Nationalism and the State, for example, John Breuilly argues
that the Dutch Revolt against Spain and the English Civil War were „movements of national
opposition‟, rather than nationalist movements, because „the idea of the nation … was
subordinated to religious and monarchical principles' (1982:45). Of course, this defence is tenable
only for those who define nationalism as a discourse. Those who understand it as a form of
identity or community usually insist that „true nationalism‟ is exclusive nationalism. In genuine
nationalism, in other words, national identity trumps all other identities.

By these standards, there was no such thing as pre-modern nationalism. But does modern
nationalism actually fulfil these criteria? Let us examine the evidence, beginning with the scope
criteria. Take the French Revolution, usually considered the fons et origo of modern nationalism.
There is no denying that the French Revolution sparked a fierce debate about the French nation
and about nations more generally, which extended well beyond the Parisian intelligentsia to the
provinces and the popular classes (Hyslop 1934; Bell 2001: 12). Nonetheless, there was much
ignorance and indifference, especially on the periphery and within the peasantry, who were often
more interested in securing municipal autonomy or strengthening property rights than in
defending the Republic or building the nation (Agulhon 1970; Karnoouh 1973; Jones 1985: 186-
95; Sahlins 1989: 169-76). It must also be remembered that there was a great deal of resistance to
the national project. In northwestern France, resistance escalated into rebellion in the events of
the Vendée and the guerilla attacks of the Chouannerie. Not that there is anything surprising
about this. Nationalist mobilization never lives up to the hopes of nationalist ideologues.

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This brings us to the second test: the existence of a nationalist movement. Here, the modernists
might appear to be on somewhat safer ground. For the modern era is replete with nationalist
movements advancing a nationalist agenda and seeking nationalist goals. But there were certainly
nationalistic movements in early modern England and Holland, and probably in other places and
earlier times as well. This is why modernist scholars who are more knowledgeable about the early
modern era, such as Breuilly, usually introduce other tests of „genuine‟ nationalism.

Which brings us to the third and last test: discursive purity. Genuine nationalism, it is argued,
must be wholly secular and/or democratic; it cannot be contaminated with religious or non-
democratic elements. Once again, it is easy to show that pre-modern movements fall short of this
criteria. Unfortunately, few, if any, examples of modern nationalism meet it either. Take Poland:
during the nineteenth century, Polish intellectuals articulated a vision of Poland as „the Christ of
nations‟ and the „bulwark of Christendom‟ (Porter 2000). One might imagine that this vision of
the nation would have been erased by four decades of Communist rule and a decade and a half of
liberal capitalism; not so. Even today, the „most common and pervasive‟ understanding of Polish
national identity is Poland as „the Christ of nations, martyred for the sins of the world, resurrected
for the world‟s salvation; a nation whose identity is conserved and guarded by its defender, the
Catholic Church …; a nation which has given the world a Pope and rid the Western world of
communism' (Zubrzycki 2004: 43). Now consider the example of German nationalism (see e.g.
Hermand and Holub 1999; Stambolis 2000). During the early nineteenth century, nationalist
thinkers contrasted a Christian German nation with a godless French one. During the second half
of the nineteenth century, and especially during the Kulturkampf, Prussian nationalists on both
left and right advanced a Protestant vision of the German nation, designed to delegitimate their
Austrian rivals and relegate their Catholic subjects to second-class status. Then, in the early
twentieth century, some radical nationalists, the forebears of the Nazis, espoused a pre-Christian
and pan-German Volksreligion. Thus, German nationalist discourse was „contaminated‟ with
religious discourse throughout the modern era. Even modern French nationalism, the very
paradigm of secular nationalism, was contaminated to some degree (see e.g. Ozouf 1989).

During the early years of the Revolution, before the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, some argued
that nationalism and Catholicism could go hand in hand, and many parish clergymen supported
the Revolution. Later, after the Revolution had taken its anti-Catholic turn, the revolutionaries
sought to install a civic religion of some sort, first the Cult of Reason and then the Cult of the
Supreme Being, each replete with its own rituals, festivals and other observances.

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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A POSTMODERNIST THEORY

Modernists argue that nationalism was born after 1750 and perhaps as late as the 1870s.
Premodernists working on England argue that English nationalism was born before 1750 and
perhaps as early as the 600s. Who is right? The modernists? Or the premodernists? Perhaps
neither.

Modernists have tried to paint a clear and sharp line between modern nationalism and pre-modern
national „sentiments‟, „identities‟ and „discourses‟. In doing so, they have painted themselves into
a corner. The nationalist tests that they have constructed are so stringent that even modern
nationalisms do not pass them. In true nationalism, they imply, loyalty to the nation is universal
and supreme, and the ideology of the nation is pure and unadulterated. This is probably a fair
description of what radical nationalists aspire to, but it is not a fair test for the existence of
nationalism. It makes the dreams of nationalist ideologues into the criteria for the reality of
nationalist politics.

Given the strength of the evidence for pre-modern nationalism, much of it long known, one
wonders why so many scholars of nationalism have clung so fiercely to the modernist thesis. One
possible explanation is a desire (possibly conscious) to discredit nationalist ideology. If nations
could be shown to be recent rather than ancient, constructed rather than primordial, cultural or
political, instead of natural or biological, then perhaps nationalism would lose some of its
legitimacy and appeal. The problem, of course, is that these are false dichotomies. For example,
while the current self-understandings of a particular nation - France, for example - may be
relatively modern, the general idea of the French nation may still be quite old, and the underlying
category of the nation older still. A second and somewhat more subtle explanation might be a
commitment to modernity as a distinct age and a political project. If the modern age really does
involve a fundamental break with everything that went before it, then it must bring a
fundamentally new kind of politics into being, a politics, it might be hoped, that is more rational
and secular than whatever went before it. This would not only explain why scholars of
nationalism have so stubbornly defended the modernist thesis, but why they have worked so hard
to distinguish „good‟ nationalism (secular and rational) from „bad‟ nationalism (religious and
traditionalist), often to the point of caricaturing reality, whether by insisting that some nations
were never nationalist (e.g. England), or by arguing that some nationalisms were purely secular
and rational and therefore wholly good (e.g. French nationalism). All of this is not to say that

227
scholars of nationalism should not reflect on whether nationalism is a good or a bad thing, or
whether some types of nationalism are more defensible than others, only that they should be clear
and explicit about the boundaries between scholarly analysis and political intervention.

While I am generally more convinced by the premodernists' arguments, this does not mean that I
agree with them in toto. Too often, premodernists simply substitute an early point of origin for a
later one. As we have seen for England, however, it is very difficult to fix such a point of origin,
both because the evidence goes so far back in time and because it becomes thinner the farther
back we go. Perhaps the debate could be resolved if there were a widely accepted definition of
nationalism. But this seems unlikely, not only because scholars of nationalism are a contentious
lot, but because nationalism is a multi-levelled and multidimensional phenomenon. In a sense, it
all boils down to this: what do we mean by „-ism‟? Does nationalism exist when people use the
national category, when they feel part of some such category, when they make this category into a
political programme, or when they organize a movement around this programme? All four views
are reasonable, all four views have supporters, and there is no reason to expect that there will be
convergence around one view.

So how shall we move forward? I would suggest that we spend less time fighting over definitions
and searching for origins and more time constructing conceptual typologies which can be used to
analyse historical dynamics. We might begin with a very general definition such as the following:
„nationalism is any form of political practice that deploys “the nation” or equivalent categories‟.
We might also add that Western nationalisms, and the non-Western nationalisms they inspire,
generally involve one or more of the following ideas: (1) the world is divided up into nations or
peoples; (2) each nation or people has a special mission and/or a territory or homeland; (3) each
nation or people deserves respect and/or autonomy; (4) these aims are best achieved when a
people has its own state and/or is ruled by its own people. (No doubt, others could be added.)

Having laid down these general parameters, which are broad enough to encompass all the rival
definitions, we could turn to the task of describing and explaining the forms and degrees of
nationalism. The forms can be understood in terms of discourses - the symbols and stories
through which the nation is constructed and experienced. In this chapter, I have distinguished
three such discourses: the Hebraic, the classical and the patriarchal. (No doubt, there are others as
well.) While these various discourses can be distinguished in theory, they are often combined in
practice. A particular nationalism can be described in terms of which discourses it draws on, and

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how it appropriates and combines them. A focus on discourses also gives us some leverage on
transformations: transformations involve the emergence of new discourses and/or novel
combinations of existing ones. For example, one could argue that the French Revolution helped
transform Western nationalism by crystallizing a new, civic discourse or, more precisely, by
disentangling it from the Hebraic and patriarchal discourses.

The degrees of nationalism can be understood in terms of mobilization. For example, we could
distinguish the scope (geographic and social) and the degree of mobilization (weak or strong). In
this framework, a very low degree of nationalism would involve, say, discourse about a nation's
history or culture within a loose and small network of people, while a very high degree of
nationalism might entail an explicit programme for national renewal advanced by a large and
well-organized political party.

From this perspective, the potential for nationalism is not unique to the modern era, but endemic
throughout Western history. What has changed, I would submit, is the scope and perhaps also the
probability of nationalism. This is not because we now live in an „age of nationalism‟ in which
the nation has supplanted or subordinated all other forms of identification or sources of
mobilization. Rather, it is because we now live in an age of mass communications and mass
organizations which allow information to travel further and mobilization to occur faster. Of
course, these same factors affect the spread of other „isms‟ as well, including religious and
secular forms of universalism (for example, otherworldly salvation religions such as Islam and
Christianity as well as this-worldly ones such as economic liberalism and Marxism-Leninism) but
also sub-national forms of identity and community (such as religious sectarianism or amoral
familism).

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Greenfeld, Liah. "Modernity and Nationalism." Pp. 157-168

THE NATIONALISM DEBATE

The year 2004 marked an important landmark for the academic community dedicated to the study
of nationalism. It was the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Gellner Memorial Lecture
on Nationalism at the London School of Economics, itself home to the first organization devoted
to the research and teaching on the subject, ASEN - the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and
Nationalism, founded 15 years ago by Anthony D. Smith and his students. Anthony Smith was a
student of Ernest Gellner; Ernest Gellner was one of the two scholars who inaugurated the new
era in the study of nationalism in 1983, when Gellner's book Nations and Nationalism appeared
simultaneously with Imagined Communities by Benedict Anderson. When Smith's The Ethnic
Origins of Nations was published in 1986, the conceptual framework which was to characterize
this new era was in place.

In this framework the question of the relationship between nationalism and modernity occupied
the central place. in his 1986 book, Smith charted the map of the emerging field. The terrain was
divided between the dominant „modernist‟ position, represented paradigmatically by Gellner and
Anderson, and the opposing „primordialist‟ one, represented, with some reservations, by Smith
himself. According to the „modernists‟, nations and nationalism were by-products of various,
usually economic, processes of modernization. The „primordialists‟, in distinction, held that they
were always with us, phenomena of the primary order and forms of association and sentiment
natural to men. In the first paragraph of the first chapter, raising the crucial question and fittingly
entitled Are nations modern?', Smith stated the logical possibilities. „Why are men and women
willing to die for their countries?‟ he asked. „Why do they identify so strongly with their nations?
Is national character and nationalism universal? Or is the “nation” a purely modern phenomenon
and a product of strictly modern social conditions? And what, in any case, do we mean by the
concepts of the “nation” and “national identity”?‟ (Smith 1986: 6). These possibilities were,
therefore, only two: either „national character and nationalism were universal‟, or „the “nation”
was a purely modern phenomenon and a product of strictly modern social conditions.‟

The theme of the ASEN convention in April 2004, held in conjunction with the tenth Gellner
Memorial Lecture, on the one hand, and the celebration of Anthony Smith's career on the

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occasion of his retirement, was „The Nationalism Debate‟, and the debate was the one between
„modernists‟ and „primordialists‟. The latter, in the years that passed, changed their name to
„ethno-symbolists‟, but did not modify their position. The question of relationship between
modernity and nationalism has remained the central theoretical question in the field.

Scholars who studied nationalism in the new era came from most of the social science disciplines.
Though there was hardly any interest in the subject among them before the early 1980s, the field
soon became very fashionable. The specific reason for that was the political turmoil in, and then
the dissolution of, the Soviet Union, followed naturally by the disappearance of the „discipline‟ of
Sovietology. Since Sovietologists were quite numerous, especially among political scientists, and
especially in the United States, this academic disaster robbed many a PhD of an expertise and left
them without a disciplinary home. Since nationalism emerged as a factor of dramatic importance
in the political transformation of the Soviet Union, many ex-Soviet specialists, who previously
disregarded it, turned to the study of nationalism. A new association was formed among the
members of the dissolved academic community - the Association for the Study of Nationalities
(ASN), which would meet at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University in New York. At first
it focused exclusively on the former Soviet nationalities, but later has expanded into other areas.
1
The programme of its ninth annual meeting, in April 2004, one week before the ASEN
convention in London, ran to 64 pages; it must have brought together hundreds of people. It also
for the first time devoted several sessions, prominently advertised in the programme, to
theoretical issues. Though, because of the historical circumstances in which the field was shaped,
the majority of the scholars engaged in the study of nationalism by this time were Americans, the
conceptual framework in which they worked was the British one of „the nationalism debate‟
revolving around Smith's question Are nations modern?'. Indeed, the central theoretical session at
the meetings was devoted precisely to this debate between „modernists‟ (who, in the American
context, were renamed „constructivists‟) and „primordialists‟ (who retained their original name).
Their positions were identical to those of their respective counterparts in London, and, in fact, the
same scholar, Walker Connor, was both the eminent elder „primordialist‟ in New York and the
eminent elder „ethno-symbolist‟ in London. 2

The traditional juxtaposition of the „modernist‟ and „primordialist‟ answers to the question Are
nations modern?' may create the impression that one is dealing with two different theories of
nationalism, modernity and social reality in general. Such an impression would be wrong: a
profound agreement exists between the two camps in regard to the nature of these phenomena.

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Despite obvious differences in emphases, which lead to certain differences in terminology, both
„modernists‟ and „primordialists‟ (that is, „constructivists‟ and „ethno-symbolists‟) subscribe to
the structuralist - materialist paradigm of human society, essentially viewing humanity as a
product of biological evolution, and modernity and nationalism, in particular, as products of later
stages of this evolutionary process, conceptualized as an interaction between various „social‟
(higher biological) forces. The biologistic assumptions behind this view are rarely stated
explicitly (although they are by such radical „primordialists‟ as Pierre van der Berghe (1967,
1987), who identify as „socio-biologists‟; the foundational text of the structuralist - materialist
paradigm, The German Ideology by Karl Marx, is also rather explicit), but a close reading
inevitably reveals them. The general argument runs like this: the specifically human evolution, at
the beginning of which „man‟ emerges with all his/her productive (inborn) capacities, proceeds by
predetermined (presumably biologically) stages - for instance, feudal and bourgeois, or agrarian
and industrial - each of which corresponds to the development of a particular capacity - for
instance, tool-making. Such development necessarily modifies the physical environment and,
therefore, its constraints on the organism, which, in turn, prompts the development of another
capacity, and so on and so forth, until we reach the stage of capitalism, that is, modernity.
Everything significant occurs on the level of the group: the individual has no influence on the
process. The group is a natural (that is, biological) formation, and in the later stages of human
evolution groups become increasingly complex. The nature of the group is reflected in such
superstructural (causally secondary) formations as one's culture, consciousness and identity;
alternatively, belonging to a group gives one a culture, a consciousness and an identity. A nation
is a group, corresponding to a late stage of human evolution; national identity, national
consciousness, nationalism are cultural forms corresponding to this group. (For an analysis of the
quasi-biological reasoning behind the dominant social science paradigm and, specifically, the
work of Gellner and Anderson on nationalism, see Greenfeld 2005a).

It is in regard to this point that differences between the „modernist‟ and „primordialist‟ positions
on the relationship between modernity and nationalism arise. „Modernists‟, while admitting that
ethnic groups represent the natural source out of which nations grow, claim that the cause of this
growth lies within the „structures of modernity‟ (free markets, bureaucratic state, print media,
highly evolved means of communication), themselves reflective of the very late - capitalist or
industrial - stage of human development. As a result, nations and national identities have to be
explained in their own (modern) context, and deep explorations of their antecedents are
unnecessary. „Primordialists‟, in distinction, insist that, while triggered by the „structures of

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modernity‟, the growth of nations out of ethnic groupings is a natural process, realizing the
potential and unveiling the essence of ethnicity itself, and that, therefore, only the study of ethnic
groups and identities can result in an adequate understanding of nations and nationalism.

The question Are nations modern?' therefore should read: Are nations essentially modern?' - that
is, Are they modern in their causes as well as in their age?' - because everyone agrees that nations
are a rather recent historical phenomenon. But, since the structuralist-materialist paradigm denies
the fundamental historicity of human phenomena (its absolute dependence on the context), this
point of agreement seems to lack significance. the denial of a causal role to history, however,
implies the denial of precisely those qualities of humanity that distinguish it from the rest of the
living world, making it a reality sui generis: the essentially symbolic (that is, not material) or
cultural character of this reality, and the essential autonomy of human individuals. The
recognition of the distinctiveness of human reality from the rest of the (biological) reality of life
makes it immediately possible to perceive a third logical possibility alongside the two listed by
Smith, namely that „national character and nationalism are universal‟ and that „the “nation” is a
purely modern phenomenon and a product of strictly modern social conditions‟. And this
possibility is that the nation is a modern phenomenon, but it is not a product of modern
conditions, but instead is the very cause of modernity.

The claim that „nationalism is the constitutive element of modernity‟ was a central proposition in
the book I published in 1992. This book, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, was based on a
view of human reality which presupposed exactly what the structuralist-materialist paradigm
denied: namely, that human reality is essentially cultural; that it is essentially historical; and that
the agent in it is the individual. In other words, it belonged to the tradition of Durkheim, Weber
and Bloch, which, because of its focus on the mind and „mental‟ phenomena, I later named
„mental-ism‟. 3
In the intervening years I had several occasions to spell out the argument
regarding the relationship between nationalism and modernity, which may be summarized as
follows (see, amongst other publications, Greenfeld 1992, 1996b, 2001, 2005c).

MODERNITY AND NATIONALISM

What is modernity? The equation of the „modern‟ with the „contemporary‟ must be rejected at the
outset as meaningless, since what was contemporary yesterday is no longer so today. This means
we cannot say that modern society (or politics, or economy) is society as it exists in our time and

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have to go beyond pure description. We must realize that there may be societies today, which are
not modern, despite the fact that they may have certain descriptive characteristics of modernity.
This, in turn, leads to the rejection of the concept of „modernization‟ - that is, of the assumption
that modernity is achieved gradually as a result of an incremental addition of such descriptive
characteristics, and that there are, consequently, at any point in time more modern and less
modern societies. Instead, we have to assume that modernity is akin to pregnancy (one is either
pregnant or not; one cannot be more or less pregnant), or to being human (one is either human or
not; one cannot be more or less human). As such, it is a state of being, rather than a stage of
development - it is a specific form, or type, of society, and we must look for the organizing
principle which creates this type (something analogous to the conception or the mutation that
produces the human species) - a principle behind its descriptive characteristics.

Nevertheless, one cannot, and by no means should, avoid description altogether. There are certain
features, certain structures and processes, which one implicitly recognizes as modern; one should
look for what connects them together. For instance, there is the modern stratification structure -
the class structure. In distinction to other stratification systems, such as the estate or the caste
ones, it is fluid; its compartments are permeable; it allows for, in fact encourages, constant
mobility; its unit is the individual, rather than the family; status in it is based on achievement,
rather than ascription, and social positions are distributed in accordance with resources that easily
transfer from family to family, such as education and wealth, instead of being determined by birth.
Then there is the modern form of government - the state. It is distinguished from other forms of
government, such as the medieval European kingship, royal absolutism, or the bakufu in Japan,
by its impersonal character. There is also the modern economy. It differs from the economies of
other social formations primarily in that the economic process, instead of taking on the shape of
cycles of growth and decline, assumes the linear pattern of sustained growth (expressed, among
other things, in the increasingly rapid change in the nature of economic activity with commerce
replacing agriculture as the leading sector, industry replacing commerce, information technology
replacing heavy industry, and so on). A similar pattern of development characterizes scientific
knowledge, a product of the dominant modern epistemological approach - the rational and
empirical science, and a central expression of the modern (secular) consciousness.

These features are invariably included in the check-list of characteristics, which, when full, is
believed to constitute the modern package within the framework of modernization theory (see
Anderson 1974; Bendix 1978; Berger et al. 1973; Black 1966; Eisenstadt 1985; Inkeles 1983;

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Tilly 1990; Wallerstein 1974); the names under which they are commonly presented are: social
mobility; modern state, bureaucratization and centralization; industrialization or capitalism; and
secularization. The currently dominant, modernist/primordialist, theory of nationalism, as I
mentioned above, similarly to earlier sociological attempts to conceptualize nationalism within
this framework (Deutsch 1953), views nationalism as a cultural and psychological function of the
process of modernization, a superstructural product of the basic „objective‟ structures. The
emergence of nationalism is seen as tightly connected to the modern phenomenon of state-
formation and as related to the trend of the secularization of culture. But almost invariably the
factor truly responsible for its rise (as well as for the development of the state and secularization)
is believed to be economic: nationalism is explained as a functional prerequisite or product of
industrialization and capitalism.

And yet historically nationalism (the emergence of national identities and ideologies of
nationalism) preceded industrialization and institutionalization of capitalism as well as the
development of the state and secularization of culture. Thus, unless we resort to teleological
reasoning, nationalism cannot be considered the effect of these later developments. It is far more
logical to suppose that it was one of their causes. Moreover, the modernist/primordialist theory of
nationalism, as well as the modernization theory more generally, is rather vague as to how the
economic, political and cultural features of modernity are connected among themselves: for
instance, it is unclear why capitalism or the state would require secularization (which is assumed
to be a condition for nationalism). If the direction of causation is reversed, it becomes quite
obvious that these central components of modernity should be related.

The considerations behind the mentalist position on the subject - thus the reversal of the direction
of causation - are the following. Human social reality is culturally constructed. Consequently, a
transformation in the conception of social order is necessary for the development of new forms of
economic and political organization. For example, both modern economy and modern science as
social institutions could only emerge in a society conceived as fundamentally egalitarian, and,
therefore, one in which transition from one stratum or sector to another (social mobility) would be
not only possible, but legitimate. (It is true that both capitalism and industrialization require a
flexible stratification system, but they cannot call such a system into being in some mysterious
way, as is assumed by many theories that view industrialization as the basic element of modernity;
a flexible system of stratification emerges independently from industrialization and capitalism
and makes the development of the latter possible.) A society conceived in the form of a

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hierarchical structure composed of hermetically closed compartments, as was the society of
orders, could import capitalism and science but would not be able to produce them in the first
place. Similarly, the state, which is distinguished from other, non-modern forms of political
authority by its impersonal character, would not be possible unless sovereignty was separated
from the person (and/or lineage) of the sovereign (or prince) and became an attribute of the
community.

Both of these conditions, the egalitarian conception of the social order and, related to this,
collectivization of authority, were accomplished by nationalism. Nationalism was a response of
individuals affected by dysfunctions of the society of orders - the traditional structure modern
society replaced - to the sense of disorder they created. Many other responses were possible; the
choice of nationalism was not inevitable, but contingent. Neither, certainly not in the form it took
or the pace it proceeded, was the dissolution of the old society. Instead, it was to a large extent
due to the nationalist response to its dysfunction. Once chosen, nationalism accelerated the
process of change, limited the possibilities of future development, and became a major factor in it.
It thus both reflected and realized the grand transformation from the old order to modernity.

Nationalism, in short, is the modern culture. It is the symbolic blueprint of modern reality, the
way we see, and thereby construct, the world around us, the specifically modern consciousness.
The core of this consciousness is a specific image of the meaningful reality. In 2004 I asked
4
participants at an international seminar on federalism - 55 people from 32 countries on five
continents - to draw me a pic-togram of how they imagined their reality; they all drew the globe
with people on it. These pictograms, obviously, could express only the most salient outward
features of the image; nevertheless, they captured its essence. This image of meaningful reality is
secular - it is limited to this, experiential, world, thereby making it, the mundane, the source of its
own meaning, or ultimately meaningful; while within this world the most significant element is
the people who populate it. This image is not only secular, it is fundamentally humanistic. (For a
detailed discussion of the position of religion in the modern world, see Greenfeld 1996a.)

Why is this worldview called „nationalism‟? For purely accidental, historically contingent reasons,
specifically the use of the word „nation‟ - at the time meaning a small group embodying an
authority in a conciliar, ecclesiastical setting, or an elite - to connote the entire population, the
people, of England. This momentous linguistic event, which occurred in the early sixteenth
century, helped the members of the new Henrician aristocracy to rationalize their experience of

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upward mobility which made no sense in the terms of, and in fact contradicted, the traditional,
feudal and religious image of reality. By the same token, it symbolically elevated the mass of the
population to the dignity of an elite and redefined the community of the people as both sovereign
- the embodiment of supreme authority - and as a community of interchangeable individuals, each
with a generalized capacity to occupy any social position, or, in other words, as fundamentally a
community of equals. The word „nation‟, therefore, acquired its modern meaning of a sovereign
people consisting of fundamentally equal individuals, while the community defined as a nation
inevitably began to be restructured as such a people. It was the definition of an earthly
community as sovereign which focused attention on this world and on humanity, exiling God
beyond its confines and creating an essentially secular consciousness. In its turn, the
secularization of the worldview reinforced the effects of the principles of popular sovereignty and
egalitarianism which between them define the modern concept of „nation‟.

To sum up: nationalism is a fundamentally secular and humanistic consciousness based on the
principles of popular sovereignty and egalitarianism. These three characteristics (secularism,
egalitarianism and popular sovereignty) are present in every specific case of nationalism. Modern
culture, more generally, is essentially nationalistic in the sense that it has at its core the nationalist
worldview and that it projects this worldview on every sphere of cultural/social activity.

STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONALISM

To claim that nationalism is the modern culture is tantamount to saying that it represents the
cultural foundation of modern social structure, economics, politics, international relations,
education, art, science, family relations, and so on and so forth. I shall mention just the most
salient of its implications for the character of modernity in the ascending order of importance,
starting with modern economy.

Modern economy, contrary to a widespread belief, to put it bluntly, is a product of nationalism,

for it is this vision of social reality which provided economic activity with the motivation that
reoriented it from subsistence to sustained growth (see Greenfeld 2001). The economic effects of
nationalism are mainly the result of the egalitarian principle at its core. To begin with, the
definition of the entire population, the people, as a nation, that is, as an elite (given the previous
meaning of the word „nation‟ in its ecclesiastical context) symbolically elevates the lower classes
and ennobles their activities. Economic activities in general, engaging the overwhelming majority

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of the people and traditionally denigrated in pre-national societies precisely for this reason, gain
status and, with it, a hold on the talented people who, under different circumstances, having
achieved a certain level of financial independence, would choose to leave the economic sphere.

Arguably of even greater moment is the fact that the symbolic ennoblement of the populace in
nationalism makes membership in the nation, that is, nationality itself, an honourable elevated
status, thereby tying one's sense of dignity and self-respect to one's national identity. This ensures
one's commitment to the national community and, in particular, one's investment in the nation's
collective dignity, or prestige. Prestige is a relative good: one nation's having more of it implies
that another has less. Therefore, investment in national prestige necessarily gives rise to an
endless international competition, for no matter how much prestige one may have gained at a
certain moment, one can be outdone in the next. Unlike other types of societies, then, nations are
inherently competitive. This competition goes on in all the spheres of collective endeavour: moral
(the nation's record on human rights, for instance), pertaining to cultural creativity (scientific,
literary, musical, etc.), military, political. Any particular nation chooses those spheres of
competition where it has a chance to end on, or near, the top, and disregards those in which it is
likely to be shamefully out-competed. For instance, Russia has always chosen to compete in the
cultural and military arenas, and has never been interested in economic competition.

Where economic competition is included among the areas of national engagement, however, the
inherent competitiveness of nationalism gives rise to the economies of sustained, endless, growth
- that is, to what are recognized as modern economies.

Since not all nations include the economy among the spheres of international competition in
which they are willing to engage, not all nations develop the specifically „economic nationalism‟,
that is, an economic interpretation of nationalism, and therefore a reconstruction of the economic
activity on the basis of the nationalist image of reality. Thus, while economies of sustained
growth (modern economies) cannot exist without nationalism, nationalism can exist without
spawning economies of sustained growth or economic modernization. In distinction, nationalism
cannot fail to affect politics, as it does not simply encourage, but logically implies the
reconstruction of political structures and processes in accordance with its fundamental principles.
The essential secularism and the two principles of nationalism's image of the social world define
this form of consciousness as such, and though its specific expressions, or particular nationalisms,

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are distinguished by numerous other qualities, it is these three general characteristics which
explain the central political features of every modern society.

The first of these central features to be listed is the democratization or universality of political
action: the striking fact that in modern societies it may be found on any rung of the social ladder
and in any corner of the national territory. It is this, dramatic by comparison to other types of
societies, level of political participation which the term „civil society‟ as a rule describes. Indeed,
it would be absurd to talk of „civil society‟ or „political action‟ in the framework of the European
feudal society or Indian caste society, to mention the two perhaps best-known non-modern types.
The forms of consciousness prevailing in them did not allow for the existence of such political
phenomena, which still appear unimaginable to us, being logically incongruent with the two
cultural frameworks.

The focus of nationalism on this world as ultimately meaningful and the principle of popular
sovereignty combine to render social reality changeable and place the responsibility for its shape
in the hands of the earthly living community - the nation. The focus on the life in this world
dramatically increases the value of this life to the individual and inevitably leads to the insistence
on a good life, however defined. One is no longer expected to submit to suffering or deprivation,
unless one has special reasons to do so, for the general reasons for such submission - the
expectation of rewards in the beyond, transmutation and migration of the soul, the duty to witness
to the glory of God wherever one is called, or the sheer impossibility to change one's condition -
no longer apply.

Moreover, in a self-sufficient world, changeable and shaped by people, suffering is generally

believed to be man-made. Even natural disasters are likely to be so interpreted: a famine, an
earthquake, or an epidemic are as often as not attributed to some human agent's withholding of
the needed but available resources or negligence; personal misfortunes, such as debilitating, life-
threatening and incurable illnesses are blamed on artificially-created environmental conditions
(second-hand smoke, lead paint, etc.) or on doctors' incompetence. None of these natural disasters,
it is said, „have to happen‟: they are no longer believed to be in the nature of things. Of course,
the right to a life free of suffering is most clearly asserted when suffering is caused - as it is
mostly in modern societies - by social evils: war, economic or political conditions, competition
for precedence, and so forth. Humiliation, rejection, thwarted ambition are felt as unjust - as
contrary to expectations and thus resulting from illegitimate intervention of malicious others. As

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one's precious time on earth is limited, the change in the conditions preventing the realization of
one's right to a life of contentment, free of suffering, is experienced as urgent, and since those
responsible for their creation are only human, any naturally active and temperamental individual,
who is not particularly timid, easily gets engaged in whatever form the political process around
him or her takes.

As a result, involvement in political action (or participation in civil society) under nationalism is a
function not of the social position - as it was, let us say, in feudal and absolutist Europe or in
Tokugawa Japan - but of character and personality. Since temperament changes with age, and
young people, for instance, are more likely to be impetuous and unthinkingly brave, it is also a
function of age: it is noteworthy that all revolutionary movements of the past 300 years, from the
French Revolution to the student movement of the 1960s, were movements of adolescents and
people in their twenties and to a lesser extent thirties. It is even more significant that in the past
300 years - but never before - there were revolutionary movements, that is, explicit attempts at
social change, movements oriented towards reshaping the world by human design. All forms of
consciousness allow for revolts and rebellions, spontaneous eruptions of frustration and rage,
essentially expressive collective actions, aimless - perhaps vaguely oriented to the righting of
some tremendous, but ill-defined, wrongs - with goals and demands thought through, if at all,
only after the fact. But revolutions are a modern form of political action: at their root always lies
nationalism (see Greenfeld 1995).

The central political institution of our age, the state, is also a product of nationalism. Specifically,
it is an implication of the principle of popular sovereignty. The state is not to be confused with
government in general; it is only a form of government, and this form is characteristically modern
and necessarily bureaucratic. 5
The concept of „state‟ as a form of government appeared in the
English language of the sixteenth century - about 50 years after the entrenchment of the idea of
the „nation‟ and well into the development of the nationalist discourse. It obviously reflected a
new reality, as it did later in other countries when the term migrated there in translation. This new
reality was the new form of government, called forth by the new form of consciousness, which
presented a new image of what a government should be. As nationalism first developed in
Western Europe, this image contrasted most sharply with the then existing Western European
ideal of government - the medieval ideal of kingship. The distinguishing characteristic of
kingship was its personality: the government was inseparable from a particular person, a person
born at a certain time to a certain family, who needed no other qualifications in addition to this

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accident of birth (of course, never regarded as an accident and at a later stage explicitly
reaffirmed as divine appointment) to assume power. In contrast, the distinguishing characteristic
of the state became its impersonality. Since supreme authority, in the framework of nationalism,
resides in the body of the nation in accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty, the
authority of the state is necessarily delegated, representative (in the sense that it only represents
the authority of the people) and, insofar as it is subject to recall, limited. Sovereignty is delegated
to the office, not to any particular person, and any person exercises authority only as a holder of
the office. The state is a government by officers, that is, a bureaucracy. In this sense, Adolf Hitler,
the Führer who ardently believed that he represented the will of the German people, was but a
bureaucrat, as was Josef Stalin, the appositely referred to General Secretary, who did not believe
in any such thing but made sure that everyone else did.

Finally, the principle of the equality of national membership lies at the root of the open
recruitment to state offices, which obviously also exerts a most profound influence on the nature
of politics in modern society. It is through the principle of equality of membership - its core social
principle - that nationalism affects the social structure most directly, because in modern society
the system of social stratification - the nodal social structure, in which all social systems meet and
connect - is based on this principle. In this case, too, the modern, or national, system of social
stratification represents the very opposite of the stratification system characteristic of the
European feudal society, which it replaced. In place of a rigid structure, sharply distinguishing
between strata of which it was composed and, except by special dispensation, allowing no
movement between them, we now have an open system with loosely and only theoretically
defined compartments, in practice virtually indistinguishable and seamlessly flowing one into
another via the numerous channels of social mobility. One no longer has a social position and
function, clearly defined by birth, which is supposed to serve one (or, rather, which one is
supposed to serve) all of one's lifetime; instead, one is supposed to choose a function and to
achieve a social position (which presupposes specifically upward mobility), moving from one
social position to higher and higher ones as one grows older, „bettering oneself, or „getting ahead‟.
In modern societies one does not talk of „usurpers‟, „parvenus‟, or, however great the temptation,
„nouveaux riches‟: one is expected, even encouraged, to strive, to have ambitions, to be a
proficient social climber. And so there is nothing strange in a poor seminarist from Georgia
becoming the all-powerful ruler of the great Soviet Union; a son of elderly underpaid Leningrad
parents rising through the ranks of foreign espionage to the presidency of only slightly less great
Russia; a daughter of a modest greengrocer gaining recognition as the premier of the United

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Kingdom; and a child of a single mother, unhappily remarried to a garage mechanic from
Arkansas, twice being elected to head the United States of America. Our form of consciousness,
nationalism, makes this kind of mountaineering normal, respectable, in fact, necessary. The
combination of the principles of popular sovereignty and fundamental equality of membership
implies democracy: government of the people by the people; therefore, political recruitment must
be open to any member of the nation. The process of recruitment in the democratic, national, or
modern societies differs drastically from those based on forms of consciousness different from
nationalism, for, whatever the differences between nationalisms (which, as I have argued
elsewhere may be very significant), it is in all nations essentially, rather than accidentally, a
process of self-recruitment, always dependent on (though not inevitably determined by)
individual initiative, the nature of one's ambition and talent, while in other societies it follows
strictly charted paths from certain initial social positions to specified political functions, which
only extraordinary circumstances allow one to circumvent.

The egalitarian presupposition of nationalism's image of society, which necessitates an open and
fluid system of social stratification, that is, the class system, characterized by social mobility,
makes the individual the historical agent and bases the social position, or status, on transferable
goods of wealth and education. When the culture of nationalism is imported into a traditional
society, it necessarily undermines the characteristic rigid stratification (such as that of the society
of orders, a legal estate- or a religious caste-system), with its status based on birth; the family,
rather than the individual, as the historical agent; and, as a consequence, the illegitimacy of social
mobility. Since the system of stratification is the nodal social structure, in which all the others
criss-cross and influence each other; it does not exist separately but only through the others. It is,
therefore, clear that a dramatic reconstruction of the social stratification, such as is presupposed
by the emergence or importation of nationalism, will change the very nature of the existential
experience, of one's desires and aspirations, frustrations and fears, the very nature of one's
passions, and with them, both of happiness and of suffering. In the modern world, defined by
nationalism, one can, nay, is supposed to, make oneself; the open system of stratification allows
and encourages ambition; one is free to move and is invited to shape one's destiny. Only in
nations are children asked what they want to be when they grow up. This question is
inconceivable, more than that, subversive in a traditional society where one's future is determined
by birth. The countless children who declare they want to become an American president, or a
British prime minister, or whatever is regarded as the preeminent leadership position in Russia at
the moment, are not checked as precocious arrivistes, they are praised for the healthy vigour of

244
their aspirations. And this freedom is not limited to the political or even generally occupational
sphere. One can dream to become a great scholar or a multimillionaire or a heroic firefighter, or
one can think not in terms of greatness at all, rather seeking self-realization as a gardener or
fulfilment in love. All these are modern desires, made possible by the egalitarianism of
nationalism and the system of stratification it creates. Who thought of marital happiness when
marriage was a contract concluded between two families, rather than a free union between two
individuals, and when being a wife or a husband was a job and an office?

THE PRICE WE PAY: ANOMIE

But the advantages of modernity come with a heavy price-tag. The greater is the choice one is
given in forming one's destiny, the heavier is the burden of responsibility for making the right
choice. The more opportunities one is offered to „find oneself, the harder it is to decide where to
look. Life has never been so exciting and so frustrating; we have never been so empowered and
so helpless. Modern societies, produced by nationalism, because of their very secularism,
openness and the elevation of the individual, are necessarily anomic. As was recognized already
by Durkheim, anomie is the fundamental structural problem of modernity (1964 [1893]; 1966
[1897]). Anomie, commonly translated as „normless-ness‟, refers to a condition of cultural
insufficiency, a systemic problem which reflects inconsistency, or the lack of coordination,
between various institutional structures, as a result of which they are likely to send contradictory
messages to individuals within them. On the psychological level anomie produces a sense of
disorientation, of uncertainty as to one's place in society, and therefore as to one's identity: of
what one is expected to do under circumstances of one sort or another, of the limits to one's
possible achievement (that is, aspirations that would be frustrated) on the social, political,
economic and personal planes. In acute cases such a sense of disorientation and uncertainty leads
to depression, deviant behaviour, even to suicide. On the social level, pervasive anomie
necessarily increases the rates of depression, deviance and suicide. Indeed, Durkheim's classic
discussion of the phenomenon occurs in his study of the rates of suicide. Anomie may occur in all
types of societies, but in modern society it is a built-in feature. One cannot have modernity, one
cannot have nationalism, without anomie.

Anomie is, in fact, the ultimate cause of cultural change. It both breaks the old cultural routine and
encourages the formation of a new one. The general pattern of human history can be imagined as
an alternation between relatively brief and rare periods of widespread (though culturally localized)

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anomie and cultural routine. Widespread anomie, most commonly implying gross inconsistencies
between elements of culture impinging on individual identities, specifically inconsistencies
within the system of social stratification which defines a person's position in the social world in
general and vis-à-vis particular others, affects large groups of individuals and expresses itself in
social turmoil. A readjustment of the stratification system in the course of such turmoil eliminates
these inconsistencies, that is, resolves anomie, again making possible unhindered development of
identity and routine functioning of both the individual and the surrounding culture. But modern
culture (and, as a result, modern history) does not fit this pattern. Nationalism, the novel vision of
reality, which was the formula sixteenth-century Englishmen used - quite successfully, so far as
they were concerned - to resolve their particular anomic situation, turned out to be anomic, and
anomie-generic, vision. Thus it has produced a culture (meaning a society, a polity an economy -
the entire organization of human life, in short), in which anomie is built-in. In modern culture, in
other words, the cultural routine itself is anomic. We live in a constant condition of anomie.

As much as the open class structure, the state and civil society, and the modern economy
characterized by sustained growth (in nations that choose to compete in the economic arena),
anomie is an implication of the nationalist image of reality. Among other things, this explains the
amount of strife in and among modern societies, providing an answer to Anthony Smith's
questions „Why are men and women [indeed, in record numbers] willing to die for their countries?
Why do they identify so strongly with their nations?‟. We are now in a position also to answer
definitively Anthony Smith's central question, Are nations modern?', and perhaps end the
nationalism debate. The understanding of the link between nationalism and modernity is indeed
of central importance, and for much more than the field of nationalism studies alone. Yes, nations
are modern: as a historical form of social organization they belong to the modern period. Of far
greater significance, however, is that modernity is nationalistic: it is defined and shaped by
nationalism.

NOTES

1 9th Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia
University, 2004, April 15-17.

2 Walker Connor is known primarily as the author of Ethnonationalism: The Quest for
Understanding (1993), which followed his 1987 essay on the subject in M. Weiner and M.

246
Huntington (eds), Understanding Political Development. In 2002, a collection of essays on his
contribution to the nationalism debate was published by Routledge (Conversi 2002).

3 This term was first introduced at the conference marking the hundredth anniversary of the
publication of Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London, June 2004) in
a paper „Communing with the Spirit of Max Weber: Nationalism and the Spirit of Capitalism‟,
which will appear in Max Weber Studies, July 2005: 311–37.

4 A part of the Summer University at the Institute of Federalism of the Law Faculty at the
University of Fribourg, Switzerland, August–September, 2004.

5 The state, it should be recognized, is a form, or type, of government, and it is this which makes
possible its definition regardless of„the particular content of social action‟ (Weber 1978: 901)
with which it is associated in any particular case. In modern society, the state is ubiquitous and,
for this reason, often identified with government or political community as such (Anderson 1974;
Evans et al., 1985; Gellner 1983; Mann 1988; Tilly 1990). We tend to project our experiences
onto the past and see all governments and political communities as states, in the same way as we
tend to ascribe to the people of the past national identities. Social reality is hardly conceivable for
us without states and nations. Even Weber, who recognized the recency of the concept of„state‟,
and therefore defined it in accordance with the characteristics of modern governments, as a legal-
rational institution, often used the term in reference to pre-modern structures of authority But
institutions for which we lack concepts do not exist, for the simple reason that conceptualization
is the first necessary step in institutionalization. Weber's usage of the term contradicts his
sophisticated discussion of the „rational institution of the state‟, which he defines as „an abstract
bearer of sovereign prerogatives and the creator of legal norms‟. The specificity of this institution,
he insists, lies in that it does not possess the „personalistic character‟ traditional ethics attributed
to power relations in the economic and political spheres, in that it was separated „from all
personal authority of individuals‟ (Weber 1978: 600, 998). Given this definition, a „patrimonial
state‟, for instance, is obviously a contradiction in terms, which one should attribute to a
concession to the conventional language.

The abstract, impersonal character is indeed what distinguishes the modern form of government –
the state - from the various pre-modern forms. This impersonality is a quality of the ideal type, in
reality it is a variable. In some cases (for example, those of Hitler, Stalin), the state is

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personalized in a certain individual statesman, but, conceptually, it remains primary even then,
and in principle, it is only represented by individuals. „These conceptual distinctions [between the
state and the personal authority of individuals],‟ Weber justly argues, „are necessarily remote
from the nature of pre-bureaucratic, especially from patrimonial and feudal, structures of
authority‟ (1978: 998) (see Greenfeld 1996b: 20–1).

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Greenfeld, L. Nationalism and Modernity Social Research vol. 63 no. 1 (1996b) p. 3–40
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Weber Studies, July vol. 2005 (2005b) p. 311–37
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(originally given as a paper at the 2004 Gellner Memorial Lecture, LSE)
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van der Berghe, P. (1987) The Ethnic Phenomenon . Westport, CT: Praeger
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Smith, Anthony. "Ethnicity and Nationalism." Pp. 169-181

In the study of nationalism, we find two contradictory tendencies. The first of these tendencies is
associated with the „modernists‟, those who hold that nations as well as nationalisms are recent
and novel phenomena, the products of the processes of modernization from the late eighteenth
century onwards. For theorists like Ernest Gellner, Elie Kedourie, John Breuilly and Benedict
Anderson, ethnicity plays at best a minor role in their accounts of the rise and spread of nations:
ethnic ties, in Anderson's case linguistic bonds, are assumed as background factors, but they play
no part in the unfolding of those processes that engender nations and nationalisms. In the eyes of
modernists, nations are products of modernization in its many forms, be it the rise of capitalism
and industrialism, the emergence of the professionalized bureaucratic state, the spread of literacy
and secular education, or the political outgrowths of Enlightenment rationalism and its reactive
twin, Romanticism (see Gellner 1983; Kedourie 1960; Breuilly 1993; Anderson 1991; cf. A. D.
Smith 1998, Part I).

Even where modernists introduce an „ethnic factor‟, it is to downgrade it. In this vein, Michael
Mann argues for the greater predictive power of politics over ethnicity in explaining the rise of
particular European nations, while for his part Eric Hobsbawm is intent on dismissing or
disparaging the claims of language and „ethnicity‟ in the construction of the „divisive‟, fissiparous
nations of late nineteenth-century Eastern Europe. In these accounts, nations and nationalism are,
in principle, opposed to ethnic communities and ethnicity: the more the former take hold in an
area or population, the more attenuated become the ties of ethnicity, and the less does descent,
actual or fictive, matter. Ethnic ties, like every localized collectivity and sentiment, diminish and
ultimately dissolve in the inclusive mass culture of modern „civic‟ nations (Mann 1995;
Hobsbawm 1990; see also Deutsch 1966).

In contrast, the second tendency regards nations as specialized developments of ethnic ties and
ethnicity, and as a result it claims that we cannot hope to comprehend the powerful appeal of the
nation without addressing its relationship with ethnic ties and sentiments. In this view, nations are
formed on the basis of prior ethnic ties and networks, which provide nationalists with cultural
resources for their projects of „nation-building‟. Without such resources, the task of forging new
nations becomes an uphill struggle against disunity and fragmentation. In Walker Connor's
succinct formulation, nations are self-aware ethnic groups: they are the largest group based on a

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conviction of ancestral relatedness, and come into being when the majority of their members feel
they belong to, and participate in, the nation. In more extreme versions, the nation is simply an
„awakened‟ and politicized version of ethnic community, a view espoused by early German
Romantic nationalists and late nineteenth-century French „integral‟ nationalists (Connor 1994, ch.
8; also Berlin 1976).

Underlying these tendencies is a strong normative impulse. In many ways, the fashionable
distinction between „civic‟ and „ethnic‟ conceptions of nationhood mirrors these tendencies. The
conception of nationhood that modernists have in mind is essentially „civic‟. The nation is a
territorially bounded, sovereign legal-political community, a constituent of an international
society of nations legitimated by nationalist ideology, whose members are citizens participating
in a mass public national culture and obeying standardized national laws. The nationalism that
underpins this conception is voluntaristic, rational and activist: it regards the nation as an
association of willing citizens residing in a given territory and obeying the nation's laws, and
while it asserts the need for every individual to belong to a nation, it leaves the choice of nation
open (see Kohn 1967; Brubaker 1992).

In sharp contrast, the „ethnic‟ conception of nationhood is tied to myths of ancestry and kinship.
The notion of nationhood here is a community of history and culture, whose members are linked
by genealogical ties, native traditions of „ethno-history‟ (the tales told by members of the
community to each other), vernacular language, customs and religion, and traditions of popular
mobilization. The accompanying kind of nationalism tends to be „organic‟: as a natural
phenomenon, the nation follows the same rhythms as other organisms in nature, from
rudimentary origins to efflorescence, decay and renewal. Such organic nationalism holds that not
only must every individual belong to a nation, it is the nation of birth that stamps the individual
for life and determines his or her destiny (Kohn 1967; also A. D. Smith 2001: ch. 2).

These are, of course, pure types, to which few nations conform. In the great majority of cases, we
find elements of both types mixed in varying degrees. Nevertheless, both tendencies noted at the
outset, shorn of their ideological freight, are vital for our understanding of nations and
nationalism, and their relationships with ethnicity. In what follows, I aim to combine the insights
of both tendencies in order to form a more rounded picture of the relationships between ethnicity
and nationalism, both conceptual and historical. I start with ethnicity.

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ETHNIE AND ETHNICITY

The term „ethnicity‟ is of fairly recent vintage. It became common in the 1950s and 1960s in the
United States to signify the quality of belonging to an ethnic group within a larger national state
and territory. Ethnicity, in other words, always denoted minorities; majorities were „nations‟,
even if this was only a tacit assumption, the „nation‟ being a civic and territorial political
community, transcending ethnicity and ethnic ties.

In contrast, the European sociological tradition, while still wedded to the idea of a waning of
ethnic ties in the modern epoch, does not focus exclusively on minorities. Ethnicity is a quality
that can pertain as much to large and dominant groups like the French or Poles as to small
minorities like the Frisians and Pomaks. This makes for a more confusing terminological situation,
but it reflects the complex history of Europe and its Middle Eastern and Mediterranean heritage.
Thus the ancient Greek term ethnos covered everything from a small band to a large nation, much
like the cognate term genos. The Romans, it is true, distinguished between populus Romanus and
distant, usually barbarous nationes, but these were not necessarily minorities incorporated in
larger territorial states. And if the Jews made a distinction between their own am and the
surrounding idolatrous goyim, the terminology was by no means consistent, the two words often
being used to refer to identical phenomena. Finally, remaining in late antiquity, we may note the
Church Fathers' references to t o ethne, for all peoples except Christians and Jews (see Hertz 1944;
Tonkin et al. 1989: Introduction; Geary 2002: ch. 2).

This disjunction between words and „things‟ continued into the medieval era. Certainly,
geographical-cultural groups of students in universities and of clerics at Church Councils were
referred to as nationes, but the same word was also used of whole peoples, as when Henry II
referred to the „troublesome‟ Welsh nation. How far the word „nacion‟ („nacioun‟) bore a
meaning in the fourteenth century similar to „ethnic community‟ rather than to the territorial-
political meaning of„nation‟ that it bears today is the subject of vigorous debate. What seems to
command greater assent is the recognition of the ubiquity of ethnicity and of the perceptions of
ethnic ties in all periods (see Hastings 1997: ch. 1; Hertz 1944; Zernatto 1944.)

But this recognition is accompanied by another: that of the fluidity and even malleability of
ethnicity. Durability and evanescence appear to define the paradoxical character of ethnic ties; the
more distant from ethnic groups, the greater the appearance of solidity, the closer, the more fluid

252
and fissiparous the bonds that hold the members together. In recent years, the latter aspect has
commanded more attention. Reacting against essentialism and the nationalist „naturalization‟ of
ethnicity, many writers, influenced by the „postmodern turn‟, have stressed the overlapping nature
of ethnic cultures and their internal conflicts and kaleidoscopic mutations. Some have followed
Fredrik Barth in emphasizing the importance of the social boundary between ethnic groups over
the changing cultural stuff that the boundary encloses. Others, reacting against earlier cultural
determinisms, have developed the theme of „situational ethnicity‟ and the idea of an individual's
multiple, overlapping identities, seeing in ethnicity a construct of individuals, an instrument of
power and control for elites, and a means of labelling and classification (Barth 1969; Brass 1991;
Eriksen 1993).

Such approaches serve a useful corrective function. But in stressing one side, they elide the
paradox of ethnicity: its simultaneous fluidity and persistence, which has been the source of both
its power and of its divisiveness for those seeking to use it to forge nations. While recognizing the
shifting nature of ethnic clusters of perceptions, attitudes and sentiments, John Armstrong has
given due weight to the persistent quality of many ethnic groups, and to the importance of
boundary mechanisms such as myths, symbols and codes of communication which serve to
„guard the border‟ and preserve ethnic ties over la longue durée. He uses this framework to
demonstrate how various long-term factors, from nomadic and sedentary ways of life, religious
civilizations, imperial administrations and mythomoteurs, to ecclesiastical organization and
language cleavages, have helped to shape and change ethnic boundaries, cultures and perceptions
(Armstrong 1982).

Armstrong titled his book Nations before Nationalism, but he was only concerned with medieval
Christendom and Islam, not with the modern era of nationalism, and in the body of the book, he
speaks of ethnic ties and persistence, not of nations. Besides, his concluding matrix of factors
suggests a long history of ethnic ties leading up to the emergence of (modern) nations. But how
then is it possible for clusters of shifting attitudes, perceptions and sentiments to provide the bases
for forging nations? We need to look more closely at what we mean by „ethnic ties‟.

Anthropologists have differentiated between different „levels‟ of ethnicity. At the lowest (most
undeveloped) level, we encounter a myriad ethnic categories: groupings of individuals classified
as such by outsiders who endow them with a name, and discover some common cultural
characteristics (a dialect or customs) and perhaps a link to some location. At this level, the

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members are aware of who they are not, but have very little idea of themselves as a distinct
cultural group with a common relationship, as, for example, with Slovak and Ukrainian
communities before the eighteenth century. It is only at the next levels, those of ethnic networks
and associations, that common activities and purposes endow these groupings with a sense of
collective selfhood, at least among elites. At this point, oral traditions evolve, and often reveal
shared myths of common ancestry and ties of presumed descent. Finally, at the most developed
level, that of ethnic community or ethnie, a clear conception of not only „who‟ but „where‟ and
„when‟ we are, together with an ethno-history, is articulated, often in chronicles and epics; and
with it a sense of solidarity, at least among the elites. Hence we may define an ethnie as a named
and self-defined human population sharing a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and
elements of culture (often including a link with a territory) and a measure of solidarity. This is a
definition that can also encompass diaspora ethnies like the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, who
retained a symbolic link with their ancestral homelands (Eriksen 1993; A. D. Smith 1986: ch. 2).

ETHNICITY IN HISTORY

There is, of course, nothing fixed or static about ethnies, or other forms of ethnicity. Like nations,
ethnies „have their beginning and will have their end‟, to transpose Renan. Indeed, ethno-genesis
takes place in every period and continent, requiring as it does the interplay of culture with politics
and a sense of common ancestry. Factors that have played a particularly important role in the
origins and development of ethnic consciousness include prolonged warfare between states, the
role and conflicts of organized religion, and the rise of codes of communication among
populations sharing some common elements of culture. Factors that have helped to sustain ethnic
identity and community include collective beliefs about origins and election, shared attachments
to landscapes and the skills of specialist elites, notably priests, scribes and merchants - factors
that, as we shall see, also contribute to the persistence of national identity (Renan 1882; Smith
1986).

Generally speaking, pre-modern epochs have been characterized by a plethora of ethnic

categories, networks and communities, standing in various relationships to polities - whether
empires, kingdoms, tribal confederations or city-states. From sources that range from Herodotus
and the Bible to inscriptions and place and family names, the record is filled with ethnic
perceptions and sentiments, as well as ethnic myths, symbols and traditions, all of which attest to
the importance of ethnicity in structuring the social and cultural life of populations across the

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globe. At times, too, ethnic attachments and perceptions influenced political action, as, for
example, in ancient Greece, where the distinction between Ionians and Dorians affected the
political perceptions and actions of Athenians and Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, and were
used by their leaders for political purposes. The politics of ethnicity can also be traced in the
visual record, for example, in the Assyrian palace reliefs of wars and foreign captives, and the
Persian reliefs on the staircase of the Apadana in Persepolis showing the various subject peoples
of their empire bringing gifts to mark the Persian New Year (Alty 1982; Cook 1983: ch. l5; Reade
1983).

In the modern period, too, ethnicity has left a profound mark, and not only in respect of nation
formation. The various movements of the so-called ethnic revival in the West in the 1960s clearly
had nationalist undertones, but for the most part these were autonomist movements of ethnic
minorities who had in pre-modern epochs been unequally incorporated by dominant ethnies into
the Western states, and were seeking to redress the balance. Though some, like the Catalans,
Scots and Quebecois, saw themselves as stateless nations, others, like the Frisians, Alsatians,
Welsh and Bretons, were more intent on improving their economic and political status while
protecting their distinctive cultural heritages. In Africa, too, while some movements such as the
Ibo and Somali undoubtedly had nationalist goals, many others have been more concerned with
strengthening their collective bargaining power and maximizing their ethnic share of the benefits
of modernization. More generally, ethnic conflicts from Northern Ireland to Iraq, and from
Kashmir to Indonesia, have fed widespread aspirations for greater autonomy, unity and identity,
the hallmarks of nationalism (see Esman 1977; Heracleides 1992; Horowitz 1985.)

PARADIGMS OF THE NATION

What is the relation of ethnicity to nations and nationalism? We have seen that the terms „natio‟
and „nation‟ have a long history, revealing once again a disjunction between words and things,
and a paradoxical combination of antiquity and modernity. For many an earlier scholar, the nation
constituted an „ancient‟ and „perennial‟ form of political community, for some even a „primordial‟
one. As a form of human association, the nation appeared to be continuous, even immemorial,
from the earliest historical records. For most latterday scholars, who are largely „modernist‟ in
their approach, nations are recent forms of community, products of modernity, and anything
resembling the nation before the modern period is purely fortuitous. Yet, as we shall see, the
modern nation does also have elements that hark back to earlier times; and there are some ancient

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 forms of community and identity that approximate quite closely to the ideal type of the nation. In
this paradox, ethnicity plays a key role (Gellner 1983: ch. 2; Grosby 2002; Horowitz 2002).

To some extent, the modernist understanding and definition of the term „nation‟ obscures this
paradox. For modernists, the nation is characterized by:

 A clearly demarcated territory with a centre and recognized borders

 A legal-political community, with a single, standardized legal system

 Mass participation, including civil and political rights, for all members or citizens

 A mass, public culture disseminated to all members through a standardized, mass public
education system

 The political status of sovereignty in an „inter-national‟ system of sovereign national states

 Legitimation in terms of nationalist ideologies.

That these are the characteristics of the modern Western nation, legitimated by a civic-territorial
nationalism, is not in doubt. But these characteristics are the product of a particular social and
cultural location, and we cannot, and should not, derive the generic concept of „nation‟ from so
specific a milieu as late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Western Europe. For this inevitably
produces a partial definition, one which mistakes the part for the whole and thereby prevents us
from discerning that whole.

There are several objections to „Western‟ civic definitions. The obvious one is its ethno-centrism
which, applied as a yardstick for non-Western cases, soon runs into difficulties. The usual
strategy at this juncture is to make a sharp differentiation - indeed, a dichotomy - between
Western „civic-territorial‟ nations and non-Western („Eastern‟, according to Hans Kohn, that is,
east of the Rhine) „ethnic‟ nations. There is some justification for such a strategy. A recent study
of Arab national identity and the Arabic language demonstrates how unsatisfactory Western
„civic‟ definitions of the Arab nation are bound to be, and locates the basis of that nation in
history and culture, particularly language, rather than in law, territory and mass politics. Similar

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 problems appear in the attempt to apply modernist definitions to Asian forms of the nation (Kohn
1967; Tönnesson and Antlöv 1996; Suleiman 2002).

The general point here is that „ethnic‟ nations like the Arab, the Polish or the Burman, emphasize
rather different attributes. These include:

 Genealogical ties, myths of presumed common descent from a (usually fictive) ancestor(s)

 Vernacular culture, notably distinctive and indigenous languages, customs and folk culture

 „Ethno-history‟ - narratives of the communal past as retold down the generations by the members
themselves

 Popular mobilization - the appeal to „the people‟ as the repository of the authentic spirit of the
nation.

Of course, „ethnic‟ nations and their „genealogical‟ nationalisms are equally interested in the
ancestral homeland - a „place of our own‟ - and in citizenship and popular sovereignty of the
common folk, even if they come to these so-called „Western‟ ideas from a rather different route.
One should not exaggerate the differences. The point is rather to underline the inadequacy of a
partial „Western‟ reading of the concept of the nation, and to try to remedy this situation. In
practice, as we saw, „civic‟ and „ethnic‟ attributes are interwoven in the history of particular
nations, and their prominence waxes and wanes in certain periods and among specific social
groups - as a glance at the oscillations in nationalist ideology and practice in the modern history
of France, that most „civic‟ of nations in its own (official) eyes, testifies (Brubaker 1992; Gildea
1994).

A second objection to the „Western‟ civic definition of the nation turns on its insistence on „mass
participation‟, a point most forcefully argued by Walker Connor. For Connor, both the nation and
nationalism are „mass phenomena‟. This means that if the nation is, as he claims, a self-aware
ethnic group, the majority of its members must be aware of belonging to it and must participate in
its social and political life. So, in a democracy, we cannot really speak of a „nation‟, until the
majority of its population is enfranchised; and from this, Connor concludes that we have to be
sceptical of any claims to nationhood before the late nineteenth century (Connor 1994, 2004).

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There are several objections to such a radical modernism. The first is that it appears to confuse
the definition of democracy with that of the „nation‟. Connor has stated the necessary conditions
for a democratic nation, not for the nation per se. He himself recognizes, in passing, the
possibility of non-democratic nations, but he does not elaborate. There is also the related problem
of „numbers‟: at what point does the Marxist law of transformation of quantity into quality come
into operation? When do the majority, including women, get the vote? There is something rather
arbitrary in a procedure that rules out, in advance, the possibility of elite, or middle-class, nations.
Finally, there is the historical problem. Connor, like so many others, stresses that nations are
formed in stages. Yet, he is only prepared to call a community a „nation‟ in the final stages of its
development. Again, there is something arbitrary in refusing to call the community in question a
„nation‟ in the earlier stages. Besides, how are we to conceptualize and term the community
which is to become a nation and which regards itself as a „nation‟ in those earlier stages? If
England was a „nation‟ only from the 1900s, how should we (and its members) conceive of it in
the sixteenth, the eighteenth or even the nineteenth centuries? (see A. D. Smith 2004; cf. Kumar
2003.)

This historical problem leads into a third objection to the „Western‟ conception, which I have
touched on before, namely, the antiquity of terms like ethnos and natio, and the problem this
raises for our understanding of pre-modern „nations‟. Here I can only note that historians,
following the main historiographical paradigms in the field, are sharply divided over the
applicability of the concept of the nation to different periods of history and to specific „peoples‟,
and over the relevance and significance of such ethnographic usages for politics (Geary 2002;
Scales 2000; Smith 2000).

There is a fourth, related, objection: namely, that the modernist definition exaggerates the
significance of political dimensions. Few scholars would deny some importance to politics in
defining nationhood. The question is how far the latter should be tied to the state and especially to
sovereignty, given that even in the modern epoch we find acknowledged stateless nations like the
Catalans, Scots and Quebecois. This insistence on sovereignty may well derive from modernist
preoccupations with centralized, bureaucratic states and with mass political mobilizations. The
latter are undoubtedly crucial for what John Breuilly terms „oppositional nationalisms‟; but he
also reminds us that there are different forms of nationalism, and that mobilizations may occur
within the framework of already established nations, and, we may add, even before the advent of
nationalist ideology, as in Holland and England (see Breuilly 1993; Guibernau 1999; Mann 1995.)

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 Given the many objections to the specific „modern Western‟ definition of the nation, a broader
approach is required. Here Max Weber's methodology of the ideal type may be useful. However,
constructing an ideal type of the nation faces the problem that, on the one hand, it is necessary to
create an ideal standard to which given cases of nations approximate, while, on the other hand,
recognizing that the concept also represents a „moving target‟ for its members, especially the
nationalists, and is best analysed as a combination of processes. In the light of this, we may define
the pure type of a nation as a named and self-defined human community sharing common myths,
memories and symbols, residing in and attached to a historic territory, and united by common
codes of communication, and a distinctive public culture, and common customs and laws.

The patterns of change to which these elements of the ideal type refer are the well-known
processes of:

 Self-definition: the increasing self-definition, and self-naming, of a human community, and the
creation of a symbolic boundary between „us‟ and „them‟.

 Myth-and-memory cultivation: the creation and dissemination of a fund of myths, memories,

symbols and traditions by members of the community peculiar to „its‟ past and future.

 Territorialization: the settlement and residence by the majority of the members of a human
community in a territory felt to be „historic‟, and the growth among them of collective
attachments to that territory.

 Codes of communication: the emergence and dissemination to the members of a community of

shared codes of communication, by formal or informal means.

 Public culture: the creation and dissemination to the members of a community of a distinctive
public culture of symbols, values, customs, laws and rituals. (See Smith 2002).

As a type of community, the ideal type of the nation is closely aligned with that of the ethnie, or
ethnic community (as opposed to the state). However, there are key differences between the two
concepts. While both are self-defined communities, and both have myths of common origins
(however fictive) and shared memories, the ideal type of the nation features shared codes of
communication and public culture, including laws and customs, whereas that of the ethnie refers

259
only to one or more elements of culture. And while ethnies usually possess at least a symbolic
(remembered) link with a specific territory, the nation features majority residence in and
attachment to a historic territory (see Smith 2001: ch. 1).

Adoption of this broader ideal-type of the nation may help us to include non-Western, and
possibly pre-modern, cases more easily. Moreover, it locates the formation of nations in the
combination of processes that usually develop separately; this in turn may help us to chart the
emergence of different nations, and gauge the degree of their approximation to the ideal type at
different periods.

NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

So far, I have focused on nations. What of nationalism? Nationalism may be defined as an

ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on
behalf of a population some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential
„nation‟. (In this sense, one can, and does, have nationalism without nations, just as more rarely
we can speak about nations without nationalism.)

As an ideological movement, nationalism emerged in eighteenth-century Europe, finding its first

full-blown expression during the French Revolution and in the aftermath of the American
Revolution, with their cults of classical antiquity and their belief in popular autonomy. But,
nationalism is in practice closely related to the cognate concepts of national sentiment, collective
sentiments for the strength and welfare of the nation, and national identity, defined as the
reproduction and reinterpreta-tion of the pattern of symbols, myths, memories, values and
traditions that form the heritage of the nation, and the identification of its members with that
heritage. Hence it is possible to detect key elements of the ideology of nationalism in earlier
periods, notably in early seventeenth-century England and the Netherlands, along with a growing
sense of national identity among their elites and middle classes; and perhaps even in nuce in
earlier „Western‟ cases (Gorski 2000; Greenfeld 1992: ch. 1; Smith 1991: ch. 4; cf. Kumar 2003:
chs. 5-6).

The reason for this precocious Western development must be sought in certain sacred traditions
closely related to some of the more general processes outlined above. The most important of these
is the succession of myths of ethnic election, the conviction that „we‟ constitute a chosen people

260
entrusted by God with a task or mission, or bound by a covenant with God to fulfil and be witness
to a divinely ordained dispensation, which requires that „our‟ community be separated from
others. Deriving from the ancient covenant with the Israelites on Mount Sinai, this tradition
spawned a series of myths of divine election which, from the medieval period onwards, became
attached to kingdoms and peoples in a Christian Europe that had come to see the Church (and
later particular ethnic and provincial churches, states and peoples) as the true successor to ancient
Israel (verus Israel). Along with myths of origin, the belief in ethnic election became the most
dynamic of the many myths and memories that were to generate a sense of national identity,
especially after the Reformation and its return to Old Testament Hebraism (Akenson 1992;
O'Brien 1988; Smith 2003: chs. 3-5).

There were other sacred traditions. The most ancient and widespread sprang from aspects of
territorialization, in particular collective attachments to sacred sites. Starting with the last resting
places of „our ancestors‟, they took in tombs of saints which became places of pilgrimage, as well
as burial places of kings and heroes. Other „sacred sites‟ included fields of battle and ancient
assembly-places, temples, mosques, churches and monasteries, as well as sacred rivers,
mountains and fields, forming a landscape filled with hallowed memories. Of course, these did
not of themselves define a bounded sacred homeland, but they delineated a sacred territorial zone
patrolled by ethnic guardians (usually priests and scribes) and often by ethnic confederations and
kingdoms. In some cases, a whole territory was demarcated as a „promised land‟ and dedicated to
a particular deity and his or her cult, and it came to signify a sacred symbolic centre, even when
the ethnic inhabitants were exiled from it, as was the case with the Armenians and Jews (Grosby
2002).

Equally important, if not quite so ubiquitous, is the myth-memory of the golden age (or ages).
Already in the ancient world we encounter a nostalgia for past ages held to be of superior worth
to the present, and to embody the inner or „true‟ virtues of the community, now sadly undermined
or forgotten. We can find it in the so-called neo-Sumerian civilization of Ur, which recalled the
earlier dynastic period of Sumer before Sargon of Akkad's usurpation and much later in Asshur-
bani-pal's Assyria in its decline (seventh century BC), as the king looked back to Babylonian
culture; and again in late Sasanid Iran under Chosroes II in the sixth century AD. It is particularly
marked in certain historians and poets of the Latin Silver Age in the early Roman Empire, in the
work of Tacitus and Juvenal, who looked back to the alleged virtues of the early Republic. It
reappears in medieval times, for example, in the myth-memory of Arthur and his knights, and the

261
opposed golden age of supposed Anglo-Saxon liberties. But, it is really much later, in antiquarian
circles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and again among the nationalists of the
nineteenth, that the ideal of the golden age comes into its own, and feeds political ideals of
restoration and regeneration as the model of the sacred „authentic nation‟ - as could be seen, for
example, among the Slavophiles in Russia and the Pharaonicists of early twentieth-century Egypt
(Roux 1964: ch. 10; Frye 1966: ch. 6; MacDougall 1982; Smith 2003: chs. 7-8).

For nationalists, the ideal of a canonical golden age was a summons to emulation and action, and
it pointed the way to a further tradition of individual and collective struggle and sacrifice on
behalf of the nation. Once again, there were ancient and medieval examples, indeed a whole
tradition of heroic sacrifice, from the Homeric and biblical heroes up to William Wallace,
William Tell, Joan of Arc and Alexander Nevsky. That these exemplars were rarely, in any sense
of the term, national and sometimes of doubtful historicity, was of little import to later
generations; they had fought (and in some cases died) on behalf of a named community and its
sacred cause. To follow their example and be prepared to sacrifice life itself for the sacred cause
of the people, came to be seen from the eighteenth century as the highest, most valued human
goal, one that applied not just to exceptional heroic individuals, but to the youth and courage of
all the (usually male) members of the nation. Hence, the efflorescence of „history painting‟ and
the growing cult of the patriotic war dead, with its rites and ceremonies and its vast cemeteries
and monuments for the millions who lost their lives in the two World Wars. Through these means,
the survivors sought to make some sense of their immense loss and bind together in one sacred
communion of the people the dead, the living and the yet unborn; and thereby fulfil the sacred
destiny of the nation (Mosse 1990; Smith 2003: ch. 9; Winter 1995: esp. ch. 4).

Only in the age of nationalism were these sacred traditions brought together for a single political
end, the „rebirth‟ and „regeneration‟ of the nation, under the influence of the newly politicized
ideals of popular sovereignty and cultural authenticity. But most of these traditions were much
older, and their very sanctity made them available for use as cultural resources for communities
which, for limited periods in pre-modern epochs, approximated to the ideal type of the nation.
These traditions provided a measure of continuity with past ethnic communities, though the
importance of such links and the degree of their continuity varies considerably.

NATIONS IN HISTORY

262
Continuity is one thing, but identity is quite another. Just as we should not confuse words and
things, so we should not equate ethnic communities with nations, because we can point to some
links between them. This point can be illustrated by considering some examples of what used to
be termed „old-new nations‟.

Take the case of Egypt. Even if we were to concede that ancient Egypt at certain periods
constituted a „nation‟ in the sense of a named and self-defined, territorially compact community
with shared codes of communication, a fund of myths, memories and symbols, and a distinctive
public culture, and that some sense of self-definition survived the Macedonian, Roman and Arab
conquests, and the introduction of first Christianity and then Islam, it would be an impossible, if
not misguided task to attempt to demonstrate links between such an early approximation to the
ideal type of the nation and the nation of modern Egypt. The same might be said of any
continuities between ancient, Byzantine and modern Greece, of the kind propounded by the
nineteenth-century Greek historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, in view of the predominantly
cultural rather than political unity of ancient Hellas and the huge impact of the subsequent Slav
and Albanian invasions (see Kitromilides 1989; Trigger et al. 1983).

What of other „old-new nations‟, like the Armenians and the Jews? Granted that here the cultural
continuities of their codes of communication, aspects of their public religious culture and their
heritage of myths, memories and symbols, are much greater, because they were carried by an
enduring institution; and that consequently the sense of an Armenian and Jewish ethnic
community persisted to a far greater degree, stimulated by diaspora exile and periodic persecution.
But, even if we are prepared to speak of more or less continuous, if scattered, Armenian and
Jewish „peoples‟ (ethnies) in the medieval epoch, the question remains to what extent they can be
termed „nations‟ before the modern period. Perhaps, as Steven Grosby argues, both communities
approximated to the ideal-type of the nation, say, in Second Temple and Mishnaic Judea, or fifth-
century Armenia. But, after their dispersion, both Armenians and Jews, losing their historic lands
and aspects of their public cultures as a result of their far-flung diasporas, are better viewed as
ethnies, their sense of collective unity having been eroded by varying degrees of acculturation in
their host societies (see Grosby 2002; Neusner 1981; Redgate 2000.)

These are matters of historical judgement measured against the touchstone of the ideal type and
its constituent processes. They illustrate the fact that we are dealing with variable processes, and
these probably need to be broken down further into more specific elements. But, at least, this

263
procedure can move us beyond doctrinaire paradigms, whether perennialist or modernist, and
direct our attention to the multiplicity of variables involved in the formation of nations and the
different forms they take in different historical contexts (Uzelac 2002). On the whole, it is true to
say that in Near Eastern and classical antiquity, ethnic categories, networks and communities
predominated, alongside empires and city-states. We rarely encounter „nations‟ even in the
broader ideal-typical sense I have been proposing. The same can be said of the early medieval
period with its barbarian regna, although there are clear intimations of nationhood among, say,
the fifteenth-century English, Scots and Swiss, certainly among their elites. Whether we can
therefore speak of elite nations in this period is a moot point, but it does point to a definite change
in the developments of the key processes of nationhood (Reynolds 1984: ch. 8).

From the late sixteenth century, however, the turn to Old Testament Hebraism and covenantal
theology in the Reformation, disseminated by translations of the Bible and Prayer Book, printed
tracts and regular sermons, „democratized‟ the old tradition of chosenness which had been
previously applied to kingdoms (and more rarely to peoples), and provided a dynamic ideology of
popular rule in the name of an original national-Christian community. At the same time we
encounter new myth-memories of golden ages, growing territorial attachments (often as a result
of wars), and a cult of martyrs which, though Protestant in origin, became increasingly national in
form.

All of these traditions build on the confluence of processes of increasing self-definition, myth-
and-memory cultivation, residence in an historic territory, shared codes of communication and the
dissemination of a public culture. As both Gorski and Schama document, the most obvious
example was the Netherlands, but among English and Scots Puritans, too, a sense of Protestant
popular nationhood emerged at this time, providing important models for later nations (Kohn
1940; Schama 1987: ch. 2; Greenfeld 1992: ch. 1; Gorski 2000; cf. Kumar 2003: ch. 5).

By the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the language of nationhood - national character,
the genius of the nation, patriotism - had become widespread in Europe. The subsequent rise of
nationalism - the ideological movement - on its back provided an accessible ideological blueprint
for aspirant ethnies to claim autonomy or sovereign statehood. The confluence of classical and
Hebraic traditions, and of ethnic cultures with the cult of authenticity and the quest for popular
sovereignty, imparted a new dynamic to the national ideal; and the success of the Anglo-French
model helped to ensure its global reach. However, the ethnically based nations have by all

264
accounts been much more successful than post-colonial „state-nations‟ based on more or less
artificial boundaries, which have found it difficult to create a deep sense of the collective self,
because they lacked a fund of shared ethnic myths, memories, symbols and traditions, and/or
strong territorial attachments. This suggests that political will, in the absence of the necessary
general processes of nation formation, not to mention the more specific sacred traditions, cannot
suffice to sustain nations. Territory and the claim for popular sovereignty within its borders may
have wrested statehood from alien hands, but the forging of nations requires deeper and more
pervasive cultural commonalities (Kemilainen 1964; Colley 1992; Bell 2001).

The success of nationalism, as well as its limitations, has therefore much to do with the
conjunction of the more recent ideals of popular sovereignty and cultural authenticity with
antecedent, and often much older, ethnic ties and communities. That it was the West that led the
way was largely due to the interplay of three sets of factors: a complex mosaic of ethnic
communities and ethnic polities in Europe, the rapidity of large-scale social and political change
from the sixteenth century on, and Christianity's, particularly Protestantism's, recovery of biblical
Hebraism and „Mosaic theology‟ with its emphasis on ethnic election, covenant and mission.

But, once the model of the ethnically based nation was firmly established, it became possible to
conceive of polyethnic nations like Nigeria, Eritrea and Tanzania, despite the obvious difficulties
of implementing such a project in the absence of one or more of the key processes. This „civic‟
model of nationhood has become increasingly attractive, partly because of a general revulsion
against the atrocities committed by radical ethnonational-ists bent on achieving congruence
between a single nation and „its‟ state, and partly because of the scale and nature of recent waves
of immigration. In some cases, notably immigrant societies like Canada, Australia and the United
States, the new kind of „plural‟ nationhood with its commitment to multiculturalism has scored
considerable success. In others, particularly in Europe, the appeal to a more „civic‟ kind of
nationalism has barely concealed the historic ethnic basis of the nation and of its cultural ties and
ethos. This is especially true of cases where constituent and long-resident ethnies, such as the
Catalans, Basques, Corsicans, Bretons, Scots and Welsh (not to mention the French, English and
Castilians) had successfully claimed the status of nationhood within an overarching national state.
In this respect, there has been little change: the post-Cold War era remains one of both
widespread ethnic communities and of nations and national states based in varying degrees on a
complex nexus of ethnic ties, with competing, but intertwined, conceptions of the nation - ethnic,
civic and multicultural (see Smith 1995: ch. 4.)

265
CONCLUSION

The current picture presented by the state of ethnicity and nationalism is a complex one. On the
surface, we are witnessing the proliferation and in some cases intensification of ethnic and
national conflicts, but also a concerted effort in certain areas, notably Europe, to create
supranational institutions that appear to undermine the bases of national identity in some existing
states. At a deeper level, our received traditions, even our ideas, of national identity in the West
are being transformed, as some of the sacred foundations on which they rest are weakened; while
at the same time Western-style „sober‟ secular national identities are being challenged, sometimes
thrust aside, by national-religious ideals that draw inspiration from radical readings of scriptures
and populist mobilizations (see Juergensmeyer 1993; on Europe, Delanty 1995.)

But these conflicting trends still operate within the field of „a world of nations‟, and the general
processes that underpin nationhood - self-definition, myth-memory cultivation, territorialization
and the like - remain operative, even when, and perhaps because, they encounter opposing
globalizing and localizing trends. Even the fashionable Western insistence on multiculturalism
and the polyethnic nation, and the associated transfer of powers upward and downwards by the
national state in a so-called post-national order, has not so far undermined the political and
cultural pluralism of the sovereign national states of the „international‟ community. Neither,
within those national states, has it dissolved the centrality of dominant or core ethnies, whose
culture, myths, mores and memories continue to define the national state and frame the ideals and
conduct of its members, even those of relatively recent origin (see Smith 2001: ch. 6).

Even when the „sacred foundations‟ of national identity are undermined, and its underlying
cultural resources are neglected, the power of competition between national states with their
uneven distribution of ethno-historical cultures, their unequal geopolitical and economic
resources, the differential nature and rates of their immigration, and the varied impact of their
religious traditions, continues to preserve and extend the global community of nations and to
excite the national aspirations of ethnic communities across the world. In an age of globalization,
the position of ethnicity and nationalism is paradoxical. The national state loses many of its
erstwhile functions, its borders become porous, consumerism penetrates all cultures, and ethnies
are revitalized. Yet, the national state extends its reach in ever-new directions and the sense of
national identity, however much „contested‟, continually resurfaces as the expression of a
powerful social solidarity and a sacred communion of the people.

266
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Juergensmeyer, Mark. "Nationalism and Religion." Pp. 182-191

Nationalism and religion have had an ambivalent relationship. Secular nationalism - the body of
ideas legitimating the nation-state that emerged in eighteenth-century Europe and America and
that by the mid-twentieth century had swept through the modern world - has usually rejected
religion. But the nation-state has sometimes relied upon religious images and identities to buttress
its power. Likewise, although supporters of religion often reject politics, including nationalism,
increasingly religious identities and ideologies have become the basis for strident new forms of
nationalism and transnationalism in a globalized, postmodern world.

AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS RELIGION

When modern secular nationalism emerged in the eighteenth century as a product of the European
Enlightenment's political values it did so with a distinctly anti-religious, or at least anti-clerical,
posture. The creation of a new mercantile society of presumably equal citizens required an
ideological justification that was different than the religious sanction for a political order
characterized by monarchy and hierarchy. The ideas of John Locke about the origins of a civil
community, and the „social contract‟ theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, required very little
commitment to religious belief. Although they allowed for a divine order that made the rights of
humans possible, their ideas had the effect of taking religion - at least Church religion - out of
public life. At the time, religious enemies of the Enlightenment protested religion's public demise,
but their views were submerged in a wave of approval for a new view of social order in which
secular nationalism was thought to be virtually a natural law, universally applicable and morally
right.

Yet at the same time that religion was becoming less political, the secular political world was
adopting a religiosity of its own. In the early nineteenth century nationalism became clothed in
romantic and xenophobic images that would have startled its Enlightenment forbears. The French
Revolution, the model for much of the nationalist fervor that developed in the nineteenth century,
infused a religious zeal into revolutionary democracy, taking on the trappings of Church religion
in the priestly power meted out to its demagogic leaders, and in the slavish devotion to what it
called „the temple of reason. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, the French Revolution
„assumed many of the aspects of a religious revolution‟. The American Revolution also had a

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religious side: many of its leaders had been influenced by eighteenth-century Deism, a religion of
science and natural law. As in France, American nationalism developed its own religious
characteristics, blending the ideals of secular nationalism and the symbols of Christianity into
what has been called a „civil religion.‟

The latter part of the nineteenth century fulfilled de Tocqueville's prophecy that the „strange
religion‟ of secular nationalism would, „like Islam, overrun the whole world with its apostles,
militants, and martyrs‟. It was spread throughout the world with an almost missionary zeal, and
nationalism was shipped to the newly colonized areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America as part
of the ideological freight of colonialism.

Secular nationalism reached its zenith in the mid-twentieth century following the end of World
War II as colonial empires crumbled and new nations proliferated in Africa, Asia and the Middle
East. As the formerly-colonial governments turned their political and economic infrastructures
from territories into nation-states, the ideology of secular nationalism infused the efforts to create
public loyalty and a sense of legitimacy for public institutions in processes that came to be known
as „modernization‟ and „nation-building‟.

Leaders such as India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser symbolized the
modern and Westernized nationalist who had little tolerance for what was perceived to be the
irrationality of religion's customs and the divisiveness of its loyalties. Yet though the masses in
new countries such as India and Egypt expressed a great deal of nationalist pride, their acceptance
of a secular basis for national identity was not extensive. in developing countries in the late
twentieth century, secular nationalism and religion were seen as competitors - just as they were in
the modern West in previous centuries. Secular nationalism in the formerly-colonized countries in
the late twentieth century came to represent one side of a great encounter between two vastly
different ways of perceiving the socio-political order and the relationship of the individual to the
state: one informed by the notion of a secular compact, the other by the authority and community
conveyed through traditional religion. Given the fundamental character of the division, and the
intensity of the loyalties to each side, it is no wonder that in the last decades of the twentieth
century the encounter was so violent.

CRITICISMS OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

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 Religious criticisms of secular nationalism emerged in the late twentieth century in areas of the
Middle East and Asia where nation-building was being attempted along blatantly European and
American models. At the same time religious activists in other parts of the world - including
industrialized countries - also began to criticize the tenets of secular nationalism, albeit for
somewhat different reasons. Both kinds of criticisms followed one or more of these three lines of
reasoning:

 Secular nationalism is a Western intrusion. The charge that secular nationalism is by its nature
Western - and therefore inappropriately applied to other parts of the world - was levelled by the
Ayatollah Khomeini against the policies of the Shah during Iran's successful religious nationalist
revolution in 1979. Though Iran had never been colonized, the Ayatollah claimed that America
and Europe's economic control and cultural influence amounted to colonization all the same, and
he decried what he referred to as the Shah's „West-toxification‟, an inebriation over things
American and European. In Algeria the Islamic Salvation Front took a similar position during the
1991 elections, claiming that the secular nationalism promulgated by Algeria's military leaders
was an extension of French colonial rule. Religious nationalism is also seen as the unfinished
business of anti-colonialism in Egypt, India, Sri Lanka and elsewhere in Africa, Asia and the
Middle East.

 Secular nationalism is intolerant of religion. The claim that secular nationalism is hostile to any
political identity or ideology related to religion was a major theme of Christian groups in the
United States, Jewish movements in Israel and many of the religious nationalist movements that
erupted in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Chechnya in the 1990s. In many of
the nations formerly associated with the USSR, religious activists saw the ideology of
communism as a foil for an irredentist Russian nationalism, which barred religion not only for
Marxist ideological reasons but also to keep national identities associated with religion from
rising in the USSR-dominated states. Following the USSR's demise in 1992, many in these
nations saw their religion as a new locus of national identity and loyalty.

 Secular nationalism promotes a unified world order. Some of the most extreme movements for
religious nationalism have criticized secular nationalism for its universalist tendencies. According
to these critics, the global ideology of secular nationalism sets the stage for the establishment of a
new world order, one that promotes a single central political authority and a unified world society
and culture. The al-Qa'eda movement has developed a transnational community of Muslims based

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on the fear that the US military and cultural sphere of influence will lead to a form of global
domination that will destroy Muslim societies. In the 1990s the Christian Identity and Christian
Reconstruction movements in the United States fostered similar fears over the global aspirations
of US political leaders, anxieties that were shared by such extremist movements as Japan's Aum
Shinrikyo, a breakaway Buddhist group involved in a nerve gas attack on Tokyo's subways in
1995. In the views of these groups it was religion that protected national interests against the
internationalism that they thought was secular nationalism's ultimate goal.

ETHNIC AND IDEOLOGICAL RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

Religious nationalism has often been associated with ethnic religious communities as well as
political-religious ideologies. In some movements the ethnic aspects have been primary, in some
the ideological issues have been paramount, and in others both aspects have been equally
important. The struggle of the Irish - both Protestant and Catholic - to claim political authority
over their land is an example of ethnic nationalism. In the former Yugoslavia three groups of
ethnic religious nationalists were pitted against one another: Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and
Muslim Bosnians.

The most confrontational movements of religious nationalism in the late twentieth century,
however, have been ideological. Though quite different in other respects, Messianic Zionist
movements for Jewish nationalism in Israel and radical forms of Muslim nationalism have both
aimed at establishing a political order based on religious law. So have the Christian Identity and
Christian Reconstruction movements associated with militia organizations in the United States.
Movements that have been both ethnic and ideological in character have had double sets of
enemies: their ethnic rivals and the secular leaders of their own people. The Hamas movement in
Palestine, for example, simultaneously waged a war of independence against Israel while sparring
with the secular Palestinian Authority.

RELIGIOUS NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

By the first decade of the twenty-first century virtually every religious tradition in the world had
provided justification for some form of religious nationalism:

Muslim concepts and movements

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The theoretical constructs of modern Islamic nationalism were linked to the writings of Pakistan's
Maulana Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, who founded the Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Association) in 1941 in
British India before Pakistan was created; and Egypt's Hassan al-Banna, who established the
Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928. These thinkers identified Western
imperialism as an enemy of Islamic society and called for political organization to overthrow
Western influences, if necessary by force, in order to establish a political order based on Islamic
law.

In Egypt, successors of al-Banna included Muslim Brotherhood leaders Sayyid Qutb and Abd Al-
Salam Faraj, both of whom were executed by the Egyptian government - Qutb in 1965 and Faraj
in 1982, after he was accused of taking part in the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Faraj had argued
that Muslims had a „neglected duty‟ to undertake a jihad (sacred struggle) against the secular
forces that threatened Islam, and he was associated with an extreme faction of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Jamaat al-Jihad. Another radical movement at the fringe of Egypt's Muslim
Brotherhood was the Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) led by Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman. The
movement was implicated in the 1993 bombing of New York City's World Trade Center and a
string of bombings in Egypt, including an assault on a group of tourists at the Temple of
Hatshepsut in Luxor in 1997. The aim of these movements was to discredit American and other
international support for Egypt's secular nationalism.

In nearby Gaza and the West Bank of Palestine, these Egyptian groups and the writings of
Mawdudi, al-Banna, Qutb and Faraj influenced a growing Muslim movement of Palestinian
nationalism that eventually rivaled the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headed
by Yasser Arafat until his death in 2004. This Muslim movement was founded by Sheik Ahmed
Yassin and other religious activists in 1987 and was named Hamas, a word that means „zeal‟ and
serves as an acronym for the phrase Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, „Islamic Resistance
Movement‟. Soon after it was founded, Hamas supported the intifada, the grassroots Palestinian
resistance movement, and rebelled against Arafat and the PLO after the secular Palestinian leader
signed a peace agreement with Israel's Yitzhak Rabin in 1993. Infamous for its reliance upon
suicide bombers in the Palestinian struggle for independence from Israel, Hamas continued to
play an important role on the extreme right wing of Palestinian politics well into the twenty-first
century. The movement suffered a significant blow to its leadership after the Israeli assassinations
of Sheik Yassin and the political head of the movement, Abdul Aziz Rantisi, in 2004, but Hamas
thundered back to victory in the Palestinian elections in 2006.

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In other Arab regions the power of Islamic political movements has also made an impact. In Syria,
Islamic activists have attempted to unseat the secular Ba'ath Party, and in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and the other Gulf Emirates, where an official Islamic culture prevails and Islamic law is honored,
rebel Islamic nationalists are also feared. In Jordan, in elections held after the Gulf War in 1991,
members of the Muslim Brotherhood became the largest single bloc in the Jordanian parliament.

In Iraq after the US-led ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003, religion became a major factor in
resurgent nationalist movements among both Shi'a activists in the South and Sunni Arab Muslims
in Baghdad and Western Iraq. Political parties were established along religious lines, including
the Sunni Iraq Islamic Party, the Shi'a Da'awa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq. At the same time many of the Sunni insurgents who opposed the US invasion
and occupation of Iraq favored a transnational religious and political allegiance. Some of these,
including the Jordanian-born militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had ties to the al-Qa'eda movement
headed by Osama bin Laden.

In Iran, the ideology of Islamic nationalism that emerged during and after the 1979 revolution
was propounded by the Ayatollah Khomeini and his chief theorist, Ali Shari'ati. Shari'ati
employed socialist notions of revolution in formulating a Shi'ite Islamic political philosophy not
unlike the Liberation Theology of Latin American Christianity. These ideas and Iran's example of
a successful Islamic revolution encouraged leaders of Shi'ite Islamic movements elsewhere,
including the Hizbullah and Amal organizations based in Lebanon that targeted both American
and Israeli military units in the 1980s. Iranian ideas about religious politics have also been
influential in the Shi'ite political movements in Iraq in the post-Saddam period from 2003. in
Afghanistan, anti-communist Muslim groups supported by the United States led a decade-long
liberation struggle against a Soviet-backed government during the 1980s. In 1996 an extremely
conservative political group, the Taliban, succeeded in establishing military control over most of
the country, including the capital, Kabul. Led by members of the Pathan ethnic community, who
were former students of Islamic schools, these religious revolutionaries established an autocratic
state with strict adherence to traditional Islamic codes of behavior. The Taliban allowed Osama
bin Laden and his al-Qa'eda movement to establish their international headquarters and terrorist
training camps in the country. As a result, the Taliban regime was toppled by a US military
invasion following the al-Qa'eda's September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. The Taliban movement continued to play a formidable role in resistance

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movements against the new secular government, especially in areas of Afghanistan dominated by
ethnic Pathans.

In Pakistan, conservative Muslims who helped to oust Benazir Bhutto from office in 1990 and
again in 1997 supported legislation that made the tenets of the Qur'an the supreme law of the land.
Tension between religious and secular nationalists were exacerbated by the support given by
religious activists to the Taliban and bin Laden's al-Qa'eda movement, and by the complicity of
Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf to the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Pakistan has
also been accused by some Indian leaders of supporting Muslim separatists in Kashmir who
engaged in sporadic clashes with the Indian army in the last decade of the twentieth century,
which have continued into the first decade of the twenty-first.

In Indonesia, an extremist Muslim political movement described as Jemaah Islamiah („the Islamic
Group‟) ignited a series of bombs in Bali nightclubs in 2002, killing more than 200 people,
including scores of young Australians and other visitors enjoying the popular tourist resort. A
radical Muslim cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir, was arrested in connection with the bombing, but other
attacks continued, including a 2003 suicide bombing at the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. Part of the
motivation of the activists was to purify Indonesian society of foreign cultural and economic
influences. Elsewhere in Indonesia, Islamic activists have led a separatist movement in the Aceh
region, where they instituted strict Islamic moral codes and engaged in a violent struggle with the
army. Islamic activists in the Maluku Islands in Indonesia attacked members of the Christian
community in 1998 in a wave of violence that continued for several years in an attempted purge
of Christians on the island of Ambon.

Malaysia has also experienced outbursts of radical Muslim activism in the first decade of the
twenty-first century, and in Southern Thailand there have been conflicts between the Muslim and
Buddhist communities over political control. For some decades the Philippines government has
battled with Muslim separatist groups, including the Moro Liberation Front, in the southern
Philippines islands of Mindanao and Sulu.

In Algeria, protests mounted by the Islamic Salvation Front led to enormous electoral successes
in December 1991. The movement, in soundly defeating the party that had ruled Algeria since its
independence from the French in 1956, promised to give the former colony what its leader called
„an Islamic state‟. Scarcely a month later, however, the army annulled the elections and

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established a secular military junta, outlawing the Islamic Front. The violent resistance to the
junta's actions that followed included the 1992 assassination of Boudiaf, the head of Algeria's
Council of State, and a series of bombings in Paris subways in the mid 1990s in protest against
what was perceived to be France's support for the secular military leaders. In neighboring Tunisia,
the outlawed Islamic Renaissance Party organized an opposition to the secular Tunisian
government.

In Morocco, an Islamic political party, the Justice and Charity Party, gained a significant electoral
following at the turn of the century. In 2003 a series of suicide bombings in Casablanca were
linked to Islamic groups that were critical of what was alleged to be the Moroccan government's
secularism, immorality and undemocratic policies. Among the targets were the Belgian consulate,
a Jewish community center, and a Spanish restaurant.

Muslim activists from Morocco were also linked to a series of bombings in Spain in 2004 that
targeted trains at Madrid stations, causing 191 deaths. Although the motives of the activists were
unclear, the perpetrators were said to be concerned about Spain's support for US policies in Iraq
and for the establishment of secular nationalism in what had been a Muslim nation in Spain some
five hundred years ago.

In Sudan, Lieutenant General Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir established one of the world's most
influential Islamic regimes in 1989, masterminded by Hassan Abdullah Turabi. The Sudan was
alleged to have been a training ground for Islamic activists world-wide, and during the 1990s the
articulate, urbane Turabi became an international spokesman for Islamic nationalism. In northern
Nigeria, Islam has fused with ethnic tribal politics.

In Turkey, the Islamic-oriented Welfare Party briefly came to power in 1996. Its leader,
Necmettin Erbakan, was forced to resign in 1997 and the party was banned in 1998, but Muslim
politics continued to be a significant factor in Turkey in elections in following years. Islam has
also been linked to the rise of ethnic Muslim politics in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
former Yugoslavia; Serbia's Kosovo province adjoining Albania; Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu and
Yunnan in China; and Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and the Islamic regions of central and southern Russia - particularly Chechnya - in the
Commonwealth of Independent States.

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Jewish concepts and movements

Concepts of Jewish nationalism have been tied to the creation of an independent state of Israel in
1948. Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak ha-Kohen Kuk, the Chief Rabbi of pre-Israeli Palestine, and his
son and successor, Z. Y. Kuk, maintained that the secular state of Israel was religiously useful
and that its purification could help precipitate the return of the Messiah. After the 1967 war in
which Israel gained land from adjacent Arab states, some Jewish nationalists thought that the time
had come for the biblical nation of Israel to be recreated. Rabbi Moshe Levinger and others
established the Gush Emunim, an organization that encouraged Jews to establish settlements on
the West Bank of the Jordan River to recover what was regarded as biblical lands from
Palestinians.

An even more extreme form of Jewish nationalism was articulated by Rabbi Meir Kahane, who
immigrated to Israel from the United States in 1971 and founded the Kach („Thus‟) Party
dedicated to the creation of an Israeli nation based on the Torah (biblical law) rather than secular
principles. Kahane advocated a catastrophic form of Messianic Zionism that urged confrontation
with Arabs, secular Jews and others perceived to be enemies of a Jewish religious state. Although
Kahane was assassinated in New York City in 1990 by Muslims associated with the Egyptian
Gamaa al-Islamiya, his movement continued to advocate violent encounters.

One of his followers, Dr Baruch Goldstein, killed Muslim worshippers at the Shrine of the Cave
of the Patriarchs in Hebron in 1994. Yigal Amir, propelled by ideas similar to Kahane's,
assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Supporters of this extreme Israeli Messianic
nationalism resist any concession of territory to Palestinians and have been at the forefront of
resistance to the Israeli government's withdrawal of settlements from Gaza and the West Bank.

Christian concepts and movements

Christianity has been associated with political power since it was embraced by Emperor
Constantine in the fourth century, and has had a history of clerical influence on political authority
ever since. Recent Christian nationalists have traced their ideas to the sixteenth-century Protestant
reformer John Calvin, who advocated a Christian religious basis for political order and
established Geneva as a Christian city-state. Some modern-day Protestant activists have adopted

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Calvin as their role model, including the Rev. Ian Paisley, a fiery supporter of Protestant political
power in Northern Ireland.

In the 1980s religious activists in the United States adopted Calvin's thinking in a movement that
they called Christian Reconstruction. This movement advocated the reconstruction of America's
economic system and legal order along Christian principles. A similar strand of revolutionary
religious activism, the Christian Identity movement, has been associated with militia movements
and has provided the ideological basis for such religious communes as the Freeman Compound in
Montana and Elohim City in Oklahoma.

In the 1990s, followers of both Christian Reconstruction and Christian Identity were involved in
the bombing of abortion clinics and in violent encounters with the US government, which they
regarded as their ideological enemy. Timothy McVeigh, who was convicted and executed for his
role in bombing the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995 - the largest act of terrorism on
American soil prior to the September 2001 attacks - was motivated by an ideology designated by
his favorite novelist, William Pierce, as „cosmotheism‟. Like many Christian Identity activists,
McVeigh and Pierce expected racial struggle and guerilla war in the liberation of the United
States from what they imagined to be its anti-religious secular despotism. Another Christian
Identity militant, Eric Robert Rudolph, was implicated in a bombing attack on Olympic Village in
Atlanta in 1996; he hid out in the Appalachian mountains for years until his arrest in 2003.

Hindu and Sikh movements

India's nationalist movement has had a religious side since the early twentieth century, when
political activists such as Bankim Chandra Chatterjee and Aurobindo Ghose added a specifically
Hindu spiritual dimension to India's emerging movement for independence. In 1925 the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), „National Volunteer Organization‟, which based its ideas on the
writings of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, advocated the political preservation of what Savarkar
called „hindutva‟, a national identity based on Hindu culture. During the 1980s members of the
RSS formed a new political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), „Indian People‟s Party', based
on Savarkar's ideas. A critical moment in the resurgence of Hindu activism was the riot that led to
the destruction of an old mosque on the site of what was reputed to be the birthplace of the Hindu
God Rama in the North Indian town of Ayodhya in 1992. In riots between Muslims and Hindus
that followed this event over two thousand people were killed. The momentum of Hindu activism

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brought the BJP to successful victories in state level elections, and in 1998 was able to establish a
coalition national government. It was led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, one of the BJP's more
moderate leaders, who ruled until 2004 when the BJP was replaced by a revived secular Congress
Party led by Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Behind many of the clashes between religious communities in India the central issue has been the
very idea of a multicultural state - whether India will be dominated by one tradition or incorporate
a diversity of cultures. In other cases the very unity of India has been at stake: in these incidents
religion has been fused with political separatism. The independence struggle in Kashmir is one
example of religious separatism in India. For many years, however, the prime example of this
kind of violent religious activism was the Khalistan movement of militant Sikhs. The movement
was a strident form of religious nationalism that arose in India's Punjab state in the 1980s. The
movement, led by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who was killed in the Indian army's assault
on the Sikh's Golden Temple in 1984, aimed at creating „Khalistan‟ - a new nation to be created
in the Punjab and based on Sikh religious principles.

During its heyday, from 1981 to 1994, thousands of young men and perhaps a few hundred
women joined the Sikh movement. They were initiated into the secret fraternities of various rival
radical organizations. These included the Babbar Khalsa, the Khalistan Commando Force, the
Khalistan Liberation Force, the Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan, and extremist factions of
the All-India Sikh Students Federation. Their enemies were secular political leaders, heads of
police units, some Hindu journalists, and other community leaders. The most spectacular victim
was India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, assassinated by her own Sikh bodyguards in 1984.
Over time the distinctions between valid and inappropriate targets became blurred, and virtually
anyone could be a recipient of the militants' wrath. By January 1988, more than a hundred people
a month were being killed; 1991 was the bloodiest year, with over three thousand people killed in
the Punjab's triangular battle among the police, the radicals and the populace. One of the more
spectacular incidents in 1991 was the attack by Sikh extremists on the Indian ambassador to
Romania in Bucharest. The Romanian government helped to capture the Sikhs. They were killed,
and later that year militant Sikhs kidnapped a Romanian diplomat in Delhi in retaliation. Behind
the violence was an attempt to assert the traditional role of religion within Sikhism as a guide to
both political and spiritual life. Even within the movement, however, opinion was divided over
the viability of a separate Sikh nation-state.

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Buddhist concepts and movements

The Theravada Buddhist tradition has had a long history of political interaction and religious
warfare. In Thailand, kings are expected to have had training as monks, and members of monastic
orders have played a role in twentieth-century political reforms. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist dynasties
have ruled that island kingdom since the time of Mahinda in the third century BC. Buddhist
monks were at the forefront of Sri Lanka's independence movement in 1948, and in 1953 an
influential pamphlet, The Revolt in the Temple, began a religious critique of secular nationalism
and the claim that „Buddhism had been betrayed‟ by secular leaders. The demand for a Buddhist
state came to a head in the 1980s when thousands of monks joined the revolutionary Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), „the People‟s Liberation Front'. In Myanmar (Burma), Buddhist
monks supported the unsuccessful democracy movement in 1988. In the twenty-first century the
influence of Buddhist clergy and ideology in Sri Lanka's political life continues to complicate the
efforts to maintain peace with the Tamil separatist movement in the northern portion of the island
nation, a movement that consists largely of Hindus and Christians. In Thailand the perception that
Buddhist ideology and leadership are privileged has spurred a violent response from Muslim
activists in the country's southern peninsula.

In China, the rule of the Emperor has traditionally been thought to have been given divine
sanction. Religion has also played a role in movements of political protest. Mahayana Buddhist
and traditional Chinese ideas fused with Protestant Christian millenarianism in the ideology of the
Taiping Rebellion (1848-65), and were aimed at establishing a religiously based dynasty. In more
recent years the communist government has tried to control religion, both through suppression
and state-sponsored official religious administrative units. In 1999 the government banned the
popular religious movement Falun Gong under the pretence that it was a potentially dangerous
cult. in Japan, Buddhism and Shinto concepts also supported state power. They were employed in
support of Japanese nationalism during World War II and in movements of neo-nationalism in the
1980s and 1990s. New religious movements in the 1990s sometimes espoused new expressions of
nationalism and political transnationalism. The Aum Shinrikyo movement was implicated in a
nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subways in 1995, perpetrated in part to warn the Japanese people
of what it imagined to be an impending apocalyptical war. The leader of the movement, Shoko
Asahara, derived his ideas from a variety of Buddhist, Hindu and Christian sources and aimed at
the religious purification of the Japanese nation.

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 Tibet has traditionally been something of a theocracy, in that Buddhist clergy have dominated
both the politics and religious life of the society. The national liberation of the country following
Chinese control and the departure of the Dalai Lama in 1959 is both a religious and political
cause. In Mongolia, the revival of Tibetan Buddhism as the national culture following the end of
communist rule led in 1992 to the establishment of a Mongolian Buddhist Party which aims to
make Buddhism the leading political ideology of the post-communist Mongolian state.

CRITICISMS OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

The world-wide rise of religious nationalism in the last decade of the twentieth century and the
first decade of the twenty-first can be attributed, in part, to the forces of globalization. European
and American political ideologies were no longer seen as universally applicable. At the same time,
the social and economic coherence of national societies was eroded by such forces of
globalization as the global market, global media and popular culture, and the easy mobility of
populations. These forces led in some cases to an attempt to reclaim national identity along the
traditional lines of ethnicity and religion.

At the same time, the rise of religious nationalism has had its critics, both inside and outside
religious quarters. These criticisms were often successful in generating new movements of
opposition to religious nationalist ideologies and leaders:

 Religion is an insufficient basis for political unity and national development. This criticism
implies the rejection of religion as a basis for national unity and a return of secularism as a
political force. Significant gains that were made by religious parties in Turkey and in India were
effectively countered by a resurgence of secular parties in those countries that were able to point
out the inadequacies of religious-based politics for dealing with modern problems.

 Politics is harmful to religion. This criticism has emerged from within religious communities. It
asserts that the political activism of religious leaders has been harmful to the spirituality and
purity necessary for a religious life. Some of the most conservative Jewish religious leaders, for
instance, have refused for religious reasons to be involved in Israeli politics. Some Muslims have
accused their religious activists of making Islam into a political ideology, and thereby reducing it
to the terms of modern politics. In Iran, a leading Muslim theologian, Abdolkarim Soroush,
claimed in the mid-1990s that the political involvement of Islam in his country corrupted the

281
 purity of religion. A decade later, however, religious conservatives again seized the reins of
power in Iran.

 Religious politics should be transnational rather than national. Some of the most harsh criticisms
of religious nationalism are from even more radical religious positions that aim at a religious
transnational rule. In Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, some Muslim clerics have accused
their fellow religious activists of being nationalistic and not appreciative of the transnational
character of Islam. Part of the popular appeal of Osama bin Laden in many Middle Eastern
Muslim societies is his rejection of the national boundaries created after the break-up of the
Ottoman Empire.

The future of religious nationalism is therefore uncertain. Although some movements will
continue to assert that religion is a viable option to the ideology and identity provided by secular
expressions of ideology, other movements may founder. They may be rejected by a new
acceptance of multicultural states united in a secular ideology, or they may be overwhelmed by
religious politics that aim at transnational ties and the emergence of alternative forms of
globalization based on religious ideologies, identities and networks of support.

References

Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism .
London: Verso
Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World . Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
Gotlieb, G. (1993) Nations Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of
Sovereignty . New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990) Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality . Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Juergensmeyer, M. (1993) The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State .
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
Juergensmeyer, M. (2003) Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence , 3rd edn.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
Kotkin, J. (1992) Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy .
New York: Random House
Lie, J. (2004) Modern Peoplehood . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
McMahon, D. (2001) Enemies of Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of
Modernity . New York: Oxford University Press
Rudolph, S. H. , ed. and Piscatori, J. (eds) (1997) Transnational Religion and Fading States . Boulder, CO:
Westview Press
van der Veer, P. (1994) Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India . Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press
Westerlund, D. (ed.) (1996) Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in
Politics . London: Hurst and Company

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Fenton, Steve. "Race and the Nation." Pp. 192-204

The concept of race was mobilized throughout much of the nineteenth century and at least the
1
first half of the twentieth century as an analytical tool within a science of races and a racial
theory of civilizations. Since its demise as an analytical term both in biology and the social
sciences (Gould 1981), it has lived on in the popular imagination of difference qua racialized
difference (Essed 1991; Tyler 2004). It continues to be found as a discursive category in public
spheres and in everyday language and in a sociology of„race and racism‟. In the latter the bio-
meaning of race is denied but the social referent „race‟ is constituted as an ideological and social
formation (Omi and Winant 1986). Since both nation and race have moved through significant
periodic shifts in meaning, tracing the relations between them involves tracking the positions of
two moving „objects‟. Equally, at any given historical moment, each of the categories „race‟ and
„nation‟ bears contradictory ideas. Thus nation carries its universalistic (or civic) meaning as well
as a particularistic (or ethnic) meaning (Brubaker 1996; Eriksen 2004); race is universal as a
science of the world's peoples and civilizations (Balibar 1991), and is particular as racialized
difference and communalism.

In what follows we shall trace out three formulations: race as nation, races within nations and
race as civilization. Race as nation reflects the fact that theoretically, historically and
ideologically, race and nation have occupied the same terrain. Races within nations shows that
„races‟ (plural) have been seen as constituting divisions within a given social formation. Race as
civilization indicates that race has borne both a national and transnational sense. Thus British or
French or American national interests, identities and cultures are transmuted into bearers of
something beyond their national boundaries - civilization. Nationally and transnationally, race has
usually been a language of domination. In the transnational civilizational frame, race-nations have
been the dominant (that is, imperial) nations which have posed as bringing civilization to the
dominated. This relationship of domination has been stripped of its racist language, but continues
under the language of civilization - for which read freedom and democracy.

Historically, the idea of a racial foundation of civilization was probably at its height in the latter
part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries. The idea of America or Britain
as the bearers, on a global scale, of Anglo-Saxon Christian civilization was to be found both in
theory and in practice. Parallel with this was the fear of the degradation of white European

283
societies in consequence of the „rising tide of color‟ (Stoddard 1923). 2 By contrast, in the 1980s
3
and up to the present Europe has been the site of a series of racialized nationalisms in which
there is a fusion of the imagery of race and nation.

UNIVERSALISM, CIVIC IDEALS AND THE NATION-STATE

State-level universalism expresses the idea that states are capable of being primary bearers of a
civic morality which bestows rights and dignity on all individuals, irrespective of particularities,
such as class or gender. One of the sources of this optimistic view of the modern state can be
found in the political sociology of Emile Durkheim (1898; cf. Fenton 1980; Lukes 1973), wherein
he argued that France and its civic institutions embodied and protected civic rights. Durkheim's
well-known attacks on German nationalism (Qui a voulu la guerre?, 1915) indicate that he
distinguished his own civic love of country from imperial and chauvinistic nationalisms. If
internal racism persisted, it was a symptom of social malaise. Race was not a proper category for
politics, nor was it a proper category for sociology, in which it could only function as biological
reductionism (Fenton 1980).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century the problem of state and nation would be stated much
more acutely and critically: we cannot now expect to make an unproblematic defence of state-
based universalism. This is not only because so many states are a threat to their citizens rather
than a protector of them. It is also because, as long as the state-nation continues to embrace the
idea of its citizens as valuable, it is frequently drawn to view its own citizens as more valuable
than the citizens of other states, or to view „others‟ as having no value at all. These doubts about
the nation-state are raised as questioning of the state and the nation. Wallerstein has described the
nation-state as „a geo-cultural value‟, constituted by the belief that „Every state should be a nation.
This is what we mean by citizenship … turning on the myth of the primacy and legitimacy of
popular sovereignty within each state‟ (1994:9). He goes on to argue that the „liberal reformism‟
expressed by the sovereign state is dead and that people must find their solutions elsewhere:
„Races, cultures, peoples have therefore a new … acute political resonance … no longer
contained by a belief in the centrality of the state‟ (1994: 9). 4
Wallerstein's critique is directed
primarily at the state as no longer capable of leading a universalist reforming programme. Others
have directed their critiques at the nation, viewing the liberal universalism of the nation-state as
masking the particularism of the category „nation‟ (Silverman 1992, Soysal 1995; Castles and
Davidson 2000).

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It is possible, thus, to argue that an attachment to nation, as a value to be preserved, necessarily
sees other nations and peoples as less valuable. If my people are very important people then ipso
facto other people are less important. Hence we find the contradiction that the state is the bearer
of a civic universalism whilst simultaneously being founded on a particularism (Balibar 1991).
Nowhere is this more starkly demonstrated than in the reporting of wars, accidents and disasters.
The dead of one's own country (or „side‟) are counted as the war dead, enemy dead sometimes
neither counted nor reported. In the 2003 Iraq war an American general was reported as saying
that the United States would not be carrying out „body counts‟ of the enemy. This was in a war in
which over a thousand coalition soldiers were killed and reported, as against, on one estimate, 5 a
possible 100,000 Iraqis (Roberts et al. 2004) unreported. Accidents are only reported fully if they
are near enough to home, and in both accidents and natural disasters there are usually two figures
(for example, „Four Britons were among the thousand dead‟).

Nations may not have navels (Gellner 1996) but they certainly have histories and construct
histories for themselves. Somewhere in the life of a nation we tell a national story about „our‟
distinctiveness, our excellence, fair-mindedness, bravery, and our „genius for democracy‟; for
others their shared travails form the oft-told stories, as is found in the victim state-nations of
Serbia and Afrikaanerdom (Bennet 1995; Adam and Gilliome 1979). The national story, it has
been argued, has all the potential of functioning in a manner parallel to racial exclusiveness
(Parekh 2000). We can distinguish nation and race, and thus nationalism and racism (Mosse
1995), but we have to accept that the contemporary world, as well as much of the twentieth
century, offers many examples of racism-nationalism fusions. The New Right movements of
Britain (the British National Party) and continental Europe, in France (The National Front), the
Netherlands and Austria, express racial ideas but tactically fly under a „nationalist‟ banner,
bowing to the utter unacceptability of avowed racialist politics (Miles 1993). In Belgium the Bloc
Flams could be declared unlawful if it is found to be racist, thus requiring the party to re-shape
(and re-name) itself as a populist party or a freedom party. If these are viewed as extremisms, and
being the „extreme right‟, at the point where excessive nationalism becomes racism, then these
racist nationalisms are viewed as deviations from „good‟ (that is, civic) nationalisms. They are
distortions of a benign social form. There is, however, a quite opposite view: that (extreme)
nationalisms are not deviations (Billig 1995). Rather the racist core is wrapped inside the national
message; the concept of nation is seen to function qua race. A traversing of the history of race,
and its connections to and departures from „nation‟, will help to unravel this problem.

285
RACES AND NATIONS: CLASSES OF PEOPLE AND THINGS

In the earliest English language usages of the concept race, in a period which undoubtedly is pre-
racist, it equates not only to nation but also to any class of people, animals 6 or even things in a
metaphorical sense: hence famously, and often cited, Robert Burns was able to write of the haggis
as belonging to „the pudding race‟. We could under this dispensation also write of the race of
Scots, meaning little more than the Scottish „people‟. The Oxford English Dictionary (1993)
offers an early meaning of race as „tribe, nation, or people regarded as of common stock‟, citing a
description of„Llewelyn ap Gruffith as „the last Prince of Wales of the Brittish race‟, in a quote
dated as 1600. A mid-eighteenth-century use refers to „a race of sheep in this country with four
horns' (1745) and at much the same time we find „the race of learned men still at their books‟
(1748). Two other shades of meaning do not appear till the latter part of the eighteenth century
and through the nineteenth. One is of a „group of several tribes‟ seen as being of „distinct ethnical
stock‟; and the second, „one of the great divisions of mankind‟, which share physical
characteristics. This last, which the Dictionary describes as a „disputed meaning‟, is the one
closest to the science of races.

With the exception of poetic usage and in the classification of animals, the modern use of race is
almost exclusively with reference to populations and peoples. Between its earliest seemingly
benign descriptive meaning and the present, the word race has come to be connected with a
biologized theory of the unequal qualities of the world's peoples and populations. In the present
day the association of the word „race‟ with a world hierarchy of peoples and types is so
compelling and so recent that it can no longer - in the human sphere - have a neutral or purely
descriptive meaning.

Race and nation have, at different points in their volatile histories, occupied some of the same
terrain. Cited uses of the words provide evidence of this sharedness, indicated by the fact that one
is used to define the other. We have (above) seen race defined as „nation or tribe' of common
stock. Similarly a core definition of nation, with examples from the fourteenth century, is given as,
„an extensive aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by common descent,
language or history as to form a distinct race of people, usually organized as a separate political
state and occupying a definite territory' (Oxford English Dictionary 1993).

286
In these references „nation‟ is called upon to assist in the definition of race, whilst „race‟ is called
upon to assist in the definition of nation. In Latin „natio‟ has the general sense of breed, stock,
kind, species, race as well as a more specific sense of„a race of people, a nation, people‟. It is
related to a root meaning of birth, being a noun akin to the verb nasci, to be born. Nation and race
have both had, and to some extent retain, this sense of „breed‟ or people united by common
descent. (Fenton 2003a).

Walker Connor has remarked that the language of ethnonationalism is the language of „blood,
family, brothers, sisters, mothers, forefathers, home‟ and cites Ho Chi Minh as asking Vietnamese
people to remember that „we have the same ancestors, we are of the same family, we are all
brothers and sisters, … no-one can divide the children of the same family‟ (Connor 1993: 379). 7

Connor has indeed sought to restrict the use of the term nation to peoples who form an
ethnonational community in the strong sense of a real or fictive claim to common ancestry,
coupled with a powerful sentiment of belonging. In this way a „civic nation‟ (connected to a state)
is difficult to accommodate in Connor's thinking, except in the limiting case where the people of a
state also form an ethnonation. For others, the idea of nation as the citizens or „people‟ of a
(multi-ethnic) state is also a powerful one, co-existing in a kind of continuous tension with the
idea of an ethnonational community. The closer the concept of nation approximates to a concept
of an ethnonational community, the closer it comes to some uses of race. Balibar speaks of the
schema of genealogy as the centre of the race idea, a schema transferable to the idea of nation:
„The nation form is articulated to the modern idea of race … The idea of a racial community
makes its appearance when the frontiers of kinship … are imaginarily transferred to the threshold
of nationality‟ (Balibar 1991: 100).

CLASSIFICATORY RACE, ANTHROPOLOGICAL RACES: A VICTORIAN

HIERARCHY

Michael Banton has done more than any other modern writer 8 to define and illustrate the shades
of meaning which have been implied in or attached to the word race, of which race as lineage,
race as type and race as sub-species are among the most important (Banton 1998). In race as
lineage, sections of humanity may „trace their histories back genealogically through the links in
the ancestral chain‟ (Banton 1998: 17). Descent from common ancestors becomes one element of
the race idea, and uses of this kind can be traced among some of the earliest English language

287
uses of the word race. A turning point was reached with the publication of the work of the great
classifiers of the plant and animal and (subsequently) human worlds, 1800 marking the date when
Cuvier began his work of exploration and science. Cuvier divided Homo sapiens into three
subspecies, Caucasian, Mongolian and Ethiopian, and described „certaines conformations
héréditaires que constituent ce qu‟on nomme des races' (cited in Banton 1998: 45). Cuvier
himself defined some subsets of these grand types, and for more than a century subsequently,
anthropologists would vie for creating the proper classificatory system which best accorded with
physical anthropological observations. Race as descentis not the same thing as race as type, that
is, as a „group defined by shared classificatory criteria‟. But, as Banton (1998) observes, it is not
difficult to understand why the two became confused, that is, that similarity of appearance is
attributed to common descent. The third great departure in nineteenth-century ideas of race, race
as subspecies, stemmed from Charles Darwin, whose work effectively undermined the idea of
fixed and permanent types by being essentially a theory of adaptation and change. The idea of
natural selection was popularized in many fields. But the meanings associated with race as
lineage, type and subspecies were not always successfully distinguished by practitioners using the
word „race‟; they could and did use the word in varying senses. Banton reaches a quite stunning
conclusion:

In retrospect it can be seen that the years from 1859 to 1930 were a dead period for physical
anthropology as a generalising science. No progress could be made in solving the central
problems until work in other fields - mainly in genetics but also in the study of human
development – had reached the point where they could bear effectively on questions about
variations in the shape of skulls, and so on. (Banton 1998: 90)

This „dead period‟ did not prevent anthropologists, more social than physical, drawing far-
reaching conclusions about society, the institutional order, and beyond these the world order,
from what they believed to be the lessons learned from the study of races.

Indeed, the period described above - the second half of the nineteenth century and the first third
of the twentieth century - may have been a dead period for physical anthropology but it was an
extremely lively period for the racialization of society politics and the world order. Diverse but
connected events and trends in this period attest to the strength of the idea of race, and to the
forms of super- and subordination within which concepts of higher and lower races were
expressed. Most observers of the latter half of the nineteenth century in England, for example,

288
suggest a very considerable hardening of racially hostile attitudes (Lorimer 1978; Hall 2000),
some of these attitudes stemming from the intense public debates about the Indian mutiny and the
quelling of the Morant Bay rebellion in Jamaica; thus the attitude shift began at roughly the mid-
point of Victorian England: „In the mid-nineteenth century, a new vigorous racist ideology
challenged the humanist traditions of the anti-slavery movement and preached a new doctrine of
racial supremacy‟ (Lorimer 1978: 14).

This new doctrine became part of the orthodoxy of the age. In Lorimer's words „belief in the
superiority of one race over another was a consistent part of mid-Victorian attitudes toward man
and society in general‟ (1978: 203). Lorimer contended that this harshness in racial attitudes and
ideas reflected a harshness in the search for confirmation of social status in an era when old
statuses were losing ground and new men sought to confirm their own position:

A change in attitude occurred when the quest for gentle status within English society intensified,
and the aspirants for gentility became more concerned about excluding those of questionable
status. Blacks were identified by their race and history with servitude and savagery (1978: 203)

This makes Lorimer's thesis an exact example of what Michael Banton (1998) was later to call
„race as status‟.

Racial hierarchy was a matter both of ideology and political domination: with respect to race, the
Victorians practised what they preached. At this point we reach something like the apogee of the
British empire (Schama 2002). On the other side of the Atlantic Americans were guided by a
sense of manifest destiny (Gossett 1965; Horsman 1981), a destiny seen as the fate of a vigorous
Anglo-Saxon people, towards new worlds of domination in central America and the Pacific,
following their internal mastery of the American west. In internal race matters in the United
States, the end of the period of reconstruction following the civil war had been superseded by a
period of intensified racial exclusion in practice and in theory. The intensification of racial
antagonism in Britain was more than matched by the post-reconstruction developments in the
United States. 9

RACES WITHIN SOCIETIES AND NATIONS: RACE STRUGGLE AND CLASS

STRUGGLE

289
We are most familiar with race as a formulation of internal social divisions in the modern period,
where, for example, the United States as a post-slavery society, and many European nation-states
as post-imperial societies, take on a multiracial character. This formation of racial differences
broadly matches lines of social inequality and class position. Thus, the post-slavery African-
Americans once constituted a racially demarcated segment of a rural poor and sharecropping
class in the American South, and now make up a wholly disproportionate element of the urban
poor (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1999). Less familiar to us is a much older history of a
kind of racial view of internal divisions in emerging European states, of which France and
England form two prominent examples. In this respect at least, the concept of race has been closer
to the concept of class than to the concept of nation; put another way, struggles between (class-
based) races form part of the history of emerging European nations. Indeed Foucault (2003
[1976]) has argued that class war, having once been discursively constituted as race war, gave
way to „races as nations‟ when new nation-states adopted a race discourse to express their
nationhood.

The French case, as an instance of class divisions being racially represented, is well documented
(Barzun 1937), with the aristocracy portrayed as Frankish and the common people as Gallo-
Roman. In Banton's words, „the nobility claimed to be descendants of the Franks and derived
their claim of privilege from the right of conquest‟ (1977: 16). Banton suggests that it had been
shown earlier (in Barzun 1937) how an „opposition between Teuton and Latin ran through much
French historical writing from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century‟ (1977: 16). 10

The English case takes on a similar form, with a conquering race, the Normans, forming an
aristocratic class over and above the common Anglo-Saxon folk. „The ruling class is pictured as
the descendants of an alien oppressing race, who have no right to be in the country and no claim
to the obedience of Englishmen‟ (Banton 1977: 17). This kind of thinking could be described as
Anglo-Saxonism, as seeing English virtues as „derived from their Anglo-Saxon forebears‟, a view
reproduced not just in political histories but also in Walter Scott's romance Ivanhoe (Banton 1977:
20).

The theme of class rule or class war as race war constitutes a central thread in a set of lectures
11
(1976-77) by Michel Foucault. In the lecture for 28 January he quotes a letter to Engels in
which Marx writes: „You know very well where we found our idea of class struggle; we found it
in the work of the French historians who talked about the race struggle‟ (Foucault 2003: 79). In

290
other words, ethnonations (Gauls, Franks) are represented as races and as opposing classes. Both
Michael Banton and Michel Foucault, remarkably, writing at much the same time (1976-77), pick
up the threads of the links between Marx, the French historians such as Thierry and the romantic
12
novelist Scott, the last of whom was undoubtedly read by Marx. Foucault however gives the
ideas of race, nation and class one further speculative twist. If „race war‟ had constituted a
discourse for class war and revolutionary struggle, then the translation of races plural into race
singular signals the matching of race with nation and its transformation into a counter-
revolutionary tool.

Race war was class war and as such was an idea with revolutionary potential, much approved by
Foucault. Such an understanding would fit the case of the Anglo-Saxon common folk fighting to
throw off the Norman yoke. The discourse of Saxonism against the Norman state is what
Foucault refers to as a counterhistory of a revolutionary type. This idea of historical struggle
comes to be replaced by a „biologico-medical‟ discourse in which the purity and survival of the
„living body of society‟ is the central theme:

The theme of the binary society which is divided into two races or groups with different
languages, laws and so on will be replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically
monist. It is (however) threatened by … heterogeneous elements (Foucault 2003: 80)

The state therefore „takes over‟ the discourse of race struggle and makes it its own by re-framing
it as the struggle for racial purity. Thus a race (class) war in which one race is identified as the
superior power over another race-class is replaced by a racist state in pursuit of race purity:

The state is no longer an instrument that one race uses against another; the state is the protector
of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race … racism is born at the point when the
theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle, and when counter-history begins to be
transformed into a biological racism (2003: 81)

Foucault signals that this transformation, which he also refers to as the emergence of state racism,
took place in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century the Nazi regime
and the Soviet regimes were to give this state racism two further twists. The Nazis partially
turned state racism, the preservation of state-race purity, back towards the idea of race struggle by
identifying the race enemies of the „Germanic race‟ as the European powers, the Slavs and so on.

291
Soviet state racism, having eliminated the class enemy, then turns upon „the sick, the deviant, the
madman‟ so that the „medical police eliminates class enemies as though they were racial enemies‟
(2003: 83).

It is clear that these Foucauldian speculations about „state racism‟, only recently circulating in
English translation (cf. Stoler 1995; Kelly 2004), are closely linked to his better-known ideas of
bio-politics and the state. Central to his arguments is the assumption by the state of the „right to
kill‟, discursively represented in the state's punitive criminology and control over the body. This
is matched by the state's concern for physical reproduction and the health of the population. In
this framework it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish the categories of „society‟, „nation‟
and „race‟. Nation is in part represented as a discursive myth about the historical origins of the
people, as opposed races or as a single race, or as a dominant race; it is in part represented as „the
population‟ which is the subject of bio-politics, that is, it must be preserved, „defended‟, purified
and maintained in a healthy condition. Once the state takes on the race myth, then „nation‟,
„people‟ and „population‟ are subsumed within this discourse. For our purposes we find in
Foucault an elision of these discursive categories. Similarly, in Balibar's account, society is
„nationalized‟, that is, represented as a nation. And, crucially, the nation is racialized, or
„ethnicized‟:

The symbolic kernel of the idea of race is the schema of genealogy … the idea that the filiation of
individuals transmits from generation to generation a substance both biological and spiritual,
and thereby inscribes them in a temporal community known as kinship. As soon as national
ideology enunciates the proposition that individuals belonging to the same people are
interrelated we are in the presence of this second mode of ethnicization. (Balibar 1991: 100)

What Balibar terms ethnicization is the process of representing the nation-state as a community.
He asks himself how ethnicity can be produced and appear natural. His answer is that „there are
two competing routes … language and race‟ of which „race‟ is the second mode of ethnicization
described above.

TACIT MAJORITIES AND MULTI-ETHNICITY

In the period identified as the high point of racist thought, the latter half of the nineteenth century
and the first third of the twentieth, mono-racial discourses were pre-eminent in societies such as

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the United States, Germany and Britain. Despite the multiracial character of the United States, the
category constituted the tacit majority which was taken to represent the American people. As
Jacobson (2001) has admirably demonstrated, successive waves of European immigrants to the
United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were initially categorized in some
racial, national or religious grouping which marked their social inferiority and class position.
Anglo-Saxon was a preferred category of„race‟ as was Protestant of religion. If „the American
people‟ was not precisely conceived as mono-racial or mono-ethnic, White, Anglo-Saxon and
Protestant stood for a norm from which others were a deviation. This was a code of race, ethnicity
and culture as described just before the mid-twentieth century by Lloyd Warner (Fenton 2003a).
Race and nation coincided to the extent that the white Anglo-Saxon model was the dominant
norm. Constituted within this white nationhood we find a system of racial subjugation, with the
subordinated black Americans confined to an inferior status.

There is, in all such cases, an acknowledgement of a multiracial population, coupled with an
equation of a dominant population with „the nation‟. This dominance is not wholly phrased within
a language of racial purity, and after international revulsion at the genocides of the German Nazi
regime, the explicit discourse of„race‟ has receded. Hence we have the concept of dominant
ethnicity to signify the way in which a particular ethno-racial and cultural category is imagined as
13
the nation. On the face of things, the concepts of race and racial difference - and certainly
„racial purity‟ - are much less negotiable than the concept of culture, although it has been argued
by some that a „new racism‟ predicated on an exclusivist cultural imagination functions in much
the same way as an „old racism‟ (Balibar 1991).

One of the most important sites for the efflorescence of the nationalisms of new nations was the
dismantling of the empires of the European powers in the three decades subsequent upon the end
of World War II. In many of these cases, nationalisms had been anti-imperial, and, in the post-
independence phase, nation-building. Two circumstances impeded a thoroughgoing ethno-
cultural or ethno-racial as against „territorial‟ (cf. Brubaker 1996) nationalism in many of these
instances. Frequently, as Brubaker observes, the inheritance of competitive European
imperialisms had been that ethno-cultural regions did not match the territorial boundaries of the
new states, especially in Africa. In other cases, the demand for labour in colonies had often led to
the importation of labouring populations whose descendants formed the ethno-racial plurality of
the postcolonial states. In the British empire these were usually Indian labourers imported into
labour-intensive (plantation, mining, railroad building) works in colonies outside India; such was

293
the case in Fiji, Malaysia, East Africa and countries of the Caribbean. Both colonially and
postcolonially there was a certain matching of class and the division of labour with ethno-racial
group. In Fiji and Malaysia the relative exclusion of the „native‟ population from the modernizing
economic sector became the basis of a postcolonial fear of losing ground „in our own country‟. In
Fiji the taukei movement as an expression of indigenous Fijianism is a persistent obstacle to bi-
ethnic or non-ethnic Fijian nationhood. In Malaysia the concept of Bangsa Melayu (the Malay
people) has been mobilized as the foundation of Malaysian nationality, but has partly given way
to Bangsa Malasia, the concept of a post-ethnic Malaysian citizenship. 14

TRANSNATIONAL HIERARCHIES: RACE AS CIVILIZATION

In much of what has preceded in this chapter we have examined the fit of race with nation, or the
racialization of nationhood; we have also looked at „races within nations‟, where class divisions
are expressed in a racial language, within a framework of a dominant ethno-race. At several
points in this debate we have hinted at a transnational dimension of a racial hierarchy, in
particular in the colonial relationship, of racial dominance being expressed across societies,
peoples and states. The concluding task is to make explicit this transnational dimension of race.
For it is clear that in the case of all the (European) imperial nations, and including in the present
age, the United States, internal class-race hierarchies have been matched by a nation-over-nations
hierarchy. This inter-nation or people-over-people inequality has historically been expressed in a
language of race and civilization.

This was quite explicitly the case at the height of the racial age. The same anthropologists who
tried to establish world racial classifications and apply them to internal differences, also saw
racial difference as a key to explaining levels of civilization. In 1873 in the Journal of the
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain, the paper read by J. G. Avery was recorded in minute
form. His main message was that „racial characteristics are not the result of accident, habit,
climate … but are physical, material, and indelible‟ (1873: 63). He goes on to classify races in
three divisions: civilized, semi-civilized and savage. Thence he sets himself three questions, all of
which will subsequently be answered in the negative:

Has any race now civilized descended from savages or any savage race become civilized?
Has any civilized race degenerated into partial or total barbarism?
Has any partially or wholly civilized race exchanged its civilization for another? (Avery 1873: 63)

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Others present questioned what Avery had argued. Were not the ancestors of the modern British
as „savage as any uncultivated races of the present day‟? Avery remained unconvinced and ended
by arguing that the failure of progress of the uncivilized must cast doubt on Darwinian theory:

If it cannot be shown that any race of men have emerged from barbarism to civilization, it will be
very difficult to prove that according to Darwinian theory, they have risen from the state of
monkeys to that of men. (Avery 1873: 67)

Only a few years later, at a conference on the Native Races of Australia, James Bonwick (1887)
read a paper, the meeting (held in June 1886) being chaired by Francis Galton. The opening
remarks show how physical the geographical and anthropological interest was - Avery above had
spoken of race as „physical, material, and indelible‟. Bonwick begins by a description of the
aborigines' colour, height and strength, „which is reputed below that of the English. Furthermore
„an odour, somewhat resembling that emitted by a goat, has been detected‟ and „the breast of the
female is pendulous in early motherhood' (Bonwick 1887: 201). Hair, chin, thick skull, nose and
teeth all receive attention but the comments on the shape of head are remarkable for their
specificity: „A pyramidal shape of the head has been compared to that in old Gaulish reindeer-
hunters and the boat-headed Brochmen of ancient north-east Scotland‟ (Bonwick 1887: 202).
Like many commentators on the position of native peoples at this period, Bonwick believed that
the Australian aborigines were on the verge of extinction. Paucity of birth was one sign of
decadence, he reports. Decadence - and degradation, degeneracy, decay - were characteristic and
crucial terms of this commentary. „The end is approaching‟, he concludes. Bonwick, like Avery,
suggests that, for a time and in small measure, the native people acquire some attributes of
„civilization‟, only for it, under pressure, to be extinguished. So, Bonwick reports:

Civilization and religion have advanced for a time. But the ploughman tires, and takes to the hunt
again. The scholar becomes a drunkard, or enters the Native Police. The convert lapses, or dies.
The race, as a race, is not rising. All surroundings are too much for the man. The weight of our
civilization crushes him. (Bonwick 1887: 207)

By contrast with Avery, Bonwick does express some expectation that the Australian natives are
„improvable‟ and acknowledges that the decline of the race may be partly on account of the denial
of their rights and lands. Anthropological views, and the political prescriptions taken from them,
were not uniform, but the central tendency was to identify „lower races‟ with lack of civilization.

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J. W. Powell in the American Anthropologist of 1888 again asks whether it is possible for peoples
to „acquire culture and lose it - and become degraded‟. He, like others, routinely refers to
„civilised travelers among the lower races of mankind‟ (1888: 99). In 1919 George S. Painter
writing on „The Future of the American Negro‟ advises us that: „the hothouse plant may bring
more immediate and brilliant results, because of forced and abnormal conditions, but at the
expense of hardiness and vitality. It is proverbially true that primitive peoples cannot stand an
enforced civilization‟ (Painter 1919: 410).

Holmes (1910) similarly writes of the „Problems of the American Race‟ and predicts the
„complete absorption or blotting out of the red race‟ leading to a final reduction of all peoples to a
common race type. He continues, ominously: „if peaceful amalgamation fails, extinction of the
weaker by less gentle means will do the work … The final battle of the races for possession of the
world is already on‟ (Holmes 1910: 161)

Both Painter and Holmes are concerned about America and the American Negro' and „red race‟
but the belief that „weaker peoples‟ would fall to the stronger more advanced races, was a
universal one, applicable across all continents. Holmes concludes his comments by referring to
„the battle for possession of the world‟, race struggle on a global scale.

The anthropological views recorded above were concentrated in the last two decades of the
nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. They carry an academic tone, notable
for their confident scientific attitude. A fine example comes in a review of a book on the „races of
Europe‟ by the Librarian of the Musée d'histoire in Paris, M. Deniker. Largely agreeing with
Deniker, the reviewer (Ripley 1899) nonetheless points to the author's failure to emphasize „the
extremely brachycephalous spot at the mouth of the Scheldt‟ and notes a difference of three and a
half points between Deniker's (77) cephalic index for Denmark and Beddoes's published index
(80.5). If Deniker were right this would make for an index that was „strongly Teutonic‟. What
confidence in the miracle of the cephalic index! If they were aware of them, Deniker and Beddoes
may have been alarmed by Lapouge's earlier comments:

I am convinced that in the next century millions will cut each others' throats because of one or
two degrees more or less of cephalic index. This is the sign by which people will recognise one
another as belonging to the same nationalities and by which the most sentimental will assist in
the wholesale slaughter of peoples. (1887, cited in Banton 1998: 91)

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But as well as the scientific method there were countless examples of the uses of race science for
political prescription. We referred earlier to the debates surrounding the Indian Mutiny and the
Morant Bay rebellion in Jamaica, which triggered bitter disputes, laced with racial attitudes. Even
earlier than this, Thomas Carlyle had published his vituperative attack on philanthropists and
„negrophiles‟ for their failure to recognize the indolence of the Negro and the threat he
represented to white civilization. (His essay was first published in 1849 (in Fraser's magazine) as
„The Negro Question‟ and reprinted in 1853 with the word „nigger‟ replacing negro.) The
language of Carlyle's essay (1971) is astonishingly crude. He was, it seems, obsessed by
pumpkins, so frequently does he refer to the „jaws of Quashee‟ eating them. His racial views
could be applied to national questions and racial purity at home, or could be applied
internationally. This was truly a world perspective in which his conviction of the racial
superiority of whites could be read into his views on white degeneracy at home (the Irish), the
plight of planters in the Caribbean (bedevilled by the Demerara Nigger), or the impending
conflict (that is, the coming civil war) in the United States.

In the early twentieth century, just after the Great War, two books appeared which proclaimed the
superiority of the Nordic white European peoples, and trajected their views beyond nations and
onto civilization and the global condition. Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race had
appeared in the United States in 1918, pronouncing that „race was everything‟. Similar in style
and import was Lorthrop Stoddard's The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy,
published in New York in 1923: „All over the civilized world racial values are diminishing, and
the logical end of this disgenic process is racial bankruptcy and the collapse of civilization‟
(Stoddard 1923: 303).

CONCLUSIONS: NATIONALIZING RACE, GLOBALIZING RACE

The pre-modern meanings (that is, prior to the biologizing of race) of race and nation converged
on the sense of „a people‟. These „peoples‟ may on the one hand form a nation and may on the
other hand represent divisions in a society, as instanced in the distinction between Gauls and
Franks in France, and between Saxons and Normans in England. In the modern period the
meaning of race as a unitary body of people, physically and culturally, is nationalized, that is
incorporated into the concept of nation. Peoples which are self-evidently multiracial (like the
United States) nonetheless adopt „a dominant race‟ framework within which others are
inferiorized. These inferiorized groups are also overwhelmingly associated with low status and

297
class position, and with social disorder, failure and deficiency. In the social theorizing of nation
and race, the universalist (civic) paradigm of nation departs from the equation of race and nation
and attempts to replace race-nation exclusiveness with a multiethnic inclusiveness. But as, in
different ways, Foucault and Balibar argue, there is a constant pressure towards racializing (or
particularizing) nation, both in its internal representations, and in the control of borders and inter-
state relations. Thus both historically and theoretically it is possible to discern race as nation, and
races within nations, as divisions within them. Finally, we have suggested, the theory of races
becomes a global paradigm of the dominance of a particular civilization seen as civilization itself.
Not uncommonly, this civilization is seen to be in peril, by decay from within, or threat from
without. The theme of race as civilization, or indeed civilization as race, was to be found in
scholarly and popular works in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth
century, from which many of our examples have been drawn. In the twenty-first century, in a de-
racialized form, the language of civilization, survival and threat is repeatedly evoked in
international relations. The United States, from its position of global economic, military and
cultural domination, continues to speak of Western civilization, civilization itself and the values
of „freedom‟ and „democracy‟ which are being defended by military means. Nation and
civilization are stripped of biological language but live on as key terms in a tacit politico-cultural
hierarchy.

It would require another chapter to discuss one crucial manifestation of „racial solidarity‟, that is
race as resistance, where suppressed or inferiorized groups build an oppositional sense of
peoplehood, in a fight for equality and liberation. This raises two questions which can only be
hinted at here. First, is the language of race capable of being transformed into a message of
liberation without replicating the race chauvinism which it opposes? Second, is the de-
racialization of the language of state, inter-state and global-civilizational politics a real or pyrrhic
victory? Wallerstein (1994) has argued that the „universalist‟ response to multi-culturalism (as a
progressive force) masks a deep conservatism. But does Wallerstein really believe that
multicultural politics poses any real threat to the world capitalist order at the centre of his own
analysis (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999)? On the second issue, the argument that de-
racialization has been a limited gain does appear to be a deeply pessimistic view. However, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that future generations might look back on the contemporary
ideologies of freedom and democracy (as civilizational politics) in much the same way that we
now look back on the language of race.

298
NOTES

1 Eric R. Wolf (1994) „Perilous Ideas: Race, Culture and people', in Current Anthropology, 35 (1):
1-12: „in the United States … the old physical anthropology remained in place until the mid-
1950s'.

2 See also Chamberlain (1911) and Grant (1924).

3 See Husbands (1991), Rattansi (1994) and Fetzer (2000).

4 See also Wallerstein (1997).

5 Much disputed by the British government.

6 Interestingly, the Greek word ethnos (people, nation) could also mean a mere class or group.

7 See discussion in Fenton (1999).

8 But see also Curtin (1964), Fredrickson (2003), Malik (1996), Stepan (1982) and Biddiss
(1979).

9 Wilson (1980), Vann Woodward (1974) and Camejo (1976).

10 Note Banton's comment (1977: 16) on race not having biological connotations at this time.

11 These lectures have recently been published (2003) as Society Must be Defended, having been
prepared as lectures in 1976.

12 See reference to this in Society Must be Defended.

13 See Kaufmann (2004) and Wimmer (2004).

14 On Fiji see Lawson (1991), Premdas (2004), Carens (2000), Gladney (1998), Kaufmann (2004)
and on Malaysia see Hirschmann (1986), Fenton (2003a, 2003b) and Milne and Mauzy (1999).

299
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turner, charles. "Nation and Commemoration." Pp. 205-213

Whether or not they have geographical extension, all human collectivities have a relationship to
time. Whatever else they do, the actions of their members contribute to the creation, maintenance,
alteration or destruction of that relationship. Regardless of the purpose for which a collectivity
exists, part of what it means to belong to such a collectivity, to share a life in common, is defined
by the manner in which the collectivity's relationship to time is shaped. And while all
collectivities have a relationship to past, present and future, students of social time may
distinguish between them according to which temporal dimension is the most important. Thus at
one extreme, collectivities such as the family, the school or churches may be dedicated to the
transmission of an already-existing tradition of practices or belief, so that in their relationship to
time the past predominates. At the other, companies or business corporations or groups of
scientists are oriented primarily towards the achievement of some future goal. At some point
between these extremes, political parties or interest groups may be oriented primarily towards the
achievement of immediate, pragmatically defined goals or to the contingent needs or
opportunities of the moment (Gurvitch 1963). If there is a politics of time it is because the
temporal logic of one type of collectivity may be imposed upon the life of another with a different
temporal logic. Educational institutions, for instance, geared to the transmission of an existing
body of knowledge, may come under pressure to adopt a temporal orientation appropriate to
businesses or bureaucracies.

One of the peculiarities of the collectivity we call the nation is that it appears from the start to
obey more than one temporal logic simultaneously, that is, to face towards the past and the future
in equal measure. A politics of time is a necessary rather than a contingent feature of it. This
peculiarity is reflected in the scholarly literature, which is able to see the nation as both the
product of forward-looking, future-oriented, modern states (Gellner 1983) and as the repository of
long-lasting or primordial longings and ineradicable memories (Smith 1986). This temporal
ambivalence - the nation is both modern and pre-modern - partly explains why the question
„What is a nation?‟ has continued to puzzle social scientists in a way that the questions „What is a
family?‟ or „What is a school?‟ or „What is a trade union?‟ have not. Indeed, at times this can
appear more as an insoluble metaphysical problem, rephrased by Ernest Gellner as the
unanswerable question „Do nations have navels?‟ (Gellner 1997). An increasingly prevalent
response has been to pay lip service to this question but to take seriously de Tocqueville's remark

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that while all nations bear the mark of their origin, „the spirit of analysis has come upon nations
only as they matured, by which time their origins have been obscured by time‟ (Tocqueville 1945:
28). Once this is accepted, attention turns towards the more localized and detailed study of the
devices through which individual nations make sense of, represent and perform their own
temporal identity, and towards the variation in the extent to which nations have available to them
a repository of genuinely original historical resources on which to base it. Of the means through
which this temporal self-definition occurs, few have received as much recent scholarly attention
as that of commemoration.

The term „commemoration‟ refers to all those devices through which a nation recalls, marks,
embodies, discusses or argues about its past, and to all those devices which are intended to create
or sustain a sense of belonging or „we feeling‟ in the individuals who belong to it, a sense of
belonging which may or may not provide for a means of addressing future tasks and possibilities.
Commemoration, then, includes public rituals of remembrance and individual acts of recollection,
the building of monuments and dedication of places of memory, the construction of museums and
the naming of streets, the visiting of such places, public debates over the meaning and
significance of historical events, and the unspoken or gestural ways through which nationality is
not so much represented as incorporated in the practices of everyday life. The construction of a
repertoire of such devices allows the student of nationhood to gain comparative knowledge of the
relationship between nation and commemoration, and to appreciate the considerable variation in
the significance attached to different types of historical event, in the relationship between
commemorative devices designed for domestic consumption and those directed at an international
audience, and in the relationship between explicit and implicit modes of commemoration. The
banal nationalism (Billig 1995) which feeds off the latter, it may be observed, is a feature of
nations with settled and relatively continuous internal political histories, while spectacular public
controversies over explicit acts of commemoration are a feature of nations with a less settled or
more violent political past. Renan's remark that forgetting is as important to nationhood as
remembering covers both of these cases. On the one hand, nationhood may be rooted in
customary ways of behaving which need no explicit articulation (the most extreme version of this
is the English seventeenth-century claim about an ancient constitution which had existed since
„time immemorial‟, that is, beyond any definable and necessarily contingent beginning which
would require marking (Pocock 1957)). On the other, where something is explicitly remembered
something else is implicitly or explicitly forgotten.

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HISTORICAL EVENTS AND PERIODS

Nowhere is the thesis about the selective character of commemoration more apposite than in the
commemoration of historical events. While it may be true that the weight and resonance which
historical events are able to acquire varies between nations, there is no nation which does not
have at least one day on which events deemed significant are marked. Proponents of the thesis of
invented traditions emphasize the delay - possibly of centuries - between the event and the
decision to mark it and the manipulative or hegemonic relationship between actors who make the
decision and those expected to agree to participate in its marking. But the ubiquity of the practice
makes it difficult to dismiss as artificial. An important task for students of nationhood is to
establish correlations between type of nation and the type of event commemorated. Here some
necessarily general relationships can be suggested.

First, it is not uncommon for older nations which have a history of belonging to larger
geopolitical entities in late feudal or early modern Europe in which their political identity was
precarious, and whose experience of modernity was accompanied by a struggle to acquire a
measure of political autonomy, to attach importance to acts of heroic resistance in the face of
overwhelming odds. Whether or not they are explicitly marked, dates such as September 11th for
Catalonia (siege of Barcelona 1714), or June 28th for Serbia (battle of Kosovo Polye 1389), April
16th for Scotland (battle of Culloden 1746) or August 19th for Romania (battle of the Marasesti,
1917) are part of those nations' memorial calendar. The case of modern Israel is a notable
variation on this theme, the defeat at the battle of Masada in AD70 and other examples of heroic
military action having acquired, for a state which sees itself as under constant siege, a memorial
significance equal to that of the Holocaust (Zerubavel 1995). Note that the heroism is more
important than the fact of defeat, and that the events concerned are distant enough in time to be
readily discussed but sufficiently well documented - they are history rather than myth - to have
contemporary resonance.

Secondly, we may observe that nations which have achieved a definitive political autonomy may
mark the fact by making independence day a national holiday, and by marking historic victories
rather than defeats. Poland, for instance, whose history is replete with heroic defeats - the Warsaw
Uprising of 1944 being the most recent - nonetheless gives prominence to November 11th
(independence day in 1918), May 3rd (the constitution of 1793) and the battles of Grunwald
(defeat of the Teutonic Knights by Polish and Lithuanian forces in 1414) and Monte Cassino

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(defeat of the Germans in 1944). This suggests that, even if one accepts Gellner's thesis that
nations are the product of processes of rationalization and modernization which generated modern
states, the events which modern states choose as markers of identity do not need to be those that
define their internal political character. In the United States, for instance, whose formal political
character has altered little since its inception, and whose citizens are conscious of and
knowledgeable about their constitution, the primary object of collective commemoration is July
4th, the issuing of the Declaration of Independence, and not the framing of the constitution or
decisive battles of the Civil War. In France, July 14th focuses the nation's attention on a relatively
insignificant historical event, the storming of the Bastille prison in Paris. In England, the one
peculiarly English secular festival which is widely observed, Guy Fawkes night on November 5th,
commemorates the foiling of a (Catholic!) plot to destroy the English parliament in 1605,
whereas events of greater long-term political significance - such as 1688 - are ignored. The choice
of these events which did not definitively shape the life of a nation may perhaps be explained in
functional terms. The United States constitution may be an agreed upon framework and the heart
of American political identity, but it can also provide a resource for opposing sides in social
conflict (over abortion or the right to bear arms). The political history of France since 1789 is one
of considerable political discontinuity, the legacy of the revolution too ambivalent for the
commemoration of its founding to refer to the most decisive events associated with it (Arendt
1960; Furet 1996). The „Glorious Revolution‟ of 1688 may have set the seal on Britain's character
as a constitutional monarchy, but to commemorate it officially would be to presume a measure of
agreement about the desirability of this form of government which does not exist. Instead,
attention is focused upon events known in common and capable of suspending or neutralizing
political or social discord.

This does not, of course, rule out the possibility of an appeal to counter-memories even on these
occasions, as Spillman has shown for the 1976 bicentennial celebrations in the United States
(Spillman 1997). But we may still speak of a process of condensation and displacement in which
politically less significant or less controversial events are the focus for or catalyst of expressions
of national belonging. If we take a shared language to be central to a nation's identity, together
with the growth of mass literacy (Anderson 1981), then we may note a parallel to this in the role
played by the anniversaries of the births and deaths of a national literature's finest exponents,
events whose marking serves to draw our attention to the role played by his or her writings in the
nation's awareness of itself.

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We may, in addition, identify a third class of nations, largely but not exclusively those which
have undergone a period of totalitarian or authoritarian rule under modern conditions, whose
political history is either too painful or too complex or both for controversy-generating events
which are within living memory to be suppressed, so that these come to occupy a place in a
nation's memorial landscape and its memorial calendar alongside and equal in importance to
those which might provide a shared sense of belonging and inter-generational solidarity. The
most notable example is the role played by the commemoration of the Holocaust in post-war
Germany, but we may also add such events as the Kielce and Jedwabne pogroms and the Vistula
Action of 1947 (in which Ukrainian and Lemki minorities were ethnically cleansed) in Poland,
the Vietnam War in the United States, the Srebrenica massacre (which Dutch peace-keepers
failed to prevent) in both Bosnia and the Netherlands, the mass disappearances under the Latin
American dictatorships of the 1970s, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland and
Czechoslovakia in 1947, the Prague Spring of 1968 or the Hungarian uprising of 1956. It is a
common feature of such events that, unlike those associated with the regular conduct of war, their
commemoration and the manner of it are a matter of both internal political and international
controversy (Herf 1997; Steinlauf 1997).

However, here too the events commemorated in many cases stand for a larger, more complex and
ambiguous set of events making up a decisive period in a nation's history. It is noteworthy here
that since 1990 a reunited Germany commemorates the period of the destruction of European
Jewry on November 8th (Kristallnacht in 1938) and January 27th (arrival of Soviet troops at
Auschwitz in 1945), anniversaries of its beginning and end. Moreover, marking these dates -
which frame only the second half of the Third Reich - is a means of recalling the entire period
from 1933 to 1945.

Similarly, the events marked in post-communist societies are often a shorthand for
commemorative energies directed at the entire period (40 or 70 years) of communist rule. If we
agree that a nation's commemorative practices create, sustain, alter or destroy its relationship to
its own temporality, we may note here an important difference between Germany's response to
fascism and the responses of Eastern European nations to communism. The post-war division of
Germany can be said to have suspended nationhood, with the commemoration of the past being
subordinate to the future-oriented projects of economic renewal in the West and „building
socialism‟ in the East. By contrast, the circumstance of post-communism in Eastern Europe is
such that commemoration is not a mere adjunct to nation-building but central to it. That

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circumstance is a postcolonial one in which commemorative activity directed at events of national
significance (activity which was forbidden by regimes which deployed their own commemorative
practices governed, in many cases, by a rhetoric of international solidarity rather than national
pride) becomes a source as well as a symbol of national belonging. It is also one in which post-
communism implies a „return to Europe‟ and to the values associated with it, and here there is a
significant difference between post-fascist Germany and post-communist Eastern Europe. In the
latter, commemorative activity may be directed not only towards the period of communist rule
but towards a preceding period in which, it is claimed, the nation embodied - albeit briefly - the
values it seeks to aspire to today. Communism, then, instead of being an ineradicable burden, can
be seen as a historical parenthesis. This hermeneutics, in which a liberal and/or democratic
tradition is recovered from within a largely non-liberal or non-democratic political history, itself
has a tradition among liberal intellectuals in Eastern Europe (Mishkova 2004). By contrast, this
aspect of national commemoration, in which a historical period preceding that of totalitarianism is
called upon to act as a focus of shared national sentiment, appeared to be unavailable to a reunited
Germany. Karl-Heinz Bohrer's liberal-conservative argument „Why we are not a nation and why
we should become one‟ (Bohrer 1991), in which a national tradition predating national socialism
is held to be recoverable, is forced to exist alongside the widespread popularity within Germany
of theses concerning the rootedness of national socialism in long-term developments in
preexisting German culture, and the consequent unavoidability of a presentist and future-directed
temporal orientation (Eley 2000).

The variety of types of event which can secure a nation's identity, in particular the availability of
both uncontroversial and controversial events as foci of national attention, reminds us that what
we call a national tradition - regardless of the extent to which we can say that it is invented - may
consist in an extended argument that a nation conducts with itself about the goods internal to that
tradition (MacIntyre 1981) or in extreme cases about whether there is such a tradition at all.
Indeed, it is rare that a nation may be said to construct a past for itself in accordance with an
already-existing agreement about what those goods consist in.

DEVICES

If all nations mark significant events in their past, they all draw upon a repertoire of memorial
devices through which to do so. There is some connection between type of event and type of
device, although the empirical variety of the devices suggests caution. The device chosen may

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reflect the internal life of the nation, its current international status, and its prevailing political
aesthetic as much as the nature of the event itself, a fact testified to by the considerable historical
variation in choice of memorial device: the monument, the museum, the cemetery, the history
textbook, the ceremonial may all be markers of the same event.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of monuments to political violence. In the case of
war memorials, it is an oft-noted fact that in Western and Central Europe before World War I,
memorials to previous conflicts would have had a predominantly figurative, heroic and/or
religious character (the Völker-schlachtdenkmal in Leipzig erected in 1913 on the centenary of
Napoleon's defeat there is a fine example), and that while officers might be mentioned by name,
regular soldiers would not be. World War I saw a change in this practice, the names of the dead
appearing side by side regardless of rank (Lacqueur 1994; Koselleck 1979) and memorials being
erected in small communities and taking on a less military character, either through the use of
non-military motifs (such as the mother and child in the villages of northern France) or through
the adoption of abstract rather than figurative modes of representation. Here the Cenotaph in
London's Whitehall is the most obvious example (Homberger 1976; Winter 1995). The tombs of
the unknown - and unranked - soldier in the capital cities of major combatant countries should
also be mentioned here. These examples have been interpreted as evidence of a democratization
of European political culture and a hesitancy about linking warfare and heroism, just as the use of
heroic and gargantuan statuary in the Soviet memorials to World War II may be said to have
reflected the survival of a militaristic ethos within a non-democratic political culture. Yet while
this may be true, we may also extend the thesis that more contingent factors influence choice of
memorial object and observe that in northern France after World War I abstract designs - in
particular the obelisk - were often chosen not because they expressed a particular political
hermeneutics but because they were the cheapest option from a repertoire of standard designs for
local communities operating under financial constraint.

Monuments - and, we may add, street names - are among a nation's most tangible and enduring
means for focusing its members' attention on matters of historical significance. However, it may
be noted that if a nation's relationship with its past is a matter of interpretation and is therefore
mediated through devices such as monuments, then its relationship with those monuments
themselves is mediated through human action. Monuments provide occasions for national
reflection both before and after they are erected, and more importantly, become recognized sites
for organized or spontaneous memorial performances.

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Yet the relationship between these two forms of mediation presents one of the more intractable
problems for students of nation and commemoration. On the one hand, it may be suggested that
the ceremonial performances which are repeated annually and which populate a nation's calendar
are more significant to the nation's temporal orientation than the sites at which they occur, that
nationality enacted is more robust than nationality represented. For the monument, which is a
permanent physical reminder of a nation's past and which can foster a community of the living
and the dead, can also become a mundane feature of the urban scene: „there is nothing as invisible
as a monument‟ (Musil 1990). On the other hand, while ritual memorial performances which take
place at such monuments may generate more intense communal sentiments than the monument in
its muteness can, they, unlike the monument, may evaporate once the performance is over. From
a technical point of view this indifference of both the monument - permanent but unnoticed - and
the ritual performance - intense but then forgotten - suggests a number of things.

First, it suggests that central to the effectiveness of commemorative performance is its regular and
repetitious character: the power of commemoration then consists less in the effectiveness of the
ritual actions which support it, than in their place on a calendar; secondly, it makes all the more
notable monuments that can command sustained attention throughout the year - Maya Lin's
Vietnam memorial in Washington is the most notable example here - and commemorative acts
which, though they take place only once, are themselves subsequently remembered. Examples
here include the burial or, more spectacularly, reburial of a nation's political or literary figures
(such as Stalin in 1953, Churchill in 1965, the reburial of Sikorski in Poland in 1993 and of Imre
Nagy in Hungary in 1991, the funeral of Sartre in 1979); the marking of centennials or
bicentennials of a nation's founding, (Spillman 1997) or ceremonies of international
reconciliation (Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand at Verdun in 1984; Kohl and Ronald
Reagan at Bitburg in 1985). Thirdly, there are spontaneous gestures which break with ritual
expectations, such as German Chancellor Willy Brandt falling to his knees at the monument to
the Warsaw Ghetto fighters in 1970, a commemorative gesture which was itself commemorated
in the photograph which continues to be reproduced in numerous works on German nationhood
and the Holocaust.

However, if we accept the thesis that nationality enacted is as robust as nationality represented,
then we may push this claim further and suggest that officially sanctioned commemoration may
be no more important as a marker of national identity than the myriad forms of non-political
practice, both formal and informal, which make up a national life. Examples of non-political

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ritual with an overtly commemorative character include the visiting of graveyards on All Souls
Day in some Catholic countries (such as Poland or Mexico), an observance which generates
almost universal national participation. But such practices need not be directed towards specific
events in the past for us to call them commemorative: the Tour de France in France or the Grand
National in England; St George's Day in Catalonia, on which everyone is expected to give a book
and a rose, are examples. The reason for this is that as well as speaking of representational
memory operating at the level of overt national symbolism and ceremonial practice, we may also
speak of embodied memory operating at the level of inherited or implicitly transmitted ways of
acting (Bergson 1988; Connerton 1989). Whether or not we refer to it as „collective amnesia‟
(Billig 1995: 38), there is as much a memory of how to do something and continue doing it, as a
memory of what happened in the past, and we may observe that those marks of national
distinction which remain most peculiar to an individual nation may be those which are most
opaque to outsiders, and reside not so much in the visible building blocks of national identity - the
ceremonial which is now readily observable by visitors and which on occasion is driven by the
logic of tourism, the national museum, the showpiece cemetery, the names of streets - but in its
interstices, in its seen but unnoticed features such as the rhythms of everyday speech (Milosz
1968) or in the nuances of bodily gesture (Mauss 1979 [1930]; Connerton 1989; Scarry 1985).
And we may add that a nation's identity, its temporal continuity, becomes looser when it forgets
how to carry out these routine practices or when they fall into neglect.

ORGANIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF COMMEMORATION

This important observation about the tacit or habitual forms of commemoration has proved
difficult to translate into sound generalizations about, say, nationally specific modes of bodily
comportment, and it remains a matter of marginal or speculative concern in the scholarly
literature, which tends to focus on the more spectacular or overt forms of commemorative
practice. Yet even here there is often a reluctance to acknowledge the fact that whether it
generates common sentiment or social discord, explicit commemoration is something which does
not happen without an accompanying agent or agents. It is always organized in some way, and
not always by public or official bodies. Particularly in cases of individual monuments or new
museums, or anniversary celebrations, we may speak of a commemorative entrepre-neurialism in
which an organizational nucleus of actors drives a memorial project forward and seeks to draw
peripheral actors in. Robert Musil gave a memorable account of a doomed version of such a
project in his comic masterpiece The Man Without Qualities (Musil 1995 [1940]); a more cynical

311
account of such projects can be found in Norman Finkelstein's The Holocaust Industry
(Finkelstein 2003). But these extreme cases only serve to remind us of the importance of the more
mundane fact that many of a nation's more potent symbols, particularly those directed at its
origins, may have been established long after such origins could be said to have occurred, and
that they are, moreover, the product of complex relationships between central government,
regional authorities, civil society associations, business people and intellectuals, an organizational
network or „cultural centre‟ in which there may be only a marginal place for political actors
(Spillman 1997). Such an organizational perspective provides an important methodological
counterweight to the view that sees invented traditions as merely a modern version of bread and
circuses, the product of a hegemonic strategy on the part of the rulers of modern nation-states
keen to provide collective compensation for the socially divisive effects of modernization.

FROM HISTORY TO MEMORY

The fact that the selection of examples of memorial practice we have passed in review here is by
no means comprehensive - we have said nothing for example about commemoration in the
ancient or medieval world or in non-literate societies (Coleman 1992; Vansina 1965), in all of
which commemorative activity played a central role in the maintenance of temporal coherence -
may tempt us to believe in a universal human need for memory, such that, for instance, the
commemoration of events of significance to modern nations may be seen as the secular functional
equivalent of practices with a religious character. However, such a thesis sits uneasily with the
geographical and historical variation in those practices, and with the more important fact that
modern secular forms of commemoration presuppose the past's pastness in a way in which
religious forms of commemoration do not. The event which is commemorated in secular modern
nations belongs to history and the commemoration of it both presupposes this pastness and can
exist alongside the construction of an historical argument about it. Regardless of the extent to
which those nations may seek to define themselves in terms of a specific religious confession,
particularly where church and state are not separated, and regardless of clerical involvement in
secular commemorative practice, the practice itself remains secular. By contrast, the historical
veracity of the events of, say, the last supper or of Christ's passion remains beyond discussion for
adherents of the Christian faith. In religious commemorative acts - such as the liturgy - past and
present are not first separate and then „brought together‟. Modern secular, as opposed to ancient
or medieval memories, are enacted in societies which have history - and the irrevocable sundering
of past and present - at their centre.

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If we put the matter like this we can make sense of the upsurge which has occurred in the past
two decades of both popular and scholarly interest in commemoration, an interest which suggests
something about the changing character of modern industrial societies in which nationhood now
resides. This approach is exemplified by Nora's „realms of memory‟ project in France (Nora 1996
[1984]), begun in the late 1970s, in which the historical-cum-progressive character of modern
societies necessarily generates radical discontinuities between past and present, and militates
against the unproblematic, quasi-natural transmission of a national memory. „Realms‟ or „Places‟
of memory then refers to all those aspects of French national life which act as anchors of identity
in the face of a history that constantly threatens to erode or transform it. We may suggest,
however, an extension of this thesis, based on Max Weber's thesis of the ineradica-bility of the
human search for meaning, and say that in the twentieth century modern societies have been
shaped by a temporality defined not merely by history, but by historical progress, in which
history is not only a matter of collective fate or inescapable change but something to be made.
History is linked with an improvement of the human condition, and has meaning as well as
direction. This type of historicism was subscribed to by both liberalism in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries and by Leninism in the twentieth, and the Cold War which ended in 1991 may
be interpreted as a struggle over the meaning which history could have. In the 1970s in the West
doubts had already set in about the steering capacities of modern states and about their capacity to
derive political legitimacy from history-making; simultaneously in the communist bloc, the
growth of dissident movements called into question historicism in its Leninist version. The
melancholia which followed the collapse of communism has been accompanied in the West by a
readiness to explore sources of meaning unconnected with the pursuit of future prosperity. In
Eastern Europe, the partially imported character of capitalism and democracy means that they
contribute only partially to the rebirth of post-communist nations. Those nations' identities are
grounded not only in economic or political achievement, but in the practices through which views
of the national past are either corrected or made a matter of public controversy.

CONCLUSION

While the flood of individual studies of nation and commemoration shows no sign of abating,
methodological questions of the sort hinted at here remain. Students of history, for instance, have
often found it difficult to combine an interest in empirical historical truth and a sensitivity to
issues in the philosophy of history. It may be that the field of commemoration, which has
attracted historians as much as if not more than sociologists, and in which the material itself

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provides a direct stimulation to reflection on history's shape and meaning, provides an
opportunity to transcend this distinction or to render it less stark. Yet frequently in studies of
memory and the politics of memory, the lure of the archive remains. This has produced many
thorough pieces of work about individual cases, but there is still work to be done in order to
connect this material with the longstanding and sophisticated literature on cultural transmission,
ritual, tradition and the philosophy of history, in order that the broader significance of
commemoration for contemporary societies remains in focus. In addition, while intellectuals and
scholars, wary of references to „national character‟ focus upon the more overt and well-
documented relationships between nation and commemoration, there is a need less for the
synopsis of controversies and debates surrounding the efforts of some nations to come to terms
with the past, than for a critical hermeneutics of commemoration as part of a broader ethnography
of nationhood. Such a hermeneutics would accord due weight to the aesthetics of public
commemoration, an aesthetics in which embodied and habitual memory was given its place
alongside that of representational memory.

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Finkelstein, N. (2003) The Holocaust Industry . London: Verso
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Brewer, John. "Memory, Truth and Victimhood in Post-trauma Societies." Pp. 214-224

The intensification of organized violence with globalization has created new wars (Kaldor 1999)
and transformed old ones (Moore 2000) to fundamentally alter the focus in social science on
genocidal nationalism (Shaw 2003). The new interest in social science with memory, truth and
suffering (on the latter see Wilkinson 2004) can be attributed to the negative impact that several
cases of genocidal nationalism have had on our notion of late modernity as enlightened and
progressive (Bauman 1989). The discovery of memory in social science is really the return of
genocide to contemporary experience. Theories of nationalism have always been sensitive to the
link between nation, violence and memory, but we now need to recast their relationship in order
to understand the new problems faced by post-trauma nations.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the pivotal role of memory in national and communal
conflicts, but primarily to shift focus on to the post-violence setting in order to assess the role of
memory as a peace strategy. This involves attention to subsidiary issues like truth recovery and
victimhood as new features of social science and their potential as strategies for healing in post-
trauma societies. Remembrance and commemoration are difficult peace-making strategies and
memories of the conflict can be obstacles to successful post-violence adjustments, nonetheless
memory must become an object of public policy after communal violence. Before we look at how
memory is implicated in war and peace, it is worthwhile drawing attention to the particular way
that memory is conceptualized as a sociological process in these arguments.

UNDERSTANDING MEMORY

Sociology understands memory as having individual and social dimensions. Remembrance is

something we all do as individuals all the time, and we all have our own personal set of memories,
unique in its constellation to us. What goes on in people's heads in the formation and use of
individual memories is a question about individual remembrance. We might call this personal
memory. What goes on in society in the formation and use of collective memory is a question of
social remembrance. The realization that societies remember as much as individuals has received
renewed attention (Connerton 1989; Misztal 2003) as societies nowadays seem to be more
conflict-ridden, vulnerable and subject to risk, and as evocations of supposedly golden ages
dominate collective memory. Sociologists in the past recognized the power of collective memory,

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 but the new term „social memory‟ now dominates the field. There is a good reason for this change
in nomenclature. Collective memories are understood as group memories, shared by a community,
that help to bind that community together. Nations have collective memories as part of their
narrative of nationhood, so may ethnic groups and other communities. Collective memories are
thus shared images and representations of the past that assist in constructing social solidarity.
Social memory as a term includes this dimension, but it also incorporates the claim that individual
remembrance or personal memory is itself social. Personal memory is clearly not collective but it
is still social.

There are several reasons why memory is social:

 People have personal and collective memories at the same time, the latter being those
representations that are commonly shared by all.

 Personal memories exist in relation to the social processes that occasion and shape them, such as
language, nationalism, cultural and political symbols and the like.

 Individual remembering takes place in a social context and memories can be occasioned by the
context in which people live.

 Remembering serves social purposes at the personal and public levels, being sociologically
functional for individuals and societies.

 Memories can affect the social behaviour of people and groups.

 Memories supply individual and social sense-making processes, giving ways of understanding
and comprehending the world and a set of values and beliefs about the world.

 Memories help in the construction of collective identities and boundaries, whether these are
national, cultural, ethnic, religious or otherwise.

 Social processes like culture, nationhood and ethnicity are in part constituted by memory.

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 Memory is constructed by various social practices that encourage or discourage the remembrance
and commemoration of particular things.

 Forgetting is as social as remembrance and the denial or recasting of particular memories serves
social purposes.

 Memories are selective and therefore always open to change and can be affected by social change,
changes that reinforce certain memories or encourage collective amnesia.

Social memory is more than just the social benefits or social aspects of personal memory, and
social memory does not just work through people's personal memory as a set of consequences at
the societal level deriving from individual remembrances. Social memory is this, but it is also a
set of specific public remembrances that are manipulated and constructed by various social
practices. The ways in which social memory has been manufactured and manipulated for the
purposes of nationalism and nation-building are obvious examples.

NATIONHOOD, IDENTITY AND MEMORY

Nations and memory are indivisible. Misztal refers to „communities of memory‟ (2003: 155), in
that memories help to mark social boundaries and define collective identity. These groups -
families, ethnic, racial or religious communities, whole nations or global diaspora networks - are
in part constituted by memory - that is, they are made up as units in part from the sense of shared
past and common journeying that memories furnish - but these communities also help to
constitute memory, in that they socialize us into what should be remembered and what forgotten.
It is for this reason that there is such a strong link between memory and nationalism.

There are several dimensions to this relationship. Social memories are often linked to features of
nationhood, to the physical and symbolic places, landscapes, cultural and historical sites and
events that constitute the nation. We have personal memories of places and landscapes that link
us collectively to the nation. Nations need a narrative by which to construct a sense of nationhood
- a historical narrative of the past, a sense of the travails and triumphs on the journey to
nationhood, a sense of collective identity and solidarity and so on - all of which memories help to
supply. Nations require a sense of their past for reasons of social cohesion, memories of which
are embodied in acts of public commemoration and in public memorials, in public images, texts,

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photographs and rituals that socialize us in what to remember. Nationhood also requires us to
forget. Deliberate collective amnesia or denial helps in nation-building since it excludes from the
national narrative items that in the present here-and-now are problematic. These items might be
anything that prevents the construction of the nation as an imagined community and which blurs
the social boundaries that mark the nation or disrupts the formation of a common identity. They
might also be any items that suggest that the members of the nation do not share a common
destiny. Nations need to forget things from the past that dispute a common journeying to
nationhood amongst its peoples and things that suggest a parting of the ways in the future. So
closely allied are social memory and nationalism that it is no surprise that in the eighteenth-and
nineteenth-century hey-days of nationalism in Europe, we saw the greatest expansion in building
large public memorials that now adorn civic centres and in the development of national traditions
and emblems that served as national memories.

The link between memory and communal violence is clear from this summary (for a fuller
account, see Ray 2000). Social memory is one of the processes that people go to war about and
memories of the violence can keep the enmity going. A comment on each is appropriate. Memory
is often deeply embedded in the conflict precisely because memory defines the boundaries
between the included and excluded groups, it shapes the identity of one's own group and that of
the marginalized other. The state or the powerful dominant community can manipulate memories
- and history generally - to create an enemy and justify violence against them. Memories help to
construct racial separateness; they can divide people into separate and distinct imagined
communities. Public acts of remembrance or rituals of commemoration of past wars, usually done
in honour of the victors who get to write history from their point of view, can keep alive old
divisions and continually reinforce the cultural inferiority of the vanquished and maintain some
ethnic group as despised; and the vanquished can have their own „sad celebrations‟ to keep alive
their servitude and defeat. These acts of remembrance can be „official‟, developed by the state,
but also „unofficial‟, in which members of the victorious group hammer home their dominance in
more aggressive acts of remembrance: contrast the celebrations of 1690 in Northern Ireland by
Loyalist gangs compared to the state.

Memories can also be used to develop a sense of vengeful justice, as Ray puts it (1999), in which
some group feels „good cause‟ to attack another to avenge some supposed or real historical
affront. Ray explores how senses of the past were used in the Balkans as part of the genocide that
befell the collapse of Yugoslavia because some groups had a distorted notion of themselves as

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 having ethnically pure homelands in the past, which they wished to recreate. This analysis has
much broader application. Notions of „historic homelands‟ often lead to contested borders (Robin
and Strath 2003) and thus to violence in the name of justice, revenge, loss or restoration. For
these and many other reasons, memory is implicated in war.

It is also implicated in peace because memories of the communal violence hamper peace
processes. They can do so in innumerable ways. Divided memories can lead to renewed outbreaks
of violence, perpetuate senses of grievance amongst victim groups that increase the risk of such
violence locally, distort perceptions of the fairness of the settlement and discourage tolerance
toward the former enemy. When the new regime that emerges from the peace settlement is weak,
its legitimation crisis may encourage the perpetuation of selective social memories and unofficial
practices of remembrance that reproduce the old divisions and perpetuate the conflict locally.
There is also the problem of how to commemorate the victims in such a way as not to keep them
locked in the wounds of war. There is a problem for peace processes in how to remember the
conflict, honour people's sacrifices, while simultaneously moving people on to a non-violent
future. There are two sociological issues around public memory in peace processes: what it is that
is publicly remembered and forgotten; and what social practices need to be adopted to culturally
reproduce these selective public memories. There is no easy policy solution to these issues.

However, social memory is implicated in peace in a second way because, despite the close
connection between memory and genocidal nationalism, social memory can be used as a peace
strategy. Indeed, it is precisely because social memory is socially constructed, subject to
manipulation and change - albeit slow - and affected by social context and social change, that
various social practices that occasion and shape memory and remembrance can be devised to
garner peace, if not also reconciliation.

MEMORY AND PEACE

Social memory can be reconstructed to become a peace strategy and to help the maintenance of
the peace process by revisiting, and where appropriate reconstituting, the past for the purpose of
peace. There are a number of dimensions to this:

 Forgetting to remember that which is divisive or inconvenient to the peace agreement.

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 Correction of the distortions of the past that once fuelled divided memories.

 Historical re-envisioning of the conflict itself so that the way it is remembered changes.

 Recovery of memories, perhaps formerly denied or avoided, that illustrate unity or peaceable co-
existence in the past rather than enmity.

 Developing new narratives of nationhood and symbolic structures that legitimize the new post-
violence regime.

 Developing new forms of commemoration that celebrate peace and cultural diversity, which point
towards the future.

 Developing a pluralist approach to memory to incorporate other groups' memories.

 Continually remembering to forget what needs to be discarded socially and to recollect what
needs to be remembered.

Collective amnesia appears the oddest of the above notions. Amnesia is here meant as a conscious
decision to forget. Amnesia has been part of the nation-building project in many post-violence
societies in the past, such as post-Franco Spain and post-war Germany (on which see Frei 2002).
In ancient Greece, there was an annual ritual in the temple in which worshippers were reminded
to continue to forget a defeat in war. Mandela was famous for saying in South Africa that people
needed to forget the past. This was not literal. What he meant was that society should forget.
People's personal memories may well continue for a long time to be full of the violence, sacrifice
and suffering. Victims often have no choice but to remember - memories furnish them with daily
tortures and living nightmares. The question is not one of individual remembrances, however, but
of social remembrances; how post-violence societies should structure public remembrances and
commemorations so as to assist individuals in managing their personal memories. In other words,
post-trauma societies should address social memory and thus only indirectly what is inside
people's heads.

Social memory cannot do all this in isolation from managing issues of truth and victimhood, all of
which are intricately related, as we shall shortly emphasize, or in isolation from managing the

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 emotions caused by violence (on which see Brewer 2006). But at this point, it is worth focusing
on some social practices by which social memory can be recast as a peace strategy in order to
achieve some of the dimensions noted above.

It is first necessary to identify the different roles memory performs in peace processes in order to
understand the practices and policies that are relevant to each. There are four roles, some of
which are primarily to do with personal memory, although indirectly social; others are directly
social memory:

 Memory as restoration for perpetrators/ collaborators. This may be achieved through

acknowledgement of perpetrators' culpability through personal memory work with them. It might
take the form of truth commissions or other truth recovery processes, restorative justice policies
and ex-offender programmes.

 Memory as healing for victims. This may be achieved through the therapeutic effects that follow
from remembering traumatic events and builds on work in cognitive psychology about the
healing effects of releasing autobiographical memory. It might take the form of story-telling and
other collations of personal narratives of suffering, such as oral history projects, as well as trauma
counselling.

 Memory as reconciling for interpersonal rela tions. This can be addressed by sharing each other's
memories, coming to learn of each other's experiences and views of history and of the conflict. It
might take the form of cross-community work on issues around identity, history and memory and
other inter-community interaction programmes. The intended outcome would be respect for
others' memories and the development of a pluralist approach to memory.

 Memory as social transformation. This may be achieved through change in social memory at the
societal level.

I want to mention in more detail the last role. Psychological healing and relationship building
have direct social benefits but social memory also needs to become an object of policy
management in its own right and be addressed through various social practices that assist in the
reconstruction of social memory. Civil society, which is a key agent of social change and
foundational to peace processes, can be mobilized to achieve these policy objectives, so that there

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 is not a sole reliance on the new state. Indeed, some of the social practices are best dealt with by
community processes rather than national or governmental strategies. Four strategies seem useful:

 Atonement strategies, such as the „sorry day‟ in Australia, earmarked as a special Day of
Atonement or Day of Reflection, the development of „narratives of mourning‟ that help deal with
the loss and grief (such as texts, images, photographs, exhibitions and story-telling that capture a
society's cultural mourning), programmes to facilitate reflexivity amongst communities,
institutions and organizations about the conflict, the provision of mechanisms for making public
apologies, like formal truth commissions, concerted campaigns, perhaps through religious and
para-church organizations, to address the issue of forgiveness.

 Citizenship education programmes, which assist people to develop the citizenship skills for living
with their former „enemies‟ in the new post-violence setting. This involves civil society and the
state developing programmes that help people acquire the knowledge and learn the skills for
tolerance (peace activists in Northern Ireland refer to this quaintly as the public practice of
manners), such as education programmes, teaching tolerance, civic responsibility and cultural
diversity in schools, the establishment of bridge-building forums and the like. Post-conflict wish
fulfilment does not have to re-fight the war (films like Rambo) but can be oriented to establish the
peace.

 Re-remembering strategies, such as mechanisms to capture hidden memories that are functional
to peace, re-visiting the distorted memories of the past, various storytelling procedures and truth-
recovery projects, changes to the history curriculum and to history textbooks and to the mass
media's cultural mediation of history, public mechanisms to garner and support new frames of
meaning and sense-making through re-remembering. Public memories can be recast and
reconstructed by means of historical re-envisioning of the conflict (in which, for example, it
might be denuded of its ethnic origins, blamed on third parties - normally colonizers - or shown to
have affected all groups equally rather than one victim group alone), as happened in Rwanda
where Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities have become recognized as nineteenth-century inventions of the
Belgians. There are even cases where memories have been publicly recovered (and people's
personal memories now publicly acknowledged) when they pertain to a pre-conflict past or
become convenient as part of the reconciliation of social divisions (as in the new public
recognition of Tamil contributions to Sinhalese culture in Sri Lanka, or Irish Catholics who
served in the British armed forces in two world wars or in the colonial Royal Irish Constabulary).

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 Re-memorializing strategies, such as museums, exhibitions, memorials that celebrate peace,
either through a focus on the pain of the past enmity (Robben Island/Holocaust museums) or
which point toward a new future, the development of new symbols of commemoration, such as
flags, public rituals, national holidays and new sites for memorializing such as Centres for
Remembrance or Reconciliation (buildings, places, heritage centres, even forests or parks devoted
to peace).

These strategies are likely to be more effective in conjunction with policies that address truth
recovery and victimization.

MEMORY, TRUTH RECOVERY AND VICTIMHOOD

Truth and victimhood seem strangely coupled, but there are good reasons for linking the two
together with memory. Some of the demand for truth commissions and truth recovery processes
comes from combatants, in that the search for truth feeds into the issue of amnesty and speeds
social reintegration of ex-combatants. The ANC was in favour of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission on these grounds, as were some former members of the South African Police.
Security force personnel in Guatemala who have been „born again‟ in their conversion to
conservative evangelicalism, have been keen to reinforce this wiping away of their past by also
participating in truth recovery (see Kaur 2003). Governments can desire truth recovery too, in
order to try to give an official version of events. Most of the demand for truth, however, comes
from victims. In the transition to post-violence there is a desperate need by victims to know the
„truth. It is for this reason that truth commissions proliferate, or take different forms as judicial
inquiries, recovered memory projects or commemoration projects through the collation of
people‟s narratives.

This wish for the „truth‟ is widely recognized as part of victims' healing and is a necessary
element of reconciliation, so truth recovery has formed a part of most post-violence adjustments.
A lot of the demand for truth recovery comes from victims groups who want an opportunity for
their suffering to be publicly acknowledged as well as to discover those responsible for their pain
and expose the general atrocities of the perpetrators. One might use the common alliteration of
the three „R‟s' to understand this: victims approach truth recovery procedures from the point of
recognition (of their victim-hood), responsibility (discovering who is to blame) and retribution
(exposing the perpetrators). Whether or not we add a fourth „R‟ to the alliteration - reconciliation

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- depends upon whether the victimhood experience becomes psychologically healing and
sociologically functional. I will explain below what is meant by sociologically functional
victimhood.

Recognition, responsibility and retribution are motivations that easily resonate with the
experience of victimhood. The three „R‟s' can dominate even the ambiguous groups and
communities that were both victims and perpetrators simultaneously. Republicans in Northern
Ireland, for example, are in favour of truth recovery procedures as a way of exposing the role of
the British state, even though they run the risk of exposing their own culpability; likewise
Loyalists want to expose the military background of Sinn Fein politicians but try to continue to
conceal the role of the security forces. It may well be that their respective support for a Northern
Irish Truth and Reconciliation Commission will wane once they realize that they cannot control
what truths the process discloses (on truth recovery in Northern Ireland see Lundy and McGovern
2001; Smyth 2003). But their wish to use so-called truth to batter their opponents illustrates the
general problem with truth recovery in all post-violence societies. The idea of truth is problematic;
hence the universal complaints that truth commissions only disclose partial truths. Analysts know
that „truth tends to be relative, truth-from-a-perspective and is subjective, but common sense
renders the idea of truth as objective, unaffected by partisan standpoints (Shapin 1994). Not
unnaturally therefore, victims often wish to know what happened and who was responsible and
tend to believe that there is but one objective course of events and decisions in the past that
represents this „true‟ account. They want to know whose hands are dirty and bloodstained and
believe such identification is unproblematic and non-partisan. Thus, while „truth is therapeutic
and part of the healing process, it can re-open wounds and hinder or slow the process of
reconciliation because the „truth may be used from one standpoint to damn a particular group.
People‟s perception of the peace process may be negatively affected by the „truth behind the
former violent acts of negotiators, peace activists or politicians, or by feelings of anger, shock or
rage at finally „proving‟ the identity of the culpable. In short, „truth can be incompatible with
„reconciliation‟ (Rotberg and Thompson 2000).

Peace processes therefore need to manage two problems: finding the balance between the need to
know what happened in the past and moving forward, and encouraging victims to see the truth
from someone else's standpoint. Such balance allows victims to know about the past in such a
way as not to keep them locked there. It is for this reason that the fourth „R‟, reconciliation, does
not automatically form part of the alliteration. If it is to do so it needs to become the objective of

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 policy management, which requires that victimhood is policy managed in such a way as to make
it sociologically functional to the new society.

WHY TRUTH IS IMPORTANT

Truth Commissions have been used for a long time (see Hayner 1994, 2001), particularly in Latin
America, and the universalization of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission has
made the demand for one part of the rhetoric of several peace negotiations since. It is easy to see
why; there are at least four reasons that make „truth important:

 Recognition of victimhood via truth recovery, particularly of unacknowledged suffering, is

therapeutic for victims.

 Assigning responsibility for incidents can be healing for victims and their relatives, as well as
restorative for perpetrators.

 Truth recovery is a way of managing the emotional dynamics of post-violence adjustments and
dealing with the problem of memory.

 Truth recovery offers procedures for making „shame apologies‟.

For my purposes here, however, I want to focus on the negative case in order to illustrate that
truth recovery is not a simple panacea.

There have been many different complaints made about the specific truth recovery processes
deployed in the past, but these essentially break down into three sorts of problem: problems
around how the claims to „truth are received in the recovery process; concern around the partiality
of the truths disclosed by the process; and anxieties over the selective use to which truths are put.
Let me look briefly at each in turn. What matters for the effectiveness of truth recovery is how the
claims to truth are received. They have to be heard as accurate descriptions of events. The South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up an investigation unit to test the veracity of
truth claims, only to discover that most things could not be proved unless the perpetrator claimed
responsibility - as most did not. The readiness to hear what is disclosed as somehow „true‟ is
diminished when what is disclosed does not fit with what the victim or relatives expected or

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wanted. Uncomfortable truths are often explained away as inadequate or, indeed, as untrue,
especially if the truth recovery process that disclosed it lacks community legitimacy. Judicial or
governmental enquiries as specific truth recovery procedures often lack legitimacy because of
poor community involvement. Afrikaners saw the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission as a witchhunt against them and mostly refused to participate.

Even where shame apologies are made as part of truth recovery as combatants acknowledge
culpability, apologies have to be heard by the former enemy to be meant, the key to which,
according to the restorative justice paradigm, is hearing the shame-guilt as genuine. Elsewhere I
have discussed some of the problems around shame-guilt as emotions, and some of the
difficulties in eliciting shame-guilt apologies (Brewer 2006). The failure of Ulster Protestants to
hear what they consider amounts to an apology from Sinn Fein has been used by anti-Agreement
Unionists as one of the grounds to suspend the Belfast Agreement. This bears witness to the
difficulties some perpetrators have in saying precisely what victims want and to the doubts
victims have about accepting what is actually said.

The partial nature of the truths disclosed is both cause and effect of the problems around how
truth claims are received, resulting in „truth being partisan. Some people can simply refuse to
participate in the recovery process, as happened in South Africa, ensuring a onesided or selective
recovery of truth. There can be vested interests trying to limit what is disclosed. Truth recovery
processes have sometimes been designed by states, governments or political groups to disguise
their own culpability or partisanly expose that of their opponents. This is most likely to happen in
post-violence settings where the former regime retains some capacity to dictate the disclosure of
its activities and thus in those peace accords where there has not been an outright winner.

The terms of reference of the truth recovery process can sometimes be under the control of
powerful groups who limit the range of activities to be addressed. The South African Commission
focused on „gross violations of human rights‟ between March 1960 and May 1994. This was
impressive enough but it addressed actual incidents and events in this time frame and thus
excluded what we might call the silent oppression of the apartheid regime itself. It has been noted,
for example, that since women bore the brunt of that oppression, through forced removals, the
pass laws, domestic violence and broken families, women were not recognized as a special
category of victim beyond specific incidents of murder or abuse that involved them (Wilson
2001). But other truth commissions have been less generous than South Africa's. The Chilean

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Commission, for example, focused only on the disappearances and not on Chilean human rights
abuses, although the El Salvadorian commission had a very broad mandate to address „serious
acts of violence‟ (for a comparison of the two, see Ensalaco, 1994). The Northern Irish Victims
Commission, not strictly a truth recovery process but which was set up as part of the peace accord,
published a Report entitled We Will Remember Them, which completely excluded victims of state
violence (for an account from the Chair of the Commission, see Bloomfield 1998).

One response to control on the truth recovery process from above is to have community-based
processes. However, these are mostly localized and focus on truth recovery in a particular
neighbourhood or group, and thus tend to be quite deliberately partisan. One notable exception to
this was Guatemala's Commission for Historical Clarification, better known as the Recovery of
the Historical Memory Project (1999). This was set up by the grassroots and civil society in
Guatemala under the aegis of the Catholic Church as a popular response to the weakness of the
state's own truth commission. The Report was launched in 1998 to great controversy - the
coordinator of the project was assassinated two days later. The project addressed country-wide
cases of murder and managed to be popularly acclaimed by local communities, demonstrating the
viability of democratic and grassroots approaches to truth recovery, but even so, it took only six
months to address 36 years of violence and lacked legal powers to compel participation.
Information collected could not be used in prosecutions, and it lacked resources.

If truth recovery mostly discloses only partial truths, it is hardly surprising that what it discloses
can be selectively used. Indeed, people often have pre-determined preferences in the way they
intend to use so-called truths, which limit their capacity to receive as genuine whatever the
recovery process reveals. „Truth may merely be a bludgeon with which to beat the other side, to
criticize their position as elected representatives or dispute their place in parliament. Disclosures
and revelations can be used to continue the war not end it, inflaming not assuaging emotions.
„Truth in these settings may lead to revenge killings rather than emotional recovery. This is
especially the case under two conditions: where victimhood is widely dispersed throughout the
society so that most people can claim status as victim and perpetrator at the same time; and where
the peace accord is fragile so that truth recovery is used intentionally to continue the conflict or to
oppose a settlement. It is reasonable to argue on the basis of all this evidence that truth recovery
works best, if at all, as part of a successful settlement that has already stopped the killing, not as a
mechanism itself to end the violence. But if not by means of truth recovery, what is the best way
to manage the experience of victimhood?

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MEMORY AND VICTIMHOOD

In earlier work (Brewer 2003), I have alluded to the psychological costs of peace for victims in
Northern Ireland and South Africa, and the special problems they face in adjusting to their
„identity dilemma‟: victims have defined their identity for so long in terms of„the enemy‟ and
suddenly find in peace processes that they have to reshape their sense of who they are. What
makes adjustment worse for victims is that victimhood is highly politicized, for it encapsulates
the moral virtues of the groups involved in the conflict and addresses their separate claims to
moral justification for the war. What is victimhood and who gets to define it are thus key
questions in truth recovery and peace processes generally.

Victim groups tend to dominate the debate about victimhood and to affect our perception of who
the victims are and what experiences victims suffered. Yet in a sense everyone who has lived
amidst communal conflict is a victim irrespective of whether they or others significant to them
experience direct suffering and harm. While some victim groups recognize that everyone shares
the experience of victimhood in different ways, others operate a hierarchy of suffering and attach
to themselves and their kind a special victimhood. There are also individuals with profound
feelings of harm and suffering who are not in victim groups and are thus ignored inasmuch as
victim groups attribute to themselves the moral claim to have suffered or suffered the worst.
Victimhood is a more general experience than victim groups imply or accept and needs to
become recognized as a moral claim everyone can reasonably invoke. We also need to recognize
that society as a whole is a victim not just individuals living in it, in that a whole society can be
impacted by the conflict, not just people directly wrapped up in it. These forms of victim
experience tend not to form part of the mobilization done by victim groups.

However, victim groups serve several functions, not all of which are negative for the peace
process. Victim groups provide support structures, from counselling through to shared
storytelling. They can act as campaigners on behalf of victims, mobilizing for material resources
and public attention. Many voluntary groups, charities and social movements in civil society
similarly work in this positive way for their client groups. Another function is more negative.
Namely, where the victim groups act as forms of political mobilization, either as political
alternatives to conventional groups, or more likely, as surrogates on behalf of political parties.
This is negative irrespective of whether the mobilization is done to undermine or undergird the
peace accord. Victim groups that ally themselves with anti-peace groups use their suffering as a

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brake on the negotiated settlement by accusations that their suffering is being neglected or
undervalued. It is hard to respond to such claims. It is more defensible to discourage all
politicization of victim experiences. Politicization is difficult to reverse once set in train; some
political parties who formerly embraced victim groups as part of their contestation of the peace
accord can find victim groups an embarrassment as the party's political agenda changes.

Victimhood can thus remain divisive in peace processes. In Northern Ireland's case, for example,
victimhood was experienced differently between Catholics and Protestants and contested notions
of culpability for the violence tend to reproduce the old divisions because there is either a
reluctance to accept the others' victimhood or a wish to impose an artificial hierarchy of
victimhood in which one's own „side‟ suffered the worst. Equality of victimhood is denied, so that
victimhood is not a uniting experience amongst people who shared the same emotional and
physical suffering. Victim groups in these circumstances thus tend to cohere around the lines of
division and differentiation involved in the former violence, easily reproducing the old
dysfunctional passions. In Northern Ireland, there are ex-combatant groups (security forces,
Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries), giving recognition to their particular partisan set of
experiences and suffering. There are survivor groups („survivor‟ here includes relatives and
family members of the dead) who act as champion on their own or their loved one's behalf as
people with shared experiences. Sometimes survivor groups are based around a high-profile
incident of atrocity in which they or their significant other were involved; sometimes, amongst
types of survivor, such as those based on neighbourhood, religion or type of suffering, injury and
harm. There are also political victim groups, who have either been hijacked by the political
parties for broader political ends or are themselves political groupings only masquerading as
victim groups. These groups tend not even to talk to one another.

Even though victimhood is politicized and manipulated, post-violence societies cannot afford to
neglect victims. Victimhood can cause feelings that constitute a psychological disorder for the
sufferer from grief upward to known psychiatric conditions. These have to be managed if the
person is to become a normal functioning member of the new society. A pathway to
psychological healing for the individual forms part of post-violence adjustments, for victimhood
is a psychological state. It is also a sociological process. That is to say, victimhood has
ramifications at the level of society rather than just the person. It can distort society by
introducing what has been called „bad civil society‟ (Chambers and Kopstein 2001), that is,
voluntary and community groups whose practice and effects, unintended or otherwise, destabilize

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 the social structure, perpetuate ancient hatreds and reproduce the conflict. Victimhood at the
social level keeps vivid the emotional dynamics associated with the former society, requiring
policies by which society manages the continued emotional impact of past communal violence.
Victimhood provides a ready source of political mobilization that can impact negatively on the
peace accord, made especially difficult since such politicization is emotion-based rather than
reasoned, thus inhibiting the transformation from emotion/ identity politics to democratic/issue
politics. A post-violence society thus needs to find pathways to healing for the society as well as
for the individual.

Victimhood can be made sociologically functional for peace processes as a result of public
policies that address it at the societal level. The following seem relevant policies, although they
are hardly comprehensive:

 Society needs to find ways in which victimhood can be honoured as an experience in public ways
(in acts of remembrance and commemoration, sites of memorial, recovered memory projects,
truth recovery projects and the like);

 Victim groups need to be recast as „healing groups‟, in which victims are encouraged to release
themselves from the past and look to the future, by which victim groups maintain their positive
functions (support structures and resource campaigners) but shed their political ones, a
transformation that society reinforces both materially and symbolically.

 Society should materially and symbolically discourage burdens of grief for the individual being
used by victims and victim groups to prevent the rest of society moving on in terms of the
victims' attitudes toward social and political change.

 Forums of public accountability need to be developed in which victims and victim groups are
required to take responsibility, along with the rest of society, for the future rather than just
commiserate in their suffering.

 Financial and material resources should be deployed by the state to manage the practice and
functions of victim groups.

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 A pluralist attitude toward victimhood should be facilitated and supported in which the
victimhood of everyone is morally upheld and hierarchies of victimhood challenged.

 Cultural adjustments in the long term should stress the unity of victimhood as an experience
across the divide, something reinforced in the short term by citizenship education programmes,
adjustments to school curricula, publicity campaigns and acts of public remembrance and
commemoration and in sites of memorial.

 Special sites of healing should be developed in parallel to sites of remembrance, being those
places, events, moments or experiences that bring together victims from across the divide.

Not only is this form of victimhood healing for society generally, many of these policy initiatives
seem relevant also for psychological healing of individual victims.

CONCLUSION

Memory, nationalism and communal violence can be an unholy trinity. However, the sociological
nature of memory permits memory to become an object of public policy, in which various social
practices are deployed to make memory functional to post-violence societies. Subsidiary issues
like truth recovery and victimhood are dealt with in the process, making memory pivotal to peace.

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Brewer, J. D. (2006) „Dealing with Emotions in Peacemaking‟ , in S. Karstedt , ed. , I. Loader , ed. and H.
Strang (eds), Law and Emotions . Oxford: Hart
Chambers, S. and Kopstein, J. Bad Civil Society Political Theory vol. 29 (2001) p. 837–65
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656–75
Frei, N. (2002) Adenauer‟s Germany and the Nazi Past . New York: Columbia University Press
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Hayner, P. (2001) Unspeakable Truths . London: Routledge
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Kaur, K. (2003) „Guatemala‟ , in M. A. Cejka , ed. and T. Bamat (eds), Artisans of Peace . Maryknoll, NY:
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Misztal, B. (2003) Theories of Social Remembering . Maidenhead: Open University
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Robin, R. and Strath, B. (2003) Homelands . Brussels: Lang
Rotberg, R. and Thompson, D. (2000) Truth Versus Justice . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Shapin, S. (1994) A Social History of Truth . Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Shaw, M. (2003) War and Genocide . Cambridge: Polity Press
Smyth, M. Truth, Partial Truth and Irreconcilable Truths Smith College Studies in Social Work vol. 73
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University Press

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Turner, Bryan. "Citizenship, Nationalism and Nation-Building." Pp. 225-236

My thesis is simple. The growth of citizenship is associated with democratization, because the
civil and political rights of citizenship play an important part in underpinning democratic
institutions. The democratic participation of the masses in the polity and civil society has become
an important foundation of nation-building in creating an identification of citizens with the
nation-state. In addition, the growth of civil institutions and community groups is an essential
aspect of the Tocquevillian model of Western democracy. To a large extent, these assumptions
are valid. It would be difficult to imagine a flourishing democracy in which the social rights of
citizenship were underdeveloped, and in this sense citizenship is an inclusionary mechanism that
sustains civil society. However, the development of citizenship is also a project of nation-building
in which the creation of the national citizen is the primary project of the nation-state. From the
Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to the First World War, the rise of modern citizenship was
coterminous with the development of nation-states and nationalism as a secular ideology of the
state. Nation-building involved the production of a uniform and integrated society of loyal, well-
trained and healthy (male) citizens, if possible speaking the same language and believing in the
same religion. We might argue that faith became a private matter for the citizen and religion came
to express the national culture of the state. This division came to be embraced in the
Enlightenment philosophy of Kant when he, in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone ([1793]
1960), distinguished between an inner, moralizing faith and the external, institutional cultus of
religion.

There is a difference between the Westphalian, liberal model of the citizen as the carrier of the
civil liberties and the twentieth-century social model of the citizen as the bearer of social rights
that are institutionalized in a welfare state. In this sense, citizenship became an exclusionary
mechanism in which the contributory rights, that are characteristic of welfare states, form the
basis of an associational democracy with clear territorial boundaries. An associational democracy
is not unlike a large club in that members pay their dues in return for privileges, that are often
jealously guarded against outsiders and intruders. This difference in turn relates to the tensions
between the democratic and liberal side of citizenship, and its nationalist and occasionally
authoritarian dimension. Nineteenth-century nationalism was the ideological framework for the
creation of citizenship as a form of „national manhood‟ (Nelson 1998).

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British national identity is a late historical development, and to some extent the unintended
consequence of colonialism and immigration. By treating British national citizenship as a late
manifestation of nationalism, I am in some respects following Krishan Kumar's argument in The
Making of English National Identity (2003). British nationalism was forged in response to
outsiders, especially to immigration in the twentieth century. When in Shakespeare's Henry V we
confront apparently distinctive notions of English, Welsh or Scottish identity, we must also
remember that the social division between aristocracy and peasantry ruled out any easy
identification of an emerging English nationalism in Shakespeare's historical dramas. There was
no dominant ideology capable of uniting elite and mass, despite the fact that in Elizabethan
England the division between Protestant and Catholic meant the internationalism of the Catholic
Church no longer bound England to Catholic Europe (Abercrombie et al. 1980). Protestantism
and the Virgin Queen rather than „English nationalism‟ provided some common cause against an
impending Catholic invasion. While one might have disputes about the historical origin of
Englishness, British identity and British citizenship are the products of the growth of social
citizenship and welfare entitlements some three centuries later.

The rise of nation-states required the production of national citizenship, and this historical
development is captured by Michel Foucault's notion of „governmentality‟ in which the state
becomes increasingly an administrative state whose task is to make populations socially and
economically productive (Foucault 1991). Citizenship overcomes, but never entirely successfully,
the divisions of social class, and renders the working class productive and efficient through the
creation of welfare and social security. Class conflict is partly contained by the spread of social
rights and partly as a result of the solidaristic functions of national ideology. There are, however,
important variations between nation-states, to which we need to attend. There were obviously
important differences between the United States, on the one hand, and Bismarckian Germany on
the other. There were also important differences between European nation-states and white-settler
societies. Colonial Australia was created on the basis of the doctrine of an empty land (terra
nullius) and the lands of North America were colonized on the basis of Lockean theories of
private property in which, because native peoples did not recognize property rights, their lands
were, strictly speaking, not settled or occupied. The universal rights of the French Revolution
were not extended to the Kanaks of New Caledonia, because theirs was not a culture of
possessive individualism, and the absence of Kanak property rights meant that French
colonialism could proceed apace (Bullard 2000). Hence white-settler societies have typically

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institutionalized citizenship as a form of national inclusion, while continuing to exclude
aboriginal communities.

In the nineteenth century, national citizenship typically presupposed a Fordist capitalist economy,
in which men went to work and women serviced their men. As a social status, citizenship was
based primarily on the contributions of men through work and war service in return for pensions
and health care. In the contemporary period, the necessary and close relationship between
national citizenship and the nation-state is becoming unravelled. Globalization, the rise of post-
industrial society, the influence of human rights and the erosion of social citizenship with the
decline of social Keynesianism have also resulted in important changes to the nation-state (Turner
2001). Notions about global governance and cosmopolitan identity also require rethinking the
meaning of „the citizen‟ and „the nation‟. This chapter explores the modern history of citizenship
as a project for creating national identities that were intended to be homogeneous and which as a
result suppressed public manifestations of cultural difference and diversity. The growth of global
migration, diasporic communities and cultural hybridity challenges the historic project of national
citizenship. This historically significant change is signalled by the increasing importance of
human rights since 1948 over national manifestations of citizenship. The tension between
national citizenship and human rights is indicative of the intellectual and legal contradictions
between social rights and human rights. The challenge to nationalism and the nation-state in the
twenty-first century is to sustain multi-culturalism and a commitment to the nation-state in such a
way that the cultural rights of difference do not eventually erode the conditions for common
citizenship. The political community to which human rights are attached (such as humanity or the
globe) is vague and indefinite; the political community to which citizenship is attached (the
nation-state) is subject to corrosive forces.

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CITIZENSHIP

There is a conventional argument that citizenship had its origins in ancient Greek and Roman
societies. Historians have recognized the ancient growth of democratic participation, but noted its
restriction by birth to men, the exclusion of women, the presence of class divisions and
dependence on slavery (Finlay 1991). Manpower shortages in ancient Athens forced the
Athenians to accept intermarriage and to recognize the citizenship rights of their offspring
(Sinclair 1988). With the rise of Christianity, the sharp separation of religion and politics in St
Augustine's City of God is also often thought to be important in the evolution of Western notions

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of civility and citizenship. Max Weber in The City (1958) emphasized the importance of Christian
universalism in which faith rather than blood was recognized as the basis of community. „Citizen‟
is derived from cité as in the Anglo-French citeseyn, citezein or sithezein. From the thirteenth
century, a citizen was simply a member or denizen (dein-sein) of a city or borough. Caxton in his
Chronicles of England referred in 1480 to „The cytezeyns of London‟ and Shakespeare in The
Taming of the Shrew in 1596 describes Pisa as „renowned for grave Citizens‟.

The term citizen came eventually to refer to a member of the bourgeois class, who lives in a city
and enjoys the legal privileges of an autonomous urban community, as in Dutch burgermaats-
chappij or German Staatsbürgerschaft. Citizens evolved as civilized members of urban society in
contrast to uncouth and vulgar country folk. A citizen was a burgess (bourgeois) or freeman, and
citizenship was associated with bourgeois not aristocratic culture. Citizens were members of civil
society and carriers of bourgeois civility. Citizenship is therefore associated in continental Europe
with the rise of the bourgeoisie - a citizen is a member of a burgh. This historical connection
provided Karl Marx with one foundation for his criticism of bourgeois rights as elements of
liberal capitalism that separated politics and economics. The real economic subordination of the
worker could not be resolved merely by the growth of civil liberties, and required a radical
change in the social and economic conditions of society as a whole. It is important to note that
citizenship is characterized by an ambiguity: it is a conduit of individual rights but also reflects
the growth of state power over civil society.

Pre-modern forms of citizenship were associated with the city, not with the nation. While we can
find words to describe the citizen from the fifteenth century, modern citizenship is a political
product of major revolutions, specifically the English Civil War, the American War of
Independence and the French Revolution. These revolutions were important because they
destroyed the system of estates and created both modern nationalism and citizenship. The French
Revolution was especially significant in that it pulverized the ancient hierarchical arrangement of
status and privilege between the three estates. The creation of European nation-states from the
seventeenth century necessarily involved the creation of imaginary nationalistic communities,
which asserted and partly created ethnically uniform, homogeneous populations, which were held
together, against the social pressures of class, culture and community, by nationalist ideologies.
The Treaty of Westphalia was the origin of the modern world system of nation-states, and state
formation involved the creation of nationalist identities on the basis of a double colonization, both
internal and external. Anti-Semitism provided the pretext in many European states for earlier

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versions of ethnic cleansing in order to create homogeneous populations, but in a less violent
form one can find various political and social pressures to create civil societies on the basis of
common languages, common religions and a single, ethnic, identity. This process was the cultural
basis for the creation of national forms of citizenship. Citizenship was crucial to nation-building
(Bendix 1964), because it weakens class identity and binds individuals to nation-state projects
through the creation of a minimum set of social rights. These processes in Europe converted
peasants into citizens.

NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND WELFARE STATES

Following the influential theory of Esping-Andersen (1990) in The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism, we can distinguish three contrasted models of the relationship between states,
citizenship and welfare. First, there is the liberal or Anglo-Saxon model of the welfare state in
which there is a predominance of means-tested assistance and universal transfers are modest.
Welfare reforms are limited by the emphasis on individual responsibility and the work ethic.
Social entitlements are limited by bureaucratic assessment and welfare recipients are stigmatized.
Liberal welfare regimes were typical of Australia, Canada and the United States. In these
societies, citizenship entitlements were contributory rights, being dependent on certain key
contributions to society. Taxation and military service were fundamental aspects of citizenship in
nation-states based on a liberal-welfare model. Systematic avoidance of personal taxation can as a
result be used as a useful measure of the effectiveness of citizenship as a form of solidarity.
Secondly, there is the corporatist legacy of Austria, France, Germany and Italy. In this continental
and corporatist model, the liberal emphasis on efficiency and commodification was never wholly
dominant, and the granting of social rights was not an issue. Private insurance and occupational
fringe benefits were marginal. The Catholic Church was influential in shaping the corporatist
model, and hence the welfare system was designed to support the traditional family and
motherhood, and therefore day care and family services to support working mothers were
underdeveloped. Finally, there is the social democratic welfare regime, which rejected the duality
of market and state, and pursued policies to achieve both equality of outcome and high service
standards. The social democratic model aims to maximize social solidarity by an inclusionary
system of benefits, but this model has to address issues related to both the family and the market.
Given the state's role in creating solidarity and achieving egalitarianism, there was no significant
entry of charitable or voluntary associations into welfare delivery, and the social democratic
societies have been reluctant to embrace liberal policies that emphasize the mix of charitable,

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voluntary and governmental agencies in welfare. The social democratic regime of the
Scandinavian societies has to support the enormous economic cost of a universalistic, solidaristic
and de-commodified welfare system, and achieve high levels of economic growth with full
employment and extensive income redistribution, fairness and transparency. The incorporation of
Sweden into the global economic market has, for example, made it difficult to achieve these
objectives in a neoliberal economic climate.

Three different types of citizenship correspond to these three models of welfare: liberal
citizenship as a set of political and civil rights in liberal capitalism; social citizenship in social
democratic societies on the basis of active participation in the economy; and social rights without
extensive democratic rights in corporatist states. Although we can identify different models of
citizenship that are based on different welfare strategies, the formation of citizenship in these
systems was fundamental to nationalism and the nation-state. These different models represent
different strategies (liberal, corporatist and social democratic) for the incorporation of the
working class into civil society, and hence they were important as strategies to bind the worker to
the nation. The vision of socialist internationalism was constantly challenged by the welfare state,
the contributory rights of the citizen and the nationalist project. These alternatives came to an end
with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The principal notion behind the institution of liberal citizenship is that the democratic state is a
political association, where membership and its rewards are ultimately dependent on individual
contributions to the public good. These contributions are the principal underpinnings of the rights
and duties of members of a nation-state community, and citizenship is in principle an effective
juridical status conferring a specific socio-political identity. It is difficult in a system of
contributory rights to secure the entitlements of people with physical or mental impairment, and
more generally incapacity to work results in stigmatization. In material terms, citizenship plays a
significant part in determining the redistribution of economic resources within society through
taxation and welfare benefits. In this sense, citizenship is an important aspect of distributive
justice, because with the contributory principle there must be some long-term balance between
individual contributions, typically through work, military service and parenting, and rewards such
as welfare, health and education. In this context, citizenship was a mechanism for civilizing the
working class in order for them to become acceptable members of civil society. In the language
of T. H. Marshall, citizenship provides rights „to share to the full in the social heritage and to live
the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society‟ (1950: 72).

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In Britain, welfare institutions expanded partly in response to working-class pressure on the state
to protect workers from unemployment and sickness. However, mass warfare and post-war
reconstruction were especially important in building modern citizenship as a mechanism for the
consolidation of the nation. Nineteenth-century imperial wars often served to illustrate the poor
health of the British working class, and evidence from medical examinations of army recruits
demonstrated a significant amount of disability. Public health statistics were important in the
development of the national efficiency movement that promoted discipline and health through
physical training, temperance and military discipline. The Boy Scout and Girl Guide movements,
the development in prisons and the army of rational dietary schemes based on calorific
measurement, the introduction of school meals, the pedagogical evolution of domestic science for
girls, the adoption of gymnastics and sport into the school curriculum, and regular medical and
dental inspections for children are evidence of public concern to improve the nation's health,
economic efficiency and military capability. Social citizenship in British society was primarily
the product of wartime mobilization and strategies to rebuild post-war society after both world
wars. Political pressure from the trade union movement for industrial reform and the desire of the
Labour Party for social reform probably played only a secondary role.

In the United States, there was historically greater dependence on voluntary associations and local
community efforts to provide services and security for citizens. Citizenship in the United States is
probably best explained in terms of Alexis de Tocqueville's classic view in 1835 of democracy
and equality in the foundation of American society in Democracy in America (2003). American
society relied primarily on the liberal market to absorb the shock of the working class, and trade
unions were absorbed as organized interest groups rather than as representatives of the working
class. Unions were organized by locality, patronage and ethnicity. There was little development
of social citizenship, and individuals were expected to insure themselves against adversity. A
buoyant economy provided sufficient rewards and social mobility to absorb workers into
capitalist society, lending credibility to the „rags to riches‟ ideology of expanding American
capitalism. The United States does not conform to the Marshall model, partly because the
emphasis on civil and political rights was not matched by social rights. Furthermore, nation-
building in America required the absorption and assimilation of waves of migrants and the
eventual granting of equality to its black population after the civil war and the end of slavery
rather than the inclusion of a well-established or „mature‟ working class.

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In the absolutist monarchies, monarch, nobility and Church resisted universal citizenship, but
they also recognized that their long-term survival depended on some compromise with the
bourgeoisie and working class, and some degree of modernization of both society and politics
(Mann 1986, 1987). In Germany, Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm were reluctant founders of the
modern welfare state, and social citizenship was developed with few concessions to civil and
political rights. This system was in place up to the opening of the First World War, and some
authors have claimed that elements of German statism survived well into the late twentieth
century (Kvistad 1999). In other absolutist systems, nationalism and national identity were
created by modernizing states, which fostered citizenship as a feature of national ideology and
institution-building. In Japan, the Meiji Revolution used the emperor system as a legitimating
principle in its strategy of conservative modernization. In 1890 the Emperor issued the Imperial
Rescript on Education and employed the word shinmin to denote loyal and obedient officials or
citizens who followed their orders obediently (Bix 2000). Japanese nationalism and the powerful
identification with the Emperor as a symbol of unity were effective in creating the illusion of
ethnic and cultural homogeneity (Weiner 1997). By contrast, the Russian imperial system was not
consistently successful in developing a strategy to retain power and modernize the regime. It
favoured political repression and exclusion, followed by periods of ineffective social reform.
Austria was the least successful, and was confounded by class conflicts, nationalist struggles and
a failure to develop a corporate strategy. Long-term political success required maintaining the
corporate coherence of the an d en régime and a partial incorporation of the bourgeoisie. These
regimes, with the possible exception of Germany, did not develop welfare citizenship, and civil
rights were often undercut by arbitrary political interventions. Despite these structural limitations,
the absolute monarchies were relatively successful in their industrialization (especially in
Germany and Japan) and working-class opposition to capitalist exploitation remained weak, given
the relatively small size of the urban working class.

BRITISH NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POSTCOLONIALISM

The gradual loss of the Commonwealth as a significant international force in the post-war period
has been an important defining process in the modern evolution of British national identity.
Britain's withdrawal from Asia, specifically from Hong Kong, provides an interesting case study
in the evolution of Britishness (Turner 2004). The political history of Hong Kong and its juridical
relationship to successive British governments illustrate the pragmatic attitude to what we might
call conditional or provisional citizenship. In 1843 Hong Kong became a Crown Colony and was,

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like Singapore, primarily a safe harbour and trading centre to support British commercial and
military interests. Within Hong Kong, citizenship was never intended to be a nation-building
exercise, and successive British administrations continued to deny basic rights in the colony. It
was not until the final stages of the transfer of sovereignty back to mainland China that the
conditions for citizenship became a pressing political issue. The British government did not offer
the Chinese majority in Hong Kong opportunities for effective democratic participation. The
development of political rights was initially a reaction to the riots of 1966-7, and the formation of
the Mutual Aid Committee eventually provided a training ground for practical citizenship. Sir
Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, made it clear that the British government did not intend to
extend its administration beyond the end of the lease in 1997 and in return the Chinese
government agreed to designate Hong Kong a Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic with considerable autonomy, except in defence and foreign affairs. The first draft of the
Basic Law made it clear that Beijing would have sovereign power over the common law courts of
Hong Kong, but the events in Tiananmen Square and the subsequent democratic crisis of the
following year produced massive protests against the authoritarian response of the Chinese
Communist Party and triggered a brain drain of professional and business people out of Hong
Kong.

After 1997 all Hong Kong residents holding British Dependent Territories passports would in
practice have dual citizenship outside China, but this privilege would not be extended to
individuals born in Hong Kong after the termination of the lease. Furthermore, holders of these
passports were not initially deemed eligible for residence in the United Kingdom. In 1990
immigration policy was modified to grant British citizenship to a limited number of Hong Kong
residents, and a nationality bill granted the right of abode to around 50,000 Hong Kong residents
who were to be selected on restrictive criteria of education, occupational status and age. Mrs
Thatcher defended this elitist bill on the grounds that it would stem the tide of people leaving
Hong Kong. The emphasis was on the economic contribution which a limited number of Hong
Kong Chinese would make in Britain, and hence the nationality bill effectively constituted the
Hong Kong Chinese as economic citizens. Official indifference to the status of Hong Kong
citizens, despite periodic attempts to force the People's Republic to respect the special legal status
of the city of Hong Kong, was combined with political realism. Mrs Thatcher might forcefully
compel Argentina to hand back the Falklands, but confronting China presented formidable
political and military risks. Political pragmatism and indifference towards the ultimate fate of the

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Hong Kong Chinese reflected official attitudes towards foreigners that have their modern origin
in the 1901 Aliens Act.

Official reluctance to grant full citizenship to outsiders has to be understood against the general
background of immigration to Britain in the twentieth century. As a liberal society committed to
the laissez-faire doctrine of a free market, the British elite should, on rational economic grounds,
welcome immigration, but these raw economic interests have been shaped and constrained by a
political culture that has remained sceptical about the ability or willingness of foreigners to
assimilate. The periodic protests of British politicians that naturalized foreigners have not become
fully British by, for example, supporting the national cricket team are the more pathetic
manifestations of this attitude of suspicion. The official view of the government has been to
accept migrants under the legal compulsion of international agreements such as human rights, and
to assume or hope that economic migrants will eventually return to their native homeland.
Likewise, Victorian liberals did not actively oppose exiles; they merely entertained the hope that
the inclement weather would eventually drive them away (Porter 1979). These attitudes of benign
indifference, political apathy and racial superiority were possible in a context of relatively
insignificant flows of immigration and asylum seekers. In Victorian Britain there were virtually
no laws regulating refugees. However, between 1880 and 1905, 120,000 Russian Jews came to
Britain, triggering a process of juridical restriction and regulation. The 1905 Aliens Act became
the foundation of immigration law until 1971. Because Britain only accepted those who could
prove they were self-sufficient, there were by 1938 only 8,000 refugees in Britain, of whom 80
per cent were Jewish. By 1939 there were 56,000 refugees.

Post-war migration was largely driven by economic interests and the majority of immigrants were
from the Commonwealth. The Nationality Act of 1948 recognized the right of Commonwealth
citizens freely to enter and work in Britain. The Act was in retrospect generous, partly because it
mistakenly assumed an outflow, not influx of Commonwealth citizens to Britain. By 1971 there
were 300,000 Caribbean migrants who, for Conservatives like Enoch Powell, created a racial
crisis. Powell's 1968 Birmingham speech alluding to the „River Tiber foaming with much blood‟
proved to be popular and he claimed subsequently to have received 100,000 letters in support of
his controversial position. The 1971 Immigration Act, which introduced work permits without a
right of residency, was seen to be inspired by Powellite political convictions. However,
Powellism as a racial ideology did not gain long-term support. Powell never held an influential
government office, and the pragmatic reluctance of post-war British governments to become

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involved in aggressive colonial wars after the Suez crisis of 1956 meant that overtly racist politics
were unpopular. In any case, Harold Macmillan's radical „winds of change‟ speech in 1960 in
Cape Town made Powellite visions of a white-dominated Commonwealth unrealistic and
anachronistic. The British political elite has, since the defeat of the Powellite Tories, successfully
excluded race from parliamentary politics on the pragmatic grounds that race is a powerfully
divisive electoral strategy.

Subsequent legislation has attempted to restrict the generous but mistaken provisions of the
Nationality Act. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962), Immigration Act (1971),
Nationality Act (1981), Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act (1987) and Asylum and
Immigration Appeals Act (1993) constituted a battery of legislation that has restricted entry,
reduced access to citizenship status and constrained labour migration. The 1981 British
Nationality Act created three categories of citizenship: British citizens, British Dependent
Territories citizens, and British Overseas citizens. The Act restricted real British membership to
the first category, removed residential criteria for citizenship status, and effectively excluded
Asian Commonwealth people from British identity. Forced migrants are covered by the 1993
Asylum and Migration Appeals, 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act and the 1999 Immigration
and Asylum Act. The legislation created four categories: refugees (quota and spontaneous),
people with Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR), temporary protection status, and asylum
seekers, namely somebody seeking asylum on the basis of a claim to be a refugee. The ELR
category refers to people who have been denied refugee status but are given leave to remain on
humanitarian grounds. In 1990 ELRs represented 60 per cent of asylum decisions, refugee status
represented 23 per cent and refusals were 17 per cent. In 2000, these figures were 16 per cent
(ELR), 15 per cent (refugee status granted) and 69 per cent (refusals). These Acts were important
stages in the definition of British national identity as an exclusionary claim on citizenship rights.
They were culturally significant in attempting to define „otherness‟ and were located within a
wider debate about Englishness and Britishness in response to membership in the European
Union (Münch 2001).

Before European involvement in Kosovo and the security crisis following 9/11, racial conflicts in
Britain, such as the Notting Hill riots of 1958, had been primarily around two separate migratory
waves, namely the post-war migration of Afro-Caribbean people from the West Indies and
Pakistan-Bangladesh migrants. While the stereotype of Pakistani migrants in Britain was initially
that of reclusive, family-centred Muslims who were law-abiding, the policing of Caribbean

344
communities involved stereotypes in which young black men were assumed to be drug dependent,
lazy and aggressive. The policing of migrant communities involved neither security activities nor
the intelligence services. Black crime was characterized by low level offences such as cannabis
use, pimping and auto-theft. The issue of law and order in relation to black youth came to
prominence as a result of the Brixton riots and the Scarman Report (1981). Police relationships
with the black community were transformed by the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the launch of
the National Civil Rights Movement and the Macpherson report (1999). Black crime remained an
important problem in London, with Mayor Ken Livingstone complaining of a free trade zone in
drugs and guns, but the „war on terror‟ has fuelled racial conflict with Muslim youth.

While negative stereotypes about Islam have intensified since 9/11, migration as such has in the
past decade ceased to be a political or economic issue, partly because labour migration from the
Commonwealth has come to an end. Popular concern has been instead directed against asylum
seekers entering Britain, for example from France, often through sleepy fishing villages in
Suffolk. By the 1980s less than 5 per cent of Britain's 55 million population were immigrants
from the Caribbean, India and Pakistan as compared with Germany's 7 per cent. Germany is often
criticized for its low level of naturalization when compared with France, because the German
emphasis on jus sanguinis has given a privileged status to „ethnic Germans‟ from Eastern Europe
and Russia over Turkish guest workers. However, Germany's intake of refugees is far greater than
Britain's, while British government anxiety shifted in the 1990s from migration to asylum seeking,
and asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia, Albania, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan have coloured
public attitudes against immigration. Throughout the 1990s, Eurobarometer Surveys of British
attitudes showed that 63 per cent thought Britain had too many immigrants and 78 per cent, too
many refugees. In fact both the media and parliamentary debates consistently fail to distinguish
between three categories: migrant, refugee and asylum seeker. After 9/11 and the Istanbul
bombings, the Labour government became increasingly intolerant of asylum seekers and
increasingly subservient to American foreign policy objectives in the struggle against terrorism.
Political ambiguity about the possible entry of Turkey into the European Community further
illustrates the implicit status of the European Union as a Christian association.

The influx of Asian and Caribbean migrants in the second half of the twentieth century produced
a protracted debate about identity that has been further complicated by devolution for Scotland
and Wales, uncertain and reluctant entry into the European Union, and the ongoing political
difficulties in Northern Ireland. While British identity became an acceptable self-definition for

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second-generation youth who are „Black British, „Englishness‟ has become a confused, and
poorly defined cultural label. While the flag of St George proliferates in the English countryside,
nobody is entirely certain what it stands for. If British identity is national, Englishness refers to a
complex cultural tradition that is difficult to define and impossible to acquire simply by
possession of a British passport. The traditional institutional glue of the United Kingdom
(monarchy, religion, parliament, the ancient universities, afternoon tea, the Mothers Union, the
Queen's English, „bumps‟ on the Cam, and the BBC) has been declining through this period,
further eroding the cultural framework of both Englishness and British citizenship identity (Nairn
1994). The complex and protracted legal process in Parliament to ban fox hunting is not simply a
failure of the Labour government to understand the countryside; it also reflects uncertainty about
the nature of Englishness. What could be more English than the sound of hunting horns in
English open fields? While Dunkirk united the nation, the post-war period has been one of
growing cultural diversity, internal devolution and uncertainty about the place of Britain
internationally, and of periodic bouts of right-wing nationalism in the shape of the National Front.
We might argue therefore that Britain had become a multicultural society not as a result of any
principled commitment to multiculturalism, but as the unintended consequence of its colonial, or
more precisely its postcolonial history. British national identity and British nationalism remain
unresolved issues of national politics.

What can we learn from this case study of Britain? There are at least two, somewhat
contradictory lessons. The first is that we can usefully distinguish between ideologically driven
colonialism and accidental or unintended colonialism. Generally speaking, British colonialism
was not driven by a consistent or strong sense of colonial endeavour; it had no lasting religious or
racial underpinnings. There was of course the legacy of Kipling, the missionary societies and the
development of a muscular and manly evangelical Christianity in Selwyn College Cambridge, the
taken-for-granted racial superiority, and the Victorian sense of a Commonwealth, but these
elements did not amount to a systematic and coherent ideology of empire or an imperial mission.
There is an important contrast to be made between the attitude of Dutch Protestants to South
Africa or Japanese imperial visions and British pragmatism. There is some merit to the argument
that Britain acquired an empire as the unintended consequence of economic conquest. Singapore,
Hong Kong and Gibraltar were important naval ports to sustain British economic ambition rather
than aspects of a political mission backed up by a definite ideology. The proof of this argument is
the ease with which Britain abandoned these outposts once their profitability in relation to
military expenditure was in doubt. The contrast between France in relation to Algeria, or Portugal

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in relation to Mozambique and Britain in relation to Kenya, Nigeria or Rhodesia is telling. This is
not to say that British troops could behave badly in Aden or Malaya, but simply to say that it was
a pragmatic colonialism. The consequence of this attitude was a certain indifference to access to
citizenship, and also the late development of a distinctive view of what constitutes British
citizenship as a form of national identity.

This pragmatic view of citizenship has collapsed quickly in the face of the perception of a
widespread terrorist threat following 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings. While
migration is no longer a political issue, asylum seeking is, mainly because political borders are
seen to be too porous. There is popular support for British Home Secretaries to get tough with
asylum seekers, and considerable nervousness about East European migration as a result of an
expanding European Union. The issue of asylum seeking and terror is now the most important
contradiction between the nation-state and economic globalization. While one justification for
economic globalization is the economic benefits that are derived from flexible labour markets and
the free flow of goods and services, this openness is seen to create security problems that have, at
present, very few solutions. As a result, liberal governments in capitalist societies, with Britain
and the United States being clear examples, have made access to citizenship more stringent,
closed off avenues to asylum, scrutinized the claims of political refugees more thoroughly and
challenged many of the civil liberties that were the hallmark of Western democracy. The result is
that in contemporary politics individual human rights appear to be often more prominent in the
defence of the rights of citizens.

CONCLUSION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EROSION OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

The tensions and contradictions between states, citizens and human rights constitute much of the
content of international dispute and conflict, and yet theories of human rights have often failed to
consider the relationship between citizenship and human rights. Statements about human rights
and state sovereignty, which is the basis of citizenship, are often contradictory. For example, the
declaration of the National Assembly of France in 1789 claimed that „the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man‟ were „liberty, property, security and resistance of oppression‟, but
it went on to assert that „the nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty‟ and that no
„individual or body of men‟ could be entitled to „any authority which is not expressly derived
from it‟. While human rights are said to be innate, social rights are created by states. These two
contrasted ideas - the imprescriptible rights of human beings and the exclusive sovereignty of the

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nation state - have remained an important dilemma of any justification of rights. The protection
offered by national citizenship is declining, and yet the state remains important for the
enforcement of social and human rights.

To understand the nature of citizenship in relation to nationalism, we should reflect upon the
differences between the social rights of citizenship and the individual rights of the human rights
movement. Briefly, social rights are entitlements enjoyed by citizens and are enforced by courts
within the national framework of a sovereign state. These social rights, which are typically related
to corresponding duties, are contributory rights, because effective claims are associated with
contributions that citizens have made to society through work, war (or a similar public duty), or
parenting (Turner 2001). By contrast, human rights are rights enjoyed by individuals by virtue of
being human, and as a consequence of a shared vulnerability. Human rights are not necessarily
connected to duties and they are not contributory. There is no declaration of human duties as
opposed to the many declarations and conventions on human rights. While states enforce social
rights, there is no sovereign power uniformly to enforce rights at a global level. While the social
rights of citizens tend to be national, human rights are universal, but it is often said that these
human rights are not justiciable and they have no „correlativity‟ with duties.

This distinction between citizenship and human rights is important because it raises the question
of the relationship between the enforcement of rights by nation states that are sovereign, and by
global institutions that have legitimacy by virtue of international agreements and hence are an
aspect of global governance. Although many theorists of human rights appear to welcome the
erosion of national sovereignty, any historical overview of human rights in international and
national politics brings us to the conclusion that effective human rights regimes actually require
nation-state stability. Because human rights abuse is characteristically a product of „new wars‟
(Münkler 2005) and state failure is illustrated by genocide, ethnic cleansing and anarchy, viable
states appear to be important as a foundation for rights per se. There is a valid argument therefore
that the liberties of citizens and their social rights are better protected by their own national
institutions than by external legal or political intervention. The often chaotic outcome of human
rights interventions in East Timor and Kosovo, or of human rights wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
might force us to the conclusion that any national government that can provide its citizens with
security but with weak democracy is to be preferred over no government at all. From a Hobbesian
perspective, a strong state is required to enforce agreements between conflicting social groups.
Another way of expressing this idea is to argue that we need to maintain a distinction between the

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social rights of citizens that are enforced by states, and the human rights of persons that are
protected, but frequently and inadequately enforced, by international conventions. The tension
between these different types of rights reflects the growing tension in the modern world between
nations and nationalism, on the one hand, and human rights, global governance and
cosmopolitanism, on the other.

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Turner, B. S. The Erosion of Citizenship British Journal of Sociology vol. 52 no. 2 (2001) p. 189–209
Turner, B. S. (2004) „Making and Unmaking Citizenship in neoliberal Times‟ , A. S. Ku , ed. and N. Pun
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Weiner, M. (ed.) (1997) Japan‟s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity . London: Routledge

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McCrone, David. "Nations and Regions: In or Out of the State?." Pp.237-248

Mainstream social science literature largely fails to distinguish between key concepts of „nation‟
and „state‟. Anthony Giddens, for example, defines the nation as a „bordered power-container'
which exists „when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its
sovereignty is claimed‟ (1985: 120). Giddens is not alone in redefining the nation in purely
political terms, and in the process losing its cultural significance. He defines the nation-state as „a
set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory
with demarcated boundaries, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of
internal and external violence‟ (Giddens 1981: 90). What is remarkable about this definition is
that it is really a definition of the state, making no mention of the nation as such.

The whole point of the hyphenated term „nation-state‟ is that it aligns the strictly political realm
of state with the cultural one of nation, thereby fusing two analytically distinct spheres. Anyone
who inhabits what have been called „stateless nations‟ will know only too well that they are not
the same thing; there are nations - imagined communities, in Benedict Anderson's famous term -
which are not formally independent states, and political entities - states - in which different
territorial cultural groupings - nations - are present.

Walker Connor (1990) once observed that fewer than 10 per cent of actual states are genuine
nation-states in which nationness and state-ness coincide, that is, in which there is ethnic or
cultural homogeneity within the boundaries of the state. In truth, there are states which are
ethnically homogeneous, with possibly Iceland being the only one in Western Europe. „Ethnics‟
are often spread across a variety of states. Brubaker uses the term „homeland nationalism‟
(Brubaker 1996) to refer to significant populations of self-defining „nationals‟ living outside the
„national‟ territory (obvious examples are in central Europe notably Hungary, Romania etc., but
the same might be said of the minority community in Northern Ireland). Such work as there is on
„nation-states‟ sensitizes us to Eurocentric understandings of „nation‟ and „state‟ insofar as by and
large West European territorial arrangements are far less complex than those in geopolitical fault-
lines of the world, such as East and Central Europe.

In short, we need to treat the concept of „nation-state‟ as not only a statistically unusual formation,
but one which belongs to nineteenth-century European thinking about state-building (revealingly,

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often referred to as „nation-building‟–classically, Deutsch (1953)). We also need to appreciate
what Anderson referred to as the „crisis of the hyphen‟ in the modern world, the disarticulation of
nation and state in the twenty-first century world, a world in which states come under pressure
from above and below to cede power and authority, reflecting the fact that the modern state is no
longer able to be the complete „bordered power-container‟ it once was. That is not to imply that
the state has ceased to matter. It remains the key territorial arena for much decision-making and
resource allocation (Mann 1997).

The second definitional puzzle concerns the terms „nation‟ and „region‟. The latter in particular is
used in diverse ways: to refer to supra-state territorial entities („the Balkans region‟, for example),
as well as to sub-state and even sub-national, entities. Thus, North-East England, Cornwall etc.
are spoken of as „regions‟ of England, as sub-state administrative territories which may or may
1
not have a degree of self-government ). Similar exist within Scotland (and Wales), where the
language of„regions‟ has been used to describe local authority areas (such as Highland, Lothian,
Strathclyde and so on). When it comes to Scotland and Wales as a whole, on the other hand, there
is dubiety. On the one hand, they are treated as „economic regions‟ of the UK for purposes of
distributional analysis (so treated in the UK government statistical publication Regional Trends).
On the other hand, they are spoken of as „nations‟ with high degrees of institutional
distinctiveness and „national‟ identity. This is not a uniquely British phenomenon; Spain
recognizes its national territories (Catalonia, Basque country, Galicia, as well as its autonomous
regions); Quebec makes the claim to be a Canadian province primus inter pares on account of its
claim to nationhood, at odds with a Canadian nation-building project. Indeed, in many West
European states there are territories which lay claim to „national‟ distinctiveness rather than
settling for mere status as administrative regions. Simply to refer to sub-state territorial entities as
„regions‟ is not especially helpful.

The problem is further compounded by matters of political ideology: the „ism‟ question, in this
case nationalism vis-à-vis regionalism. Both imply a sense of territorial identity, but the former
implies that it is a higher order, of degree and/or kind, than the latter. Thus, in everyday terms,
identifying with Yorkshire does not imply that one is not English; nor that coming from the
Highlands, one is not Scottish. The first identity is regional, and it is nested in the second -
national, which in turn might imply that they are nested within „state‟ - British - identity.

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The literature on nations and nationalism is not especially good on nationalism vis-à-vis
regionalism. To simplify, there is a tendency to think that „nationalism‟ is equivalent to
separatism and secession. Anything less than that is treated as sub-nationalism, or regionalism.
There is something of a teleological argument here: nations exist when they are states, either as
political fact or as aspiration. Where they do not, then they aren't really nations at all, but
something less than the real thing. However, simply defining nationalism in terms of its
constitutional outcomes is not adequate. We need to know a lot more about the conditions under
which territorial entities, whether we call them nations or regions, develop an overtly political-
constitutional project for great self-government, but we should not assume the pursuit of greater
self-government is itself the defining feature of „nationhood‟.

There is a related issue which often comes up in the course of the argument. Put simply, there is
the question of ethnic versus civic, which has bedevilled writings on nationalism at least since
Kohn's Encyclopedia Britannica entry of 1945 (Kohn 1945). Nationalism is deemed to be about
„ethnic‟ feelings; not to be confused a priori with civic institutions and practices (most obviously
featuring in and through the state). The vocabulary of nationalism frequently involves comparison
between civic/territorial forms and ethnic/cultural forms. In Jonathan Hearn's words: „It has been
common to make a distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” forms of nationalism, the former
involving beliefs in biological and cultural essentialisms, and the latter involving commitments to
ideas of citizenship and the rule of law‟ (2000: 7). The problem with the distinction between
ethnic and civic is that it is normative rather than analytic, the former „bad‟ and the latter „good‟.
As ideal types they might help us get a handle on issues of culture versus territory, but it is a
distinction of limited analytical value. Hearn comments:

The difference between a useful distinction and a misleading dichotomy can be difficult to discern,
and this is so for both civic versus ethnic, and liberal versus communitarian constructions of
reality. Minimally, we should bear in mind that what these conceptual pairs ultimately define is
opposing styles of arguments about what nations are and how social values are created, rather
than actual types of nations or societies. (2000: 194)

The distinction is not simply a matter of political rhetoric, but of academic analysis. Thus, Rogers
Brubaker (1992) has employed the distinction between „ius soli‟ - literally, the law of the soil, a
territorial jurisdiction, and a community of descent, „ius sanguinis‟ - the law of blood, roughly
corresponding to „civic‟ and „ethnic‟ respectively.

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When all these ideas are put together, confusion usually arises: ethnic/civic; nation/region;
state/nation. Consider the following observation: „Scottish nationalism is an example of an ethno-
regional nationalism, and, like many of its kind, it is divided between secessionism and moderate
devolutionism‟ (Delanty and O'Mahony 2002:129). The point is two-fold. On the one hand, it
implies that because Scotland has not seceded from the British Union, and the Scottish National
Party has not achieved its goal of an Independent Scotland, then it falls short of full-blown
„nationalism‟, that is, „secessionism‟, and instead pursues „devolutionism‟. On the other hand, the
authors are using the term „ethno-regional nationalism' to distinguish it from „ethno-linguistic
nationalism' (in Quebec, Wales, Flanders, for example). By any reading, nationalism in Scotland
is not „about‟ language, thus it must, by implication, have some other motor, in this case political-
territorial, that is „regional‟. Such a set of distinctions, ethnic/civic, linguistic/regionalist
(territorial), may actually muddy more waters than it clarifies.

NATIONS WITHOUT STATES

Let us explore the regionalist/nationalist distinction with regard to that set of territories often
referred to as „nations without states‟. These seem especially significant in the light of debates
about nations and regions in the modern world. What has emerged in recent years is the „re-
invention of territory‟, a new territorialism (Keating 2001). Much of this is attributed to
„globalization‟, in particular the destabilizing effects of economic, political and cultural change
on state formations which were formed in the nineteenth century, such that key social processes
were no longer quite as aligned as they once were with state boundaries. Keating observes: „In
some cases, this has focused on places with a strong historic identity, but the new regionalisms
[sic] do not so much hark back to pre-modern forms of territorial identity, as reinvent the notion
of territory in ways consistent with contemporary experience. Place becomes an important link
between global developments and individual experience, and an arena for new forms of politics'
(1996: 54). Space is important here not simply in and of itself, as mere topography, but as „place‟,
relatively coherent and cohesive territories which shape and interpret social forces. Keating cites
John Agnew's useful distinction between three elements of place: locale - the settings in which
social relations are constituted; location - the geographical area encompassing the settings for
social interaction; and sense of place - the local „structure of feeling‟ (Keating 1996: 62).

We begin to see something of a continuum of place, along which we can place nations/ regions.
On the one hand, in some territories there will be a greater density of social interaction and

353
 institutional activity than in others. This will be most obviously expressed in levels of governance
(not simply government, narrowly defined), networks of social organization and civil society
which set the parameters for how social life is organized. There is a tendency for these to be
relatively self-contained and self-sustaining such that they reinforce shared commonalities
between people. It is impossible to know which comes first, the sense of social cohesion or the
density of networks, though in practice it does not matter, as each reinforces the other. Often
these territories are culturally distinctive: they are differentiated from their neighbours by aspects
of language, religion, customs and practices, and ultimately senses of identity. Much of this is
akin to debates about the nature of „nations‟, the search, fairly fruitless, to find the key identifiers
which all nations have in common. Nowadays, the literature has largely given up the search for
the cultural marker(s) which define all nations, in large part because the sense of nationality, or at
least sense of place, can be generated by all sorts of markers, and even none except insofar as
people choose to identify themselves as having something in common. Thus, we know that
language is frequently a cultural marker which defines a nation to itself, but it is neither necessary
nor sufficient in this respect. For example, „English (language) is no longer the preserve of „the
English (people) - Americans do not define themselves as English, nor do Scots or Australians for
that matter. Indeed, the Scottish case is especially interesting in this regard. Benedict Anderson
once tried to explain the Union of 1707 on the grounds that the Scots were insufficiently distinct
from their southern neighbours in terms of cultural habits and practices to remain independent.
The problem with that as an explanation of fusion (becoming British) is that it does not account
for the progressive process of fission from the final quarter of the twentieth century (becoming
less British). Language undoubtedly has the capacity to be a key marker of difference, and in
places like Quebec, Catalonia and Flanders it is difficult to imagine processes of identity
generation without it. That is not to imply that language „causes‟ national distinctiveness any
more than religion does. Rather, they are two obvious cultural frames through which differences
are imagined, and that is the key. Benedict Anderson's term „imagined community‟ has become
part of the lexicon of nations not because it is „imaginary‟, but because, in his words:

 „It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of
their communion Anderson (1996: 6).'

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 „The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a
billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations (1996:
7).'

 „It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained hierarchical dynastic realm
(1996: 7).'

 „ … it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation

that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship (1996:
7).'

His point of departure is:

that nationality, or as one might prefer to put it in view of that word's multiple significations,
nationness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind. To understand them
properly we need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways
their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional
legitimacy. (1996: 4)

To start with this approach to „nation‟ helps to distinguish it from a purely administrative region.
It reinforces the point that there is cultural content without implying that it precedes the sense
of„nationality‟, or that it is its cause. Indeed, cultural distinctiveness may well arise from
administrative practices undertaken over a long historical period. Thus, Scotland is relatively light
in terms of cultural distinctiveness from, say, Wales, where language has played a much more
central part in defining what it is to be Welsh. Having Gaelic as its oldest known language has not
prevented it being driven back to the fringes of Scotland, spoken by around 2 per cent of its
population. If anything, the sense of nationality in Scotland is stronger than it is in Wales as
measured by various social and cultural attitudes, and by the fact that political nationalism (as
evidenced by support for the Scottish National Party compared with its Welsh equivalent, Plaid
Cymru is stronger in Scotland than it is in Wales). What this suggests is that language may (or
may not) become the vehicle for expressing difference, which in turn may (or may not) take a
political turn if and when conditions allow. In other words, we should not mistake the carrier for
the cause, important though it may be as a cultural-political vehicle.

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The Scottish case is an interesting one because it is, in conventional terms, culture-light. A strong
sense of nationality is not only not tied to issues of language (English-speaking); or historically to
religion (species Presbyterian of the genus Protestant); but it is modern, in the sense that for much
of the post-1707 Union history, it was „British in aspiration and affiliation. It was also one of the
most industrialized „regions‟ of the UK, on a par with similar in England, therefore its developing
nationalism was not the result of catch-up economic development, still less a desire to overthrow
foreign oppression. There was no process of„internal colonialism‟ in Scotland, given that its
economic and social history was far more „British in its structure than many regions of England
(McCrone 1992). History mattered in the sense that Scotland had a memory of political
independence, but memory alone was insufficient to sustain a sense of separateness, at least until
that memory itself became grist to a political mill in the late twentieth century. In other words, it
was not history per se which mattered; rather, it was the way it was mobilized as cultural-political
ideology when conditions were judged to be right. To reiterate the point: we search in vain for the
„right‟ set of cultural markers which are common to self-defining „nations‟ because these are the
means of collective self-assertion, not their cause.

Does this mean that no such cultural markers are necessary? Strictly, yes, though to have a
cultural-free content in favour of simply shared territorial identity is hard to imagine. At the state
level, some, such as Jürgen Habermas (1996), have argued for the pursuit of „constitutional
patriotism‟ as a way of protecting civil society from the ravages of ethnic nationalism, but it is
hard to imagine a content-free form that is purely civic. One is hard pushed to build shared
nationality without a modicum of cultural straw. As Dominique Schnapper observed: „Would a
purely civic society, founded on abstract principles, have the strength to control passions born
from allegiance to ethnic and religious groups?‟ (1997: 211). In practice, some measure of
ethnicity, however invented, seems necessary to the endeavour of shared national awareness.

„No bricks without cultural straw‟ is also relevant to the distinction between nations and regions.
In broad terms, the latter lack the kind of cultural substance which might give them a strong(er)
sense of identity. That is not to say that over time this might not evolve, even if based simply on
shared experiences which are then fed through a prism of meaning to explain why social and
political relations in a territory are distinctive. One might ask: are nations and regions different
only in degree, or in kind? Are we talking about quite different phenomena, or not? At one
important level, it does not matter, insofar as territories may develop (or not) a sense of difference
on the basis of relatively little, but that sense is magnified by political circumstances. Manifestly

356
it „helps‟ if there are obvious cultural markers - language, religion, ethnicity - which act as
rallying points for political action. The point about these markers is not that they somehow stack
up, as if the more one has, the more „national‟ a territory is. Let us turn the puzzle around. The
point is that markers of this sort only „matter‟ when they are vested with the power to make a
difference. They are the rallying points, the moments of difference, around which identities form
and coalesce. It is not their presence or absence per se which matters so much as their power to
mobilize, and the range across which they do so. It is manifestly limiting if, for example, not
everyone shares the marker, or if it differentiates people such that some are included and others
excluded. Issues of language can have as much power to divide as unite; if, for example, you are
considered more of a Ruritanian if you speak the language of Ruritania; if your claim is
recognized by others around you to be a valid one. Issues of birth, lineage, modes of dress may
also matter as much as language or religion, but we cannot draw any a priori conclusions about
the primacy or otherwise of such markers. Much depends on the social and cultural situations in
which they are mobilized, and manifestly these may change over time.

It also helps if there are alternative ways of doing, and ways of seeing. Thus, the fact that
Scotland had been an independent state for more than 700 years before its Union with England
provides an alternative imagining as and when the conditions arose for grievances to be newly
politicized in the final quarter of the twentieth century. Territories (like Wales?) which had never
been „independent‟ in the modern sense of the term found it much harder to envision a
constitutional model other than attachment to a bigger neighbour, even where the raw materials of
„nationhood‟ (language) were stronger. It is not simply „history‟ which matters, however invented
that is. Ways of seeing may depend as much on the medium as the message. Thus, the media -
print and broadcasting - matter, because they have the power not only to reproduce but to set the
agenda for what is worth reproducing. Benedict Anderson's observations about the role of the
print media in the rise of nationalism are well-known, but it is their ongoing capacity to set the
framework for debate which matters. Where there is a „language press‟ then there are advantages
to be had, although it is not possible to stop people reading „foreign‟ material in liberal
democracies. Nevertheless, it is something of an advantage to have an indigenous press and
media even if the linguistic medium is not distinct. Thus, Scotland has national press insofar as
the vast majority of its newspapers are Scottish, and even where the media are not strictly
Scottish (like the BBC) there is sufficient attention to its agenda to be virtually indigenous. The
BBC has ceased to speak of Scotland (and Wales) as a „national region‟, and in the 1990s issued
to its staff a set of norms and guidelines reflecting the fact that terms could mean quite different

357
things in different parts of the kingdom. Tellingly, even the word „nation‟ became fraught as it
had the capacity to refer to the state (the UK) as well as its component (national) parts (England,
Scotland, Wales, and even Northern Ireland, though no one has as yet come up with a suitable
descriptor for that divided province).

We should not make the mistake of focusing only on those territories in which there is manifest
political action for self-government of whatever variety as evidence of „national‟ feeling. It is
analytically valid, and even more interesting perhaps, to look too at territories that do not show
much evidence of secession. Bavaria, for example, would on the face of it appear to have a
number of important markers - history, institutions and not least a political system, even political
parties - that do not conform to the rest of Germany. There is, as yet, no sign of territorial
secession, but one would be unwise to rule it out forever should political and social conditions
change at some future point. To be different is not tantamount to separation, and we look in vain
for the factor or factors which make a difference. Rather, it is the broader context which matters,
which turns manifest difference into political opportunity. After all, if one were to compare the
non-English territories of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, one would not really have predicted in the
mid-nineteenth century that the first would be partitioned and most of it independent, and that
Scotland would have a devolved law-making parliament, and Wales something less than that, but
a fair degree of self-government.

Are such developments inevitable? No. Context, in many ways, is all. In the late nineteenth
century, for example, there was at least a reasonable chance that Ireland would have „home rule‟,
and that this would be a prelude to „home rule all round‟, such that the UK might well have
become a federated state. That this did not happen is not the result of some iron law of
constitutional development, but of circumstances and events. There was no inevitable outcome
involved; merely a set of serendipities which generated outcomes that few expected, though once
in existence demanded a priori explanation. In truth, many of the large moments in history - one
thinks of the birth of Soviet communism in 1917 as well as its demise in 1989 - were unforeseen
until they actually happened, at which point a veritable academic industry grew up seeking to
explain their inevitability. That is perhaps to stretch a point, for a purely serendipitous account of
history does not get us very far, and explaining ex post facto is better than no explanation at all.

Are nations without states, then, sustainable? There are usually two conventional options: either
one argues that they are „not really‟ nations - mere „regions‟ - in which case they do not seek

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statehood; or sooner or later they will emerge into statehood which is the natural end-game once
the conditions have been met. It is not so simple. Perhaps academics have been too bound to
nineteenth-century visions of statehood and „nation-building‟ to recognize that the socio-political
world is a much more complex and changed place in the twenty-first. Even the term „nations
without states‟ (or „stateless nations‟) is something of a misnomer. By and large, these are not
territories which are completely stateless, that is, without much in the way of institutional self-
government. Rather, they tend to have long pedigrees of systems of governance, public
bureaucracies, even legislatures. The European Union, for example, has a committee of
legislative regions (REG LEG) which describes itself as follows:

Currently, regions with legislative powers are part of eight of the fifteen EU member states:
Belgium, Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom. Regions
with legislative power have their own Government and Parliament. They have often similar
responsibilities as the member State within their areas of competence in the three domains of
government: legislative, executive and judiciary (http:/ / www.regleg.org/ )

The likes of Scotland, Flanders, Catalunya, Euzkadi, Bavaria and the German Länder have
considerable legislative powers as well as high degrees of territorial identification. They tend to
have strong civil societies, levels of associational and institutional networking, systems of law,
media, education, cultural products, which frame political and social understandings. They do not,
on the face of it, suffer from some kind of arrested development towards full and formal
independence, but rather, their political aims are geared to maximizing autonomy in a much more
open-ended fashion. In short, they are understated nations, but only in the sense that they are not
nations with an army and a navy. 2

Much is made of the impact of „globalization‟ on territorial-constitutional arrangements in the

modern world, that the conventional nation-state finds itself pulled in two directions, upwards by
global economic forces and supra-state institutions (such as the European Union), and downwards
to the sub-state level by territories which sense that the hyphenated nation-state has had its day.
This is captured by Benedict Anderson's comment about the crisis of the hyphen (1996) between
nation and state; by suggestions that fully fledged nation-states were always something of a
trompe l'oeil, involving claims to, rather than the reality of, genuinely national statehood (Held
1988; Tilly 1992; Tamir 1993). Another version of the hyphen's crisis was expressed in Daniel
Bell's wry observation that the nation-state is too small for the big problems of life, and too big

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for the small problems of life (cited in McGrew 1992). One does not, of course, have to buy into
the globalization thesis to accept that various processes in the modern world do not come
naturally and inevitably to rest on the platform of the national state (Tilly's preferred term).
Where there is a density of institutional arrangements, there is no reason why different territorial
levels cannot become the „natural‟ arena in which to do politics, deliver services and thereby earn
the loyalty and identification of the citizenry. Where these arenas are most developed (most
obviously in terms of „legislative regions‟) but also where there are long histories of alternative
cultural frames, then it is not surprising that they offer the most obvious challenges to existing
political-constitutional arrangements.

NEO-NATIONALISM IN UNDERSTATED NATIONS

It is important to recognize that such developed „regions‟ are not the incubi of fear and loathing,
driven by a deep reactive dislike for the modern world, building a „back to the future‟ mentality.
Over 25 years ago, Tom Nairn (1977) coined the term „neo-nationalism‟ to describe the
emergence of a new kind of territorial politics in Western states. Such forms of neo-nationalism
owe more to the pocket-book than the prayer-book. They are led by parties and associations not
of poets and prelates but of bankers and bureaucrats. They are not, on the whole, designed to stop
the world in order to get off, but to shape it in a way more conducive to the business of alternative
territorial formations. The Catalan economy has long been regarded as relatively „over-developed‟
compared with the rest of Spain, just as Quebec has shifted from its historically agricultural
economy to one which services large parts of the North American trade area. In Michael
Keating's words: „Deregulation, neoliberalism and free trade have not destroyed the Quebec
model of development but they have transformed it. It is geared now to the interests of large
corporations, based in Quebec but increasingly continental or global in their scale of operations‟
(1996: 6).

The internationalizing of the economy occurs within a new geometry of power, most obviously
framed by supra-state institutions and practices. The most obvious, in the case of Scotland and
Catalonia, is the European Union such that there is a complex and variable speed geometry
involving the national, the state and the supra-state levels. In the Quebec case, it is NAFTA which
provides the critical third level, and while lacking the political and institutional framework of the
EU, it lays down a new sphere of economic interaction which, possibly with time, will require
new structures of governance.

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In sum, we tend to find neo-nationalist movements in territories which have outgrown their
historic relationships with their core states. Just as Scotland developed its union with England as a
„marriage of convenience‟ within the imperial context of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
so a new set of economic and political circumstances in the late twentieth and twenty-first
centuries has required a recasting of this relationship in the light of supra-state and global
arrangements (McCrone 2001). Having a European strategy, for example, to relate to the new
power geometries is somewhat easier for „stateless nations‟ than it is for their central states which
have a more constrained institutional legacy to contend with.

The development, then, of niche-nationalism is reflected in the ability of political movements to

shift around the spectrum; for example, from right to left, corporatist/neoliberal/ social
democratic. Thus, the Scottish National Party has shifted its position from right to left to compete
for the largest block of left-of-centre Labour votes. The Parti Quebecois positions itself as a leftist
party while retaining strong links with the local business elite. The nationalists in Catalonia, who
formed a longstanding coalition until 2003, are closely allied with local, essentially small, capital,
yet have a strong appeal to manual working-class voters in autonomous elections. The trick is to
play the system so as to capitalize to maximum advantage, mixing and matching ideology,
strategy and voter appeal. Compared with more traditional forms of nationalism that seek to
defend and maintain social and cultural values, neo-nationalist movements are more promiscuous
in their appeal, learning to live with, and even love, the global market in a social democratic or
liberal way.

Not all forms of neo-nationalism are leftist in ideological character. The Lega Nord in Italy, for
example, has allied itself firmly with the right, in arguing that northern and southern Italy
represent two distinct, non-converging societies which should be free to go their own ways (Bull
1999). Its leader, Umberto Bossi, has argued that Lombardy and Trentino have far more in
common with the Sud-Tirol and Bavaria than with Calabria or Campania. The Lega has benefited
from two processes: first, the collapse of the Italian party system, notably the demise of the
Christian Democrats and the Socialists, and the emergence of rightist coalitions led by
Berlusconi's Forza Italia; and second, the mobilization of concerns with migration into the
affluent north, first from the poor Italian south, and latterly from out-with the EU. Turkey's
overtures to join the EU, for example, are opposed by the Lega as a „muslim invasion‟, that
„Turkey‟s entry into Europe is a very high risk, a real Trojan horse in the heart of the West (EU
Business, 19 December 2004). Important though presenting political opportunities are, the Lega

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Nord recognizes that they are not enough in and of themselves to create a social movement. It has
attempted to forge a cultural-territorial construction in the north of Italy which it calls Padania, to
give it symbolic underpinnings which it judges key to its separatist cause (Sciatino 1999). It
remains to be seen whether constructing nationalist bricks with a minimum of cultural straw in
this case is feasible in the longer term.

In many respects, neo-nationalism grows organically out of a cohesive and coherent civil society.
The communicative space marked out by institutional autonomy helps to generate a sense of
national identity, which can then feed through, as and when appropriate, to political forms of
nationalism. Indeed, without institutional distinctiveness, it would be much more difficult to
imagine oneself as, for example, „Scottish. Feeling Scottish is not the result of some ill-
remembered set of historical emotions, but derived from the institutional framework of social
governance. Similarly, all political parties, from Right to Left, accept that Scotland is a „nation‟
with its own historical and institutional distinctiveness, and thus are all „nationalists‟ in the lower
case sense of the term. Where they differ, of course, is in their assessment of the constitutional
politics which derive from that. For „unionists‟, Scotland's national distinctiveness is best served
by remaining part of the United Kingdom, albeit in devolved form, whereas for „separatists‟, only
an independent legislature can achieve that satisfactorily.

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

It is institutional autonomy which builds a civic rather than simply an ethnic sense of being
Scottish. If it were the case that being Scottish was simply an ethnic, cultural, identity as some
have claimed, then it could more easily be accommodated by being incorporated into a wider
political Union. In other words, the „nesting‟ of Scotland within the United Kingdom would have
been much easier. It is precisely the challenge to governing state structures which is provided by
„civil society‟. For as long as social institutions have freedom of manoeuvre, then there is little
call for a distinctive political legislature. Once, however, this freedom is constrained, it is almost
inevitable that the social and the political are reconnected. Thus it was that it took until the second
half of the twentieth century before formal political nationalism became a serious force in
Scottish politics, reflecting the growing power of the British state, first, through welfarism, and
later, in a more overtly ideological form, in the challenge of Thatcherism.

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It would be wrong, however, to jump to the conclusion that the „social‟ and the „political‟ must be
reconnected in modern societies. One important aspect of that is how people articulate their sense
of national identity. Thus, Scots are also British, the Catalans are Spanish, and Quebecois
Canadian, when it suits them to be. This plural identity is a political resource which is played in
appropriate circumstances, rather than a fixed characteristic. While it is true that people in
Scotland are more than six times more likely to emphasize their Scottishness over their
Britishness, it remains the case that just as many claim to be British in some form or another. This
is not the result of some socio-psychological inability to make up one's mind, the result of a
„deformed‟ culture. There is no inconsistency in this, for it is a matter of having different identity
cards to hand as and when they need to be played. In short, there is something quite calculative
about national identity which shifts according to the political circumstances. It is far less a matter
of sentiment than it is of political practice. It reflects the need for multiple political identities in
the modern world, for just as sovereignty is layered and shared (Scottish, British, European), so
people appear quite content to attach identities, and political commitment, to these levels as and
when necessary. The issue, in other words, is not which one you are, but which you choose to be
according to circumstance and purpose.

The ambiguity of identity is also reflected in ambiguity in the political project. Is neo-nationalism
about independence or not? It depends what one means. It is true that the Scottish National Party
is a separatist party in that it seeks an independent Scotland, but this is „independence in Europe‟,
which strictly speaking is an autonomous position, namely, conditional independence. In similar
fashion, the Parti Quebecois adopts a „sovereignist‟ goal, but one which is contingent on
maintaining close links with the rest of Canada. On the other hand, the main nationalist bloc in
Catalonia, CiU, currently supports „auto-nomisme‟ rather than full independence, while its
smaller but older rival, Esquerra Republicana (ERC), aims for an independent Catalonia. Whereas
a majority of ERC supporters wish Catalonia to be independent, only a minority of CiU
supporters do so. 3 The leader of CiU, Jordi Pujol, established its philosophy in 1984 as follows:

Catalonia is a nation and has the right to be recognised as such in the area of culture and
language, politics and institutions. I reiterate my desire that this is to be done within the [Spanish]
Constitution, so that Catalonia continues to be a factor for the stability and progress for the
whole of Spain, and I especially emphasise my determination that all that is done through
dialogue and understanding, both within and outwith Catalonia, hence my conviction that

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citizens' „convivencia‟ has to be our most important preoccupation, that we explicitly recognise in
nationalism. (Caminal and Matas 1998: 21)

In short, these are nationalist movements whose goals turn out to be less than clear-cut. Home
Rule, Autonomisme, Sovereignty-Association do not sound like full-blown and traditional
independence. In truth, the issue is more how to adapt in order to maximize political
independence in an increasingly interdependent world.

The contingent nature of neo-nationalism is also reflected in support for the relevant political
party. Voters are adept at voting differently at different elections, notably supporting the
nationalist parties more heavily at „autonomous‟ elections than at elections for the central state
government. It is also noticeable that the political parties of neo-nationalism are of relatively
recent origin. They date, by and large, from the second half of the twentieth century, although
they have grown out of previous political movements.

The Italian sociologist Alberto Melucci commented:

The ethno-national question must be seen … as containing a plurality of meanings that cannot be
reduced to a single core. It contains ethnic identity, which is a weapon of revenge against
centuries of discrimination and new forms of exploitation; it serves as an instrument for applying
pressure in the political market; and it is a response to needs for personal and collective identity
in highly complex societies. (1989: 90)

Thus, we can see that nationalism combines three key aspects: the sociological („a weapon of
revenge …‟; the political („an instrument … in the political market‟), and the psychological
(„needs for personal and collective identity‟). That is why nationalism is such a potent force in the
twenty-first century, at a time when conventional state structures struggle to maintain their claim
to absolute sovereignty in the modern world. Nationalist movements can encapsulate cultural
defence, the pursuit of political resources, as well as being vehicles for social identity in periods
of rapid social change. We should not be surprised that nationalism is a catch-all movement,
lending itself to versions of ecological or green politics, as well as seeking out new forms of self-
determination and self-management. It has a chameleon-like quality in ideological terms of
presenting itself as a movement that moves across the Right-Left spectrum as circumstances

364
require. This is not a reflection of weakness but of strength in the politics of the twenty-first
century.

Above all, neo-nationalism, as it operates within advanced capitalist states, pinpoints the shifts
that have taken place in the nature of states themselves. It is too facile to claim that, in a
globalized world, the age of the state is dead, although it is now much harder to sustain the
argument that the state is all-powerful. Rather, there are new tensions and pressures on systems of
governance such that nation and state have become disarticulated. Instead, we are confronted with
a messier world in which degrees of state-ness, and even degrees of nationness become more
imaginable and plausible. The very fact that the „nation-state‟ has become a contested concept
reflects the new social and political forces at work. What these generate is a much more complex
system of governance than textbooks allow, as well as a more nuanced and sophisticated sense of
cultural distinctiveness.

The fall of communism in 1989 did not create this state of affairs so much as remove the rationale
for big bloc politics whereby any threat to state supremacy was considered a threat to the geo-
political division of labour. In this context, the conundrum - that neo-nationalist movements are
emerging just at the point at which the „nation-state‟ is in decay - is more apparent than real. On
the one hand, neo-nationalism represents a challenge to the zero-sum orthodoxy that sovereignty
is all, for this is a debate about the degrees of self-government rather than whether territories
should have any at all. On the other hand, while the soi-disant nation-state is in decay in the sense
that it was always, in its strict sense, a chimera, there is little doubt that states themselves matter,
and will continue so to do. Just as it is facile to proclaim the death of politics in a global world, so
predicting the end of the state, let alone history, represents false prophecy. The political realm
remains the arena for debate about the public good, and government remains the key mechanism
for redistributing resources among its citizens. It may be recognizing the limits of its actions, but
that is a far cry from predicting its incapacity and demise. Political movements like neo-
nationalism, then, are based on accepting limited and shared sovereignty in an interdependent
world. The political movements which emerge around these issues are not inadequate reactions to
the state of that world, unable to make up their minds as to whether they are „in‟ or „out‟ of the
state, but quite rational responses to the more complex world of the twenty-first century.
Understated nations flourish not because states are collapsing, but because of the variable
geometry of power, layered and shared, in the modern world. There is no forward march to full
independence, any more than a back-to-the-future trek to the world as it was imagined to be. The

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task of the social scientist is to understand that world rather than to measure it against the models
of political development we inherited from the nineteenth century. If it is a more complex and
messy one than our theories give credit to, then so be it. The task is to understand the world, and
then, just possibly, to change it.

NOTES

1 The rejection of a devolved assembly for North-East England by a majority of 4 to 1 in a

referendum in November 2004 reinforces the argument in this chapter that „regions‟ (such as
North-East England) have far less cultural capital available to them than the „nations‟ of Scotland
and Wales in which successful referendums were held in 1997 to set up devolved institutions.

2 The allusion here is to the aphorism „a language is a dialect with an army and a navy‟, in other
words, that cultural differences frequently have to be backed up by state force to be taken
seriously

3 In 1996 data, 62 per cent of ERC supporters preferred independent status for Catalonia,
compared with 23 per cent of CiU supporters. I am indebted to John MacInnes for bringing this
and the following quotation to my attention.

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King, Anthony. "Nationalism and Sport." Pp. 249-259

In June 2004, the football European Championships were played in Portugal. England had
qualified for the competition earlier in the year and popular hopes were extremely high that
England could win this tournament, its first such victory since the World Cup of 1966. As
anticipation for the tournament gathered in May, small Cross of St George flags, flying from
plastic attachments, started to appear on car roofs. The flags fluttered patriotically as the fans
inside drove proudly across England. Their numbers swelled to reach a climax during the
tournament itself - and England's disappointing performance in it. By June, it was impossible to
undertake a journey of any length in England without seeing the Cross of St George waving
furiously from a passing car. Perhaps symbolically, the plastic attachments which held the flags
onto the cars broke regularly and, during the tournament, England's roads were littered with white
and red flags, muddied and ripped as they were routinely run over by the wheels of other passing
cars. Even after the end of the tournament throughout July and into August, the odd tattered and
faded flag could still be seen flying hopefully. For those brief summer months, these flags were a
powerful statement of national pride and solidarity. These car-borne flags symbolized the
England team and affirmed the pride which was embodied by the three lions on the England team
shirt. Interestingly, they were not limited to the masculine fans from the fragmented working
class, which had been football's central audience up to the 1990s, but were affixed to the cars of
professional groups, including those of women. In every city - and in every area of every city -
the flags were ubiquitous. This intense public interest in the England team was particularly
noticeable given the nature of the tournament. Although the World Cup had routinely attracted
the interest of those who did not follow the club game, and England's victory in 1966 had been
the spark of national celebration, the European Championship was a tournament which had
attracted only limited public interest in England. Indeed, even the European Championship of
1996 (hosted by England) inspired more circumscribed public interest. The car flags of 2004
demonstrated the new position of football in English social life. In England, football has become
a shared public ritual which is central to popular imagination across the social hierarchy. Even a
tournament of traditionally moderate attraction now inspires an intense expression of national
sentiment. Yet, just as football now attracts a different kind of audience than had previously been
the case, the nationalism which this audience espouses had also changed. The England flags
which fluttered from cars throughout June 2004 may have been trivial gestures of enthusiasm but

368
they marked out a reformed national community in response to the new flows of transnational
capital. These flags denoted the outline of a new form of nationalism in England.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the way that the transformation of English nationalism
can be plotted through the activities of football fans. England and, indeed, the summer months of
2004 are the exclusive focus of attention. Although the peculiarities of English nationalism must
be recognized, there are manifest advantages in concentrating on a single case when considering
nationalism. A detailed, ideographic approach illuminates the precise social processes by which
social groups imagine themselves as national communities. These communities emerge, after all,
out of face-to-face interactions. Consequently, a grounded, ethnographic approach ultimately
provides a more adequate theoretical account of nationalism than sweeping abstractions.
Moreover, once the precise processes are identified in relation to English nationalism, they can be
mapped onto other national communities and the way fans in those countries express themselves
through sport. In this way, the differentiated responses of national communities and the
alternative forms which they have adopted in the face of new conditions can be identified. At the
same time, the underlying processes of change can also be recognized. Thus, the national
communities which are imagined by football fans across the world are also changing. Like
England, these imagined communities are undergoing a dual process of change: they are
becoming simultaneously more local and more transnational. This chapter hints only briefly at
how other national communities are changing but the example of England may provide a model
for tracking these wider changes.

It is important to recognize that national identity is a collective concept which is mobilized

situationally In changing circumstances, different kinds of groupings will appeal to different
concepts of nationality to unify themselves. Consequently, although the transformation of
national identity may be evident in the ritual of sport, it does not automatically follow that this
identity will be reflected in all other spheres of social activity. No direct transposition can be
assumed. Nevertheless, while football fans constitute one social group in a specific circumstance,
it seems highly likely that changes in national identity in this sphere of activity will be paralleled,
in admittedly differentiated ways, in other areas of social practice.

THEORIZING THE NATION

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In his now seminal work on nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1990) argued that nations were
„imagined communities‟. By this he did not mean that nations were mythical or false
communities which did not really exist. On the contrary, nations are among the most real and
powerful forms of social group in the modern world. For Anderson, the concept of„imagined
community‟ pointed to the process by which a nation - and indeed any social group - comes into
being. In order for a nation to exist, its members must recognize their common bond to each other.
They must understand that they share a special relationship which gives them certain shared
interests on the basis of which they will commit themselves to common courses of action. They
must imagine a special duty to each other on the basis of which they subsequently act. The act of
creating a nation is then an act of understanding - or imagination - but once humans recognize
their membership of a special national community, this group is real. It is important to recognize
that, while human imagination or understanding is critical to the creation of national communities,
imagination alone is not enough. In order for national communities to emerge, the members of
these communities need to interact with each other on a regular basis. More particularly, they
need to interact with each other as a specifically national community. Although Anderson cites
neither, his argument accords almost exactly with the claims of Weber and Durkheim. Weber
(1968) famously claimed that in order for a social group to come into being, its members had to
engage in exclusive social interaction with no extrinsic purpose. To form a group, individuals had
to gather in exclusive moments to affirm their special relationship to each other. Durkheim's
analysis (1964) of aboriginal religion made a parallel argument. For aboriginal clans to exist, the
members of these tribes had to gather periodically and affirm their special bond of unity to each
other ecstatically. The recognition of the group requires actual practices and, above all, powerful
and exclusive social interaction between the members of a group.

Although less dramatic, Anderson identifies a daily ritual as an exclusive period of interaction
which has been critical to the creation of imagined national communities. Each morning the
members of a nation have opened the same newspapers over their breakfast and this
geographically diverse ritual has unified the nation around the key issues which confront it. The
newspaper has created common understandings and shared interests which have unified members
of a national community even though they have never nor will ever meet. Of course, although the
majority of individuals in a national community will never meet, each is embedded in a web of
social relations interlocked with others, all employing the newspaper as a shared resource and all
discussing the newspaper with each other during the day to confirm communal understandings of
it. The newspaper becomes a common symbol employed across a nexus of interlocking

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interactions which unify individuals within particular groups. Each group is, in turn,
interconnected with others into broad social networks; families and neighbours are
simultaneously embedded in professional groups or groups unified around forms of leisure
activity. Consequently, by means of these interconnections, the newspaper becomes a shared
resource across a very wide social network as individuals interact with others in other groups who
in turn interact with others. Eventually, a broad set of understandings is established across an
entire nation and continually re-established every day through a myriad of apparently trivial
interactions. „Interaction rituals‟ are, in fact, the basis of imagined communities. Apparently
trivial everyday, face-to-face encounters are critical to the creation and maintenance of national
communities. Only insofar as these webs of relations continue to affirm a sense of common
destiny does the nation persist. Members of a nation must be continually - albeit briefly -
reminded of their special relationship to one another.

Sport is sociologically important to nationalism because it constitutes a charged interaction ritual

out of which imagined national communities arise (King 1998; 2003). Certainly, sport is not the
only, nor the most important, ritual which affirms the networks that constitute a nation, but it is
among the most striking in contemporary society. The England flags which appeared on cars
before and during the European Championships of 2004 become socially significant in the light
of Anderson's discussion of nationalism. These flags constituted an important interaction ritual
which expressed and affirmed the idea of England as a national community in the twenty-first
century. In placing a flag on their car, English people announced their support of the English team
but this statement was not individualistic, aimed at expressing merely personal pride. It was
directed in the first instance at other, mostly anonymous, people past whom these flag-bearers
drove and was aimed at communicating a sense of solidarity with them. Those who put a flag on
their car knew that others would understand the meaning of this symbol and respond to it in the
appropriate way. This flag focused communal attention on the English football team and
expressed the shared hopes which the English had for them. In the weeks before and during the
tournament, a previously meaningless encounter with another car driver became a shared act of
solidarity; it became an interaction ritual. The mundane reality of traffic was transformed into a
sacred, though brief, communion. As cars drove past each other, eyes would turn to the others'
flag and each person would be communally oriented to a single idea - England. Like Anderson's
newspaper reader, the unconscionable myriad of trivial flag-encounters germinated a fluid and
complex network; a recognizable social community, involving millions of individuals, who
understood themselves to be English and were all communally oriented to the same end.

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In the current era, as the flows of global capital subvert national boundaries, promoting uneven
development, and transforming even the most intimate relations, new social groups are emerging
while other long established groups are having to re-negotiate themselves. Nations are currently
being re-invented and re-imagined in the face of the new economic pressures to which social
groups are being submitted. In his work on changing forms of identity, Appadurai has
emphasized the increasing significance of the locale. The locale - the local city or region - has
become a means by which corporate capital has disguised its increasingly anonymous and
globalized operations. Appadurai overstates the Deterritorialization of capital but his argument
about the growing importance of the locale is relevant to contemporary discussions about
nationalism. Nationalism is changing in the face of global pressures and is, perhaps ironically,
becoming more local in response to these external pressures. Under the uneven pressure of
globalization, formerly unified national identities have been increasingly fissured by new
regionalized nationalities (Keating 1998; Jenkins and Sofos 1996). In Europe today, the transition
of national communities is particularly obvious in the appearance of new forms of national
groupings in Central and Eastern Europe as states fail, most obviously in the former Yugoslavia
(Kaldor 1999). However, it is an error to believe that national communities are undergoing
change only in those areas where there has been a radical collapse of the state. The same forces of
globalization which led to the collapse of Yugoslavia are also transforming apparently stable
nations. Nations that centralized during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries like Italy and Spain
are beginning to decentralize once again and even a nation like Britain, which has been unified
since 1707, is undergoing a degree of fragmentation. New forms of solidarities - new „national‟
communities - are emerging in Europe, especially in those dynamic regions which have been
constrained by backward or exploiting nation-states such as north-western Italy (see Mingione
1993), Catalonia or Scotland. The rise of these new communities is propelled by a national
system of regulation which jeopardizes their participation in the global economy (Sheridan 1995;
Sznajder 1995). As global forces are channelled towards different regions, former national
solidarities begin to have less importance in certain contexts as new collective interests,
mobilizing around re-invented notions of the nation, have come to the fore.

In this historic moment, it has been relatively easy for those disadvantaged regions to construct a
new identity for themselves. Emergent national communities like Scotland and Wales constitute
themselves in opposition to an oppressive and colonizing England. They draw on the history of
their resistance to the centralizing authority of the English monarchy and state. For the English, it
is more difficult to define themselves in this era (Nairn 1981). England's identity was based

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specifically on the Union which the English created through military conquest. English identity
was consequently indivisible from British identity. The English defined themselves precisely by
being British and dominating an island empire, comprising Scotland, Wales and Ireland. As
Britain is breaking up under the force of global markets into its constituent and re-emergent
national communities, England's national identity has become deeply problematic for, unlike
Scotland, Wales and Ireland, there is no obvious identity which the English should adopt.
Historically, English national identity was ironically defined by not being English; it was a pride
in Britain. Now thrown back on itself, it is difficult for the English to establish an identity for
themselves since their history up to this point has always been a story of their role in the creation
of Britain. In his great novel, A Man Without Qualities, Robert Musil (1995) noted that on the eve
of the First World War, Austria faced the same dilemma. Austria was defined by being the ruler
of the Austro-Hungarian empire. It was therefore defined ironically by not being itself but in
consisting of other nations. Its identity was hollow, consisting only of otherness which it could
not claim as its own. Musil exposes this crisis of identity with the parody of the Parallel
Campaign. The Campaign was intended to organize celebrations for the 70th anniversary of
Emperor Josef in 1918, in response to Germany's plans to have a jubilee to celebrate Emperor
Wilhelm II's 30th jubilee. However, although the committee was initially inspired by „the Great
Idea‟, it was unable to identify a single characteristic that defined Austrian identity. Its
celebration of Austria was entirely vacuous.

This sense of the Austro-Hungarian states was so oddly put together that it must seem almost
hopeless to explain it to anyone who has not experienced it himself. It did not consist of an
Austrian part and a Hungarian part that, as one might expect, complemented each other, but of a
whole and a part; that is, of a Hungarian and an Austro-Hungarian sense of statehood, the latter
to be found in Austria, which in a sense left the Austrian sense of statehood with no country of its
own. (Musil 1995: 180)

The current search for English identity (Kumar 2003; Paxman 1999; Scruton 2000) resonates
with Musil's parody - albeit less amusingly. Like Austria, England must re-invent itself as its
historic conflation with Britain is becoming increasingly problematic. English identity must be
defined against Scottish, Welsh and Irish identity when it was once defined precisely as the
domination and incorporation of these communities. The concept of Britain has become a
problematic solidarity in the 1990s. Britain is not an irrelevance at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, but the conflation of England, Scotland, Wales and (more problematically) Northern

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Ireland is now a matter of dispute. The novel use of England flags during the 2004 European
Championships constitutes a new interaction ritual in which English people strive to constitute
themselves as a distinctive national community at a deeply ambiguous moment.

Global forces are promoting the development of new kinds of national communities. New kinds
of social solidarities are appearing across the world under the name of nationalism. Although
geographically differentiated, these new nationalisms involve two fundamental processes.
National communities are becoming more local. The nations which were established from the end
of the nineteenth century are contracting, as regions within them devolve from centralized state
authority. They are concentrating onto a more geographically circumscribed, core group.
Simultaneously, emergent national communities are becoming more transnational. These
contracted national groupings - or the new nations based on once-repressed ethnic groups and
regions - employ much wider criteria of membership; the nation is expanding globally across its
own borders which are themselves increasingly penetrated by economic traffic and population
movements. Many people are now included in the new localized national communities who once
did not qualify as nationals. In the globalized world, the nation is becoming more local and more
transnational. It is ironically both contracting and concentrating while also expanding and
diversifying. These processes of localization and transnationalization are evident in the attempts
of the English to constitute themselves as a new national community in the face of new global
pressures. The European Championships of 2004 provide a convenient focus through which the
re-invention of English nationalism can be observed.

THE NEW LOCALISM

Before the 1990s, travelling England fans preferred the Union Jack (a red, white and blue flag
comprising the crosses of England, Scotland and Ireland) for display within the stadium. Union
flags, often with the name of the local club imprinted horizontally, were draped over hoardings,
barriers and fences in support of the national team. At the now famous World Cup semi-final
against Germany in Turin in 1990, in which England was eventually eliminated on penalties,
television broadcasts showed the England fans chiefly waving the Union Jack, with only a few St
George's flags in evidence. In the course of the 1990s, however, England fans have increasingly
preferred to use the red and white Cross of St George. This flag denotes a specifically English
identity. The St George's Cross fuses with the Scottish Cross of St Andrew and the Irish Cross of
St Patrick to create the Union Jack, but alone it stands exclusively for England - a national

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community without its own state. The use of the Cross of St George for the car flags in the
summer of 2004 reflects the increasing weight which is being attached exclusively to England.

It is interesting that English football strips have also reflected this growth of distinctive English
identity. Since the first England international match against Scotland in 1872, England football
teams have traditionally played in white with blue shorts and white socks. The choice of white
seems to have been a direct response to the fact that Scotland chose dark blue - the background
colour of the Cross of St Andrew - as their shirt colour. Scotland wore white shorts and blue
socks. England, therefore, seemed to have selected white on the basis that it was the matching
opposite of Scotland's colours. In the 1930s, a red away strip was introduced and red has
remained England's usual alternative colour. The World Cup winning team of 1966 famously
played in red because opponents West Germany also played in white. Red and white have
continued as the favoured colours for England up to the present. However, there has been a
significant change in the design of the shirt in the past decade, particularly with regard to the
secondary shirt colours.

From 1974 until 1980s, English football strips, produced by a company called Admiral, were
predominantly white but the subordinate colourings, around the shoulder and chest, were blue and
red. Alternatively, on the red England shirt of the early 1980s, the trimming was white and blue.
In this way, the football shirt referenced the red, white and blue Union Jack as a common symbol.
The strips made an important symbolic point. They represented a conflation of English and
British identity which was unproblematic at the time; for the English, England and Britain were
synonymous and English national identity was founded on an idea of Britain as a unified state.
The England strip corresponded with the Union flags which the fans waved from the terraces.

In 1984 the sports manufacturer Umbro won the contract for the England strip, which it retains to
this day. Reflecting the Admiral design, Umbro shirts were white, with only a small blue and
sometimes blue and red collar, referencing the Union Jack - but only minimally. Significantly,
from 1997, the Umbro design changed. Although red and blue stripes were inserted on the flanks,
a small but prominent Cross of St George flag appeared on the trim at the neck-opening of the
shirt, near the middle of the player's chest. 1 In later shirts the Cross of St George has become an
even more central motif. For instance, in 2001 Umbro launched their new England strip on St
George's Day itself and the shirt made an explicit reference to the English saint with a bold red
line running down the left-hand side of the shirt (over the player's heart). From 2003 a new

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England white strip was introduced and the Cross of St George theme persisted. The red line,
representing the Cross, now runs across the shoulders. Similarly, the new red away strip
introduced in 2004 repeats the earlier design. A Cross of St George flag was prominently
displayed on each shoulder while a third cross was sewn into the lining of the shirt just below the
neck so it was visible when the shirt was not being worn. In these new England Umbro designs
the white shorts have similarly referenced the Cross of St George by featuring a red stripe. The
strip symbolizes the transformation of English national identity in the era of globalization.
England players no longer play in the Union Jack as they did in the 1970s and 1980s, but in the
exclusively English Cross of St George.

Significantly, the use of the St George Cross seems to accord with public self-understandings and
identities. The Umbro shirt design has been very successful as sales indicate. For instance, the
new red away strip, released in March 2002, was bought by four times as many fans in three
months as the previous away shirt in its entire two-year life span. It also outsold the England
2
home shirt launched in April 2001. The St George Cross design is manifestly attractive to
England fans, reflecting their own sense of identity and the way they understand themselves as
England fans. The new England shirt design symbolizes changes in national affiliation, but
Umbro's marketing strategy also usefully illustrates how the processes of globalization encourage
the formation of new national communities.

In his work on globalization and identity, Appadurai (1996) identifies an important process. The
operations of increasingly transnational companies do not mean the end of the locale. On the
contrary, the competitive global market promotes and supports increasing mobilization and
identification at the level of the locale. The England football team represents exactly this process.
Since the 1980s, sport has become an essential commodity for the media and other sponsoring
interests to expand their markets and sustain their profits in an increasingly competitive global
economy. In the case of England, the expression of a new national identity which attracts fans is
directly in the interests of these corporations. Rupert Murdoch's BSkyB television network, The
Times and the Sun newspapers (which are part of his News International conglomerate) have been
central to this process. BSkyB was the product of a merger in 1990 between Murdoch's Sky
Television and British Satellite Broadcasting and BSkyB's rise to national and increasingly
transnational dominance is primarily due to its monopoly of the rights to Premier League football
from the first contract in 1993 to the current date (see Chippendale and Franks 1992; King 1998).
Murdoch's media corporations have promoted English football to a position of cultural

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dominance which it has never experienced before. As Murdoch has himself emphasized: „Sport
absolutely overpowers film and everything else in the entertainment genre [and] football, of all
sports, is number one‟ (Rupert Murdoch, cited in Guest and Law 1997: 24). Sport is then, to use
Murdoch's term, a „battering ram‟ by which commercial interests can break into and indeed create
new markets (Harveson 1996). In England, the global competition between emergent
transnational corporations like Murdoch's News International has promoted football and
stimulated the development of re-invented local and national communities around this
transformed ritual. The promotion of new national identities by multinational corporations is
recognized explicitly by these companies themselves. Martin Prothero, Head of Marketing and
International at UMBRO International, conveniently demonstrated the point when he discussed
the success of the new red England shirt during the World Cup in June 2002. „A combination of a
fantastic product design and value for money pricing, allied to England's success on the field, has
led to vast numbers of fans wanting to show their support by wearing our England products. Let's
hope the team can keep going in the World Cup and generate even more excitement and support
3
around the country!'. England success - and the nationalist solidarity which that success
stimulates - is directly in the interests of Umbro. The competitive global economy does not mean
the end of nationalism. On the contrary, as they develop their markets, multinationals actively
promote national solidarities and identities in new localized forms. Umbro's new England shirts
symbolize the transformation of English national identity in the era of globalization. As Great
Britain has been compromised by global economic pressures, English people have mobilized
themselves around the concept of a new localized national identity.

Yet, this is only one side of the current process. Emergent social groups are not only promoted by
globalization - they are also threatened by these forces. New social groups emerge as a means of
collectively resisting the uneven development initiated by globalization. Appadurai has called this
resistance, which often takes the form of violence, the „ugly face‟ of globalization (Appadurai
1996:42). There is an ugly side to new English nationalism which attempts to resist the threat
posed by the new power of commercial forces. In England, this resistance to and resentment of
global forces has been consistently focused on a single football player: David Beckham. He is
seen to represent the very commercial forces which have both brought the new English
community into existence but have also threatened its world status. For much of his time as a
Manchester United player, David Beckham was subjected to barracking and verbal abuse by
opposition fans, focusing specifically on his - and his wife's - financial status. He was explicitly
seen as a product of threatening corporate forces. The barracking was not limited to club fixtures

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but was also a common occurrence at England games, when he was supposedly representing the
nation. Certainly his dismissal against Argentina in the 1998 World Cup increased this abuse, but
that dismissal was itself invested with decisive significance because Beckham had already been
identified as a problematic figure. Thus, in the important qualifying game against Finland on 24
March 2001, which was played at Anfield (Liverpool), a significant portion of the previews of the
game focused on the issue of whether Beckham, as captain, would be barracked by England fans.
In 2002, when Beckham ensured England's qualification for the World Cup almost single-
handedly, the abuse against him declined. However, his move to Real Madrid in 2003 and his
decline in playing form for England has once again stimulated increasing antipathy towards him
by England fans. Once again, the accusations against him highlight his commercial corruption:
his poor form is not explained in sporting terms, it is not the product of injury or fatigue, it is seen
as specifically a result of his lack of pride in England. He has played poorly for England, so the
accusation goes, because he is more concerned with money, sponsorship and the rankly venal
Real Madrid than with his nation. He is seen as a representative of global corporate forces and is,
therefore, a danger to national integrity. Illustrating his corrupting commercial influence, a story
was circulated among (and deplored by) England fans that David Beckham had asked that
England wear the all-white strip (the colours of his new club, Real Madrid), in his first match in
England after his transfer from Manchester United, and, so it was alleged, the Football
4
Association had acceded to his request. It is unclear whether this story is true, but it
demonstrates that fans believe that Beckham represents a corrupting commercial presence. It is
instructive to compare Beckham's treatment by England fans with that of Kevin Keegan in the
late 1970s. As a player, Keegan was at least as successful an international star as Beckham and he
also benefited commercially from football. He became extremely wealthy and like Beckham he
made a high profile move abroad - to SV Hamburg - on a lucrative contract. There is little doubt
that Keegan was as interested in financial remuneration as Beckham. Nevertheless, his loyalty to
England was never questioned and, especially in an era of very poor England team performances,
he was supported by the fans as a figurehead. In the current globalized era, Beckham, in contrast,
as the abuse he receives demonstrates, is widely looked upon with suspicion even though there is
no evidence that he is any less committed to England on the field. In this globalized context,
certain players, like Beckham, represent precisely the commercial forces that threaten localized
national communities, and they become figures of hate. In the face of new global forces, localized
national identities are emerging in new kinds of public rituals. Through these new localized
identities, groups are collectively mobilizing themselves to exploit the opportunities of
globalization while they also resist the threats it poses. Localism has two sides.

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TRANSNATIONALISM

In the ritual of football, the localization of national identity is evident. However, this localization
involves a further element. As nations concentrate, they simultaneously expand globally, seeking
support and members from populations in other parts of the world. These localized nations
consist paradoxically of increasingly diverse population groupings. This dialectic is reflected in
sport, in general, and in football, in particular. In 1966, England won the World Cup with a team
which was socially homogeneous. It consisted of white players all of whom came from urban,
working-class backgrounds, and all of whom played exclusively for English professional clubs:
Banks (Leicester), Cohen (Fulham), Wilson (Everton), Stiles (Manchester United), Jack Charlton
(Leeds), Moore (West Ham), Peters (West Ham), Ball (Blackpool), Hunt (Liverpool), Bobby
Charlton (Manchester United), and Hurst (West Ham). They were from England and played in
England. Since that time the demographic basis of the national team has changed, reflecting in
particular widespread immigration into Britain from the 1950s. The England team which lost to
Portugal in the semi-final of Euro 2004 featured four black players (James, Campbell, Cole and
Vassell). In addition, although England football professionals migrate less than their European
counterparts, the defeated Euro 2004 side included two notable émigrés: David Beckham and
Owen Hargreaves who played for Real Madrid and Bayern Munich, respectively, though Michael
Owen and Jonathon Woodgate also transferred to Real Madrid in the summer after Euro 2004.
Owen Hargreaves is especially interesting because he has never played in England and is
Canadian by birth and, therefore, he would not have qualified to play for England in the past. He
represents transnationalization at its extreme; he has virtually no concrete connection to England.

There is further evidence of this process of transnationalization. Until 1999, England had always
been managed by an Englishman and, indeed, it would have been regarded as inappropriate for
the national team to be managed by anyone other than a national. In the face of increased
international competition, these nationalist principles have been compromised. As a result of poor
performances under a series of English managers throughout the 1990s, culminating with Kevin
Keegan, the Football Association prioritized results over national purity, and appointed the Swede
Sven Goran Eriksson in January 2001. Interestingly, Eriksson had never even coached an English
club side but came to the attention of the FA due to his success over a 15-year period in
international club football, including a League Championship (Scuddetto) with the Italian club,
Lazio. Significantly, there was initially intense opposition from some fans and from certain
elements of the press. On his arrival at FA headquarters in London, for instance, a Union Jack-

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clad individual protested with a banner which read „FA - Hang your heads in shame‟ (Winter
2001). It was significant that the fan wore a Union Jack. He represented an increasingly
outmoded British nationalism whose exclusiveness undermined national competitiveness in a
globalized era. The appointment of Eriksson as a manager represented a transnationalization of
the England team. In the face of new pressures, the Football Association sought to exploit the
potential of the global market to promote the national team, seeking new alliances irrespective of
traditional solidarities and cultural boundaries.

Under the managers of the 1990s, and Kevin Keegan in particular, England employed crude
tactics which reflected the insular national style of fast and aggressive rather than skilful football.
Keegan also favoured older players, most of whom had become professionals in the 1980s before
the deregulation and globalization of the game. These players were educated in increasingly
anachronistic styles of English professionalism. Although Eriksson's period as England manager
has not been without its problems and England still fail to reach the level of the best international
teams, Eriksson has employed young players and has greatly improved the tactics of the England
team. They are now a more professional and more tactically astute team than they were
throughout the 1990s and have begun to adopt a style of play which accords more closely with
that employed by other international sides. England has thus become a more transnational team
both in terms of players and style of play.

The process of transnationalization is demonstrated by other national sides. Indeed, other teams
have transnationalized more radically and far more successfully than England. While the French
national league is extremely weak due to now obsolete business structures, the national team was
very successful in the late 1990s and early 2000s. France's victory in Euro 2000 and their earlier
success in the World Cup Final in 1998 was substantially due to the transnationalization of the
national team. A notable feature of the French team was how many players were drawn from
France's former colonies, including one of the world's greatest players, Zinedine Zidane, who is
of Algerian descent. While Jean Marie Le Pen's French National Front rejected the national team
for its ethnically diverse composition, the team was celebrated in France as a symbol of social
diversity, representing a multicultural nation. The definition of who is part of a nation has
broadened to include individuals who would once not have been considered as genuine French
nationals. The French team is also dispersed geographically, with few players having any tie to a
French club. Of the 22 players in France's squad for the World Cup of 1998,15 played in leagues
outside France and the proportion of the squad playing outside France increased even further by

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2000 (Mignon 2000: 232). Other national football teams have also exploited the pool of players
once considered ineligible. This is a strategy particularly popular with weaker footballing nations.
Thus, under Jack Charlton, the English 1966 World Cup winner selected to manage the Republic
of Ireland team on the same competitive grounds that Eriksson was later chosen as English
manager, the Irish side fielded players who tenuously qualified for the team by the possession of
a single grandparent of Irish birth, such as Andy Townshend and Tony Cascarino. National teams
have effectively transnationalized to include individuals who were not once part of the nation.
Echoing the Football Association's decision to employ Eriksson, there has been a developing
trend in world football for national teams to be coached by foreign managers. Scotland
temporarily and unsuccessfully hired German coach Berti Vogts, while South Korea employed
the Dutch coach Guus Hiddink for the 2002 World Cup, who led them to the semi-finals of that
competition. The European Championships of 2004 were won by outsiders Greece, coached by a
German, Otto Rehagel. 5 The economic pressures of globalization are forcing national institutions
to develop new strategies which drive them beyond established national borders. National
institutions expand their operations in the face of increased global competition and they draw
upon new transnational connections to maximize their competitiveness.

CONCLUSION

Like the nation-state, nationalism is changing not dying. Globalization engenders uneven
development within national communities so that there are increasing disparities of economic
wealth and interest between cities and regions that were regulated in the past by an overarching
state. Certainly, in the twentieth century, state regulation did not destroy all regional inequality
but through programmes of macro-economic management, welfare and subsidy, it limited the
worst of the effects of this unevenness. In the light of global economic forces, nation-states have
been unable to mitigate against the effects of uneven development and the nation-state is being
compromised internally and externally. Externally, the borders of the nation-state are becoming
more porous as new flows of immigrants and capital subvert national boundaries and as states
draw into ever-closer intergovernmental alliances with other states, pooling and sharing
sovereignty. Internally, nations are fissuring in the face of economic pressure that promotes the
independence of cities and regions. The state remains a critical political institution and nations
remain primary social communities. Yet, both state and nation are undergoing profound
transformation. In particular, although the nation appeals to an unbroken past and therefore
appears as a primordial solidarity which has never changed, national communities are, in fact,

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undergoing radical transformation as they respond to new pressures and threats. Nations are
becoming new kinds of solidarities, concentrating on core communities which include those who
were once not part of the nation. In the name of putatively timeless nationalism, new national
communities, like the English, the Scottish, the Welsh, the Catalan or the Lombardian, are
emerging. Nations are localizing and transnationalizing.

The transformation of the nation-state and nationalism can be traced through almost any social
activity. Not unreasonably, it has been traditional to trace these changes through formal political
activities and institutions. Yet, the transformation of the nation today can be equally well
identified through informal social activities and above all through an activity like sport, even
though sport appears otiose to the grand sweep of human history. Yet, in the ritual of sport,
humans create and sustain the social groups of which they are part and consequently in this ritual
the contours of national communities are thrown into relief. The recent and continuing
transformation of sport and of European football, in particular, is especially striking in this regard
for, there, in microcosm, the outlines of new kinds of national communities can begin to be seen.
European football today demonstrates the enduring importance of the nation as a basis of social
solidarity and mobilization but it also reveals quite radical changes to the nation as a community.
Nations are localizing under the pressure of globalization which is also simultaneously forcing
them to transnationalize. In the world of sport, the new solidarities to which fans appeal provide a
rich and pre-emptive insight into the new geography of nations and nationalism.

NOTES

1 England team strip (or uniform) from 1872 to 2006 can be viewed at http:/ /
www.englandfootballonline.com/ TeamUnif/ Unif.html.

2 http:/ / www.umbro.com/ corporate/ 130602.htm.

3 http:/ / www.umbro.com/ corporate/ 130602.htm (accessed September 2004).

4 http:/ / www.englandfootballonline.com/ TeamUnif/ unif.html (accessed 25 September 2004).

5 The process is not confined to football. Britain's Olympic rowing team employed Jürgen
Grobbler who had coached the East German rowing team to successive Olympic gold medals

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since 1972. The English cricket team is coached by an Australian, Duncan Fletcher. In other
sports, very broad definitions of national identity have been applied to determine whether an
athlete has qualified for national selection. The British Olympic athletics team included an
American, Maliki David, who was part of the men's relay team which eventually beat the
American team to the gold medal in the 2004 Olympics. Similarly, the tennis player, Greg
Rusedski, and the world champion boxer, Lennox Lewis, are both Canadians who have sought to
exploit their tenuous familial links to Britain into order to maximize their market potential.

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Harveson, P. (1996) „It‟s a New Ball Game as Takeover Talk Hits Fever Pitch‟ , Financial Times, 16
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Nairn, T. (1981) The Break-up of Britain . London: New Left Books
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(retrieved 14 September 2004)

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Roche, Maurice. "Nations, Mega-events and International Culture." Pp. 260-272

„Mega-events‟ are specially constructed and staged large-scale international cultural and sport
events. They are short-term events with often significant long-term pre-event and post-event
impacts on the host nation across a range of dimensions of national society, particularly cultural
but also political and economic dimensions. Since the late nineteenth century, when they first
made their appearance, the two main mega-event genres have been expos and great international
sport events. The paradigm of the latter has been the Olympic Games, but in the post-war period
this was joined by the football World Cup international championship event. The historical, social
and political landscape of nations and of international relations in which mega-events have
occurred since their first appearance has evidently undergone seismic shifts and transformations
over time. Nevertheless, although they are relatively fragile and have been periodically vulnerable
to ideological forces, mega-events seem to have established an enduring presence, popularity and
memorability in modern society.

The interest of national and international publics in mega-events and of nation-states in staging
them appears to be even greater now at the beginning of the twenty-first century than it was at the
beginning of the twentieth, as we observe later in the chapter. For instance the „Millennium‟ year
of 2000 saw the staging of a highly successful Olympic Games in Sydney, an Expo in Hanover
and the controversial sub-expo-type national „Millennium Experience‟ exhibition in London. In
addition, around the Millennium year highly popular football World Cup events were held in
France in 1998 and, uniquely jointly, in Japan and Korea in 2002. 1 Nations' continuing interests
in the twenty-first century in attempting to use mega-events to provide an international or global
media platform for projecting positive images are evident in such phenomena as the continuing
intensity of the bidding competitions to win the right to the host the Olympic Games and the
football World Cup. It is also evident in, on the one hand, the political troubles the Greek nation
went through as a result of preparing for the 2004 Athens Olympics and, on the other hand, the
scale of the economic effort China is putting into preparing Beijing and its 2008 Olympics to
operate both as a „global village‟ for the event and also as a „world stage‟ for the Chinese state
and nation.

The main aim of this chapter is to introduce and map some of the general relationships between
nations and mega-events. The discussion proceeds in three stages. The first section outlines some

384
of the framework and concepts needed to address the relationship between international mega-
events and nations. These include concepts of nation-states, of mega-events and of the main
periods of development in modernity since the mid-nineteenth century which provide the social
context for both phenomena. The second section focuses on the key mega-event genre of the
Olympic Games, and with particular reference to the „short twentieth century‟ period, that is,
starting from the end of World War I, through to the late twentieth century. In this period
particularly important in understanding the role of mega-events is not only nationalism but also
the connection between the latter on the one hand and both idealistic and aggressive („super-
nationalist‟) versions of internationalism on the other. Aggressive „super-nationalism‟ was
particularly exemplified in fascist and communist states and their nationalist and internationalist
ideologies, and the Olympic Games mega-event came to be seen as a useful if transient
international „theatre‟ for the display of both super-nationalist as well as peaceful internationalist
ideals and ideologies. The third section addresses the contemporary period of „late modernity‟
and considers recent and current relationships between nations and mega-events. The staging of
multiple international mega-events, or the aspiration to do so, has now become a common
strategy for many nations and their major cities around the world. This is illustrated with
particular reference to the new South Africa's use of mega-events in its contemporary nation-
building.

UNDERSTANDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEGA-EVENTS AND NATIONS IN

MODERNITY

To explore the relation between mega-events and nations over time some of their basic relevant
features need to be indicated in this section, together with a sketch of the main stages of societal
development in modernity (for fuller conceptualization of mega-events and national history see
Roche 2000 and 2006, respectively). The periodization is applied to a review of the national and
international role of international sports mega-events, in particular the Olympics, over the course
of the twentieth century, in the rest of the chapter.

Mega-events are directly or indirectly the product of nation-states which can be said to host them
and which often use them to promote nationalism. However, even from a national perspective
states are not the only actors to be con sidered. National „civil societies‟ and „publics‟ can also be
relevant actors in campaigns for mega-events, in the success or otherwise of their staging, and in
their long-term impacts. In addition there is the distinction between „states‟ and „nations‟ which

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may or may not be institutionalized in states. For instance, it might be argued that the Catalans
and Quebecois are „stateless nations‟ incorporated within the states of Spain and Canada, and that
this distinction is relevant to understanding the nature of mega-events such as the 1976 and 1992
Olympic Games mega-events, which were staged in Montreal and Barcelona respectively.

Mega-events are at the same time both national and also international social phenomena. From a
sociological perspective international mega-events are the „tip of the iceberg‟ of an ecology of
events and event sites which typically characterize nation-states, their national cultures and
collective cultural identities. Many of these events may be popular „heritage‟ events such as
traditional festivals and/or religious rituals which derive from pre-modern periods. No doubt
many are sustained currently to serve nations' touristic images and industries. However, they may
also be reproduced and participated in to affirm something particular about both a society's sense
of its „roots‟ in time and place, and also the inter-generational linkages and solidarities in which
its collective identity is formed (Sabate et al. 2004). More important for our purposes, though, are
the self-consciously „modern‟ („post-traditional‟) and „official‟ state-derived cultural events and
institutions „invented‟ (Hobsbawm 1992) by nationalist and state elites during important phases
of nation-building, particularly the late nineteenth century.

These events symbolize and legitimate the modern nation-state, and help to simplify and amplify,
construct and propagate, the particularities of its national narrative and identity. They include, for
instance, public rituals surrounding the investiture or death of political leaders, the collective
memorializa-tions of key founding figures, revolutions or wars, and the special places and
architectures in relation to which these events occur (Smith 1998; Roche 2001a; Jones 2003).
They also include the „inventions‟ of the cultural institutions, calendars and movements
concerned with the national exhibitions and the national sports and their urban heritages, sites and
architectures, which were developed in many different nations, but particularly in France, Britain
and the United States, from the late nineteenth century 2 The international mega-event genres we
discuss in this chapter derive from, and can be said to sit astride, these latter „modern‟ cultural
innovations at the nation-state level and which contribute to what we can refer to as the social
ecology of public events within nation-state societies. It is worth noting, then, that to focus on
mega-events in relation to nations as we do in this chapter has its limits. Mega-events have
certainly been significant for nations in modernity, and they continue to be so. But they are only
one dimension of the broader and deeper social phenomenon of cultural events (together with
their related cultural politics and policy-making, not least in terms of the spaces and times of their

386
occurrence) which has helped to structure the cultural, communicative and reflective life of
publics in modern nation-state societies. 3

To adequately contextualize both nation-states and mega-events and to provide a basis for
understanding the connections between them a view needs to be taken about „modernity‟ and
historical periods. The history of mega-events runs from the first international exposition, the
Crystal Palace exhibition in 1851, through to the present. From the perspective of many of the
most influential sociologists and historians of nationalism this is coterminous with the
4
construction and development of nation-states. From the perspective of much sociology more
generally, this is effectively coterminous with „modernity‟, since the mid-nineteenth century was
when industrialization began to transform modern societies across Europe and in the United
States into „industrial societies‟. These involved historically distinctive configurations of classes
based on industrial and urban capitalism. We can refer to this as a „mainstream modernization‟
perspective. As containers of this structural revolution the modernization process also involved
the development and institutionalization of nation-state systems. States committed themselves to
promoting economic growth and to controlling and ameliorating class conflict, processes which
would ultimately provide conditions for the evolution of nation-states as educational and „welfare
states‟, particularly in Europe. So the main developmental background for exploring the relation
between mega-events and nations concerns the stages of development that need to be identified
within this modernization process from the mid-nineteenth century to the present.

However, the whole concept of „modernity‟ and „modernization‟ and also of the development of
nation-states has often been contested terrain both between historians and sociologists, and also
within the disciplines between differing theoretical and normative perspectives. Recent
alternatives to the „mainstream modernization‟ perspective are concerned with perceived
problems, among other things, with the „pre-modern‟ on the one hand, and the „post-modern‟ on
the other - that is, around each „end‟ of the mainstream modernist version of historical
development.

At the „pre-modern‟ „origins‟ end of the continuum, medieval historians and historical
sociologists declare that „modernity‟ and/or the nation-state originated far earlier than either the
nineteenth century industrial revolution or the eighteenth century Enlightenment precursor period.
5
Guided by this recent analysis, the perspective taken in this chapter is that while we should
recognize the potentially very deep pre-modern historical origins of modernity and its „nations‟,

387
we particularly need to give a renewed significance to the „early modern‟ period of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. That is, economic, cultural and national institutions identifiable as
recognizably „modern‟ first substantially developed as aspects of a state-integrated complex in
leading European societies like France and England from the sixteenth century. The most
important great „events‟ for nation-states in this period were not cultural but military, namely
wars (albeit wars for cultural (religious) reasons, which then became the subject of national
events of ritual memorialization), as in Europe's „civil wars‟ of the Reformation period of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in which the European nation-state system began to be
consolidated (Kennedy 1988; Tilly 1992).

To take account of the realities of this „early modernity‟, and to differentiate it from the
„mainstream modernity‟ period, this chapter focuses on the period from the mid-nineteenth to the
late twentieth century which can be referred to as that of„mature modernity. However, within this
periodization it is important to recognize the massive and complex impact on nations and on the
international system of various major transformations, notably World War I. So it is useful to
discriminate between a first and a second stage of mature modernity, the first focusing on the late
nineteenth century and pre-war period, and the second running through from the inter-war and
post-World War II periods. The history of the modern Olympics is bound up with the adaptation
of nation-states to the transformation of intra-societal and international environments, particularly
those in the second stage of mature modernity.

At the „contemporary‟ end of the historical continuum of modernity there is the perspective that
perhaps „modernity‟ is over, and we are now into a new era. 6 Without conceding the argument to
such a „post-modern‟ analysis, it is nonetheless possible to acknowledge that phenomena like
post-industrialism and globalization suggest that there has been a further qualitative evolution of
society beyond the second stage of „mature modernity‟. We can refer to this period as one of „late
modernity‟, and see it as running from the mid-1970s to the present. The next section focuses on
the relationship between mega-events and nations in the period of the second stage of „mature
modernity‟, and then we turn to consider this relationship in the contemporary period of „late
modernity‟.

THE OLYMPICS IN MATURE MODERNITY: NATIONALISM, SUPER-

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

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This section outlines some key elements of the relationship of the Olympic mega-event
movement and its games mega-event with nations and politics over the course of the „short
twentieth century‟, from the end of World War I to the mid-1970s, the second stage of mature
modernity. Since the politics of much of this period was characterized by the neo-imperialistic
ideologies of fascism and communism, it is necessary to consider what might be referred to as
„super-nationalism‟ as a factor in the staging of Olympic Games. As part of this discussion, we
also look briefly at the association of the Olympics with ideals of internationalism in this period.

The Olympics and nationalism in the twentieth century

Nineteenth-century European nationalisms and elite national cultures, particularly those of Britain,
France and Germany, elaborated particu laristic myths of ethnic origin in medieval „gothic‟ pasts,
and this can be seen most visibly in the „neo-gothic‟ architecture of some of the new public
buildings constructed in the period, particularly in Britain. However, at the very same time,
national elites also were able to build on the discoveries of the new discipline of archaeology and
associate themselves with the roots of European civilization in ancient Greece and Rome. This
also can be readily seen in the „neoclassical‟ style of new public buildings constructed in this
period in many nations (Jones 2003). The interest of the French aristocrat Pierre de Coubertin and
his associates in the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in producing a modern version of
the ancient Olympic Games was thus part of the long wave of interest by otherwise modernizing
European elites in the Hellenic world. In addition, de Coubertin was also influenced by the
internationalism of the late nineteenth-century French expos which he had been enthralled with in
his youth. Indeed the expo genre helped give birth to the Olympic movement as three of the first
four Games events were held in association with expos (namely, 1900 Paris, 1904 St Louis, 1908
London; see MacAloon 1981; Roche 2000: ch. 3).

The Olympic movement built on the mid-and late nineteenth-century „invention‟ of formalized
sports by British elite groups, energizing and articulating the sport movement by adding an
idealistic international and „civilizational‟ set of meanings and values to it. International Olympic
Games were organized on a regular four-year calendar from the beginning in 1896, as were
football World Cup events after they broke away from the Olympics in 1930 (Sugden and
Tomlinson 1998; Lanfranchi et al. 2004). These regular and irregular mega-event cycles provided
a significant intra- and inter-generational structuring of the international cultural calendar for the

389
mass publics and the mass press and media of Europe and North America, and also for elite
groups around the world, throughout the first and second stages of mature modernity.

Host nations have traditionally used, and continue to use, the Olympic Games for a variety of
nationalistic reasons, including such things as the promotion of nationalistic ideology, marking a
new stage in nation-building, expressing particular national (multinational) complexities. All host
nations seek to use the Olympic Games to promote their nationalistic ideology and this is an
underlying and pervasive theme of most occurrences of Games events since their recreation in the
modern period. In 1896, at the first of the modern Olympic Games, the Greek nationalist hosts
tried to get the Olympic event based permanently in Athens, on the model of the permanent siting
of the ancient Olympic Games in Olympia. However, the IOC had already decided that the event
should rotate between nations (even between continents), and they successfully resisted this
pressure. In 2004 Greece once again hosted the Games. Although the event was in many respects
a success at the time, there is no doubt that the real costs and opportunity costs involved in both
the preparation and long-term impact of the event imposed heavy economic and political burdens
on the Greek state and society. Given their 2004 experience, Greeks might be relieved that their
forebears failed to win the argument back in 1896.

Nations may also use the Games to mark a new stage in their development involving a new
national identity and image. There are a number of examples of this sort of use. They include
Spain's use in 1992 of the Olympics in Barcelona and also the Expo in Seville, to mark a new
post-Franco and new-EU-member status (Spa et al. 1995; Harvey 1996; Hargreaves 2000). They
also include Australia's use of the 2000 Sydney Olympics to attempt to mark a new phase in its
national narrative in its decision to use the opening ceremony to symbolize its commitment to the
challenging idea/l of multicultural nationhood (although the connection of this cultural gesture
with the reality of its policies towards its native peoples and also to its subsequent immigration
policy is perhaps open to question). In terms of nation-building and modernization (including in
the sense of „Westernization‟) some of the main examples of Olympic events marking this in the
post-war period have been staged by East Asian countries, namely Japan (Tokyo 1964) and South
Korea (Seoul 1988). China seems to be preparing to use the 2008 Beijing Games in the same sort
of way.

Given the practically unavoidable interconnection of the Games with the nationalism of the host
state it is rare that more complex messages are conveyed, for instance in terms of the sub-

390
nationalism of stateless nations incorporated within multinational states. However, in the games
of Montreal (1976) and Barcelona (1992) attempts were made to use the events to express the
Quebec and Catalan sub-nationalist identities of the host cities alongside of the Canadian and
Spanish national identities of the host nations. On equally rare occasions the organization and
ritual of Games events can be disrupted by largely unrelated political movements interested in
using the events' extensive media coverage to bring particular political issues to the attention of
the international public. The main illustrations of this are the case of the „Black Power‟ protest by
American athletes at a medal ceremony in the Mexico City Olympics 1968 and the bloody
intervention by a Palestinian nationalist group in the 1972 Munich Olympics, which involved the
taking of Israeli athletes as hostages and ended tragically with the killing of both the hostages and
7
the hostage-takers. These examples indicate both the general usability of the Olympic mega-
event for host nations' nationalist purposes, but also the relative openness of the events as „texts‟
in relation to particular political „readings‟, interpretations and interventions.

The Olympics and super-nationalism from the inter-war period

Super-nationalism refers to the neo-imperial strategies of nation-states which aspire to being

hegemonic in relation to other nations either in a world-region or world-wide. The main forms of
super-nationalism which concern us here in the early and mid-twentieth-century development of
the Olympic Games are those evidenced in Nazi Germany and the USSR (e.g. Roche 2000: ch. 4
and 2001a respectively). These forms of super-nationalism were both causes and effects of the
two „world wars‟. These two periods of mass slaughter and destruction in the supposedly
„progressive‟ and „advanced‟ civilization of Europe left impacts on the mega-events of the period,
both positive and negative. Super-nationalism influenced these public cultural events
substantively by attempting to use them and take them over for propaganda purposes and also by
providing them with models of address to mass publics. They influenced these public cultural
events negatively by providing processes and arenas for the expression of political and cultural
conflict. They might be said to have influenced them positively by making the pursuit and
achievement of peaceful international communication through cultural events a matter of historic
consequence for the future of modernity and of enduring concern and interest, both for elites and
for mass publics (see the „internationalism‟ theme below).

The super-nationalist theme and its association with the Olympic Games event was most clearly
and floridly developed in the neo-imperialism of inter-war totalitarianism, on the one hand that of

391
Stalinist Russia (neo-imperial in relation to the numerous other „soviet republics‟ which made up
the „union‟ in the 1930s and the Eastern European communist states in much of the post-war
period), and on the other hand Fascist countries, particularly Nazi Germany in the 1930s
(explicitly committed to aggressively expansionist neo-imperialism). The growth of twentieth-
century super-nationalist politics in general involved an address to mass publics, the use and
promotion of the charismatic, emotionality and aestheticization in politics and culture, involving a
heavy emphasis on symbols and myths, and on the cultural forms of mass collective rituals,
theatre and festival. The dramatic theatricalization and ritualization of politics and of events in the
super-nationalist period both had a direct impact on, and also provided a model for, the
development of the sport movement in general and the Olympics in particular. Mass sport
spectacles came of age in this period in the West, in fascist Europe and also in the Olympic-like
„Spartakiads‟ of the USSR.

Olympic symbols and rituals were developed and institutionalized in both the pre-1914 and also
the inter-war periods. The Olympic movement was directly influenced by inter-war super-
nationalism and by the threat that the latter posed to its independence and integrity as an
international cultural movement and institution. Olympism was influenced to invest much further
than it had previously done in creating a distinctive and identifiable set of ideals, symbols and
rituals. These needed to be trans-national as well as inter-national, not least in order to act as a
counterweight to super-national influences. The alternative was to risk being taken over, used and
abused by super-nationalist powers and their versions of nationalism and internationalism. This
risk undoubtedly threatened the Olympic movement in the 1930s in relation to Nazi Germany.

Evidently the Olympics could be used to promote „super-nationalist‟ ideologies; and this has been
a feature not only of the mature modernity period, but it also runs through into the late modernity
period. As we have indicated, in terms of „super-nationalism‟ and the regime ideologies promoted
by aspirant or de facto „super-power‟ nations, probably the most notorious Olympic Games in this
respect was the 1936 „Nazi‟ Olympics in Berlin. However, other post-war examples in the history
of the Olympics Games, particularly the games of Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984, indicate
that the super-nationalist theme continued to permeate the movement and its events until at least
the end of the Cold War. The two „Cold War‟ Olympics blatantly promoted the world-views and
ideologies of Soviet Communism and American liberal capitalism respectively, and in response
to this each event also generated international political debate and was the target of international
boycott campaigns.

392
The Olympics and internationalism in the twentieth century

The Olympic movement and its mega-events, from de Coubertin onwards, are strongly associated
with the normative principles of liberal internationalism. Throughout the twentieth century, and in
spite of the periodic vulnerability of the Olympic movement to political ideologies and to
problems of corruption, they provided publicly engaging spectacles in which these principles
have been and continue to be expressed, symbolized and dramatized (Roche 2000: ch. 7, 2002a;
Barney et al. 2002). In the 1970s the IOC and the Olympic movement played a leading role in the
sport boycott movement which helped to isolate and delegitimize the racist „apartheid‟ regime in
South Africa (e.g. Hill 1996: ch. 10). More recently the IOC has become a visible cultural actor in
the field of international governance and politics through its association with the United Nations
organization. It has attempted to associate the movement with the promotion of universalistic
human rights and also it has promoted development in underdeveloped nations by means of a
sport aid programme.

Less credibly it has attempted to promote peace in the international arena by means of the concept
of an „Olympic Truce‟. This draws from the 1000-year tradition in the ancient Games of safe
passage for athletes from all city-states and nations in the Hellenic world to compete in the
Games. Since the 1990s the IOC has influenced the United Nations to accept and declare
Olympic truces in the cycle of Olympic Games. However, apart from a brief ceasefire in the siege
of Sarajevo in 1992 this process has not yet been notably successful. Perhaps a more tangible way
to conceive of the Olympic movement's internationalism and its use in symbolizing peace
between nations is its record in relation to the world wars of the twentieth century. It might be
argued that the Games' capacity to symbolically mark postwar reconstruction after the two World
Wars has been among their more substantial internationalist achievements.

Beyond the formal peace treaties which concluded the World Wars, Olympic Games events not
only marked but began to celebrate peace, reconstruction and a return to humanity and normality
in national affairs and international relations. In relation to World War I the 1920 Antwerp Games
enabled nations to gather in what had been „the killing fields‟ of Flanders in a spirit of peace and
cultural community. The 1948 London Olympics performed the same sort of function in relation
to World War II in a city still marked at the time by the destruction of the „blitz‟. Post-war
reconstruction in relation to both World Wars was a long-term process for European nation-states.
In relation to World War I it is possible to see the Olympics of Paris in 1924 and Amsterdam in

393
1928 as continuing the work of Antwerp and as having something of this character. Comparably,
in relation to World War II it is possible to see the Olympics of Helsinki in 1952 and Rome in
1960 (not to mention also the Brussels Expo of 1958) in this light. Beyond Europe something
similar could be said about the Olympics of Melbourne in 1956 and even possibly also of Tokyo
in 1964 and Munich in 1972. Also, as long aftermaths of the Korean War, the fact that South
Korea staged an Olympics in 1988, and that North and South Korea made a decision to march
together at the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics (2000), can be noted in this context. At
the time the latter action was regarded, at the very least, as a notable diplomatic gesture and
movement towards a possible future of peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula.

MEGA-EVENTS AND NATIONS IN LATE MODERNITY

The same set of nationalistic and nation-state reasons that drove states' interests in staging mega-
events in general and the Olympics in particular in the period of „mature modernity‟ continue to
do so in the contemporary „late modern period‟. States have traditionally used mega-events to add
to their national status and identity, and also to their national narratives, for both internal and
international publics. Evidently, however, these national interests in the contemporary period are
played out against a changed and changing international context, in terms of their geopolitical
situation, their stage of economic development and the available technologies and resources. This
changed context includes decisive and irreversible shifts towards „post-industrial‟ national
economies based on services and new information and communications technologies in the
context of an integrating and globalizing international economy. The potential role and
significance of sport mega-events in particular for nations in this period have, if anything,
increased.

On the one hand international mega-events and their organizations, in particular the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) and the international soccer governing body, FIFA, have been
significantly empowered as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) vis-à-vis
nation-states in the contemporary international and global cultural system, such as it is. This is
because of their ability to organize synergies between, and derive significant income streams
from, such key developments characteristic of late modernity as the advent and cultural
dominance of global satellite television, of mass international tourism and of globally distributed,
marketed and branded consumer commodities together with the jungle of multinational
companies organizing their circulation.

394
On the other hand, the most significant political developments in this period have increased the
interest of nations in symbolizing themselves both to their own national publics and also in the
eyes of the community of nations and global publics. These developments include the fall of
communism and also the rise of world regions as international political arenas (whether for
aspirant continental federations following the model of the European Union or for aspirant
superpowers such as initially Japan, and subsequently China). Each of these processes has
stimulated the renewal of national identities, nationalism and nation-state formation, in various
ways, even though in one case this is a product of the disintegration of a transnational system and
in the other a product of the progressive integration of such a system. The fall of communism in
the early 1990s inaugurated a new and ongoing wave of nationalist ideologies and nation-building
from the disintegration of the former USSR and its sphere of influence. In addition, the EU
integration process has also generated renewals of nationalism among its member states. Thus
both of these political developments in late modernity have stimulated an interest in symbolizing
and communicating messages about national images and identities in general, and nations'
interests in using mega-events to do so in particular.

In summary then, in „late modernity‟, the era of„globalization‟, such factors such as the rise of
global television and consumer culture, the fall of communism and the growth of world regional
multinational economic agreements, provide stimuli and opportunities not only for a maintenance
but also for an increase in nation-states' interests in staging mega-events over the course of the
period. The rise of global television is particularly important in offering host nations real, albeit
transient, „live‟ access to substantial proportions of the planet's populations in most of the planet's
nations. For instance, the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Games was watched by an
estimated 3.5 billion people world-wide. These events provide some rare substance to the idea of
„the global village‟, and it is understandable that contemporary nation-states are interested in
8
gaining the status and opportunities offered by hosting them.

In late modernity there has been a notable increase in cities and their sponsoring nations entering
the cycle of global competitions to stage such international sport mega-events as the Summer and
Winter Olympic Games and the World Cup football championship. This has occurred particularly
since the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984. This event showed that sport mega-events could
generate large revenues from the sale of television rights and from commercial sponsorship. Thus,
at least in principle, they might even make surpluses, or at least they might not need large public
subsidies. In practice, the enthusiasm of states to host these events is indicated by the fact that

395
they have continued to provide large subsidies and expenditures for mega-events. These finances
have been particularly to provide such less visible but absolutely necessary elements of mega-
events as up-to-date urban transport and communications infrastructures capable of managing the
unprecedented inflows of international visitors and the outflows of televisual images such events
unavoidably generate. The interest of states in mega-events in late modernity can be seen
particularly in the fact that many leading nations can be said to have pursued multiple mega-event
strategies. The extent of this contemporary phenomenon can now be indicated, and the intensity
of nations' commitments to these strategies can be illustrated in the case of the new South Africa.

Nations and „multiple mega-event‟ strategies in late modernity

At the beginning of this chapter the longevity and continued importance of the main mega-event
genres in national and international culture in the modern period in general were noted. This is
clear in the contemporary late modern period, from the mid-1970s to the present, which has seen
the impact of global medi-atization on mega-events, a shift from expo to sport events, and within
the dominant sport events a near equalization of status and role between the Olympics and World
Cup football events. Among both the advanced Western nations and also among developing and
newly industrialized nations and their leading cities there has continued to be a strong interest in
aiming to stage international popular cultural mega-events, often (and preferably) more than one
such event to extend and maximize their positive impacts. These can be seen as effectively
constituting long-term national multiple mega-event strategies, and as giving a new status and
profile to culture as a vehicle and tool in the repertoire of contemporary nation-states' domestic
public policies and their foreign and diplomatic policies.

The range of nations which can be said to have pursued multiple mega-event strategies in recent
decades includes most of the major nations in the North American, European and East Asian
world regions. European nations have had an advantage in terms of staging mega-events since the
late nineteenth century, since the major event genres were invented in Europe, Europe remains
the leading world region for soccer, is an important location for international sport governing
bodies, and is one of the leading world regions for most of the Olympic sports. Most of the major
European nations have either staged a number of mega-events in the late modern period, or have
bid to do so, and this can be briefly illustrated in the case of Spain. Spanish cultural policy has
been distinctly marked by the staging of mega-events in the contemporary period. Spain hosted
the 1982 FIFA World Cup, the 1992 Summer Olympics (Barcelona), the 1992 Expo (Seville) and

396
Madrid put in a bid to host the 2012 Olympics (subsequently awarded to London). The 1992
events were used to mark the nation's historic emergence from Francoist authoritarianism and
also its entry into the European Union. Mega-events and multiple event strategies are perceived to
be just as relevant, arguably even more so, for new and developing nation-states in the
contemporary period, and this can be illustrated in the case of post-apartheid South Africa.

New South Africa has sought to build its national identity - both its internal solidarity and
national consciousness, and also its external image and standing in the eyes of the international
community - through the staging of international sport mega-events and through national
achievements in the global culture of world sport. No doubt factors such as South Africa's status
as both an African continental nation and also as a relatively poor and developing nation have
added to the unusual commitment and persistence the governing African National Congress party
has brought to the mega-event strand of its nation-building strategy. In 1995, soon after the defeat
of the apartheid regime, it staged the Rugby Union World Cup and in addition managed to win it.
In 1996 it staged the African Nations soccer cup and managed to win this also. In the 1994–97
period the South African government encouraged Cape Town's ultimately unsuccessful campaign
to win the right to stage the 2004 Olympics. In the period 1996-2000 it similarly backed the
national football association's campaign to stage the 2006 FIFA World Cup football
championship, with the same negative result. In the meantime it also campaigned successfully for
and staged the 1999 All-Africa athletics event and the 2003 Cricket World Cup. In this period
also it was finally successful with FIFA and won the right to host the 2010 World Cup. For good
or ill this consequential achievement will, no doubt, increasingly dominate the public expenditure
plans of the national government and the public discourse of South African politics as the event
deadline inexorably approaches over the coming few years.

CONCLUSION

In each of the main stages in the development of modernity outlined in this chapter factors have
pushed states to take an interest in mega-events. The emergence of multiple event strategies in
many states in the contemporary period testifies to the fact that these push factors, and nations'
willingness to respond to them, if anything, seem to have increased over time. Overall it might be
suggested that national governments' generally positive interests in responding to the pressures to
bid for and to stage international mega-events in the contemporary period are connected with
their assumptions about the predictability of the mass popularity of these events, both

397
internationally and domestically. This predictable mass popularity no doubt is in part a product of
the varied competences of the ideologists and „imagineers‟, the organizers, communicators and
participants who produce the spectacle of the events. Thus to a certain extent it continues to
remain open to attempted use and abuse by nation-states for reasons of national interest in the
pursuit of ideological and hegemonic projects of various kinds. Aspects of the 2008 Beijing
Olympics in China are likely to be interesting from this perspective.

This chapter has reviewed the changing nature and role of mega-events and their relevance for
nations from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, using the concepts and rough
periodization of „mature modernity‟ and its two main stages, together with „late modernity‟, as a
framework. Mega-events and their associated organizations and movements have been shown to
be relatively fragile and vulnerable to influences. Nevertheless, the main mega-event genres have
retained a significant position over the long term in international culture, international cultural
politics and also in the cultures of the succession of host nations. Mega-events can be seen to
offer the promise of concrete, if transient, versions and visions of symbolic, participatory and
celebratory national and international community. In an era in which nations mourn the „loss of
community‟ and governments powerlessly observe the alienation of citizenries from national
politics, this promise is likely to continue to be hard for nation-states to ignore.

NOTES

1 On the Sydney Olympics see Sinclair and Wilson (eds, 2000); on the London Millennium Expo
see Edensor (2002) and Jones (2003) on France's World Cup see Dauncey and Hare (1999); on
the Japan/Korea World Cup see Horne and Manzenreiter (2002).

2 On the history, development and politico-cultural role of expos see studies by Roche (2000
passim; also 1999, 2001a, 2003a), Rydell (1984, 1993), Rydell and Gwinn (eds) (1994) and
Greenhalgh (1988). For studies of particular expos both historical and contemporary see Ley and
Olds (1988), Pred (1991), Harvey (1996), Spillman (1997) and Hendry (2000). For alternative
views on the influence of an „exhibitionary complex‟ in late nineteenth-century Britain which its
expos can be claimed to attest to see Bennett (1988) and Roche (1999).

3 On the general relationship between public cultural events and national culture see Connerton
(1989), Jarman (1997), Spillman (1997), Smith (1998), Handelman (1998), Roche (2001a) and

398
Jones (2003). On relationships between the event-rich popular culture of sport and national
culture and identity see Roche (1998, 1998 (ed.), 2006); Smith and Porter (2004). On the
Olympic mega-event genre and the development of national and international publics see
MacAloon (1981, 1984), Hill (1996), Senn (1999), Roche (2000: ch. 3, 4 and Part 2 passim,
2001b, 2002a,b, 2003b).

4 On the mainstream sociology of nationalism, see Gellner (1983,1997), Smith (1998) and
Hobsbawm (1990,1992).

5 On the history of nation-states and nationalism, and also of„modernity‟, historians who
emphasize the role of the medieval period in general include Abu-Lughod (1989), Hastings
(1997), Geary (2002) and Le Goff (2005). Historical sociologists who emphasize the „early
modern‟ (c. sixteenth-century) origins of capitalist modernity and the nation-state include,
classically, Max Weber (1970 [1904–51]), and more recently Wallerstein (1974), Mann (1988),
Tilly (1992) and Smith (2004); also see Kennedy (1988).

6 For positive discussion and applications of „postmodern‟ perspectives to popular culture and
expos see Featherstone (1991) and Harvey (1996) respectively. For a general and critical
appraisal of „post-modernism‟ see Harvey (1989). For alternative versions of„late modernity‟ see
Castells (1996) (on „network society‟) and Held et al. (1999) (on late modern society as subject to
„global transformations‟). On the meaning and uses of the globalization interpretation of late
modernity for sport and the Olympics see Maguire (1999) and Roche (2002a, 2002b, 2003b).

7 For histories of national and international politics in relation to the Olympic Games see Hill
(1996) and Senn (1999); also Houlihan (1994). For accounts of the politics of recent particular
Olympics see Larson and Park (1993) on Seoul 1988, and Hargreaves (2000) on Barcelona 1992,
Sinclair and Wilson (2000) on Sydney 2000. On the national and international cultural and
collective identity implications of the marriage between television and sport see Maguire (1999:
ch. 7), Boyle and Haynes (2000), Rowe (2004), Roche (2000: ch. 6, 2005) and Roche and
Harrison (1992); on the televising of the Olympics as a global media event providing an
international platform for nations and their images see Larson and Park (1993), Spa et al. (1995)
and Roche (2002b, 2003b).

399
8 Nations that can be argued to have pursued multiple mega-event strategies in the contemporary
period include the following in three world regions: (a) North America: USA: 1984 Summer
Olympics (Los Angeles), 1994 FIFA World Cup, 1996 Summer Olympics (Atlanta), 2002 Winter
Olympics (Salt Lake City); Canada: 1976 Summer Olympics (Montreal), 1988 Winter Olympics
(Calgary), and (forthcoming) Winter Olympics in Whistler 2010. (b) Europe: Italy: 1990 FIFA
World Cup and (forthcoming) 2006 Winter Olympics (Turin); France 1992 Winter Olympics
(Albertville), 1998 FIFA World Cup, and the unsuccessful bid for the 2012 Olympics. West
Germany: 1972 Summer Olympics (Munich) and the 1974 FIFA World Cup; re-unified Germany:
2000 Expo (Hanover), and also the forthcoming 2006 FIFA World Cup; Portugal: Expo in Lisbon
in 1998 and the UEFA European Nations soccer championships in 2004. (c) East Asia: South
Korea: Olympics in Seoul in 1988 and, (with Japan), the ELFA World Cup in 2002. China:
(forthcoming) the Summer Olympics (Beijing) in 2008 and an Expo (Shanghai) in 2010.

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Berezin, Mabel. "Xenophobia and the New Nationalisms." Pp. 273-284

Xenophobia is the fear of difference embodied in persons or groups. Transgression is constitutive

of xenophobia. Xenophobia transcends time and space - history and culture. Territoriality and
territory, a bounded physical space with rules and norms of access, is the procrustean political
bed upon which xenophobia operates (Berezin 2003: 4–14).

Since the late eighteenth century, the modern nation-state has been the locus of modern
territoriality and fertile terrain for outbreaks of xenophobia. The social science literature on the
formation of national states and national welfare systems is voluminous. Scholars agree to some
degree on the following summary points. Whereas war-making defined the political and territorial
boundaries of the state, citizenship and nationality laws defined the cultural boundaries of the
nation. Citizenship and nationality laws articulate strangeness by establishing the rules of
membership (Brubaker 1992). 1

When politics and society were local, social welfare, as well as government, was local and
strangers were not an issue (Somers 1993). Walzer, in Spheres of Justice (1983: 38), argues that
localism, by necessity, closed the doors to outsiders. The larger territorial scale of the national
state opens doors and makes hospitality in the form of social welfare a normative and political
issue. Members of the modern nation-state must ask themselves whether the state should provide
social welfare only for those who are citizens, or to provide to all in need as Christian charity
demands. Walzer's later work, On Toleration (1997), further develops the point that he began in
Spheres of Justice. He argues that toleration is not simply an attitude expressed towards
individuals who are different but something that is built into the structure of diverse forms of
political arrangements from nation-states to empires.

Episodes of xenophobia may occur anywhere on the globe. Since the mid-1980s, xenophobia has
become a salient feature of political reality and discourse in the former Western Europe. Acts of
violence and vandalism against Jews and first and second generation immigrants from Africa and
the Middle East coupled with the rise of ultra-nationalist populist parties suggest that
contemporary Europe is intolerant at best and racist at worst.

403
To meet the growing threat of xenophobia, the Council of Europe established the European Union
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) in June 1997 as a research and
prevention organization (Council of Europe, 1997). In addition to monitoring anti-semitic
activities in Europe, the EUMC has recently turned its attention to hate speech on the Internet
(EUMC 2004). Continuing acts of violence and intolerance are clearly a cause for concern. Ethnic,
racial and religious violence generates popular and social science assumptions that require
exploration and elaboration. Prominent among these assumptions is the claim that xenophobia is
directly responsible for the resurgence of nationalism in contemporary Europe.

This chapter uncouples neo-nationalism from xenophobia. Taking Europe as its principal location,
this chapter first discusses xenophobia as a social category and a historical phenomenon. It then
proceeds to discuss the relationship between xenophobia and immigration in contemporary
Europe. It then explores two facets of contemporary nationalism: first, ultra-nationalism as
embodied in the electoral successes of right-wing political parties and second, the reassertion of
nationhood in European nation-states confronted by both immigration and European integration.

XENOPHOBIA AS A SOCIAL FORM

Difference is constitutive of modernity. When social life was local, strangeness was not part of
the environment. In pre-industrial societies, strangers were strange in the sense that they were odd,
not usual. The pre-industrial vocabulary of difference focused on uniqueness. As society became
more modern, more industrial, more differentiated, strangeness and the stranger became a
customary social phenomenon as well as a political problem. The categories, industrial, pre-
industrial as well as global and postmodern, are ideal types that point to composite features of
social reality at various historical conjunctures. As composites they have utility for describing
social aggregates. Empirical reality is more variegated. Pre-industrial social structures may
coexist with modern forms of social and political structures within contemporary societies.

Social philosopher Georg Simmel (1971 [1908]), in his classic essay The Stranger, points out that
there were no strangers when social and political life was purely local. According to Simmel, the
merchant trader, a social product of the development of markets, is the first „stranger‟ who comes
into a territory and forces the locals to define themselves. The locals must decide how they differ
from the stranger and whether or not they should allow the stranger to live on their territory. In
short, they must deal with the issue of trust in the face of difference. Simmel points to the

404
European Jew as the classic social archetype of the stranger. European Jews were typically
traders who owned no land and had no stake in the community. Their control of money and credit
permitted the Jews to engage in financial markets and to profit off the established economic
positions within society.

Strangeness demands the need for incorporation and definition of the social and political space.
But, as Simmel points out, the condition of being a stranger involves a paradox. Groups perceive
strangers in their midst as both „near and far at the same time ' (Simmel 1971 [1908]: 148).
Simmel argues:

Between these two factors of nearness and distance, however, a peculiar tension arises, since the
consciousness of having only the absolutely general in common has exactly the effect of putting a
special emphasis on that which is not common. For a stranger to the country the city, the race …
what is stressed is again nothing individual, but alien origin, a quality which he has or could
have in common with many other strangers. For this reason strangers are not really perceived as
individuals, but as strangers of a certain type. Their remoteness is no less general than their
nearness. (p. 148)

The Jews in Frankfurt serve as Simmel's illustrative example of this point. The city of Frankfurt
taxed the Jews as a religious group and always at the same rate simply because they were
different, whereas other members of the Frankfurt community were taxed on their income and
properties. The Frankfurt Jews were taxed as part of a social category and in the end paid more
taxes - so they were members of the community and exploited by the community.

Gotman, in Le Sens de l'hospitalité (2001), a theoretical treatise on, and a social history of,
hospitality, takes up the issue of the stranger and the relationship between welcoming and owing
responsibility to the stranger. France's recent amendment to its immigration law, the Debre law of
1997, is among the empirical cases upon which she draws. The French left dubbed the Debre law
the „law of inhospitality‟. The law established that no one could host a foreign national unless
they provided temporary lodging documents for them. Gotman points out that while the French
right viewed strangers as outsiders who are to be kept outside, the left took the position that
strangeness is a universal condition. According to the French left, the phrase „we are all
immigrants‟ best approximates the human condition (Gotman 2001: 37-45).

405
XENOPHOBIA AS A HISTORICAL PHENOMENON: FROM THE DREYFUS AFFAIR
TO WORLD WAR II

The term xenophobia came into the vernacular in 1901 in France with the publication of Anatole
France's novel Monsieur Bergeret à Paris (Wicker 2001). Xenophobia was listed in the French
Nouveau Larousse illustre for the first time in 1906. The Dreyfus affair fueled the development of
the term. Anti-semitism and the Nazi genocide of the Jews are paradigmatic in discussions of race
hatred and xenophobia in Europe. Naimark (2001) underscores this point in his comparative
historical study of genocide and ethnic cleansing by demonstrating that the Jews were the first but
not the unique victims of organized hate. Despite the now acknowledged horrors of the Nazi
Holocaust, anti-semitism is never far from the surface of European political discourse, as when
Jean Marie Le Pen, leader of the French National Front, said the „gas chambers were merely a
detail of the history of the second world war‟. 2

Hannah Arendt's essay on anti-semitism (1973 [1951]) in the Origins of Totalitarianism

underscores the importance of insider versus outsider status - a theme that recurs frequently in
discussions of xenophobia. She emphasizes the connection between statelessness and the
vulnerability of the Jewish people. The Jews, without a national territory to claim as their own,
were constantly the victims of discrimination and persecution. Arendt makes the point that the
Jews were allowed to be in the territory but not of the territory in European nation-states in the
nineteenth century. Their positions as traders made them useful to the development of European
capitalism and some strata of European Jews acquired great wealth. In the twentieth century
capitalism and finance became intimately connected with the state because private assets were
insufficient to ensure its continued wealth. At that point, the Jews became politically and socially
vulnerable - with only money, they were perfect victims. Believing that they could survive as
outsiders, European Jews had confused monetary power with social and political power.

Brustein (2003) provides empirical elaboration of anti-semitism in Europe in the period before
the Holocaust. In Roots of Hate, Brustein conducts an exhaustive study of newspapers in Great
Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Romania to document either anti-semitic acts or remarks
unfavorable to Jews. He argues that anti-semitism is a special type of xenophobia because it
contains elements of political and economic prejudice as well as racial stereotyping. There was a
prevailing view that Jews were either political leftists and hence socially destabilizing or
excessively rich. A surprising finding is that when he examined newspaper accounts of gypsies,

406
Roma, for the same period, he found that they suffered from more negative reporting than the
Jews. Despite popular and, to some extent, scholarly perceptions, the Jews were not the only
objects of racism in inter-war Europe. Schor (1985) demonstrates that France was not particularly
welcoming to the Armenians, Poles and Italians who flocked into the country between 1919 and
1939.

XENOPHOBIA AND IMMIGRATION: THE POST-WAR PERIOD

There is a tendency to speak of racism and xenophobia as though they were the same
phenomenon. Taguieff (2001: 43-67) draws the important distinction between racism of
extermination and racism of exclusion. Contemporary xenophobia and accompanying acts of
violence in the former Western Europe reflect a desire to exclude and control the stranger, not to
exterminate him. Frederickson (2002), in his history of racism, elegantly argues that
contemporary racism is about the slow pain of exclusion and denial of resources rather than
outright murder. Acts of anti-semitism in the early 1980s arguably began the current wave of
xenophobia. In August 1982, six people were killed and 26 wounded in an attack on a Jewish
restaurant on the rue des Rosiers in the Jewish quarter in Paris. Much of the contemporary
European discussion of xenophobia centers on Muslim immigrants. In an unfortunate reversal,
Muslims are now beginning to attack Jews as they blame them for the current crisis in the Middle
East. A recent New York Times article cites one Jewish youth living in an Arab Muslim
neighborhood saying, „You have to carry an umbrella to protect yourself from the stones that fly‟.
3

While Europe has always been a country of movement, the characteristics of immigration
dramatically changed in the 1980s (Moch 2003 [1992]: 177-97 and Massey et al. 1998: 108-33
provide an overview). In the period between the two world wars, parts of Europe were political
asylums. In the post World War II period, there were a variety of migrants. In the late 1940s and
1950s, refugees and guest workers dominated the body of immigrants - as well as colonials
migrating to the mother country. In the 1980s, in contrast, people began to migrate in large
numbers for work and without the guest worker arrangements that characterized the 1950s and
1960s. The origin of the new migrants varied by nation-state. In Germany and France, Turks
dominated (Kastoryano 2002). They were foreign in two senses: first, they were foreign with
respect to country of origin, and second they were foreign with respect to religion. The new
immigrants were predominantly Muslim in nominally Christian Europe.

407
Structural differences in the forms of immigration coupled with the religious „otherness‟ of the
migrants fueled a mixture of xenophobia and racism that became apparent as early as the first
years of the 1990s in Europe. Beginning in the early 1980s in France and followed in the early
1990s in Germany there was a stunning series of events that constituted violence against Muslim
immigrants. German social scientists were able to document 276 acts of anti-semitic and extreme
right violence in Germany between 1989 and 1994 (Erb and Kurthen 1997). A recent study of
right-wing violence in Germany (Koopmans and Olzak 2004) reported that acts of xenophobic
violence were correlated with public discourse about „problems‟ with immigrants, particularly
asylum seekers, and not with the number of immigrants or the unemployment rates in a site of
violence. The study found a steady state of violence directed against immigrants to Germany in
the years between 1990 and 1999. However, violence peaked in the years of 1991 and 1992 when
asylum seekers were on the public agenda.

In the fall of 1983, after a series of Muslim youths were killed in incidents with police in the
housing projects on the outskirts of Paris, SOS-Racisme, an association to prevent racism,
constituted itself in response. Throughout the 1980s, the group organized demonstrations against
racism. In June 1985, SOS-Racisme mobilized 300,000 people for a rock concert in the Place de
la Concorde in Paris. They spread their motto, „Don‟t touch my buddy', on a badge that they
distributed widely in Paris (Veugelers and Lamont 1991: 143-9). Despite the immediate
mobilization against racism in France, incidents have continued to occur. Prominent among these
incidents were the murder of a Muslim teenager in Marseilles and the killing of an immigrant
youth and the dumping of his body in the Seine (Ardagh 1999: 219-43; Birnbaum 2001 [1998]:
246-7). 4

Anthropologists have begun to turn their attention to sites of ethnic conflict and violence (Banton
1996; Hervik 2004; Holmes 2000). To date, journalists rather than social scientists have provided
more vivid narratives. In 1992, skinheads on the loose in northern German towns burned down an
immigrant Muslim apartment complex. Jane Kramer chronicled these events for the New Yorker
Magazine. Kramer's articles were later published in a volume on the Politics of Memory (1996).
She describes the life of a skinhead who is on probation for „sidewalk cracking‟, which is finding
Turkish immigrants, knocking them down and kicking them in the head. Kramer's subject is
marginally literate and employed and spends his spare time listening to Oi music and describing
the „chaos in the head‟ that he experiences. The Turkish immigrant in Kramer's narrative thinks
he has had a good day if he has not experienced any random acts of verbal abuse - despite the fact

408
that the grocery store, in which he had invested his hopes and dreams, was burned to the ground
by local skinheads.

Against this backdrop of dramatic events that captured the attention of the national and
international media, social scientists began to demarcate the boundaries of xenophobia in Europe.
French sociologist Michel Wieviorka (1992,1994) conducted a series of comparative studies of
racism and xenophobia in Europe. Wieviorka (1994: 9-25) argues that there are three crises that
face contemporary Europeans and immigration only partially fuels them. These crises are
structural, social and cultural. First, European labor markets are changing. Industrial jobs are
disappearing and with them the political influence and power of trade unions. A graphic symbol
of this change is a map of mobilization routes that appeared in the French left newspaper Le
Monde on May Day 2002. Record numbers of French citizens turned out to march against Jean
Marie Le Pen's second place in the first round of the Presidential elections. Le Pen's supporters
marched on their traditional route to the Place de l'Opera; the mass of protesters marched through
central Paris. The CFTC, a French trade union, chose to march between the two other groups on a
much less central route symbolically underscoring the marginality of organized labor in
contemporary French politics. 5

The second crisis is social. De-industrialization signaled the breakdown of the post-war European
social settlement in which labor and business supported some version of a national welfare state.
This breakdown, coupled with increasing unemployment rates (France has some of the highest
rates in Europe), has led to ghettofication and hopelessness among the urban working class. The
housing projects outside of Paris, the banlieue, are cauldrons of class and racial conflict, as the hit
French film L'Haine (Hate) depicts. According to Wieviorka's analysis, there is a paradox within
the European welfare state. The public functions of the post-war state lead to inadvertent „positive
discrimination‟ because that state was designed to draw boundaries between insiders and
outsiders. The European state heavily regulates and subsidizes many public functions that the
United States leaves to the market sphere. The third crisis is cultural. Immigrants seem to pose a
crisis of national identities. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that long-term secular
forces such as European integration and globalization are the source of these identity crises - and
not the presence of immigrants.

American social science turned its attention to xenophobia in Europe as it was in the process of
emerging. Pettigrew (1998) relied on Eurobarometer data coupled with a review of secondary

409
literature to examine prejudice towards minorities in contemporary Europe. Using theory
informed by social psychology, he developed an index of what he describes as „subtle prejudice‟
and „blatant prejudice‟. Pettigrew reviewed polling data on attitudes towards the extension of
citizenship rights to immigrants and the deportation of illegal foreign nationals. He found that the
more „blatant‟ your level of prejudice, the less likely you were to favor extension of rights to
immigrants and the more elastic rights were with respect to legality the less likely you were to be
willing to grant them.

Quillian (1995) focused on the evolution of prejudice in contemporary Europe and used
Eurobarometer survey data to document that it is the perception of the threat (that is, of the out-
group) to the group (that is, the in-group), not the absolute number of out-group members (that is,
immigrants in a country) that accounts for prejudice and xenophobia in a country. This accounts
for his finding that the perceived threat is higher in Ireland and Belgium, countries that are not
particularly noted for their immigrant populations.

Given Quillian's logic, we would expect xenophobia to be strongest in ethnically cohesive

societies. The emergence of ethnic conflict in the Scandinavian countries supports his findings
(Hervik 2004). Sweden provides a provocative example. Sweden has not had a war since 1814
and has a generous welfare state with an egalitarian vision. It also has had until recently an open
immigration policy. Swedish citizenship initiation policies include language training and other
mechanisms of social and cultural integration.

What is often overlooked in discussions of Sweden is that the renowned welfare state was about
generosity among people who were ethnically and culturally the same. The Swedes have a history
of being concerned about purifying the race that is often overlooked in discussions of social
democracy. Alva Myrdal argued in Nation and Family, published in English in 1940, for a state
population policy that weeded out undesirables (Spektorowski 2004). Given this history,
anthropologist Alan Pred, in his study of racism entitled Even in Sweden (2000), should not
express the surprise that his title suggests. The curious feature of Swedish openness to immigrants
is that Sweden, a large, cold and dark country in the winter, with most of its population in the
south and the big cities, makes them re-locate to the rural and frozen, less-populated North.

THE EUROPEAN RIGHT AND THE NEW NATIONALISM

410
As recently as 1988, when the journal West European Politics published a theme issue on „Right
Wing Extremism in Western Europe‟, contributors appeared to dredge up the past rather than
describe an emerging phenomenon. For example, the article on Italy (Caciagli 1988) analyzed the
MSI, the right-wing party with direct links to the Italian Fascist party. By 1994, this party was
disbanded and Gianfranco Fini founded the National Alliance. While immigrants were on the
radar screen of contributors to this volume, European integration as a driving force in European
politics was conspicuously absent - even four years before Maastricht. In his introduction to the
volume, Von Beyme (1988: 5) identifies acts of anti-semitism as a measure of right-wing
tendencies.

The political science literature, as well as the popular press, routinely attribute the resurgence of
ultra-nationalism in the established nation-states of Europe to xenophobia. The electoral success
of right-wing political parties in European nation-states (for a summary description of these
parties see Hossay 2002) is one empirical indicator of the new nationalism. In the past ten years,
political parties that analysts had viewed as fringe have become part intermittently of legally
constituted national governing coalitions. In March 1994, Gianfranco Fini's „post-fascist‟
National Alliance became part of the Italian government. In March 1998, Jean Marie Le Pen's
National Front swept the French regional elections and in April 2002 Le Pen came in second in
the first round of the French presidential election; in 2000, Jorg Haider's Freedom Party became
part of the Austrian government. In addition, fringe parties have threatened to achieve significant
parliamentary seats in Switzerland, Belgium and Denmark. In 1994, right-wing populist parties
appeared to be fissures in their national political landscape. From the vantage point of 2004, they
appear more as fixtures on the political scene.

Jean Marie Le Pen's National Front in France was the first neo-nationalist party to breakthrough
electorally, in 1983 in the city of Dreux (Schain 1987; Mitra 1988). Since that election, the
National Front has served as the benchmark in discussion of the new right. The relation between
xenophobia and immigration policy has dominated studies of the European right (for example,
Schain 1996; Lafont 2001; Karapin 2002). Increased numbers of immigrants in the former
Western Europe presents a social problem; there is no necessary reason why xenophobia has to be
the response. Whether the emergence of the right is a cause or effect of xenophobic reactions to
immigrants is empirically under-specified in the literature. From the early emergence of the right
in France, analysts have been puzzled by the fact that the right is often strong in areas in which
there are no immigrants (Schain et al. 2002: 11-12).

411
 6
The literature on the right in Europe is voluminous and growing exponentially. In addition to
immigration, social scientists have examined the logic of party coalitions and changes in the class
structure of post-industrial society to structure explanations of the rise of the right (Betz 1994;
Ignazi 1994; Kitschelt 1995). Among these studies, Kitschelt's (1995) political economy model of
right-wing success argues that the new occupational structure of post-industrial society has
pushed traditional left/right parties towards an undifferentiated center and left an ideological void
that „extremists‟ fill. The social science literature in the main has not gone far beyond the initial
focus on immigration despite the fact that immigration has been considerably fixed for at least ten
years in Europe (Withol de Wenden 2004) and there was never a strong correlation between
absolute numbers of immigrants in a given locale and support for the National Front. in the years
since 1983 and its initial breakthrough in Dreux, the fortunes of the National Front have risen and
fallen and the issues that they have chosen to address have changed. By the early 1990s, the Front
appeared to be a nuisance and an embarrassment to French politics and society. In the regional
elections of March 1998, the Front increased its presence to 15.27 per cent of the vote and held a
bargaining position in 19 of France's 22 regions. The Front's „victory‟ in 1998 stunned the French
political and intellectual establishment (Perrineau and Reynie 1999). In 1999, the National Front
split into two factions and suffered a defeat in the European Parliamentary elections.

The Front appeared to have lost political consequence in France. In April 2002, Jean Marie Le
Pen finished second in the first round of the French presidential election. Although this „victory‟
was due more to certain structural oddities in the French electoral system than to a genuine
increase of support for the National Front, Le Pen's second place did at least temporarily end the
political career of the Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (Mayer 2003). The Front failed to
achieve any major electoral gains in the regional elections of spring 2004. The trajectory of the
French National Front is typical of the fortunes of other right-wing parties. Haider has been in
and out of Austrian politics since spring 2000. Pim Fortuyn, the Dutch right-wing candidate, was
assassinated before he could see his party achieve a victory in the April 2002 elections (Bruff
2003).

Anti-immigrant sentiment in contemporary Italy is the analytic focus of Sniderman and his
collaborators in The Outsider (2000). These authors rely on their own primary data collected from
a carefully designed telephone survey of Italian households to support their conclusions. By
combining insights garnered from social psychology as well as macrosociol-ogy, The Outsider

412
provides the foundation for a generalizable and non-reductionist account of contemporary
European right-wing politics.

The Sniderman research team was interested in studying how race intensified prejudice. Despite a
recent trend to analyze prejudice as a function of a human propensity to categorize drawn from
the work of cognitive psychologist Henri Tajfel and others, Sniderman and his colleagues initially
reasoned that race would be the most salient dimension of prejudice. Drawing upon their
knowledge of the United States, they hypothesized that the color of a person's skin, that is,
darkness, would most likely make him or her the object of prejudice - even when tested cross-
culturally

Armed with this hypothesis, the researchers turned to Italy as the site of a „natural experiment‟.
Italy until just recently was a country of out-migration; and it had a legacy of internal prejudice -
north vs. south, which Italians viewed in color terms, that is, white vs. black. Prejudice articulated
in the color of one's skin was a long-standing cultural idiom in Italy - even if that prejudice was
directed against those who were nominally fellow Italians and by all modern classificatory
schema white. Within the past 15 years, Italy has become a country of immigration with a
corresponding increase in violent actions against immigrants and in anti-immigrant sentiment
mobilized by the political right. The contemporary wave of immigration to Italy divides into two
distinct groups - persons of color, mostly but not exclusively from sub-Saharan Africa, and „white‟
refugees from the turmoil of the former Eastern Europe.

As a terrain new to immigration but not to color prejudice, Italy was the ideal research venue to
develop an „integrated‟ account of why groups become prejudiced against other groups. The
results of their experiment surprised the researchers and forced them to re-think their analysis.
Contrary to the researchers' expectations, race did not seem to matter in the Italian case. Bluntly
put, Italians disliked Eastern Europeans more than blacks. The initial findings suggested prejudice
was more a perception than a fact of difference. How could they account for this?

To interpret results that were at first puzzling, Sniderman and his collaborators developed what
they label a „Two Flavors Model‟ of prejudice. The first „flavor‟ drew upon psychological
accounts of prejudice that were long out of favor in studies of race and ethnicity. These accounts
described prejudice as an individual response to difference generated by childhood socialization.
The focus on social psychology, Sniderman argued, needed to be refined, rather than abandoned.

413
This refinement required a „second flavor‟ with a more rational taste. Prejudice would reflect an
instrumental group struggle over scarce societal resources, that is, we dislike immigrants because
they take our jobs. Both „flavors‟ rely on categorization - who is like us and who is not - but with
an important caveat. At any given historical moment there is more or less difference and more or
less scarcity in a society. The task before the researchers was to identify the social mechanism
that triggered the propensity not only to view others as different but also to actively dislike them
because of that difference. Identifying this mechanism would permit the researchers to develop a
theory of prejudice that blended both flavors - the social psychological and the instrumental.

The „Right Shock model‟ that incorporated politics in the study of prejudice was the result. The
authors argue that differences of race, ethnicity, nationality, or whatever are always more or less
present in a modern society. It is only under certain circumstances that the propensity to
categorize others as different in negative ways emerges. Exogenous shocks to the social,
economic and political system such as recessions or, as in the case of Italy in 1994, the collapse
of the political party system, transform difference from a social fact to a social exacerbation. This
transformation of the social weight of difference has the potential (as it has done in contemporary
Europe) to contribute to the parliamentary success of right-wing parties that mobilize around it.

The „Right Shock‟ model suggests a purely structural analysis. However, Sniderman's data allow
more subtle and novel analyses. Due to the research team's interest in the „two flavors‟ model,
they constructed an „authority‟ variable - that measured individual level commitment to discipline,
stability and order. The data showed that ordinary constituents of the left and right parties may
espouse different ideological positions but they share a common commitment to authority. When
exogenous threats to the system occur, most people, independently of the ideological labels they
espouse, are likely to retreat to „authority‟, or more colloquially put, pleas for law and order. The
political party that exploits that commitment, whether left or right, is likely to garner electoral
support. This analysis suggests that the tendency to categorize others as different, as agents of
disorder, is likely to increase, not decrease, in a contemporary Europe that is awash with
exogenous shocks - the least of which is immigration.

REAFFIRMING NATIONHOOD

The variable fortunes of right-wing parties within European nation-states suggest that social
scientists should look to long-term political developments and macro-structural change when

414
trying to account for xenophobia and neo-nationalism in established nation-states. Much of what
falls under the label of nationalism in discussions of xenophobia and ultra-nationalism is what
students of nationalism have labeled ethnic nationalism - the notion of a community of memory
based on primordial ties. 7 The legacies of the nation-building activities of the nineteenth century
in Western Europe suggest that ethnic nationalism, particularly in France and Northern Europe,
does not resonate with the political community. Nationhood, the basis of civic nationalism, does
have resonating cultural, political and moral claims. 8

Much of the empirical evidence suggests that at the core of extremist politics is a reaffirmation of
nationhood in the face of a range of external threats to the nation-state. For example, De Master
and Le Ro (2000) demonstrated a positive relation between xenophobia and level of support for
European integration within individual member states. Low support for continuing integration
correlates with high feelings of xenophobia. This finding suggests: first, that immigration may
pose a stronger threat than immigrants to European citizens; and second, that untangling the
mechanisms through which xenophobia and European integration interact is a worthwhile
enterprise. Recent empirical work on Europe and national identities suggests the reaffirmation of
national identities among groups that are not particularly right-wing: for example, Lamont's (2000)
interviews with native and immigrant French working-class men which revealed that they framed
their identities in terms of nationness and in a manner that was not particularly xenophobic. Both
groups looked to Republicanism as a political practice and ideal that made the French nation-state
a just society for all. If immigrants became French, then they became part of the normal body of
the nation and were not a security threat. Diez-Medrano (2003) studied how ordinary Europeans
conceive of Europe and how those conceptions influence their support for accelerating European
integration. Diez-Medrano deployed an arsenal of qualitative and quantitative data in his study.
His overriding conclusion was that citizens' relation to their own national histories and identities
was a strong predictor of how they would feel about increasing the pace of European integration.

The trajectory of political events suggests that the reaffirmation of nationhood, not ultra-
nationalism, is on the rise. The aftermath of Le Pen's successes in France, as with his his
ideological compatriots in other nation-states, has been a shift towards a conservative nationness.
Sniderman et al.'s (2000) data support this position, as does Chirac's overriding victory in April
2002. Electoral politics, however, is not the only terrain on which this new nationness is affirming
itself. Religion is emerging as the new area of contestation

415
In the realm of nationness. in the process of nation-state building, every European country came
to institutional terms with the issue of religion (Marx 2003). While complicated and the result of
long-term political processes, adjudicating the issue of religion was less fraught when
Protestantism or Catholicism were the only candidates for official status. The recent influx of
immigrants from Islamic countries to Europe, coupled with their requirements to build mosques
and engage in religious practices, have once more made official religion an issue.

The recent ruling in France on the wearing of the headscarf by young Muslim women in public
school is an example of this reaffirmation. The headscarf affair first emerged in France in 1989
when two young women were expelled from school for wearing the veil. France is committed to
laicité, the ideological position legalized in a 1905 law that requires that church and state be
strictly separated. In 1989, after much public debate from all sides of the political spectrum, the
issue was basically left unresolved and the young girls were allowed to return to school and wear
their headscarves if they wished. 9

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the war in Iraq and the presence of a more radicalized Muslim
community in France, the headscarf became an issue once more. This time, the French
government convened an official commission, and in December 2003, the commission delivered
its report. The Stassi commission suggested that a law be passed that would ban the wearing of
religious symbols in all state institutions (that is, schools, military). The logic of the decision was
that laicité was the cornerstone of French Republicanism, which defined the French nation.
Chirac accepted the commission's recommendations and in February 2004 the French parliament
passed the law with an overwhelming majority.

The forgoing analysis of xenophobia as both a formal category and historical entity suggests that
it is a volatile political and social phenomenon. It tends to emerge as a response to challenges to
territorially bounded geographical space. In the modern nation-state, immigration has posed one
such challenge but arguably so has the accelerated process of European integration. The paradox
of xenophobia might lie in the fact that while ultra-nationalism and a closing of borders may be
the first response, the second and more pragmatic response is an affirmation of nationhood and an
accommodation to the stranger. Affirmation and accommodation are occurring in France and
arguably in the rest of Europe. Affirmation and accommodation underlie historical cycles of
xenophobia and the cultural and political processes by which strangers become familiar.

416
NOTES

I wish to acknowledge the careful reading and helpful suggestions of Gerard Delanty, Krishan
Kumar and Riva Kastoryano and the research assistance of Anna Karwowska.

1 Hansen and Weil (2001: 1–23) summarize the development of nationality law in Europe.

2 Birnbaum (1993) provides the best history of racism in France.

3 Elaine Sciolino, „Attacks by Arabs on Jews in France Revive Old Fears', New York Times, 3
December 2003.

4 Bleich (2003) documents state response to race in Britain and France.

5 „Un des plus grands defiles parisiens depuis la Liberation‟, Le Monde, 2 May 2002.

6 Eatwell (2003) summarizes the state of the art.

7 Suny (2001) provides a compelling account of primordialism.

8 Calhoun (1997: 6) provides an account of these distinctions.

9 There is a large scholarly discussion of the first head scarf affair. For succinct summaries in
English, see Berriss (1990), Feldblum (1999) and Benhabib (2002).

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Triandafyllidou, Anna. "Nations, Migrants and Transnational Identifications: An Interactive
Approach to Nationalism." Pp. 285-94

This chapter proposes an interactive approach for the study of nations and nationalism. In this
approach, attention is paid to the development, consolidation or transformation of national
identity through interaction with Others. Nations are formed through a double process of internal
identification, based on pre-existing cultural, political, historical and territorial features that bind
a collectivity together, and of external definition that is activated through interaction with
outsiders.

The notion of Significant Others is introduced as a useful analytical tool for studying real or
„imagined‟ interaction between the nation and Others. While the notion of a Significant Other
may apply to different groups, both internal and external to the national community, this chapter
concentrates on the role that immigrant groups as a particular type of Significant Other play in the
formation and development of national identity and nationalism. The relationship between the
national in-group and a given immigrant out-group is influenced by their historical links and
present situation. It is my contention that immigrant Others are characterized by their subordinate
1
position in the host society, constructed and reproduced through the use of racial, ethnic,
cultural or religious markers. In the following section, I shall discuss how the use of these
different types of markers and, in particular, the discourse of racialization and that of cultural
difference, are functional to the consolidation of the national majority identity.

The relationship between Self and Significant Other is an interactive one. Not only is the host
nation influenced by immigrants as threatening Significant Others, the national identity of the
immigrant community is developed and transformed through its interaction - both real and
symbolic - with its mother-nation and also with the national majority in the country of settlement.
Immigrant communities have a positive relationship with their „mother-nation‟. Their relationship
with the national majority in the receiving country is, by contrast, ambivalent. The third section of
this chapter discusses the ways in which interaction and ties between the immigrant minority and
the country of origin, on one hand, and the immigrant minority and the host nation, on the other,
shape the national identity of the immigrant group. In this context, I also question the validity of
classical approaches to national identity, that overlook the complex, dynamic and multifaceted
nature of national identities today, especially in multinational and multi-ethnic contexts.

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NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A JANUS-FACED PROCESS

Nationalist activists as well as scholars of nationalism tend to consider national identity as an

absolute entity, constructed from within by reference to a set of common characteristics that
members of the nation have in common. In my view, this is only part of the picture (see also
Triandafyllidou 2001, 2002). National identity expresses a feeling of belonging that has a relative
value: it expresses a bond with fellow nationals by contrast to the feelings that members of the
nation have towards foreigners. Fellow nationals are not simply very close or close enough to one
another, they are closer to one another than they are to outsiders. in this relational approach,
national identity is conceived as a double-edged relationship. On one hand, it is inward looking, it
involves a certain degree of commonality within the group. It is thus based on a set of common
features that bind the members of the nation together. These features include a historic territory,
shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs (Smith
2002: 15) but also often a common economy and common rights and duties for all members of
the nation (Smith 1991: 14). On the other hand, national identity implies difference. It involves
both self-awareness of the group but also awareness of Others from whom the nation seeks to
differentiate itself.

The interaction between nations and their Others can best be analysed through the notion of the
Significant Other (Triandafyllidou 2001). The history of nations is marked by the presence of
Significant Others; other groups that have influenced the development of a nation by means of
their inspiring or threatening presence. The notion of a Significant Other refers to another nation
or ethnic group that is usually territorially close to, or indeed within, the national community.
Significant Others are characterized by their peculiar relationship to the in-group: they represent
what the in-group is not. They condition the national in-group, either because they are a source of
inspiration for it, an example to follow for achieving national grandeur, or because they threaten
(or are perceived to threaten) its presumed ethnic or cultural purity and/or its independence. A
nation may develop its own identity features in ways that differentiate it and distance it from a
specific Significant Other or it may seek to adopt some characteristics of an inspiring Other that
are highly valued by the in-group too.

Throughout the history of a nation more than one nation or ethnic group become salient out-
groups, namely Significant Others, and even at any one time more than one group may be
identified, against which the nation seeks to assert itself and which in turn influences its identity.

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A Significant Other need not be a stronger or larger nation or a community with more resources
than the in-group. The feature that makes some other group a Significant Other is its close
relationship with the nation's sense of identity and uniqueness. Social psychological research has
shown that a given group will engage in comparisons only with relevant out-groups. According to
Tajfel and Turner (1979: 41), factors such as similarity, proximity and situational salience may
influence the comparability between two groups and the higher the comparability the greater will
be the pressure for confirming in-group superiority through comparison with that particular out-
group. In fact, dissimilar out-groups are already distinctive from the in-group, hence there is little
need to differentiate from them. In contrast, those that share a set of common features with the in-
group pose a threat to its distinctiveness and uniqueness (Johnston and Hewstone 1990: 188-9).
Thus, Significant Others are by definition groups that share with the nation some common
features, be they cultural, ethnic or territorial.

Because of their close relationship with the nation, Significant Others pose a challenge to it. This
challenge may be of a positive and peaceful nature, when the out-group is perceived as an object
of admiration and esteem, an exemplary case to be imitated, a higher ground to be reached by the
nation, in brief, an inspiring Significant Other. This challenge, however, may also take the
character of a threat; the Significant Other may be seen as an enemy to fight against, an out-group
to be destroyed, if necessary, an Other that represents all that the nation rejects and despises: a
threatening Significant Other.

IMMIGRANTS AS OTHERS

In this chapter, I am particularly interested in the case of immigrant communities that are
perceived by the receiving nation as Significant Others. Indeed, the different language, religion or
customs of immigrant populations are sometimes seen by the receiving societies as threatening to
the latter's presumed cultural and/or ethnic purity. The national majority is then likely to engage
in a process of reaffirmation of its identity, seeking to redefine it so as to differentiate itself from
the newcomers.

There is virtually no record of an immigrant population that is perceived by the host nation as an
inspiring Significant Other. The negative and threatening representation of the immigrant seems
to be an intrinsic feature of the host-immigrant relationship, deriving, among other things, from
the fact that the immigrant's presence defies the social and political order of the nation. Of course,

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other factors play a role in the development of xenophobic or racist attitudes towards immigrant
minorities, including race, religion, lack of communication between the two groups, the poverty
of immigrants and their marginal position within the host society.

Othering the immigrant is functional to the development of national identity and to achieving or
enhancing national cohesion. The immigrant is a potential threatening Other because s/he crosses
the national boundaries, thus challenging the in-group identification with a specific culture,
territory or ethnic origin as well as the overall categorization of people into nationals and Others.
In other words, the immigrant poses a challenge to the in-group's presumed unity and authenticity,
which it threatens to „contaminate‟.

Immigration by definition requires that members of one nation or nation-state emigrate to a host
country of which they are not nationals. As Sayad (1991) argues, the phenomenon of emigration-
immigration involves an absence-presence that is against the national order: the immigrant is
absent from the country of which s/he is a national, while s/he is present in a different country, to
which s/he does not belong. In a world organized into nations and national states, this absence
from the country of origin and presence in a foreign one lead to the exclusion of the immigrant
from either society.

The relationship between the immigrant and the host nation and, more particularly, the
immigrant's transformation from a potential to an actual threatening Other are related to the
preservation of the host nation's identity and/or to its overcoming a period of crisis. A thorough
understanding of the immigrant's role as a Significant Other involves the study of this double
dynamic: on the one hand, the immigrant as a contradiction within the national order and, on the
other, the functions that the Othering of the immigrant have for the in-group and the host society.

Immigrants and Nations in Europe today

In the post-1989 period, when the traditional post-war alliances between „East‟ and „West‟,
„Capitalism‟ and „Socialism‟ have been reorganized and the geo-political boundaries of Europe
re-shuffled, immigrant - and in particular Muslim - populations have become new Others by
contrast to whom the identity and cohesion of European nations are reinforced. This tendency has
become particularly strong after the events of 9 September 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Of course not all host societies have reacted in the same way but there is a common dynamic

423
in many countries. Most European states conceive of themselves as national states, where the
state is the political expression of the dominant nation. This idea implies a static view of culture
and ethnic descent: these are seen as homogeneous and unique. Their presumed purity and
authenticity has to be protected from the intrusions of foreigners. Thus, pluralism is accepted only
(and not always) to the extent that a nation or ethnic minority is a constitutive element of the
country, namely made part of the state from its very moment of creation and is in some way
integrated into the national narrative. Even in those cases, of course, the potential for conflict
between the dominant nation and minorities is high. A plurality of identities and cultures is not
easily accommodated within national states.

In some countries immigrant communities are integrated into the national history, and the cultural,
territorial, civic and genealogical links between these populations and the nation are officially
recognized. Thus, as happens in France and the UK, the links between the „mother-country‟ and
its former colonies are deemed to justify, under certain conditions, the conferral of citizenship on
people of immigrant origin. Nonetheless, often the status of citizenship does not suffice to
guarantee the social integration of these people. In fact, it is not unusual for individuals of
immigrant origin, who have acquired by birth or residence the citizenship of the „host‟ country, to
continue to be discriminated against in practice. Discriminatory behaviour or practices are related
to race, namely skin complexion and phenotypic characteristics, culture or a combination of these.
Even where having access to the status of permanent resident or, indeed, with the citizenship of
that country constitutes a major step towards immigrant integration, a study of the process of
Othering the immigrant must pay particular attention to more subtle mechanisms of
discrimination and in-group-out-group construction.

Not all immigrants are perceived as Significant Others and, in particular, as threatening
Significant Others. With regard to the European Union, for instance, citizens of fellow member
states are endowed with the same rights and duties as the host country nationals, because they are
citizens of the Union. Moreover, these people do not generally suffer from discrimination in the
social sphere. Similarly, North Americans and citizens from other industrialized countries may be
foreigners in Europe but do not form part of the negative stereotype usually associated with
immigration. In other words, the process of Othering the immigrant is activated towards specific
groups.

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 2
The common feature that characterizes such out-groups is their subordinate position in society
and the existence of ethnic, cultural, religious or racial markers that distinguish them from the
dominant group. Such markers are not the reason for which these groups are perceived as
threatening out-groups. On the contrary, difference is context-bound: in one case, religious
markers may be prevalent (for instance, anti-Muslim sentiment in the UK), while in another
situation ethnic categorization may be emphasized (for example, prejudice against Albanians in
Greece). Often also the two categorizations are intertwined, enhancing or mitigating the
difference effect. Hence, Bulgarians or Russian immigrants in Greece, who are Christian
Orthodox, are seen as less threatening than Muslim Albanians or Turkish Muslims. On the other
hand, Muslims in Britain may be perceived as threatening Others because of their religious
beliefs, but discrimination against them was until recently recognized only if it referred to race or
ethnicity (Modood 2005).

The Othering of specific immigrant groups serves the interests and identity of the dominant
nation. Immigrants become the negative Other in contrast to whom a positive in-group identity is
constructed and/or reinforced. Moreover, they provide for flexible and disenfranchised labour in
an increasingly globalized post-industrial economy. Their construction as Significant threatening
Others legitimizes their social and political exclusion from the host society.

Race and cultural difference

There are two types of discourse that characterize the process of constructing the threatening
immigrant Other. On the one hand, there is an overtly biologizing, racist language, which,
although condemned by the social and political norms of Western societies, is often involved in
the process of excluding, socially and politically, the immigrant communities from the host
country. On the other hand, discriminatory practices are supported by a cultural differentialist
discourse, according to which there are irreducible differences between certain cultures that
prevent the integration of specific immigrant populations into the host society (van Dijk 1997).

The relationship between power or privilege and racism or cultural prejudice has been explored
from different perspectives - economic, sociological, linguistic and ideological - by a large
number of researchers. It has been shown that racial or ethnic prejudice and discriminatory
discourse or behaviour are related to the power structure of society and serve to maintain the
privilege of one group over another (Essed 1991; Riggins 1997; van Dijk 1993; Wellman 1993

425
[1997]). Exploring further this line of inquiry, however, goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
My interest is to explore the features of race or culture that make them suitable as markers for
differentiating and subordinating the immigrant out-group.

The notion of race includes a variety of features such as parental lineage, phenotype (skin colour,
stature and genetic traits) as well as the combination of physical attributes with cultural
characteristics. Racism is not necessarily linked to ethnicity or nationalism. As Silverman
observes (1991: 74), in nineteenth-century England and France the concept of race referred to
social difference: the poor were distinguished from the aristocratic „race‟. What is common to the
various definitions of the concept is that it is associated with natural difference: it implies shared
characteristics, be they phenotypic, cultural or other, that cannot be chosen or shed (Manzo 1996:
19). This does not mean that racial difference is indeed natural but rather that it has been socially
constructed as such. It is perceived as irreducible and, hence, threatening for the nation and/or
nation-state.

Clearly, one should not equate a socio-political situation that allows for the perpetuation of latent
racism with one in which the perpetration of racist behaviour, the organization of racist
movements and the acceptance of institutionalized racism are integrated into the system. This,
however, does not mean that „subtle‟ or „symbolic‟ racism (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986) is
harmless. It still treats difference as permanent because it is natural, and inherently negative, or
threatening, a problem to be solved.

The discourse of cultural difference has some similarity with that of biological racism because it
links culture to nature. Cultural difference is seen as irreducible, because it is dependent upon
ethnic descent, a presumed psychological predisposition, environmental factors or a specific
genetic make-up. Thus, Others are constructed as alien, unfamiliar and less developed. In fact,
nationalism brings with it the seed of discrimination against minorities. The notion of„authenticity‟
of the national culture, language or traditions, intrinsic to civic and not only ethnic nationalism,
implies that cultural difference is undesirable. The underlying idea is that „someone else‟s roots
are growing in the national/ethnic soil, distorting the particular form of human nature that ought
to be sprouting there' (Manzo 1996: 23). Hence, the national order has to be restored by means of
excluding the Other both physically and symbolically from Our society.

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It has been argued that the effects of culturalist or differentialist discourses differ little from
biological racism: they are racist even if their arguments are not explicitly racial (Anthias and
Yuval-Davis 1992: 12-13). Of course, cultural difference provides scope for fluidity and change
in social patterns and allegiances: members of minority groups may make conscious decisions to
abandon some but hold on to other attributes of the minority culture, as they see it. Or, minority
groups may themselves strive to maintain cultural distinctiveness alongside full social and
political integration. Race, in contrast, cuts across a population without the possibility of
nuancing or changing one's skin colour. Nonetheless, Silverman (1991:79-80) points out that the
two types of discourse are conceptually and historically interrelated. The key to understanding the
importance of race and culture and their role in the relationship between the nation and the
immigrant is the fact that they can both be defined as transcendental notions, linked to nature
rather than nurture and, hence, irreducible. They, thus, justify the Othering of the immigrant in
moral and identity terms and allow for the process of creating a threatening Significant Other in
contrast to which the nation asserts and delineates its identity. Moreover, these naturalizing and
moralizing arguments legitimize the status quo and the distribution of power within the national
state.

IMMIGRANTS AND TRANSNATIONAL IDENTIFICATIONS

The approach I have presented concentrates on national majority identity. In the previous sections
I have concentrated on the construction of the immigrant Other and on the ways in which the
immigrant Other contributes to the demarcation of the boundaries and the strengthening of the in-
group identity. In this section, I would like to discuss how the national identity of immigrant
minorities is transformed through their interaction with the receiving society.

Immigrant communities usually have close symbolic and material ties with their „mother nations‟.
Diaspora nationalism theories not only emphasize the importance of these ties for ethnic and
national identity in both the homeland and among the diaspora population, but also see the
relationship between the immigrant community and the receiving country's majority as one of
limited integration, if not alienation. The immigrant community and the host society are
conceived as separate entities forced to live together mainly for economic reasons. They are both
assumed to be longing for national and cultural „authenticity‟ and „purity‟ that could be achieved
only through the return of the minority to the home country.

427
Although links between the country of origin and the diaspora community are important in
explaining migration phenomena (Vertovec 2003) and processes of ethnic segregation and/or
alienation between immigrant populations and receiving societies, they fall short of explaining
the identity transformation among second- and third-generation migrants. A large part of the
diaspora nationalism literature takes its point of reference in the post-war migration flows which
were related to the Fordist system of production. These theories, however, fail to account for the
new features of migratory flows within Europe and globally. Today's immigrants often move
without proper travel and identity documents, are employed in the tertiary sector, frequently
without proper work status, or welfare contributions. They may move back and forth between the
sending and receiving country or may have multiple destinations. Moreover, their motivations
may be economic but not solely. They often experience migration as a life project that contributes
to their overall personal development (Jordan and Vogel 1997; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2003,
2004; Romaniszyn 2003).

Diaspora nationalism approaches, with their focus on the diaspora-homeland relationship on the
one hand, and, on the other, on the presumed alienation (or lack of integration) of the minority
into the receiving country, tend to neglect the interaction between the immigrant group and the
host nation and the emerging transnational identities among immigrant minorities. Contemporary
migrations are characterized by complex relationships between hosts, migrants and their
communities of origin within which ethnic and cultural boundaries are negotiated and redefined.
It would be misleading to analyse such processes through the lens of national identities
understood as stable and cohesive. Recent studies have highlighted the dual nature of national
identity among immigrant diasporas, its status of neither here nor there and its double point of
reference: in the country of settlement, usually experienced as actual „home‟, and the country of
origin, often imagined as „home‟ too but also as often experienced as an „alien‟ culture and place
(Christou 2006). Such ethnographic accounts of diasporic identity that highlight the complexity
of dual or multiple identifications reveal a different identity dynamic that transcends more
„classical‟ understandings of national identity and of the relationship between the nation and the
immigrant Other.

These transnational identity formations, largely the result of the interaction between a majority
national identity and several ethnic minority cultures all subscribing within a new context of
intensive communications and socio-economic globalization, are better analysed by
cosmopolitanism theories. The cosmopolitan approach pays more attention to the overall

428
processes of social transformation in the „late modern‟ period. It emphasizes the features of post-
industrial societies, such as highly improved communications across the globe, better, quicker
and cheaper means of long-distance transports, media that select and cover events worldwide, the
resulting compression of time and space: geographical distance becomes less important while
people in disparate parts of the world are constantly „connected‟ through new technologies. These
changes greatly enhance our global inter-connectedness (Held et al. 1999), not least that of
immigrants as they enable them to maintain frequent and intense ties and communication with
their countries of origin.

Theorists of late or post-modernity have argued that individuals can be seen as free floating
agents picking and choosing from different cultural repertoires the features that suit them best and
hence able to create their own very individualized identities. Even though many agree that
members of transnational networks and communities „need political stability, economic
prosperity and social well-being in their places of residence, just like anybody else‟ (Castles
2002), they argue that transmigrants living in a mobile world of culturally open societies adapt to
multiple social settings, develop cross-cultural competences and no longer have a sense of
primary national identity. Rather they negotiate choices with regard to their participation in the
place of settlement, in their homeland and in relation to their co-ethnics in either.

The cosmopolitan perspective is a useful tool in analysing how migrants adapt their national and
ethnic identity to the host society environment, negotiating multiple cultural and emotive
attachments and developing transnational identities. However, these approaches tend to neglect
the fact that the use of new technologies may also lead to polarization between global cultural
patterns - usually concentrating around issues of consumption (both material and cultural) and
youth cultures - and increasingly ethnicized behaviours developing in reaction to such global
cultural homogeneity within ethnic enclaves of inner city areas. New technologies may as well
enable the preservation of immigrant identities and cultures as closed containers with direct ties
between the country/region of origin and that of settlement.

One important question that is also open to investigation is the extent to which new technologies
have fostered new, qualitatively different, transnational attitudes and practices leading to the
development of hybrid cultures and multiple identifications that are personalized and fluid. Or
whether new technologies have simply intensified and widened the scope of phenomena that
existed before without making a qualitative dif ference. To put it simply, migrants have always

429
led transnational lives to the extent that they moved from their place of origin to the country of
settlement and to a lesser or greater degree maintained economic, cultural and emotive links with
both. Have the new technologies led to the development of cosmopolitan transnational attitudes
and practices or have they simply reinforced a neo-communitarian perspective in which
immigrant minority cultures are transposed into the country of settlement, while remaining
relatively isolated from both the host society context and from wider transnational cultural
currents?

There is a further facet to this which can work against cosmopolitan practices amongst migrants.
Second generations are sometimes ghettoized by the very policies and social attitudes in their
countries of settlement which thus prevent them from either assimilating or becoming
cosmopolitan: they are trapped in the external categorization attributed to them even if they
personally identify with different groups and views. I have analysed in the previous section the
exclusionary dynamics shaping the relationship between the national in-group and the immigrant
minority.

We should also not neglect the question of class. Not all migrants have equal access to new
technologies and cosmopolitan lives. Unavoidably migrants with greater average economic
resources, higher education and better social skills will have more access to the necessary
infrastructure, thus engaging more intensively with such transnational activities and networks. It
is likely that those less affluent and less skilled may, at the same time, remain attached to their
places of origin and to the „myth of return‟ (Bhachu 1995: 224; Portes et al. 1999: 222). This is
not to say that migrants become diasporic by definition, in that a singular national or ethnic
identity is retained, or replaced by a narrowly defined dual identification with two home countries.
This is rather a plea for caution when assuming that the availability of new technologies leads to
transnational identifications.

In my view, multiple identities are constructed out of a whole range of possibilities made
available by the cultural diversity in countries of origin as well as of settlement which - as was
shown above - cannot be retained within narrow conceptions of national identities and cultures. In
this sense, multicultural repertoires are a reality, and especially so in large city environments. But
the context in which migrants move very often includes kinship and ethnic networks which
continue to confirm the significance of national identity and „homeland‟ connections. Thus, rather
than assuming the transcendence of nations and nationalism as we have known them in the past

430
couple of centuries, we should investigate the new forms of national and transnational
identifications emerging today. In these, the power of individual agency in negotiating personal
identities, national culture and globalized economic realities is not to be neglected (Ong 1999).
National identity and nationalism still retain a strong command over people's sense of who they
are and to whom they are related. Moreover, nationalism is still an important factor in domestic
and international politics.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have proposed an interactive perspective from which to study nations and
nationalism. I have introduced the notion of Significant Others as a useful tool for the analysis of
the relationship between national majority in-groups and immigrant minority out-groups. I have
also analysed the ways in which migrants are functional to the development, transformation and
consolidation of national identity. However, in order to better understand contemporary
nationalism as well as contemporary migration realities, one needs also to consider the
transformation of national identity among migrant populations in relation to both their countries
of origin and the societies of settlement.

I have briefly reviewed here the diaspora nationalism and cosmopolitanism perspectives and the
ways in which they consider national identity among immigrant minorities. The former
concentrate on the strong identity, cultural, economic and political ties between the immigrant
community and the mother-nation. They assume that these ties tend to orient the immigrant
population more towards its country of origin and believed point of return once the migratory
project objectives are achieved. They therefore emphasize the interdependence between the
mother-nation and the immigrant minority - each is a positive Significant Other for the other - and
to a certain extent assume that the national identity of origin is maintained and even reinforced
within the immigrant communities. The latter, by contrast, emphasize fluidity and change. They
point to the multiple identifications experienced by second- and third-generation migrants and to
the globalization of cultural and economic flows. They thus consider the society of settlement as
the most important Significant Other for the immigrant population and emphasize the multi-
polarity of identities today.

In my view, it is important to use different perspectives in order to catch the complexity of

national identity dynamics and to account for their multifaceted nature in immigration societies in

431
particular. Diaspora nationalism and cosmopolitanism theories cast light on different faces of the
immigration phenomenon and the identity dynamics involved in it. Their diverging interpretations
differ in the priority and strength that they attribute to national identity and/or transnational
identifications. My interactive perspective seeks to abridge the different views by drawing
attention to the interactive nature of national identity and to the ways in which threatening and
inspiring Significant Others shape the development and transformation of the national in-group
identity. It would be misleading to consider national identity among immigrant diasporas as
shaped only by their ties with the sending nation. However, it would be equally wrong to consider
only the interaction between immigrant diasporas and their societies of settlement. I propose the
National Self-Immigrant Other dynamic as a key mechanism that lies behind national identity
transformation generally and suggest that in particular today globalization trends open the
possibility of more complex, diversified and individualized identity repertoires. Without
neglecting the presence of such repertoires, we should however remain cautious about their nature,
as socio-cultural (race or religion), economic (class) and demographic (age, gender) factors
condition the range of the repertoires that individuals can develop and organize national and
ethnic identities from within.

NOTES

1 The term „host‟ is used here in a euphemistic sense to distinguish the country of residence from
the country of origin. Often the so-called host society/country is often „their country‟ because
they were born and/or have lived there most of their lives.

2 For a broader discussion of the concept of race, recism and the racialization of boundaries
which informs my analysis here, see Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992), Chapter 1 in particular.

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Hutchinson, John. "Hot and Banal Nationalism: The Nationalization of „the Masses‟." Pp. 295-
306

This chapter examines nation-formation as a dynamic and potentially reversible process. Scholars
tend to view national-formation as a teleological development in which there is first a romantic
nationalism of intellectuals that gives way to the routinized „banal‟ identities of sovereign
national states as rival class, regional and religious formations are incorporated by political and
economic processes into solidary nations. In this view the national state was a late nineteenth-
century institution, constructed from above by the progressive integration of the masses into a
national society that is unitary and sovereign.

I shall reject such accounts as mythical. Throughout the modern period nations and national states
have been beset by class, regional and religious conflicts, and national states have never been
sovereign actors. Although nations have increasingly taken on a mass character in European
countries, national identities arise from civil society rather than state, co-exist with other
identities, and vary in salience between countries and over times. I suggest the co-formation of
two types of nationalism: a „hot‟ transformational movement produced by a sense of crisis and a
„banal nationalism‟ that people consume as part of giving meaning to the experiences of everyday
life. In seeking to explain fluctuations in the salience of national identities, I will identify
unpredictable factors such as warfare, famines and large-scale migrations of populations in
triggering movements from below for and against the nation and national state.

THE RISE OF THE MASS NATION

For many scholars a shift from elite to mass nationalisms derives from industrializing states
struggling for survival within a competitive inter-state system. The rise of the modern national
state was a consequence of ideological, administrative, economic and military transformations.

First, the secular Enlightenment legitimized politics rather than religion as the means of human
salvation. As a political consciousness spread, excluded social classes organized to demand
citizenship and thereby participate in the state. The extension of citizenship in its various forms,
civil, social and political, bound broader sections of the population to the state. Andreas Wimmer
(2002: ch. 3) argues that the provision of social welfare (social citizenship) nationalized the

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working classes, driving them to construct boundaries against foreign migrants who threatened to
dilute their new rights.

Secondly, the administrative reach of the state over its territory and population was intensified by
revolutions in communications that enabled regular censuses and surveys, improved monitoring,
taxing, policing and the provision of social welfare. As state and society became intermeshed so
the former required the psychological bond supplied by nationalism (Giddens 1985: 116-21). The
national state is, in Anthony Giddens's words, „a bounded power container‟.

Thirdly, the state was an enabler of industrial capitalism through its legal protection of property,
regulation of internal and external trade, supervision of the money supply, tax structures and later
macro-economic policies to facilitate „full employment‟. The rise of territorial currencies in
Europe, North America and Japan from the mid-nineteenth century, made possible by new
industrial techniques to produce standardized currencies (notes and coins) in mass quantities,
increased the capacity of states to create national collectives (Helleiner 2003: chs 3, 5). State
currencies and common interest rates harmonized populations into a single economic cycle
(Helleiner 2003: 11).

Finally, military revolutions encouraged the rise of large, efficient and homogeneous national
states able to maintain standing armies and mobilize their populations in defence of the territory.
Charles Tilly (1995: 196-7) argues that the European states, faced with intensified military
competition from their neighbours, needed to extract ever greater resources from reluctant
populations. This led to policies of circumscription (the control over contiguous and sharply
defined boundaries) and centralization as rulers substituted direct top-to-bottom government for
the indirect rule of tribute-bearing intermediaries, allying with the middle classes to develop a
national solidarity and promoting cultural homogenization through the educational system.

Most date the mass nation in Western Europe to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(Connor 1990; Hobsbawm 1990). Eugene Weber's Peasants into Frenchmen (1976) examines the
formation of the exemplary modern nation. Even in 1870 much of France was regional rather than
national in its consciousness, speaking local patois rather than French. A French nation formed
only after the humiliating defeat by the Prussian-led German Confederation, when the Third
Republic, from 1871 to 1914, instituted a secondary education that inculcated a patriotic
historical consciousness, military conscription and a network of communications connecting the

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regions to the centre and forming a territory-wide economy. The nation as mass phenomenon
came late, and for much of Europe formed during World War I, which mobilized the whole
population.

There are problems with these arguments. Statist pressures cannot explain by themselves why
populations come to identify with a given polity as a national state. During the period 1870-1914
nationalism among European minorities intensified against a state homogenization that was
perceived to be driven by the interests of dominant nationalities. Tilly admits that such pressures
produced not just state-led but state-seeking nationalisms of minorities. This highlights the
neglect of ethnicity as an active factor in the formation of mass national identities, particularly in
multi-ethnic states.

Ethnic considerations shaped state military recruitment policies. Conscription did not necessarily
mould populations into a common nationality, and was often viewed as a last resort by military
planners, who mobilized the most costly and least reliable last and released them first. Russian
Imperial armies in the nineteenth century tended to be drafted from Slavs in the west and only
rarely from Asia (Enloe 1980: 65). Conscription could result in national differentiation rather than
national state unity, when minorities would join up in the (false) expectation that their
participation in war would give them greater political rights. The rise of state-territorial currencies
and the bringing together of populations into a common economic space do not necessarily
establish social solidarities. Economic policies, as we shall see, have always impacted unevenly
on regions and where disparities are long term and are overlaid on ethnic differences, they can
excite nationalist resentments.

But what of the state-led nationalisms of the dominant nationalities? Here again, when we are
supposed to witness the formation of the solidary mass nation, we find many states subject to
intense resistance from anti-imperial, religious, regional and class interests.

The German national state, unified from above by war in 1871, was hobbled from the start by
Bismarck's attempt to use nationalism to preserve from social revolution an Imperial Prussian,
aristocratic and Lutheran ascendancy in a rapidly industrializing country. A cultural war
developed with the Catholic minority in the southern German states. A hostile Marxian social
democratic subculture formed amongst the German working class, unchecked by the combination
of government repression of socialist activities and the introduction of welfare policies (Roberts

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1967: 73, 203-7). In the French Third Republic the secular republican onslaught on the Church
and the Dreyfus affair pitched republicans against royalists, Catholics and the army. On the left,
anti-regime socialist ideologies took root among the urban working class, including the Second
International and Syndicalist movements. The nationalizing drive of republican centralists fanned
regionalist resistance in Alsace, Brittany, French Flanders, Provence and Languedoc (Gildea
1994:177-211).

If the idea of the unified mass nation is questionable, so too is that of the national state as
sovereign power container, capable of circumscribing its populations and militarily autonomous
against external foes. During the nineteenth century national states clearly lacked sovereignty
according to many benchmarks. National state formation coincided with the expansion of
transnational capitalism, and the permeability of state frontiers to the movement of goods, capital
and people in the period 1870-1914 was not surpassed until after World War II (Milward 1997:
11). There was a shrinking of agricultural sectors in many countries, a loss of self-sufficiency in
food production, and rural depopulation. The era of national states was marked by the largest
emigration in European history (of some 40 million people between 1851 and 1920) (Woodruff
1973: 700-1). In military affairs, accelerating great power competition forced into alliances
Britain and France and Imperial Russia, and Germany and the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

Although the European peoples rallied to the defence of the homeland at the outbreak of World
War I, all countries were bedevilled by social unrest, and hardship and impending defeat led to
the socialist November revolution of 1919 in Germany that overthrew the Kaiser. After the war
all participant states were haunted by fears that the social order would be swept away by an
international communist revolution inspired by the Bolshevik coup in 1917, fears intensified by
the Depression. in short, the rise of a unitary and sovereign national society during the period
1870-1919 is something of a myth.

NATIONALISM FROM BELOW

Yet, in spite of social divisions, national sentiment intensified during the nineteenth century in
many European countries. In the late nineteenth century an English cultural nationalism formed in
defence of the shire against a London cosmopolitanism and materialism. Conservatives found
there the country houses that bred the officers and gentry and yeomen who formed the core of the
Empire; liberals and radicals, the fount of ancient English democratic liberties; and socialists, like

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William Morris, a model for the future communitarian socialist ideal (Wiener 1981: 59-60). In the
German post-unification state a new wave of movements struggled to create a stronger emotional
bond with the nation, and, in some cases, nationalize the Imperial state. They included
Wandervogel, a pacific middle-class youth movement, and the Heimatschutz, whose goal was the
historical preservation of homelands, nature conservation, „life reform‟ and industrial design
against the pressures of commercial development (Koshar 1998: 20-64).

This suggests that state activism does not so much construct homogeneous national identities as
provoke countervailing romantic conceptions of community as a site of multiple diversities.
Nonetheless, these communitarian nationalist revivals were minority projects. What is interesting
is that national symbols and genres were eagerly consumed by an educated public so that they
pervaded public and domestic life. As a new secular urban civil society formed oriented to
consumption, so its public buildings, housing and leisure activities assumed a national character.

In England national emblems were of long standing. The greenwoods and their outlaws had long
been a defiant symbol of English liberties against Norman despotism, represented in the legend of
Robin Hood (Schama 1995: ch. 3). This national consciousness had broadened by the mid-
eighteenth century to a middle-class cult of native landscape, particularly the Lake District,
formed by guide books and better road communications, and was also expressed by the Gothic
revival. Gothic styles pervaded the public and private architecture of the Victorians, including the
rebuilt Houses of Parliament and Manchester Town Hall, shops and public houses. During the
late nineteenth century a broader revival of English vernacular styles inspired new middle-class
garden suburbs such as Bedford Park and Hampstead, and public housing estates in the 1930s
period reflected a medieval nostalgia (Wiener 1981: 29-66). Everything from suburban gardens to
domestic wallpaper was given an English vernacular character.

In Ireland the national revival of the early nineteenth century expanded the stock of national
symbols as the round tower, Celtic cross, Hiberno-Romanesque styles of architecture, the
illustrative manuscripts of the Book of Kells and historic monastic sites were added to the
traditional symbols of shamrock, harp and wolfhound. Several leading Irish nationalists were
topographical artists, and picturesque scenes in numerous guidebooks fed a tourist industry,
sustained by improvements in literacy and in communications (Sheehy 1980: ch. 5). Hiberno-
Romanesque styles were deployed from the 1840s by Protestant and Catholic churches as they
competed to claim succession from St Patrick. Round towers appeared on the facades of public

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houses. Furniture establishments produced artefacts for the drawing room and boudoir with Celtic
iconography, as did makers of porcelain and glass (Sheehy 1980: ch. 5).

In Germany too a national past was eagerly consumed by aspirant middle classes in the form of
tourism, photography, and post cards (Koshar 1998: 20-64). Among the cherished monuments
were medieval castles and churches and residential structures. After World War I, the sense of
loss generated new democratic rituals and organizations similar to those in Britain and France:
Germans saturated public buildings with crosses, plaques and insignia on church bells. Germans
journeyed not just to war graves, but also, in response to the extreme political instabilities,
travelled in unprecedented numbers to historic sites, especially in the Rhineland (Koshar 1998:
138-41).

If national myths and symbols were promoted by elites and used instrumentally by states, they
were also appropriated and consumed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by many
social groups. This suggests that there are two types of nationalism at work in national identity
formation. One is the „hot‟ didactic nationalism that instils the idea of the nation as a sacred and
transcendent object of worship and sacrifice. This emerges in waves as a project that is self-
conscious, systematic and prescriptive, providing exemplary forms of conduct in order to unify
all the components (of class, region, religion and gender) of the nation. Revivalists find allies
(and rivals) in political ideologues who use cultural nationalism to construct political
communities, demarcated from others by multiple boundaries. The other is the informal or „banal‟
nationalism of populations who „consume‟ nationalism in a relatively unself-conscious manner as
a guide to the conduct of everyday life as expressed in popular songs, political posters, stamps,
banknotes, coinage and brand names of staple products. This seems to be a continuous
phenomenon in the modern period.

This raises three issues. First, is a collective national consciousness a channeller or a product of
political mobilisation? Secondly, what are the factors that trigger these waves of nationalist
mobilisation? Thirdly, what is the relationship between „hot‟ and „banal‟ nationalism, and how is
the emergence of national civil society compatible with the persistence of religious, class and
regional identities?

PATTERNS OF MASS IDENTIFICATION WITH THE NATION

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How do we explain the rise of mass nations? One has to understand the appeal of nationalism as a
constructor of meaning that was able to trump attachments of family, class, region and religion.
National identities were not constructed from above but consumed from below by an emerging
civil society.

Underlying nationalism was a secular revolution that eroded hegemonic religious ideologies and
enabled nationalists to present the nation as the necessary base of an innovative modern culture.
State modernization and economic development engendered a crisis of identity as newly educated
middle and later working classes entered a society in transformation from rural to urban, religious
to secular, and oral to literate. Aspiring educated groups found in nationalism an integrative
vision of life that, combining a notion of human progress with a sense of rootedness, equipped
them to engage with a world in transformation and conflict. They attempted both to preserve links
with an ancient past (castles, medieval churches, village and city squares) being eroded by
modern development and also to invest with authenticity a novel public and private life by
pervading it with „ancient national symbols‟. A national repertoire was adopted across the
political and class spectrum as education and aspirations spread.

The capacity of national identities to suborn other loyalties depended on nationalists' capacity to
build on earlier ethno-cultural heritages that regulated identities of family, class and religion.
National identities also varied according to whether they were oriented towards or against the
culture and rituals of the state. In the case of England and France there was a strong identification
with the state and its long-established ethno-historical core that for centuries were targets of
aspiring individuals. Official England was based in the southern region of London (centre of the
royal court and Parliament), Canterbury (historic centre of the Church of England) and the
ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Paris and its hinterland of cathedral cities, such as
Reims, was still more important, from the thirteenth century dominating by virtue of its
administration, universities, law courts and later royal court that defined the language and culture
(Grillo 1989: ch. 8).

These centres were not unchallenged by the other regions. Nonetheless, London and Paris
prevailed because historically they were the foci of aspiring individuals, and in the modern period
their power increased as they became the centres of higher education, the mass media,
government bureaucracies, the professions and business. When new classes from the provinces
entered this environment, they were drawn to established symbols of identity. The new

440
metropolitan-dominated print culture of newspapers, novels and self-help literature of all kinds
can be seen as conduct manuals, instructing insecure individuals in national norms regulating
large areas of life, from proper speech, required reading, sense of dress, the taking of holidays or
leisure to national sites, sports and the organization of the suburban garden (see Mercer 1992).

Class incorporation into the nation was also shaped by ethnicity. The political and social struggles
of modernity were articulated and legitimized by reference to older idioms, in some cases local
and religious, but in others ethno-national. In France the struggle between the French bourgeoisie
and the nobility was expressed in ethnic terms as a battle between Gauls and Franks. In England
the drive for class power in the era of nationalism was articulated and legitimized through older
ethnic traditions. The campaign of non-conformist middle classes for representation was justified
by an Anglo-Saxonist Gallophobia focused on the national „betrayal‟ by a Gallic Whig
aristocracy at a time when the nation engaged in a long series of wars against France. Similarly,
radical journalists such as William Cobbett activated English workers into a separate class
consciousness, citing ideas of the rights of free-born Englishmen under the „ancient constitution‟
to demand parliamentary reform (Thompson 1968: ch. 4).

FLUCTUATING IDENTITIES

This might suggest that nation-formation is an evolutionary process, but nationalism as an

ideological movement is episodic, triggered by a periodic sense of crisis that the nation is in
danger. Under such circumstances, nationalists seek to expand (and sometimes totalize) the
sectors of life regulated by national norms as a means of redirecting all energies to the defence of
the collectivity and insulating it from pollution and destruction. These resurgences are triggered
by sudden threats to those primary goals identified by Smith, namely the autonomy, identity and
territorial integrity of the nation (Smith 1991: 74). The rise and subsidence cannot be charted in
linear terms because such threats are unpredictable. The nation is a process, and a nonlinear one,
that is reversible (Connor 1990).

An identification with the nation is separable from an orientation to the national state. Although
states are important protectors of nations in a world of competing states, they can be
denationalizing since, in the pursuit of economic and social efficiency, they adopt the successful
strategies of rival polities, intervening to restructure social institutions and exposing their
populations to transnational tastes and perspectives. As national identities become blurred with

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the interests of state, they lose the capacity to energize populations in practice of their daily life.
Economic success tends to make national ossification the norm. Mass nationalist mobilization
depends on a sense of crisis.

What then are relevant catalysts? We find a clue in the connection, observed above, between a
nationalization of emerging classes' foreign threat and a sense of betrayal by a class establishment.
Nations with or without states are regularly challenged by shifting military balances, new
technologies, religious movements and changes in demography and migration. In short, nations
are far from being autonomous and when these challenges cannot be managed, they have
stimulated a mass mobilization to nationalize the social world. The effects are not always one
way: national identities may be attenuated by these experiences or profoundly modified as a
consequence.

Warfare

Warfare has required a continuous redefinition of populations with respect to each other. An
ethnic nationalism has been stimulated by the invasion, overthrow and rise of states, the shifting
of states into new geopolitical spaces, the turning of dominant groups into national minorities and
vice versa, and large-scale transfers of population. Many scholars (Howard 1976; McNeill 1984;
Mann 1993; Tilly 1995) have examined how state mobilization produced pressures that led to the
extension of citizenship to formerly low status groups such as the working classes, women and
ethnic minorities. But citizenship by itself is not a gauge of national identities, since ethnic
minorities can use it to organize against the territorial state.

What is central is the relationship between warfare and the perception of the nation as a
community of sacrifice. George Mosse (1990) relates the rise of nationalism to the quasi-religious
cult of the fallen soldier from the time of the French Revolution, as celebrated in heroic poetry,
monuments, commemorative ceremonies and military cemeteries (see also Smith 2003: ch. 9).
This cult was linked to the idea of the soldier as „volunteer-citizen‟ rather than peasant conscript
and of a willed sacrifice for the nation. The resistance in German territories to Napoleon
mythologized by such (initially middle-class) cults was directed against the existing German state
structures.

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Arguably, such guerrilla wars of liberation rather than inter-state wars have been more
community-forming. These, although usually conducted by small minorities, are dependent on
grassroots social support, giving them a demotic character that results in a greater penetration of
nationalist sentiments - example being, the Vietnamese liberation struggle against the French and
the Irish war of independence against the British. Such memories deeply institutionalized in
popular culture are even more the possession of communities, out of reach of the state and
difficult to change.

This is not to discount the nationalizing effects of the statist wars in early nineteenth-century
Europe, the Franco-Prussian war and the twentieth-century's World Wars. Michael Howard (1976:
ch. 6) observes that by the time of the Franco-Prussian war national identifications were
undoubtedly heightened and extended by the scale of modern warfare and the rise of the mass
media that enabled the „home front‟ to know and identify more directly with the fate of the
fighting men. During the total wars of the twentieth century the whole population became in turn
the target of military planners through blockades and bombing, and states regulated every aspect
of life for national purposes.

Nonetheless, the diffusion of such identities was not so much a result of conscriptive processes
but arose from populations turning to ethnic and national identities and often in reaction to state
failure. The endurance of national states depended on their maintaining collective morale in
adversity. Popular fervour was inspired by ethnic stereotypes: older images of France as the
Catholic enemy of England were deployed in the wars against the revolution and Napoleon! In
turn, the legends and heroes of these wars (Nelson and Napoleon) added to the deposit of national
memories.

Whereas victory enhances the status of the national state, defeat focuses more attention on
regenerating the nation, especially if it is accompanied by the loss of territories. The classic
example of the former is Wilhelmine Germany created from above by the Prussian state
victorious in war yet identified with an Imperial junker elite, and hence undermined by defeat in
1918. In contrast, Denmark's traumatic loss of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia in 1865 triggered
the slogan „What has been lost externally will be regained internally‟ and a programme of land
reclamation and intensive cultivation (Yahil 1992).

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Warfare does not necessarily enhance the mass internalization of national identities. It can
produce a return to religious identities in the face of individual and collective destruction.
Disillusion with the economic and social performance of a secular Arab elite combined with
defeat in the Six Day War and the loss of holy places to Israel supported a radical Muslim critique
of secular nationalism as a Western ideology, contrasting it with the glories of the older and
authentic Islamic past (Hutchinson 1994: ch. 3).

Protracted warfare can create a popular disillusionment with national identities. The association
between nationalism and war in the twentieth century combined with the threat of scientific
warfare to the physical and social survival of peoples has resulted in a periodic weakening of
identification with the national state. In much of Europe such disillusion was reflected after
World War I in pacifist literature, memoirs and films and after 1945 in the rise of the European
Union. This disillusionment, however, was more directed against the national state elites than the
nation. As Mosse (1990: ch. 4) has argued, the need of individuals to find meaning in their
terrible experiences produced its own transforming myths (of the comradeship of the trenches).
After the World Wars, the annual commemorations and the large-scale pilgrimages to the shrines
to the dead, although expressing a horror of mass death, reinforced the nation by commemorating
the nobility of the sacrifice. The memory of sacrifice was carried into peacetime by permanent
social institutions such as Returned Servicemen's Leagues.

When members of the nations claim a commitment or mission to broader civilizational values,
collusion in war crimes can, even more than defeat, delegitimize national identities. Since 1945
neither Germans nor Japanese have been able to sustain a „normal‟ national state and have altered
their constitution to forbid foreign military involvement.

The aftermaths of warfare have been a factor in the (re-)nationalization of populations. The
Versailles Treaty consigned sections of formerly dominant groups to newly independent nations,
determined thoroughly to nationalize their state and wreak revenge for previous injustices. A
dynamic triangular pattern of interaction formed in which new nationalizing states, the politicized
ethnic minorities within them, and the „homeland‟ states of these minorities had to redefine the
nature and scope of their nationality claims (Brubaker 1996: ch. 3). The resentments of once
dominant minorities such as Germans in new states such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, and
Hungarians, one-third of whom found themselves outside their national state in Romania,

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Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine, generated an irredentist nationalism that contributed to the
outbreak of war in 1939 (Sharp 1996).

Economic dislocations

Economic revolutions have periodically instigated nationalist resurgences, particularly when they
re-ignite older ethnic antagonisms. The feature of economic innovation is that it is uneven,
emerging strongly in particular centres, and it has caused large-scale migrations from the
countryside into the cities (Gellner 1964). In much of Eastern Europe cities were „alien citadels of
the imperial (German) nationality which dominated business and the professions and were
disproportionately Jewish. Such population movements, therefore, created intense competition on
ethnic lines (Pearson 1983: 31-6).

In late nineteenth-century Europe international financial speculations contributed to a crisis of

traditional economic sectors and provoked a racial anti-semitic nationalism that blamed Jews,
prominent in banking and traditional ethnic scapegoats. Commodity prices collapsed with the
emerging world agrarian market, made possible by speedier communications, and shook the
European landed order, symbolically central to national identity, and caused mass migration from
the country to the cities. A flight of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe into cities such as
Vienna fanned a racial nationalism of both the right and the left. In 1911 two-thirds of German
voters in the Austrian elections voted for anti-semitic parties (Roberts 1967: 67).

Because industrial progress became integral to military strength, changes in economic

performance upset the power of states vis-à-vis each other and hence the nations they „protected‟.
German leadership of the „second industrial revolution‟ of iron and steel intensified nationalist
rivalries in the early twentieth century with France and also with Britain, which felt its traditional
naval superiority threatened by Tirpitz's development of an armoured battleship fleet.

Economic depressions, notably the Great Depression of the 1930s, encouraged both nationalist
protectionism and the spread of internationalist socialist ideologies among the working classes,
for whom the world nature of the capitalist crises demonstrated the irrelevance of national
solutions.

„Natural disturbances‟

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Unexpected natural changes - shifts in population balances, famines, diseases and ecological
disturbances, largely beyond the control of states - have destabilized relations between
populations, heightening national tensions and conflict.

In Eastern Europe a century-long population explosion had by the late nineteenth century led to
unprecedented competition for land (McNeill 1984: 310-12). Demographic growth was highest
amongst less developed nations, causing the nationalist mobilization of the more developed Poles,
Magyars and Czechs to claim territory and independence before they were overhauled by their
minorities (Pearson 1983: 28). Changes in birth rates relative to „significant others‟ have regularly
created anxieties about the future of the nation and heightened tensions between rival states
(between France and Germany during the inter-war period) and between ethnic populations
within states (between Russians and the Central Asian peoples in the former USSR).

Famine and disease may shatter for a time „primordial‟ attachments to the homeland and lead to
an inner religious retreat. In Ireland, to many contemporaries, the Great Famine was a judgement
of God, and the very land seemed „cursed‟ leading to continuous large-scale emigration.
Constitutional nationalist organizations collapsed and a powerful religious revival led by the
Catholic Church followed, but in the long term nationalist interpretations of the famine as a
genocidal British conspiracy powerfully reinforced Irish nationalism (Beckett 1966: 344). The
devastating earthquake in Armenia of 1988 heightened the disillusion of Armenians with the
Soviet state. Climatic changes, including those from the greenhouse effect, are likely to increase
tensions between states already locked in conflict over such natural resources as water, a major
issue between Israel and Jordan and between India and Bangladesh.

Ideological threats

Competing ideological movements arising from the heritage of the Enlightenment and religious
counter-challenges, transmitted through transnational institutions such as churches, revolutionary
internationals, diaspora groups and printed media, have fed nationalist antagonisms. Many ethnic
and national identities defined themselves as custodians of distinctive religious principles,
differentiating themselves against infidel neighbours.

A popular English national Protestantism had long viewed Catholic France as the threatening
other, and this interpreted the radical republicanism of the French revolution as just another

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attempt to subvert national values, leading to the powerful nationalist evangelical revival focused
on the crown (Colley 1992: 216-20). Papal „ultramontane‟ rejection of secular nationalist
principles, culminating in the Syllabus of Errors (1863) and the declaration of the Doctrine of
Infallibility (1870), caused Protestant nationalist reactions in England and Germany and
mobilized secular nationalists in France and Italy.

The Bolshevik revolution created a nationalist panic in Western and Eastern Europe among
conservative middle-class groups, fearful not just of a large external enemy but also an internal
enemy in the form of an internationalist working class. Pilsudski sought to provide the new Polish
state with a national mission, reviving its heritage as an antemurale Christianitas, this time not
against Russian orthodoxy but against godless Communism. The Russian Revolution provoked a
xenophobic response in the USA, since the Bolsheviks in claiming to represent the vanguard of
history, threatened to usurp America's universal democratic mission (Pfaff 1993: 185). The
growing power of the USA after 1945 and particularly since the Cold War has in turn provoked a
culture war with France, as possessor of its own universal mission and protector of European
civilization against American cultural imperialism (Cauthen 2004).

Outside Europe, the onslaught of Christian missions on native religions has stimulated indigenous
nationalisms. Arab nationalists viewed first European expansion into the Middle East, then the
establishment of Israel, as a continuation of the Christian crusades against Islam, and their leaders
from Nasser to Arafat have assumed the mantle of Saladin.

The legacy of ideological nationalism

All this illustrates the episodic nature of the modern challenges that result in the periodic
expansion and contraction of national identities, both in terms of the spheres they regulate and
also the social classes they penetrate. From time to time national loyalties are challenged by
religious, class or familial loyalties; and at other times are reinforced by them. The reactions to
these episodic challenges are shaped in part by older ethnic memories and images that are
triggered into life. These periods of nationalist mobilization, sometimes prolonged, in turn deposit
further layers of „experience‟ into collective memory.

Warfare has left a legacy of inspirational leaders and military heroes, villainous others, climatic
battles and memories of collective endurance, sacred sites in the mass war graves, and institutions

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such as the commemorative ceremonies and returned servicemen's leagues. Economic
mobilization has created myths of group discrimination by ethnic others, images of cheap foreign
competition and swamping immigrants, subcultures of conspiracy myths (notably anti-semitic),
many of which have been institutionalized in trade union and labour organizations as well as the
conservative right. Demographic pressures have also re-inforced group antagonisms, fears of
national decline in emigrant nations, and famines and natural disasters generated myths of the
cruel indifference or malignity of others. Ideological struggles have sustained a sense of ethnic
election as custodians of religious or secular values, as well as images of enemies within, and
these have been institutionalized by churches and popular culture.

All this thickens the texture of a national culture, providing reference points both inspiring and
shameful that orient the members of the nation in their everyday life.

BANAL NATIONALISM

Does this not suggest after all the emergence of an enveloping national identity which is able to
incorporate all sectors of the population? Is this not the picture of the settled national state so well
described by Michael Billig (1995) in which a national identity is so deeply institutionalized in
the rhetoric of politicians, the editorials and organization of newspapers, and marketing brands
that we are scarcely aware of it all?

Only with qualifications. A nationalist mobilization may have denationalizing consequences (in
the case of the Germans). It may result in class stigmatizations (of disloyal workers or aristocrats).
Although in wartime crises nationalists may be able to organize the national members into rigidly
bounded societies, after the crisis fades the demobilized individuals return to their multiple and
competing loyalties of family, class, religion and region. Moreover, the myth of the nation as a
unitary and autonomous society remains just that, a myth.

For much of the time, this gap between myth and reality is not a problem. Taking the nation for
granted as a category means that there is little questioning of its meaning and coherence.
Individuals, when times are stable, are normatively and socially integrated by their membership
of the many other social institutions and usually have no need for overarching appeals to the
nation (Mann 1975:280). There is no incongruity felt by most members of the nation in being

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national and in pursuing sectional interests. The use by most social groups of national symbols
implies that a national identity is the ground on which other loyalties rest.

This is not to maintain that nations are fluid categories of self-ascription that are maintained by
marking boundaries with „others‟. Banal nationalists will become „hot‟ in defending such
elements as cultural distinctiveness, homeland integrity, economic power and political autonomy.
But in most circumstances all nationalists are selective in interpreting what in practice is crucial
to achievement of these goals, and this will differ from case to case.

Nations vary considerably in the social niches they wish to regulate and in that their salience
fluctuates for individuals. Banton (1994) reasons that a switch from avowedly national to
international class loyalties (for example industrial action against a co-national employer in
support of foreign workers) may not indicate changes in the values attributed to national
affiliations, but rather a changing conception of what relationships should be governed by
national norms. An adherence to the nation may not fluctuate much despite apparent changes in
behaviour. Here Banton is speaking at the level of individuals.

At the collective level national states, although focused on certain objectives, make strategic
choices about how best to achieve them. National states have never been the autonomous actors
sometimes portrayed and have always acknowledged the limitations of their sovereignty and
pursued different strategies so as to achieve their national objectives. A successful state such as
nineteenth-century Britain remained a world power in part because of its skill in mustering
coalitions of states against the dominant great power on the European subcontinent. Periods of
„splendid isolation‟ when Britain would enjoy a relative autonomy as a global power have
alternated with a pooling of sovereignty in the two World Wars. In the economic sphere states
have employed different means to compete in transnational economic markets, depending on their
relative strengths and the degree of „opennness‟ of the world market itself. As the pioneering
industrial society, Britain saw it as in its national interest to promote free trade, though it had to
shift to protectionism after World War I destroyed the „golden age‟ of liberal internationalism. By
contrast, „latecomer‟ Germany rejected liberal markets to pursue more protectionist policies that
shifted into a territorial mercantilism by 1900 (Mann 1993: 298-301).

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It is when these pragmatic arrangements to secure the primary goals of the nation fail that we see
the resurgence of nationalist movements to develop new strategies, harness new energies and
redraw boundaries.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

There are at least two types of nationalism at work in national identity formation. One is the „hot‟
didactic and transformative nationalism that aims to instil the idea of the nation as a sacred and
transcendent object of worship for which people must sacrifice. This is an episodic phenomenon
that is self-conscious, systematic and prescriptive, providing exemplary forms of conduct in order
to unify all the components (of class, region, religion and gender) of the purported nation. This
nationalism engaged in an intensive and extensive regulation of social boundaries. Of long-term
significance was the appropriation of national myths, images and symbols by an increasingly
educated public for whom they provided meaning, status and direction in the practice of everyday
life. This is the informal or „banal‟ nationalism of populations who „consume‟ nationalism in a
relatively unself-conscious manner in decorating their homes, constructing their gardens,
expressing their allegiances in international sporting contests. Although there is a tendency to
view them in linear terms, they operate together in an interactive relationship to form the
identities of the mass nation; indeed, the latter may have preceded the era of ideological
nationalism. This interaction continues into the contemporary period.

NOTE

This is a condensed version of J. Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict, London: Sage (2004),
ch. 4.

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Maleševic, Siniša. "Nationalism and the Power of Ideology." Pp. 307-19

Since the publication of the Dominant Ideology Thesis (1980) by Abercrombie, Hill and Turner,
it has become a commonplace to accept the view that there is not, and never has been, such a
thing as „the dominant ideology‟. Their well-documented study was taken as proof that
ideological unity did not exist in the past, nor was it essential to the smooth operation of
contemporary societies. While one can easily accept many of the criticisms levelled against
traditional Marxist and functionalist accounts of the dominant ideology thesis it would be too
hasty to completely discard the notion of dominant ideology from the sociological vocabulary. In
this chapter I argue that the concept remains sociologically indispensable when attempting to deal
with the dominant ideological narrative of modernity - nationalism. The chapter is organized
around the argument that nationalism, in all its diverse forms, remains an essential source and the
principal glue of state legitimacy. However, to fully comprehend its ideological power one needs
to dissect a given society's ideological make-up at the two main levels - normative and operative.
The potency of nationalism comes from its ability to adapt and metamorphose so as to dovetail
with distinct and often contradictory official doctrines. In other words, while normative
ideologies may be transient and ephemeral, and may change or proliferate in different directions,
operative ideologies, in the age of modernity, tend to remain stable and endure couched in the
dominant narrative of nationalism. To substantiate this argument the chapter conducts a
comparative analysis of three very diverse cases - post-revolutionary Iran, Cold War Yugoslavia
and contemporary Britain. By looking at the form and content of dominant ideologies in these
three societies it aims to demonstrate that despite their mutually exclusive official doctrines all
three cases show a great deal of similarity at the operative level where differently articulated
nationalism remains a dominant ideology.

NATIONALISM, IDEOLOGY AND MODERNITY

As most macro-sociologists and socially minded historians now agree, nationalism is a modern
phenomenon (Gellner 1983; Smith 1991; Breuilly 1993). The pre-modern world was politically,
economically and most of all socially too hierarchical and too stratified to allow for any
significant degree of congruence between polity and culture. Before the era of Enlightenment and
the French Revolution the social realm was clearly divided between a small nobility concerned
with status and prone to warfare, and the masses of illiterate agricultural producers who were both

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socially and geographically immobile. This separated the world of „high Latin-speaking culture,
concerned with recovering the glory of the Roman Empire under the guise of Christianity, from
the ocean of „low‟ oral cultures of the peasant populations, who communicated through thousands
of unstandardized and often mutually incomprehensible vernaculars. This was also the world of
empires, fiefdoms and city-states all underpinned by a shared belief in the monarch's right to rule
on the basis of blood and „divine origins‟. Although there existed notions of France, England or
Russia, very few among the general population would conceive of themselves as French, English
or Russian, identifying instead with a particular family, clan, religious group or village. In other
words, for nations to happen it was necessary that an overwhelming majority of the population
become transformed „from peasants into Frenchmen‟ (Weber 1976). So the individual sense of
nationhood goes hand in hand with dramatic structural transformations - the birth of the modern
bureaucratic rationalistic state, the introduction and expansion of mass public education
conducted through a single standardized vernacular, the corresponding growth of literacy rates
and the democratization and secularization of the public space. Nationalism is born in and
expands with modernity: initially the preserve of political and cultural elites, excluded
intelligentsia, disappointed revolutionaries and a few literate others, through the nineteenth
century it gradually captured the hearts and minds of the middle classes in Europe and America
(Mann 1988). With the extension of the franchise and other citizenship rights to manual workers,
peasants, women and minorities after the two World Wars, nationalism has cemented itself as the
dominant ideology in the northern hemisphere. The steady erosion of colonial rule from the 1950s
and the establishment of new independent states worldwide further extended nationalism, from a
largely European or Northern phenomenon into a truly global and dominant ideology of
modernity.

Since its power and mass appeal have expanded simultaneously with the proliferation of modern
bureaucratic state structures and its corresponding mechanisms of integration such as civil,
political and social rights (Marshal 1992 [1948]; Mann 1988), welfare provisions, economic
growth and coercive apparatuses, the development of nationalism and of the modern state is a
deeply intertwined process.

Breuilly (1993) and Mann (1995) have both argued convincingly, as well as demonstrated
empirically, that one of the key reasons why nationalism and the modern state became so
entangled lies in the big rupture caused by the arrival of modernity, or the relation between the
newly emerging arenas of the civil society and the sovereign state. The expansion of ruthless

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capitalism, the development of a centralizing administrative apparatus under the authority of a
territorially bound and often war-prone state, the secularization of society and increasing literacy
rates among the general population, have all created a fundamental tension between the public,
rational and often absolutist state on the one hand and the expanding private sphere of civil
society on the other. All modern ideologies such as liberalism, socialism and conservatism
emerged in this period, all offering a coherent, plausible and relatively certain answer on how to
reconcile the conflict between the (often dehumanizing) realm of the public and the (emotional)
realm of the private.

However, despite the obvious successes of socialism, conservatism and liberalism, it is

nationalism in its many guises that proved to be the most potent and popular ideology of
modernity. Both historically and geographically one finds nationalist movements and doctrines
spreading with equal vigour on the right, center and left of the political spectrum - from the
Flemish Block and BJP, to Kuomitang and Peronism, to Sinn Feinn or the Socialist Party of
Serbia. Nationalism comes to prominence in times of economic crisis just as in times of
unprecedented economic boom (Connor 1994). The ascendancy and vigour of nationalist
discourse is to be found today in the most globalized areas of the world, such as North America
or Europe, as much as in the most isolated and sanction-ridden states such as North Korea or
Myanmar (Burma). Whether acute or dormant, or to use Billig's (1995) terminology, whether hot
or cold/banal, nationalism remains the most potent ideology of modernity. More than any other
ideology, nationalism was able to articulate a narrative bent on reconciling the public and the
private, the institutional and the communal, the political and the cultural, utilizing the most
egalitarian and democratic expression - „we the nation‟. As Gellner (1997: 74) succinctly phrases
it: „nationalism is a phenomenon of Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft: a mobile
anonymous society simulating a closed cosy community'.

The success of nationalist narrative has a lot to do with its ability to offer a solution to the
problem of personal oblivion in a secular age, thus providing a modern equivalent of religious
belief (Kedourie 1960; Smith 2003). It also owes much to the ability of political elites to „invent
traditions‟ in times of dramatic social change as well as to the changing nature of geopolitics and
wars fought in the post-feudal period (Mann 1988; Giddens 1985). We now have some answers
as to why nationalism has become such a prevalent discourse in modern times but we still know
very little about the workings of nationalist ideology. We know that in the modern age the two
main pillars of political legitimacy are the ability to generate economic growth and nationalism

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(Gellner 1997: 25), but we lack a coherent account of the machinery of nationalism - its inner
workings and logics. To do that one has to look more closely at the structure, form and content of
the various modalities that nationalist ideology can take. As I have argued elsewhere (Maleševic
2002a, 2002b), it is fruitful to analyse conceptual segments of ideological narratives such as the
statements and practices relating to the prospective organization of a particular society (economy,
politics, culture and the image of the nation), dominant actors as depicted in the narratives, type
of language used, as well as the portrayal of principal counter-ideologies. But to understand the
potency of ideological appeal it is essential to dissect the two principal layers through which
political ideologies operate, that is, the realm of the normative and that of the operative.

The domain of the normative is articulated in ideal-typical terms. It is built around principles
outlining fundamental goals and values as well as providing a blueprint for the realization of
these goals. The normative realm contains a strong kernel of utopian thinking as conceptualized
by Mannheim (1936), a set of ideas that „transcend the present‟ and are geared towards the future.
This realm is formulated to espouse key tenets of a particular W eltanschauung, providing well
elaborated statements and diagnoses regarding the structure and organization of the past, the
present and the future of an entire society. It is in the normative domain where ideas concerning
actual and possible relationships between individuals and groups are clearly spelled out and the
assessment of their present or future direction is provided. More than anything, the normative
realm presents a relatively clear and uncompromising set of ethical prescriptions which are in
large part derived from concrete knowledge claims or „given‟ moral absolutes. In this respect the
normative realm is articulated in a way that is predominantly universalist. It may explicitly or
implicitly address humanity as a whole by speaking with the voice of moral or cognitive (or both)
authority. Its focus can be on individuals or a specific group (that is, workers, women, citizens,
etc.) but its message generally remains within the confines of rationality, ethical universality or
the combination of both. Even when aimed at a very particular collectivity it still operates through
a logic and language that resonate beyond the borders of that particular community. The realm of
the normative defines itself through reason and ethics and is most likely to challenge other
weltanschauun-gen by pinpointing faults in their ethics and reasoning. The normative layer of
ideology is most often deduced from authoritative texts and scriptures such as religious „holy
books‟ (Bible, Qur'an, Talmud, Vedas, etc.), the influential publications of mystics, philosophers,
prophets, scientists, or documents with powerful legal, ethical or semi-sacred status (Bill of
Rights, Declaration of Independence, Magna Charta, Geneva Convention, etc.), the constitutions
of sovereign states, political and party manifestos, and so on.

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The operative realm functions rather differently. It is an arena of everyday life with all its
complexities, contingencies and ideational flux. The concepts, ideas, values and practices present
in this realm can never be ultimate, final or uncompromising. This is a domain of existential
ambiguity and a constant value dynamism where different images of the world and different
diagnoses of reality compete for the „souls‟ of each and all. The operative realm is expressed in
institutional as well as extra-institutional arenas of individual and social life. It is the way that
ideas and values, often evident in socio-cultural practices and rituals, operate in the routine
circumstances of daily life in any given society. The dominant beliefs and values in this domain
can be composed of different concepts and ideas, some of which can be intentionally formulated
with the aim of justifying a particular course of action (or inaction), or to legitimize or
delegitimize particular policies. The realm of the operative is the realm of the mundane. However,
unlike in Durkheim's (1964 [1937]) understanding, the mundane does not always equal the
profane. On the contrary, the operative realm can be articulated and visualized by majorities as
the area of the sacred, just as much, if not more, as the normative realm can be. Since the
operative realm has to address, in one or another way the majority of the population in any given
society, it is bound to rely on simplified concepts, language and images with popular appeal. It is
also more likely to use emotional and instrumental discourse when making an appeal to the public.
The general message, and in particular the key principles and ideas employed in this realm are
more likely to be personalized in the image of concrete individuals so as to be recognizable and
acceptable to the mass public. Most of all, the operative layer of ideology is more likely to
address individuals and groups as members of very specific interest and emotion bound groups
using a narrow particularist discourse. The language of the operative realm is most often the
language of affect and individual or collective self-interest. To dissect the dominant operative
ideas and values of a particular collectivity or society one can analyse such sources as school
textbooks, tabloid newspapers, mainstream news programmes on the TV, specific Internet
websites, political or commercial adverts, speeches of political leaders, and so on.

The relationship between the normative and operative realms, that is, between the two layers of
ideology, is always a question of empirical evidence. They can overlap, express similar or even
identical values and ideas but more often than not they tend to be composed of differently
articulated concepts. For example, analysing dominant normative and operative layers of
ideology in the cases of communist Yugoslavia and post-communist Serbia and Croatia, I have
attempted to demonstrate how, despite sharp differences on the normative level, all three cases
exhibit a great deal of similarity on the level of operative ideology. Whereas normative ideology

456
may be as different as self-management and reformed democratic socialism or Christian
democracy, in all three cases the operative ideology was found to be staunchly nationalist
(Maleševic 2002a). The subtle analysis of the inner workings of normative and operative layers of
ideology can bring us much closer to understanding the complexities of nationalist appeal. To
achieve this it is essential to recognize that nationalism is not only a dominant ideology of
modernity (as seen from the West or North), as rightly argued by Gellner, Mann, Smith and other
leading historical sociologists, but more precisely that it is a dominant operative ideology of
modern times. Whether democratic or authoritarian, left-wing or right-wing, religious or
secularist, radical or moderate, at the end of the day modern political orders tend predominantly
to legitimize their rule or to delegitimize the rule of others in nationalist terms. In other words, the
rulers of any modern nation-state may formulate their official doctrine or normative ideology as
liberal, socialist, Islamist, or environmentalist, but their operative ideologies are more likely to
supplement those normative ideals with an extensive dose of nationalism. Regardless of the
official pronouncements made by various governments and oppositional groups representing or
attempting to represent a particular nation-state, which are regularly couched in universalist terms,
it is nationalism, in all its forms, which remains the dominant operative ideology of the modern
age. To illustrate this argument I provide a brief analysis of three very diverse case studies often
considered to be the epitome of ideological difference: Islamic Iran, communist Yugoslavia and
the liberal democratic UK. The argument is that despite sharp and irreconcilable differences in
their normative ideologies there is a great deal of congruence between their respective operative
ideologies, with all three articulated in strict nationalist terms. The analysis of the normative level
of ideology will focus on the state constitutions as they most succinctly articulate the dominant
official doctrine of any modern nation-state. The operative ideology will be decoded from key
speeches of the respective leaders, as well as from school textbooks as they most effectively
reflect the dominant values of the operative realm.

THE LAYERS OF IDEOLOGY: NATIONALISM IN PRACTICE

Islamic Iran

The contours of the dominant normative ideology in the Iranian case can be extracted from the
1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (CIRI). This document states that Shia Islam of
the Twelver Ja'fari sect is the state's official religion and ideology. According to the Constitution
this view is sanctioned „by the people of Iran on the basis of their longstanding belief in the

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sovereignty of truth and Qur‟anic justice' (CIRI 1979: Article 1). This revolutionary republican
Shia doctrine is grounded in a belief„in One God (as stated in the phrase “There is no god except
Allah”), His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to
His commands‟ (CIRI, 1979: Article 2.1). In other words, absolute sovereignty over the world
and man belongs to God and not to the people. The Constitution stipulates that all laws in the
state have to be „based on Islamic criteria‟ (CIRI 1979: Article 4). One of the central ethical goals
of the Republic is fostering the conditions „for the growth of moral virtues based on faith and
piety and the struggle against all forms of vice and corruption‟ (CIRI 1979: Article 3.1). This is
clearly a normative realm formulated as a set of uncompromising and universalistic moral
prescriptions.

The Constitution also explains that the economic system is divided between the state, co-
operative and private sectors but all three are „to be based on systematic and sound planning‟. The
system has to be „self-sufficient‟, „correct and just‟, cannot go „beyond the bounds of Islamic law‟,
while the state itself reserves the right to administer and control „all large-scale and mother
industries‟ (CIRI 1979: Articles 3, 43, 44). The family is seen as „the fundamental unit of Islamic
society‟ (CIRI 1979: Article 10) and it is stated that „government must ensure the rights of
women in all respects, in conformity with Islamic criteria‟ (CIRI 1979: Article 21). Following
specific verses from the Qur'an, the constitution specifies that „all Muslims form a single nation‟,
which implies that the state „has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to
cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples‟; is committed to „the defence of the
rights of all Muslims‟; and „must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and
cultural unity of the Islamic world‟ (CIRI 1979: Articles 3.16, 11, 152).

The message given in the normative ideology is clearly a universalist one, making an appeal to
the superior knowledge and the moral absolutes as formulated in a specific book - the Qur'an. The
focus is on universal principles and ideas which go beyond the particularity of any single state,
nation or political order. When the concept of nation is invoked it does not refer so much to Iran
but rather to „all Muslims‟, which potentially can include any human being. The normative
ideology legitimizes itself by invoking the discourse of morality and reason. It calls upon what is
considered to be the ultimate form of ethics (Qur'anic justice) and the most rational and advanced
form of social organization (an Islamic republic).

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The operative level of ideology as discernible from school textbooks published in the post-
revolutionary period, and the key speeches of the „founding father of the Republic‟, Ayatollah
Khomeini, give us a very different picture of reality. While here too Islamic principles are
emphasized in culture, politics, economy and the social sphere, there is a particular twist to it, that
is, they are largely couched in nationalist terms.

So reading Khomeini's speeches one encounters numerous references to „the noble Iranian nation‟,
„our beloved country‟, „dear nation‟, „beloved Iran‟ and so on (Khomeini 1985: 243-4). Instead of
deriving legitimacy from the unquestionable doctrines of the Qur'an and the clergy's exclusive
ability to access these ultimate truths as stated in the constitution, in the speeches their superiority
comes principally from loyalty to the nation. Hence one can read how „the noble Iranian nation,
by supporting the genuine and committed Iranian clergy, who have always been the guardians
and protectors of this country, will remit their debts to Islam and will cut off the hands of all of
history‟s oppressors of their country' (Khomeini 1985: 247). The speaker rarely discusses the
complexity of theological arguments but rather refers to the need to „defend your dignity and
honour‟ since „our dignity has been trampled underfoot; the dignity of Iran has been destroyed‟
(Khomeini 1985:243,181). Instead of a universalistic appeal to brotherhood among all
underprivileged people, and especially the unity of all Muslims around the world, the speeches
devote far more attention to the glorification of the Iranian nation. Thus one finds references to
the „noble Iranian Armed Forces‟, as Khomeini (1985: 244, 176) explains that „we know that the
commanders of the great Iranian army … share our aims and are ready to sacrifice themselves for
the sake of the dignity of Iran‟. One also learns how corrupt and servile rulers „have reduced the
Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog‟, how „government has sold our
independence, reduced us to the level of a colony‟ (Khomeini 1985: 182). The focus of the
speeches is again less on the universality of the moral message of Islam than on the particularist
values of nationhood couched in terms of collective self-interest and emotions.

So the problem with the enemy is not so much that they stray from the true religion, but rather
that the enemy constitutes a physical and tangible threat: Israel is „assaulting us, and assaulting
you, the nation; it wishes to seize your economy, to destroy your trade and agriculture, to
appropriate your wealth (Khomeini 1985: 177). The enemy is not only threatening in a material
sense, it also assaults the nation‟s dignity:

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Iranian nation! Those among you who are thirty or forty years of age or more will remember how
three foreign countries attacked us during WWII. The Soviet Union, Britain, and America invaded
Iran and occupied our country The property of the people was exposed to danger and their
honour was imperilled. (Khomeini 1985: 179)

Those who do not oppose foreign influence are not only branded un-Islamic as in the constitution,
but as un-Iranian and treacherous. So Iran under the despised Shah regime „has sold itself to
obtain dollars‟ since when „you take the dollars and use them … we become slaves‟, and in this
way the former leaders are said to „have committed treason against this country‟ (Khomeini 1985:
187).

The school textbooks give us a very similar picture. Here too Islamic principles are regularly
couched in nationalist terms. The Iranian nation is depicted in a primordialist sense as an ancient
phenomenon emanating a sense of eternity, existing before and often beyond Islam. So one can
read how „the people of our country … have been involved in sports since times immemorial. At
the very same time the Greeks inaugurated the Olympic games, the ancient Iranians taught their
children horse-riding, archery and the game of polo‟ (Ram 2000: 79). The Iranian nation is
glorified by the heroes and martyrs who regularly made sacrifices for their country. The Mongol
invasion was stopped only because Iranians were in possession of these noble qualities: „in this
barbarous attack the valiant people of Iran did not disdain from any display of manliness and
sacrifice. Men, women, the old and the young … excelled in the defence of the country, not
accepting the disgrace of foreign rule‟ (Ram 2000: 81). It is Iran and not Islam that elicits the
special emotions of devotion and uniqueness, as in the following excerpt from a poem which is
given prominence in the school textbooks:

O Iran, O my splendours house! I love you. The laughter of your children, the clamour of your
youth, the [battle] cries of your men, I love them all. O splendours house. I hold dear your pure
soil, which is coloured with the blood of the martyrs.(Ram 2000: 85)

Unlike the normative level of ideology which speaks principally in the voice of universality
rationality and superior ethics, that is in the name of Universal Islam, the operative layer of
ideology is for the most part particularistic and appeals to affect and group self-interest among a
specific and exceptional social entity - the Iranian nation.

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Communist Yugoslavia

The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (CSFRY) provides the
skeleton of a dominant normative ideology often referred to as socialist self-management. Its first
article defines the state as a federal voluntary association „based on the power of and self-
management by the working class and all working people‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article 1). The central
focus of the Constitution is work relations, workers and the economic system and it is emphasized
that the state is based „on freely associated labour and socially-owned means of production, and
on self-management by the working people‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article 10). In such a system the
means of production are the property of the society and „no one may gain any material or other
benefits, directly or indirectly, by exploiting the labour of others‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article 11). The
document also refers to the authority of science (including economics) in planning the social
development of society as a whole. So one is informed that „workers in basic and other
organisations of associated labour … shall have the right and duty, by relying on scientific
achievements … and by taking into account economic laws, independently to adopt working and
development plans and programmes for their organisations and communities …‟ (CSFRY 1974:
Article 69). Social planning is seen as an essential normative principle both in the economic and
the social spheres: „workers in organisations of associated labour and working people in other
self-managing organisations and communities … shall be responsible for the fulfilment of the
working and development plans of their organisations and communities‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article
74). Hence, as in the case of Iranian normative ideology, the central principles are derived from a
realm of superior knowledge (Marxist science with rational social planning) and universal ethics
(the equality of all working people and the gradual disappearance of classes).

The political system is also founded on the principle of devolving a decisive role to workers:
„power and management of social affairs shall be vested in the working class and all working
people‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article 88). To fully participate in decision-making „working people‟
were to organize themselves „on a self-management basis in organisations of associated labour,
local communities, [and] self-managing communities of interest‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article 90). As a
multi-ethnic federal state Yugoslavia was devised as a state where all its „nations and
nationalities … shall have equal rights‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article 245). These rights are defined in
terms of „the freedoms, rights and duties of man and the citizen‟ which are to be „realised through
solidarity among people and through the fulfilment of duties and responsibilities of everyone
towards all and of all towards everyone‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article 153). In addition to standard

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citizenship rights (freedom of thought and opinion, freedom of the press, profession of religion,
freedom of movement, etc.), the Constitution also invokes the right to self-management where
„each individual shall be responsible for self-management decision-making and the
implementation of decisions‟ (CSFRY 1974: Article 155).

All the ideas expressed in the normative realm refer either to the authority of science (as the most
efficient and most rational course of action), or to the authority of universal ethical principles
(invoking a sense of justice for all). Again, similar to the Iranian case, though this time cast in the
image of the socialist worker rather than the pious universal Muslim, normative ideology appeals
to general values of relevance to humanity as a whole. Socialism is presented as the most
progressive and most virtuous doctrine, which is open to all human beings. There is little
reference to particularistic identities or closed group memberships. This is a transcendental realm
of fundamental values and ethical absolutes.

However, when one examines the articulation of this at the level of operative ideology it is
possible to see, just as in the case of Iran, a certain synergy of socialist self-management rhetoric
with explicit reliance on nationalist discourse. One can discern this by examining excerpts from
the Yugoslav leader Tito's speeches and the content of school textbooks. Tito, as with Khomeini,
addresses his public in nationalist (albeit state nationalist) rather than socialist terms. The
authority of scientific central planning and ethical universality is displaced by the argument that
„We have spilt an ocean of blood for fraternity and unity of our peoples - and we shall not allow
anyone to touch this or destroy it from inside, to break this fraternity and unity …‟ (Tito 1975: 2).
There is less by way of reference to proletarians and workers of the world than to our „Croatian
mothers‟, „brothers and sisters‟, to Croatian „sons and sisters who fought together with Serbs,
Slovenes, Bosnians, Montenegrins and Macedonians to clear your Croatian name‟, or to injustices
that „were washed with the blood of the best sons of all peoples of Yugoslavia‟ (Tito 1945a: 1).
Instead of socialist self-management of the workers the speaker invokes the idea of „brotherhood
and unity of peoples of Yugoslavia who fought against superior enemy force in terrible conditions
and won‟ (Tito 1945a: 1). Instead of appealing to the Soviet Union as a fellow socialist state
sharing the goal of emancipating labour and establishing proletarian internationalism, one
encounters reference to „our big Slavic brother‟ whose cooperation with „us‟ was „signed by the
blood of our best sons‟ (Tito 1945b: 1). Even the defeated enemy is not delegitimized on the
grounds of inferior or unethical political ideology (i.e. Nazism) but rather by reference to ethno-
national origins: „we are entering a historical moment of unification of Slavs in the Balkans and if

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internally divided by quarrels we can easily become a booty of the greatest enemy of all Slavs -
German conquerors' (Tito 1945a: 1). Thus what is emphasized as essential in the process of
creating a new socialist Yugoslavia is less economic equality or worker solidarity, but rather the
mythical and sacred experience of fighting and dying together for the new state. This precious
state, argues Tito, „was liberated with the blood and lives of the sons of all peoples of Yugoslavia‟
(Tito 1945a: 1). That is why this new state is our „shared house‟ built on the human sacrifices by
„spilling a sea of blood‟. And most of all it is made clear that „these sacrifices are holy, they will
be remembered by our descendants for thousands of years‟ (Tito 1975: 2). As such, „they have to
be preserved as a pupil of one‟s eye' (Tito 1966: 1).

School textbooks exhibit a similar discourse. The focus is less on socio-economic issues than on
the idea of Yugoslav „brotherhood and unity‟ which are continually defined and legitimized in
relation to a common struggle against a common enemy. So one is informed that „the brotherhood
and unity of Serbs and Croats has been built by the struggle‟ and that „the struggle of our peoples
against a superior enemy was difficult and bloody‟. (Teodosic et al. 1946:97). Here again, while
making explicit reference to countries of the socialist bloc and to the USSR in particular, there is
an appeal to Slavic unity instead of universal socialism. So the Soviet Union is described as our
Slavic brother, „our hope and tower of light‟ and its army as a „mighty brotherly Red Army‟
(Culinovic 1959: 54; Teodosic et al. 1946: 62). The leadership of the Communist party of
Yugoslavia is not legitimized through its capacity to bring about socialist revolution but almost
exclusively as liberators of the nation:

when fascist conquerors enslaved our country in 1941, they started to destroy, rob and kill our
people. Peoples of Yugoslavia have raised the uprising under the leadership of the Communist
party and its spearhead comrade Tito against German, Italian and Hungarian fascists and their
collaborators. (Teodosic et al. 1946: 62)

The ideological enemies are rarely depicted as espousing different „recipes‟ of social
development (i.e. liberalism, monarchism, etc.) but again are delegitimized in nationalist terms as
traitors who are „rotten‟, who have „openly collaborated with occupiers‟, and who have „poured
poison and acid between the peoples of Yugoslavia‟ and are now „whispering from [their] holes‟
(Culinovic 1959: 57-81).

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Thus, one finds here a very similar pattern to the one identified in the Iranian case. The lofty
normative message of progress and justice for all, or the appeal to humanity as a whole, has been
largely transformed into an emotional and ethnocentric battle cry within the operative realm,
aimed not at the world proletariat and „the wretched of the world‟, but at a very specific and
ideologically privileged group of people - the Yugoslavs.

Liberal democratic United Kingdom

Although the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland does not have a formal
Constitution as such, it has a number of legal documents such as the Acts of Government, the Bill
of Rights (1689), Common Law and the Human Rights Act 1998 that clearly spell out key ideas
and principles that constitute the dominant normative ideology of the state. This social and
political order is termed liberal democracy and is defined as „a system of representative and
responsible government in which voters elect the members of a representative institution, the
House of Commons, and the government is accountable to the House and ultimately to the
electorate‟ (Turpin 2002: 20). The system is underpinned by the notion of parliamentary
sovereignty, which establishes the legislative supremacy of the Parliament. This is historically
„assured by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 which established the primacy of statute over
prerogative‟ so as that the „statutes enacted by Parliament must be enforced, and must be given
priority over rules of common law, [and] international law‟ (Turpin 2002: 23). The state is built
on the principle of a separation of powers, so that the relation between the legislative, executive
and judiciary establishes a set of checks and balances that guarantee the rule of law. Again, as
with the other two cases, the realm of normative ideology is articulated by principles that
transcend the particular. In this case legitimacy comes from the legislative supremacy of a system
of government which is founded on reason and grounded in the tripartite division of powers thus
providing the most righteous system for the organization of social life. The ultimate principle
invoked is one of parliamentary sovereignty which codifies the universal principle that all
individuals are of equal moral worth and equal before the law.

This is underlined in the Human Rights Act of 1998 which guarantees citizens the following
rights: right to life, freedom from torture and slavery, right to liberty and security, fair trial,
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expression and information, assembly, association,
freedom from discrimination, free elections and the peaceful enjoyment of possessions (Turpin
2002: 142). Although this particular document is recent, the idiom of universal human rights is

464
understood as giving expression to the original Bill of Rights (1689), a document which not only
established Parliament as the ultimate ruling body of the state by limiting royal powers, but it also
asserted a number of mechanisms to secure democracy such as the freedom of speech and debate,
a right to petition the sovereign and the free parliamentary elections. In other words the emphasis
is on the universality of human rights, justice and equality before the law. While these principles
and statutes make special provisions for the royal family, for example that it be referred to as the
„Crown‟ instead of the state, and that the members of government are nominally „servants of the
Crown‟, the powers of the monarch are nonetheless limited to the symbolic realm.

Although clearly different in terms of content, the form which normative ideology takes in the
British case corresponds to the Yugoslav and Iranian cases in the sense that it too speaks through
the voice of higher reason and advanced ethics. While it discusses ideal-typical conditions in one
concrete society, it also addresses humanity in its entirety by relying on a single and
uncompromising value - the principle of human rights.

When turning to the level of operative ideology as formulated in school textbooks and speeches
of leaders one again finds a shift from the universal message of liberal democratic values to more
restricted and particularist expressions of dominant values grounded in the discourse of state-
centred nationalism. Hence Tony Blair regularly addresses the public in state nationalist and even
ethnocentric terms rather than solely in liberal democratic terms, declaring himself to be a British
patriot who is „proud of my country and proud of the British people‟ (Blair 1999a: 1). According
to the British Prime Minister, one has to be proud of being British because Britain has produced,
and continues to produce „some of the world‟s finest scientists, authors, composers, artists, sports
people, designers'. But more than this is the unique British national character which constitutes a
horizon of pride - „what makes us different is our character: hard working, tolerant, understated,
creative, courageous, generous‟ (Blair 1999a: 1). And this is complemented by „our humour, our
integrity, or what people know as basic British decency‟ (Blair 1999a: 1). These unique British
characteristics are „deep in the British character‟ and are something that one should be
„immensely proud‟ of because „so much that is good in the world bears the stamp of Britain‟
(Blair 1999a: 2).

Blair's speeches often make reference to historical events such as wars and other collective
tragedies where Britain and the British people are depicted as heroic martyrs who sacrifice
themselves for the greater cause of the nation. So he argues:„ I don‟t believe there was a finer

465
episode in this often glorious history than in the Second World War when Britain led the world in
a crusade against dictatorship and barbarity' (Blair 2000: 1). This was seen as a magnificent
„victory over tyranny‟ and again the people are instructed to „take pride‟ in such emblems of „our
country‟s remarkable history and achievements' (Blair 2000: 2). There is also a need to reflect
that such victories were built on enormous „sacrifice and selflessness‟ on the part of ordinary
British men and women, and according to the prime minister, there is a moral obligation to
„properly remember the efforts of all who ensured freedom and decency triumphed more than
fifty years ago‟ since „we have reaped the full rewards of this selfless sacrifice‟ (Blair 2000: 2). In
linking the experience of World War II to the more recent Kosovo war, Blair appeals to the
unique British qualities: „the poor defenceless people [of Kosovo] are begging us to show
strength and determination; we would have shown unpardonable weakness and dereliction. This
is not the tradition of Britain‟ (Blair 1999b: 2). For Blair the unity of British people is essential
and he envisages „a one nation Britain coming together‟ as people continue a „patriotic alliance
that puts country before Party‟ (Blair 1999a: 2, 1999c: 1).

A similar nation-centred discourse is also evident in school textbooks. As many analysts of

British history and geography textbooks have documented (Crawford 2000; Hopkin 2001; Doyle
2002) most textbooks espouse direct or indirect ethnocentrism which conflicts with the official
commitment to pluralism, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. The contents of the great
majority of textbooks are focused on the positive portrayal of „British people‟ and Britain
(Robson 1993), glorifying its imperial past and overlooking the contributions of others. When
discussing wars and other major historical events the narrative tends to represent the British
nation as a unified actor which, standing alone and against impossible odds, achieves glorious
victory through heroic sacrifice (Kallis 1999; Crawford 2000, 2001). For example, the events of
World War II and especially the 1941 Blitz and the withdrawal of British troops from Dunkirk are
discussed in many history textbooks in terms of the unique sacrifice and bravery of„British
people‟: „by June [1940] Britain stood completely alone‟ and the Blitz „brought out the best in
people‟ (Lancaster and Lancaster 1995: 560, 67). The textbooks invoke and construct a „Dunkirk
Spirit‟ - „the feeling that even though Britain was alone, it would fight on until victory was done‟
(Grey and Little 1997: 69). The unwavering unity and commitment to the national cause is self-
evident given the fact that German air raids on the UK killed tens of thousands and destroyed
millions of homes but „did not break the will of the people‟ (Lancaster and Lancaster 1995: 83).
What was essential in achieving such a glorious victory was the sense of national equality:

466
„during the war, everyone was equal and there was a community spirit‟ (Lancaster and Lancaster
1995: 69).

The layer of operative ideology again differs in many respects from its normative counterpart.
Instead of universal human rights, the rule of law and the other general liberal democratic values
articulated on the normative level, operative ideology resembles that of the other two cases.
Again one notices a dramatic slip into particularism expressed in the self-adoration,
instrumentality of collective egoism and intense emotional appeals. In place of the liberal,
democratic and cosmopolitan citoyen one finds a chosen people with a unique and exceptional
character - the British.

THE IDEOLOGICAL POWER OF NATIONALISM

The argument that nationalism is the dominant operative ideology of modernity does not imply
some unquestionable and uniform sense of societal cohesion as functionalists would have it.
Ideological unity is never fully accomplished. Rather it is a messy, contested and unending
struggle - a process which is shaped by social, political and historical contingencies. While this
process is highly dependent on asymmetrical power relations, these are not reducible to the
capitalist mode of production; they do not necessarily entail the ideological assimilation of one
stratum by another, and nor are they always beneficial to the rulers. This much is true of
Abercrombie et al.'s (1980) criticism of the dominant ideology thesis.

However, one cannot underestimate the simple fact that nearly all contemporary sociopolitical
orders, whether described as liberal democratic, state socialist, Islamist, Buddhist, authoritarian or
bureaucratic, have one thing in common - they all tend to legitimize their existence in nationalist
terms. This is not to say that nationalist discourse is the only one present in the rhetoric of state
leaders, school textbooks or tabloid newspapers. That is clearly not the case. What is argued here
is that for normative principles to be acceptable and to resonate with the desires, projects and
aspirations of the general public, it is necessary that they be articulated in a nation-centric way.
The success of a particular normative doctrine lies in the process of its „translation‟ into its
operative counterpart. The world of abstract principles, complex and distant ideas, and grand
vistas has to be transformed and concretized into accessible images, familiar personality traits,
stark metaphors and the general language of everyday life. This can entail a conscious attempt at
manipulation on the part of political entrepreneurs always happy to aid such an endeavour, but in

467
most cases it is more a matter of habit and daily routine, as certain practices, beliefs, values and
modes of conduct are simply taken for granted and often reproduced in a quite mechanical way.
As Billig (1995: 37) rightly indicates, it is not easy to pinpoint and analyse these discursive
practices because they seem so obvious, normal and natural: „One cannot step outside the world
of nations, nor rid oneself of the assumptions and common-sense habits which come from living
within that world‟. And this is precisely how every successful ideological project operates. It does
not lie, for that would be amateurish and in the long term counterproductive. Instead, as Barthes
(1993: 143) explains, it makes things seem innocent, natural, clear and apparent. The modern
nation-state as a „bordered power-container‟ (Giddens 1985) by its very design, largely created
and institutionalized in the past two hundred years, provides clearly demarcated and delineated
contours within which any successful attempt at self-legitimization has to be made. No serious
power-seeker can dramatically amend these rules. Even a potential revolutionary cannot build the
world from scratch, and every successful revolution since World War II „has defined itself in
national terms' (Anderson 1983: 12). Hence the dominance of the nationalist content of operative
ideology may have less to do with the aims and actions of concrete individual power-holders but
much more with the existing mechanisms, institutionalized routines and geopolitical
arrangements that are already in place. One does not have to be particularly nationalistic when in
power, one just has to implicitly or explicitly draw on and reproduce what is already there. In this
sense the modern state is like a game of chess: there are thousands of combinations one can play
(as a ruler), one can even at some point exchange a pawn for a queen, but one is extremely
limited in altering the existing moves of the figures on the chessboard, or in changing the
structure of the board.

The striking similarities between the three operative ideologies in the case studies discussed here
illustrate this point. In the case of Iran, the former Yugoslavia and the UK, one encounters three
extremely different and in many respects incommensurable normative ideologies, which is
perhaps unsurprising given that they are drawn from three radically different cultural and
geographical environments. Yet on the level of operative ideology all three cases exhibit a
remarkable degree of similarity, invoking nearly identical images and metaphors of kinship and
group solidarity. Unlike its normative counterpart, the operative domain is predominantly
instrumental and emotional in its appeal, but more importantly the central principles of normative
ideology are also transformed. Thus in all three cases the central values such as Islam, socialism
or human rights do not stand on their own in operative ideology as the key principles around
which society is/to be built, but rather become submerged and deduced from the central idea of

468
the operative ideology which is the nation. In other words, while at the normative level all
particularistic attachments are downplayed or subordinated to grand ethical or epistemic vistas,
on the operative level it is the other way around where human rights, Islam or socialism are seen
as valuable only insofar as they help to consolidate or contribute to the cause of the particular
nation. So despite Abercrombie et al.'s authoritative attempt to demonstrate otherwise, there is
something called dominant ideology. For the past two hundred years nationalism has been and
continues to be a dominant operative ideology of the modern age.

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Tito, J. B. (1975) „Titovi govori‟ , http:/ / www.leksikon-yu-mitologije.net/ read.php?id=618
Turpin, C. (2002) British Government and the Constitution: Text, Cases and Materials . London:
Butterworths
Weber, E. (1976) Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 . Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press

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Conversi, Daniele. "Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing and Nationalism." Pp. 320-33

Genocide and nationalism share common etymological roots: genocide derives from the ancient
Greek genos (stirp, race, kind, category, overlapping with class, tribe and people), subsequently
leading to the Latin gens. 1 Nationalism comes from the Latin verb nascor, nasci, natus sum (to
be born), later leading to the substantive natio, nationis. The suffix-cz'de, from the Latin caedo,
caedere, cecidi, caesus (to cut (down) or kill), has been added onto the Greek root. 2 The world
itself was coined in 1944 by the Polish-born US jurist Raphael Lemkin (1944: 19). A new term
was indeed needed as humanity emerged from a crime without historical antecedents, the
Holocaust (in Hebrew, Shoah). Since the combination of genocide and nationalism characterized
the darkest era of human history and occurred during the past century, both are often associated
with modernity and rapidly modernizing societies. Moreover, both relate to a third set of terms
also describing common descent and membership in a single „extended family‟: ethnicity, „ethnie‟
and ethnic group. In its original Greek connotation, ethnos was already associated with the idea of
shared descent and lineage. 3
The term „ethnic cleansing‟ has various origins, but its
contemporary popular usage is a verbatim translation of the Serbian etnicko ciscenje, which
began to be used widely in the global media in the 1990s. Initially, it was a more „benign‟ way to
describe the same unspeakable event, genocide.

The exaltation of a dominant nation as superior to all others, particularly subaltern groups,
inevitably leads to a series of discriminatory acts against competing nations, ranging from
assimilation and marginalization to genocide. The role of central governments and the military
appears to be crucial in most instances of genocide, together with media censorship and popular
misinformation.

Since they developed often simultaneously, a crucial question arises: how intense is the
relationship between nationalism and genocide? Nationalism is the doctrine that „the rulers should
belong to the same ethnic (that is, national) group as the ruled‟ (Gellner 1983: 1). The doctrine
assumes that a ruler belonging to an alien nationality or ethnic group is illegitimate (Connor
2004). However, the inverse formula is a sure recipe for ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation,
mass deportation and genocide: to claim that the inhabitants of a specific constituency must share
the same ethnic lineage of its leaders is to give carte blanche to mass expulsion and the drastic re-
drawing of boundaries to suit the group's pedigree. Nationalism also holds that „nation and

471
political power should be congruent‟ (Gellner 1983: 1). This longing for congruence, or
ethnopolitical purity, is the historical hallmark of most nationalist attempts to erase ethnic
distinctiveness by homogenizing entire populations.

Nationalism was generally accompanied by assimilationism which, in turn, entailed an effort to

absorb or eliminate cultural minorities. The very intolerant nature of the assimilationist modern
state has created the preconditions for turning its unprecedented powers against hapless minorities
(van den Berghe 1990, 1992). This was made easier by the fact that nationalist mobilizations
were either ushered in or accompanied by state militarism. Hence ethnopolitical, ideological and
religious opposition was marginalized and reconceived within a „discipline and punish framework
(Foucault 1991).

Probably, the earliest avatar of this tragic trend was the Armenian genocide (Melson 1996). Large
pogroms had already occurred in 1894-96, when Westernizing nationalism emerged as an
influential force, first in the Balkans, then among Turkish elites. But the 1914-16 mass
extermination campaigns were unprecedented by any humanly acceptable and recognizable
standard. This was a direct consequence of rapidly modernizing state structures emulating
Western models and the ensuing collapse of empire (see also Mazower 1999, 2001; McCarthy
4
1996). In other words, the Ottoman Empire was then living under the simultaneous impact of
massive Westernization accompanied by territorial losses. Turkish nationalism developed
amongst the returning diaspora, particularly refugees from the Balkans and Russia. These
refugees often mimicked „modernizing‟ nationalism, particularly in the latter case (Lieven 2000:
134).

Westernization materialized also in the form of victorious secessionist movements mobilizing

their peoples behind ethnic banners and attacking the empire from within - although they were
most often supported from abroad. Young Turk army officials fought against successful
nationalist uprisings in the Balkans and ended up imitating them - while forging links with
German and other Western nationalists. So the Young Turks movement was inspired by, and
mimicked, its post-1789 Western archetypes. Paradoxically, the main victims of Turkey's secular
and anti-Islamic nationalism were non-Muslim minorities which had previously enjoyed
protection and prosperity under the more liberal „consociational‟ laws of the Ottoman Empire
(Mann 2005: 62, 114-19; Nimni 2005: 10, 79).

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MODERNITY, GENOCIDE AND THE NATION-STATE

The twentieth century has been widely recognized as the century of nationalism and genocide.
Most historians and social scientists are in concordance on this grim assessment of the past
century (see Carmichael 2005; Hobsbawm 1995; Kuper 1981; Levene 2000, 2005b; Melson 1996;
Shaw 2003): Never before has mass killing been carried out on such a vast scale and in such a
short span of time.

Nationalism has become a truly „global‟ political movement and the dominant ideology of
modernity. From its European core, it has slowly shifted and mutated, adapting its chameleonic
shape according to geography and history. Thus, the modern itinerary of genocide follows the
trail of nationalism and Westernizing modernity.

The connection between Westernization, modernity, war and genocide has become relatively
established in academia. These historical developments are strictly related to state formation in an
age of militarized nationalism. Thus, many Holocaust scholars describe genocide as an entirely
modern and Western event with its unprecedented systematicity and techno-bureaucratic
dimension (Bauman 1989). The French historian Léon Poliakov (1974) argued that the Holocaust
was legitimized as a triumph of Western civilization, the latter being conceived in terms of racial
superiority against spurious Oriental, non-Western influences which could imperil civilization
from within and lead to its fatal decadence. Genocide is therefore intensively related to European
inter-state rivalry, government expansion, imperialism and the state's intrusion into the private
realm via the consolidation of central power. Patriotism and nationalism provided its ideological
glue and emotional underpinning.

The correlation between nationalism and modernity largely depends on how the latter is defined.
Whether we identify modernity entirely within the philosophical (Enlightenment and post-
Enlightenment), the political (French Revolution), the economic (ascent of the bourgeoisie), the
scientific (Darwinism) or the technological (Industrial Revolution) sphere, we can find each of
them well represented within radical nationalism, particularly Nazism. The latter was indeed
inconceivable without, or outside, modernity as intended in any of the above senses: it can be
associated with the spread of Jacobin-inspired centralism and state idolatry, the protection of
bourgeois interests, the diffusion of „only-the-fittest-survive‟ logic, and, finally, massive
industrialization.

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This brings us to the role of the modern state and its bureaucratic-military machine. Basically,
two trends have confronted each other in genocide studies: the „strong-state‟ thesis (Rummel
1994, 2003; Harff 1986; Harff and Gurr 1988; Horowitz 1980) and the „weak-state‟ thesis
(Bloxham 2003; Mann 2005; Mommsen 1997). The former, often identified as the intentionalist
explanation, argues that genocide is rooted in the absolute concentration of power into the hands
of tiny elites. The latter, or functionalist explanation, diagnoses its emergence in the collapse of
empire, state disintegration, political chaos and other forms of state „weakness‟. One view
concentrates on the intention to kill, the other on the chain of circumstances as they unfold
independently from full governmental control. The structure-agency debate remains in fact a
substantial cleavage in the literature.

However, it should be noted that the two approaches are not incompatible. What matters is the
subjective perception of weakness experienced by state elites, rather than any actual „weakness‟
to be objectively measured. For instance, „paranoid‟ leaders, such as Saddam Hussein, Stalin and
the Young Turks, tended to radicalize their oppressive policies out of sheer fear of armed
mutinies and defenestration. To engage rogue elements of the army and the party in mounting
spirals of massacres and counter-massacres provided a vital „safety valve‟ for the continuity and
survival of these leaders. Even the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution could be seen as
a sign of state weakness or paranoid leadership. Yet, the sheer power of the state's bureaucratic
machine contributed to mass murder on an unprecedented scale, such as the Vendée massacre
(1793-94). French historians have debated whether this can be defined as the first modern
genocide or „populi-cide‟ (Lebrun 1985). State power was indeed further emboldened by
nationalist fervour at the very peak of its „weakness‟, leading to the first levée en masse (August
1793). The impact of state-led nationalist terror on ordinary people was in fact devastating. Hence,
it is not the state's alleged „strength or „weakness‟ which matters, but the perception of personal
threat experienced by state elites.

Yet, in all of the documented cases of genocide, the power of even the „weakest‟ states was
unmatched in comparison with the inadequate, futile means of self-defence available to isolated
rural communities and other hapless targets of genocidal practices.

Although most interpretations of genocide tend to be modernist or state-centred, it is essential to

look briefly at the major alternative explanation linking genocide to the overseas expansion of

474
Western empires. Colonial genocides are therefore to be conceptually distinguished from modern
genocides. 5

ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE AND IMPERIALISM

Historically, genocide occurred in the wake of both imperial expansion and disintegration. Even
before the conquest of the Americas, the fate of the indigenous Guanches of the „Fortunate‟
Islands (present-day Canaries) anticipates a pattern of European expansion leading to cultural
destruction, environmental collapse and physical extermination (Crosby 1986).

Pre-modern genocides are often linked to ecological disaster, rather than modern state-building
ideologies consciously aiming at the eradication of cultural differences. The worst instances
occurred among settlers over which the imperial government had scarcely any control - and
eventually lost control after they declared independence. Thus, the newly independent states
emerging from the decolonization of the Spanish Empire pursued their genocidal campaign with
even greater fervour.

Some areas, like southern Argentina, had been completely „cleansed‟ of their indigenous elements,
while others, like Chile, nearly succeeded in the same goal, bar for surviving exceptions like the
Mapuches. Not by chance, these countries were situated at the antipodes of Europe, at the further
reaches from Madrid. Likewise, the complete annihilation of Tasmania's aborigines could more
easily take place in an area most removed from direct British rule. This interpretation has been
advanced with particular sharpness by Michael Mann (2005: 70-110), who expands the modernist
approach by incorporating the fate of Native Americans and other indigenous peoples. An
important trend in genocide studies is now devoted to the study of what David Stannard (1992)
has famously described as the American Holocaust' (see also Churchill 1997).

Mike Davis (2001) has observed how British rule was marked by cyclical regular „holocausts‟,
during which the settlers and the imperial core saw an opportunity to weaken the colonial
peasantry and increase their dependence on empire. 6 This was the era of liberal dogmas justified
by a blind belief in Adam Smith's (1723-90) „invisible hand of the market‟ as a self-regulatory
mechanism of supply and demand. We can therefore discern implications for contemporary
globalizing trends, which Davis specifically links to environmental degradation and climate
change.

475
It was not only expanding or pre-modern empires which spawned genocide. Downsizing semi-
authoritarian states or contracting autocratic empires, such as the French in Algeria during the
1950s or the Ottoman in its death throws, occasionally display genocidal behaviour (Melson 1992,
1996). Before withdrawing from Kenya, Britain committed massive atrocities, establishing its
own „gulag‟ system to control the natives, ritually engaging in torture and mass murder of
children, elderly, disabled, women and men alike (Elkins 2005). As late as 1968, the entire
population of the „British Indian Ocean Territory‟ of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Islands was
secretly deported to leave space for a US air base (Curtis 2003: 414-30).

However, the end of empire can hardly compare with its opposite and competing development,
the advent of the modern state. Even more than with erstwhile empires, the key legitimizing
ideology of the new centralizing state was one of „unlimited progress‟ and, in its totalitarian
version, the promise of a new society and a „new man‟. This radical shift could only befall with
modernity. Indeed, the more rapidly modernization was imposed, the more genocidal it tended to
become, independently from its association with nationalism.

RAPID DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL CHANGE AND GENOCIDE

The obsession with industrial-economic development and Westernization has been a recurrent
feature in most genocides. The concept of „developmentalism‟ can be useful in this context: it can
be defined as the ruling elites' attempt to enforce rapid modernization upon largely defenceless,
disconnected, disorganized and mainly rural populations. The adjective „developmentalist‟, with
its ideological implications, should be distinguished from the more widespread term
„developmental‟, which may not refer to hastily implemented development, but to a variety of
other possible applications. In most countries affected by developmentalism, peasants and
workers have been systematically uprooted. The peak of the tragedy was of course reached under
totalitarian regimes, which turned citizens and peasants into pliable „masses‟ through their
overwhelming control over the state and justified this in the name of „progress‟ and economic
development. Extreme developmentalism, or the obsession with „catching up‟ with the West
irrespective of its human costs, was already visible in the „desperately modernizing‟ drive of the
Russian military well before the Bolshevik revolution (Mann 2005: 99), as well as in the Ottoman
Empire before its collapse (Mann 2005: 114-19).

476
In the twentieth century, Taylorism became a key influence as a method of maximizing industrial
efficiency and serializing mass production. This was essential in shaping the Soviet Union's NEP
(New Economic Policy, 1921-1928) since 1928. Lenin „saw Taylorism‟s “scientific” methods as a
means of discipline that could remould the worker and society along more controllable and
regularized lines … Lenin encouraged the cult of Taylor and of another great American
industrialist, Henry Ford, inventor of the egalitarian Model “T”, which flourished throughout
Russia at this time: even remote villagers knew the name of Henry Ford (some of them believed
he was a sort of god who organized the work of Lenin and Trotsky)' (Figes 2002: 463). This cult
for discipline and work became part of a wider militarization of society which reached its apex
under Stalin. Some radical Taylorists envisaged indeed „the mechanization of virtually every
aspect of life in Soviet Russia, from methods of production to the thinking patterns of the
common man‟ (Figes 2002: 463).

7
Taylorism's weight upon Hitler's plans was even more substantial. Only recently, the mutual
admiration between the Führer and Henry Ford has begun to attract scholarly attention (Baldwin
2003; Gray 2003; Silverstein 2002; Wallace 2003). By 1938, the more than 2000 km Autobahn
network began to surpass in extension the United States' highway system, while Hitler's idea of a
Volkswagen (car of the people) dated back as early as 1933, owing much to Ford's Model T.
Henry Ford's extreme anti-semitic views also found a fertile reception in Hitler's Germany
(Baldwin 2003). In fact, at least in its organizational and technological sphere, the US model was
posited as the „correct‟ path to progress throughout the world well before the Cold War (Shaw
1994: 11). The concept of „developmental dictatorship‟ has been applied to the cases of Italy's
fascism (Gregor 1979) and Spain's francoism (Saz 2004).

Further East, Stalin's attempt to compete with the West has often been interpreted in the light of
his anti-Western rhetoric. However, the dictator and his entourage were avid devourers of
cowboy movies and other US consumerist items (Sebag-Montefiore 2004: 167-9, 262). As in
Turkey's case, modernization was to be achieved by Westernizing terror. Rapid mass
industrialization led to the annihilation of Russian and Ukrainian kulaks and peasant classes by
either direct or indirect methods.

Stalin's extermination campaigns have produced a voluminous body of literature. Mao's Great
Leap Forward (1959-1962) led to similar results. Over China's long history, the worst ever mass
famine was a direct consequence of Mao's top-down industrialization, costing between 20 and 40

477
million Chinese lives (Mann 2005: 15-16, 334, 336; Shaw 2003: 158, 166, 178). Mao's rapid
development plan turned into the largest single case of mass death in the whole twentieth century
(Becker 1997). 8
China's entire countryside was devastated as „a direct and foreseeable
consequence of Mao‟s attempt to subordinate the peasantry to his will. The Great Leap Forward
was a policy of do-it-yourself industrialisation and agricultural change forced on the peasant class
to destroy their traditional way of life' (Shaw 2003: 39, emphasis added). Shaw argues that
similar forms of extreme developmentalism are still visible in China's current rush to „modernize‟
(that is, Westernize) and its obsession with economic „progress‟. Many projects adopted by ruling
elites in developing countries, such as Turkey and India, have led to massive human dislocations,
for instance to clear space for the building of huge dams. Saddam Hussein annihilated the
millennial livelihood of the Marsh Arabs after drying out their wetland environment under a 15-
year reign of terror. Particularly affected are indigenous peoples in countries such as Indonesia,
Malaysia and Brazil, with the destruction of rainforests for commercial goals (Shaw 2003).

Even the one which, at least on the surface, appeared to be the least „industrializing‟ of these
regimes, that of the Parisian-born Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, promoted the goal of remaking a
totally new society, completely detached from tradition and permeated by a collectivist ethos
dedicated to the total extirpation of all traces of religion (particularly Buddhism). The goal of the
penal labour camps in which millions perished was rapid development. The agricultural surplus
produced by forced collectivization was expected to generate the income needed for heavy
industrialization by import-export (Chandler 1993, 1999). The term „auto-genocide‟ (self-
genocide) has hence been used to distinguish the extreme distortion of nationhood by dictators
such as Pol Pot and Atatürk through a deep-reaching subversion of history. Exterminating one's
own people and culture apparently does not contrast with the restoration of ancient monuments
like Angkor Vat (the largest temple in the world).

The most problematic case was, of course, that of Kemal Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal Pasha), who
could only conceive development as utter, remorseless and complete Westernization (Atabaki and
Zürcher 2004). This led him to the extreme paroxysm of banning key elements of popular Turkish
culture, such as the fez or tarboosh, a hat common to most Ottoman Mediterranean lands, which
he replaced with Western, particularly British, hats and suits - to the great benefit of Western
textile industries. 9 Rummel (1997: 233-6) calculates that 264,000 Greeks, 440,000 Armenians, as
well as other minorities and countless Turks perished under his „reign of terror‟.

478
Another important factor pointing to the relationship between developmentalism and genocide is
the use of new technology by disproportionately powerful state elites. With new technology,
increasing channels of communication and the potency of weapons, the ability to kill large
numbers of people in very short periods of time and with minimal planning can only become
greater. Some authors like Bauman (1989) relate the modern capacity of destruction not only to
10
technology, but to the rise of the post-Westphalian bureaucratic state. Hannah Arendt (1958)
has similarly related the Holocaust to the advent of modernity as massive human dislocation
leading to the arbitrary removal of individuals from their localities, positions, jobs. For Arendt,
this process resulted in the creation of an uprooted, highly manipulable mob which inevitably
opened the gateway to totalitarianism.

In short, nearly all of the genocidal regimes in history obeyed to a strong developmental logic and
Westernizing impetus. On the other hand, there is an area which finds scholars in even greater
agreement: the relationship between war and genocide.

WAR AND GENOCIDE

War situations typically lead to states of emergency wrapped up in „securitization‟ discourses. In

these circumstances, even democratically elected governments can silence public opinion, not
dissimilarly from authoritarian-born regimes. In times of war, patriotism can be invoked by both
dictatorships and democracies to target internal „enemies‟, terrorists, deviants, outsiders and
„security threats‟, hence proceeding to their elimination. War can be used as a cover to destroy
opposition and engineer „final solutions‟. It is significant that the Holocaust's intensity increased
as German borders expanded eastward. Its quantum leap occurred on non-German soil, in the
newly occupied lands of an expansionist Third Reich.

The relationship between war and genocide has been explored particularly well by Melson and
Shaw. Both argue that genocide is actually „war carried out by other means‟. For Melson (1992) it
was the chaos brought by revolution, following war and empire meltdown which led to genocidal
massacres. Genocides tend to occur in the midst of war, as in the Armenian case (1915-16). For
Shaw (2003), genocide is a form of war directed against civilian populations, while the boundary
between genocide and „degenerate war‟ (aerial bombing, mass destruction of civilian populations
as carried out by the Allies during World War II) is too thin to be firmly established.

479
In all cases, it is the state which can more easily harnesses patriotism in order to prop up political,
economic and military elites (Horowitz 1980). The introduction of illiberal laws under the pretext
of protecting „national security‟ is a first indicator of radical centralization attempts that may
result in the persecution of minorities and their culture. Mann (2004) argues that the Nazis
married extreme statism with extreme nationalism, hence Fascism can be defined as extreme
„nation-statism‟.

Holocaust scholars have long debated whether the war was a triggering effect of the Shoah during
Germany's eastward expansion. Some identify it as themajor catalyst (Fettweis 2003). The same
argument has been applied to the case of Turkey, where a „cumulative radicalization‟ effect has
been diagnosed as the main trigger of the Armenian genocide (Bloxham 2003), although the root
causes may be searched for in the Young Turks' ideology. Other scholars have analysed the
11
causality of war by comparing genocide across continents and timespans (Bartrop 2002).

Civil wars, as conceptually distinguished from inter-state wars, can also lead to genocidal
outcomes. In both instances the long-term devastation inflicted on the civilian population tends to
outlast various generations, even exceeding the numbers of people directly killed by war
(Ghobarah et al. 2003). This was certainly the case with Russia's potentially genocidal war on
Afghanistan and its daunting legacy of massive loss of human life and destruction of the local
economy, mostly due to millions of land-mines.

FORMS OF GENOCIDE

Fenton (2003: 8) remarks that „one of the notable things about Yugoslavia is that the press (in
English) always referred to ethnic conflict and ethnic cleansing. But conflicts in the United States
which bear some similarities (without being full scale civil war) are described as racial conflict
and racial segregation‟ (see also Churchill 1997). He argues that different countries share
different discourses, so in the United States „the idiom of race is the mainstream one, elsewhere it
is the idiom of ethnicity, to which one may eventually associate the idiom of nationality‟ (see also
Conversi 2004a, 2004c; Banton 2004).

Physical atrocities and murder are often seen as the key criteria for establishing genocide.
Alternative terms, such as „cultural genocide‟, connote that wanton acts of cultural annihilation
occur in the wake of, even independently from, genocide. On the other hand, cultural genocide

480
may encompass a physical dimension of murder, like the elimination of intellectuals and
professional cadres. This took place under many Third World dictatorships, like Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam's Ethiopia, General Abacha's Nigeria, and Turkey
in the 1980s with the elimination of moderate Kurdish and Islamist leaders. Most important,
cultural genocide is often carried out in tandem with physical genocide, and is hence an intrinsic
part of it. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Croatia was supplemented by attacks on cultural
heritage and symbols, the blowing up of churches, mosques and libraries, the forcible change of
names, and various assimilationist policies (Carmichael 2002; Cigar 1995; Gallagher 2003). The
term „ethnocide‟ has in the past been used as a replacement for cultural genocide (Palmer 1992;
Smith 1991: 30-3), with the obvious risk of confusing ethnicity and culture.

Man-made environmental disaster has often resulted in actual genocide. Historians of empire
have studied the destruction of both self-sustainable eco-systems and local economies (Crosby
1986; Davis 2001). The term „ecocide‟ has been applied to a variety of man-made disasters
leading to massive human loss, particularly in the former Soviet Union (Ehrlich 1971; Feshbach
and Friendly 1993) and the United States (Churchill 1997, 2003). Finally, the devastation of
home and habitat („domicide‟ for Porteous and Smith 2001) acquires cogent meanings for its
relationship with nationhood, given the ensuing destruction of security and community.

In other words, restricting the definition of genocide only to acts involving death fails to reflect
real patterns of genocide. In Bosnia, for example, while concentration camps were used as
genocidal tools, parallel „acts‟ included systematic mass rape and the destruction of Croatian and
Muslim cultural icons (that is, architecture, religious symbols, books) (Carmichael 2002;
Gallagher 2003). These acts do not necessarily involve death, but constitute an „intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national/ethnic group‟. 12
For instance, genocidal rape has served to
traumatize and destroy the reproductive capacity of entire groups, while the offspring from such
acts are seen as supplanting the group in its ethnic continuity 13

Another problem lies in the forms of mass killing subsumed under the heading „genocide‟. Shaw
(2003: 35-7) has argued that, because the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide was laid down by the victors of World War II, it was a curious melange of
Stalinist and Allied self-apologies. The Convention's definition of genocide clearly circumscribed
it to the deliberate destruction of entire groups. It drew a sharp line between genocide and other
forms of mass killing or degenerate forms of war. It did not encompass the annihilation of

481
civilians for strategic calculations, a practice followed by Anglo-American forces during World
War II. Thus, Treblinka was genocide, but the annihilation of Hiroshima and Dresden were not to
be classified as such. Moreover, a pro-Soviet bias was also present in the Convention's excision
of any reference to the mass murder of class and ideological enemies, thus condoning Stalin's
elimination of class and political opponents, like the kulaks (Shaw 2003).

For this purpose, the terms politicide and democide have posteriorly been introduced. „Politicide‟
can be defined as the mass murder of political opponents on the part of a government because of
their political beliefs and activities (Harff and Gurr 1988). 14
„Democide‟ is instead the broader
umbrella term used to describe „the murder of any person or people by a government, including
genocide, politicide, and mass murder‟ (Rummel 1997: 1-2; 1997: 36, 2003). In both instances,
the state or government is the main perpetrator.

HOMOGENIZATION AND GENOCIDE

Most nationalist-led mass murders are directed against minorities which are fully integrated,
undifferentiated and assimilated into the mainstream culture. The victims and targets are
frequently indistinguishable, similar-looking groups, often sharing the same language, outlook
and customs. The Tutsis in Rwanda, the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and the Jews in Nazi
Germany were fully integrated into their societies and assimilated into the mainstream culture of
their time and place.

Why does genocide so often involve groups which are indistinguishable from the surrounding
majority? Why do victims and perpetrators appear to be alike and identical to each other, sharing
the same outlook - at least to the external observer? Probably one of the most important linkages
is the one existing between homogeneity and genocide, yet this is a question still left largely
unexplored (see Conversi 1999), although there is abundant literature inquiring into the linkages
between genocide and state-led programmes of homogenization and assimilation.

Modern ethnically driven genocides do not normally occur in the incipient stages of
homogenization or during colonial expansion, but rather during the final stages of the assimilation
process, when inter-group differences and peculiar traits have all but disappeared, yet group
consciousness persists. The main counter-case is the Porrajmos or Roma Holocaust (Burleigh and
Wippermann 1991: 113-35; Hancock 1996; Huttenbach 1991). The Roma were typically seen as

482
borderless, and hence as incompatible with the nationalist concept of an homogeneous,
territorially bounded and self-contained nation-state. In general, it was a matter of„border-making‟
and population control. 15

In short, cultural differences are never in themselves a cause of genocide or any other forms of
political murder (Conversi 1999). Modern genocides and inter-ethnic wars are rarely, if ever,
directed against wholly differentiated groups. The opposite pattern can instead be discerned, with
largely assimilated, un-hyphenated (yet self-conscious) ethnies providing the usual targets. In
other words, genocide tends to take place more readily when groups share many characteristics.
In Shakespeare's Macbeth, murdered King Duncan's son Donalbain preciently utters: „There‟s
16
daggers in men's smiles: the near in blood, The nearer bloody'.

It is debatable whether we tend to sympathize with people who look visibly and openly „other‟
from us. When the Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia and Croatia, perhaps the most
„Europeanized‟ of the Yugoslav republics, Europe did not come to their rescue (Ramet 1999,
2004). European imagination was certainly struck by the wanton destruction of treasured cities
like Vukovar and, most of all, Dubrovnik. However, a compassionate sense of human solidarity
was more widely felt when the victims of the plight became ordinary Kosovars (with all their
baggage of differences, including dress and lineaments/traditions). Throughout Europe grassroots
charity initiatives and other forms of mobilization spontaneously sprang up in their aid.

Two other possible factors should be explored, one active, the other passive. First, there may arise
a sense of potential rivalry among „similar‟ groups. This may lead to a series of active measures,
even without radicalization. Secondly, we often find widespread ignorance about a nation's
valuable cultural heritage, the latter easily leading to indifference. While active hatred is
insufficient as a catalyst, much more determinant is the role of apathy and insensitivity. These
often go along with conformism, obedience and widespread states of denial (Cohen 2001). The
„bystander‟s' role is hence a crucial angle through which to explore genocide.

This particularly affects global „audiences‟ or spectators, as genocides can unfold due to
international apathy and heedlessness (Power 2003). Indifference towards collective rights and
dignity can feed the machine of mass destruction. Indeed, Hanna Arendt (1994) famously
explained how the key element of genocide is not inter-ethnic hatred, as commonly assumed, but
simple indifference towards fellow human beings. She described the perpetrators as ordinary,

483
order-obeying citizens with unremarkable lives and no hint in their CVs that one day they would
later become mass murderers. In 1915 Antonio Gramsci (1980) wrote a few touching pages about
Europe's fateful indifference to the Armenian genocide.

A similar argument about passive conformism as complicity can be applied to international

diplomacy: it is hardly conceivable that the existence of the Nazi gas chambers was unknown by
17
Western elites, despite Hitler's ruthless censorship attempts. The fate of East Timor was
deliberately kept secret by international media, because the Indonesian government was classified
as a Cold War ally by the United States (Cribb 2001; Hitchens 2001). Saddam Hussein's
extermination of 100,000 Kurds in the Arbil/Anfal campaign (1988) could be safely ignored by
the media when the Ba'athist regime was a key Western and Soviet ally in the war against
revolutionary Iran (Makiya 1998). In all these cases, international public opinion was kept in the
dark about ongoing events, often deliberately. On the other hand, the war in Bosnia has been
defined as the first case of „simultaneously broadcasted‟, „instant‟ genocide (Baudrillard 1996;
Cushman and Mestrovic 1996).

Passivity and indifference make up the „raw material‟ of genocide. British initial appeasement of
Hitler's Germany and Milosevic's Serbia was essential in safeguarding these regimes during their
incipient destructive undertakings (Simms 1996, 2001). The French government and media
massively concealed the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda (Uvin 1998). And the British media was being
swamped with news from South Africa's first post-apartheid elections, just as genocide in
Rwanda was unfolding.

CONCLUSIONS

We have seen how genocide and nationalism are clearly related, although most nationalist
movements have never developed genocidal trends, while the worst forms of mass murder
occurred under officially „non-nationalist‟ (Socialist) totalitarian regimes.

During the Cold War, the two superpowers competed in support of genocidal regimes. Noam
Chomsky (1993) argues that the crimes committed by the United States in places like Nicaragua,
18
Guatemala and Indonesia have been of a genocidal nature. If advanced Western democracies
can be held indirectly responsible for genocide, the United States and Britain may stand out as the
most „genocidal‟ international power players of the post-Cold War era, given their simultaneous

484
record of direct backing of genocidal regimes (Curtis 2003, 2005; Hitchens 2001) and
comfortable non-intervention when genocide was actually occurring (Cushman 1998, 2004;
19
Gallagher 2003; Kent 2005; Melvern 2000; Power 2003; Simms 2001). From a Native
American perspective, the United States can be identified as the most genocidal state that has ever
existed in human history (Churchill 1997, 2003).

Globalization provides a third, still unexplored, element in the triangular relationship including
nationalism and genocide. Will globalization lead to new holocausts? Mark Davis (2001) argues
that the twisted logic emanating from contemporary free market ideology is a replica of the
unchallenged dogmas prevailing in the Victorian era. Then, the results were decades of economic
sabotage culminating in the genocidal famines and the deaths of up to 32 million people in India,
China and Brazil (1876-1900) under the impact of direct or indirect colonial rule. Davis skilfully
relates this to the contemporary trend towards climate change (see also Levene 2004,2005b).

Like nationalism, globalization is destroying whole lifestyles and communities, exerting

unprecedented homogenizing pressures (Barber 1995; Chua 2003). However, not only is this
occurring on a larger scale and at a quicker pace than ever before, but it is also accompanied by
unprecedented ecological degradation and environmental disaster. A strong state endorsing a
developmental ideology may be redundant nowadays, simply because neoliberal development has
taken an unrestrained course of its own. It would be tempting to extrapolate from this that the age
of genocide is far from being left behind.

NOTES

1 In ancient Rome, gens (gen. gentis) referred to both tribe and clan and was sometimes translated
as „race‟ and „nation‟, from genus (pl. genera), referring to „race, stock, kind'. The latter was
cognate with the Greek genos („race, kind‟) and gonos (birth, offspring, stock).

2 This was inferred from words such as „homicide‟ (killing of a human being), and, more political,
„tyrannicide‟ (killing of a tyrant).

3 Classical authors used ethnos to refer to contiguous peoples, while the Oxford English
Dictionary renders it as „nation‟. A fourth more malleable term, phylon, was also used to describe

485
race, class, tribe or nation (Fenton 2003:15–16). The concept of patriotism also shares family-like
connotations, coming from the Latin pater (father, as in patria).

4 Although Justin McCarthy has produced excellent work on the fate of Muslim minorities in the
Balkans, he is not a reliable source on Armenian genocide, to the point of being regarded as a
„genocide denier‟ by most Armenian scholars.

5 Palmer (1998) reformulates this distinction as one between „societal‟ and „state‟ genocides.
Two other interpretations of genocide should be briefly considered here. The „primordialist‟ one,
shared by many nationalists who see genocides as recurring patterns of everlasting persecution.
Many Armenian historians share this view. And the „barbaric hordes‟ one, describing episodes of
wanton destruction during barbarian invasions as genocidal acts, such as the occasional burning
of entire villages and the massacres of harmless people. The most commonly adduced cases are
Attila's Huns and the Mongols under Genghis Khan.

6 Mike Davis (2001) asks how British rulers could be so immune to the sufferings of the
multitudes they ruled. One can find answers not simply in classical racism, but in the very
supercilious aristocratic Victorian attitudes which characterized the upwardly mobile, rapidly
enriching classes vis-à-vis Britain's sub-human lumpenproletariat. Paradoxically, it is this very
lumpenproletariat which remains the unquestionable and loyal reservoir of manpower in times of
war and colonial expansion through the British-specific ideology of imperial patriotism or
„missionary nationalism‟ (Kumar 2003).

7 Gottfried Feder's (1883–1941) cult of technocracy closely resembled Taylor's idea of a society
ruled by engineers, as did Fritz Todt's (1891–1942) ideology of road building as key to German
economic strength.

8 It should be pointed out that, although it is impossible to calculate the exact number of dead,
Becker's estimate of 40 million victims might be slightly inflated.

9 There are parallels here with the Khmer Rouge's banning of all forms of traditional Cambodian
music and dance and its replacement with military hymns, revolutionary chants and other form of
radically Westernizing cultural manipulation, often inspired by China's even more devastating
„cultural revolution‟ (Shapiro-Phim 2002).

486
10 More recently, Bauman (2005) has extended this critique to neoliberal globalization.

11 The „cumulative‟ approach has also been applied to indigenous people: Madley's (2004)
comparative study of „frontier genocides‟ among Tasmanians (Australia), Yuki (California) and
Herero (Namibia) has revealed common patterns developing in three phases: (1) invasion and
destruction of the local economy; (2) aboriginal response and retaliation; and (3) the settlers and
the central government's slow drive towards „final solutions‟ passing through several sub-phases
such as deportation, mass incarceration, ecological destruction and „domicide‟ (Porteous and
Smith 2001).

12 Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948, entry into
force 12 January 1951, available at http:/ / www.preventgenocide.org/ law/ convention/ text.htm.
See also Cushman and Mestrovic (1996), Appendix 2, pp. 360–2.

13 The term „gendercide‟ has appropriately been cre ated, while new ones, such as „homocaust‟
or „queer-cide‟ have known mixed fortunes (Stein 2002).

14 Occasionally, „politicide‟ has assumed different con notations. For instance, Baruch
Kimmerling uses the term to indicate „a process that has, as its ultimate goal, the dis solution of
the Palestinian people's existence as a legitimate social, political, and economic entity'
(Kimmerling 2003: 3).

15 Governments, especially authoritarian and totalitar ian ones, are typically obsessed with
controlling their popu lations in times of rapid social change. Nomadic peoples, reluctant to
sedentarize, faced particular pressures in adapt ing to the extreme modernizing environment
spearheaded by industrialization and state-building. Being particularly vulnerable, they also find
it hard to organize their self-defence via pressure groups. Some of the most ruthless
sedentarization programmes have been carried out under forms of extreme nationalism allied with
„developmental socialism'. In the case of Somalia, this led to a futile war with Ethiopia and to the
final collapse of the Somali social struc ture. On the other hand, sedentarization programmes were
mimicked by Ethiopia once „developmental socialism‟ became the country's dominant ideology
under Menghistu's dictatorship.

487
16 Macbeth (II. iii. 146–7). My thanks to Krishan Kumar for this perceptive insight.

17 Many US corporate leaders were certainly conscious of the fate of the Jews. We have already
discussed Henry Ford's close relationship with Hitler. According to Black (2001), America's top
corporation, IBM, directly supplied the Nazi regime with technical know-how in the full
knowledge of its use.

18 For instance, he describes East Timor as a classic instance of imperialist genocide committed
via the inter-posta persona of the US-backed Suharto regime (see also Jardine 2003).

19 The only approximate calculation of the combined casualties of both direct British military
intervention and indirect support for democidal regimes is provided by Curtis (2005). He gives a
very broad estimate of 8–13 million deaths. This includes Britain's support for Iraq's Ba'athist
regime between 1963 and 1991, and, perhaps more disputably, the support for the Idi Amin
(Uganda 1971) and Pinochet (Chile 1973) coups, but does not include the Tory government's less
direct (that is, purely political, but not military) support for Milosevic between 1987 and 1997
(Gallagher 2003; Kent 2005; Simms 2001).

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Wimmer, Andreas. "Ethnic Exclusion in Nationalizing States. Pp. 334-44

The most prominent theories of nationalism disagree on a number of crucial questions: whether
nations are modern inventions or rather rest on pre-modern ethnic foundations; whether state
modernization and warfare are the cause or the consequence of nationalism; whether nationalism
flourishes exclusively on the soil of industrial capitalism or everywhere where the model of the
nation-state has been implanted; if nationalism has indeed already passed its greatest moment and
we thus find ourselves at the threshold of a post-national age. All these major debates rest,
however, on an underlying consensus. Nationalism and nationhood are portrayed as integrative
political and social forces transforming older, exclusionary and hierarchical societies.
Nationalism and the nation-state provided the basis for the democratic inclusion of large sections
of the population that were hitherto held at arm's length from the centres of power. Nationalism
also changed the power relations in the cultural domain by raising the status of the despised
culture and language of the lower classes.

The terms in which the integrative power of the national community is conceived vary from
author to author. For Karl Deutsch, a nation was constituted by a shared communicative space,
enhanced by similar cultural codes (not necessarily a language) and dynamized by the uprooting
and mobility that urbanization and modernization had brought about. The state is notably absent
from this picture and seems to play no role in shaping communicative spaces, assimilating
minorities or enforcing legal discrimination against them (Deutsch 1953). This improved with
Ernest Gellner's account.

He emphasized the role of the educational system of nation-states in bringing about cultural and
especially linguistic homogeneity. The state played the role of a servant to an industrial
capitalism in need of flexible, mobile workers who can quickly assume new roles in an ever-
changing division of labour (Gellner 1983). He did observe that being governed by bureaucrats of
foreign language and culture may stimulate national awakenings and conflicts, such as in the
Czech example (his „Ruritania‟) used to illustrate the industrialization argument. And he did
consider the durable inequalities that groups may suffer if their culture or physical appearance
made assimilation into the nation difficult - having in mind the Jewish and African American
experience. But such domination and exclusion did not, in his view, represent a major feature of

492
the new world order of national states but rather one of its rare and deplorable pathological
permutations.

According to Benedict Anderson, imagining the national community was made possible by the
delegitimation of dynastic rule, the disenchantment of universal religions and the rise of
vernacular languages through the combined influence of Protestantism, the modernization of
absolutist state administrations and the development of a market for printed materials (Anderson
1991). The national community was held together by common language or the experience of
restricted social mobility within the territory of a colonial province. It was imagined as a
community of shared origin and history that would live through all the historical changes and
secular developments that the newly discovered emptiness of time made it possible to think of.
While Anderson noted, en passant, that the nationalist leaders of Latin America, including Simon
de Bolivar, were not prepared to count the black population of Venezuela or the Indian peasants
of Colombia in the national „we‟, he did not draw any consequences from this observation. In
general, there is little room for the more conflictive, warlike aspects in his analysis of the rise of
nationalism as the Zivilreligion of the modern world.

Anthony Smith goes furthest in blinding out the struggles for and against domination that
accompany the establishment of national states. Although he is aware that the solidarity of ethnic
and national communities is often the result of conflict and war (Smith 1981), his main
intellectual project went in an entirely different direction: to challenge the modernist account of
his former teacher Ernest Gellner by pointing to the continuity between modern nationalism (and
nation-states) and pre-modern ethnic communities (and ethnically defined polities). Nationalism
thus reframes already existing ethnic myths, historical memories and symbols of identity (Smith
1986). In a neo-Herderian fashion, then, history breathes through the body of immortal ethnic
groups that grow to full blossom in the age of nationalism. From this perspective, nations appear
as historically stable communities of solidarity which provide human beings with dignity, cultural
meaning and a sense of belonging.

Finally, authors like Michael Mann or Charles Tilly emphasized the role of warfare between
competing absolutist states in the generation of nationalism - which is seen as the response of an
emerging civil society against the increasing pressures of taxation and conscription. But they did
not look at the new forms of exclusion along ethnic lines that the nation-state brought about,

493
emphasizing instead its capacity to create solidarity and loyalty and thus to mobilize the
population for external conflict (Tilly 1975; Mann 1995).

It is only in the work of those authors most critical to the ideology of nationalism - not
accidentally the first authors to write book-long essays on the subject - that the exclusionary
character of nationalism and the nation-state are discussed more systematically. The conservative
historian Eddie Kedourie wrote a book (Kedourie 1960), against which much of Ernest Gellner's
writing was implicitly directed, that portrayed nationalism as an ill-guided modern ideology, born
out of German Romanticism and prone to bring destruction and violence to historically grown
multicultural societies such as those of Eastern Europe or the Middle East. Hans Kohn deplored
the totalitarian character of nationalism when it was combined with East European traditions of
authoritarian rule (Kohn 1944) - swiftly overlooking the history of nationalist wars, forced
assimilation and „religious cleansings‟ that characterized the development of nation-states in the
democratic, „civil‟ West. Hanna Arendt decried the fate - which included her own - of those who
fell between the grids of a world order of states that defined citizenship in national terms (Arendt
1951).

However, these remained marginal voices in a scholarly choir that praised the inclusionary
character of nationalism and the nation-state. Little attention was given to the making of the
boundaries of this egalitarian and inclusive community: the struggles over who belongs to the
nation and thus should enjoy equal rights before the law, be called upon to participate in politics
and be granted the privilege of having one's own culture and language valued and legitimated by
school and state. Thus, the fate of those who end up on the other side of the boundary went
almost unnoticed: those not treated as equals before the law but as aliens or second-class citizens;
who's political voice will be disregarded as that of „minorities‟; who's culture will be excluded
from the national sanctuary of museums and school curricula; who's language will not be
understood by administrators, university professors, policemen or judges. The horizontal
inequality between the estates of agrarian empires, so vividly portrayed by Ernest Gellner, is
replaced by a vertical inequality. The privileged access to the modern state that some ethnic
groups - turned into nations - enjoy is mirrored in the exclusion of those who are being declared
aliens, ethnic minorities, or immigrants with no such privileged relationship to the state.

There are three reasons for the orthodox focus on the process of inclusion within rather than the
exclusion at the borders of the national community. First, most authors take it for granted that

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nationalism leads eventually to the establishment of ethnonationally more or less homogeneous
states, such as the French, German or Italian proto-types. This obscures that fact that most nation-
states in the contemporary world are ethnically much more heterogeneous. Accordingly,
questions of dominance and subordination along ethnic lines play a crucial role in most modern
nation-states, especially in the postcolonial world. With the partial exception of Anderson and
Michael Mann, however, most of the well-known authors took the ideal envisioned by
nationalists - the congruence of nation and citizenry - as the average case to be explained by a
theory of nationalism and the nation-state. Secondly, the warlike process of achieving this ideal
state is, more often than not, taken as a by-product of specific, accidental historical developments
and not given an analytically central place in the portrait of nationalism and the rise of the nation-
state. Whatever the traumatic and deplorable historical circumstances, what matters, according to
the orthodox account, is that the historical train arrives at the final station, the homogeneous
nation-state. Finally, the analytical horizon is often reduced to what happens within the borders of
a would-be national state, thus obscuring the process of boundary-making and its exclusionary
nature. All three mechanisms - confounding the ideal for the average, the teleological reasoning
and the caging of the analytical perspective - establish and support what has been termed
„methodological nationalism‟, a characteristic of much social science thinking in the post-war
period (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).

THE BOUNDARY-MAKING PERSPECTIVE

There is, however, a respectable tradition of research which looks at the interplay between
national inclusion and exclusion along ethnic lines, between democratic participation of co-
nationals and the authoritarian domination of ethnic others (Young 1976; Williams 1989; Verdery
1994; Grillo 1998; Wimmer 2002; Kaufman 2004a; Mann 2005). This tradition aims to
understand how the imagining of a national community is intertwined with the creation of ethnic
or immigrant minorities and how these boundaries are reinforced and reproduced subsequently.
The emphasis lies less on explaining the rise of the nation-state in the West, as in most of the
classic accounts referred to above, than on the consequences that the spread of the nation-state
had outside the area of its original development - thus building on a perspective that had been
established by Kohn, Kedourie, Anderson and Meyer (Meyer 1997).

Once a state apparatus has been taken over by a nationalist movement, a process of nationalizing
its basic principles of exclusion and inclusion is set in motion. This politics of ethnic boundary-

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making by nationalizing state elites can take on different forms, depending on power relationships,
the nature of the ethnic mosaic on the territory of a new state and the relationship with the nation-
building projects of neighbouring states who may host similar ethnic populations on their territory.
Across all these variations, however, we can discern a common pattern: the new elites try to
establish a distinction between a dominant ethnonational core, „the people‟ considered to
represent the legitimate foundation of the new state, and those who are seen as not belonging to
that core and thus to the legitimate „owners‟ of the state.

Why should the modern state be propelled to distinguish between national core and ethnic
outsiders? Why does it try to nationalize criteria of access and membership? We should first
mention its heightened capacity, compared to pre-modern governments, to exercise control over
the population - through a unified administration, an integrated school system, a coordinated and
centralized military and judiciary apparatus - and enforce its rules even in remote parts of the
state's territory (Hechter 2000: chs 3 and 4; Mann 1995). The modern state uses this technical
power to enforce certain ethnic-national boundaries because it derives its legitimacy from the
nationalist doctrine according to which it represents the will of „the people‟ (Wimmer 2002: ch.
3). Defining the ethnic boundaries of this people is of utmost political importance because these
boundaries now also determine who will and who will not be included by the legal, political,
welfare and military institutions of the state. According to the nationalist doctrine, only full
members of the nation have the right to be treated equally before the law, to participate in
national politics, to be taken care of in case of illness or old age, to be defended against outside
aggressors.

However, it would be exaggerating to maintain that pre-modern, non-national states were not
interested in ethnic boundaries at all. Many of them were, in at least three ways. Some pre-
modern states were based on some, albeit comparatively loose notion of ethnic homogeneity (for
examples see Smith 1986: Part I). Secondly, the hierarchical strata of agrarian empires were,
contrary to what Gellner assumed (Gellner 1983), sometimes defined in ethnic terms. The
Spanish empire, to give an example, distinguished between peninsulares (Spanish-born settlers
and administrators), criollos (New World-born individuals of Spanish descent), indios and negros.
Thirdly, the early modern principle of cuius regio eius religio led to the first systematic attempts
at homogenizing a population in religious terms - as seen in the expulsion of Jews from Spain
under Isabella and Ferdinand, of Huguenots from France through the Edict of Nantes and the
countless similar episodes after the principle had been adopted by the Treaty of Westphalia.

496
The change from empires to modern nation-states, however, implied three fundamental
differences in the politics of ethnic boundary-making. First, the principle of ethnonational
homogeneity and of the ethnic-national repre-sentativity of the ruling elite became de rigueur for
the legitimization of authority. Thus, state elites now attempted to systematically homogenize
their subjects in cultural and ethnic terms, usually by declaring their own ethnic background,
culture and language as the „national‟ core into which everyone else should aspire to melt.
Secondly, stratifying ethnicity, dividing rulers from ruled, privileged groups from less privileged
ones, was replaced by a vertical ethnic boundary that separated foreigners from nationals,
national majority from ethnic minority. The trans-ethnic, universal principles of imperial rule - in
the name of Allah, of the spread of civilization, of revolutionary progress - had to give way to the
particularist ideal of national self-rule. Third, for all these reasons, the state apparatus now
embarked upon an active politics of diversity management that pre-modern empires were neither
interested in nor capable of.

Several variants of this politics of diversity management have been studied (Young 1976;
McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Young 1994; Esman 2004; Mann 2005), of which I will discuss only
two: the creation of national communities through the policies of assimilation of ethnic others
who are seen as potential members of the nation; and the enforcement of boundaries between
national majorities and ethnic minorities in cases where assimilation is not seen as an option.

Nation-building: from assimilation to ethnic cleansing

Many new state elites have embarked upon a project of nation-building - or „nation-destroying‟ if
seen through the eyes of the objects of such policies (Connor 1972). Even fervent nationalists
were often conscious of the limited reach of their own vision of the world. Massimo D'Azeglio,
Cavour's predecessor as prime minister of Piedmont, famously suggested, in the first meeting of
the parliament of the newly united Italian kingdom, that „Italy is made. We still have to make
Italians‟… the same held true for Arabs, Turks, Germans, Nigerians, Mongolians and Frenchmen.
Not only peasants were turned into Frenchman by the nationalizing state, to paraphrase a famous
book title (Weber 1979), but also Aquitanians, Provençales, Occitanians and other linguistic
groups that had maintained, at least to a certain degree, a sense of regional identity, sometimes
based on or connected to histories of previous political independence, such as in the case of
Savoy. In Poland around 1919, the state asked its population about their national background - an
eminently political question in this region of disputed boundaries. In the East, which was later

497
annexed by Russia, three-quarters of a million people answered by identifying as tutejsi, which
roughly translates as „locals‟. They spoke white-Russian dialects and adhered to the Orthodox
faith, but did not see themselves as Russians or white-Russians. They certainly do today (Hroch
1985: 166). Other examples abound: the various Slavic and Albanian groups in the Peloponnese
became Greeks; Wendish peasants in Eastern Germany, Germans; Copt-speaking communities,
Arab-speaking Egyptians (Deutsch 1953: 94).

To be sure, not all attempts at nation-building were successful. In Somalia, the idea of a Somali
nation as a community of political destiny has not had much success in overarching and erasing
clan and regional identities (Rothchild 1995). The failed nationalizing projects of Czechoslovakia
or Yugoslavia (Sekulic et al. 1994) are other examples. The unsuccessful attempt by the Kemalist
state to declare Kurdish-speakers „mountain Turks‟ adds to this list.

Nation-builders may employ various strategies to overcome existing ethnic divisions (cf. the
similar typology of McGarry and O'Leary 1993). They may simply push them aside and
propagate the new idea of a national community of solidarity, using the classical tools of school,
army and administration to teach and propagate this vision. „Invented‟ traditions, flags, symbols,
anthems may help in achieving this end, as an enormous literature in the wake of the seminal
volume edited by Hobsbawm and Ranger has shown (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

Secondly, a nationalizing state may actively encourage „mixture‟ and „amalgamation‟ of various
ethnic groups and their cultures into the melting pot of the grand nation. Mexico's ideology of
mestizaje, which was supposed to create, in the words of Mexican philosopher and longtime
minister of education José Vasconcelos, a „cosmic race‟, is one variant of this strategy (cf.
Wimmer 2002: ch. 6); the Brazilian state's ideology of „whitening‟ to deepen Brazil's „racial
democracy‟is another (Skidmore 1993 [1974]).

Thirdly, forced assimilation may be the means of transforming the mosaic of local ethnic and
religious identities into the national picture of a homogeneous population - from a Kokoschka to a
Mondrian, to play with a gellnerian metaphor. The Bulgarization of Turkish names in the 1980s
may serve as a rather dramatic recent example. Another is the successful absorption and total
assimilation of a large group of mixed Dutch-Indonesian descent that had fled to Holland after the
archipelago gained independence. Despite a „racial‟ difference, the policies of cultural
assimilation through special education, dispersed settlement all over the country and controlled

498
absorption into the labour market resulted in the disappearance of the group and the
corresponding boundary - a formidable demonstration of the power of nation-building (Willems
et al. 1990).

Other examples are the sedentarization of gypsies and the forced adoption of their children by
majority parents, framed as policies of re-educating the deviant and degenerated race of the
itinerants, a common practice throughout Europe. In Switzerland, a state-sponsored programme
that forced gypsy children into foster families and asylums ran from 1926 to 1972. The Australian
state, committed to its „white Australia‟ policy, aimed at annihilating the aborigine population by
a forced adoption programme which lasted from World War II to 1967 (Wolfe 2001: 872-3).

Fourthly, we may describe the various forms of ethnic cleansing as a strategy of homogenization.
Ethnic cleansing by nationalizing states can be traced back to the two Balkan wars and from there
to the „population exchange‟ between Greece and Turkey, the extermination of large sections of
the indigenous population of El Salvador during la matanza, the Holocaust, the mass massacres
and evictions during the partition of India and straight up to the recent events in Bosnia and
Darfur. Such „final solutions‟ to the „problem‟ of ethnic heterogeneity are a typically modern
phenomenon pursued by a state apparatus that is dedicated to realize the ideal of ethnonational
homogeneity by means of force and violence. The ethnic heterophobia of nationalizing states is,
together with other more precise contextual factors that Michael Mann (2005) has identified,
responsible for these moral nadirs of modern history - whether liberal nationalists like it or not (cf.
O'Leary 1998).

More specifically, state terror and violence against minorities often serve the aim, as Appadurai
(1998) has argued, of making clear, in a complex situation of overlapping membership, where the
boundaries to the dangerous enemies lie. Violence thus cuts the tumour from the flesh of the
nation's body, to paraphrase language often used by the intellectual fathers and organizational
masterminds of genocides. Gathering „Jews‟ into the camps and ghettos of Nazi Europe, driving
„Armenians‟ onto the mountain roads of Anatolia, forcing „Tutsis‟ into the churches and
schoolhouses of the land of a Thousand Hills makes unambiguously clear who „Jews‟,
Armenians' and „Tutsis‟ are where intermarriage, assimilation and conversion have previously
blurred boundaries.

The creation and management of ethnic minorities

499
Not all ethnic minorities are singled out, however, for a policy of assimilation or expulsion and
not all such policies succeed in erasing all marks of ethnic difference from the landscape of
identities. In many cases, minorities are meant to remain permanently outside of the sphere of
national imagination but inside the state's territory. Whether or not an ethnic group is envisioned
as being a potential member of the national family depends on the structure of political alliance in
the crucial early phases of nation-state formation, as recent research has shown. Anthony Marx
explains how different constellations of political conflict and alliance led to inclusion of the black
population into Brazil's nation-building project and to their exclusion and domination in the
United States and South Africa (Marx 1999). Similarly, I have tried to show that it depends on the
reach of elite political networks which groups will be considered part of a nation to be. Thus, the
trans-ethnic character of political networks in Switzerland explains the exceptional history of
multi-ethnic nation-building. Those networks were limited to a Creole-mestizo elite in newly
independent Mexico, which accounts for the exclusion of the vast majority of the indigenous
populations from their nation-building project up to the Mexican revolution. The segregation of
political networks along ethno-religious lines in pre-independent Iraq inhibited an Iraqi
nationalism from emerging as a politically dominant force once the country was released from the
colonial leash (Wimmer 2002).

What happens to those who remain outside of the national community, who are not meant to
assimilate into it and are not driven from the territory through forced expulsion or relocation? We
can postulate a certain pattern of how nationalizing states deal with permanent minorities on their
territory. The first step often consists in creating or re-arranging ethnic categories to describe and
administer those local groups that are perceived as not fitting into the national picture. Various
local communities, peasant villages and urban communities organized along lines of
neighbourhoods, local churches, or guilds, are grouped into larger ethnic entities. This helps to
administer them more easily and to exercise some form of control over them by naming
„representatives‟ for these newly forged entities and co-opting them into the bureaucratic-
administrative system. Over time, these newly created categories become inscribed into the
administrative routines of the state. A recent example of such ethno-genesis is the emergence of
the ethnic group of the Comanche (Hagan 1976:133) out of a variety of bands of different ethnic
origin.

A major technique for minority creation is the census. A small literature on the politics of
boundary-making through national censuses has emerged (Alonso and Starr 1987; Nobles 2000;

500
Arel 2002). Recent examples from the United States are the creation and growing acceptance of
the categories of „hispanic‟ (Padilla 1986) or Asians' (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2003), which
originally made little sense from the point of view of those that were designated as such. Much
earlier, the boundary between „black‟ and „white‟ was imposed by state agencies on a more
diverse and complex system of classifications that had previously been recognised in the South
(Lee 1999). However, attempts at imposing new ethnoymes by modern nation-states may also fail.
The authorities of the homeland of Ciskei in Apartheid South Africa created the ethnonation of
the „Ciskeians‟ but remained the only ones to find the new category meaningful (Anonymous
1989).

The creation of ethnic categories is a first step in the process of singling out and „managing the
problem‟ of ethnic minorities - „die jüdische Frage‟, „the Negro problem‟, „la cuestión indígena‟,
and so on. It is often followed by enforcement of the distinction between national majority and
ethnic minority through the three related strategies of segregation, legalization and discrimination
(see also, with regard to racialized groups, Wacquant 1997). By tying the distribution of life
chances to membership in ethnic categories, segregation, legalization and discrimination
powerfully affect the way individuals define themselves and are formidable tools to enforce the
distinction between national majority and ethnic minority (Forsyth 1999).

Strategies of segregation aim at reducing the interaction between members of different ethnic
categories. This greatly supports the plausibility of the categorization, since it creates or
reinforces group boundaries and closure and thus makes the division of the social world appear
natural and self-evident. Examples are the residential segregation rules imposed on minorities, the
paradigmatic case being the creation of Jewish ghettos in early modern Europe - albeit this is an
example of a medieval policy of community segregation rather than of modern minority
management - and of black ghettos in North America after the First World War (Massey and
Denton 1994). Another example is the marriage rules such as those prohibiting „white‟ and „non-
white‟ marriages in the United States; the first laws were passed in 1661 in Maryland
(Frankenberg 1993) and the last corresponding constitutional provisions were abolished in
Alabama more than three hundred years later.

As this last example indicates, law represents a powerful mechanism for enforcing ethnic
boundaries and the different statuses ascribed to the various ethnonational categories. The most
important tool in the legal arsenal of boundary enforcement is citizenship laws (Brubaker 1992;

501
Wimmer 2002: ch. 3). They tie universal human rights to a specific ethnonational community, as
Hannah Arendt was the first to remark (Arendt 1951). And they made membership in such
communities a matter of birth and inheritance. Once acquired, one's citizenship becomes a
permanent, „deep-seated‟ characteristic to be transmitted to the next generation - born from
„French parents, one would be and remain „French‟ even if one had never set foot on the Hexagon.
In contrast, ethnic minorities that were not considered part of the national majority were often
relegated to the status of second-class citizens - such as African Americans in the South or Jews
in pre-war Eastern Europe - or sometimes even completely deprived of all citizenship rights.
Examples of the latter include the so-called Faili Kurds in Iraq, who in the 1970s were deprived
of Iraqi citizenship and then driven over the border to Iran (McDowall 1996: 30), or of the
Banyarwanda in Zaire, who were denaturalized in 1980 following a retroactive nationality law
(Lemarchand 2004). The struggles over the citizenship status of Russians in the newly
independent Baltic states are well known.

A final strategy of ethnic boundary enforcement is institutionalized discrimination: the unequal

treatment of persons of different ethno-racial background in the day-to-day workings of the state
administration - even when no restrictions are placed on formal citizenship rights. One of the
most dramatic examples of negative discrimination is again provided by the American South
before the civil rights movement. Discrimination by state authorities against ethnic minorities is
widely reported from the newly independent Soviet successor states (Grodeland et al. 2000) and
the developing world (Horowitz 1985: 194; Hyden and Williams 1994). Positive discrimination
may also reinforce and institutionalize ethnic boundaries between a national majority and
„underrepresented‟ or, to the contrary „overachieving‟ ethnic minorities, the most prominent
examples being the minority quotas in the US educational system (Bowen and Bok 2000), in the
Soviet bureaucracy (Vujacic and Zaslavsky 1991; Martin 2001), and in Malaysia, Nigeria, India
and Sri Lanka (a critical view on these policies is provided by Sowell 2004; for other examples,
see Horowitz 1985: 655f.).

Once the distinction between national majority and ethnic minority is established and enforced,
members of the dominant ethnic group with a privileged relationship to the nationalizing state
share a common interest in controlling the boundary (Rothschild 1981: ch. 5). Various strategies
are known from the literature. One is establishing a „moving cultural target‟ for assimilating
groups, thus recreating a boundary with new diacritical markers when previous assimilation by
minority groups has threatened to make it permeable or fuzzy. Examples such as the assimilating

502
Jews in nineteenth-century Europe or Sanskritizing caste-less groups in India are discussed by
David Laitin (Laitin 1995). Other authors have observed that in Guatemala and highland Mexico,
the ethnic boundary persists despite considerable cultural assimilation, mostly due to the
boundary policing strategies of ladinos and mestizos (Tax and Hinshaw 1970; Colby and van den
Berghe 1969: 173; Smith 1975: 228; Reina 1966: 31f). Tellingly enough, those fully assimilated
may be rejected as indios revestidos („disguised Indios‟) or, in South America, as cholos (Aguirre
Beltrán 1967: 301-11). In Northern Ireland Catholics were recognized by their gestures, body
language and idiosyncrasies of grammar (Easthope 1976, cited in Banton 1983: 180; Burton 1978,
cited in Jenkins 1997). In all OECD countries, citizens with „foreign‟ names are confronted with
very substantial forms of discrimination on the housing and labour markets, as a series of studies
using the ILO methodology has shown (Taran et al. 2004). More imposing markers of identity to
ensure non-ambiguity of boundaries include the star of Davis in Nazi Germany, the ethnic labels
in Rwandan identity documents (Longman 2001), or the percentage of Indian „blood‟ certified by
government agencies in the United States (Meyer 1999). They are all formidable instruments to
police the boundary and prevent its blurring through strategies of assimilation and passing.

VARIATIONS

Obviously enough, the degree to which nationalizing states enforce ethnic boundaries and
discriminate between national majority and ethnic minorities varies from one state to another and
from one historical period to another. Along a continuum from more inclusive to more exclusive
constellations, we find, at one end, extreme cases of ethnocratic domination, such as Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, which was effectively controlled by the members of his own clan and tribe
(Baram 1997). Shi'as and Kurds were systematically excluded from higher ranks in the
bureaucracy, party and the army, which did not hesitate to declare war against the civilian
populations of the Kurdish North (Wimmer 2002: ch. 6). At the other end of the spectrum, we
find the contemporary United States, which has officially abandoned the exclusive ethnocracy of
Anglo-Saxon Protestantism and embarked upon a remarkable programme of multi-ethnic nation-
building through the official recognition (albeit not social inclusion) of an ever-greater number of
ethnic and racial minorities (Kaufman 2004b).

However widely the boundaries of the national community are imagined, however, it remains a
bounded community, with the large majority of the world's population on the outside. The
institution of citizenship is the legal tool to enforce social closure along national lines even in

503
cases where the doors of assimilation or of recognition as minorities are held widely open. In
some highly integrative nation-states, such as Switzerland, which managed to build up a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious national community and where ethnic domination between citizens is
largely unknown, one-fifth of the resident population are systematically and legally discriminated
against as foreign nationals - and thus denied the right to vote, the right to choose one's profession
and place of residence freely and the right to be taken care of by the welfare state in case of
lifelong dependency (Wimmer 2002: ch. 8). Characteristically, whenever the legal discrimination
between citizens and non-citizens was reduced, access to the national territory for immigrants
became more selective and restrictive. The more the nation opens its gates for established
immigrants, the more it closes its borders to those left on the outside (cf. also Lucassen 1995). We
should therefore be careful in taking the recent decline in legal discrimination of immigrants as a
sign that the inclusive logic of the modern nation-state has finally won over its more shadowy,
exclusionary sides (for such a view, see for example Joppke 2004).

In less domestically inclusive nation-states, we find many of the same mechanisms of exclusion
between different ethnic segments of the state's citizens rather than between the latter and
immigrants. Where the political networks of the nationalizing state elite did exclude large
sections of the population, an overarching, inclusive mode of imagining the nation à la Suisse
could not develop. The new state classes then use ethnicity as a basis for mobilizing a political
following and in turn favour their co-ethnics when it comes to deciding who gets a government
job, where to build a hospital or a bridge, whom to give justice to in a trial or whom to admit to
the newly founded universities. The state administration, the school system, the army are thus
compartmentalized along ethnic lines and ethnic discrimination and favouritism flourish.
Depending on power relationships and the waxing and waning of political alliances, larger or
smaller groups may gain control of the state apparatus and successfully drive others from the
sources of power. In extreme cases such as Syria, Iraq or Burundi, a demographic minority may
be in total control of the state and its repressive apparatus and thinly veil the authoritarian
ethnocracy with a nationalist discourse appealing to all citizens of the country.

Wherever a society is situated on this continuum of variations - and other dimensions could easily
be added - they are characterized by some form of closure and exclusion along ethnonational lines.
These shadowy sides of the modern nation-state have remained largely unexplored by the classic
works that have shaped the historical sociology of nationalism. Whether or not such exclusion
can be defended on normative grounds, as the political philosophy of liberal nationalism

504
maintains (Miller 1995), is an entirely different matter - as is the more general question of
whether the exclusionary features of the nation-state highlighted in this chapter will fade away as
the universalizing logic of the rule of law further unfolds. It may suffice to note here that the „de-
nationalization of the modern state that many social scientists have noted during the 1990s and
some have interpreted as signs the coming of a „post-national‟ age (e.g. Soysal 1994) has been
reversed in some noticeable cases - from the United States to the Netherlands.

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Haugaard, Mark. "Nationalism and Liberalism." Pp. 345-56

INTRODUCTION

Arguably nationalism and liberalism are two of the most successful ideologies of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries (the others include socialism and conservatism) and both are associated
with the rise of modernity in the eighteenth century. While they share their origins in modernity,
only liberalism's success was widely predicted and perceived to be the logical outcome of
modernization. In contrast, nationalism was seen as a temporary aberration. Modernity
presupposes atomized individuals, fitted for industrial production, who reject any forms of
essentialism, which is seen as a hangover from feudalism. Modernity is also premised upon the
march of reason, which should dispel sources of the self based upon metaphysical notions of
community, especially those that lay claim to primordial roots.

By and large, liberals do not find the recent emergence of liberalism in the least perturbing but
interpret this fact as a confirmation of the sophistication of their ideology - a manifestation of the
growth of reason. In contrast, nationalists frequently dispute the view that nationalism is a
phenomenon of historically recent date, tending to see it as a „natural condition‟ of humankind.
Consequently, nationalists rarely develop complex philosophical arguments to justify their
position. In Imagined Communities, Anderson argues that nationalism is not an ideology but more
a form of sentiment and, in support of this he observes that liberals frequently refer to political
theorists, whereas nationalists rarely do so (Anderson 1983: 5).

While liberals expend greater intellectual energy theorizing, nationalists are more willing to
sacrifice their lives for the sake of their ideological cause. Or, at the very least, nationalists are
more likely than liberals to make reference to, and celebrate, those who have died in their cause.
The celebrated tomb of the „Unknown Soldier‟ commemorates a soldier who died for the cause of
nationalism (Anderson 1983: 9-12). There is no liberal conceptual equivalent to this, nor do
liberals appear to feel the need for it - there are no annual pilgrimages to the tombs of dead
liberals.

These contrasts tell us that, while both are consequences of modernity, nationalism and liberalism
are sociologically different phenomena. While I would not go as far as Anderson, arguing that

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nationalism is not an ideology, it is a mistake to compare them as though they were normative
political theories where disagreement is over some philosophical point, as is the case, for instance,
in contemporary debates between liberals and communitarians. Hence, I would argue that
attempts by thinkers such as Tamir (1993), Miller (1995) and Moore (2001) to bring nationalism
and liberalism together purely within the traditions of contemporary political philosophy miss an
important aspect of what distinguishes nationalism from liberalism. In this article I shall use a
sociological understanding of how these very different ideologies were the outcome of modernity
and, from these premises, analyse the normative compatibility of the two ideologies. However, it
is essential to begin with a few words concerning nationalism and liberalism as concepts.

THE CONCEPTS

Nationalism and liberalism are concepts that do not have stable uncontested definitions. Part of
the reason is that both are what Wittgenstein (1967) has termed „family resemblance‟ concepts.
These are concepts which do not have a single core essence that defines them but are rather like
the members of a family, who resemble one another by a criss-crossing of characteristics - eyes,
complexion, stature and so on.

The differences in form taken by liberalism are largely a reflection of theoretical traditions of
thought and premises. The two dominant traditions are utilitarianism and contractarianism, while
the most frequently used premises are either toleration or autonomy. Within the liberal
perspective the basic unit of analysis is the individual. The latter maximizes autonomy and
considers the pursuit of toleration essential for legitimacy. In contrast, any definition of
nationalism is largely a reflection of historical circumstance. It used to be taken for granted that
all nationalists desired full sovereignty in the form of a state of their own (for instance, Gellner
1983: 1), but, as many commentators have pointed out (for instance, Keating 1996), only some
nationalists wish for full sovereignty, while others are content with local autonomy. Nationalism
varies according to what is considered central to constituting the nation, which can be language,
religion, perceived racial difference or identity. The central unit of analysis of nationalism is not
„the individual‟ but the „nation‟, which is a communally constituted entity. Of course, it is
individuals who are nationalists but these social agents are perceived as „incomplete‟ without
national membership. The autonomous individual of liberalism is preoccupied with community as
a constraint upon freedom, while the nationalist considers community a condition of self-
realization. Nineteenth-century nationalist rhetoric used the concept of autonomy, which sounds

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superficially like liberalism, but for nationalists the autonomy of the individual derives from the
autonomy of the nations and is consequently subservient to it.

Like all political ideologies, both liberalism and nationalism are essentially theories stipulating
the conditions under which state power structures are legitimate. Because both are family
resemblance concepts, any definition will not cover all instances. Most liberals hold that the state
is legitimate insofar as it is based upon one of the following: toleration, neutrality, rights, justice
as fairness, freedom or autonomy. In contrast, nationalists believe that the state is legitimate
insofar as there is congruence between sovereign state and nation, or sufficient state power
delegated to the nation for it to flourish. Within this the nation can be defined linguistically,
religiously, culturally or in terms of identity.

Nationalism and liberalism should be considered as scalar, rather than absolute concepts.
Absolute concepts are like apples and oranges: something is either an apple or an orange, not
more or less so. In contrast, as scalar concepts nationalism and liberalism are both held with
differing levels of intensity. At one end of the scale there are nationalists and liberals who, for
instance, are willing to give their lives either for the nation or freedom of speech while at the
other end are those who, in everyday life, express some mild pleasure in seeing „their‟ national
team win a sporting event or express mild dismay at the passing of some law which violates „their
liberties‟. While individuals occur at the extremes of both liberal and nationalist scales, it is
arguably the case that the intense end of the scale is more significant to nationalists than to
liberals.

The scalar nature of nationalism and liberalism points to another aspect of these ideologies. As
characterized by Giddens (1984), an actor's knowledge of social life can be divided into two parts:
discursive consciousness knowledge, which is knowledge that actors can readily put into words,
and practical consciousness knowledge - what Bourdieu called habitus. Practical consciousness
knowledge is much greater in its extent than discursive consciousness knowledge and is essential
to the everyday social competence of social actors. It is an interpretative horizon, constituted of
conceptual categories, upon which we routinely draw in making sense of the world - we see
tables and chairs as „natural occurrences‟. While there is a continual flow between practical and
discursive consciousness, there are some concepts that tend, by their nature, to be more discursive
than practical. Knowledge of tables and chairs tends to be practical consciousness, while obscure
empirical facts, such as „black holes‟, tend to be discursive in nature. By and large, liberalism

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tends to be more discursive consciousness than nationalism. Liberalism is more akin to black
holes, while nationalism tends to be like tables and chairs. The average social actor does not
believe that they need to resort to theoretical physics in order to understand tables and chairs,
while they do for black holes. They believe that political theory is necessary for the justification
of liberalism, not for nationalism. Hence, liberalism tends to be associated with political
philosophy while nationalism is seen primarily as a social phenomenon and academic writing on
liberalism tends to be from the perspective of political theory, whereas nationalism is treated
sociologically. There are no „Andersons‟ or „Gellners‟ of liberalism because, like theoretical
physics, liberalism is not considered to be a social phenomenon - it is the march of„socially
unencumbered reason‟. Of course, both these claims are false: liberalism is a social product in the
same way as nationalism is and a proper understanding of nationalism presupposes some fairly
complex discursive normative theory.

THE ORIGINS OF NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM

Nationalism and liberalism are inextricably bound up with a change of practical consciousness
associated with modernity. This fact is not altered by the existence of great liberal and nationalist
thinkers - Hobbes, Locke, Herder and Fichte. To be successful even the most highly discursively
ideology „floats‟ in a sea of practical consciousness. While there may have been instances of
liberalism or nationalism in the feudal or Classical world, these ideas could not constitute a
socially influential ideology without a shift in general practical consciousness knowledge. In the
medieval world the language of liberalism and nationalism could not have been generalized.
Social actors were neither the autonomous individuals of liberalism nor primarily members of
nations, as in nationalism. People were members of local communities, families, status groups
and religious faiths, all of which created obligations which made liberal individual autonomy a
conceptual impossibility and membership of a nation, if existent at all, just one among many
obligations.

The decline of teleology was central to the change. In a teleological system objects move or
change because of some essence within them. As argued by Aristotle, what makes an acorn
become an oak is the essence of „oakness‟ within the acorn. The ultimate end or telos is the prime
cause of change. The world of teleology was one of essences realizing themselves. Planets did not
move according to laws of physics, which are indifferent to purpose, but because of telos. The
revolution which Galileo and Newton brought about in physics was the replacement of a

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purposeful teleological cosmos with an essentially purposeless universe driven by laws that are
expressed mathematically.

In politics the teleological world manifested itself in a complex hierarchy of political institutions
that reflected particular essences. The „Great Chain of Being‟ manifested divine purpose whereby
aristocrats embodied a different essence from feudal serfs. In social practice this entailed a great
cultural difference, which reinforced and legitimized the hierarchy of the feudal world. As
described by Elias (2000), the local aristocracy deliberately lived and behaved differently from
peasants. They dressed differently (as expressed in sartorial laws), ate differently (using knives
and forks while peasants used their hands) and, frequently, even spoke a different language.
There is a medieval Danish saying which encapsulates this: „An aristocrat speaks Latin to
scholars, French to his peers, German to the peasants and Danish to his dogs.‟

The adoption of particular forms of behaviour made classes different in their predispositions in
much the same way as peoples from disparate cultures are different in today's world. The
legitimacy of the system was rooted in this cultural difference, which created the illusion of
deeper essential difference between classes. The manners of the elites were not perceived as a
manifestation of „arbitrary‟ social practices but were considered to reflect essential differences
ranging on a continuous scale from the humblest plant, through human society, to God. Any
attempt at violating this hierarchy was „unnatural‟ because it represented violation of essence and
was likely to bring divine retribution - witness Shakespeare's Macbeth.

The vision of the Enlightenment was a continuous one, in which reason was expected to expand
indefinitely and everything was reducible to rational laws. Kant defined enlightenment as the
courage to think purely according to reason, while authority and tradition are sources of error
(Kant 1970 [1784]). This continuity entailed that there was a conceptual move from the physical
world to that of politics. Beginning from the premise of a „state of nature‟, which precludes
tradition and authority, Hobbes (1914 [1651]) argued that he was constructing politics that
„mirrored‟ the natural world and likened it to building a clock - a machine that moves according
to the laws of mechanical physics.

Since people along the Great Chain of Being had different essences, it was considered natural that
the law to which they were subject should reflect this - different laws for different people. In
physics the laws of gravity apply equally and, so too, in liberalism all individuals are subject to

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the same law, regardless of life plan. Consequently, the different cultures of the hierarchy of the
feudal world become quaint arbitrary irrelevancies.

The liberal view of the self is paradigmatically represented by Rawls's description of the „original
position‟, which he considers the premise for all considerations of justice. In the original position
social actors are behind a „veil of ignorance‟ whereby „no-one knows his place in society, his
class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like …‟ (Rawls 1971:12). This view of
justice entails that legitimate political institutions must bracket precisely the characteristics which
were essential to feudal legitimacy. The liberal selves are „unencumbered‟ (Sandel 1982), or
indifferent to specificity, and the state must be „neutral‟ in order to be legitimate. It is not that
telos disappears entirely from the liberal interpretative horizon but becomes separated from the
public realm. As observed by Hayek (1960), we must distinguish between political systems
(composed of anonymous individuals thrown together by chance) and organizations, which are
deliberately created for specific purposes. Telos becomes confined to the private realm of
organizations.

This fundamental social change of interpretative horizon reflects (and legitimizes) the rise of the
bourgeoisie. The private world of commerce works according to laws of economics which, like
gravity, know no exceptions. As argued by Weber, it is a world that functions best when it
conforms to principles of calculated rationality, one in which precise calcula-bility of profit
makes reinvestment possible. Of course profits were made in the feudal world, but they were not
derived from this form of precise instrumental rationality - from fortuna, not double entry book-
keeping.

In feudalism what could be bought and sold was frequently tied to status, while in capitalism all
that counts is the ability to pay. This indifference to the identity applies to the internal structure of
the firm, which works according to bureaucratic instrumental rationality. The good bureaucrat
applies means-ends rationality to all things and people irrespective of „irrelevant considerations‟.
People are like things that, in principle, are interchangeable (numbers in a file) and are the
conceptual equivalents of the unencumbered selves of liberalism.

As has been argued by Spruyt (1994), an essential element in the triumph of the bourgeoisie was
the emergence of the sovereign territorial state, which made the world of commerce easier. The

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interests of the early bourgeoisie were fundamentally at odds with the confused hierarchies of the
pre-modern world. They wanted one legal system where goods could not arbitrarily be seized or
taxed based upon ancient feudal privilege and desired one monetary system and single set of
weights and measures.

The emergence of a centralized state is essential to liberalism. Hobbes (1914 [1651]) is regarded
as one of the founders of modern liberalism (although he believed in absolute sovereignty)
because he argued that all authority should be vested in a centralized state, in contrast with the
diffused power structures of feudalism. The reason that the liberal state claims a monopoly on
violence is that it is also the sole source of political authority.

While the unencumbered self of liberalism is inherently rational, it has to be created through
socialization. The world of interchangeable individuals presupposes that they are relatively
similar. While the feudal world presupposed socialization that made classes dissimilar, in contrast,
large contiguous industrialized territorial states are premised upon a relatively homogeneous
people. As Gellner has argued (1983), the only method of achieving this outcome is by moving
socialization from the home to the state. In essence, a common educational system functions as a
form of mass state-controlled socialization.

When an employee is hired, their personal biography, lineage and descent become irrelevant. A
common education ensures that their social practices are relatively predictable in accordance with
established norms („lateness‟, „negligence‟ and „disobedience‟ etc. should have been eradicated:
Foucault 1979: 178) and their educational qualifications can tell you exactly what the person is
capable of. However, this mass socialization through education makes culture a political issue.
For instance, a local dialect or language has to be chosen as „standard‟. While the Danish peasant
was content to speak Danish at home and the local lords to converse in French, suddenly
everyone had to speak Danish and, of course, this raises the question, whose Danish or which
dialect? the answer was, unsurprisingly, Danish as spoken by the bourgeoisie of Copenhagen.
Dictionaries were compiled, grammars written, which became the basis for „school‟ Danish.
Slowly Danish dialects were eradicated, except in Norway where it was decided to standardize
different dialects and call the result Norwegian. Similarly, in all the major European sovereign
territorial states (Spain, France, Italy, Germany and Britain) a single dialect becomes standardized
as the language of the nation. The language that you speak, or your children are compulsorily
socialized into, becomes a political issue and nationalism is born.

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State control over education is not only functional to capitalism but reflects both the liberal view
of individuals as essentially equivalent and the nationalist perception of a people or nation who
share common socialization. Common education is also central to legitimating capitalism.
Individuals who share common state-monitored education are the essential starting point for
meritocracy. In theory (although frequently not in practice), effort should be rewarded and
educational qualifications reflect this. The fact that theory and practice do not always correspond
results in temporary localized perceptions of illegitimacy but even this failure leads to renewed
efforts to use education as a tool of meritocracy, which is central to liberalism. Individuals come
into the world unencumbered and, entirely by their own efforts, succeed. For this reason so much
of A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971) is devoted to this subject.

Nationalists do not present the standardization of a particular local culture as a form of

homogenization but as a return to traditional community. This dual aspect of nationalism led
Gellner to argue that there is an essential deception at the core of nationalism whereby it is really
„the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substi-tutable atomized
individuals …‟ which presents itself as a return to the peasant virtues of the volk (Gellner 1983:
57). In essence it is a Gesellschaft presenting itself as a Gemeinschaft (Gellner 1997: 74).
However, as has been argued by Delanty and O'Mahony (2002: 73), this type of false
consciousness argument is theoretically unsatisfactory because it reduces social agents to dupes
who are mistaken about their beliefs.

The founders of modern sociology (Marx, Durkheim and Weber) shared the common
Enlightenment misconception that modernity was a move from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft,
from traditional communities to societies governed by abstract reason. In all probability, this
influenced Gellner into believing that, as a modernizing force, nationalism had to be a
Gesellschaft, irrespective of what nationalists believe. However, I would argue that in the
transition to modernity Gemeinschaft does not disappear, or is not overcome, but becomes
transformed, even if it appears counterintuitive that the disenchanted, individualistic and de-
essentialized modern world could be fertile soil for a nationalist Gemeinschaft.

Following Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990), modernity entails an increase in levels of reflexivity
In traditional societies social structures are taken as given and tradition confers sanctity upon
them. In contrast, in a reflexive society actors are constantly expected to justify social structures,
which, I would argue (unlike Beck and Giddens), is deeply problematic (Haugaard 2002: 122-37).

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The reproduction of structure by individual social agents, or structuration (Giddens 1984),
presupposes knowledge of social life which, when tacit, is unproblematic. However, if it is
reflexive, it is no longer routine. If actors are called upon reflexively to justify everyday social
practices, this entails a massive transfer of taken-for-granted knowledge into discursive
consciousness. However, while such a transfer may be critically liberating, it can lead to massive
ontological insecurity, whereby actors feel ill at ease with their being-in-the-world. Competent
social agency entails viewing social convention with a „natural attitude‟, whereby social life
remains as a given. This is not simply because the complexity of social life demands that most
social knowledge remains practical consciousness but because there is a real danger that the
structures of social life dissolve once converted into discursive reason, as they are largely
arbitrary social constructions that cannot be justified through reason.

Giddens observes that modern reflexivity entails that your life history is of your own making
(1991), while in traditional societies, careers, sexual orientation, gender and so on were largely
predetermined. While Giddens views this reflexivity as inherently empowering, I would argue
that this invitation to construct your own history has the potential to be quite the opposite: an
invitation to meaninglessness. Constructing self, coupled with the realization that social structures
are an arbitrary convention, results in ontological insecurity. While most social actors are forced
to choose careers within the industrial system of modernity, they do not have a desire to choose
their identity in its entirety, especially in the knowledge that such a choice is between arbitrary
conventions. Hence, they may embrace the idea that while being a carpenter or high court judge is
not predetermined by family lineage, there are other aspects of identity that should remain
foreclosed - you simply are Irish, Japanese or Norwegian. Which is why we may ask a child of a
carpenter if they wish to become a firefighter or judge but it would be most unusual to enquire of
an English child if they wished to become Japanese or Norwegian.

In the minds of most people nationality is part of their inherent being-in-the-world. Of course,
people can change nationality but this is often viewed as suspect. As has been argued by Bauman
(1989: 52-6), the Nazis felt more threatened by Jews who were indistinguishable from other
Germans than they did by Orthodox Jews. The point is that the former demonstrated, through
their social competence, that „German-ness‟ was a social construction, which they could choose
to adopt. Consequently, they became an essential reminder of the arbitrariness of nations, one that
had to be eliminated.

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Nationalism entails that identity is a given and, as a form of Gemeinschaft it means that there is
something beyond the self securing the structures of social life from degeneration into arbitrary
conventionality. Following Durkheim's Suicide (1952), Gemeinschaft, or what he termed
„mechanical solidarity‟ (I am subsuming the two), entails that the self depends for its existence
upon an external whole in which community is more than the sum of its parts. This totality is not
seen as an arbitrary construct but is reified; consequently everything that is embodied by the
nation becomes more than mere convention. As nationalism embodies the socialization of a
people, this entails that the entire way of life of a people becomes deconventionalized and, thus,
saved from the inherently deconstructive tendencies of modern rationalism.

The reifications used are complex and varied. The doctrine that the nation is created by God is a
relatively common one. It is most obviously manifest in the doctrine of „God‟s chosen people',
which is central to Zionism but also found in the nationalism of Dutch settlers in South Africa,
Ulster Protestantism (Akenson 1991), American and Basque nationalism.

Nature has traditionally always been considered beyond convention. So, nations are frequently
naturalized and it is claimed that belonging to nations is some kind of natural inclination, which is
common to all humankind. Primordialism affirms the naturalness of nations by indefinite
extension into the past. A diluted version of the primordialist thesis, which nonetheless preserves
this form of reification, is the doctrine that nations are essentially equivalent to the tribes of
traditional societies.

Science is another way of reifying nationalism. Biological genetic theories of race are the most
obvious and enjoyed a vogue in the nineteenth century but generally have fallen out of favour
since 1945. A different mode of making nationalism scientific is Darwinian evolutionary theories,
which claim that nationalism is a manifestation of needs that are essential for the survival of the
species. For instance, van de Berghe (1981) argues that the nation is a natural extension of the
family.

The nation can be reified by claiming that it has a unique civilizing role. As a „higher civilization‟,
a national culture is not some arbitrary form of social convention but a unique achievement,
which transcends convention in some deeply metaphysical way - for example, French, English,
Italian, Japanese and Norwegian nationalism. A variant on this is the claim that, even though the
national culture is not uniquely civilized at the moment, there was a past „Golden Age‟. Decline

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was forced upon the nation but national awakening contains the promise of a return - for example,
Irish nationalism. The Hegelian notion of the nation representing the march of reason would be
another variant on claiming a unique civilization.

What all these claims have in common is the reification of the nation as something other than
arbitrary convention. The ontological security that this provides is coupled with an attempt to
render the nation sacred through ritual. The flag becomes iconic and the yearly calendar
punctuated by collective rituals, such as the national day, and more routine and everyday rituals,
which include diplomatic and sporting events - banal nationalism (Billig 1995). These share more
with religious belief than they do with instrumental disenchanted logic. Large crowds come
together and chant encouragement at „their‟ national team, while they wave the national flag,
which serves a similar function to a sacred totem in primitive religions. Supporters frequently
consume large quantities of alcohol, which has the effect of intensifying feelings of excitement
and consequent enchantment (Durkheim 1995: 228).

In essence what is being argued is that while liberalism is consonant with Enlightenment
rationality, the latter threatens the ontological security of everyday life by showing cultural
practices and identity as part of essentially arbitrary cultural conventions, which become
disenchanted. In contrast, the appeal of nationalism is precisely that it does the opposite. The
practical consciousness of the nation becomes other than arbitrary convention, which can be
cherished by the state and, when placed in the context of banal rituals, becomes enchanted. The
functionality of nationalism to modernity stems from its homogenizing effects while it appeals to
social actors because it provides ontological security and enchantment in a social world where
reflexivity tends to undermine it. This explains why nationalists find constructivist accounts of
nationalism threatening. It is not that they do not understand that social constructivists take „the
social‟ seriously (Gellner 1997) or that „imagined‟ means „imaginary‟ - Anderson - but they intuit
that the appeal of nationalism lies in its capacity to overcome the ontological insecurity entailed
by constructivism.

If ontological security is rooted in practical consciousness knowledge, it is logical that

nationalism should be a less discursive ideology than liberalism. Nationalism is part of the
practical knowledge of competent social agency and the reifications, which make nations non-
conventional and sacred, entail that the nation does not require intellectualiza-tion. The nation
just „is‟ and to theorize it in the language of sociology is irrelevant and smacks of profanation.

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The perception of the nation as non-conventional and sacred gives externality to the social actor
which renders their identity enduring. For the liberal self, the autonomous self has no meaning
outside itself, hence it makes no sense for the self to be sacrificed for a collective social
construction that is arbitrary convention. In contrast, for the nationalist the nation is what gives
meaning to the self as a socialized being. Socialization makes them part of the nation, which is
made real by the belief that it is beyond convention and part of the enchanted world. To such an
actor the ultimate self-sacrifice, dying for the flag, represents a union between the self and the
real. As Durkheim argued (1952), such self-sacrifice is not self-annihilation but self-realization.
The dead soldier or suicide bomber lives on through their fusion with the nation. Dead liberals no
longer count, but dead nationalists are still real as long as the nation lives on.

To nationalists, betraying their dead is both a betrayal of the nation and a betrayal of the self. In
negotiations with Sinn Fein/IRA it is noticeable that the views of all those who died for Ireland
are considered particularly significant. Within this the views of those who died on hunger-strike
in 1983 are given particular weight. Suicide for the cause renders these members „real‟ through
„fusion‟ with the history of the nation.

If the hypothesis is correct that nationalism is essentially a modern Gemeinschaft, while

liberalism is a Gesellschaft, the question has to be raised: how is it possible that modern social
actors subscribe to both ideologies? The easy, although sociologically unsatisfactory, answer
might be that they represent different people - liberal moderns and nationalist moderns. However,
I would argue that the majority of social actors are nationalists and liberals simultaneously. In
modernity there is a latent promise of a great fusion and singularity of interpretative horizon -
once reason develops, all knowledge will become integrated. Yet, the reality is that modernity has
frequently resulted in fragmentation (Delanty 1999). Indeed, fragmentation is central to
competent social agency in the modern world. Consider Weber's characterization of the modern
bureaucrat with the capacity to switch between instrumental purposive rationality at work, to
affective rationality at home. Of course, there are moments of conflict (for example, when a
much-loved relation is the number on a file), but the routine functioning of a bureaucratic
machine is premised upon the ability of social agents to switch interpretative horizon. In Goffman
(1969), the competent social agent can switch from „backstage‟ to „frontstage‟ monitoring of their
behaviour. Similarly, modern social agents have both a liberal and nationalist interpretative
horizon, which alternate as circumstances demand. Modernization theory predicted the advance
of scientific rationality would result in the demise of religious belief but, contrary to expectations,

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many social actors find it possible to be both technically competent and religious. It is not that
some consistency between science and religion has been discovered, rather that social actors
switch, depending upon circumstances, between scientific and religious interpretative horizons. I
am not claiming that this discontinuity does not create moments of internal conflict when it is not
clear which interpretative horizon is appropriate to the circumstances. In Sartre's famous
conundrum: in a state of war, should a son take care of his sick mother or defend the nation? The
irresolvable conflict is caused by the fact that the question can be answered either through a
nationalist or an affective interpretative viewpoint. Similar conundrums are raised between
nationalism and liberalism: in a state of war, should the state do everything in the interests of
defending the nation, including curbing freedom of speech? However, both are scalar concepts
and when there is a conflict between these ideologies, degrees of intensity are crucial to
determining which ideology wins.

NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

While nationalism and liberalism are functionally compatible with modernity, I would argue that
they are normatively theoretically incommensurable. The basic premise of liberalism is the
singular individual who, in considerations of politics, has the capacity methodologically to
bracket their particularities. In contrast, the basic unit of nationalism is a self who realizes
themselves through a collectivity which embodies significant aspects of „their‟ socialization. For
the liberal, the ultimate good is the autonomy of self, while for the nationalist the ultimate end is
the autonomy of the nation. For the liberal the legitimate state is a neutral one, while for the
nationalist the legitimate state has a telos - the flourishing of the nation. The liberal individual
critically subjects their beliefs to discursive examination, while the nationalist believes that the
nation is a natural entity and practical consciousness.

This is not to argue that a liberal nationalist theory cannot be constructed, which may be
internally consistent, but at the expense of the very characteristics which are central to the success
of nationalism. For instance, Tamir (1993) attempts such a fusion by premising her liberal
nationalism on the liberal self. Tamir's self is an autonomous chooser who chooses nations in the
same way as they select a career which, of course, misses precisely the attraction of nationalism
in a uncertain world, that is, part of your identity is not subject to radical reflexivity Miller (1995)
also begins from liberal premises but his nationalism is of a weak variety, which amounts to little
more than a slight preference for co-nationals over non-nationals in regard to welfare provisions.

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Moore (2001) is unique among these attempted fusions in working from nationalist premises to
liberalism - a nationalist liberalism. Her opening premises are: first, that national identification is
a legitimate constitutive part of the self and, secondly, that in practice liberal states are never
entirely neutral. When these elements are placed together it appears that legitimacy demands that
the nationality of the self and the state be congruent. After all, if the state represents one
particular nation, it is an injustice if that state has jurisdiction over a different (minority) nation.
In those circumstances secession becomes legitimate - either full or partial depending upon the
practicalities. However, her second premise, concerning the neutrality of the state, is flawed
because she treats liberalism in absolute terms, not as a scalar concept. Of course it is correct that
no state can be entirely neutral but this is not the same as arguing that there is not a significant
difference between a state that aims at neutrality as an ideal and one that considers its legitimacy
inherently linked to its ability to promote the will of the nation. Liberal states are not liberal by
virtue of their ability to be entirely neutral; rather they are more and less neutral. To take an
instance, in the 1937 Irish constitution, the Catholic Church was given a special status that
reflected the (supposed) views of the majority nation, although other churches were allowed to
continue to practise. In 1972 this clause was removed and there began the slow process of
separating church and state - a process that is still ongoing. In this case we would argue that the
Irish state became more liberal with the removal of the clause privileging the Catholic Church.
This is a meaningful statement even though it was not entirely illiberal prior to the removal of the
constitutional clause: after all, other religions were allowed freedom of worship. Given that it is
possible for the state to be more or less neutral, the fact that it is impossible for a state to be
entirely neutral (in every respect) does not entail that claims to state neutrality are bogus, even if
they are relative. A state with high levels of impartiality may, in practice, be substantially more
just with reference to competing ethnic claims than secession into avowedly nationalist states -
especially if we take account of the fact that these states will have jurisdiction over minorities of
„the other nation‟, other cultures and, indeed, individuals who may not wish to be defined in
nationalist terms.

While a fusion of nationalism and liberalism into one ideology can be achieved only at the
expense of removing what is central to the ideological success of nationalism, this does not lead
to the conclusion that one is to be jettisoned at the expense of the other. I would argue that the
ability to switch between interpretative horizons for different conceptual problems is intrinsic to
modernity. This parallels Mouffe's (2000) argument concerning democracy. What we call
democracy is actually made up of two elements, which are frequently in conflict with each other.

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On the one hand there is the liberal tradition that emphasizes the rights of the individual and, on
the other, the democratic participatory perspective with emphasis upon collective decision-
making. The answer to a conflict between the two is not to try to subsume one into the other but
to view this as a constructive agonistic tension, which is central to democratic debate. Similarly, I
would argue that the conflict between nationalism and liberalism is a constructive force. Even if
Tamir, Miller and Moore do not succeed in constructing a single ideology, part of the initial
plausibility of their argument derives from the fact that, in practice, liberalism leans heavily upon
nationalism. For instance, developed to their logical outcome, the premises of liberalism lead to
international cosmopolitanism. Yet, all liberal states exclude some people from the citizen body.
Nationalism provides a ready-made solution to „who are the people?‟ However, such a solution
can never be made consistent with liberalism. Instead of attempting to reconcile these ideas, we
should view them as in constructive tension. The liberal state is less liberal because of this
exclusion but, as it is a scalar concept, this does not entail that it is entirely illiberal.

The result of living with this kind of constructive tension is similar to Walzer's (1983) description
of spheres of justice. Walzer argues, for instance, that some issues are decided by principles of
the market while others are decided by meritocratic principles or principles of need. A doctor is
appointed on meritocratic principles and we consider it wrong that such a position could be
bought or given to the person based upon need. In contrast, we think it correct that medicine be
distributed upon principles of need. Of course, not all issues come with a ready-made decision as
to which interpretative horizon is appropriate but this ambiguity is constitutive of democratic
debate. When we define citizenship, there may well be a creative tension between applying liberal
principles and wider or narrower definitions of the nation.

Viewing the tension between liberalism and nationalism as agonistic and seeing both as scalar
concepts, allows us to accept that the workings of liberal societies presuppose some nationalist
premises. However, recognizing the tension, in place of opting for one over the other, allows us to
avoid certain liberal and nationalist excesses.

There are four principle issue areas in which liberal practice presupposes nationalism. The first is
relatively self-explanatory, nationalism answers the question: „Who are the people?‟ Secondly, as
argued by Miller, nationalism both limits the numbers of welfare recipients of the liberal welfare
state to practical levels and facilitates redistributive justice (1995: 92-4). Without nationalism,
liberal welfare states would find it difficult to justify giving welfare to co-nationals over those in

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greater need in distant places. How could the Swedes ever justify their welfare state when people
in Ethiopia are in so much greater need? Nationalism also makes redistribution easier. The idea of
the nation as a community, which is „ours‟, entails that any redistributive welfare taxation is
giving from „me‟ to „us‟. Even if this is reprehensible to a committed liberal, the belief that
welfare is going to one of „us‟ may be necessary for the welfare state to function. It is a necessary
condition, but not a sufficient one - it does not follow that nationalist states are invariably
generous in their welfare provisions.

Thirdly, nationalism contributes to liberal practice by providing sufficient common culture for the
effective functioning of the type of reflexive debate central to liberalism. On its own, liberal
debate is premised upon a kind of Kantian pure rationality. However, as has been argued by
Fichte (1922), our ability to reason is not simply an unencumbered abstract one.

Reasoning without meaning is a conceptual impossibility. This is not simply J. S. Mills's practical
observation that democracies function better with a common language (Mill 1972 [1861]: 359-66)
but the more profound point that the ability to reach consensus through disputation presupposes
convergence of interpretative horizons. When Rawls wrote A Theory of Justice (1971), he argued
that his liberal principles were based upon universal premises, but with Political Liberalism
(1993), he had come to see that an „overlapping consensus‟ was necessary for liberalism. I would
argue that part of this „overlapping consensus‟ is not only a certain civic spirit (following de
Tocqueville) but also a certain commonality in systems of meaning. While I would agree with
Habermas that liberalism presupposes something like an ideal speech situation, in which the most
convincing argument wins on its own merits, like Ackerman (1980), I would argue that this ideal
is only possible between actors who share certain fundamental ways of seeing the world,
presupposing a substantive degree of shared culture. Consequently, while the homogenizing task
of „nation-building‟ would be anathema to any serious liberal, the outcome of such a process is a
community that shares sufficient cultural similarity to allow persuasion by the force of better
argument.

Fourthly, nationalism provides the conditions for liberalism by providing the state with citizens
who are willing to undergo significant sacrifice in its defence. An entirely rational liberal is
unlikely to put their life at stake for the sake of the state, while the altruistic Gemeinschaft
nationalist is willing to die for the flag.

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In all these instances, in which nationalism creates the conditions for liberal states, it is the case
that these contributions come from a nationalist interpretative horizon that, in many respects, is
antithetical to liberalism. Defining „we the people‟ in strongly nationalist terms can lead to
xenophobia in citizenship and welfare policies. Nation-building can result in illiberal enforced
assimilation of minority cultures and the nationalist desire of self-sacrifice can lead to
belligerence and „suicide bombing‟. However, I would argue that this is less likely to take place if
we recognize the essential tension that exists between nationalism and liberalism, rather than
blind our critical faculties through some kind of enforced fusion which, in any case, will not
become a popular ideology since it has lost the Gemeinschaft characteristics that have made
nationalism an ideologically successful outcome of the conditions of modernity.

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Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism .
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Bauman, Z. (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust . Cambridge: Polity Press
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Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism . London: Sage
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Fichte, J. G. (1922) Address to the German Nation . Chicago: Open Court
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Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity . Cambridge: Polity Press
Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and Self Identity . Cambridge: Polity Press
Goffman, E. (1969) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life . Harmondsworth: Penguin
Haugaard, M. (2002) Nationalism and Modernity‟ , in S. Malesevic , ed. and M. Haugaard (eds), Making
Sense of Collectivity: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Globalization . London: Pluto
Hayek, F. A. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty . London: Routledge
Hobbes, T. (1914 [1651]) Leviathan . London: J. M. Dent
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Keating, M. (1996) Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and
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Mill, J. S. (1972 [1861]) Considerations on Representative Government . London: J. M. Dent
Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality . Oxford: Oxford University Press
Moore, M. (2001) The Ethics of Nationalism . Oxford: Oxford University Press
Mouffe, C. (2000) The Democratic Paradox . Verso: London
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Sandel, M. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Spruyt, H. (1994) The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change . Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press
Tamir, T. (1993) Liberal Nationalism . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Van den Berghe, P. L. (1981) The Ethnic Phenomenon . New York: Elsevier
Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality . Oxford: Blackwell
Wittgenstein, L. (1967) Philosophical Investigations . Oxford: Oxford University Press

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Delanty, Gerard. "Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: The Paradox of Modernity." Pp. 357-68

Two striking features of the present day are an apparent rise in nationalism and, on the other side,
the increasing impact of global forces. This paradox of nationalism and globalization has been
widely commented on and a variety of explanations is given to account for this. Globalization can
be seen as creating the conditions for new nationalisms, which arise as defensive responses to
global forces, or it can be seen as a response by powerful nations to the nationalism of the
periphery. Nowhere is this paradox more evident than in Iraq where a transnational Islamic
nationalist movement has arisen as a result of a global military campaign and much of the Middle
East has been caught in a revival of nationalism under the conditions of globalization. In the
United States itself the global context of alleged terrorism has driven a new wave of nationalism
which has gained momentum since 2001. In an increasingly globally oriented China, nationalism
has stepped into the ideological space created by the passing of the communist ideology (see
Gries, Chapter 40 in this Handbook). On a less vociferous note, nationalist movements have been
on the rise throughout Europe, especially in the former communist countries (see Chapters 32 and
33 by Holmes and Hann respectively in this Handbook). In all of these cases the transnational
context has been central in bringing about changing centre-periphery relations (see James,
Chapter 31 in this Handbook).

No account of nationalism in its relation to the global context can neglect a second dynamic,
namely the emergence of post-nationalism, that is a movement both within and beyond
nationalism and which may be related to cosmopolitanism. Although there has been an
undeniable expansion in nationalism worldwide since the early 1990s, a feature of the current
situation, and one closely connected with globalization, is cosmopolitanism. Indeed, it is possible
to speak of a revival of cosmopolitanism, which is an older tradition to that of the nation and
gives expression to a different dimension of belonging to that of nationalism. For the purposes of
this chapter, cosmopolitanism is a condition distinct from nationalism and from globalization. By
cosmopolitanism is meant the consciousness of globality and of postnational ties; it is a critical
and reflexive consciousness of heterogeneity as opposed to the quintessentially modernist spirit of
an homogeneous vision of sovereign statehood. But it is too, despite its ancient origins, a modern
creation and expresses the embracing of otherness and plurality. As with much of nationalism
today, globalization is the context for cosmopolitanism, but the latter is also defined in terms of a
tension with nationalism and makes sense only in relation to nationalism. So nationalism,

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globalization and cosmopolitanism are characteristic features of the present day. What then is the
nature of the relation and what are the implications of cosmopolitanism for the very idea of the
nation? Can the nation escape nationalism and define itself by reference to cosmopolitanism?

It would be a mistake to see cosmopolitanism and nationalism as opposed to each other and
fundamentally different. Although this is a view that many critics take, the contention of this
chapter is that nationalism and cosmopolitanism, which exist in a relation of tension, can be seen
as complementary and it is possible to speak, with Julia Kristeva, of the idea of„nations without
nationalism‟ (Kristeva 1993). It is clearly the case that the nation is not disappearing from the
world and, moreover, the nation will survive nationalism, in the sense of nationalism as a
movement based on the principle that every nation must be defined in terms of an ethnicity and
have a state. Nationalism in this conventional sense of the term has been a pervasive feature of
the modern world and may even be the dominant feature of modernity, as Wimmer (2002) argues;
however, it has also been notoriously a failure in the sense that its very success in achieving its
goal has been the cause of some of the major disasters of the previous century. The nation, on the
other hand, predates nationalism and while having been claimed by nationalism its continued
appeal is something that cannot be denied, as critics such as Anthony Smith have argued (Smith
1995). Part of the appeal of the idea of the nation is its integral connection with a vision of human
community that is seen as under threat from many forces, including from nationalism and global
forces. There is considerable evidence to indicate that there are national traditions in the world
which exist separately from nationalism and which have, it will be argued, a relation to
cosmopolitanism. In this context some pertinent examples are Latin American traditions of the
nation, the federalist notion of the nation as in Canada, German constitutional patriotism, and the
emergence of postnationalism in the European Union. In these cases there is some evidence to
suggest that postnationalism is a significant force in the world and the basis of a really existing
cosmopolitanism as opposed to a utopian idea or a purely administrative international order (see
Beck and Grande 2004).

More generally, the trend towards cosmopolitanism can be related to developments that have
occurred within the nation-state. In place of the hyphen that has linked the nation to the state are
now multiple points of connectivity. The cross-fertilization of all nations as a result of the many
dimensions of globalization - ranging from migration, multiculturalism, global information and
communication technologies, and Americanization - has loosened the links that have tied the
nation to the state, a process that has led to the release of the nation from the state. This situation,

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which has often been characterized as a post-sovereign world, is the context in which new
nationalisms emerge and also the context in which cosmopolitanism takes root. This chapter is
concerned with the relation of nationhood to cosmopolitanism under the conditions of
globalization. The main thesis of the chapter is that the ideas of cosmopolitanism and nationalism
have been linked and the current situation points to a notion of the nation without nationalism.

The first section looks at the rise of the cosmopolitan idea in the context of the emergence of
liberal nationalism in the wake of the Enlightenment. The second section discusses the decline of
the cosmopolitan ideal and its transformation into xenophobic nationalism. The third section is
concerned with the contemporary revivial of cosmopolitanism along with the wider
transformation of nationalism.

NATIONALISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The origins of cosmopolitanism, it has been remarked, go back earlier than nationalism and are
associated with the ancient consciousness of the world. The Greek conception of human
belonging referred to the world of the polis and the cosmic order of the Gods. By means of the
concept of kosmopolites, a cosmopolitan notion of belonging emerged in which the universal and
particular were combined in a non-contradictory relation. The idea of cosmopolitanism developed
with Stoicism towards the end of the classical Athenian period. Although it was an earlier Greek
philosopher, Diogenes, who coined the term, it was the Stoics who gave it a wider meaning.
Where for Diogenes it meant simply individual liberty, for the Stoics it entailed a more
universalistic concept of belonging. Zeno, for instance, advocated the notion of an ideal
cosmopolitan city based on membership of a wider human society. This was the sense of
cosmopolitanism that influenced modern thought (Nussbaum 1997). Cosmopolitanism was
reflected too in the idea of the oikoumene, meaning „the whole world‟ or „the inhabited world‟
and designated an identity with a broader vision of human community beyond the immediate
context (see Inglis and Robertson 2005).

Thus from its inception, cosmopolitanism is an orientation that challenges a narrow and
exclusivist patriotism, but it is also opposed to the view that political community must reflect a
disembodied globalism, such as a predetermined universal „natural‟ order which can only be
discovered and legislated for by science or by political elites. In this sense then from the
beginning cosmopolitanism asserts the entanglement of the local in the global but does not

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prioritize one over the other. This reading of ancient cosmopolitanism suggests a view of
cosmopolitanism as a dimension that mediates between the national or local and global; it is not
one, but the reflexive relation of both. The cosmopolitan is someone whose roots are not for once
and for all settled. Cosmopolitanism entails the positive recognition of difference and signals a
conception of belonging as open. As a critical sensibility, then, it is opposed to closure and
particularism.

Cosmopolitanism did not play a significant role in medieval thought and it was not until the
Enlightenment that it emerged to become a central part of the imagination of the modern era. For
the Greeks, cosmopolitanism was primarily a moral condition that did not have a strong political
or legal significance. Moreover, for the Greeks, cosmopolitanism was largely a disposition
associated with individuals who identified themselves as citizens of the world. In this respect it
differs from nationalism in lacking a collective identity. However, there is one clear strand
linking the ancient and the modern conception of cosmopolitanism and it is in this too that the
link with nationalism is most forcibly evident: cosmopolitanism was above all an expression of
the belief in freedom. As a philosophy of freedom it had tremendous appeal for Enlightenment
intellectuals and for nationalist leaders alike. Both nationalism and cosmopolitanism were based
on the idea of freedom, be it the freedom of movement or the right of the nation to be free of
tyranny. The emergence of the modern notion of the self-legislating subject, which lies at the
heart of modern philosophical thought, gave to both nationalism and cosmopolitanism the basic
animus of freedom as a political and personal goal and ideal to be pursued. Cosmopolitanism had
a resonance in three major strands of Enlightenment thought which had an abiding influence on
the nineteenth century and beyond: republicanism, liberal nationalism and Kantian
cosmopolitanism.

Like cosmopolitanism, republicanism is an older movement than nationalism and with ancient
origins but differs from cosmopolitanism in its conception of peoplehood in terms of a territorial
community of self-legislating subjects. Although having numerous forms, republicanism in
particular in the American tradition tended towards particularism in its view of the political
community as a community of fate. But much of that tradition - including the Jeffersonian
tradition - was open to the cosmopolitan orientation to the world and to the principle of human
freedom. The most famous example of republicanism and cosmopolitanism as co-existing was the
French Revolution. The principles of the revolution were held to be universal and applicable to all
nations fighting injustice and tyranny. In this sense the spread of the French Revolution and the

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ideas to which it gave rise across Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century reflected the
cosmopolitanism of the idea of a human republic based on freedom. Tom Paine wrote: „The true
idea of a great nation is that which extends and promotes the principles of universal society;
whose mind arises above the atmosphere of local thought, and considers mankind of whatever
nation or profession they may be as the work of the Creator‟ (cited in Schlereth 1977: 106). La
Patrie signified a belief in equality, justice, tolerance and freedom for the Enlightenment. Thomas
Schlereth, in his study of Enlightenment cosmopolitan thought, refers to this kind of
cosmopolitanism as humanitarian nationalism and a contrast to an unchecked nationalism
(Schlereth 1977: 109). But of course it is evident that this mixture of republicanism and
cosmopolitanism can equally be seen in terms of nationalism, since it was the nationalism of the
French republic that promoted this kind of cosmopolitanism. In time, with the transition from the
republican nation to the centralized French republican state, the subordination of nationalism to
cosmopolitanism is precisely what happened: cosmopolitanism became associated with the
French aspiration to be a world power.

If republican cosmopolitanism was a national project and one closely associated with the
patriotism of the French republican state, the other face of cosmopolitanism reflected minority
nationalism. Liberal nationalism was the dominant nationalist movement of the early nineteenth
century and can be contrasted to the state patriotism of the established nation-state; it emerged
from the 1820s - along with the Greek national cause - and, although like all nationalist
movements of the age, it was elitist in leadership, unlike republicanism, which had become a state
patriotism, it embodied a populism that was to prove enduring. The cosmopolitan dimension of
this nationalism consists of a view that had gained widespread support in the nineteenth century
that nations of a certain size had a right to become independent from the major powers. The
famous examples of this are the Greek, Bulgarian, Italian and Irish nationalist movements, which
gained the support of liberals, most notably from the 1870s the Liberal Party in Britain under the
leadership of William Gladstone. Liberal nationalism within a broad cosmopolitanism found a
major expression in Giuseppe Mazzine's Young Europe League, founded in Berne in 1834, which
promoted the idea of self-determination as the principle by which the political map of Europe
should be drawn. The movement led to several other such leagues, such as Young Poland, Young
Italy and Young Ireland, which all pursued this goal. For this movement there was no
contradiction between a European cosmopolitanism and the creation of sovereign republican
nations. Kok-Chor Tan (2004) has argued that there is no fundamental contradiction between the
principle of self-determination that is the basis of liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan political

531
aspirations. Indeed, nationalism itself is a demonstration of the cosmopolitan principle that people
can image a political community beyond the context of their immediate world. Moreover,
cosmopolitanism requires an acknowledgement of national forms of attachment.

The third strand in nineteenth-century cosmopolitanism is the Kantian internationalist one. In his
Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purposein 1784 Kant recognized the limits of
the existing international arena in which nations were not bound to international norms. Where
international law is based only on conventions and treaties, a cosmopolitan order would be based
on a legal order that sets normative standards for what states can do both within their domestic
jurisdiction and beyond. In this sense, cosmopolitanism goes beyond the limits of
internationalism to a view of the world as fundamentally connected. He believed history was
leading to the creation of a cosmopolitan republican order which would replace a world of
national republican nations. In a later essay in 1775, Towards Perpetual Peace, he modified this
somewhat utopian position with a more realistic argument that a cosmopolitan law would limit
the actions of states. In this view, cosmopolitanism would slowly emerge out of a process of
enlightenment in which states would recognize the need for a new normative international order.
According to Robert Fine, this was not just an abstract idea in the head of a philosopher but a
reality. Referring to Hegel's reworking of Kant, he argues this was a social fact of the modern age
and a very real part of the social world, manifest not only in new international laws but also in
new moral frameworks (Fine 2003a). This Enlightenment conception of cosmopolitanism was
influential throughout the nineteenth century. It influenced republican political thought and liberal
nationalism, but it also created a distinctive tradition which has been expressed in federalism and
in the European idea as well as in various internationalist movements (see Bohman and Lutz-
Bachmann 1997).

It can, of course, be noted that both cosmopolitanism and nationalism are territorial concepts. One
resting on a belief in the territorial basis of belonging and the other based on freedom from a
specific territory. Although it is not the defining tenet of cosmopolitanism, it has been closely
related to a belief that the individual can transcend and move beyond and between the territories
of nations. The entwine-ment of nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the nationalist movements
and political thought of the nineteenth century also confirms the argument made earlier, namely
that most, if not all, nations in the modern world, and in particular those that were created in the
nineteenth century, contain within their national imaginaries a cosmopolitan strand. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the much debated relation between nationality and citizenship

532
(Habermas 1992). Cosmopolitanism, with republicanism, shares a basic belief in the centrality of
citizenship in the sense of a conception of the person and their rights as defined by birth as
opposed to inherited privilege. While today we may no longer accept this definition of citizenship,
in its time it was part of a progressive movement towards democratization and the recognition of
the autonomy of the individual against the received values of the past such as the view that all
people are part of a natural order in which some are signalled out by rank or class to social
privilege.

It was only with the descent into xenophobic nationalism from the early twentieth century that
this consciousness was lost. Cosmopolitanism expresses the universalistic dimension of the
nation and is in tension with particularistic ten dencies. It may be suggested that cosmopolitanism
as a movement towards openness resists the drive to closure that is a feature of the nation-state.
The revival of cosmopolitanism today is symptomatic of the crisis of the nation-state in much the
same way as the earlier emergence of nineteenth-century cosmopolitanism was an expression of
the ancien regime. But the utopianism of a new age of nation-states within a cosmopolitan order
lost its utopianism by the early twentieth century.

FROM COSMOPOLITANISM TO NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Few works capture the decline of the cosmopolitanism idea better than Frederich Meinecke's
famous work Cosmopolitanism and the National State, originally published in German in 1907.
Meinecke was struck by the gradual demise of the cosmopolitanism of the nineteenth century and
the concomitant rise of the national state. For Meinecke, a German liberal nationalist, this was a
positive development and reflected a broadly liberal view of nationalism as the inheritor of the
cosmopolitan project. 1
It was Meinecke's view that „the true, the best German national feeling
also includes the cosmopolitan ideal of a humanity beyond nationality and that it is “unGerman to
be merely German” (Meinecke 1970: 21). Meinecke, who introduced the now familiar distinction
between the „cultural nation‟ and the „political nation‟, argued the German Enlightenment notion
of the cultural nation had been cosmopolitan but in resting on an intellectual universalism it was
too weak to be politically effective since it lacked a clear focus on the state. The political nation
needed more than lofty ideals, he argued.

Clearly this was a position that had not been informed by the two world wars that were to follow
and it is not impossible to imagine that Meinecke and other liberal patriots of the age, such as

533
Max Weber, who held similar uncritical views, might have been less enthusiastic about the rise of
the national state had they been writing at a later period. But until 1914 it was possible for
German liberals to be hopeful about the promise of the nation-state. This was, after all, a country
that had only recently been unified and a country where the intellectuals and professional class
were highly cosmopolitan, having, as Liah Greenfeld remarks, only lately discovered nationalism
(Greenfeld 1992). However, it was obvious to everyone that cosmopolitanism alone was not
going to solve the problems of the age.

The Germans were enthusiastic cosmopolitans, but became even more enthusiastic about
nationalism, which quickly overshadowed cosmopolitanism. Two developments are noteworthy
concerning the fate of cosmopolitanism in the twentieth century: the demise of cosmopolitanism
into a xenophobic fear of diversity, on the one hand, and on the other, the decline of an
international normative order.

For most of the first half of that century the notion of cosmopolitanism was associated with the
outsider and indicated a fundamentally pejorative condition of deracination. The cosmopolitan
was epitomized by the Jew and came to signify the outsider within. The xenophobic and racist
climate that developed in Europe from World War I onwards represented not merely a turning
away from the cosmopolitanism of the nineteenth century, in Meinecke's terms, but the reversal
of it. Gone was the idea of the national community as the embodiment of cosmopolitan ideas;
instead was a view of the cosmopolitan as an other to be excluded from the national polity. With
this too came a shift in many countries from citizenship in terms of birth to a national citizenship
based on descent.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century population increase as a result of urbanization and
industrialization led to greater and more mixed cities. In an age of empire-building the increasing
mix and flow of peoples led to a shift in the meaning of cosmopolitanism in the direction of a fear
of otherness. Nationalism lost its liberal underpinnings and with scientific racism on the rise, fear
and otherness combined to forge xenophobia. The cosmopolitan is associated with the socially
uprooted and with the decadence of the cosmopolitan city to which the national state had an
ambivalent relation. As pointed out by Eleanor Kofman, migrants, outcasts and refugees were the
new cosmopolitans, but the terms came more and more to be defined with respect to the city and
its inhabitants rather than to individuals (Kofman 2005). Indeed, the great cosmopolitan cities
were often colonial trading outposts - Shanghai, Tangiers - where peripheral and imperial peoples

534
settled. The resulting multiple identifications that such metropolitan centres tended to nurture did
not fit easily with the national project towards uniformity and single identities. This is equally
true of the Soviet Union. Although the antithesis to the Western democracies, the expression
cosmopolitan was a pejorative term to equate the critical intellectual with bourgeois culture and
Western decadence.

The cosmopolitan city is a product of forces that the national state does not control and which it is
unable to homogenize. Intellectuals, artists, political refugees and déclassé individuals of the
various kinds that the late nineteenth century produced represented a cosmopolitanism that was
perceived to be a threat, since these groups were separated from the elites but not directly under
political or class power in the way the working class were. Cosmopolitanism thus signifies
rootlessness with which goes, allegedly, a lack of loyalty to the nation. It is in the figure of the
Jew that this suspicion of cosmopolitanism is most evident since with the Jew rootlessness is
combined with otherness. The Jew was the cosmopolitan who as outsider embodied the vision of
modernity as a relation of self and alterity (see Cheyette and Marcus 1998). Vienna was the
melting pot of cosmopolitanism and nationalism. According to Ernst Gellner:

The influx of nationalities into the expanding imperial capital meant that by the end of the
nineteenth century almost everyone went over to a Völkisch-national position. The only liberals,
or very nearly, were those of Jewish background or with Jewish links, i.e. the cosmopolitans.
They could choose, in their public persona, to be proud of their universalistic liberalism and
spurn the ethnic totem poles as shameful atavisms. (Gellner 1998: 138)

Here again we have an example of cosmopolitanism as part of the dark imaginary of nationalism
and without which it would not have been able to define itself. It will of course be noted that
many of these cosmopolitan cities - Paris, Vienna, Berlin - were national capitals and were,
especially in Central Europe, multi-ethnic. The national project, on the one hand, sought to
domesticate this cosmopolitanism by giving it a universalistic form and, on the other hand, it
sought to suppress cosmopolitanism. The condition of cosmopolitanism was nationalism. As with
national capitals, universalistic projects such as world exhibitions and monumental architecture
were intended to make the nation part of a universalistic Western civilization. In this centralizing
mission cosmopolitanism was absorbed into the universalism of the national state, without its
critical and ambivalent relation to fixed reference points. But the figure of otherness and
rootlessness could not easily be domesticated. In terms of a wider conception of modernity, it

535
could be suggested that nationalism and cosmopolitanism reflected different aspects of modernity:
the homogenizing project of the modern state and the pluralization of modern culture and social
relations. Ernest Gellner, in his final book, described this in graphic terms as a struggle between
atavistic and closed nationalism and a liberal cosmopolitan nationalism open to the world. Many
primordialist nationalist movements, he argued, defended their völkisch cause against „bloodless‟
and „rootless cosmopolitanism‟ (Gellner 1998). It is evident, then, that by the twentieth century
cosmopolitanism has given way to nationalism. The polyethnicity which William McNeil
believed was a feature of history prior to the arrival of the modern nation-state, disappeared and
was replaced by a national citizenry (McNeil 1986).

Finally mention can be made of the other fate of twentieth-century cosmopolitanism, namely
internationalism. To the extent to which the Kantian notion of a cosmopolitan order of republican
states survived the first half of the twentieth century it was as an international order based on
sovereign nation-states. From the ill-fated League of Nations to the United Nations and the 1948
Declaration of Human Rights, an international normative order had come into existence, but one
based on sovereign nation-states and which could be seen as reinforcing, not undermining, the
nation-state. This was also the fate of the international socialist movement, which since the Third
International, developed on national trajectories and eventually became absorbed into national
political parties. There were some exceptions, notably the International Brigade during the
Spanish Civil War and, possibly, the case of the resistance movement to German occupation
during World War II.

In one of the best-known studies of internationalism, Hedley Bull, in The Anarchical Society,
detected a move in the direction of what he called „international society‟, with the suggestion that
something like a new normative order was coming into existence (Bull 1977). An earlier
indication of this was Karl Jaspers's claim in 1945 in The Question of German Guilt that the
notion of„crimes against humanity‟ marks the birth of a new cosmopolitan order (Jaspers 1961;
see also Fine 2000). At this point we can speak of the revival of cosmopolitanism.

THE REVIVAL OF COSMOPOLITANISM

It is possible to speak of a revival of cosmopolitanism, which has been the subject of a wide range
of recent publications (see Breckenridge et al. 2002; Fine 2003b; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). The
details of this burgeoning field will not be examined here, rather the discussion will be confined

536
to one issue, namely the relation of cosmopolitanism to the nation. On this question, roughly
speaking, three positions can be identified. First, the universalistic position taken variously by
Habermas, Held and Nussbaum, who argue for the inherent superiority of cosmopolitanism as a
condition fundamentally different from nationalism. Second, the liberal argument represented by
Kymlicka that cosmopolitan trends can be articulated by a liberal conception of the nation. Third,
the postcolonial notion associated with Bhabha that the national and transnational are mutually
implicated in hybrid identities.

The universalistic argument takes different forms, ranging from moral cosmopolitanism to
cosmopolitan democratic governance. A leading representative of moral cosmopolitanism is
Martha Nussbaum, for whom, in a widely cited and discussed essay, patriotism is fundamentally
wrong and cannot be a basis of the good society (Nussbaum in Cohen 1996). The nation-state, she
argues, is unable to solve the problems facing it, especially those related to environment, food
supply and population control. In place of patriotism, she argues, cosmopolitanism, as loyalty to
the world community, is a real condition and has epistemological and cognitive dimensions. For
instance, self-knowledge comes only through knowledge and identification with others and,
moreover, it is a fact of our time that democracy cannot be constrained by territory. Nussbaum is
uncompromising in her rejection of nationalism, which, in her view, allows no room for
cosmopolitanism. What this position appears to exclude is the possibility of multiple forms of
identification and also excludes what is surely an important feature of cosmopolitanism, the
pluralism of co-existing forms of life and overlapping identities. Nussbaum would presumably
argue that patriotism by definition is antithetical to such cosmopolitanism, based as it is on a
unitary and exclusivist conception of belonging. While establishing convincing arguments in
favour of cosmopolitanism, this stance on the whole results in a dualism of nationalism and
cosmopolitanism.

In a related position, David Held and others have advocated a stronger political and legal theory
of cosmopolitanism, which goes beyond Nussbaum's essentially moral conception of
cosmopolitanism and which has strong Kantian origins (Held 1995). This version of
cosmopolitanism is based on a theory of global governance which is conceived in opposition to
national forms of democracy. The thesis is that the nation-state is unable to realize democracy
because it is both too big and too small to solve what are global problems. As a result, and briefly
put, the nation-state is unable to realize democracy in terms of three principles: individual
autonomy, political legitimacy and democratic law. Although Held does not entirely reject the

537
nation-state, which he acknowledges will not disappear as some of the more extreme positions
suggest and may even have a place in a wider cosmopolitan order, he sees it in highly normative
terms as not the primary site of democracy. At best the nation-state will co-exist with
cosmopolitan forms of governance, as represented by international non-governmental actors and
transnational organizations such as the United Nations. The difficulty with this argument is that it
makes too strong a claim for cosmopolitanism and neglects that some of the most important
political achievements have in fact been made by nation-states, such as social justice and local
forms of democracy (see Brennan 1997; Zolo 1997). In addition, there is the problem of the
cultural foundations of what, in effect, is a world polity. It is difficult to see how these problems
can be resolved without taking into account cosmopolitan developments on the level of the
national community.

Habermas's version of cosmopolitanism can be seen as one located midway between the moral
universalism of Nussbaum and the political universalism of Held. The limited universalism of
modern societies, which have created a democratic constitutional political culture based on
reasoned argumentation, is tendentially cosmopolitan in that the cultural and political horizons of
the political community cannot be contained by the nation-state. In terms of a theory of
cosmopolitanism Habermas makes two major claims (Habermas 1996, 1998). The first is that
political communication, like all human communication, is based on universalistic norms and
structures which are the normative and cognitive basis of political legitimation in democratic
societies. What is universalizable, then, is not a specific political or cultural value or belief
specific to a particular society, but the discursive form of communication itself, as in the
contestability of justifications and rules for inclusion in the discursive space of communication.
Second is the argument that the communicative space has progressively expanded in modern
societies in both formal and informal spheres. In his earlier work Habermas emphasized the role
of radical social movements in expanding the discursive space of modern societies in which
public debate became the focal point for democracy. Although the nation-state was the main
container of universalizable political communication, this has now expanded beyond the nation-
state.

Most of Habermas's reflections on the cosmopolitan political order refer to the European Union,
which he sees as the main embodiment of the universalistic project of modernity (Habermas
2001,2003). The European Union is the main chance for Europe to overcome the divisions of its
history to create a genuinely democratic order. The central feature of this cosmopolitan European

538
democracy is a „constitutional patriotism‟, that is an identification with the principles of the
constitution rather than with a particular set of national characteristics or culturally defined values.
Habermas's writings have been much discussed and it will suffice to mention here one problem.
Habermas's entire conception of cosmopolitanism demonstrates the limits of traditional kinds of
nationalism, but presupposes the idea of the nation-state. This is because his idea of Europe is
based on the constitutional form of national democracy bolstered by social rights and a
framework of citizenship based on a common definition of peoplehood. Even if this self-
understanding is largely civic in kind, and Habermas argues it must necessarily be so, the
question remains how this can be transferred to a transnational order. There are complex issues at
stake here but the point of the present analysis is simply to demonstrate the futility of
disconnecting cosmopolitanism from the national level. It is not surprising therefore that
Habermas's very theory appears to presuppose the constitutional and normative framework of the
nation-state. The following two positions can be seen as a modification of the implicit dualism in
the universalistic position.

The second approach to cosmopolitanism differs from the universalistic ones discussed in the
foregoing in that they are based on a liberal conception of the nation (see Moore, Chapter 8 in this
Handbook, for a further discussion of liberal nationalism). The best-known liberal theorist of
nationalism is Will Kymlicka, who takes as his point of departure group rights and multicultural
politics (Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Straehle 1999). His question can be posed as this: what
are the conditions under which a political community must recognize the rights of minorities,
including the demands of minority nationalism? His main argument is that minority claims need
not be seen as a threat to nation-states and the satisfaction of such demands is often essential to
the survival and stability of democratic polities. Although this kind of liberal nationalism is not
necessarily opposed to cosmopolitan governance as in Held (Kymlicka recognizes the role of
transnational democracy) or Habermas's constitutional republicanism (to which it is closer), it is a
version of cosmopolitanism that does not set up a basic tension with the category of the nation.
The disadvantage with this approach, however, is that it tends to reduce cosmopolitanism to
relatively specific issues, such as the claims to autonomy or special rights particular groups may
have. Indeed, Kymlicka is quite explicit on the limits to cosmopolitan claims, which is why his
approach is simply a modification of standard liberalism. Habermas excludes most cultural
problems from the sphere of cosmopolitanism, leading Thomas McCarthy to argue for the
reconciliation of national and cosmopolitan perspectives in terms of a concern with cultural issues
(McCarthy 2001).

539
The postcolonial notion of the nation as put forward by Homi Bhabha is one of the most relevant
examples of a cosmopolitan conception of the nation. According to Bhabha, nations are not
unified or homogeneous but contain within their imaginaries alterity (Bhabha 1990). The nation is
formed in a narrative of transgression and negotiation with otherness; it is, as a result, a
fundamentally hybrid category. By means of the concept of narration, Bhabha aims to capture the
negotiation of identity in a continuous movement. Nations are built upon narratives which are
incomplete and perspectival; they are stories that people tell about their collective existence and
in which the past is constantly redefined. This is more true today than in the past when marginal
groups of people are coming to play a greater role in defining national identity: women,
immigrants, colonial peoples are less „outside‟ the nation than within it. Related to this is a shift
in the narrative construction of the nation from the centre to the peripheries and from a male
worldview to a female one. The result of this shift to the margin is more and more different
narratives of nationhood. As a hybrid and multivocal category the nation is thus already
cosmopolitan (see also Cheah and Robbins 1998). In other approaches the emphasis is on
mobility. For instance, Ong sees a new cosmopolitanism in transnational migration and diasporic
movements (Ong 1997; see also Hannerz 1996). The kind of cosmopolitanism that is referred to
here is different from the Enlightenment's model of cosmopolitanism, which was often
Eurocentric and individualistic, based as it was on a notion of the citizen of the world; it is rather
one that is represented by movements from the periphery and whose carriers are diasporic nations.
In this view cosmopolitanism is itself a new kind of patriotism, a „rooted cosmopolitanism‟
(Appiah 1998, 2004).

The postcolonial notion of the nation as containing within itself a relation to cosmopolitanism has
the obvious merit of avoiding some of the dualistic assumptions of the universalistic position and
offers a broader vision of the nation than in liberal nationalism. The main objection to it is that
cosmopolitanism is too easily reduced to the condition of hybridity, on the one hand, and on the
other to a postcolonial conception of the nation, which becomes difficult to apply to nations not
essentially formed out of colonialism. Yet, important gains have been made in overcoming the
tendential dualism in the Enlightenment-influenced models of cosmopolitanism.

Although not advocating a postcolonial position as such, Ulrich Beck has outlined the
foundations of a more comprehensive cosmopolitan social theory which echoes similar ideas
(Beck 2000,2002,2006; Beck and Grande 2006). He is more critical of the notion of hybridity,
stressing instead the recognition of difference as opposed to the simple fact of cultural mixing. In

540
addition, cosmopolitanism requires the adoption of an approach that replaces national-national
relation with national-global and global-global relations. Cosmopolitan refers to the end of the
„closed society‟ of the nation-state but it does not spell the end of nation. Beck thus speaks of a
„rooted cosmopolitanism‟ to refer to what is a really existing cosmopolitanism in the world today
and which corresponds to multiple attachments and forms of belonging that are reflexively
constituted. Just as there is a „banal nationalism‟, so too there is a „banal cosmopolitanism‟, as in
the multiculturalism of many societies and in forms of consumption.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion we can draw from this chapter is that the category of the nation does not exist in a
pure form any longer and, moreover, a critical examination of the nation in history will reveal that
it was not fundamentally in tension with cosmopolitanism. Moreover, cosmopolitanism does not
exist as a supranationalism, beyond and above the nation. Cosmopolitanism can itself lead to new
expressions of national identity, as Aihwa Ong and Yasamin Soysal argue (Ong 1997; Soysal
1994; see also Triandafyllidou, Chapter 24 in this Handbook). Nationalism and cosmopolitanism
are mutually implicated. Cosmopolitanism is no longer an individualistic disposition but has been
incorporated into the cultural horizon of modernity and into the imaginaries of many nations. It is
thus possible to see the nation as a vehicle for cosmopolitanism which is not disembodied and
rootless. As a politically oriented movement, it is also a form of resistance against both
globalization and the new nationalists, who, like the new global elites, also transnationally
mobilized. As argued by Mary Kaldor, a genuinely democratic cosmopolitanism must give voice
to the grievances of the great many people excluded from the benefits of globalization (Kaldor
1996). This „cosmopolitanism from below‟ can be related to forms of solidarity that go beyond
traditional nationalism and which are also different from transnational and supranational
networks. It may be suggested in conclusion that cosmopolitanism refers to a notion of
peoplehood as defined by neither nation nor state but by the encounter with difference, both
difference within the self and beyond the self.

NOTE

1 The German term Meinecke used was Weltbürgertum, which has a more restrictive meaning
than the term cosmopolitanism and more specifically means „world citizenship‟.

541
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Vertovec, S. , ed. and Cohen, R. (eds) (2002) Conceiving Cosmopolitanism . Oxford: Oxford University
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Wimmer, A. (2002) Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity. Cambridge:
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Zolo, D. (1997) Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Governance . Cambridge: Polity Press

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James, Paul. "Theorizing Nation Formation in the Context of Imperialism and Globalism." Pp.
369-82

Just as the nation-state did not die at the end of the twentieth century - despite claims of its
imminent demise - its emergence as a social form in the nineteenth century was neither a creation
ex nihilo nor a specifiable moment of birth. In that period we saw for the first time the uneven
merging of national communities and state polities to form nation-states, but „the nation‟ as a
social form has a much longer history. In other words, nations and states can only be understood
in the long run of uneven and changing global history. This chapter suggests that understanding
the matrix of nationalism, the nation and the nation-state requires as one line of enquiry a
recognition that different kinds of nation formation have emerged across world history in the
context of the dominance of different ways of living and being: traditionalism, modernism and
postmodernism. Traditional nations - the medieval natio, for example - arose in the context of
communities of persons lifted out of place and thrown together in contexts such as universities,
courts, monasteries and barracks that brought them face to face with people from other cultures.
Traditional nations cannot be understood by simply reading backwards from our understanding of
modern nations. As I will argue, modern nations are much more abstract communities and are
formed in the context of globalizing practices of production, exchange, communication and
enquiry, practices that change the nature of how people live in time and space. Postmodern
nations have yet to emerge as such, but in the present, we are seeing continuing structures of
modernism increasingly overlayed by practices and subjectivities of postmodernism, including
postmodern nationalism. This is evidenced, for example, in the ideology that the extension of the
national interest has no spatial limits and a particular nation can be exemplary for all.

This discontinuous but long-term history makes theorizing nation formation an incredibly
complex process. It also suggests a second line of enquiry that treats nation formation and
globalization as interconnected rather than simply antithetical. Modern nation formation, in
particular, can only be understood in the context of historically and ontologically changing
patterns of imperialism and globalization. In other words, the formation of the modern nation-
state and the burgeoning of modern globalization, were bound up with each other.

In their modern form, they burgeoned across the same period of the mid-nineteenth century into
the twentieth. This argument seems counterintuitive in the context of the current tensions as

544
processes associated with contemporary globalization contribute to the reconstitution of the
framework of state sovereignty. However, in conjunction with the argument about the changing
form of both globalization and nation formation, this begins to make sense. These two lines of
narrative - the changing nature of nation formation and the changing context of globalization -
weave through the present chapter.

The underlying premises of the discussion thus run as follows: Proposition 1 Just as the nation-
state is not about to disappear, it did not suddenly appear in history. There is no first nation-state
and there is no date that marks the beginning of the nation-state as a social formation. The best
that we can say is that a motley collection of modern republics and constitutional monarchies
emerged as a globalizing system of nation-states in the mid-nineteenth century and that this had
begun to consolidate by the beginning of the twentieth as the dominant global system of polity-
communities. In other words, the nation-state system is a globalizing phenomenon. The
development of this system coincided with a particular expression of a globalizing mode of
organization called „rationalizing bureaucracy‟ - namely the modern state - as it came to surpass
all other institutional forms for organizing political power.

Proposition 2 Across the globe, nation formation as we know it developed with the changing
modes of practice associated with the dominance of modernism. However, though modern
nations are modern constructions (note the apparent tautology), they are not simply so. Nation
formation involves both deep continuities and radical discontinuities with traditional (including
sacredly conceived) ways of life. There were traditional nations or natio long before the rise of
modern nations; at the same time most modern nations have no continuous relationship to those
earlier traditional nations.

Proposition 3 Nation-states - as distinct from the much older phenomenon of nations - first
emerged during the period of heightening modern globalization. In other words, modern nation
formation and modern global formation were born during the same period out of the same
processes - that is, through the same abstracting modes of practice: capitalist production, print
communication, commodity exchange, bureaucratic organization and rationalized analytic
enquiry. This simple historical reality should at least give pause to those who would argue that
globalization is in essential opposition to the nation-state.

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Proposition 4 It is the galloping and overt dominance of these very processes of abstract
structuring - experienced as global flows of capital and culture - that, ironically, is giving rise to
the sense that the nation-state faces an impending crisis, and that the social whole is collapsing
into fragments. However, this does not mean that the nation as a form of community is about to
disappear. In fact, national identity is being vigorously reasserted, whether it is in the classically
modern form of a million soldiers massing on the India-Pakistan border or as autonomous
individuals walking the postmodern streets of a Hip Hop Nation. Nations, like other post-tribal
territorial communities, are changing fundamentally - with the placements and relationships
between persons at the level of the face-to-face becoming more contingent and fragmented.
However, rather than becoming anachronistic vestiges of a passing world, nations are becoming
more contradictorily stretched between traditional, modern and postmodern ways of living.

In short the contemporary nation is layered in contradiction. The contemporary nation -

secularized, horizontal, currently dominated by modernist practices and concerns - contradictorily
grounds its subjectivities in the very categories that, at another level, have been substantially
reconstituted. Three such grounding categories are particularly relevant here: relations of
embodied connection, times of sacred recollection and places of enduring nature. The use of the
concept of grounding here is intentional. It marks a clear distinction from the prominent
modernist theorists of nationalism such as Ernest Gellner (1998), Anthony Giddens (1985), and
even Benedict Anderson (1983), who tend to treat these categorical elements as the mere
traditional content, re-fabricated for a modern context. By contrast, I am suggesting that these
things still have categorical meaning as part of the contradictory form of the nation-state in a
globalizing world. This continuity-discontinuity has become clearer as the modern connection
between nation and state has become increasingly problematized.

At the same time, the argument presented here is also very different from that presented by
historians such as Leah Greenfield or Adrian Hastings. Greenfield (1993) traces what she claims
are continuities in the rise of the nation back to early sixteenth-century England. She bases her
argument tenuously on a „semantic transformation‟ that drew the word „nation‟ together with
„people‟, supposedly signalling „the emergence of the first nation in the world, in the sense in
which the word is understood today‟ (1993: 6). Hastings (1997) pushes this claim back further to
the Saxon times at the end of the tenth century, again based on language, particularly as it was
1
regularized as a specific vernacular for the translation of the Bible. By contrast, this chapter
argues that modern nations are lived communities that emerged in the globalizing generalization

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of modes of practice that came to affect everyone across the world, however unevenly. In this
argument, the development of a vernacular literary language or a changed definition of the
concept of „nation‟ expresses only the abstraction of a few before their time as they worked in the
abstracting medium of writing - in particular, groupings of intellectuals and clerics.

ACROSS THE TRADITIONAL-MODERN DIVIDE

The question of different forms of nationhood takes us directly into a debate that continues to
dominate the nationalism literature: the traditionalism-modernism question. There has been little
theoretical progress in this area beyond the debates over deep ethnic origins versus fabricated
modern structurings. The most revealing example of this debate was that between Ernest Gellner
(1996) and Anthony Smith (1996) in the pages of Nations and Nationalism, but in the end it was
left hanging. On the one hand, the radical modernists overplay the break between traditional and
modern societies. When Ernest Gellner says that nationalism was possible only through the
changes wrought by modern industrialism, the evidence suggests that his theory is more
applicable to the nation-state than to the nation as a long-run, but fundamentally changing, form
of community. On the other hand, the ethno-symbolists tend to give a descriptive and factorial
account of the continuities, without providing us with a way of theorizing the discontinuities.
When Anthony Smith says that the basis of the modern nation is usually a long-run ethnic
community, the genealogical accuracy of his position depends upon treating the national recovery
of a unified ethnic past as a one-dimensional matter of retrieving symbolic content. It misses out
on the matter of subjectivity being unevenly reconstituted in the context of changing social form.
When Benedict Anderson says that the nation has to be understood in terms of the faltering grip
of the great religious communities upon people's imagination, what he is describing is the rise of
a subjectivity of modern national reflexivity - not the full sense of nation formation as it
simultaneously carries forward and reworks traditionally located subjectivities. Hence, the sixth
summarizing argument of the chapter can be expressed as follows:

Proposition 5 Rather than replacing traditionalism in a revolutionary and epochal shift,

modernism emerged unevenly and across a long period of change and upheaval as the dominant
ontological formation. These practices and subjectivities of modernism have come to interconnect
the globe at one level, but they have not changed everything or completely swept earlier
formations aside.

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As any area-specialist would understand, there is a deep and contradictory relationship between
traditionalism and modernism, both in the past and in all contemporary national societies. The
current „revival‟ of nationalistic Islam in Aceh, for example, carries all these tensions. The 1976
Achehnese Declaration of Independence carries an archetypical modernist claim for a primordial
past:

We, the people of Acheh, Sumatra, exercising our right of self-determination, and protecting our
historic right of eminent domain to our fatherland, do hereby declare ourselves free and
independent from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the
Island of Java. Our fatherland Acheh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent
sovereign State since the world began. (Cited in Knapman 2001)

There you have it: a modernist argument for an essentialism of identity „since the world began‟. It
is an argument that contradictorily cuts straight across the rational interpretative relativism of the
modernist mode of inquiry. Modernist claims for the deep continuity of nations are rarely now
made in such stark primordialist terms, nevertheless even when historical/primordial claims come
mediated by more rationalized inquiry they still tend to look back to a pre-modern continuous
past. For example, for their rendition of the Acehnese chronology showing that their nation began
before the colonial incursion, the writers for the atjehtimes.com website draw upon the
Encyclopedia Britannica and Encarta Encyclopedia. Without a notion of levels - that is, an
understanding of overlaying levels of tribalism, traditionalism, modernism, and most recently
postmodernism - the problems of explaining this intersecting set of contradictory claims to
knowledge remain intractable, including why they feel it necessary to project claims about their
nation on the World Wide Web, and why they felt it legitimate to draw upon a populist global
text such as Encarta Encyclopedia.

The contemporary nation as an abstract community of strangers stretched across state-

administered abstracted territory, is both projected globally and calls back upon the embodied
subjectivities of more traditional forms of community, including traditional „ethnic‟ community
(or ethnie in Anthony Smith's (1996) terms). However, as a dominant formation it only comes
into being under conditions of the emerging dominance of globalizing modernism. In these terms,
Ernest Gellner would, for example, rightly say that it is rare for nations to be seen as objectively
connected by a verifiable genealogy linking the whole society - the act of census data-collection
just documents an already-existent civil nation and incorporates ethnicity as one marker of

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modern nationality. This is true; however, it is not the point. No communities beyond the
immediacies of family are ever formed along one-to-one bloodlines.

A complicated example comes from Somalia, where according to Islamic tradition the whole of
the nation is linked by one intricate genealogical tree. The tree from which the ancestor-king
descends is both mythological and doubly abstracted. It is abstracted as an icon - the sacred tree,
sycamore - and as the genealogical tree that can be memorized graphically or drawn as lines on
paper: an abstract but lived tableau. Moreover, it is the representation of a community that will
never all meet together. In this way, the modern nation can leave genealogical placement behind
or carry traditional genealogical placement to a further level of abstraction - and carry it, it most
often does. National genealogy can thus bear two forms of truth: old and new, traditional and
modern. However, when Abdalla Omar Mansur (1995) sets out to interrogate the authenticity of
such a claim by looking at its epistemological logic he completely misunderstands the nature of
this mythology. It doesn't matter that different tribal groupings have different narrative versions
of the creation story of the stranger coming down from the sacred tree, or that the Qurianic
version links the motif of the man in the tree to Moses whereas others do not. What we have here
is an intersection of tribal forms (including the Daarood and Ajuuran clans) and traditional forms
of inquiry and knowledge (the Islamic religion), together with modern nation formation (the
Somali nation), all interpreted through a globalizing postmodern ideology - the nation as
„invention‟.

Contrary to the „invention of nations‟ thesis, persons can believe as practical consciousness that
the mythology is, in the tribal or traditional sense, true, and at the same time, if pressed, accept as
reflexive consciousness that nations are not literally held together as a single documentable tree of
blood-by-birth. Moreover, even at a reflexive level the categories of life and death continue to
inhere in the modern nation. They do so not as the putatively kinship-based idea of a single
founding family 2 but as the ideas of living in the territorial place of one's forebears and at times
of crisis self-actively putting one's life on the line for one's nation. The verities of blood and soil
become the metaphors of the modern nation, and these metaphors, though not so directly
expressed as under Adolf Hitler's Germany, continue to permeate the language of even the most
civic of nation-states. A tragic contemporary example is found in the discourses of the
martyrs/suicide bombers of Palestine as they confront the modern militarized state of Israel.

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Anthony Smith (1996) would thus say that this shows that ethnic embodiment is often important
to the sense of nationhood. And of course in many cases - though not including Indonesia or
Singapore or Australia or the United States of America - he would also be right. However, it tells
us little about the structural changes, objective and subjective, that make ethnicity a symbolic
marker, drawn upon across the globe in proclaiming the formations of nations. By contrast, I have
been pressing to have these themes of traditionalism and modernism understood in terms of an
argument about ontological formations as unevenly layered across each other, rather than as
epochal replacements of prior formations. The themes of extended genealogy and abstract
bloodline point to the continuities and discontinuities of social formation across different
ontological formations, and it suggests that a „levels‟ argument thus provides a way out of the
„ethnic roots/modern structures‟ dilemma.

There are methodological traps here for the unwary. The most obvious trap is to treat the
constitutive foundations of tribalism and traditionalism as the basis of the modern (contradictory)
nation. This, in other words, entails forgetting a primary insight of comparative social theory:
nations are not tribes, even if tribes can become nations. 3 By the same argument, ethnicity is not
the basis of the modern nation. Moreover, „ethnicity‟ is itself a modern phenomenon, not a pre-
modern expression of genealogical connection. That is why Anthony Smith (1996) has to use the
French term ethnie rather than „ethnic community‟. „Ethnicity‟, in the argument of this chapter, is
the modern name given to one way of subjectively embedding the more abstract relations of the
modern nation in more concrete ontological categories of embodiment, temporality and spatiality
Ethnicity is important and relates to subject/ objective relations of embodiment, but it is not so
important that it warrants lifting above other ontological categories such as tradition and future
common fate (temporality) or place and territory-in-common (spatiality). Modern empire-nations
as diverse as Indonesia and the United States are cases where issues of temporality and spatiality
have been officially emphasized over and above questions of ethnicity. This relates to a further
major issue on which this chapter departs from the mainstream writings, the question of the
relationship between ethnicity and territory.

Proposition 6 The distinction between territoriality and ethnicity is useful, but the distinction
between „territorial nation‟ (Western) and „ethnic nation‟ (Eastern) collapses into a heap of
qualifications. Nations in both the East and the West were formed through interwoven processes
that drew them into relation to each other. In particular, they were formed in the context of
relations of imperial expansion and the clash of empires, East and West.

550
There is a tendency, following a long tradition from Hans Kohn onwards, to treat the analytic
distinction between „territorial nations‟ and „ethnic nations‟ as the basis of two distinct models of
nation formation. This leads to a tortured narrative about the sequence of nation formation. In this
story, first came the „territorial nations‟ in the West. Supposedly, for some unspecified time,
territoriality formed the only concept of the nation. Then, those European states found that it only
worked if they also developed a shared culture of myths and symbols. Alongside this
development, but more gradually and as a separate process, there emerged ethnic nations on the
basis of pre-existing ethnic ties: Germany, which was also a bit territorial; and Eastern Europe
and the Middle East, more prominently ethnic. Later, when the political elites of Asia and Africa
decided to create nations they first tried the Western model, but were then compelled by the
„logic of the situation‟ to form new myths and symbols.

Who were these first „territorial nations‟ that could take their ethnic elements for granted? First, it
should be said, they were territorial states or empires, not territorial nations. Secondly, these
states could take ethnicity for granted before the nineteenth century because ethnicity as distinct
from blood ties (genealogy) was not for anyone at that time an active category of self-
identification. The „ethnic revival‟ and the positive use of the concept of„ethnicity‟ occurred in
these states as they became nation-states. If we take one of the oft-used examples, the French, we
find an amalgam of cultures and regions (ethnies if you like, but only as a retrospective
appellation) brought together through changing modes of practice across the nineteenth century.
Nation formation was evidenced in such apparently banal processes as military conscription
(beginning in the late eighteenth century), railways (from the 1850s), compulsory and secular
education (from the early 1880s) and the generalization of print distribution and radio
broadcasting from the end of the century. These were all developments that were occurring in
different places around the world. In this case an empire-state was extending its territorial hold
and naming itself as a nation.

However, even despite the self-conscious territorial organization of the nation-state, it was not
until the beginning of the twentieth century that this could be taken for granted. Even then we can
list the continuing ethnic-territorial cultures that could have become nation-states: (1) the
Burgundians in eastern France, a people of Scandinavian origin whose language had died out
since their incorporation into the French state at the end of the fifteenth century, but who have
carried forth a regional identity to the present day; (2) the Basques from the south-west border of
France and Spain who have asserted for themselves the national legitimacy of a government of

551
Euskadi; (3) the Bretons, from the north-west peninsular of France, who revived the Breton
language at the end of the nineteenth century as a response to Francification, not the other way
round; (4) the Provençales, who still use the language of Occitan or langue d'oc, though as a
private rather than public language, and sustain a sense of cultural difference through folk
revivals and tourism; (5) the Corsicans, who from the late 1960s have sponsored strong
movements for regional autonomy or semi-autonomy; and (6) the Catalans, from the south-east
border of France and Spain (including Andorra), who still feel a strong cultural, though not
political, nationalism drawing upon the distinct and old language of Catalan.

This tendency to treat patchwork Western territorial states such as France as if they were already
territorial nations is related to a tendency to treat the features of being a nation as intrinsically
Western. This is simply a category mistake. There is nothing about the notions of „territoriality‟
or „political culture‟ or „legal codes‟, for example, that makes them „Western‟. Certainly the
dominant Western mode of organization involves a certain form of abstract territoriality and
sovereignty over the landscape, however the absolutist states (or what some writers too easily call
„the nations‟) of England and France did this by virtue of their transition to modern forms of
juridical framing - not by virtue of being „Western‟. We only have to compare these to the
approaches to territory and culture in the „Eastern‟ state of Japan to see how shaky the categories
become (Anderson 2000/1). Japan, like China, had long been a territorial state with established
legal codes and conceptions of sovereignty. The Tokugawa modernizing revolution of the late
nineteenth century was certainly influenced in part by Western-educated intellectuals, but it also
restored the traditional emperor as the essence of the national polity, or kokutai. This carries
through our theme of the contradiction of traditionalism and modernism.

Proposition 7 European imperial expansion, in the context of fundamental shifts in the modes of
practice, was fundamental to nation formation, but this does not mean that Europe provided the
blueprint for nation-state formation. Imperial expansion provided the context for a globalizing
relation that saw nation-states formed across the world in relation to each other. Each nation-state
was „unique‟, but only made sense in relation to other nation-states.

When some writers argue that the earliest cases of territorial nations were in the West - England,
France, Spain, the Netherlands and later Russia - there is a further question of analytical
anachronism here that needs to be addressed. So far I have argued that though these polities were
certainly long-run territorial entities that later became nations, it does not make them continuous

552
nations, or at least it does not make them nations back then. It should however be said that there
were „nations‟ prior to the nineteenth century, but they were not nation-states, and they were not
„territorial nations‟. As a short-hand response to the existence of nations prior to the nation-state,
the different „stages‟ in the history of nations, nationalism and nation-states can be set out as a
series of moments. Woven into these moments are practices of imperialism and globalization.

The concept of natio existed in the medieval period and earlier, but it meant something
completely different from the modern sense of the word „nation‟: first, in archaic definitions the
concept of natio was used as co-extensive with that of „tribe‟, or what have been referred to as
ethnie. Secondly, it referred to traditional communities of erstwhile strangers who found common
purpose with each other under conditions of being lifted out of their locales into new settings of
face-to-face interaction. This occurred in places such as monasteries, universities and military
barracks, places that institutionally marked the traditional imperial extension of states and
churches. The only commonality in this second case with the modern nation is that these
communities - groups that we can call traditional nations, assuming all the unusual ontological
weight that the adjective „traditional‟ has to carry in this context - were abstracted communities
forced to examine basic issues of embodiment, temporality and spatiality They were communities
of fate, but they were not territorial nations.

From the sixteenth century in England, but also in other places such as the Netherlands, the
concept of the „nation‟ went through a stage of politicization. However, it was associated with the
genealogically connected aristocratic ruling classes or the emergent groupings of persons of
learning, the new intellectually trained of a country or region, rather than with the general
population of the realm. Despite the language of„nation‟-ness, the predominant political structure
remained from the top firmly that of traditional kingdom or empire, and from the bottom, village
or parish. The unwashed masses did not care to be part of any putative nation, nor were they
invited to be so. In this third manifestation of traditional communities of common fate, traditional
nations were only territorial to the extent that they were co-extensive sometimes with kingdoms,
sometimes counties and sometimes empires. This was the period of early-modern globalization as
European states in competition with others extended their power in the New Worlds. It was, in
short, the period of the emergence of globalizing capitalism (Wolf 1982).

From the late eighteenth century we started to get intellectual and political creeds about
„nationalism‟ as European philosophers, theologians, composers and poets „discovered‟ the

553
concept. However, as I have been implicitly arguing, naming the thing does mean that the thing is
exclusive to the places that first name it. Nevertheless, this period marked the rise of modern
nationalism as a self-conscious European philosophy. It is the period that Roland Robertson
(1992) calls the „incipient stage‟ of globalization, when we saw the crystallization of conceptions
of formalized international relations.

The late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries saw the emergence of explicitly nationalist
movements in the Americas, Europe and parts of Asia. These movements rose before most of the
old absolutist states, kingdoms and empires began to see themselves as territorial nations. 4 This
simple fact is an important challenge to the idea of pre-nineteenth century, pre-nationalist
territorial nation-states.

Across the nineteenth century, public spheres developed in different places across the globe that
broadened the sense of the „public‟ beyond the court or town square. This development occurred
in association with ideologies of public sovereignty, democracy and national citizenship, and was
an important ideological backdrop to the still emerging nation-state system. They depended upon
a changing mode of communication that drew a reading public into political consequence, but
also began to globalize communications.

It was not until the late nineteenth century that the uneasy conjunction of national citizenry and
abstract state really became established, forming in some cases what can be now called the
classical modern nation-states. It is important to remember that the old empires carried through
into the next century as viable polities, but also that the first wave of nation-states was formed in
the context of classical imperialism, including what has been called the „Scramble for Africa‟.
This was the period that Roland Robertson (1992) calls the „takeoff phase of modern
globalization or Robbie Robertson (2003) calls the Second Wave of Globalization.

The short twentieth century featured the „great wars‟ of territorial nationalism, and the liberation
movements of modern tribalism and neo-traditionalism. During this period new nation-states
emerged in the Third World, but they also formed in the West, including Yugoslavia, and its
subsequent breakaways.

The late twentieth century and early twenty-first century saw the rise of a new subjectivity of
nationalism - postmodern nationalism - where the emphasis moved to an aesthetic of choice.

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While there may still be no postmodern nations as such, during this period, particularly in the
West, postmodern subjectivities of ephemeral intensity came to overlay the continuing modern
foundations of the contemporary nation.

The first point to draw from this series of moments is that the history of nation formation is one
of continuity and discontinuity. Traditional national sentiment is qualitatively different in many
fundamental respects from the modern nationalism of horizontal and generalized compatriotism.
Nevertheless, despite this difference, it is a subjectivity that demands a broader explanation of
nation formation than the modernist theorists currently allow. In the sense in which I am using
these terms, modern nationalism is associated with a self-conscious politicization of the relation
between community and polity, usually with the desire for a state for one's nation, whereas
traditional national sentiment has no such associations. On the other hand, modern and traditional
national subjectivities are related in that they both entail a process through which persons are, at
one level, lifted out of the integral connections of face-to-face community, and abstracted from
messianic time and sacred place. It is this process that enables certain persons still living within
the ontological formation of traditionalism - namely intellectuals, clerics, poets - to name
territorialized places or genealogically connected peoples as distinct and demarcated entities,
bounded in territorial space and historical time, and separable from other such similar entities.

The second point is that this chapter parts company with any implicit argument in the mainstream
literature that Europe provided the blueprint for modern nation formation, except in regard to
being contextually crucial as the dominant globalizer of practices and ideas, including
philosophical naming of the idea of nationalism. One step in this revision is to qualify
fundamentally any implication that Europe is the birthplace of the nation-state. Certainly, as has
already been acknowledged, Europe was central to the emergent system of capitalist production
and exchange relations that through imperial expansion affected fundamental changes in the soci
eties of the „periphery‟. These changes became the context for the first wave of emergent nation-
5
states in the nineteenth century However, even in relation to the last wave of Third World
nation-states we have to be careful, for example, of too-quickly agreeing with Benedict
Anderson's emphasis on the export of the idea of nationalism when he draws attention to the
surface phenomenon that „twentieth century nationalisms have a profoundly modular character‟
(1991: 135). In one sense it is true. However, questions remain. Why, and in what way, was the
blueprint of the civil nation-state taken up? (I will come back to this question shortly.) Moreover,

555
we need to ask whether in fact it is the case that the Western European nation-states simply came
first as a model to copy.

Examples that qualify the focus on Europe as the proximate source of the nation-state are not hard
to find. As I wrote in Nation Formation (1996), profoundly influenced by Benedict Anderson's
thesis on the nations of the New World, the Thirteen States in North America had instituted the
internal pacification of its indigenous inhabitants; they had fought a war of independence against
a European power which brandished absolutist doctrines of the indivisibility of sovereignty
(1775-81); they had worked out a system for parcelling, commodify-ing and administering the
„empty‟ frontier territories; and, in the name of the People of the United States, had ratified a
unifying constitution (1789) - all before the August Days of 1789 saw Louis XVI's ancien régime
brought to an end by his erstwhile royal subjects. If we travel south to the colonies of Spanish
America, Anderson asks: „why was it precisely creole communities that developed so early
conceptions of their nationness - well before most of Europe ?' (1991: 50) The apparent
anachronism cannot be explained through a straightforward diffu-sionist or modular argument.
Rather the gradual and uneven consolidation in Europe, and elsewhere, of developments that
framed the transition from the imperial or monarchical state to the abstract state, also contributed
to a changed and globalizing world-time, a changed constitutive setting in which across the globe,
and bearing back upon Europe, states and peoples began to assert their political and cultural
identity. In short, nation-states were formed in the over-determined and uneven context of
modern globalization. This was a basis of the formation of nation-states, both in Europe and
elsewhere. Even the nation-states that were formed during the second wave of decolonization
after the late 1950s could not simply copy the Western blueprint. The decolonizing communities
may have been pressed to take up what was by then a global model, but the more important issue
was a globalizing pressure of social change that was integrated and accommodated from within.
In other words, as the nature of the dominant layer of their internal societies changed, modern
nation-state status was contradictorily naturalized: at one level as an expression of a traditional
continuity, and at another as an expression of modern progress and complete discontinuity.

IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPERIAL GLOBALIZATION

A further step in distancing the present argument from the idea of a Western blueprint or
„modular export‟ approach involves examining the process of how the colonies responded to the
imposition of a modernizing administration. In explaining how the development of nationalism in

556
Spanish America could arise earlier than in the heartlands of Europe, Benedict Anderson
describes a manifold process that helps us to qualify his own „modular‟ argument. In the first
place, Creole administrators, clerically trained men (women were excluded) who were often
white but born in the Americas, found themselves as administrators on common „journeys‟ that
took them across time, status and place. In the language of the present chapter, through a new
rationalizing mode of organization they were abstracted from relations of traditional embodied
temporality and spatiality Moreover, unlike European and East Asian feudal nobles, who
ascended genealogically, or absolutist „men of learning‟ and Confucian functionaries, who
climbed through talent, the Creole functionaries of the New World climbed to a certain level only
to find themselves barred vertically and horizontally. They shared the embodied cultural marks of
trans-Atlantic birth, bound within the geographical limit of their particular colony, but were
unable to be masters of it. Finally, in the context of a changed mode of communication in
intersection with capitalist trade relations, they began to imagine themselves as a horizontal
community. Though my condensed description of the process may not be immediately clear,
Anderson presents it with a brilliantly lucid word-picture:

Early gazettes contained – aside from news about the metropole – commercial news (when ships
would arrive and depart, what prices were current for what commodities in what ports), as well
as colonial political appointments, marriages of the wealthy, and so forth. In other words, what
brought together on the same page, this marriage with that ship, this price with that bishop, was
the structure of the colonial administration and market-system itself In this way, the newspaper of
Caracas quite naturally, even apolitically, created an imagined community among a specific
assemblage of fellow-readers, to whom these ships, brides, bishops, and prices belong. (1991: 62)

This description provides us with the means of qualifying Anderson's own claim about
modularity. However, I want to emphasize that it is only a qualifying and a resetting of the
argument, not a rejection. I say this because the theorist whose work I intend to use to carry my
argument a step further - Partha Chatterjee - is more critical of Anderson than is warranted.
Chatterjee rightly describes Anderson as problematically setting up three distinct and
chronologically ordered models of nationalism: (1) Creole nationalism in the Americas; (2)
linguistic or so-called „popular‟ nationalism in Europe; and (3) official nationalism in Europe. It
is from the third variant that nationalism develops a modular quality that in the twentieth century
can be drawn on by the Third World. Chatterjee concludes that,

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instead of pursuing the varied, and often contradictory, political possibilities inherent in this
process, Anderson seals up his theme with a sociological determinism … What, if we look closely,
are the substantive differences between Anderson and Gellner on twentieth century nationalism?
None … In the end both see in third-world nationalisms a profoundly „modular‟ character. They
are invariably shaped according to the contours outlined by given historical models: „objective,
inescapable, imperative‟. (1986: 21)

Here Chatterjee has overstated his objection to Anderson, particularly given our earlier discussion
about the importance of his work on endogenous structural processes such as the journeys of the
Creole elites. Nevertheless, Chatterjee's critique of most modernist theory, including that of
Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner, is telling. On political grounds it challenges the liberal
modernist approach as treating Third World colonial resistance and postcolonial politics as
predetermined by a universalizing modern West. And on factual grounds he criticizes the
approach for misreading the nature and timing of nationalism as it developed in Africa and Asia.
For example, during the second half of the nineteenth century a new elite-driven education
system was developed across Bengal (not too dissimilar to the examples of Japan and Germany in
the 1870s). Thus the beginning of modern and public-political Indian nationalism was marked
symbolically by the formation in 1885 of the Indian National Congress. At this point he adds a
subtle and unexpected twist. We might have expected him to say that the mainstream position
forgets that the process parallels the timing in much of Europe when it argues that Indian
nationalism is said to have emerged after the period of modernization and „social reform‟ from
the 1820s to 1870s. On this he would have been right, but he sets out to establish a much more
difficult and important point, one that allows us to illustrate the „levels‟ argument left hanging a
couple of paragraphs ago.

Chatterjee's argument (1993) becomes that „anti-colonial nationalism‟ develops culturally long
before its overt political manifestations. It does so by dividing social life into two domains: first,
the (traditional) spiritual or the „inner‟ domain of deep cultural identity - language, religion,
family. It is at this level that we see the earliest resistance to the intervention of the colonial state,
and later the reinter-pretation of the nature of the traditional spiritual domain in national terms:
subaltern politics becomes more than „numerous fragmented resistances‟. The second domain is
the „outside‟ (modern) domain of economy, state and science. For the indigenous intellectually
trained groupings this involved study and imitation of the acknowledged Western „superiority‟,
including „its‟ notions of Rule of Law and State. Later, drawing upon the resources of Western

558
Enlightenment universalism, they challenged colonialism and its differentiation between the
outsiders as rulers and indigenous peoples as ruled, thus completing the project of the modern
state. These two domains, or what I would call the two „ontological formations‟ of traditionalism
and modernism, were in a contradictory relationship, though with mutual historicities and
interwoven practices. In the histories of the late nineteenth century written by Bengali scholars,
the narrative style located in „homogeneous empty time‟ was interwoven with mythic and sacred
time. Concurrently, the bilingual intelligentsia embarked upon a cultural project to make Bengali
a standardized language outside the influence of the state, and in doing so they wove together two
versions: a formal and standardized prose influenced by European syntax, and a poetic idiom self-
consciously drawing upon „rustic‟ Indian preachers and philosophers. Thus, says Chatterjee (1996:
217):

In fact here nationalism launches its most powerful, creative and historically significant project:
to fashion a „modern‟ national culture that is nevertheless not Western. If the nation is an
imagined community, then this is where it is brought into being. In this its true and essential
domain, the nation is already sovereign, even when the state is in the hands of the colonial power.

Much more could be done to draw out the implications of both Anderson's and Chatterjee's work
for the argument being developed here, however enough has been said to indicate that the
emphasis of the present chapter is as much on social form as it is on social content. This takes us
back to where we started - Anthony Smith's attempt to find an intermediate position between the
two problematic positions of theoretical modernism and primordialism. However, as this chapter
has been concerned to argue, the trouble with this intermediation is that it has significant costs.
Smith effectively gives up on the possibility of a broad theory of nation formation and
emphasizes what he calls the driving force of mythomoteur with specifically „ethnic‟ content.
This takes away from the deeply materialist sense of the basis of identity formation and puts the
emphasis primarily on ideas that can be dredged up from the past.

CONCLUSION

Despite obvious differences there were patterned and materially based similarities in the
formation of nations, Western and Eastern, First World and Third World. This suggests that an
overall theory is possible. First, nation formation involved a predominant even if uneven shift in
the nature of each society based upon changes in the dominant modes of practice - production,

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exchange, communication, organization and inquiry - not just the taking up of an imported idea.
This is not to suggest that change was homogenizing, that it involved the reconstitution of all
those modes of practice, or that it permeated all the way down to the day-to-day life of all people
in a way that completely remade their lives. Whether we are talking about Portugal or Indonesia,
older modes of practice continue(d) long after nation-state status was declared. Secondly, it
involved an abstraction from traditional social relations through such processes as cultural
upheaval, geographical mobility and education. Thus the difference of emphasis between
different theorists on different actors - Anderson on the importance of local „creoles‟, Nairn on
„intellectuals‟ and Gellner on „clerks‟ - can be understood in this common framework where the
process of forming abstract communities can take many pathways on the same map. Thirdly,
nation formation is rarely based upon an homogeneous or genealogically connected population,
even if mythologies of common ethnic connection are forged. This has the effect of qualifying
rather than rejecting Smith's argument. Still, it is important to remember that whether we are
talking about France, the United States, East Timor or West Papua, nations were, and are, being
quilted together out of patchworks of culturally distinct peoples. Fourthly, nation formation is
rarely consensual, even if it does over a couple of generations become deeply constitutive of
social identity. In this, Rwanda and India, Britain and the United States, have much in common,
even if the violence had different expressions, different adversaries and different ideological
rationales.

The modern nation came into being across the globe through the overdetermination of changing
dominant modes of practice, integration and being - modes associated with the upheavals of
modernity in the context of extended global confrontations, imperial and otherwise. However,
though the modern nation was made possible by these patterned changes, it had to be made by
people acting politically. We can say that as a consequence of this process of change, not as a
cause, the formation of nation-states came in late modernity to be experienced as natural. That is,
to the extent that they thought about it, most of the population came to assume that nation-
statehood, whether consensual or striven by blood sacrifice, is the normal form of community-
polity. From the bottom, some individuals and peoples may have thought they wanted to live
under a different nation-state, but usually this meant wanting a state for their own self-proclaimed
subordinate nation. Throughout this chapter, I have being arguing about the dialectic of continuity
and discontinuity. Reading through the flickering screen of the contemporary globalizing and
postmodernizing nation-states of the West with all their contradictions, it is hard to see any of the
continuities-of-form here. The continuities at most appear as surface content, and even then only

560
as points of reference: a Jewish Bible, a Christian cross, a Stone of Destiny, a slab of engraved
marble, or a coloured piece of calico. However, the postmodern/late modern nation has all the
ontological vulnerabilities of the prior dominant forms of polity - from traditional kingdom and
absolutist state to the classical modern nation-state. Despite unprecedented technical power, it
still has to legitimize itself, at one level, through basic categories of human existence such as
embodiment, placement and the temporal transcendence - the transcendence of the community-
polity despite the assured mortality of all who live within it. And communities will continue to do
so, for good and evil, so long as we remain embodied persons living with others.

NOTES

Sections of this chapter recontextualize and rework material initially developed in James (2003). I
would like to thank Damian Kingsbury for his critical responses, and to acknowledge my
colleagues at Arena Journal for their ongoing critical contextualization of all my writing.

1 See by comparision the much more qualified arguments of medievalists who write of the
discontinuous nature of the developments: e.g. Geary (2002), Forde et al. (1995).

2 It is actually the projection back upon originating social formation from (different) positions of
abstraction within (different dominant ontological formations). Compare the biblical creation
story of Adam and Eve and the Freudian creation story of the totem and taboo: the first is sacred
truth, the second is metaphorical truth.

3 For an examples of a work that forgets this insight see Marvin and Ingle (1999).

4 „England‟ might be one counter-example, but prior to the nineteenth century I would still call it
a traditional nation (genealogically extended but bound by class-based delimitations) rather than a
modern nation.

5 This is the thesis put forward by Tom Nairn in The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-
Nationalism (1981 [1973]). It also bore back on the empires themselves. For an elegant
exposition of the case of England see Kumar (2003).

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references

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Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism . London: Sage
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Chatterjee, P. (1993) The Nation and Its Fragments . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Chatterjee, P. (1996) „Whose Imagined Community?‟ , in G. Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation .
London: Verso
Forde, S. , ed. , Johnson, L. , ed. and Murray, A. V. (eds) (1995) Concepts of National Identity in the
Middle Ages . Leeds: Leeds Texts and Monographs
Foster, G. M. (1996) „A Christian Nation: Signs of a Covenant‟ , in J. Bodnar (ed.), Bonds of Affection:
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Wills, G. (1979) Inventing America: Jefferson‟s Declaration of Independence . New York: Vintage Books
Wolf, E. R. (1982) Europe and the People without History . Berkeley, CA: University of California Press

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Part Three

Nations and Nationalism in a global Age

563
Holmes, Douglas. "Supranationalism - Integralism - Nationalism: Schemata for Twenty-first-
Century Europe. Pp. 385-98

Foreigners, in the lexicon of the whites-only British National Party (BNP), are not welcome
here. … But for some foreigners, the BNP puts its xenophobia on hold and tries to be nice. This
week it invited Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the BNP's much more successful French counterpart,
the National Front, to lend support, if not respectability, for their effort to secure a seat in the
European Parliamentary elections in June 2004. (The Economist, 1 May 2004: 58)

The author of this small insert in The Economist, with a picture of Le Pen surrounded by beefy
BNP bodyguards, is clearly repelled by this encounter while drawing attention to the ludicrous
character of the fêting of the French nationalist by his British counterparts who are inclined to
define themselves in opposition to just about everything imaginable that is French. Yet even in
this truncated journalistic account there is an acute observation; though meant no doubt
sarcastically, the incident is described as evidence of an „international alliance of xenophobes‟.

The curious encounter between these leaders hints at an important and rather paradoxical shift in
the communicative space of European politics engineered in the last decade of the twentieth
century allowing traditional cultural forms - typically glossed as „nationalism‟ - to be
communicated in new ways to an expanding audience. The leaders of these groups understand
viscerally that as the era of the nation-state is eclipsed their ideas and values can be
communicated in innovative ways to a new European public. In this chapter I will examine how
the complex sensibilities that have historically enlivened the idea of nationalism in Europe are
being recast by those forces encompassed by advanced European integration.

My aim here is to outline an analytical framework for examining this decisive transformation in
the political character of phenomena conventionally coded as „nationalism‟ by linking it to
„supranationalism‟ via a third term, „integralism‟ (Holmes 2000). I will argue that integralism
mediates between nationalism and supranationalism as spheres of theory, analysis and practice.
To navigate analytically among these three terms I will review some well-known and not so well-
known intellectual lineages that tie together the lives and works of an unusual group of theorists
and practitioners: John Maynard Keynes, Jean Monnet and, most significantly, Jean-Marie Le
Pen.

564
I will demonstrate how Le Pen, drawing on the ideas and practices that animate integralism,
broached the intricate architecture of supranationalism, inspired by Keynes and Monnet,
translating its arcane technocratic language of market integration into a radical politics of
contemporary Europe. 1

‘NEW ORDER’

The communicative space of supranationalism coalesced in the 1940s out of the diplomatic
agreements ushering in the current era of globalization. Created through a series of ongoing
projects of market integration, this communicative space is predicated on a common and rather
precise agreement by which

Language, contractual obligation, institutional relation, money, accounting, property, and hence
deeper matters like the past, the future, the individual, and the exercise of the will, must be
understood in similar ways … As a result, this communicative space has become the frame of
reference for those who care about money or the things money buys, and, more broadly, for those
who care about politics, and more broadly still, those who care about the efforts to make sense of
our time that we call culture, art, literature, religion and such. (Westbrook 2004: 1)

Communicative action in the contemporary - the ways we collectively think, act and experience
the world - is increasingly constituted in relation to supranational markets. How and why this has
happened are the key questions of our time; questions that demand a comprehensive reorientation
of our scholarship and our intellectual practices.

John Maynard Keynes and Jean Monnet, while seeking to resolve the most fundamental questions
of the nation-state - war, trade and debt - arrived at solutions that yielded two radically subversive
and interrelated projects: the Bretton Woods Institutions and the European institutions. Both
Monnet and Keynes experienced World War II from within the bureaucracies and ministries that
managed, supplied and financed the war efforts. They were aware of one another's work; Keynes
is reputed to have credited Monnet's skill in orchestrating the Allies' logistical efforts with
shortening the duration of the war by a year. Both men understood the inner operations of the
Leviathan; they knew how to manage the Wealth of Nations. Both were in fundamental ways
economic nationalists and liberal internationalists and, to say the least, they both had a subtle
understanding of the workings of capital markets. What they sought, however, was a deployment

565
of markets to achieve a profound historical transformation. In the designs of the European and
Bretton Woods institutions markets are recast as political tools to eviscerate the nation-state of its
economic sovereignty and hence what Monnet and Keynes understood to be its most rapacious
proclivities, as personified by Adolf Hitler, to organize its industrial apparatus for total war
(Westbrook 2003). In its place they created a politics of a distinctive sort, a supranational politics
that for very intriguing reasons defied expression as a wide-ranging political rhetoric; rather it
operated as an obscure technocratic discourse that transformed the world in the second half of the
twentieth century. Their veiled efforts were aimed at achieving, in Keynes's words, „a new order,‟
„a realizable utopia‟ (Skidelsky 2000:208).

The birth of the „new order‟ emerged from a technical problem Keynes faced in 1941, a dilemma
posed by a troublesome provision of the Lend Lease Agreement with the United States. The
famous agreement is known for allowing the Roosevelt administration to provide aid to the
British in the form of 50 surplus warships, against the backdrop of American isolationism prior to
Pearl Harbor. Inserted in the agreement was a provision, Article VII, which the British found
profoundly irksome and which bound the parties to an agenda that would define the future status
of international trade in the post-war world. Article VII became part of a wide-ranging debate
within the British Treasury and the Bank of England, already under way in 1941, on planning for
the post-war British economy and, more broadly, the structure of international trade within and
beyond the empire. Keynes played a pivotal role in these discussions, particularly in the debate on
the relative merits for postwar Britain of planned trade, based on the illiberal Schachtian system
of bi-lateral managed trade relations developed by Hitler's banker and Economics Minister
Hjalmar Schacht and Walther Funk, who succeeded Schacht as Economics Minister, and the
laissez-faire approach of „non-discrimination in trade‟ or „Hullism‟, espoused by the American
Secretary of State Cordell Hull (Skidelsky 2000: 179-232). The former arrangement would, at
least in theory have perpetuated the „imperial preferences‟ of the Commonwealth; the latter
would have decisively ended the political economy of empire.

Over a long weekend in September 1941 Keynes drafted two papers as rejoinders to Article VII,
„Post War Currency Policy‟ and „Proposal for International Currency Union‟, which Robert
Skidelsky, Keynes's biographer, described as „the most important he ever wrote in terms of their
direct influence on events‟ (2000: 208). In many respects these were incomplete and rather messy
documents, yet together they constituted a major „fragment of a Grand Design' that was to be
fully realized in the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1946. At the center of this technical design

566
were the mechanisms of an „International Central Bank (ICB) that would, as Keynes fatefully put
it, „make a beginning at the construction of the future government of the world‟ (quoted in
Skidelsky 2000:223).

The negotiations over this plan, first within the British government and then crucially in response
to the plan drafted by Harry Dexter White, a New Deal-appointed assistant to US Treasury
Secretary Henry Morgentheau, yielded the now famous tripartite Bretton Woods institutional
arrangement for global economic integration. What is most significant for our purposes is how
these complex negotiations defined the space of technocratic intervention predicated on monetary
issues. At stake in these negotiations were issues of highest national concern to the two parties,
inspiring potentially divisive political confrontation in the midst of war. Yet the translation of
these fraught political issues into technical terms opened the way to Keynes's „realizable utopia‟.
What this translation entailed was a conceptualization of „the supranational‟ as a sphere of theory,
analysis and intervention.

The creation of a supranational institutional framework also defined the role of a new class of
actors, who Robert Reich (1992) describes as „symbolic analysts‟, specialists whose interests
were no longer fully aligned with or reducible to those vested interests that defined the nation-
state. These actors, Keynes being one of the first, were no longer constrained by its theories,
methods and histories; indeed, by virtue of their institutional projects they sought to render the
intellectual apparatus underwriting the nation-state increasingly irrelevant. What emerged from
their labor was a discursive field of politics that operated increasingly through the idioms of
capital markets and international finance and largely outside the realm of conventional political
discourse and hence public scrutiny. Within a decade (9 May 1950) Jean Monnet and Robert
Schuman had engineered in a remarkably similar fashion the founding of the European
institutions.

INVISIBLE POLITICS

Jean Monnet made a decisive discovery about the communicative possibilities (and limitations)
constituted by supranationalism, a discovery that he relentlessly exploited and built into the fabric
of the European project. Commenting on the journalists covering the announcement of the
Schuman Declaration, Monnet notes their bafflement: „They were still uncertain about the
significance of the proposal, whose technical aspects at first sight masked its political meaning‟

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(Monnet 1978: 304). It is precisely this bafflement that allowed one of the most important
political projects of the twentieth century to develop in plain sight with little, if any, serious
public scrutiny. In other words, the inscrutability of the European project and, for that matter, the
Bretton Woods project was not merely the outcome of public inattention, but a consequence of
how these projects displaced fundamental historical realities that endowed events with coherence.

Inspired by Conrad Adenauer, first post-war chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
drafted by Robert Schuman, French Prime Minister, and Jean Monnet with a small group of aides,
the founding document of the European Union explicitly aimed to end the possibility of war in
Europe via comprehensive and wide-ranging market integration starting with the production of
coal and steel. Monnet was struck at the press conference announcing the Schuman plan that the
journalists failed to grasp its significance; the elite French intellectual community lacked a
framework and language to understand what the document represented. Monnet expresses in his
memoir initial disappointment with this tepid response to this remarkable declaration, but then,
one guesses, he realized what a remarkable asset this pubic indifference could be: he could build
Europe in plain sight without serious public scrutiny. He was free to pursue this staggering
project because the journalists, the intellectuals, the political elites of France and Europe would
be unperturbed, they operated within a cognitive purview and critical political agendas that were
seamlessly tied to histories and theories from which his supranational ambitions were largely
inscrutable (Rabinow 1999). Like Keynes, he had discovered the tightly defined communicative
character of supranationalism: its technical language, and its goal of market integration. Monnet,
one of the shrewdest minds of the twentieth century, recognized almost instantaneously that with
the Schuman Declaration a vast political space was created that was virtually invisible and
inaccessible from the standpoint of conventional political ideology and practice. 2

An explicit ethos and practice, designed by Monnet, was embraced by the founders of the
European Union and could be used to fill this technocratic space of Europe. At its philosophical
core were a comprehensive rejection of the nation-state as an instrument for managing human
affairs and the development of an expert method - an administrative science of the supranational -
that would impel the political integration of Europe. The founders of the EU were emphatic that
their goal was to escape the blighted history of the European nation-state (Adenauer 1966; Haas
1964, 1968; Herzfeld 1993; Lipgens 1985; Zorgbibe 1993). 3

AN EVER-CLOSER UNION

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David Westbrook has analyzed acutely how a par ticular appropriation of the market mechanism
as a constitutional instrument yielded a new type of polity, of which the European Union is a
decisive manifestation. He terms this polity created by the interleaving of European and Bretton
Woods institutions, the „City of Gold‟. By shifting our theoretical preoccupations about capital
markets from conceptualizing them in relationship to those commercial transactions organizing
production, distribution and consumption to conceptualizing markets as constitutional devices, he
provides analytical purchase on the forces giving social form and cultural content to the
contemporary world.

[T]o understand the way we now live rests therefore on a restatement of politics as it appears in
the context of supranational capital, legitimated through our faith in the institutions of money and
property as opposed to the modern nation state, legitimized through the familiar mechanisms of
the liberal republic … The communicative space formed by financial markets is the object of
political thought in our time, as the nation state was for most political thought during the time we
still regard as modern … (Westbrook 2004: 12)

These constitutional innovations were embraced unevenly in Europe until the 1980s, when two
projects rekindled the agenda for integration: the „single market‟ programme was established by
the treaty known as the Single European Act (1986) followed by the project of European
Monetary Union (EMU) codified in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). In 2002 the latter initiative
culminated in a new common currency, the euro, initially adopted by 12 member states and the
establishment of the European Central Bank to manage monetary policy within the newly
established euro-zone. The creation of the single market and the pursuit of monetary union have
been driving forces underwriting advanced European integration for the past two decades; they
literally encompass the principles integrating a supranational polity that now embraces 25
member states and 450 million citizens (Connolly 1995; Delors 1989; Milward 1999; Moravcsik
1998).

What is poorly understood about this monumental project is how it redefines the fundamental
nature of political discourse and how it recasts the way ideas of and about collectivity are
communicated. In other words, European integration poses basic questions about how we confer
meaning on social life generating in turn unusual possibilities for political innovation. The
predicament of integration through markets yields a distinctive problem of meaning.

569
The market's grammar, the dialectic between property and money, does not express many things
important to being human. Capitalism is therefore radically impoverished as a system of politics.
Insofar as we long for community, we necessarily experience life in capitalism as a sort of
exile … The construction of markets – the creation and alienation of property rights – involves
the destruction of meaning, and in longing for that meaning, we complain not only about the
market before us, but about the arrangement of social affairs through markets per se. (Westbrook
2003: 164)

This abstract predicament was, in the early 1990s, given a radical interpretation by a very
unlikely figure working within one of Jean Monnet's supranational institutions, the European
Parliament. The conundrum of community and meaning was forcefully diagnosed by Le Pen and
from that analysis he sought to establish a strategic set of social and cultural issues as a key axis
of struggle defining politics in Europe at the opening of the twenty-first century. Le Pen
diagnosed how „society‟ was being transformed simultaneously under the sway of the
supranational market and by the eclipsing of the nation-state as the dominant institutional
framework defining life in the new Europe (Berezin and Shain 2004; Holmes 2000; Wright 1998).

THE PARADOX OF JEAN-MARIE LE PEN

The presence of Le Pen and his associates at the European Parliament itself poses important
questions. The cynical view - which I held initially - was that the parliament provided the Front
National, Le Pen's party, with a forum within which to articulate its resolutely French political
agenda. Lacking the electoral strength to secure seats in the National Assembly, the Front
National took advantage of the European Parliament's different electoral rules and the propensity
of the French electorate to view European elections as an opportunity to register protest votes, to
win seats in the European Parliament and thereby gain a measure of political legitimacy. This is,
no doubt, a correct assessment. However, circumstances conspired to make Le Pen a far more
consequential figure in European politics. One formulation was decisive in this transformation:
by linking key elements of nationalism to the emergence of a multicultural and multiracial Europe,
Le Pen and his associates defined acutely the terms of political contestation that have broad
relevance across Europe. Indeed, their inventory of political imperatives has moved from the
margins to the center of political struggle in Western Europe.

570
Le Pen, from his vantage point within the European institutions, discovered that his message,
designed to address a tiny conservative, if not reactionary, French public could be re-crafted to
give it wide currency that could inspire radical forms of activism beyond the borders of France
(Simmons 1996; Stoler 2002; Taguieff 1988, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1994). This newly crafted
political framework, that broached the discursive field of supranationalism, I have termed
integralism. As Le Pen's integralist agenda evolved during the early 1990s it was gradually
adopted by his colleagues representing similar small regionalist and nationalist groupings within
the European Parliament and then, later in the decade, by a wide range of new or reconstituted
political movements across the EU. Thus, by the opening of the twenty-first century Le Pen had
crafted a model of political engagement which has entered the political discourse across the 25
member states of the EU; it is a model for activism that, despite its often cloying appeals to
nostalgia, is emphatically about the fundamental nature of contemporary European society
(Holmes 1993; Holmes and Marcus 2005; MacDonald 1996; Smith 1992; Stolcke 1995).

In the remainder of this chapter I will describe the insurgent character of integralism and its
relationship to advanced European integration. The focus will continue on Le Pen, who created a
conceptual architecture for integralism that allows critical interpretation of society undergoing
fundamental transformation. He and his associates have made a series of decisive - though largely
implicit - theoretical innovations that disrupt the categories by which we appraise modern
political phenomena.

My aim here is to render this theory explicit by tracing its intellectual lineage and contemporary
expression. I use integralism as a theory of society that, among other things, translates between
nationalist and supranationalist idioms, thereby providing analytical purchase on the shifting
nature of collective life, transformations of the public sphere, and realignments of human
intimacy. In the next section, I examine how integralism can serve as a framework to analyze how
mundane forms of collective practice can be linked to sublime political yearning, how varied and
contradictory political ambitions can be synthesized within an overarching integralist agenda, and
how integralism can draw on a specific European intellectual tradition for its form and substance
(Boyer and Lomnitz 2005; Hertzfeld 1987).

Integralism is often cloaked in the rhetoric of „nation‟, but when integralist agendas are
scrutinized it becomes clear that they encompass far more than just fidelity to the idea of nation,
rather they draw authority from a wide range of collective practices that implicate family, town

571
and country, language groups, religious communities, occupational statuses, social classes, and so
on (Alter 1994; Boyer and Lomnitz 2005; Handler 1988; Holmes 1989). At the opening of the
twenty-first century these collective practices and the sensibilities that infuse them are being re-
aggregated. In other words, the ideas, sentiments and values that have historically animated
various expressions of European nationalism are now enlivening not merely elements of national
collectivities, but other collective groupings, aligning them in complex fashion to the
supranational imperatives of European integration. These new alignments attaining articulations
within this supranational communicative space reveal the unsettling potential of integralism to
join, fuse, merge and synthesize what might appear to be incompatible elements imparting a
distinctive and volatile power to this kind of politics. In the following sections I will briefly
describe the historical character of integralism and how integralism gained articulation as a
modern social, cultural, aesthetic and political phenomenon. My purpose is to provide insights on
how and why contemporary expressions of integralism appear both profoundly familiar and
distinctly alien.

Isaiah Berlin (1976) sets out „three cardinal ideas‟ that he draws from the work of Johann
Gottfried Herder that have historically endowed integralism with social form and cultural content.
Populism, expressionism and pluralism provide both the basic conceptual structure of integralism
and locate its roots in European intellectual history. Populism is „the belief in the value of
belonging to a group or a culture …‟ (1976: 153). Berlin draws from Herder's distinctive
orientation to the vicissitudes of human association, an orientation that envisions patterns of
association crosscut by the possibility of loss and estrangement. The stranger, the exile, the alien
and the dispossessed haunt the margins of this populism. „[Herder‟s] notion of what it is to belong
to a family, a sect, a place, a period, a style is the foundation of his populism, and of all the later
conscious programmes for self-integration or re-integration among men who felt scattered, exiled
or alienated' (1976: 196-7). Though Berlin acknowledges that Herderian populism embraces
views of collectivity that are not necessarily political and ideas of solidarity that need not be
forged through social struggle, he is clear that populism, by taking dispersed human practices and
beliefs and by conferring on them collective significance, creates singular political possibilities.

Expressionism encompasses all aspects of human creativity orienting analysis of society towards
„inner truths‟ and „inner ideals‟.

572
[H]uman activity in general, and art in particular, express the entire personality of the individual
or the group, and are intelligible only to the degree to which they do so. Still more specifically,
expressionism claims that all the works of men are above all voices speaking, are not objects
detached from their makers, are part of a living process of communication between persons and
not independently existing entities … This is connected with the further notions that every form of
human self-expression is in some sense artistic, and that self-expression is part of the essence of
human beings … (1976: 153)

Expressionism thus encompasses virtually the entire compendium of collective practices, the
varied fabrications of culture, from rustic cuisine to high religion (Holmes 1989). Herder posits
an inner logic and internally derived integrity to these creative enterprises and thus a unifying
dynamic.

Pluralism is for Berlin „the belief not merely in the multiplicity, but in the incommensurability of
the values of different cultures and societies, and in addition, in the incompatibility of equally
valid ideals, together with the implied revolutionary corollary that the classical notions of an ideal
man and of an ideal society are intrinsically incoherent and meaningless‟ (1976: 153).
Significantly, Berlin's rendering of pluralism can yield tolerance of difference among discrete
groups with their own enduring traditions and territorial attachments. However, when cast against
a „cosmopolitan‟ agenda based on universal values and „rootless‟ styles of life, it is a „pluralism‟
that can provoke fierce intolerance. In its embrace of „incommensurability‟, it creates a
potentially invidious doctrine of difference, which holds that cultural distinctions must be
preserved among an enduring plurality of groups and provides, thereby, a discriminatory rationale
for practices of inclusion and exclusion (Anderson 1992).

There is one more concept that Berlin also derives from Herder, which has relevance for the
articulation of integralism, the concept of alienation. Berlin notes that it „is not simply a lament
for the material and moral miseries of exile, but is based on the view that to cut men off from the
“living center” - from the texture to which they naturally belong - or to force them to sit by the
rivers of some remote Babylon,… [is] to degrade, dehumanize, [and] destroy them‟ (1976: 197).
This is a view of alienation that emphasizes cultural estrangement over and above socio-
economic oppression. Crucially, estrangement can also be figurative; it can be instilled by the
„emptiness of cosmopolitanism‟ without entailing any physical dislocation (pp. 198-9).

573
These ideas delineated by Berlin are postulates about the essence of human nature and the
character of cultural affinity and difference that can potentially imbue fervent political yearnings
and foreshadow a distinctive political economy. Taken together they constitute the basis of a
distinctive intellectual and cultural movement in European history, which assumed its most
sophisticated manifestation within the humanistic triumphs of Romanticism and most malevolent
4
expression in the politics of fascism. The enduring significance of these concepts is that they
reveal how, under the guise of „tradition‟, new cultural forms and social distinctions can
proliferate and, as we know too well, how these distinctions can yield tainted and incendiary
discriminations of human difference (Stoler 1995, 1997a, 1997b).

Fundamentally, these postulates formulated by Berlin represent a theory of society, a distinctive

project of human collectivity. What is most significant about integralism and easily overlooked is
its potential to take what might appear to be nostalgic cultural configurations and continually
refine and recast them as future-oriented collective ideals demarcating a formidable societal
milieu in which human creative potentials impart a distinctive dynamic of change and
transformation. Indeed, it is the way that integralism has become virtually inextricable from the
progressive dynamism of the modern world that demands scrutiny.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM

A tiny dissident movement emerged in France at the close of the nineteenth century that
translated the key assumptions of integralism into a modern theory of industrial society. The
collective ideals of populism, expressionism and pluralism were recast and interleaved as
„nationalism‟ and „socialism‟ yielding a political movement that devastated Europe and became
the rationale for European integration. In the following section I review this decisive historical
episode whereby integralism became a vertiginous politics.

Conceived by George Sorel and developed by his followers within groups like the Cercle
Proudhon, the movement pursued this translation through an implausible, if not bizarre, revision
of virtually all the basic tenets of Marxism. 5 Indeed, „revisionism‟ hardly captures the thorough
evisceration of Marxist doctrine accomplished by the Sorelians. 6 What started as revisionism, in
fact, opened up an entirely new ideological path upon which a virulent synthesis of socialism and
nationalism took form. This synthesis jettisoned virtually the entire intellectual tradition of the
European Enlightenment and circumscribed a wholly novel terrain for modern political

574
radicalism. In the process it liberated „new‟ forces to propel political insurgency: the power of the
irrational, the unconscious and the intuitive. 7

Two radical „alterations‟ of Marxist theory, formulated on or about 1910, were crucial in casting
a new revolutionary politics that ultimately set the course to fascism. On the one hand, the
economics of capitalism were superseded in the Sorelian scheme by the psychology of myth as
the driving force of class struggle and the catalyst for revolutionary action. On the other, the
„proletariat‟ as agent of revolution was supplanted by the „nation‟, unified across classes, as the
moral framework for radical action. This section touches briefly on the innovations represented
by the Sorelian and fascist legacies as a way to introduce the politics of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Le
Pen is neither a Sorelian nor is he a fascist, but in the late twentieth century he and those leaders
who have modeled themselves on his activism drew on these two traditions to define an
integralist politics for Europe (Rémond 1982; Weber 1962, 1964, 1986).

Sorel's faith in the working class was disclaimed abruptly in the face of what he and his followers
believed to be a monumental historical impasse, an impasse that led them to repudiate the
proletariat as the agent of revolution.

The proletariat of the great industrial centers of western Europe corresponded to the portrait
[Gustave] Le Bon had painted of it: it too was only a crowd, and a crowd is conservative … This
proletariat was no longer and would never again be, an agent of antibourgeois revolution. One
had therefore either to follow it into its retirement or find an alternate revolutionary force
capable of destroying liberal democracy and rescuing the world from decadence … [T]he
ineffective proletariat would be replaced by the great rising force of the modern world, born of
modernization, wars of independence, and cultural integration – that is, the nation. The nation
with all its classes [was thus] joined together in the great fight against bourgeois and democratic
decadence. (Sternhell 1994: 26–7)

During the first decade of the twentieth century Sorelian socialism migrated toward the
nationalism of Charles Maurras and his followers affiliated with Action française. These activists
sought a socialism with a national character drawing its inspiration from „the old French
socialism of Fourier and Saint-Simon, Considerant and Louis Blac, Lamennais, and George Sand
and Eugène Sue - not from German intoxicants like those produced by Marx and Engels‟ (Weber
1991: 266). The social order imparted by this socialism became, under the sway of nationalism,

575
anti-materialist, illiberal and resolutely authoritarian. „Where Charles Maurras differed from the
Socialists was not in matters of social concern, but in matters of social order - denouncing their
egalitarian myths and their belief that authority stems from the masses when, to him, authority is
clearly established only by the natural hierarchy of competence and birth. Maurras, then, opposes
socialist democracy; he also opposed socialist internationalism' (Weber 1991: 264). This of
course implies a radical inversion of the Durkheimian telos of modern society, it is a „socialism‟
founded on an ersatz „mechanical solidarity‟ and predicated on renewed sentiments of rootedness
as revolutionary principles (Noiriel 1996).

Through the intellectual work and activism of Maurice Barrès, George Valois, Pierre Drieu la
Rochelle, Marcel Déat and Robert Brasillach an incendiary course was set in the direction of a
„national revolution‟ that culminated in Vichy.

Thus, it was quite natural that a synthesis would arise between this new socialism, which
discovered the nation as a revolutionary agent, and the nationalist movement, which also rebelled
against the old world of conservatives, against the aristocrats and the bourgeois, and against
social injustices and which believed that the nation would never be complete until it had
integrated the proletariat. A socialism for the whole collectivity and a nationalism that, severed
from conservatism, proclaimed itself as being by definition the messenger of unity and unanimity
thus came together to form an unprecedented weapon of war against the bourgeois order and
liberal democracy (Sternhell 1994: 27-8).

The advocates of this national socialist synthesis addressed forcefully, if not obsessively,
solidarity and the nature of human collectivities. They did not, however, focus their radical
interventions solely on social or economic structures, but rather they emphasized the potential of
a cultural assemblage - orchestrated around populism, expressionism and pluralism - to serve as
the basis of collectivity. Their socialism, unified across classes, dissolved „society‟ into the
„nation‟, thus creating a nationalism that could become, not just an idiom of solidarity, but a
vehicle for social justice. They sought to formulate a politics that could circumvent a
disintegrating „bourgeois public sphere‟, and engage directly the human substance of integral
lifeworlds. These are the dissident maneuvers that connect Jean-Marie Le Pen to the Sorelian
legacy and the fascist synthesis.

576
Fascism wished to rectify the most disastrous consequences of modernization of the European
continent and to provide a solution to the atomization of society, its fragmentation into
antagonistic groups, and the alienation of the individual in a free market economy Fascism
rebelled against the dehumanization that modernization had introduced into human relationships,
but it was also very eager to retain the benefits of progress and never advocated a return to a
hypothetical golden age … Fascism presented itself as a revolution of another kind, a revolution
that sought to destroy the existing [bourgeois] political order and to uproot its theoretical and
moral foundations but that at the same time wished to preserve all the achievements of modern
technology It was to take place within the framework of the industrial society, fully exploiting that
power that was in it. (Sternhell 1994: 6–7)

Sternhell further notes, „fascism was only an extreme manifestation of a much broader and more
comprehensive phenomenon … an integral part of the history of European culture‟ (1994: 3). It is
this broader phenomenon, deeply rooted in European experiences of modernity - collective
experiences of modernity that are no longer fully encompassed by notions of nation and state -
that I seek to capture with the idea of integralism.

CULTURAL PHYSICIAN

Le Pen discovered how the discursive field of supranationalism as something other than a
technical discourse could be broached. He made a fundamental translation of the arcane
technocratic language of market integration into a contemporary political idiom. By so doing he
solved the central conundrum, the core riddle of advanced European integration. He asserted that
the European Union, which presents itself, as an immense economic undertaking, is in fact a
radical social and cultural project, a project aimed at creating a vast multiracial and multicultural
Europe. Moreover, the project as he understood it was unfolding unmarked, unrecognized and un-
narrated. He had assumed for himself the task of giving voice to this process, giving the project of
European integration a language and thereby a new political reality.

Le Pen's ambition in the early 1990s was to define the discourse on the emergence of a
multiracial and multicultural society by eviscerating its moral and intellectual foundations. He
thereby escaped the tightly sequestered world of right-wing French nationalism and established
the premises of a supranational politics of Europe, a politics emphatically opposed to integration.
Indeed, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Le Pen was the first to elaborate what could be

577
 construed as a new political articulation, a rancorous articulation, of what is at stake in advanced
European integration. in this final section I will outline how the projects engineered by Keynes
and Monnet provided a framework for the alignment and the configuration of communicative
action to coalesce and to circulate beyond the institutional ambit of the nation-state: antagonistic
to or unconstrained by its regulatory conventions and its intellectual traditions. I will continue to
personify these innovations in terms of Le Pen because, as I have argued above, he has been
largely responsible for discovering this space and refining the techniques for entering and
exploiting it politically. That said, there are now numerous agile political leaders across Europe
who have explicitly or implicitly modeled their practices on Le Pen's and are now pursuing his
conceptual and tactical strategies with equal if not greater zeal. Hence, I am using „Le Pen‟
figuratively to stand for a series of political innovations that Le Pen, the person, initially worked
out, but which now operate beyond his control as an inchoate politics of Europe (Holmes and
Marcus 2005).

1. Le Pen asserts that as society framed by the bourgeois nation-state is eclipsed a space is created
for a radical politics that draws on latent cultural idioms for the conceptualization of collectivities.
He narrates the usurpation of the nation-state and its significance not just for those traditional
political constituencies displaced and estranged by this process - most notably the working class -
but for all Europeans. He has conjured a complex emotional landscape for a supranational Europe
upon which sublime longings and desires are crosscut by acute fears and anxieties. He recognized
that integration is paradoxically creating new domains of alienation and estrangement in which
radical formation of meaning can establish the terms of struggle over multiracial and
multicultural society (Holmes 2000).

2. Le Pen's theatricality is renowned, his performances are widely acknowledged to be masterful

and compelling despite (or because of) their extremist character. He prides himself on the texture,
the subtlety and the range of his emotional message. What others consider distasteful about his
performance, Le Pen claims as the distinctive means by which he engages the intimate struggles
that circumscribe the lives of his public (Herzfeld 1997). Underpinning the theatrical and
emotional dimensions of his political practice is the formidable intellectual tradition of the
„Counter Enlightenment‟ from which Le Pen distils what he believes to be the essence of human
nature and the character of cultural affinity and difference, ideas that imbue ardent political
activism and foreshadow an exclusionary political economy (Stoler 2002). Le Pen's outlook
exceeds what is conventionally understood as „politics‟, rather he conjured a complex sociology

578
 and metaphysics that tether the new political economy of the EU to emerging existential struggles
taking shape in the lives of virtually every European (Stoler 1997b: Taguieff 1989).

3. Le Pen's decisive insight is that the communicative space of supranationalism renders the
bourgeois public sphere largely irrelevant permitting new forms of communicative action. In this
space he substitutes the authority of „experience‟, shared experience, as the basis of legitimacy,
credibility and truth (Stoler 1997a). He recognizes that a particular kind of message - an
integralist message - can be communicated in ways that are not susceptible to the forms of
rational scrutiny and intellectual mediation that characterized the era of the nation-state, but can
enter the lifeworlds of a new European public and be accepted, as it were, on „faith‟ (Eley 1994:
298; Habermas 1987, 1991).

4. Le Pen frames his political practice to embrace far more than fidelity to the idea of „nation‟,
rather it draws authority from a wide range of collective ideas, that implicate family, town and
country, language groups, religious communities, occupational statuses, social classes and so on.
He understands that this kind of dynamic pluralism can be cast in opposition to the supranational
imperatives of European integration revealing the potential of integralism to join, fuse, merge and
synthesize what might appear to be incompatible principles of association within a common
political movement or insurgency. Simple distinctions between left and right no longer serve as
reliable guides within this communicative space where „socialism‟ can be constituted in relation
to illiberal assumptions and values of collectivity (Boyer and Lomnitz 2005; Holmes 2000).

PLURALIST DYNAMIC

I will conclude with two brief paradigmatic representations of how integralist ideas circulate
across a newly contoured Europe: how populism, expressionism, pluralism and intensifying
forms of estrangement are inciting ideas that can be communicated politically to a newly defined
European public.

The initial trajectory of this hypothetical communicative action is, in the case of Le Pen, from his
headquarters in Paris to the homes, bars, workplaces, sports clubs and so forth of French and now
European citizens, where his narratives move in countless informal conversations, in press
accounts and in the shop-talk of local politicians. These political narratives are interpreted and
endowed with diverse meaning in these local contexts depending on whether they are configured

579
across the borderlands of Ireland or Poland or within the working-class neighborhoods of
Marseilles or Vilnius. In these varied sites Le Pen's narratives are translated into „indigenous‟
idioms to address human predicaments conferring on them a fraught conceptual and emotional
substance. These volatile narratives can be refracted back to the political precincts of Paris, or
Stockholm, Warsaw, Belfast, or Madrid, to the offices of all those who seek to emulate or to
oppose Le Pen, where they can be re-calibrated and re-communicated aligning a complex
discursive field, the communicative space of a supranational Europe.

If early in the twenty-first century one were to attend a public rally for Le Pen in France, or for
one of the many political figures who model themselves on Le Pen elsewhere in Europe, and
walk through the crowd one would see the embodiment of integralism, particularly its pluralist
dynamic. As one surveys the audience, whether on the outskirts of Budapest, Antwerp, Lisbon or
Prague, one can identify by vestments, demeanor, dialect or other overt characteristics the distinct
groups that make up this notional audience. One would likely find: farmers, conservative
Catholics, pensioners and military veterans, school teachers and other low- and mid-level
government employees, factory workers, owners of small shops and businesses, university
students and members of other often religiously sponsored youth organizations, a coterie of
skinheads and, at the margins, the police, who alternately participate as security contingent and as
attentive listeners.

The speaker typically acknowledges these groupings and addresses them on their terms: the
audience need not divest themselves of their idiosyncratic identities, on the contrary, the only way
their participation makes sense is from the standpoint of their own particular sensibilities and
consciousness. Neither are they addressed as abstract citizens of a nation-state nor as citizens of a
European Union and they certainly are not addressed as „consumers‟ to be sold a political
message. These groupings are equally hostile to the rule of the market and to the logic of
technocracy. For them, political meaning can only be socially mediated through idioms of family,
town and country, ethnic and linguistic assemblages, religious communities, occupational statuses,
social classes and so on. Their faith and loyalty reside in experience reconciled through these
collective entities, and thus through forms of solidarity that are simultaneously prosaic and radical.
Again, the acute irony, that Le Pen so carefully configured, is that only from the perspective of
these collective groupings is the „true‟ meaning of Europe revealed, only from these vantage
points can the supranational project be critically appraised and its „ominous‟ meaning
apprehended. What members of these groups share is a profound sense of encroaching

580
estrangement that threatens the integrity of their diverse communities providing the common
thread that weaves their pluralist agendas together. These are the manifold human predicaments
gaining political articulation as integralism, an integralism that resonates across a supranational
Europe and beyond.

The „alliance of xenophobes‟, alluded to at the outset of this chapter, is thus far more
consequential than a ludicrous charade performed by „brutes in suits‟. Rather, as I have argued
above, it is a manifestation of an expanding insurgency: an insurgency predicated on ideas about
human affinity and difference that not only have deep roots in European intellectual history, but
also represent a keen understanding of contemporary European political economy. Initially
coalescing among a tiny group of activists, the ideas that animate this movement have relentlessly
made their way into mainstream political discourse shaping the consciousness of an ever-wider
community of adherents and sympathizers. These people no longer perceive the discriminatory
values they embrace as extremist, but articulate them as a matter of fact.

NOTES

1 I have sought to emphasize the role of particular kinds of actors, „technocrats‟, „social
modernists‟ and „symbolic analysts‟, who have engineered, as it were, the transformations that I
am discussing in this chapter (Boyer and Lomnitz 2005; Holmes 2000; Rabinow 1999; Reich
1992).

2 There is one group, Catholic intellectuals (Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman were
Christian Democrats) that understands the supranational project both as metaphysics and as
practice, they give it an entirely modern political cast drawing on Aquinas and the writing of neo-
Thomists. If anything, however, these communicative practices further occlude the discourse on
Europe and prevent it from entering public debate (Holmes 2000: 47–50).

3 The nation-state remains a significant institutional reality in Europe. What has changed is that
the economic, social, political and cultural forces transforming the lives of Europeans are
increasingly supranational in form and content and largely beyond the control of the political,
judicial and technocratic apparatus of the nation-state. For extended ethnographic treatment of
integralism see Holmes (2000) and for a discussion of the methodological issues at stake in
analyzing integralism see Holmes and Marcus (2005).

581
4 The theme of the Counter-Enlightenment runs through Berlin's entire distinguished oeuvre and
serves as one of the central unifying themes of his scholarship. See Eric R. Wolf's (1999) concise
summary of the Counter-Enlightenment tradition (pp. 26–30) and Perry Anderson's (1992) review
of Berlin's intellectual commitments.

5 Sternhell notes: „The aim of the Cercle Proudhon, wrote [George] Valois, was to provide “a
common platform for nationalists and leftist antidemocrats”‟ (1996: 11). Valois went on to found
Le Faisceau in 1925. Eugen Weber comments on the analytical unease this marriage provokes:
„The connection of socialism and nationalism has existed for a long time; it is like one of those
common-law unions which practice and habit render commonplace and extremely unremarkable.
Less so, if only because theoretical discussion has insisted upon the incompatibility, is the
ideological alliance of the two, an alliance … that has never lacked supporters in France since the
days of Barrès‟ (1991: 262–3).

6 „[Sorel] regarded Marxism as a whole, including Marx‟s own works and the codification of
Marxism by Engels, Kautsky and Bernstein, as a kind of receptacle that could be voided of its
original contents and filled with another substance. This principle applied not only to the means
but also to the end of revolutionary action …' (Sternhell 1994: 22).

7 Again, Zeev Sternhell notes: „Marxism was a system of ideas still deeply rooted in the
philosophy of the eighteenth century. Sorelian revisionism replaced the rationalist, Hegelian
foundations of Marxism with Le Bon‟s new vision of human nature, with the anti-Cartesianism of
Bergson, with the Nietzschean cult of revolt, and with Pareto's recent discoveries [regarding the
role of elites] in political sociology. The Sorelian voluntarist, vitalist and antimaterialist form of
socialism used Bergsonism as an instrument against scientism and did not hesitate to attack
reason. It was a philosophy of action based on intuition, the cult of energy and élan vital' (1994:
24)

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Hann, Chris. "Nation and Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe." Pp. 399-409

In an age strongly marked by both the rhetoric and realities of Europeanization, primarily in the
context of the expansion of the European Union, it is easy to forget that Europe is a construction.
The idea that the western section of the world's largest landmass comprises a continent, separate
from Africa to the south and from Asia to the east, illustrates only the extent to which we are still
in thrall to the symbolic constructions of the Ancient Greeks.

Central and Eastern Europe is also a construct, but of much more recent origin (see Cornis-Pope
and Neubauer, 2004). It is itself a product of the era of modern nationalism, and it has a
distinctive place in the nationalism literature. The term Mitteleuropa underwent a curious
revitalization in the last decade of socialism, when groups of intellectuals in Budapest and Prague
sought to convince the world that it was a mistake to classify their countries, or rather their
nations, in a binary schema which subordinated them to the jurisdiction of Moscow (Schöpflin
and Wood 1989). The rediscovery of this German term was no accident, since German was the
dominant political language in a vast zone of largely Slavic settlement until well after the collapse
of the Habsburg Empire in 1918. Even today, scholarship in Germany and Austria makes (rather
imprecise) use of the term Ostmitteleuropa. The Balkans are usually excluded from its remit. For
the purposes of this chapter, Central and Eastern Europe includes the Balkans, but the discussion
will focus on those regions which formerly belonged to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The
pragmatic justification for this focus is that the core territories of the other major imperial powers
of Eastern Europe in the era that preceded the domination of the nation-state are the subject of
separate entries in this Handbook. Germany belongs here, as do peripheral zones of German
expansion such as the eastern Baltic; but the latter regions, and all those East Slavs who did not
come under Habsburg influence, will not be considered in any detail. We shall concentrate on
populations which, though considered eastern in the nationalism literature, nonetheless fall within
the boundary of western Christianity, considered by some scholars to be a civilizational boundary
(Huntington 1996). We shall return to this ambiguity below. In any case the purpose is not to
pinpoint geographical or cultural boundaries but rather to question them, by emphasizing their
contingent, constructed character. We shall see that, contrary to some simplifying stereotypes,
Central and Eastern Europe has been a home to many quite different forms of nationalism and
ethnicity; some continue to flourish there, even as the region is gradually incorporated into the
European Union.

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GENERAL HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This chapter will be divided into three parts. This first section provides a historical overview. It
will be convenient to follow this with a detailed presentation of the work of some of the most
celebrated theoreticians of ethnicity and nationalism, whose roots are in Central and Eastern
Europe. Prague alone is home to some of the greatest contributors to twentieth-century debates,
among them Hans Kohn, Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner and Miroslav Hroch. In the final section I
shall review contemporary developments and assess the extent to which nationalism and ethnicity
remain important political and sociological factors in contemporary Ostmitteleuropa.

The locus classicus for an intellectual declaration of an „eastern‟ model of nationalism is the
oeuvre of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803). In his Outlines of a Philosophy of the
History of Man (1784) and elsewhere he elaborated the idea that each and every „nation‟ or Volk
possessed its unique Geist or spirit. Each nation was not merely analogous to an organism but an
element in God's historical design. Herder is deservedly viewed as a precursor of what came later
to be known as cultural relativism in anthropology. The contemporary message of the Sturm und
Drang movement was that Germans should celebrate their own language and literature, and give
up their attempts to emulate the French philosophes. Herder countered the individualist-
universalist rationalism of Enlightenment France by asserting the importance of a collective
identity given by cultural endowments. According to him, the spirit or soul of the nation is
expressed above all in its language. Herder was more humanist cosmopolitan than political
nationalist. He extolled the folksongs of the Slavs and his work was held in high esteem by
Eastern European nationalists throughout the nineteenth century.

Germany itself remained politically fragmented until unification was achieved by Bismarck in
1871, but the idea of a unified German Volk gained ground steadily after Herder's death.
Eloquently set out in Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation (1807-8), it came to suffuse every
realm of culture, from the fairy tales of the Grimm brothers to the music of Richard Wagner and
the sociology of Max Weber. Among the political consequences of German nationalism were the
two World Wars of the twentieth century. Whether German understandings of the nation and the
„blood‟ basis of national identity changed significantly after the catastrophe of National Socialism
is a question to which we shall return.

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The other leading power of Ostmitteleuropa throughout the nineteenth century was the Habsburg
Empire, with its capital in Vienna. After withstanding the revolutions of 1848, the empire was
restructured as a Dual Monarchy after the 1867 „Compromise‟ with Hungary. This political entity
differed sharply from the case of Germany, even if the dominant language was the same. In
Germany, no matter how great the local variation, for example, in terms of religion or dialect, it
could be maintained that all citizens could acknowledge a common Hochkultur. But the
Habsburgs were a dynasty which had, since the early sixteenth century, ruled over millions of
Slavs (of very different types), not to mention Magyars, Romanians and many other smaller
minorities and splinter groups. The structural conditions were utterly different from those
prevailing in Germany, not only in terms of political and administrative machinery but also in
terms of socio-economic development. The Vielvölkerstaat could boast extraordinary creativity in
almost every realm of culture; but this culture could not possibly be reduced to a national culture,
nor could it be incorporated into a grossdeutsch union with Germany. The plaintive statement of
Gustav Mahler, son of a village tavern keeper, exemplifies the predicament to which this situation
led by the turn of the twentieth century: „I am thrice homeless, as a native of Bohemia in Austria,
as an Austrian among Germans, and as a Jew throughout the world.‟

A closer inspection reveals significant differences in policy in the later nineteenth century in the
two halves of the empire. Budapest controlled a territory in which ethnic Hungarians amounted to
less than half the population. The Magyar elites set out to raise this proportion through policies,
mainly through the privileging of Hungarians in the educational and administrative systems,
which created strong incentives for non-Magyars (especially Jews) to assimilate. The populations
administered from Vienna in the later nineteenth century were still more diverse, from the
Western Slavs of Bohemia to the East Slavs of Galicia and the South Slavs of Slovenia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the latter case including large numbers of Muslims); some of these
groups were perceived in the capital to be more „Oriental‟ than European. The subjects of the
Emperor were all expected to be patriotic Austrians at one level; but below this they were allowed
to cultivate their separate national identities. In some cases, notably that of the Ruthenians (who
by the end of the nineteenth century were beginning to adopt the new designation Ukrainian),
considerations of imperial „divide and rule‟ led the centre to support the consolidation of a
national movement (in order to counter the power of the Poles in the province of Galicia).

In the last decades of the Empire, group identity was increasingly „ethnicized‟. The various
Völker of Emperor Franz Josef became increasingly conscious of their distinctive national

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cultures. Their demand for a political entity congruent with the cultural identity was partially met
when the Empire collapsed at the end of World War I. Ostensibly the Vielvölkerstaat was now
replaced by the nation-state, epitomized in Woodrow Wilson's principle of„self-determination for
nations‟. The practical outcomes were inevitably still fuzzy. While Vienna and Budapest now
became the capital cities of radically truncated states, populated overwhelmingly by German and
Hungarian speakers respectively, the violent aftermath of the post-war settlement at Trianon left
the new Polish state with a population of which approximately one-third was not ethnically Polish.
The new federal entity of Czechoslovakia in fact comprised three ethno-territorial entities, once it
was decided to attach Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the new state. Of course the Czech, Slovak and
Ruthenian lands all contained substantial minority groups, notably the Germans of the
Sudetenland and the Hungarians of southern Slovakia, not to mention more dispersed groups such
as Roma and Jews.

The settlement of Trianon proved short-lived and much more radical moves towards the ideal of
the nation-state were accomplished during and immediately following the Second World War.
The Holocaust removed from Central and Eastern Europe the great majority of those whose
continued existence was inconsistent with nationalist frenzy. The redrawing of borders and forced
population movements of the type later to be called „ethnic cleansing‟ brought state and nation
into greater harmony than ever before. Poland, for example, became as a People's Democracy one
of the most homogeneous states of the region, thanks not only to the new borders imposed by
Stalin but also to massive expulsions of Germans and East Slavs. Many cities that had been
multicultural for centuries, such as Vilnius, Prague or Bratislava, lost that diversity. It was
replaced by a new monoculture, primarily the product of socialist urbanization and
industrialization. Germany itself, by contrast, was now divided. Czechoslovakia survived, but
Subcarpathian Ruthenia was detached and allocated to the Soviet Ukraine, where it became the
Transcarpathian Oblast.

The ultimate triumph of nationalism throughout this region was ushered in with the collapse of
socialist power in 1989-90. Whether nationalist sentiments contributed significantly to the
making of these revolutions is debatable; but it seems clear that the nation was for many the only
secure identity available to them in the turmoil of the post-socialist years. Within a few years not
only was Germany miraculously united but the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav federal states were
replaced by new entities based on the national principle. While Czechoslovakia experienced a
„velvet divorce‟, ethnic violence plagued the western Balkans for approximately a decade. Only

588
the interventions of the „international community‟ have established a fragile peace in Bosnia,
Kosovo and Macedonia. In the eastern Baltic region Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania regained their
independence as nation-states, as did Ukraine (with its Transcarpathian Oblast). We shall address
some of the factors which continue to complicate this apparently tidy picture later in the chapter.
First, let us turn to consider some of the theories which influential intellectuals have put forward
in accounting for the phenomena of ethnicity and nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe over
the past two centuries.

LOCAL THEORETICAL MODELS

It surely cannot be a coincidence that numerous pathbreaking attempts to provide general

explanations of nations and nationalism (we shall focus on these terms and neglect ethnicity
because the latter is not prominent in the work we shall be discussing) have been made by
scholars whose roots lie in Mitteleuropa. Of course the work of each individual scholar is
influenced by personal biographical details as well as the wider social and intellectual context
within which he worked. Lack of space prevents a comprehensive analysis of these factors here.

Hans Kohn (1891-1971), whose early publications in his native Prague were influenced by
Zionism, devoted much of his later distinguished career in the United States to the study of
nationalism. For Kohn, nations were the given basic units of history, as they were for Herder
(Kohn 1944). He traced the idea of nationalism back as far as the ancient Hebrews, but he also
developed a distinction, which is still highly influential, between two variants of modern
nationalism within Europe. Whereas the western variant was rational and emancipatory, the
eastern variant of nationalism, rooted in Herder's notion of the Volksgeist, emphasized cultural
(ethnic) identity over civic identity. This was politically problematic, as exemplified in the
aggressive imperialism developed by German nationalists, some of whom perceived the entire
zone of Slavic settlement as a German Kulturraum, at least potentially. The dichotomy between
western and eastern forms of nationalism, popularized by Kohn, has had considerable influence
on later authors (see, for example, Sugar and Lederer 1969; Brubaker 1992). Only recently, in the
post-communist era, have scholars begun to draw attention to the extent to which it misrepresents
nations and nationalism in both East and West (Kuzio 2002).

Karl Deutsch (1912-1992) was also born in Prague, where he grew up as a member of the large
German (Sudeten) minority before following Kohn's path to the United States. Like Kohn, he too

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was a Jew, at least by the criteria of the Nuremberg laws, but his upbringing was entirely secular.
Unlike most Germans and Jews in Bohemia, Deutsch was fully at home in Czechoslovakia and
taught briefly at the Charles University. Whereas Kohn worked primarily as a historian, Deutsch
found his main disciplinary base in political science and influenced work in several other
branches of the social sciences. His major work on nationalism approached it not in terms of a
civic versus ethnic dichotomy but in terms of a general theory of „social communication‟ relevant
in principle to all modern states (Deutsch 1953). He was among the first scholars to address the
role of the media in modern states, which made possible new forms of centre-periphery relations
and „social mobilization‟.

Ernest Gellner (1925-1995) came from a similar Prague background. He developed his theory of
nationalism on a similar foundation of Enlightenment universalism in the course of an academic
career pursued primarily in Britain in the disciplines of philosophy, sociology and social
anthropology. Gellner insisted that nations were not the given antecedents of national movements,
waiting to be „awakened‟; they were rather the product of such movements. His most influential
work (Gellner 1983) provides a strong „constructivist‟ view of the nation, vividly demonstrated
with an ideal-type description of„Ruritania‟, an imaginary territory somewhere in the eastern
realms of an entity he calls „Megalomania‟. Gellner injects an element of political economy into
this caricature of the Habsburg Empire by emphasizing uneven economic development, rather
than the dissemination of a political doctrine per se. We can expect a national movement to
emerge when the elites of a zone such as Ruritania conclude that they stand to gain more from the
creation of a new political unit under their domination than from attempting to assimilate into the
elites of the imperial centre.

Gellner preferred schematic models to close-up historical analysis. He accepted Kohn's basic
dichotomy between East and West, and he offered a more suggestive materialist explanation than
Deutsch to explain the process of nation-building. According to this view, East European
nationalisms developed as a result of the exogenous stimulus of industrialization in regions
lacking both a long history of statehood (on the model of France and Britain) and a language-
based high culture to serve as a foundation for political unification (on the model of Germany and
Italy). In an essay published posthumously (1997), Gellner replaced the Kohn dichotomy with
four „time zones‟ in Europe: he first distinguishes the German path from that followed further
west (zones 1 and 2); this is followed by the typical East European plasticity of „Ruritania‟ (zone
3); the fourth zone is comprised of entities formed only under Soviet rule.

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Although Gellner's insistence on material conditions was an important correction to the idealism
of earlier theories and although his theories have proved extraordinarily fruitful in international
discussion (see Hall 1998), neither he nor his predecessors offer typologies and tools that furnish
a comprehensive explanation of national phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, for
example, with its long history of statehood in the pre-industrial period, bears a closer resemblance
to the Atlantic seaboard cases of Gellner's „zone 1‟ than to its Ruritanian neighbours. Moreover,
when one looks more carefully at Ruritania-candidates, that is, „nations without history‟ such as
(sub-Carpathian) Ruthenians, Galician Ukrainians or Slovaks, it seems clear that the growth of
national movements in the nineteenth century preceded the impact of industrialization and can
hardly be attributed to its dissemination. It might be possible to salvage Gellner's functional
model by substituting a more diffuse notion of modernization for industrialization, which would
take account of changes introduced by the Habsburgs in provincial administration and education.

But as a descriptive model of this region Gellner's model is simply too far removed from the
realities on the ground: for example, it cannot help us to explain why such different policies were
pursued in the two halves of the Empire after 1867.

Unlike the three Prague émigrés considered so far, the fourth scholar I wish to discuss, the Czech
historian Miroslav Hroch, did not need to migrate to the West to achieve fame as a theoretician of
nationalism. Since the publication of his key works in German and English (Hroch 1985) he has
been deservedly regarded as one of the most influential contemporary scholars of „nationalist
movements‟, as he himself prefers to term his principal subject. Hroch's perspective is in some
respects more rigorously materialist than that of Gellner: reflecting the ideological currents of the
socialist republic, he offered an account of the spread of nationalism that drew explicitly on the
historical materialism of Marx (always anathema to Gellner); he was open to the possibility that,
in certain circumstances, a class identity could be more significant than a national identity. Yet he
was never satisfied by dogmatic assertions that attributed the rise of nationalism to the emergence
of a bourgeoisie. Hroch's typology of national movements begins with a Phase A, in which small
numbers of intellectuals, many of them priests, the largest literate social grouping, begin to
discover the distinctiveness of „the national culture‟, to collect folk songs, and to standardize the
language. In Phase B, the phase to which Hroch himself paid most detailed attention, these
intellectuals are either joined or pushed aside by larger numbers of secular activists, for example,
journalists, who spread the nationalist message through new media, notably the press. Phase C is
that of mass mobilization: intellectual midwives must now give way to a new political class and,

591
through the education system, eventually even the populations of isolated rural districts will
internalize the conviction of possessing a national identity.

Hroch's typology of the main phases of national movements and their critical agents is designed
for application in Central and Eastern Europe, where it works rather well for peoples such as the
Slovaks and the Ruthenians (Ukrainians). It has also proved useful in analysing ethnonational
movements in other parts of the world and in this sense it has general analytic value. Compared to
the models of Kohn, Deutsch and Gellner, Hroch offers a helpful set of tools with which to
explore concrete cases. Unlike Kohn and Gellner, he is not concerned to argue for a
geographically distinctive eastern or Ruritanian type. He does not claim that his model can be
applied in the same way to all the movements of the region: on the contrary, we can expect
significant differences in the case of„historic‟ nations such as Hungary and Poland, and the Czech
case is evidently quite different from the Slovak. In sum, Hroch's work teaches us that Central
and Eastern Europe is a rich laboratory for the study of nations and nationalism - but not because
it features phenomena not found elsewhere. Rather, this region is characterized by great diversity.
Let us now turn to consider some examples of how this diversity is playing itself out in the early
twenty-first century.

CONTEMPORARY PATTERNS

The recent history of Central and Eastern Europe has been decisively influenced on the one hand
by the end of the Cold War and on the other by the eastwards expansion of the European Union,
which by 2004 included all countries in the sphere of Western Christianity, with the exception of
Croatia. Whereas the collapse of socialism led to an increase in the number of sovereign states,
EU expansion involves new forms of supranational integration. The tensions between these
contradictory trends render this a highly instructive region in which to observe a wide range of
beliefs and behaviour pertaining to nationalism and ethnicity.

The unification of Germany in 1990 appears to have resolved „the German Question‟ once and
for all: the Oder-Neiße boundary with Poland is no longer questioned by any significant political
forces in Germany. The question of the strength of German national identity remains, however,
complex. The unique legacies of this population have been illustrated in the controversies that
have surrounded the decision to transfer the federal capital to Berlin, in painful discussions about
how best to commemorate the Jewish component of German history - and even in recurring

592
debate over the national holiday. It seemed self-evident in 1990 that Germany, like every other
nation, should have such a holiday. The night on which the Berlin Wall was breached, November
9th, seemed the most obvious candidate. But there was a problem: this was also the date of the
Kristallnacht in 1938, a decisive moment in the trajectory which culminated in the gas chambers.
Eventually it was decided to celebrate the nation on October 3rd, but this holiday has not been
accompanied by much ceremony or symbolic investment. It seems not to have „caught on‟,
leading some to suggest that Germany is now definitively „post-nationalist‟. Yet when the
government brought forward proposals in 2004 to save money by holding the holiday not on a
working day but always on the first Sunday of October, there was an immediate public outcry, by
no means confined to the conservative parties. In 2005 the election of Joseph Ratzinger as pope
was not celebrated as Karol Wojtyl'a's election had unified and mobilized the vast majority of
Poles a quarter of a century earlier, but national pride was expressed at every level (including the
tabloid newspaper that pro claimed simply „We Are the Pope‟). This suggests that the arguments
of Jürgen Habermas, probably the country's most influential intellectual, on behalf of
Verfassungspatriotismus, that is, a „constitutional patriotism‟, in which the citizens celebrate their
loyalty to a political structure rather than to an ethnic identity, do not grasp the actual strength of
German patriotism today. Recently the German government has introduced new laws to make it
easier for millions of non-ethnic Germans to become citizens, but the social integration of some
groups remains problematic, especially Muslims. The political potential of the appeal to the
historic forms of nationalism is regularly exploited by conservative political parties (for example,
in widespread opposition to the admission of Turkey to the European Union, a sentiment asserted
strongly even by some left-leaning intellectuals).

It seems indeed that some of the energies which once fuelled German nationalism have been
transferred to the European level: Europe is conceived as a unique value-based community
(Wertegemeinschaf i), but it is das Abendland (the West) in the sense of Weber, and not the
continent as a whole; the territories shaped historically by Islam and Orthodoxy are excluded (a
special case is made to permit the inclusion of Greece). At the same time, populist rhetoric
invoking older national ideals has by no means disappeared entirely. Support for extremist „neo-
Nazi‟ parties has been conspicuous in parts of the former German Democratic Republic; it is
especially strong among young people, including unemployed casualties of the economic
dislocation brought about by unification.

593
Of course similar political expressions of right-wing nationalism can be found in many other parts
of Europe. The most notorious politician to base his appeal on such sentiments is Austria's Jörg
Haider, whose Freedom Party rose to share power in the splendid ministries with which the
Habsburgs endowed Vienna when it was still their imperial capital. Then as now, Vienna was a
city unable to reproduce itself endogenously. Many immigrants in Habsburg days also tried to
preserve their religions and cultural identities in the new metropolis, and in this sense there is
nothing new in contemporary multiculturalism. Yet somehow the presence of large numbers of
Muslims seems to activate more sensitivities than Hungarians and Slavs generated in the past, and
these sentiments have been exploited by the populist right (Pelinka and Wodak 2002).

Socialist rule ensured that the impact of new forms of multiculturalism in Budapest and other
central European cities was long delayed. The confrontation with a „Chinatown‟ (which actually
began in the 1980s in the last years of socialism) came as a shock for most Hungarians, though it
has not inhibited them from patronizing the new markets, shops and restaurants in which these
immigrants specialize. Hungarian national identity continues to pose some distinctive issues, if
only because of the distinctiveness of the Finno-Ugric language. Herder did not expect the
Magyars to be able to hold on to their main cultural characteristics, but later developments in the
nineteenth century proved him wrong. The large Hungarian minorities created at Trianon are still
there today, outside the borders of the Hungarian state, and this continues to have a strong bearing
on policy-making in Budapest. With only small numbers of indigenous minorities as a result of
assimilation pressures in the past, Hungary has introduced a generous system of local councils
and minority educational provisions for all ethnic minorities, including Roma. Hungarian
politicians then insist on similarly liberal measures for the much larger, compact groups of
Magyars in neighbouring states. They assert that it is their duty to represent the interests of ethnic
Magyars wherever they happen to reside. Their efforts to grant privileges to co-ethnics who were
citizens of Romania led to much controversy in the years when Hungary was negotiating to join
the EU and, economically as well as politically, adjusting much more successfully than its
neighbours to the challenges of post-socialism. The emotions raised by the „status law‟ suggest
that, at least among elites, the card of nationalism is still highly significant in electoral politics
(Stewart 2003). Yet a referendum on the issue in Hungary failed due to low turnout, and in many
mundane contexts it is clear that the extent of solidarity with co-ethnics is limited. Some
Hungarian citizens are openly critical of the large numbers of seasonal immigrants who pour in
from Transylvania, irrespective of their ethnic identity.

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Transylvania is one of the areas of mixed population in central and eastern Europe where the
impact of the ethnic cleansings of the twentieth century was less dramatic. The large-scale
disappearance of Saxons, Jews and other smaller groups can be attributed to protracted processes
of cultural repression. Yet, in spite of large-scale Romanian immigration into the region, cities
such as Cluj (Kolozsvár-Klausenburg) have maintained a large Hungarian minority. Apart from a
burst of unrest in 1990, this region has remained stable, in sharp contrast to the western Balkans.
It seems that an accommodation has been reached between the elites that allows Hungarians a
very high degree of autonomy, for example, in the organization of their own cultural life, political
party and even universities. Although there is little ethnic segregation in terms of settlement
patterns in large cities like Cluj, for some sections of the population one can almost speak of
parallel societies. Yet the further away one moves from the national elites, the less important
national (ethnic) identity seems to be in shaping everyday interaction (Feischmidt 2003).

More generally, it is clear that international concern to protect ethnic and cultural minorities has
had considerable impact on post-communist states wishing to „join Europe‟. In both Romania and
Bulgaria, expected to join the European Union in 2007, but also in Slovakia, which was admitted
in 2004, the political parties representing the most numerous national minorities have played an
active role in government coalitions - indeed, their political influence has been disproportional to
their electoral support, and it seems likely that this has been a major factor in mitigating conflict.
In the more homogeneous case of contemporary Polish society, the internationalization of
minority rights has been conducive to more generous recognition of groups with whom Poles had
very troubled relations in the past, including Germans, Ukrainians and Jews. However, even the
most liberal legislation is insufficient to guarantee the practical take-up of rights in the case of
those minorities which lack a powerful state to support diaspora rights: Poland's Belorussian
minority is a case in point (Fleming 2002).

The discussion so far has focused on nationalities whose name is linked to a state. In spite of
globalization, Europeanization, the supermarket revolution etc., it is evident in this region that
states remain effective agents in the buttressing of national identities. This seems to hold as true
for „historic‟ states with large populations such as Poland as for much younger and smaller
entities such as the Baltic states and Slovenia. However, former Yugoslavia presents several cases
in which the nation-state model has failed; at the time of writing in 2005, no long-term solutions
to the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia are in sight. Among the causes,
religious differences are undoubtedly important; yet religion cannot be the only key factor. After

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all, Bulgaria too has a significant Muslim minority, yet despite severe economic dislocation this
state has remained stable and peaceful. Nor can memories of inter-ethnic violence in previous
generations be the decisive factor: if they were, then we should expect similar eruptions of
violence in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, yet this region, despite being a „civilizational fault
line‟ in the sense of Huntington (1996), has remained stable. Rather than supporting simplistic
theories of„primordial hatreds‟ and monocausal explanations, the evidence from the Balkans
suggests that we need to see nationalism as a modern phenomenon, the forms of which depend on
highly complex local conditions (Carmichael 2002). It is not a question of„the‟ modern sense of
national identity being still unevenly disseminated throughout the region; we must recognize that,
in some places, such a model of identity is unlikely ever to approximate the realities; thus, while
Bosnia may now have its own national flag and football team, the meaning of national identity in
such places is bound to differ from the content of national identity in established nation-states.

To close this survey, I turn to consider two further „awkward‟ cases, in which a cultural and
linguistic identity lacks the frame which the state-endowed groups can take for granted. Although
they have been present in Central and Eastern Europe for centuries, the visibility of Roma and
other gypsy peoples has increased following the forced population transfers that reduced the
significance of other minorities in the course of the twentieth century. Always „on the margins‟ of
society, gypsies occupied specific niches in the social division of labour and, like the Jews (whom
they in some ways resemble in their structural predicament), they seldom married outside their
group. One difference from the Jews was the fact that the vast majority were visibly different
from the majority population in terms of skin pigmentations, thereby making assimilation into
gadze (non-gypsy) society more difficult if not impossible. Under socialism determined efforts
were made in exactly this direction: gypsies were supposed to give up their old lifestyles and join
the international proletariat, enjoying in return all the securities, including modern housing,
enjoyed by other members of the ruling working classes. The contradictions and ultimate failure
of this attempt to eradicate gypsy cultural distinctiveness have been carefully documented in the
Hungarian case by Michael Stewart (1997). Stewart takes an optimistic view of the options open
to this group in post-socialist conditions: he sees potential in their history of pragmatic
adaptations, which should make it easier for them than for other, less flexible actors, to adapt to
the new market conditions (2002). Others are less sanguine: there is abundant evidence that the
gypsies are more marginalized than ever before, with very high rates of unemployment and
illiteracy and resi-dentially highly segregated. In short, they fulfil the criteria for a classical
„underclass‟ (Szelényi and Emigh 2001).

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For our last example let us return to Sub-carpathian Ruthenia, a territory which approximates as
well as any other Ernest Gellner's fictitious Ruritania. The homeland of the „Rusyns‟ (the most
common of the local self-descriptions) is nowadays divided between four states, Ukraine, Poland,
Slovakia and Romania, while additional scattered groups are found in Hungary and Serbia. The
history and current controversies over the „real‟ identity of these East Slavs exemplify the
plasticity of ethnic and national identities generally. As the historian Paul Robert Magocsi (1978)
showed in his study of Subcarpathian Ruthenia between 1848 and 1948, many options were
potentially available, some more attractive than others in different epochs.

At the time Magocsi wrote, it seemed that the incorporation of this territory into the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic after World War II had sealed the long-term affiliation of this
population to a Ukrainian national identity. Thanks to the collapse of the USSR, it turns out that
other options for the Ruthenians can once again be freely explored under the exhilarating
conditions of post-socialism. Magocsi himself has been an active participant in the World
Congress of Rusyns, supporting a kind of cultural nationalism which calls for recognition of the
Rusyns/Ruthenians as a distinct East Slavic people (see Magocsi 1999). No longer a distant
scholar of Ruthenian history, Magocsi visits the homeland regularly and, for all practical
purposes, plays the role of an „awakener‟, even a „mobilizer‟. A significant step was achieved in
1995 when agreement was reached on the standardization of Rusyn (in its eastern Slovakian
dialect) as a fourth East Slavic literary language.

Is it possible to replicate the nineteenth-century model for nation-building at the beginning of the
twenty-first? The Rusyn activists do not aspire to create a new state in their mountainous
homeland, but they hope that Europeanization, for example in the form of „Euroregion‟ initiatives
to promote cross-border contacts, will enable at least a greater measure of cultural recognition
than has so far been accorded by the nation-states of the region. Further successes have been
chalked up; in the most recent Slovak census the number of Rusyns has risen significantly,
apparently at the expense of Ukrainians. In Ukraine itself, however, where the great majority of
potential group members live, there is little sign of mobilization. We see rather a pattern similar
to that already identified in Transylvania. The activists' cultivation of a distinctive language and
organization of folklore festivals represent the most attractive side of nationalism - the celebration
of human cultural distinctiveness. But the evidence seems to suggest that the great majority of
those who attend the festivals (including those who come from North America) have, in Gellner's
terms, been well integrated into the states that issue their passports. As in Transylvania, it would

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seem that, for the large majority of „ordinary citizens‟, questions of national identity are no longer
of burning significance; if indeed they ever were.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has questioned the most common stereotypical representations of Central and
Eastern Europe in the literature on nations and nationalism. Many authors, both natives of the
region and outsiders, have held this region to exemplify the illiberal face of the nationalist Janus,
which envisages ethnicity rather than citizenship as the sole criterion of national belonging. The
cases of „historic‟ multi-ethnic states such as Poland and Hungary suffice, however, to show that
this diagnosis is much too simple. Gellner's model of „time-zones‟ is a variant of a common
tendency to view Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century as a prototype for certain patterns of
nation-building and state formation in other parts of the world in the twentieth century. Such
ahistorical comparisons are potentially misleading, especially when they rest upon exoticized
constructions of the East (notably of„the Balkans‟) and no less idealized models of a benign
liberal nationalism predominating in Western Europe and North America. Closer inspection
reveals that the national movements considered to be quintessentially Eastern European emerged
in very similar forms elsewhere in Europe, in some cases at the very same time. Contemporary
Central and Eastern Europe exhibits great diversity in the strength and forms taken by national
and ethnic minority identities; even when the focus is restricted to the formerly socialist countries,
there is little nowadays to distinguish these countries from phenomena found in other parts of the
world.

This critique does not, however, invalidate all attempts to identify general patterns in the history
of this fuzzy region, such as those resulting from structural similarities of political economy and
empire in the pre-nationalist era, and those which created more homogeneous populations by
means of „ethnic cleansing‟ at various times in the twentieth century. Nor does the critique
undermine the heuristic value of models such as that of Gellner for the analysis of nations and
nationalism. I have adapted his vocabulary in arguing that, while nineteenth-century „Ruritanias‟
such as Slovakia and Ukraine have recently succeeded in carving out their own states,
Subcarpathian Ruthenia seems unlikely to succeed at this level. The reasons are complex: they
include the mountainous location, the absence of cities and of scope to consolidate an
infrastructure facilitating industrial development and communications. Failure, if indeed the
Rusyn movement eventually fails, should not be attributed to size alone; after all, the populations

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of the Baltic states are no larger, let alone Luxembourg. This Rusyn/Ruthenian case thus
illustrates the ultimate plasticity of group identities and the historical contingency of their forms.

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Sakwa, Richard. "Nation and Nationalism in Russia." Pp. 410-424

Russian nationalism is as exiguous and protean as its English counterpart (Anderson 1983: 12).
Both were subsumed into larger entities; English nationalism into the larger idea of Britain
(Colley 1992); and Russia became the core of an imperial project (Hosking 1997). Russia was at
the heart of the tsarist empire and then the Soviet Union. Only at the end of the twentieth century
did the English and Russian nations emerge from the detritus of the dissolution of the larger
imperial missions and take on autonomous forms. In Russia, however, the traditional emphasis on
the state rather than the nation or a democratic polity undermined the development of both.
Nation-building traditionally took second place to territorial expansion, and the very idea of a
democratic and sovereign Russian nation remains ambiguous. Four concerns will be at the centre
of our account of Russian nationalism: the tension between imperial and national identities; the
process of national identity formation; the relevance and applicability of the concept of
nationalism to Russia; and the tension between nation, state and polity-building projects.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The success of the early modern tsars in unifying the various principalities around Muscovy
meant that by the sixteenth century Russia had become one of the most cohesive and strongest
European states. The „gathering of the lands‟ across ever-larger expanses, however, dissipated the
„national‟ element and the tsarist system increasingly operated on a supranational basis. Imperial
Russia from Peter the Great's time was no longer a nation-state but subsumed numerous ethnic
identities in a system focused on the person of the monarch. According to one scholar, „the
defining characteristic of Russian statehood was the absence of ethnocentrism based on the
coincidence of national and political borders‟ (Agadzhanov 1993). The under-development of
national consciousness only reinforced the concept of statehood (gosu-darstvennos f) while at the
same time exalting its great power status (derzhavnost).

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONISM

Throughout the modern period Russia has faced the challenge of what it was, and its people in
turn had to decide who they were. The failure of the romantic but doomed attempt to assert some
sort of popular sovereignty in the Decembrist uprising of 1825 placed the question of democracy

600
and constitutionalism firmly on the agenda, but at the same time endowed them with the patina of
failure. For the Russian intelligentsia the question „What is Russia?‟ became an obsessive theme.
The notion of an intelligentsia, of course, is a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, defined „as a body
of educated people who felt responsible for their country‟s future - a group not unanimous in its
views but united by the common ethos of a struggle against reaction' (Walicki 1979: xv). The
notion of an intelligentsia, used in this sense, is an ethical category, one that took on political
features when defined as an opposition to the government. As Andrzej Walicki puts it:

The questions Russians were asking themselves at this time were all concerned with their
national identity: „Who are we?‟ „Where do we come from and where are we going?‟ „What is the
common contribution we can make to humanity?‟ „What can we do in order to carry out the
mission entrusted to us?. (Walicki 1979: xv–xvi)

The problem remains as acute in the first decade of the twenty-first century as in the nineteenth
(Billington 2003).

The debate continues to this day over the concept of the nation and nationalism, with three major
differences. The messianism of the past, the view that Russia could use the „privilege of
backwardness‟ to chart an alternative path of development that would show the more developed
world how it should really be done, has weakened, although not entirely disappeared (Duncan
2000). Russia's tragic twentieth century has demonstrated, after all the sacrifices, enthusiasm and
mountain of corpses, precisely What is Not to be Done, as Lenin did not quite put it. After the fall
of Soviet communism the question became „What is to be Undone?‟; and the answer in the 1990s
appeared to be almost everything. At the basic level it was long assumed that Leninism had at
least resolved the problem of the state in Russia, but the events of 1991 demonstrated that it had
failed to do so at every conceivable level - internal governance, external borders and national
identities.

The second difference is the dissolution of the intelligentsia itself. The intelligentsia as a distinct
caste had emerged in the reign of Catherine the Great in the second half of the eighteenth century,
where the question of Russia's future development took hold of educated society. It was under
Catherine that we see a growing divergence between the elites of power and the elites of the mind;
or, as Foucault would put it, between knowledge and power. Thereafter the Russian intelligentsia
considered itself a source of political authority in its own right, a third force between the

601
government and the propertied elite, the opposition that the government would not allow to take
political form. Today the picture is very different. Post-communism has achieved what 74 years
of communism was unable to do - to destroy the status of critical thinking and the ethics of the
intellectual and the word as the conscience of the nation. In a peculiar way communism, of course,
by its very persecution of free thought and association, elevated and granted them a status that
long ago had eroded in the West. The critical role of the intelligentsia was perpetuated by the
Soviet system's peculiar blend of modernity and tradition. „Normality‟ has now returned to Russia,
and the struggle for resources and survival has undermined any residual claims of the
intelligentsia to a critical ethical status. This is one reason why the eternal „What is Russia?‟
question is today conducted in such a diffuse manner, and with the exception of some marginal
groups is not at the centre of popular concerns.

Finally, the remaking of Russia as a nation-state is taking place at a time when what we might
call „classical nationalism‟ is itself, while apparently triumphant after the disintegration of the
colonial empires and the dissolution of communist internationalism, being hollowed out by liberal
globalization. Marxist and liberal predictions that nationalism would gradually die out appear
finally to be coming to pass where states have entered broader communities, such as the European
Union. A profound commitment to what has been called neo-nationalism (we shall call this
nationism), however, remains prevalent in these countries, demonstrating that nationalism, even
and perhaps especially in postmodern supranational contexts, is part of the larger question
of„identity‟. In the post-Cold War era the politics of ideology have now given way to the politics
of identity in which the sense of the nation is a cardinal element (Smith 1986, 1991). Identity is -
like the nationalism that it selectively reflects - part of a larger set of shifting relationships
(Rajchman 1995). National identity provides the cultural matrix and symbols for nationalism,
which represents the politicization of a community's culture, typically in the form of a programme
for group development (Schopflin 1991). In Russia the cultural question of national identity
predominates over any more focused classical nationalistic project. This is why it is useful to call
the former „nationism‟, to describe the ideological penumbra around the nation-state, the defence
of its existence and attempts to understand its civilizational identity, while leaving the term
nationalism to describe projects that seek to extend the nation's power and glory. Russian
nationism is not synonymous with ethnicity, and indeed embraces the cultural specificity of the
many peoples that constitute the country. It is more than the civic attempt to extend equal
citizenship to diverse communities, but it is less than an ethnically-defined characterization of the
dominant community. The Russian nation is like a sponge, drawing in many peoples, with

602
unclear borders across Eurasia, and constantly changing its shape but always remaining
recognizably the same (Bassin and Aksenov 2003).

FROM SOVIET ETHNOFEDERALISM TO RUSSIAN NATION-STATE

Although expounding an internationalist ideology, once securely in power the Bolsheviks were
forced to recognize the strength of national feelings. Communism was a cosmopolitan and
internationalist ideology, but it had come to power in one specific country and was compelled to
acknowledge the persistence of national identities despite the ideology's stance that
internationalist class principles would take priority (Suny 2002). Rather than being resolved, the
nationalities problem in the USSR was managed, and when that failed, suppressed. The elaborate
ethnofederal system imposed by the regime, granting certain titular nationalities the trappings of
statehood, gave formal expression to nationalism but deprived it of any real power. Bolshevik
policies sustained national identities, as in their insistence in Point 5 of the Soviet passport for
each citizen to register their nationality, and thus undermined the goal of creating a new
nationality, the Soviet people.

The creation of ethnofederal units in the Soviet Union was a concession to a part of the
population identified by its ethnic characteristics, introducing an ingredient into the process of
Soviet state-building that would ultimately destroy it. Article 15 of the 1936 Soviet constitution
stated that the union republics were „sovereign‟ with the right of secession from the Union. Early
drafts of the 1977 constitution deleted references to sovereignty, but it was restored precisely to
differentiate them from Russia's autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and national districts.
Article 76.1 stated: A union republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist republic that has united with
other Soviet republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.' The Russian word soyuz here
means „alliance‟ rather than the English meaning of„union‟. The USSR was in theory an alliance
of sovereign states - but Russia's own sovereignty was institutionally less developed than in the
other 14 republics, lacking its own party organization, academy of sciences, KGB and other
bodies that were to be found elsewhere. Russia was a superfluous link between the regions and
the union centre and deliberately kept weak. During perestroika the belief that Russia had been
exploited by the centre came to the fore, and Boris Yeltsin used these perceptions to fuel his bid
for power.

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Russians were the largest single national group in the USSR, with a population in 1989 of 149
million, representing 51 per cent of the Soviet population. A declining birth rate from 1960 made
Russians an ever-smaller proportion of the total Soviet population. By 1979 the ethnic Russian
part of the population was less than half, if the number of mixed marriages and children opting to
have Russian as the nationality placed into their passports is taken into consideration. This
represented a major psychological turning point and emphasized even more clearly the
multinational character of the Soviet Union. In 1989 Ukrainians comprised the second largest
group, with 52 million (17.8 per cent), and, together with the Belorussians at 10.3 million (3.5 per
cent), Slavs made up nearly three-quarters of the total population. The differentiation of Russian
nationism from a broader East Slav one is still far from complete.

Russian nationalism in the Soviet era took many forms and ranged from the officially acceptable
to the unorthodox. The extreme right stressed the racial purity of the Slavs in a language couched
in anti-semitic allusions and imbued with militaristic patriotism. They were particularly harsh in
warning against the Chinese threat. Less extreme but still on the right was a tendency called
National Bolshevism, derived from Nikolai Ustryalov, who in 1920 reversed what was to become
the official slogan and argued that the new regime was „socialist in form, nationalist in content‟
(Agursky 1987). Stalinism became imbued with a sense of Russian-centred Soviet nationalism
(Brandenberger 2002), but Mussolini was mistaken when he argued that Bolshevism had
disappeared in Russia and in its place a Slav form of fascism had emerged. Soviet nationalism on
the whole had little in common with the fascist type since it was not based on the militant
projection of one ethnic group at the expense of others - in fact, quite the opposite (Martin 2001).
The Russianization that did occur was largely part of the modernization process, although there
were features glorifying Russia (Russification). Latter-day national Bolsheviks praised the Soviet
regime for having recreated the Russian empire and restored Russia to great power status. Soviet
nationalism certainly projected its Russian credentials, but any Russian patriotism that deviated
from the Soviet path was persecuted as much as any other national deviancy In certain respects
expression of Russian nationalism was the least tolerated since the other nationalities had their
own republican party leaderships to shelter behind whereas Russia, as noted, lacked its own
communist party and other attributes of statehood (Barghoorn 1976; Allensworth 1980; Brudny
1999).

Expressions of the Russian national idea in the Soviet period were as fragmented as today. The
conservative nationalists, like the group around the Molodaya Gvardiya publishing house of the

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Komsomol organization, can be characterized as Russites and neo-Slavophiles. They worked
within the establishment and were shielded by Politburo member Dmitry Polyansky and allegedly
by the KGB, since they served as a counter-weight to unorthodox Russian nationalists, who
focused on religious or human rights issues. The two tendencies are labelled „cultural Russian
nationalism‟ and „dissident Russian messianism‟ by Duncan (2000). The semi-fascist and anti-
semitic features of some elements in this tendency represented morbid symptoms of the stifling
immobility of the later Brezhnev years. In the November 1972 issue of Literaturnaya gazeta
Alexander Yakovlev, then acting head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU's Central
Committee, in an article entitled „On Antihistoricism‟, condemned the anti-Leninist stance
adopted by nationalists and neo-Stalinists in some official publications, and denounced the
awakening of Russian self-consciousness as „patriarchal mentality, nationalism and chauvinism‟
(Yakovlev 1972). In response, in 1973 he was dismissed from his post and sent into „exile‟ in
Canada to serve as Soviet ambassador. Recalled by Mikhail Gorbachev, he was made a member
of the Politburo and developed the increasingly liberal ideology of perestroika in the second half
of the 1980s - for which he earned the hatred of the Soviet Russophiles.

During perestroika a number of „historical-patriotic‟ groups among ethnic Russians emerged,

such as Pamyat (Memory), Otechestvo (Fatherland) and Spasenie (Salvation). These groups
found their support among intellectuals and, perhaps surprisingly, among scientists, but gained
little support among the mass of Russians when they placed themselves to the test of the ballot
box. Alexander Yanov argued that the alleged erosion of Marxist-Leninism ideology would give
way not to the triumph of Western rationalist or liberal ideas but instead cleared the way for a
variety of nationalist ideas while permitting a revival of the Slavophile versus Westernizers
debate of the nineteenth century over the role and path of Russian development. He argued that a
so-called Russian party, the fusion of unofficial and official Russian nationalism, would come
together as the basis of an authoritarian but „sanitized‟ (that is, non Marxist-Leninist) new ruling
ideology (Yanov, 1978). In the event, the Soviet Russophile trend remained marginal, although it
was given formal expression later in Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (CPRF).

The moderate orthodox nationalists were represented by the „village school‟ of Russian writers
such as Vladimir Soloukhin, the author of Vladimir Back Roads, and Valentin Rasputin, who
actively campaigned over ecological issues (above all to preserve the purity of the world's largest
fresh-water environmental treasure, Lake Baikal), joined by the painter Il'ya Glazunov. They

605
criticized the excessive pace of industrialization, which caused great damage to the environment
and Russian village life. The Moscow Headquarters of the All-Russian Society for the
Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPIK) was familiarly known as the
„Russian club‟ for its exposition of Russian nationalist sentiments. On certain issues this tendency
mobilized as a powerful lobby, notably to protest against the building of a cellulose plant on Lake
Baikal. Similarly, the widespread anxiety provoked by the scheme to divert the flow of the
Siberian rivers from North to South were acknowledged by Gorbachev to have contributed
towards the plan's cancellation in August 1986. Major cultural figures like Academician Dmitry
Likhachev gained official approval to start a fund to preserve Russian cultural artefacts.

Russian nationalism was coloured by the paradox that while the Soviet state ensured Russian
political pre-eminence, in economic terms Russia was far from being the most prosperous.
Unorthodox Russian nationalists condemned the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church, the
excessive internationalism whose burden fell disproportionately on Russian shoulders, the
distortion of Russian history and the imposition of socialist realism in place of Russian
romanticism. National Bolshevism was condemned by more religious nationalists for espousing a
Russian patriotism without a Christian foundation, based purely on the great power status of the
Russian part of the Soviet Union - communism with a national face. Religious patriots stressed
that Soviet nationalism was in fact antithetical to genuine Russian traditions; the Russian
patriotism incorporated into Soviet nationalism, they insisted, served to buttress the power system
but had little to do with genuine national traditions (Dunlop 1976,1983,1985).

Alexander Solzhenitsyn argued that Russia should be permitted to pursue its destiny freed from
the burden of empire. Liberal patriots like him argued for the conversion of Russia from a
military superpower to a spiritual great power, which they insisted would pose no threat to non-
Russians or the outside world. Russian patriots of this sort (labelled pochven-niki, part of the soil-
bound tradition associated with Dostoevsky) were contemptuous of Western democracy but
merciless in their condemnation of Soviet totalitarianism (Solzhenitsyn (ed.) 1974). The
authoritarian implications of such views derive from their sense of moral absolutism; the attempt
once again to remove politics from society and instead impose an organic theocratic government
of justice and order.

The All-Russian Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (VSKhSON) of the
1960s tried to sustain a uniquely Russian path, not democratic but benignly authoritarian, and

606
endowed with a theocratic vision of Russian uniqueness. These themes were taken up by the
journal Veche, edited by Vladimir Osipov, which between 1971 and 1974 proclaimed itself the
voice of the „loyal opposition‟. It was marked by a liberal nationalism which condemned „the
bureaucracy‟ and was concerned with the regeneration of Russia based on the Church and village
traditions and focused on Siberia as the rampart of a reborn nation from which the threats from
China and the West could be rebuffed. All of these tendencies played their part in the post-
communist context, joined by new tendencies that sought to respond to the challenges posed by
the fall of the USSR.

In his Letter to the Soviet Leaders, Solzhenitsyn (1974) pointed out that the Soviet Union was an
empire ruled not by a nation (a role usually con sidered to have been fulfilled by the Russians) but
by a political party, the CPSU There appeared to be no way out of the realm of ideology for the
Soviet Union since there was no nation (unlike China) which could „nationalize‟ the revolution.
As part of the broader attempt to revive the state under Gorbachev the trappings of national
statehood came to life in the 15 union republics (and in some autonomous republics such as
Chechnya and Tatarstan), and the Soviet state found itself surplus to requirements. However, it
was not nationalism as such that was responsible for the disintegration of the USSR: the failure
was above all political, the inability to transform the „sixteenth republic‟ (the Soviet state) into a
viable polity rooted in a national community (Beissinger 2002). Only in the wake of the
disintegration did the various republics seek to root their (sometimes enforced) state-building in a
national (but not necessarily nationalist) discourse. Indigenous elites, typically former party
functionaries, grasped at the symbolic power of nationalism to consolidate their own regimes and
then proceeded to „nationalize‟ their states (Brubaker 1996). In Russia the „nationalizing‟ agenda
has at best been weak.

FROM EMPIRE TO FEDERATION

Russia did not have an empire; it was an empire - although towards the end it became more
classically a colonial power both in internal and external aspects. The USSR had been an empire-
state, like the Bismarckian Second Reich and the Habsburg empire, based not on the colonial
model of subjugated peoples but rather on a system in which all came under the tutelage of an
abstract principle, in this case incarnated in the form of the collective emperor, the Communist
Party (Lieven 2003). Neither the Russian empire nor the USSR had been nation-states in the
conventional sense, but neither were they, according to the patriots, empires in the colonialist

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sense. Beissinger stresses the ambiguity in the distinction between states and empires, with the
tsarist empire in particular representing „a confused mix of empire and state-building‟ (Beissinger
1995: 158). While Russians were over-represented in all-union institutions, giving the Soviet
Union the appearance of a Russian empire, the ethnofederal system had, as it were, become
increasingly ethnicized but not federalized by the advancement of national elites to positions of
power in their respective republics. In the post-Stalin era it was not clear whether protest against
the system used the language of nationalism, or whether nationalist movements in the old regime
had no other option but to become movements against the system itself. In the last years of
perestroika nationalism was used as a battering ram against the communist system and what
increasingly became characterized as the imperial Soviet state as well (Suny 1993).

THE END OF EMPIRE

The debate over whether the USSR was an empire or not continues to this day. For the subjugated
peoples of the Baltic, Western Ukraine and some other places there is little to discuss: the Soviet
regime perpetuated (and indeed intensified) Russian imperial dominance. For the rest, however,
the question is not so clear; while repressing overt forms of nationalism, the Soviet ethnofederal
system sustained, and in some cases engendered, nationhood. The USSR certainly differed from
the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman or even the British empires, which were based on very different
dynamics. A geographically compact „empire‟ such as the Soviet Union, with a high proportion
of the core ethnic group living in the other territorial units, is usually called a multiethnic country
(Hough 1997: 373). As Simonia argues, „Soviet imperialism was a rather unusual phenomenon ….
The new, rather specific “metropolitan country” finally took shape as a central bureaucratic party
and state machinery (establishment), with the military-industrial complex (MIC) as its mainstay.
All the republics, including the Russian Republic, found themselves in the position of one big
colony exploited by this metropolitan country (Simonia 1995: 20-21). This is the theory of the
Soviet party-state as a hypothetical sixteenth republic, the empire of ideology, lacking national
roots or a national identity but subjugating all the other republics equally - albeit in different ways.

Although Soviet leaders „had long identified themselves with Russian nationalism, it was a
superpower nationalism and not an ethnically centred one' (Hough 1997: 238). Russians retained
an „all-union‟ concept of territory. As the Soviet ethnographer Yurii Arutiuniyan put it,
„Wherever they lived they actively used their own language and almost always clung to their own
culture‟ (Arutiuniyan 1991: 21). In most parts of the USSR Russians behaved as if they were at

608
home and failed to learn the local language, assuming that the local peoples should learn Russian,
whereas most other peoples remained loyal to a distinct homeland. It was this generalized
„imperial‟ attitude that made it more difficult for Russians after 1991 to identify with the Russian
Federation as a separate homeland. The challenge now was for them to become Rossiyane
(inhabitants of the Russian republic) more than Russkie (ethnic Russians). In recognition of the
multinational character of the country Yeltsin promoted a civic Rossiiskii (supranational) identity
(Tolz 1998,2001).

The passage from empire to nation-state entails not only the institutionalization of a new political
form but also the recasting of fundamental political categories. In his proposals for the post-
Soviet order presented in 1990 Solzhenitsyn called for a Russian Union comprised of Great
Russians, Little Russians and White Russians. Solzhenitsyn (1991: 15) argued that, „The time has
come for an uncompromising choice between an empire of which we ourselves are the primary
victims, and the spiritual and physical salvation of our own people'. Khazanov (1994: 164) notes
that „Many Russians conceive the nation as an ontological category and/or confuse nation with
ethnicity‟. In Russian, he notes, the word „nation‟ (natsiya) means „ethnic group‟, a „people‟, „but
not an aggregate of all citizens of a given state‟. The notion of Russia as a nation emerged slowly
and is to a large degree a product of the geopolitical realities that emerged in 1991.

RUSSIAN ETHNOFEDERALISM AND THE THREAT OF DISINTEGRATION

The tension between sub-national ethnic identification and the state continues into the post-Soviet
epoch. ethnofederalism remains a potent force for the disintegration of the Russian Federation,
seen most notably in Chechnya. Russia is a multinational nation state, but in the 1990s it
increasingly became a multi-state state, with areas like Tatarstan and the Chechen Republic
retaining only a tenuous unity with the rest of Russia. A multi-state state is a precarious invention,
and the leadership under Vladimir Putin from 2000 recognized that the future lay either in the
establishment of a more ordered federation regulated by the rule of a single law and constitution,
or the path of confederalization and possibly disintegration (Kahn 2002).

Russia remains a federation consisting of a number of different units: 21 republics, 57 ordinary

regions (oblasts and krais plus two cities, Moscow and St Petersburg, with the rights of oblasts),
eight autonomous okrugs and the Jewish autonomous oblast, a total of 89 so-called „subjects of
the federation‟. The Federation Treaty of 31 March 1992 sought to regulate relations between the

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various units and the centre, but it was only with the adoption of the new constitution in
December 1993 that, formally at least, all the subjects of federation became equal in status. The
new constitution did not recognize the various declarations of sovereignty adopted by some
republics, yet the signing of bilateral treaties between the federal authorities and the subjects of
federation, beginning with the one signed with Tatarstan in February 1994, formalized
„asymmetry‟ in Russian federal relations. This period of federalism à la carte came to an end
under Putin as he sought to establish a more uniform system, with the unimpeded priority of the
writ of the constitution across the country. As part of this most regions „voluntarily‟ renounced
their bilateral treaties (by the time he came to power 46 had been signed with 42 regions).

The price paid by Yeltsin to keep the country together was regional segmentation. A rich variety
of regional regimes emerged as subjects of the political process in their own right, rather than as
actors in a national political process. Yeltsin's approach can be defended as a realistic response in
conditions of minimal state infrastructural capacity, and the disastrous attempt to exert the state's
despotic capacity is evident in Chechnya. Yeltsin's neo-Brezhnevite bargain between regional
elites and the centre encouraged a dynamic of sovereignty dispersal that undermined the integrity
of the state. The segmentation of sovereignty only superficially took federal forms; rather,
federalism was used to legitimate the aggrandisement of regional powers. State-building became
fragmented, and in the regions the very idea of the centre became something alien. In his study of
Russian national identity on the basis of extensive elite and popular interviews, Bo Petersson
(2001) stresses the way that „otherness‟, one of the key elements in national identity formation, in
Russia is directed as much towards „the centre‟ as it is towards outsiders.

Path dependency suggests that earlier institutional choices limit and define later choices. This is
nowhere more true than in the area of nationality relations, where the development of a distinctive
form of ethnofederalism circumscribes post-communist Russia's institutional choices. Russian
federalism, like the USSR earlier, institutionalizes ethnicity in the form of ethnofederal units, and
despite the urgings of Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia, to re-establish a unitary state on tsarist lines (the gube m iya model
where ethnicity lacks institutional representation), such a move is effectively precluded today.
Nations in Russia remain defined in both political (ethnofederal) and ethno-cultural forms. It was
the tension between the two that provoked the disintegration of the USSR, yet the Russian
Federation in the immediate term is unlikely to suffer the same fate on a global scale. While a
republic like Chechnya at one time looked as if it would be successful in its bid to secede, its

610
tragic example means that few others are likely to follow (Hale and Taagepera 2002; see also
Hale 2004). The predominance of ethnic Russians, at 81 per cent of the population, moreover,
entails a different dynamic to that in the USSR.

Post-communist Russia has become an entire borderland, the distinguishing feature of post-
imperial identities. The very existence of Russia as a state has been questioned. Ryszard
Kapuscinski in his book Imperium formulates the problem succinctly:

[F]ollowing the disintegration of the USSR, we are now facing the prospect of the disintegration
of the Russian Federation, or, to put it differently; after the first phase of decolonization (that of
the former Soviet Union) the second phase begins – the decolonization of the Russian Federation.
(Kapuscinski 1994: 172)

The strongest exponent of this is Rafael Khakimov, one of president Mintimir Shaimiev's chief
advisers in the early 1990s and still an influential figure in Tatarstan. He espoused the
„decolonization‟ model, contrasting a Moscow-based officialdom and „a provincial, colonial
nation living in another world‟ (1993: 16). In his view, as the regions struggled for greater
cultural and economic autonomy and gained ever more legal sovereignty, Russia itself would
gradually disappear:

Russia will increasingly become an ephemeral notion limited to rather vague emotional slogans.
There is no hope of preserving Russia in its earlier condition. Russia's borders have lost their
legitimacy There are no legal norms whereby its approximate borders could be defined …
Regional interests and the idea of regionaliza-tion offer a way out of the impasse for Russia.
(Khakimov 1993: 62)

In this way sub-national (regional) identities emerged as one of the dominant discourses of the
1990s, condemning the Russian state-building endeavour as fundamentally illegitimate. For
Khakimov, Russia as a geopolitical reality is destined to disappear.

It was fear of this coming about that prompted Putin to restore state coherence. He took
advantage of the widespread desire to restore greater integrity to the state, and to give form to the
political nation. While ethnofederal separatism remained strong in Chechnya, elsewhere the
strong regional identities of macro-regions such as the Urals and Siberia now lack a separatist

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dynamic. Putin is more of a nation and state builder than an empire restorer, and rejected any
forceful attempts to restore anything like the former Soviet Union. In internal politics he
recognized, with the terrible exception of Chechnya, that any attempt at an overtly authoritarian
solution to Russia's myriad problems, like the August 1991 coup earlier, would provoke the result
that it seeks to avoid, namely the disintegration of the country. He recognized the multiplicity of
post-communist identities, as long as they remained within the framework of the constitution, and
recognized the authority of the federal authorities.

On the level of nationality politics this means that one might simultaneously consider oneself a
Russian, a Tatar and, residually, a Soviet person, while politically favouring democracy and the
restoration of closer links between the former republics of the Soviet Union. It is for this reason
that Valery Tishkov (director of the Institute of Ethnography of the Russian Academy of Sciences
and an adviser to the government) argued for the development of a multicultural nation on the
basis of a „dual and not mutually exclusive identity (cultural-ethnic and state-civic)‟. The formula
proposed a strategy of „the gradual de-ethnicization of statehood and the de-etatization of
ethnicity‟ (Tishkov 1995: 9). This to a degree is the programme pursued by Putin in a type of
neo-Jacobin republican state-building endeavour.

CONSTITUTING THE NATION

Russia has traditionally had a strong state, a weak society and an under-developed sense of nation.
The imperial idea substituted for nationalism, and thus Russia remained rooted in nineteenth-
century ideas of national grandeur, but failed fully to enter the era of mass nationalism. Today,
however, it would be misleading simply to say that Russia has a weak state and a weak nation: in
fact, the country has an exceptionally strong cultural sense of its own identity, although this lacks
clear political characteristics. In this respect both political nationalism and ethnonationalism are
relatively weak, while cultural nationalism (the civilizational identity that we called nationism
above) is extremely strong. As in so many other areas, terms and definitions that are appropriate
for the rest of Europe have to be modified when applied to Russia.

NATIONISM AND THE ‘RUSSIA IDEA’

Post-communist Russia is engaged in a multiple process of political and economic modernization,

accompanied by the passage from expansive „empire-state‟ to a reduced notion of the nation-state.

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The national subject of these transformations has not been resolved, and thus the „Russian
question‟ remains on the agenda (Allensworth 1998). As we have suggested above, the very idea
of nationalism is a highly ambivalent category and remains an arena where different
representations of the national idea are contested. Before 1917 Russian nationalism became
associated with the shift in empire-building strategy following the assassination of Alexander II
in 1881. Alexander III sought to employ Russification policies to enhance the cohesion of an
empire under strain from within from various stripes of revolutionaries and from outside by a new
array of great powers (Germany, and later Japan). In the Soviet era Russian nationalism was
submerged in the larger communist modernization and formally internationalist project. Today
Russia once again finds itself facing renewed plans for modernization and international
integration, provoking typical reactions ranging from adaptation to nativist rejectionism.

„Nationalism‟ as such is alien to the Russian tradition, where the focus has historically been on
maintaining the state and advancing the culture. Igor Klyamkin noted that „Nationalism has not
taken root in the Russian mentality, and contrary to the West, is perceived by Russians with
suspicion‟ (Klyamkin 1995: 19). Patriots in the Slavophile tradition consider nationalism yet
another Western invention, like Marxism, imposed on long-suffering Russia. Pozdnyakov (1994:
61) insists that patriotism, love of the motherland and one's people, has nothing in common with
nationalism. In his view „Nationalism is the last stage of communism, the last attempt of an
outdated ideology to find in society support for dictatorship‟ (1994: 74). In Russia nationalism is
a recent political phenomenon, and even then has shallow roots. „Russia has been a state-nation
rather than a nation-state … identity has been centered on the state, which became an empire long
before the population consolidated as a nation‟ (Goble 1995: 163). The state was the primary
agent of development and the focus of identity, with the society left to follow.

The „Russian idea‟ is the term used to express „the conviction that Russia had been entrusted with
the divine mission of resuscitating the world by sharing with it the revelation that had been
granted to her alone‟ (Szamuely 1988: 92). The monk Philotheus in 1510 penned his famous
address to the Tsar arguing that „two Romes have fallen, but the third stands‟, suggesting that
Moscow should take up where Rome and Constantinople had left off, a view that later took the
form of the conviction that the Russian nation was a „God-bearing people‟ (narod bogonosets).
The theme of the individual's duties to the state, the idea that collectivism, known as sobornos f or
communality, was of a higher moral order than crass individualism, and the view of the Russian

613
as otherworldly and idealistic rather than grossly materialistic like the Westerner, all contribute to
the Russian idea (McDaniel 1996).

The belief that the country is fated to tread a distinct path is not unique to Russia, but its
combination with a residual messianic belief in the transcendental virtues of Russian
exceptionalism is. Almost every significant Russian writer has had something to say on the
question of„the Russian idea‟, and the whole notion is at the centre of debate over Russia's path of
post-communist development and the relevance of Western notions of liberal democracy to
Russia. The Russian idea in one way or another suggests a unique path for Russia, and reflects
Nikolai Berdyaev's view that Western capitalism and Soviet communism both represented blind
alleys in the development of humanity (Berdyaev 1946). Dostoevsky was not the only one who
believed that from Russia would come the salvation of the world. Nevertheless, he refused to be
bound by any narrow nationalist agenda and sought to broaden Slavophile ideas to become the
source of universal redemption (Hudspith 2004). However, as noted, messianism has been on the
wane, and exclusionary forms of Russian nationalism find relatively few supporters. The potential
for exploiting Russian nationalism, which both Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov in different ways
counted on, was disappointed. There is no influential nationalist political party in Russia and
Russian nationalism is not an independent subject of the political process. This may change,
however, under the pressure of terrorist shocks and internal disorder.

STATE- AND NATION-BUILDING PROJECTS: OFFICIAL NATIONISM

National identity is both immanent (passive) and instrumental (projectural). In the active voice,
national identity takes the form of a national project. A „national project‟ is a predominating,
coherent vision arising out of a complex of alternative variants of development models proposed
by different political forces and individual thinkers of a given community. In the case of Russia
today, its national project is multifaceted and highly fragmented, although some common themes
emerge: the maintenance of the integrity of Russia as a sovereign multi-ethnic state, the
entrenchment of political identity and economic self-sufficiency, recognition of its international
great power status, and ensuring predominance in Eurasia. Some sections of the Russian elite take
a rather more „democratic‟ approach, emphasizing human rights, the development of civil society
and enforcing the separation of powers and the rule of law. For the neo-communist left, there is
greater emphasis on social cohesion and equality, while for traditional nationalists Russia should
become the core of a new „state-gathering‟ enterprise to restore the unity of the East Slavic world.

614
Even some liberals have been attracted to such ideas, as in the call by Anatoly Chubais, one of the
leaders of the democratic Union of Right Forces, in the December 2003 parliamentary election
campaign to establish a „liberal empire‟ based on Russia's economic power over former Soviet
states.

One reason for the weakness of projectual Russian nationalism today is that it has a small role to
play in the current remodernization project. As Mikhail Molchanov puts it:

It is not paving a road to modernity. It is not being called upon to consolidate a socially divided
society, or to create a new, postcolonial identity for the empire's former subjects … This
nationalism was born in the fight for resources that had transformed amorphous movements for
democratization and decentralization into a struggle for full national independence, as only full
independence gave the right to choose developmental paths and international alliances freely.
(Molchanov 2000: 283)

With independence achieved, nationalism in Russia took on a subaltern role. In the passage out of
communism statehood was thrust upon the local administrative elite, and they certainly were in
no mood to allow various intelligentsia or religious elites to dominate state- and nation-building
agendas.

The prolonged debate over the adoption of Russia's new national symbols - the flag, emblem and
a new national anthem - revealed Russia's confused identity. According to Andranik Migranyan
(2000: 3), „a country without symbols is only a territory, and the people a population‟. Putin
insisted that „The difficulty over Russia‟s national symbols is real. If we accept the fact that in no
way we could use the symbols of the previous epoch … then we must admit that our mothers and
fathers lived useless and senseless lives, that they lived their lives in vain.' In a speech on 28
December 2000, Putin argued that Russia must „stop living in permanent contradiction with itself,
and on this basis sought to forge a syncretic Russian national identity that drew on all phases of
Russian history (Sakwa 2004). The adoption in 2000 of the tsarist eagle as the nation‟s emblem,
the republican tricolour of 1917 as the country's flag, and a modified version of the Soviet anthem
sought to reconcile all political generations. Soon after Putin returned the red star to the Russian
Army, reinforcing the sense of continuity with the past, while refusing to restore the hammer and
sickle or the name „Stalingrad‟ to the city of Volgograd; although in 2004 the word „Stalingrad‟
once more commemorated that most terrible of battles at the eternal flame by the Kremlin walls.

615
Putin's model of liberal republicanism espouses individual citizenship against traditional
communitarian views of group solidarity. The central principle of the 1993 Russian constitution is
that individuals, not communities, are the supreme legal entity in the country. The USSR had
been negligent in establishing a national identity, perpetuating separate ethnicized identities
through the notorious fifth point in the passports issued from 1932. From 1997 Russia began to
issue new passports. Ethnicity is no longer stated on the new passports, provoking a storm of
protest in Tatarstan, Dagestan and some other ethnofederal republics. President Mintimer
Shaimiev in Tatarstan, for example, feared that the officially recorded existence of non-Russian
majorities at local level, in effect the source of ethnocratic power, was being deliberately
undermined. Defenders of Tatar national identity were concerned that the end of the formal
registration of nationality would lead to the identity of minority ethnic groups becoming lost in
the amorphous mass of a denationalized citizenry. It appeared to be the first step towards the
guberni-fication of Russia (that is, as noted, its transformation into a unitary state), a policy long
advocated by Solzhenitsyn and Zhirinovsky in the belief that sub-national identities were no more
than constituent strands of the rich tapestry that was the Russian nation. Being half Jewish
himself, Zhirinovsky could speak with a certain authority on the question. Even Jews, long
discriminated against on the basis of their passport identification, were hesitant about the loss of
ethnic markers as Russia's post-communist leaders sought to forge a de-ethnicized civic identity.
This was the view defended by Tishkov, who insisted that the abolition of Point 5 was a major
advance, removing one of the most divisive forms of totalitarian control, and allowing the
emergence of a civic national identity (Tishkov 1996). Putin sought to give substance to Yeltsin's
idea of Rossiiskii citizenship. The de-ethnicized citizen became reconstituted as the subject of
Russian political space.

THE NATION TODAY

Nationalism is a set of competing symbols over which elites struggle, but in contemporary Russia
there is little passion at the national level for the struggle. Nationalist fundamentalism remains a
relatively minor political phenomenon. Perhaps more important is the escape from tradition, from
the burden of messianic interpretations of Russian national destiny in either the traditional
imperialist or communist forms. Post-communist democratization for Russia is a way of escaping
from the burden of the past, and allows a reinterpre-tation of tradition that brings to the fore the
democratic elements in Russian political culture (Petro 1995).

616
With the dissolution of communist power the Russian Orthodox Church provides a template for
the definition of Russian-ness. As with Orthodox churches elsewhere, while the church does have
a national-political dimension, in the post-communist context it is challenged by a number of
other traditions, including the secularism with which the Soviet project was identified.
Orthodoxy's engagement with issues of social policy and political matters, as Noel Malcolm
stresses, is more distant than is the case with Protestantism or Roman Catholicism: „The
intellectual energies of Orthodoxy‟, he notes, „have been devoted to mystical theology, and the
real focus of religious life is placed … on just one thing: the celebration of the liturgy‟. He goes
on to argue that the alleged Byzantine legacy of „caesaro-papism‟, the fusion of temporal and
spiritual rule, has been misunderstood, and that the problem is not so much Orthodoxy endowing
politics with mysticism and fanaticism, but the inverse: „far from fusing themselves with politics,
the Orthodox Churches withdrew from social and political engagement into a realm of
contemplation and liturgical celebration‟ (Malcolm 1998: 13). In Russia it is only belatedly that
the Orthodox Church has begun to develop a social policy, but it remains a body torn between
traditionalists who seek to impose the hegemony of the church on society, and those who see the
church acting more modestly as an agent of moral and social renewal in a democratic pluralistic
society (Knox 2005).

The distinction between nationalist and patriotic trends in Russian thought remains.
Solzhenitsyn's patriotism revived elements of the Slavophile critique of Western liberalism but
sought to find a democratic way to institutionalize Russian exceptionalism. Right-wing
nationalists, however, condemn the West in its entirety and retreat into isolationist policies. The
collapse of the reform communist current during perestroika opened the way for an open alliance
between irreconcilable parts of the communist tradition, Stalinists and neo-communists, and
right-wing Russian nationalism, something that Yanov had predicted more than a decade earlier.

In the exit from communism, two main paths were available for the communist party, social
democratization or „Russification‟. The CPRF under the leadership of Zyuganov took the latter
(Urban and Solovei 1997; March 2002). This placed them in direct competition with other
nationalistic groupings, and meant that they were also essentially fighting for the same political
terrain as authoritarian statists. One of these is Zhirinovsky's LDPR. In his best-known work The
Last Push to the South, Zhirinovsky argues that Russia's geopolitical problems (and the world's)
would be resolved by a Russian advance to the Indian Ocean that would bring Turkey, Iran and
Afghanistan under Moscow's control. His thinking is imperial rather than nationalistic, although

617
he clearly privileges ethnic Russians over all others as the core of empire. The imperial theme is
strong in Dmitry Rogozin's Rodina (Motherland) party, one of the main opposition groups in the
Fourth Duma from December 2003. The Rodina party is potentially the vehicle for the ugliest
manifestations of classical nationalism.

There are numerous right-wing (left-conservative) nationalists, a tendency that includes

Alexander Prokhanov, Igor Shafarevich, Lev Gumilev (who died in 1992) and Alexander Dugin,
called the Russian New Right by Thomas Parland (1993). The mere mention of the names above,
however, shows the enormous variety in nationalist thinking. Prokhanov is obsessed with empire
and is a Slavophile who insists on a „sovereign path for Russia‟. „Russia‟, he insisted, „will keep
producing for the world, and particularly the Western world, the idea of a subtle irra-tionalism, of
a universal love, of pan-humanity.‟ He showed little of this universal love towards what he called
the Occidentalists: „Today‟s Westernisers in Russia are the liberals and radicals. They are
criminals; they are destroying Russia (Prokhanov 1997: 76-7). Dugin's geopolitical Eurasianism
returns to the ideas of conservative Russian nationalists of the late nineteenth century, who
opposed the liberalism of the West and bureaucratic absolutism in favour of a popular
authoritarianism based on the unity of the tsar and the people (Gubman 2004). Lev Gumilev
brilliantly but eccentrically expounded on the birth of nations (ethnogenesis) and Russia's
Eurasian destiny. Sharafevichs denunciation of Russophobia was in part accurate and in part
demented, and is a theme taken up by the author Alexander Zinoviev. It is for this reason that
Parland's simple description of them as „right-wing‟ is inadequate: the „left-wing‟ component
needs to be recognized: right-wing thinking veers into fascism at one extreme, moderates into
democratic conservatism in the middle and runs again into Russified communism at the other end.

Yanov compares contemporary Russia with Weimar Germany, and although marred by sweeping
generalizations and the failure to define terms, some of his points are valid. He insists that the
transition to capitalism by no means denotes the triumph of democracy, that the failure of
democracy in Russia would have enormous international security implications, and asserts that
the West in the early 1990s focused too narrowly on economic reform and failed to support the
broader democratization process (Yanov 1995). During perestroika the rise of the extreme right,
above all the various tendencies of Pamyat, attracted much attention, yet when faced by the test
of the ballot box they attracted few votes. Today there are numerous extreme rightist
organizations, some of whom are fascists or neo-fascists, yet none can be portrayed as a genuine

618
mass movement (Shenfield 2000). The fascistic Russian National Unity disintegrated leaving a
residue in the inchoate racist violence of skinhead groups.

Social surveys agree that the major identities of respondents were social and professional, and
only then ethnic and state (Grushin 2000: 8). A survey by the St Petersburg Institute for Complex
Sociological Research (NIKSI) revealed that while 59.7 per cent are proud of being born in
Russia, „serving Russia‟ is a priority only for 2.7 per cent, appearing last on a list of priorities.
Even „state-mindedness‟ is not a slogan that attracts many votes, while a majority reject the use of
military force for the sake of statehood, with statehood as such valued by no more than a third
(Cheremnykh 1997). Other survey evidence suggests little support for imperial policies, although
cultural nationalism remains strong. Russians are not only becoming citizens, but their citizenship
is as much of the world as it is of a narrowly defined Russia. As in other countries, statist and
cultural forms of nationalism transcend the old dichotomies of ethnic versus civic forms (Gans
2003).

CONCLUSION

As an exercise in nation-building the USSR proved an epic failure. The Bolsheviks tried to
transform an empire into a state based on ill-defined notions of „socialist internationalism‟, and
failed. Russia is now seeking to build a multinational state based on universal citizenship while
exploiting the resources of only the mildest of forms of nationalism, a nationism that is inclusive
and culturally based. The development of a post-communist national identity is distorted by a
range of distinctive factors: the legacy of empire; the presence of some 25 million Russians in the
former Soviet republics; the existence of ethnofederal republics within the borders of its formally
sovereign republic; the humiliation of the geopolitical collapse at the end of the Cold War; the
unprecedented scale of economic collapse and social polarization. At the same time, a number of
salutary features reinforce a sense of national cohesion: the Russian Orthodox Church; the
vigorous development of patriotic Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist and numerous other confessions; a
rich cultural legacy that represents a deep well of social capital; and a civilizational sense of
national identity. The main problem today is to give this a coherent political form. While Russian
nationalism in the late nineteenth century might have begun to reach the „mass movement‟ phase
(Hroch 1985), its history for most of the twentieth century has taken a very different trajectory.

619
Post-communist mass Russian nationalism has not been mobilized to pursue an aggressive or
irredentist foreign policy, even though there is a broad consensus among elites that Russia must
remain a great power. At home, the primordialist view of „one state - one nation‟ has not taken
root. Russia is at last becoming a nation-state based on principles of ethnic and religious diversity
and civic inclusion. Nationism is triumphant, although the danger of nationalism can never be
discounted.

References

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Keyman, E., and Şuhnaz Yilmaz. "Modernity and Nationalism: Turkey and Iran in Comparative
Perspective." Pp. 425-37

The claims of nationality have come to dominate politics in the last decade of the twentieth
century. As the ideological contest between capitalism and communism has abated with the
breakup of the Soviet Union and its satellite regions, so questions of national identity and
national self-determination have come to the fore. It matters less, it seems, whether the state
embraces the free market, or the planned economy, or something in between. It matters more
where the boundaries of the state are drawn, who gets included and who gets excluded, what
language is used, what religion endorsed, what culture promoted. (Miller 1995: 1)

David Miller's diagnosis has so far been correct and illuminating not only for the 1990s, but also
for the first years of the new millennium. Nationalism and nationalist sentiments were unleashed
rather than suffered a demise during the last decade of the twentieth century, and dictated the
return of culture and authenticity in globalization by bringing about ethnonationalist and religious
fundamentalist identity conflicts in different parts of the world. As the claims to national identity
and national self-determination have recently involved the simultaneous existence of global
terrorism and war, both of which constituted the defining features of what has come to be known
as „the post-9/11 world‟, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that nationalism will retain its
dominant place in politics in the foreseeable future of national and global affairs.

It is in this sense that there has been an upsurge of interest in academic and public discourse
concerning the question of the power of nationalism to remain one of the dominant ideologies of
modern times, as well as of its ability to revitalize itself and resurface in various forms in
different world-historical contexts, and to articulate itself in different political ideologies and
social movements. Turkey and Iran constitute one of the important and interesting cases in
demonstrating how nationalism has been able to maintain its presence both ideologically and
politically in modern times, and to understand its system-defining and system-transforming power
even today. Nationalism had operated as a dominant ideology in the process of the transition to
modernity in both Turkey and Iran. Moreover, the historical experience of modernity in these
countries throughout the twentieth century, and even now, has to a large extent been determined
by the continuing system-defining and system-transforming power of nationalism. In both
countries, the modern state-building process and the state-centric mode of modernization have

623
constituted the very foundation on which nationalism has acquired its dominant ideology status
and its transformative power. Moreover, both countries represent a case for alternative modernity,
since while these countries have accepted the norms and institutions of Western societal
modernization, they also had to confront the challenge of establishing them in predominantly
Muslim societies. Given this similarity, it should be pointed out, however, that the connection
between nationalism and modernity has been experienced differently and, more importantly, has
given rise to different claims to nation-state, national economy and national identity in these
countries.

In what follows, we will elaborate on these points by delineating the ways in which the ideology
of nationalism has been put into practice in relation to modernity in Turkey and Iran. First, we
will focus on the Turkish case with a special emphasis on the republican era, when the
relationship between modernity and nationalism was constructed through and in the process of
nation-state-building. The experience of the republican era provides important insights to account
for the continuing presence of nationalism in Turkey today. Secondly, we turn our attention to the
Iranian case, in which the focus will be on the interrelationship between religion and nationalism
that has framed the domestic and foreign policy orientations of the strong state. In conclusion, we
will suggest that it is only through the democratization of the state-society relations in Turkey and
Iran that we could resist the power of nationalism and its continuing impact on the nature and
formation of modernity in these countries.

MODERNITY AND NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

Although it is true that „Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.
It was “made” in the image of the Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign
invaders and the old regime‟, the history of nationalism goes back to the late-Ottoman times
(Ahmad 1993: 2). A quick glance at the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876) and the Young Turk
movement (1908-1918) in the late-Ottoman times demonstrates that nationalism was put into
practice as an articulating principle of the need for modernization and the desire to save the
Ottoman state (Kazancgil 1981: 37-9). The making of modern Turkey however brought about a
rupture with the Ottoman past, with the emergence of the nation-state, and in that context
nationalism was situated in the process of making in direct relation to the process of state building.
To a large extent, the republic indeed presented a radical break with the past, as it was nurtured
by „concepts and doctrines such as progress, laicism, nationalism, Comtean positivism and

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solidarism‟, owed a lot „to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and nineteenth-century
scientism‟, and aimed as „its ultimate consequence to create “a modern Turkish state”‟(Kazancgil
1981: 37). The creation of modern Turkey presented a rupture with the past, insofar as it
privileged the Turkish state as the sovereign and dominant actor of modernity. Yet, at the same
time, it carried in itself certain elements of continuity with the past, since the goal of„saving the
state through modernization‟ remained the dominant motto of nationalism in the republican era.
In fact, this legacy still frames the debate on nationalism in today's Turkey. This means that
nationalism has been one of the most important and effective characteristics of the process of
making modern Turkey, and it has remained and continues to play that role, even in different
contexts and articulations. Since the main goal of Atatürk and his followers was to reach the level
of „Western civilization‟ by installing an independent nation-state, fostering industrialization, and
constructing a secular and modern national identity, and this goal was derived to a large extent
from the desire for saving the state and securing its existence, it was nationalism that linked
security with modernity, and became the dominant ideology of the state (Keyman forthcoming).
From its inception in 1923, modernity and security have constituted intertwined processes that
had to be carried out by the Turkish nation-state through the ideology of nationalism.

The Kemalist elite's will to civilization was not simply a local project of economic or political
modernization. Nor was it based essentially upon an attempt to create a national identity for
Turkey. It was a more complex and at the same time more ambiguous project of modernity,
aiming to achieve a top-down and state-based transformation of a traditional society into a
modern nation by introducing and disseminating Western reason and rationality. In this context,
according to Mardin, the project of modernity involved the conceptualization of the Turkish
Republic as a nation-state and required a set of transitions, including: (i) the transition of political
authority from personal rule to impersonal rules and regulations, that is, the rule of law; (ii) the
shift from divine law as the explanation for the order of the universe to positivist and rational
thinking; (iii) the shift from a community founded upon the „elite-people cleavage‟ to a political
community; and (iv) the transition from a religious community to a nation-state. These transitions
were regarded by Mustafa Kemal as the precondition for Turkey living „as an advanced and
civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization‟ (Ahmad 1993: 53).

As an integral element of the project of modernity, nationalism was employed by the state to
initiate a „rapid‟ political, economic and cultural modernization, in order to create a modern
institutional political structure, a quickly industrializing economy and a homogeneous national

625
identity with a highly secular and progressing society. The rapid modernization was necessary not
only to catch up with the level of Western civilization, but also to make the Turkish state more
secure and stronger. Therefore, how to achieve both modernity and security simultaneously was
and has remained the fundamental question for the state to cope with, and it was in this context
that nationalism was considered and employed as the effective answer.

The idea of the state in the mind of Atatürk and his followers was by no means abstract: rather it
was a reaction to two aspects of the Ottoman state, which they identified as key to the Empire's
decline. Because the Ottoman state was identified with the personal rule of the sultan, eventually
it was unable to compete within the European state system which was organized on the basis of
legal-rational authority (Heper 1985). Secondly, the Islamic basis of the Ottoman state was seen
as the primary obstacle to progress in Ottoman society, insofar as modernization required the
regulation of state-society relations through the nation-state. Therefore, the republican elite
sought to create a state distinct from the person of the sultan and secular enough to reduce Islam
to the realm of individual faith. For them, the state had to involve commitment to political
modernity, meaning that the link between the modernization of the polity and that of society had
to be established by the state. It is for this reason that the republican elite initiated reforms,
imposed from above to „enlighten the people and help them make progress‟ (Heper 1985: 1).
These reforms were designed to equate the national will with the general will, and included the
principles of republicanism, nationalism, étatism, secularism, populism and revolutionism (or
reformism from above). In each principle, nationalism enabled the state to initiate political and
economic modernization, to construct a secular and homogeneous national identity and thus to
make sure that the security of the state could be maintained. Moreover, it is through nationalism
that the state maintained its sovereign and dominant role in almost every sphere of societal
relations, from politics to economics, from cultural identity and morality to everyday life
practices of individuals.

Having delineated the basic premises of the ideology of nationalism and its employment by the
state, we can make a number of suggestions about its power and continuing presence in the
course of modernity in Turkey. First, nationalism derives its power from its central role in
Turkish modernization, in which the state seeks to achieve security and modernity simultaneously.
Secondly, the ideology of nationalism has always been one of the defining characteristics of
modern Turkey, insofar as it played a vital role not only in the process of nation-state building,
but also in the top-down and state-centric attempt to achieve the economic and cultural

626
modernization of society. Thirdly, nationalism has also operated as the main ideological
imperative of the state in formulating its international politics. In other words, nationalism has
constituted the ontological foundation for the state-centric formulation of Turkish foreign policy
(Çelik 1999). Fourthly, given the significant changes that the formation of Turkish modernity has
faced throughout the contemporary history of modern Turkey, such as the transition to democracy
after World War II, the post-1980 economic liberalization, globalization, European integration
and the emergence of religious, ethnic and cultural identity-based conflicts in the 1990s, and the
increasing importance of civil society organizations, nationalism has nevertheless remained
influential and effective. In other words, the question of modernity and nationalism has continued
to occupy its central place in academic and public discourse, even though its content has been
subject to reconstructions and been articulated by different, and even contrasting, political actors
and movements.

In this sense, the continuing power of nationalism in Turkey can be said to have gone hand in
hand with the success of the strong state in governing its society. In modern Turkey, this success
can be observed in the creation of the necessary institutions of political and economic
modernization in terms of politics, law, economics and industrialization, in the transition to multi-
party democracy in 1945, as well as in foreign policy with respect to Turkey's integration in the
Western alliance system. Yet, since the 1980s, especially during the 1990s, we have seen the
increasing failure of the strong state to link modernity and nationalism with one another, as a
result of the significant changes and transformations confronting the state-centric and top-down
operation of Turkish modernity (Cornell 2001). In this period, at the economic level, the strategy
for industrialization shifted dramatically from import-substitution to export-promotion, and much
more emphasis was placed on market forces. The export-oriented industrialization created a
strong shift from a vision of society which was heavily statist, towards one that is characterized
by neoliberal free-market individualism. In this sense, the emerging neoliberal ideology in Turkey
during the 1980s called for and initiated radical market-oriented reforms in the name of economic
progress (Önis 1997: 750), which in turn has generated a serious challenge to the state. The
neoliberal restructuring of the economy, which has placed the idea of market rationality at the
center of the state-economy interactions challenged both the dominant regulatory role of the state
in the economy and its national developmentalist ideology.

At the political and cultural levels, Turkish modernity has been confronted by a number of
identity-based conflicts challenging the homogeneous and secular national identity. A variety of

627
claims to identity and demands for recognition with different political imaginations have made
their mark in all spheres of social life. From the resurgence of Islam, the Kurdish question, the
women question, the minority question to civil-societal calls for individual and cultural rights and
freedoms, in a wide spectrum, identity politics, with its challenge to national identity, has become
one of the important characteristics of post-1980 Turkish modernity (Keyman and Içduygu 2005).
Moreover, identity politics, which has been voiced and put into practice by different societal
groups, has simultaneously involved both democratic demands for multiculturalism and pluralism,
and the communitarian political strategies with anti-democratic and ethno-religious nationalist
claims to nationality. It is true that, today, it is not possible to think of modernity without
reference to identity. Yet it is equally true that identity politics is not necessarily democratic, but
often conflictual and crisis-ridden. It is due precisely to this fact that identity politics, and the
frequent use of ethno-religious nationalism in it, has made it very difficult for the state to
maintain the secular and homogeneous basis of the national identity it has attempted to create
through the ideology of nationalism as an articulating principle of modernity and security. Thus,
since the 1980s, there has been an increased dominance of security in state discourse, understood
as the security of both the territorial state and the secular national identity of the republic.
However, the most far reaching impact of identity politics on Turkish modernity has been a shift
in the ideology of nationalism from modernity to security (Bora 2003: 433-53). In other words, if
in the republican period, rapid modernization with the intention of reaching the level of Western
civilization had been considered an answer to the question of saving and securing the Turkish
state, the post-1980 Turkey has witnessed the privileging of security over modernity.

It has to be acknowledged that the historical context in which this shift from modernity to security
has occurred and has given meaning to the changing content of the ideology of nationalism, is not
only national, but also regional and global. The former Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem
emphasized the significance of this broader international context by arguing, „In the formation of
Turkey in the twenty-first century, foreign policy is a determining factor … The goal of current
generations should be to create a Turkey … which will be a global and regional center of
attraction with its history, cultural richness, democracy, economy and progressiveness based on
social justice‟ (Cem 2004: 59-60). With the end of the Cold War, Turkey emerged as a pivotal
regional power in a volatile region. Since the 1980s, Turkish modernity has also been exposed to
globalization, which has triggered the process of the widening, deepening and speeding-up of the
interconnections between states, economies and cultures in the world. One of the most important
impacts of globalization on national societies has been the increasing importance of the global,

628
regional, national and local interactions that have provided a suitable platform for the emergence
of new demands for cultural identity and political recognition. As the research on globalization
has indicated, the identity-based conflicts that have been occurring throughout the world since the
1980s, but especially during the 1990s, have been locating themselves in the intersection between
the global and local, making claims to nationality and national identity, voicing strong demands
for recognition, and strengthening themselves through global networking (Keyman and Koyuncu
2005: 105-29).

The ideology of nationalism has been influenced by globalization in two ways; first, it has been
articulated by the locally organized political movements in their struggle for recognition, and thus
we have observed the emergence of micro-nationalism in ethnic, religious and cultural terms; and
second, the national context has lost its capacity and power to be the most important spatial
ground for nationalism, and thus we have observed that nationalism has become a more and more
globally and locally constructed ideology. These two impacts of globalization on nationalism
have been observed in Turkey too. As has been noted, the post-1980 Turkey has witnessed the
emergence of mainly religious and ethnic identity-based conflicts which have confronted the
secular and homogeneous character of national identity. Moreover, the way in which these
conflicts have voiced their demands for recognition, legitimized their struggle to gain cultural
rights and freedoms, and more importantly politicized themselves to influence national and local
politics has to a large degree benefited from globalization and global debates about
identity/difference. As a result, not only has nationalism become localized in ethnic and religious
terms, it has also become the main ideology of the state to react against these identity demands
and conflicts in a highly security-oriented manner. In the context of globalization, nationalism in
Turkey has continued its dominance, but this time it was framed by security concerns (Özbudun
2000).

It should be pointed out, however, that there are two specific processes, namely those of the end
of the Cold War and European integration, which should be taken into account in order to
understand how security concerns have characterized the modus vivendi of nationalism and its
relation to modernity in post-1980 Turkey. The end of the Cold War gave rise to the emergence
of important changes and ambiguities in the domestic and foreign policy initiatives of Turkey. It
is true that the end of the Cold War has also ended the „buffer state foreign policy identity‟ of
Turkey, which Turkey had enjoyed and benefited from in the years of the hegemonic struggle
between two superpowers, and thus has brought about a need for Turkey to search for a new

629
identity. Yet it is also true that in the post-Cold War years, as well as in today's post-9/11 world,
the geopolitical and historical significance of Turkey in the Middle East, the Balkans and Central
Asia has become increasingly apparent, and thus Turkey has been increasingly perceived as a key
regional actor in the creation of regional peace and stability (Larrabee and Lesser 2003). However,
the new identity and role of Turkey in the post-Cold War era, in which international affairs have
been undergoing a significant transition and transformation process, is not yet certain. Instead,
change and uncertainty about the future are going hand in hand and this has had important
consequences for the ideology of nationalism in Turkey. The post-Cold War era has created a
new impetus for the ideology of nationalism to continue its dominant role in modernity, a role
defined increasingly by the security concerns of the Turkish state (Fuller and Lesser 1993: 148).
This uncertainty, embedded in the foreign policy identity of Turkey since the end of the Cold War,
and the increasing identity-based conflicts in ethnic and religious terms that have marked the
changing nature of domestic politics in Turkey, have both reinforced the security-oriented
operation of the ideology of nationalism and its relation to modernity in Turkey.

Likewise, changes and uncertainties have also become more and more apparent in the process of
European integration since the mid-1990s, as Turkey has attempted to achieve full membership
status in the European Union. As a country on the borders of Europe, trying to start the full
accession negotiations, and initiating the significant political and constitutional democratic
reforms necessary for full membership, Turkey's expectation has been to receive an objective and
fair response from Europe. However, the high level of uncertainty in Europe about whether or not
culturally it regards Turkey as part of itself has brought about not objectivity and universality, but
instead a sense of double-standards skepticism, and mistrust in Turkish society. As a result, even
though, in the period between 1999 and 2004, Turkey-EU relations deepened, and full accession
negotiations began in October 2005, the prevailing dominance of such uncertainty has
strengthened nationalism in Turkey. The ideology of nationalism, used by the anti-European
integration forces, voicing the significance of the state and its sovereignty to maintain the security
of Turkish modernity and territorial integrity, has benefited from the high level of uncertainty
within Europe about the place of Turkey in it. Nevertheless, the EU integration process has
served as an important external anchor, giving impetus to the democratization process in Turkey
(Ugur and Canefe 2004) and has also played a critical role in shaping the intricate dynamics of
the EU-Turkey-US triangle (Önis and Y1lmaz 2005). It would not be mistaken to suggest that the
impressive record of Turkey in upgrading its level of democracy in recent years, as well as its
perception by the US as a key actor for the future of the Middle East would not have been

630
possible without the positive role of the European integration process. It can also be suggested in
this sense that the way in which the Turkey-EU full accession negotiations develop will
determine to a large extent the role and the power of nationalism in reshaping the formation of
Turkish modernity in the near future.

Having briefly outlined the domestic and global developments that have contributed to the
continuing dominance of nationalism in Turkey since the 1980s, we could conclude here that
insofar as nationalism functions as the main articulating principle of modernity and security, and
operates as the dominant ideology of the formulation of domestic and foreign policies of the state,
it continues to operate within a system-defining and system-transforming capacity. Put differently,
we could suggest that as long as the experience of modernity involves a strong state without a
normative and political commitment to democracy and its consolidation in societal affairs,
nationalism acts as a dominant ideology and maintains its presence as such. In this sense, the
presence of democratic deficit and that of nationalism are in fact two sides of the same coin,
namely state-centric modernity. To elaborate on this point, we will now turn to the Iranian case.

FOUCAULT'S PENDULUM: EXPLOSIVE DILEMMAS OF IRANIAN NATIONALISM

AND MODERNITY

The crafting and re-crafting of national identity through political mobilization has been a
recurrent theme in modern Iranian history. While following an alternative path through the global
process of modernity, Iranian nationalism has developed in a „bombastic and dualistic fashion‟
(Fahri 2005: 7), swinging like Foucault's pendulum between the extremes of glorification of Iran's
pre-Islamic past and its Islamic heritage, secularism and Islamic fundamentalism, isolation and
the desire for a pivotal regional role, and an ardent anti-imperialism and integration in global
trends. Ironically, while the Islamists generally uphold political Islam as an ostensibly
universalistic ideology and condemn nationalism, they are often strikingly nationalistic. In the
Iranian case, they also display a parochial nationalist character (Munson 2003: 40-53). Moreover,
in its efforts to ensure its security and to form a sphere of influence in the Middle East (and in
Central Asia in the post-Cold War era) as a pivotal medium-size regional power, Iran had to
persistently tackle the challenge of coping with its Persian Shi'ite heritage as „the other‟ in a
predominantly Arab and Sunni region. Consequently, these factors have played a critical role in
shaping the nature and course of Iranian nationalism and modernity.

631
Iran has experienced two major revolutions in the modern period: the Constitutional Revolution
of 1905-09 and the Islamic Revolution of 1977-79. The first one marked the triumph, albeit brief
and limited, of the modern intelligentsia, who wanted to reshape their society in the image of
contemporary Europe. They were inspired by such ideologies as nationalism and liberalism and
drafted a predominantly secular constitution. The second revolution, on the other hand, brought
the traditional ulema to the epicenter of a political earthquake in Iran. In sharp contrast to the
previous period, this time Iran's political leaders were inspired by „the golden age of Islam‟ and
have sealed their victory by creating a thoroughly clerical constitution and an essentially Islamic
fundamentalist republic. Consequently, they tried to Islamize Iranian nationalism by bringing the
religious dimension to the forefront.

During the first Pahlavi state of Reza Shah from 1926 to 1941, as well as during the second
Pahlavi era of his son Mohammed Reza Shah (after a period of foreign occupation during World
War II) continuing up to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, a glorification of Iran's pre-Islamic past
and an emphasis on the ethno-linguistic dimension of Iranian identity were coupled with the
promotion of an ardently secular version of nationalism. In these periods, the monarchy's attempts
to mold a secular Iranian nation-state were accompanied by a rapid process of top-to-bottom
modernization and these efforts marked the transformation of a society (with varying degrees of
success) whose primary forms of identification were mainly at the religious and tribal levels.

While creating an autocratic style of rule, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Shah Pahlavi,
had a clear idea of the path along which Iran should be moving. The goal was the rapid creation
of a modern and secular nation-state like Turkey. The ruling elite envisioned Iran as a distinct
cultural and political entity molded and enriched by history (with particular emphasis on the pre-
Islamic heritage) and language (Persian) (Tavakoli-Targhi 2001). The attempt to create a
common national identity was perceived essentially as a modernization project. As Yapp
emphasizes, „For Reza Iran was a teleological as well as a historical concept; the greatness of Iran
was in the future as well as the past and it depended upon modernization.‟ (Yapp 1996: 174-5)
Yet, whether the society would be able to cope with this extremely rapid pace of modernization
or share this particular version of Iranian nationalism was not a major concern for the ruling elite.
Like his father, Mohammed Reza Shah also believed in the process of rapid modernization,
calling it the march towards the great civilization. In this respect, modernization was perceived as
a Westernization project. During this fast-paced march, however, the Pahlavi regime often had to
resort to coercion, because it was after all an elite regime (often perceived as a pawn of Western

632
powers) which tried to push a reluctant society frequently in a direction in which it did not want
to move.

The ruling elite tried to shape Iranian nationalism through a distinctly secular ideology by
diminishing the role of Islam in Iran. They attempted to accentuate the ties with Iran's pre-Islamic
past, as well as to underscore the racial difference between the „Aryan‟ Iranians and the Arabs
(Yousefzadeh 2004). In doing this, the major strategy was to de-emphasize Arab, hence Islamic,
influences on Iranian history. In addition to placing the glorious history of the Achaemenid
dynasty in the limelight, the ruling elite presented Western modernity as the ideal model for Iran.
Similar to the Turkish case, the attempt to shift from divine law to positivist and rational thinking
lay at the core of the Iranian modernization project. However, unlike the Turkish experience, with
the continuation of the monarchy, the transfer of political authority from personal rule to an
impersonal institutional structure marked by the rule of law did not materialize. Moreover, the
transition from a community shaped by „elite-people cleavage‟ to a political community also
failed. The extremely close ties of the monarchy with foreign powers (first with the British and
Russians and then with the Americans), not only severely challenged the legitimacy of the rulers,
but also accentuated the „elite-people‟ division. Hence, although the ruling elite took a number of
measures to curb the power of the clergy and to diminish the role of Islam in Iran, the transition
from religious community to a nation-state assumed a parochial and precarious nature.

Between 1960 and 1979, the socio-economic landscape in Iran was, nevertheless, transformed in
a very radical way. There was significant population growth accompanied by rapid urbanization.
Some 3.7 million people left their villages to settle in towns between 1956 and 1976 compared to
virtually none before 1934 and only 750,000 between 1934 and 1956. By 1979, close to half of
the population was urban. There was also land reform curbing the power particularly of major
absentee landlords. In this period, the government developed infrastructure and communications
by constructing ports, railways and especially roads, of which more than 20,000 kilometers were
built (Yousefzadeh 2004). There was also a push for industrialization and particularly for the
development of the iron and steel industry. The money to finance the economic growth and the
additional services came from oil revenues that had started to flow in. By 1970 Iran's oil revenues
were approximately one billion dollars a year and as a result of drastic increases in oil prices
during the early 1970s Iran's earnings from oil reached 20 billion dollars per annum in 1976. No
country in the Middle East, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, was transformed more in those
years than Iran. Over the whole period, the average annual economic growth rate was

633
approximately 12 per cent (Wilber 1981: 263-331). While Iran still lagged behind countries like
Israel, Egypt and Turkey on a number of indicators, Iran had begun from a much lower baseline
and thus compressed its economic growth into a much shorter period. The Shah's White
Revolution that gained momentum between 1960 and 1963 and the ensuing period of rapid
economic growth transformed Iran drastically by shifting the center of gravity from rural to urban,
from agriculture to industry and most importantly from landowning notables to the state.
Ironically, the urban character of the Islamic Revolution would reflect both the influence of
religion and the unintended consequences of this rapid transformation and modernization of
Iranian state and society.

As far as Iranian nationalism is concerned, during the reign of Mohammed Reza Shah (like his
father), the pre-Islamic dimension of Iranian national identity was emphasized. The ruling elite
presented the history of pre-Islamic Iran as its golden age and frequently portrayed the monarchy
as the descendants of the glorious kings of the Achaemenid dynasty such as Cyrus and Darius.
While emphasizing Iran's glorious pre-Islamic past, they tried to present the clergy as a backward
class and an obstacle to the reforms in Iran. For instance, the monarchy often referred to the
potential tyranny of „the Red and the Black‟, with the „Red‟ symbolizing the communists and the
„Black referring to the clergy. However, the Shah‟s attempts to marginalize the powerful Islamic
clergy clearly backfired and with the advent of the Islamic Revolution the discontented masses
led by the ulema cast a „Black shadow over efforts to mold a secular Iranian nationalism. In this
respect, the revolution not only brought the end of the 2,500-year-old monarchy, but also „sought
to make Iran less a land of Cyrus and Darius, and more a land of Mohammed‟ (Wilber 1981: 263-
331).

The primary components of Iranian nationalism promoted during the monarchy were turned
upside down with the 1979 revolution. However, the duality itself was not fundamentally altered.
As opposed to the constitutional discourse that emphasized Iran's pre-Islamic past as a time of
enlightenment and glory, the revolutionary discourse reconstituted that past as the dark era of
monarchical despotism and oppression and instead presented the Islamic period as the golden age.
The charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, repeatedly argued that the
only part of Iran's past worth studying and glorifying was the period after Iran's transformation
into an Islamic country, following its conquest by Arab and Muslim armies. For instance, as early
as 1924, Khomeini stated that „Before Islam, the lands now blessed by our True Faith suffered
miserably because of ignorance and cruelty. There is nothing in the past that is worth glorification‟

634
(Wilber 1981:263-331). By the time of the 1979 revolution the battle lines were clearly marked
with pre-Islamic symbolisms and monarchy on one side and Islam and the clergy on the other
(Abrahamian 1993: 88). By creating memory wars and ideologizing the past, Islamic clergy
leading the masses attempted to redefine Iranian identity and nationalism along religious lines
and intensified the temporal divide separating the pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran. Moreover, the
new Islamic republic set out to crush all remnants of secular Iranian nationalism. Thus, the
Iranian pendulum has swung from one extreme to another, yet again by policies enforced on the
society from the top.

Iranian nationalism, being a modern phenomenon, submerges its roots in the construction of the
modern state; hence, in the policies of territorial centralism and in the efforts to construct a
uniform national identity. In this respect, the geographical context and the protection of Iran's
territorial integrity and security remain as one of the most persistent themes in Iranian nationalism.
The aftermath of the Islamic Revolution was marked by two concomitant trends. On the one hand
there was the attempt towards Islamizing Iranian nationalism. Yet, on the other hand, while
political Islam aspired to be a universalist ideology, Islam itself was nationalized by the
peculiarities of the Iranian case. What ultimately provided the essential link between these two
opposing trends, which could have served as a perilous centrifugal force, was the presence of a
strong centralized state.

Three main factors, namely, modernization, mobilization and participation, have shaped the
course of the revolution and the post-revolutionary politics in Iran. The fundamentalist strategy
was to take over the state and to conduct the affairs of the state in strict compliance with the
Shari'a (Islamic law). Hence, once again there was a radical shift from a secular state to divine
law as the source of political authority and legitimacy. However, due to the establishment of a
strong state system and the international context, this reversal was not accompanied by a similar
transition from the nation-state back to the religious community. Moreover, the Islamic clergy in
their efforts to reshape Iranian society and politics along religious lines did not oppose the other
main elements of modernization such as a powerful state and rapid economic development. Yet,
while trying to present a path towards an alternative modernity, they insisted that modernization
should not necessarily be accompanied by the acknowledgement of the epistemic and moral
dominance of the West. As argued by Fred Halliday, „Revolutions were a product of the tensions
of a developing modernity, of the combined and uneven spread of that modernity across the world,
but they were also constrained by that process' (Halliday 1999: 54). Hence, the Iranian revolution

635
was both a reaction to modernization and also in return was shaped and constrained by it through
mass mobilization and political participation.

In the post-revolutionary period in Iran, during the first decade under the leadership of Khomeini,
efforts to Islamize the state and society and to carry out the inqilab-i farhangi (cultural revolution)
marked the domestic scene. In the international arena, Iran was preoccupied with eight years of
Iran-Iraq war and the desire to export the revolution in defiance of the Western powers and the
Soviet Union. Ironically, however, by co-opting a religious rhetoric, Saddam pushed the Iranian
regime to use nationalism instead of Islam, in order to get the support of the masses against
Saddam's armies. Once again, in Iran's search for security appealing to nationalist sentiments
proved to be the most convenient and effective mechanism to unite the people against a common
enemy.

During the late 1980s, under President Hashemi Rafsanjani, the desire for social, economic and
political reform gained momentum, both among an influential group of political elites and the
public. Particularly, under the leadership of Khatami the need for reforms in all aspects of the
Islamic system was emphasized. This was accompanied by a foreign policy orientation towards
promoting peaceful co-existence and reconciliation with neighbors and other countries, as well as
an attempt towards better integration with global trends and the push for increased regional
cooperation both in the Middle East and in Central Asia. Just like Turkey, Iran also had to
respond to the penetrating impact of globalization. However, in Iran these new domestic and
foreign policies faced difficulties of a different nature than identity politics and were frequently
challenged by the confrontation between the conservatives and the reformists. Hence, the reform
process was carried on with limited success.

External factors have played a crucial role in shaping the dilemmas of Iranian nationalism. Initial
impetus for nationalism, similar to the Ottoman Empire and many other countries, was strongly
intertwined with patriotic sentiments and lamentations over the loss of Iranian territory and
diminishing Iranian military might vis-à-vis the imperial powers (Cole 1996: 36-56). Ever since,
Iranian nationalism has been closely tied with Iran's constant search for security. However, unlike
Turkey which was never colonized and had fought a glorious war of independence against the
Western powers, prolonged foreign interference in the domestic affairs of Iran (particularly by
Britain and Russia and by the United States since the end of World War II) not only increased the
public's skepticism towards equating modernization with Westernization, but also tainted Iranian

636
nationalism with a spirit of xenophobia which was to be clearly reflected during the Islamic
Revolution.

In the aftermath of the revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran, while trying to enhance its
regional influence by emphasizing an Islamic worldview and political structure, remained rather
isolated. In this respect, Iran's Persian and Shi'a heritage in a predominantly Arab and Sunni
region served as an additional obstacle in exporting its own version of an Islamic Revolution and
state. In the end, just as Trotsky's vision to export the communist revolution differed from the
Stalinist model of „socialism in one country‟ shaped by the realities of the domestic and
international arena, despite their universalist claims the Islamists had to operate within a national
context. Thus, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iranian foreign policy moved from radical
revolutionary ideals to a relatively more rational and peaceful orientation, particularly under
President Khatami. However, Iran's recent attempts to develop nuclear weapons might perilously
alter regional balances and set Iran on a course of isolation and confrontation with the United
States. Moreover, unlike Turkey, for which the prospect of European Union membership serves
as a powerful impetus for the democratic reform process, due to the deep-rooted skepticism
towards the West and particularly thorny relations with the United States, Iran lacks an effective
external anchor for democratization and reform. Hence, the domestic tensions between the
reformists and conservatives also find their resonance in external relations and there is a
persistent democratic deficit. Iran's 2005 presidential elections, bringing the ultra-conservative
mayor of Tehran, Ahmedinejad, into power with a quite unexpected landslide victory, will swing
the pendulum of Iranian politics once again towards the religious conservative hardliners to the
dismay of the reformist camp.

Iranian nationalism is not a monolithic or a uniform concept and encompasses multiple facets and
manifestations of Iranian national identity, including the territorial, linguistic, ethnic and religious.
This is not very surprising for a multilingual, multi-ethnic and multicultural country like Iran.
However, what makes the Iranian case rather unique, as Firouzeh Kashani-Sabet underlines, „is
the way, in which the varying emphases on these complementary, but often competing
articulations of nationalism, has transformed Iranian politics in radical ways‟ (Sabet 2002). In
return, the radical changes in Iranian politics also gave way to major swings and stark choices as
to which components of national identity would be at the forefront. For instance, if at one time
the ruling elite upheld secular nationalism and language as the principal defining characteristics
of modern Iran, at another historic juncture (after the Islamic revolution) religion has become the

637
primary determinant of being Iranian. The struggle between these two visions and the versions of
Iranian nationalism still continues. Moreover, there has been a persistent mismatch between the
perceptions of the political leaders regarding the defining characteristics of Iranian nationalism
with those of the masses, as well as the pace and the course of modernization in Iran.
Consequently, their level of success in permeating their particular version of Iranian identity in its
extreme forms (in either the militantly secular or Islamic fundamentalist version) and alternative
models of modernity through top-to-bottom coercive policies, both in the past and present
remains highly questionable.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: TURKEY AND IRAN IN COMPARISON

In the light of the foregoing analysis of the Turkish and the Iranian experiences of nationalism, a
number of comparative insights can be drawn, which should be taken into account in delineating
the way in which nationalism operates and remains one of the dominant ideologies of modernity.
These insights are as follows. First, both countries represent post-imperial social formations with
strong historical, philosophical and cultural imperial legacies. In analyzing nationalism in Turkey
and Iran, one cannot ignore the impact of the Ottoman and the Persian imperial past on the
connection between nationalism and modernity within the context especially of the nation-state-
building process. Since neither of these countries have experienced prolonged periods of direct
foreign rule, it is important to underline that their nation-state-building process took place not in
the postcolonial, but the post-imperial context. Secondly, both countries represent strong-state
traditions, in which the practice of the ideology of nationalism has been embedded in the active
and major role of the state as the sovereign subject of the process of the top-down modernization
and transformation of traditional society. Thirdly, both countries represent a case for alternative
modernity, insofar as their experience of modernity has taken place in a Muslim social setting
with Islamic cultural and religious identity. As an alternative modernity, both countries have
accepted the institutions of the Western societal modernization, such as the nation-state, political
institutions and economic market relations, and have attempted to establish them in a Muslim
social setting. Fourthly, both countries act as pivotal states in international politics, due precisely
to their regional power. In this sense, the ideology of nationalism in these countries takes place at
the intersection of domestic and international politics, and thus acts as an integral element of the
role and power of the state in shaping and reshaping the structure and formation of not only
domestic relations but also regional politics. Fifthly, both for Turkey and Iran their geopolitical
context and constant search for security have shaped the course of their nationalism and

638
modernity. While in the early phases of their nation-building process the emphasis was on the
link between nationalism and modernity, in the Cold War period and particularly in the post-Cold
War era nationalism started to be more closely tied with security, resulting in the securitization of
the nationalist discourse.

In light of these common denominators, we have argued that it is the state-building process and
the continuing presence of the strong-state tradition in Turkey and Iran that provide an adequate
theoretical and political ground for an analysis of the historically and discursively constructed
relation between modernity and nationalism in these countries. However, the historical course of
modernity in these societies has given rise to different, even contrasting, articulations of
nationalism and politics which have resulted in the emergence of different state ideologies,
political regime structures and possibilities of democratization. In Turkey, the relation between
modernity and nationalism has been determined to a large extent by the secular state aiming to
create a modern society with a strong desire to reach the level of contemporary Western
civilization. Therefore, the Turkish experience has revealed the fact that the ideology of
nationalism can be employed by the state to establish the necessary institutions of Western
modernity and to create a modern society through a homogeneous secular national identity. This
experience has demonstrated that a secular and modern political structure is possible in a Muslim
social setting, and Turkey becomes an example of the possibility that a secular state can govern a
society with a predominantly Muslim population. In Turkey, the relation of nationalism and
modernity has produced a highly secular state structure and the top-down construction of a
secular national identity, which, in turn, brought about the possibility of the coexistence (rather
than the clash) of Islam with modernity. In contrast, in the course of Iranian modernity, religion
has played an important role in the formation of national identity, as well as in the process of
building the nation-state. Religious institutions have reinforced the ideology of nationalism, and
religious beliefs have been integral to national identity formation. Thus, despite the militant
secularism of the ruling elite, religion has given meaning to the historically and discursively
constructed relation between nationalism and modernity in Iran, which, in 1979, resulted in the
Iranian revolution that has created a religious state structure. Although the course of modernity in
Iran has been state-centric, the religiosity of nationalism has been used by the strong state in
governing its society, as well as in formulating its foreign policy both regionally and globally. As
a result, nationalism in Iran has gone hand in hand with religion and operated as a dominant
ideology of the state.

639
Finally, both Turkey and Iran represent republican political formations where the state-centric
constitution of modernity through nationalism has not involved democracy, and as a result the
„democracy deficit‟ has remained one of the main characteristics and problem areas of the
modernization process in these countries. However, while for Turkey the EU serves as an
important external anchor for democratization, despite some critical attempts Iran's
democratization and modernization process has been deeply troubled by the tension between
reformists and conservatives as also revealed by the Iranian presidential election of 2005. In both
cases, the democratization of state-society relations and the interaction of a complex set of
domestic and international factors will continue to determine the course and nature of their
respective nationalisms and their alternative modernities.

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Oommen, T. "Nation and Nationalism in South Asia." Pp. 438-49

The nationalism of South Asia analysed in this chapter could be referred to as anti-colonial,
geographical, linguistic, religious, secular, territorial and Third World, and derivatively South
Asia has different types of nations. To complicate matters, the six South Asian countries which I
subject to analysis vary enormously in terms of their size, socio-cultural features, developmental
levels, type of political system and the like, which impinge on the process of nation formation and
the crystallization of nationalism in them.

Religious and linguistic identities directly shape the national fabric and nationalism in South Asia
as elsewhere. Even in this context the variations between the South Asian countries are
substantial (see Table 36.1). An examination of the data presented in Table 36.1 reveals that all
six South Asian states 1 have one dominant religion but none is mono-religious. It may be noted
here that all the countries of South Asia, except India, have enclosed their dominant religion as
their state/national religion.

The situation with regard to language is more complex. In India and Pakistan, only 40 and 48 per
cent respectively speak the most numerically dominant language. While India has 24 official
languages, in Pakistan only Urdu, the mother tongue of less than 8 per cent of its citizens, is
recognized as the official language, because of its attributed association with Islam in the
subcontinent. Except India, only Sri Lanka has recognized a second official language.

By recognizing only one religion as the state/national religion and only one language as official,
four out of six South Asian states have adopted the collectivistic-ethnic idea of nation wherein the
fusion of citizenship and nationality is the ideal. If one were to go by available empirical evidence,
this does not augur well for the full flowering of democracy. Sri Lanka by recognizing two
languages as official languages opted for a bi-national state and India by recognizing 24
languages as official has opted for a multinational state. Thus the notions of citizenship and
nationality are conceptually differentiated. The merit of this arrangement is that common
citizenship becomes an instrument of equality and the recognition of different nationalities
(linguistic groups) provides the anchorage for secular identity, that is, an identity neutral to
religious affiliations.

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While the Sri Lankan and Indian model approximates the individualistic-civic idea on nation, it
goes beyond it in that the nation is not conceived as a collective of sovereign individuals but as a
collective of culturally distinct units having reciprocal and interdependent economic and political
involvement. This model provides for the legitimacy of collective/group rights within sovereign
states. Such an arrangement is conducive for the co-existence of political federalism and cultural
pluralism (cf. Greenfeld and Chirot 1994: 79-130).

Table 36.1 Religion and Language Variations in South Asian Countries

Country Religion Language

Bangladesh 86% Muslims 12.5% Hindus 95% Bengali (official language)

1.5% others; state religion Islam

Bhutan 70% Buddhists 25% Hindus; 70% Dzongkhsa (official language) 25%
state religion Buddhism Nepali

India 82% Hindus 12.12% Muslims 40.22% Hindi 8.3% Bengali 7.8% Telugu
2.34% Christians 1.94% Sikhs; 7.45% Marathi 6.32% Tamil 5.18% Urdu
no official/state religion (24 languages are officially recognized)

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Nepal 89.5% Hindus 5.3% Buddhists 58.45% Nepali (official language) 11.1%
2.7% Muslims; state religion Maithili 7.6% Bhojpuri
Hinduism

Pakistan 97% Muslims 2% Hindus; state 48.2% Punjabi 13.1% Pushto 11.8%
religion Islam Sindhi 9.8% Saraiki 7.6% Urdu (official
language)

Sri Lanka 69.8% Buddhists 15.17% 70% Sinhala (official language) 15%
Hindus 7.36% Muslims; state Tamil (second official language)
religion Buddhism

CONCEPTUALIZING NATION AND NATIONALISM 2

Broadly speaking, one can identify seven ways in which nation has been defined in the Indian
subcontinent. These are: (1) ancient civilizational entity; (2) composite culture; (3) political entity;
(4) religious entity; (5) geographical/ territorial entity with a specific cultural ethos; (6) a
collection of linguistic entities; and (7) unity of great and little nations. The first three of these are
specifically pre-partition conceptualizations. The fourth initiated the impulse of partition,
achieved that objective and has continued to provide a source of legitimacy to Pakistan and
Bangladesh. The fifth, sixth and seventh conceptualizations largely belong to the post-partition
period. However, it is important to note that these conceptualizations did not always surface in
the order in which they are listed; some of these co-existed and competed for legitimacy.

Radhakumud Mookerji (1914) had asserted the essential unity of India based on natural
geography, an ancient pan-Indian Hindu culture, economic self-sufficiency and the
interdependence of its constituent regions. Further, he had alluded to the „national‟ consciousness,

644
which had become a „settled habit of thought‟ since ancient times. In the same vein, a quarter of a
century later Beni Prasad (1941) referred to India's „geographical wholeness‟ and her „urge to
political unification in defiance of vast distances and immense difficulties of transport and
communication‟.

If geography had been the basis of constituting nations, there would have been only a handful of
them in the world and quite a few would not have emerged at all. The reference to Hindu culture
as the element that provides the essential unity implies (a) that the time-referent is prior to
Muslim and British intrusion/ intervention, (b) and that the contributions of the Muslims and the
British are largely ignored and/or they are treated as aliens, (c) that they „disturbed‟ the unity of
India that was provided by Hindu culture, and (d) that religion is a necessary element in the
conceptualization of nation and national identity. The reference to the „urge for political
unification‟ implies that a nation is a united political entity, comprising of one dominant religious
collectivity.

The two writers, Mookerji and Prasad, are mistaking civilizations for nations although the former
is a much broader entity compared to the latter. Generally speaking, several nations and/or states
co-exist within a civilizational region. Second, „natural geography‟ or religion are both not
necessary conditions for a nation to emerge and exist. Third, a nation is essentially a cultural
entity and it is not natural for a nation to establish its own state, as is widely believed.

Those who describe India as a composite culture emphasize the fusion of Hinduism and Islam, as
against the distinctiveness of Hindu culture. This fusion, a product of conflict and synthesis,
although an ancient tendency, is believed to have intensified with the Muslim conquest. „As soon
as the first waves of conquest, plunder and desecration had spent themselves, there began the
operation of the forces, inherent in human nature, which interknit contacts into conational wholes
and transform plurality into community‟ (Prasad 1941: 8). Tarachand (1963) graphically
described the efforts of Kabir, the saint-poet, to fuse Hinduism and Islam; Humayun Kabir (1955)
referred to Emperor Akbar's effort at creating a syncretic religion as the first conscious attempt to
establish a „secular state‟.

The Muslim „conquest‟ provides the salient point in Indian history to those describing India as a
composite culture. In contrast, those who describe India as an ancient Hindu culture and
civilization consider the Aryan „advent‟ as marking the beginning of Indian history. For both, pre-

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Aryan culture either did not exist, or if it did, it was a „low culture‟ contributing nothing to
„Indian culture‟. Thus, this conceptualization ignores the pre- and non-Aryan peoples (the
Dravidians, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) who together constitute nearly 50 per cent
of the population of India. If Hinduism provides the essential content of Indian nationalism, as
per the first mode of conceptualizing India, according to the second mode it is the fusion of
Hinduism and Islam that provides content to Indian nationalism.

In retrospect it would seem that the very characterization of Indian culture as composite was a
political project intended to avert the partition of India. Despite the nobility of intention, the
project failed and in the process another conceptualization, namely, the „two-nation theory‟, got
wide currency. Compositeness implies assimilation and fusion, and hence is the very antithesis of
pluralism, which instead is the celebration of diversity in order to facilitate the co-existence of
cultures, in spite of their distinctiveness. The „synthetic‟ view had its predictable consequences;
the Indian „nation‟ came to be viewed as a political entity; state and nation became
interchangeable. In characterizing the Indian „nation‟ as a fusion of Hindu and Muslim cultures
the reference was to a civilizational entity, a vast continent inhabited by one-quarter of humanity.

During the colonial era the nationalist expectancy was visualized primarily in political terms. The
„nation‟-to-be was conceived as a community of would-be citizens; the thrust of the anti-colonial
struggle was to transform subjects into citizens. But as the dismantling of colonialism became
imminent, this disjuncture between state and nation should have been squarely recognized and an
appropriate reorientation in conceptualization should have been effected. But this was not to be.
Consequently, in the post-partition subcontinent state and nation became synonymous notions.

Even Indian Marxists, who conceptualize India as a multinational state, do not maintain a clear
distinction between state and nation. For A. R. Desai a nation is an entity consisting of economic,
political and cultural elements. Almost everything, from the development of agriculture, to
religious reforms, to the emancipation of women is viewed as the expression of„nationalism‟ (see
Desai 1948: 382-7). While the existence of nationalities, that is, linguistic collectivities, is
recognized, some of them are seen as „dormant‟, others „wakened‟ and yet others moving from
the dormant to the wakened stage (1948: 387-90). Such a characterization of the Indian „nation‟
and „nationality‟ is problematic because it postulates a hierarchy among Indian nationalities.

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Although the „two-nation‟ theory was the one to gain wide currency, in fact three religious
communities (Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs) had explicitly invoked religion as the basis of nation,
admittedly for different reasons. In 1940, M. A. Jinnah, the then president of the Muslim League
observed: „The history of 1,200 years has failed to achieve unity and has witnessed, during the
ages, India always divided into Hindu India and Muslim India' (1960: 161). Basing himself on
this view he asserted that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations and demanded a
separate „homeland‟ for the Muslim „nation‟. The fact that the majority of Indian Muslims were
converts from Hindu castes and tribes did not improve the standing of the neo-convert Muslims in
the Hindu social structure (1960: 230). Viewed in this perspective, the movement for Pakistan
was aimed at equality for Muslims in the subcontinent and indeed it overshot its target!

Those invoking Hinduism as the basis of the Indian nation were more explicit in their advocacy.
The statements of Golwalkar were the clearest and sharpest in this regard. For him the basic
divide was between believers in the religions of Indian origin - Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and
Sikhism - and believers in religions that had originated outside India, like Islam, Christianity,
Judaism, Zoroastrianism and the Baha'i faith. Those professing religions of Indian origin were
insiders and nationals while all others were outsiders and aliens, expected to reconcile themselves
to a subordinate position or agree to be assimilated. He held:

The non-Hindu people in Hindustan must learn to either adopt the Hindu culture and language,
must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no ideas but those of
glorification of the Hindu race and culture … may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the
Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges not even citizen rights. In this country,
Hindus alone are national, and Muslims and others, if not actually anti-national, are at least
outside the body of the nation. (Golwalkar 1939: 55–6)

There are several difficulties with this position. Let me list just three. First, there is no Hindu
language; Hindus are drawn from several speech communities. Second, the notion of a Hindu
race is a howler. Third, this position is utterly undemocratic.

For both Jinnah and Golwalkar national reconstruction meant reappropriation of an appropriate
past. For the Hindus this meant ancient Indian culture and civilization, with the Gupta Age being
regarded as the golden age of India and Chandra Gupta Maurya as the ideal emperor. For the

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Muslims the golden age was the medieval period when they had been the rulers of India. Both the
Hindus and the Muslims had to invent and construct tradition and history.

The third religious collectivity in India that defines itself as a nation is the Sikhs. The demand for
a separate Sikh „nation‟ was first articulated in 1946, but a majority of the Sikhs preferred to stay
with India. Sikh demands were not feasible because in the Indian Punjab, where they are
concentrated, the Sikhs constituted a mere 33 per cent. In spite of the fact that the Hindu-Sikh
interaction was intense and included intermarriages, an essential wedge existed between them.
The popular belief that the Hindu-Sikh divide is recent, and is the handiwork of a handful of
crafty politicians, militants and terrorists, is not exactly correct. Khushwant Singh, an
acknowledged „secularist‟, writes: „The only chance of survival of the Sikhs as a separate
community is to create a state in which they form a compact group, where the teaching of
Gurumukhi and the Sikh religion is compulsory, and where there is an atmosphere of respect for
the traditions of their Khalsa forefathers‟ (1966: 305; the reference to „a state‟ is not to a
sovereign state but to a province within a federal set-up).

The untenability of conceptualizing India (which at the time included the Pakistan and
Bangladesh of today) as a nation by invoking religion was understood by a few, for example,
Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya (see Pandey 1990:212) and Lala Lajpat Rai (see Nagar 1977: 175).
But Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi articulated it with greater clarity:

If the Hindus believe that only Hindus should people India, they are living in dreamland. The
Hindus, the Mohammedans, the Parsis and the Christians who have made India their country are
fellow countrymen … In no part of the world are one nationality and one religion synonymous
terms; nor has it ever been so in India. (1938: 49)

If religion is not a necessary element in nation formation, what are the essential attributes of a
nation? All available facts and experiences suggest that the two most critical elements in nation
formation are territory and language. These could be ancestral or adopted. Thus if a people have a
common homeland and if they have and/or adopt a common language they could become a nation.
Such an effort was made and is being pursued in India.

The Indian practice clearly indicates that all major linguistic collectivities with a territorial base
are deemed to be culturally distinct entities, that is, nations/nationalities, although these terms are

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not acceptable to most. The Indian National Congress endorsed the idea of creating administrative
units based on linguistic homogeneity as early as 1921. In 1928 the Jawaharlal Nehru Report
acknowledged the desirability of creating linguistic provinces. Although as Prime Minister Nehru
accepted the principle underlying linguistic provinces on 27 November 1947 in the Constituent
Assembly, the mobilization by linguistic collectivities was perceived as a threat to the „nation‟
(that is, to the state) and was labelled as chauvinist, parochial and „anti-national‟. But after this
initial resistance and ambivalence, the States Re-organization Commission was appointed in 1955.
The Commission did by and large uphold the principle of a language-based administrative
reorganization of India, which in effect is a vindication of the definition of nation as a linguistic
collectivity with a territorial base. The Indian experience also demonstrates that if nations are
conceded a certain level of politico-administrative autonomy within a federal setup they may not
demand separate sovereign states; the coterminality between nation and state is not axiomatic. In
fact, most Indian nations have renounced the idea of having their own sovereign states.

There has been a tendency among some authors to refer to tribal and linguistic collectivities as
sub-nations or „little‟ nations. In this strand of thinking, the „little nations‟ and their nationalism
are juxtaposed to the great Indian nation and its nationalism. Thus „great nationalism‟, according
to Guha, emerged in the colonial context as the ideology of the pan-Indian big bourgeoisie which
was eager to capture an appropriate share of the growing market in India. The big bourgeoisie
perceived an Indian state more conducive to meeting its aspirations and establishing the
hegemony of Indian capitalism. On the other hand, the „little nationalism‟ emerged as the
ideology of the regional small bourgeoisie, the regional middle classes, who feared competition
not only from the middle classes of other regions but also from the pan-Indian big bourgeoisie.
Thus, the ideology of little nationalism is oriented to the exclusive control of regional markets by
the respective middle classes (see Guha 1979: 455-8; 1982: 2-12).

N. K. Bose (1941:188-94) discussed what he terms sub-national movements among tribes, which
are, according to him, typically characteristic of economically backward communities in new
nations, initiated by the emerging elite to subserve their interests and aspirations. Roy Burman
(1971: 25-33) goes a step further and distinguishes between proto-national and sub-national
movements among tribes. Proto-national movements emerge when tribes experience a
transformation from „tribalism‟ to nationalism; it transcends tribalism. In contrast, sub-
nationalism is initiated by an accul-turated tribal elite to cope with the disparities of development.

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In sub-nationalism the ultimate sanction is the coercive power of the community; in proto-
nationalism it is primarily the moral consensus of the community which is the motive force.

All the authors who refer to sub- or little nationalism endorse the view that India is a nation but
what they mean by nationalism varies according to individual perceptions. For Guha, the battle
between the two nationalisms - great and little - is motivated by economic considerations.
However, no nation or nationalism can emerge and exist exclusively on this basis. In contrast,
proto-nationalism is trans-tribal whereas sub-nationalism is intra-tribal, both being anchored in
the problematic of identity; the first in transcending and the second in reinforcing it. But there are
several movements which are inter-tribal (for example, the Jharkhand movement) and geared
simultaneously to economic development, political autonomy and cultural identity. Bose's
contention that sub-nationalism is a characteristic feature of backward groups and a mere
manifestation of manipulations by an elite is too rash an evaluation.

The fact is that several nations are vivisected across South Asian states: the Tamils between India
and Sri Lanka, the Bengalis between India and Bangladesh, the Nagas between India and
Myanmar (Burma), the Punjabis and the Kashmiris between India and Pakistan. While these
collectivities have a common nationality, their citizenship differs.

Having briefly reviewed the different modes of conceptualizing the „nation‟ in South Asia, it is
necessary to indicate which of these conceptualizations are proximate, if not entirely isomorphic,
with its social reality. While there has existed and perhaps there continues to exist a South Asian
civilization, the territory that this civilization encapsulates now hosts several states. The frame of
reference of those who refer to India as a civilizational entity is the Indian subcontinent.
Admittedly, independent India constitutes only a part of this civilizational region. One cannot and
should not substitute the part, even if it is a substantial and significant part, for the whole. Further,
the effort to equate South Asian civilization with Hindu civilization is unsustainable because it
ignores the nativity of non-Hindu groups and underestimates their contribution to this civilization.

However, language and tribe have been accepted as the bases to constitute administrative units,
thereby investing them with a degree of legitimacy. This in effect means that linguistic and/or
tribal collectivities with a firm territorial base are implicitly recognized as „nations‟. But, some of
the linguistic collectivities and tribes which are viable „nations‟ are denied the possibility of

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maintaining their cultural identity because of state policy and the hegemonic tendencies of the
bigger nations.

The utility of a concept depends on its ability to come to grips with the empirical reality it intends
to capture. A meaningful conceptualization of nation and national identity in South Asia should
combine several elements identified in the different modes of conceptualizations that I have listed.
First, South Asia is home to a long and enduring civilization, which was earlier referred to as the
Indian civilization. Second, this civilizational region now hosts several states and some of these
states are divided into administrative units with a certain level of cultural specificity and political
autonomy. Third, the states have jurisdiction over clearly demarcated territories; disputes, if there
are any, will have to be settled satisfactorily on the basis of agreed principles. In turn, some of
these states (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) should be viewed as collectives of linguistic groups,
quite a few of which are large and firmly anchored to specific territories. The people of these
linguistic collectivities cognise the territory to which they are attached as their ancestral
homelands. That is, they are nations - products of fusion between territory and culture (see
Oommen 1997). Even though nations, most of them, do not aspire to become sovereign states,
they are state-renouncing nations. They only insist on having a certain level of administrative and
fiscal autonomy. In the final analysis, South Asian states should be viewed as collectives of
nations co-existing within federal states.

I find support for this mode of conceptualizing in the articulations of a statesman and of a scholar.
I will let them speak in their own words.

It is fascinating to find how the Bengalis, the Marathas, the Gujarathis, the Tamils, the Andhras,
the Oriyas, the Assamese, the Canarese, the Malayalis, the Sindhis, the Punjabis, the Pathans, the
Kashmiris, the Rajputs and the great central block comprising the Hindustani-speaking people,
have retained their peculiar characteristics for hundreds of years, have still more or less the
same virtues and failings of which old tradition or record tells us and yet have been throughout
these ages distinctly Indian, with the same national heritage and the same set of moral and
mental qualities. (Nehru 1961: 61)

In the same vein, Mukerji (1958: 268-9) had written:

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Cultural symbiosis is the outstanding feature of India's cultural reconstruction. It is to be clearly
noticed in the specific culture patterns of the Arya Bhumi and the Anarya Pradesh of Bengal,
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. We submit that these symbiotic patterns are the true significance
of the terms „nationalities‟ in India. Our nationalism in the political sense may be the gift of
industrial capitalism … but the student of Indian history with the proper approach will find the
meaning of nationalism in every case in the formation of cultural patterns.

It should be underlined here that to uphold this conceptualization one needs to distinguish
between citizenship and nationality. The former alludes to membership in a politico-legal entity,
that is, the state and the entitlements thereof. The latter refers to membership in a cultural entity,
that is, nation, and the identity that it implies (Oommen 1997). South Asia's polities include
different religious communities and a multiplicity of castes, none of which can legitimately lay an
exclusive claim to the whole or specific parts of the territory as both these socio-cultural
categories are territorially intermingled. The persisting effort to define some of these religious
communities as „outsiders‟ to the soil and others as „insiders‟ is to perpetuate falsehood and
distort history. Similarly, the tendency to perpetuate the age-old discrimination and oppression
based on caste and tribe is to undermine the cardinal principles of democratic citizenship.

NEW NATIONALISMS IN SOUTH ASIA 3

The postcolonial nationalisms of South Asia, which I designate as New Nationalisms, may be
categorized into two: state-centred and state-renouncing (cf. Tilly 1993). In turn, state-centred
nationalism has two sub-types: state-seeking and state-sponsored. Figure 36.1 illustrates the types
of new nationalisms and their main features. One variety of state-centred nationalism conflates
state and nation and views sovereignty of the state as the critical marker of nationalism: like one
variety of old nationalism, it is also state-seeking. But there is a critical difference between the
old and the new variety of state-seeking nationalism. The old variety of state-seeking nationalism
was a struggle to wrest the state from an external colonial power; it was a confrontation between
the colonial state and an aspired national state. Understandably there was near-universal
participation and consensus regarding the goal of that struggle. But the enemy of the new state-
seeking nationalism is not an external but an internal agent.

Although the internal colonizer is often perceived as a hegemon, the „colonized‟ are sharply
divided about the solution; while one section insists on secession from the state to which it is

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presently attached and the creation of a new sovereign state, another section argues for the
acquisition of a certain level of autonomy within a federal polity. Both are asking for group rights
but the quantum and the quality of these rights vary. In general parlance, the secessionists are
called „anti-nationals‟ and „extremists‟, although they are acute nationalists in their perception.
Those who opt for autonomy within the federal framework are usually viewed as moderates, the
autonomists. However, most of the time secessionists reconcile to become autonomists.

The Tamil-speaking Dravidian Hindus in free India saw Hindi-speaking Aryan Hindus as a
hegemon in the 1960s and 1970s, but with the accommodation of Tamil nationalist parties in the
federal government, abandoned the state-seeking goal of their movement. Today the „Tamil
national movement‟ only seeks the protection of „Tamil interests‟ in India; from the demand for
national self-determination they moved to assertion of their collective rights in the form of
adequate representation in power sharing and maintenance of cultural identity. The Naga and
Mizo national movements are divided in their goals. While some factions in both movements are
secessionists, others are autonomists; both insist on collective rights. This is also true of the Sikh-
led Khalistan movement, although the secessionists are reduced in strength and the autonomists
have gained substantially in recent times.

Tamil Hindu nationalists of Sri Lanka perceive Singhla-Buddhists as a hegemon, but while one
faction is secessionist and insists on a sovereign state for Tamils others opt for different degrees
of autonomy within a federal set-up. The three minority nations of Pakistan - Sindh, Baluchistan
and Pashtunistan - view the Punjab as an internal colonizer; in fact, they think Pakistan has
become „Punjabistan‟. But the secessionists are particularly vociferous in Sindh. The grand old
man of Sindhi nationalism, G. M. Syed, is candid. He maintains: „Sindh has always been there,
Pakistan is a passing show. Sindh is a fact, Pakistan is a fiction. Sindhis are a nation, but Muslims
are not a nation. Sindhi language is 2000 years old. Urdu is only 250 years old … The Sindhis
have long been fooled in the name of Islam‟ (quoted in Malkani 1984: 134). However, while
some of the state-seeking new nationalists of South Asia are willing to shed their secessionist
orientation, and a minority among them even abandon their nationalist orientation and become
assimilationists, the majority aspire to be autonomists; they only insist on certain collective rights
within a federal polity. This is in utter contrast to the state-seeking nationalism of the colonial
times wherein there could not have been any compromise on the goal of a national sovereign state.

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The second variety of state-centred new nationalism is state-sponsored; it seeks to mobilize the
resources of one sovereign state against its „enemy‟ state. Inter-state rivalry is the fodder on
which this variety of nationalism is fed, wherein states are defined and cognised as nations and
nationalism is nurtured through the hatred towards an external and despised other.
Understandably, chauvinism and jingoism are likely manifestations of this variety of nationalism.
If intra-state tension is the feature of state-seeking new nationalism, interstate conflict is the
necessary accompaniment of state-sponsored new nationalism. However, in so far as the states in
conflict are not socio-culturally homogeneous and have populations that share the same
characteristics - religion, language, physical features - the conflicts have serious intrastate
consequences. This is the situation of South Asia and this is the context in which collective rights
become relevant. But in order to render collective rights of minorities irrelevant, assimilationist
nationalism is put on the agenda - Islamic nationalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Buddhist
nationalism in Sri Lanka and Hindu nationalism in India are examples of this. This often prompts
secessionist nationalism.

In South Asia inter-state rivalry has been at its peak between India and Pakistan. There have been
two wars and a war-like situation, the Kargil conflict in 1997. Nuclearization is viewed by both
states as a project of national security; questioning excessive expenditure for defence purposes is
instantly labelled anti-national; the soldiers killed in conflicts become martyrs; the usually
uncared-for defence personnel instantly become charismatic objects; even tax evaders may
contribute „liberally‟ for the National Defence Fund and can become „nationalists‟. Amidst this
heightened national temperature, the Muslims in India and Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan become
objects of suspicion; they are required to prove their loyalty to the respective nations/states. This
puts enormous strain on these minority populations and on their constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression, a test to which members of the majority community are scarcely subjected.
Not only the collective rights of these religious minorities (for example, congregational worship,
pilgrimages, religious processions, are occasionally in jeopardy) but markers of their collective
identity (dress pattern, food habits, hairstyles) may also become „security risks‟. State-sponsored
nationalism endangers the collective rights of those minorities who share cultural characteristics
of the majority of the „enemy state‟.

Of the two varieties of state-renouncing nationalism, one manifests in the demand for establishing
coterminality between political-administrative units and cultural boundaries in multinational
federal polities. Inter-nation equality along with preservation of cultural identity are the goals of

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this variety of state-renouncing nationalism. However, while renouncing sovereign states, these
nations invariably insist on their „provincial‟ states. The movement for linguistic reorganization
of India in place of the artificial administrative units set up by the British is an example of this
kind of nationalism. Most of the large linguistic collectivities in India and Pakistan have their
own „states‟ if they have their own homeland. In the case of Sri Lanka, the goal of autonomists
among Tamils is precisely this while secessionists demand an exclusive sovereign state for
Tamils. Even in the case of Bangladesh, which is predominantly populated by Bengali Muslims,
the non-Bengalis insist on cultural autonomy. The Chakma leader, Manabendra Narayan Larma,
articulated the demand for cultural identity of Chakmas, who are predominantly Buddhists and
inhabit the Chittagong Hill Tract, thus: „Under no definition or logic a Chakma can be a Bengalee
or a Bengalee can be a Chakma … As citizens of Bangladesh we are all Bangladeshis but we also
have a separate ethnic identity, which unfortunately the Awami League leaders do not want to
understand‟ (quoted in Hussain 1986: 201).

While the major linguistic groups (that is, nations) in India and Pakistan have their own
provincial states, this is not true of the tribal communities or the subaltern nations. If the demand
for their provincial states is conceded, it is to tone down their demand for sovereign states. But
such subaltern nations invariably have their homelands on inter-state borders and hence command
considerable political clout and striking power.

Thus, the numerically smaller Nagas (1.2 million) and Mizos (0.7 million) of India have their
own separate provincial states but the demand by larger encysted tribes of central India for
separate provincial states is not yet conceded. In fact, some of the central Indian tribes are much
larger in size: Santals, 6 million; Bhils, 6 million; Gonds, 3 million; and Oraons, 2 million.
Subaltern nations such as Santals and Bhils are denied their collective rights to protect and
preserve their cultural identity as their legitimate demand for provincial states is not conceded. To
deny them collective rights, be it in South Asia or elsewhere, may be designated as culturocide
(Oommen 1990a: 43-66), the systematic liquidation of cultural groups.

One of the contentions in multinational federal polities is the relative importance to be assigned to
the central government and provincial governments. Those who argue for a strong centre see
themselves as „nationalists‟, and those who prefer strong provincial governments are dubbed as
„regionalists‟ who uphold parochial interests. But it is often forgotten that what are designated as
„regions‟ are „nations‟ in a multinational polity and the „regionalists‟ are arguing for their national

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collective rights. Conversely, those who prefer a central government with limited but crucial
areas of operation (defence, foreign policy, fiscal policy, etc.) and substantial decentralization of
political authority to provincial governments define themselves as „democrats‟ and dub those who
insist on a strong centre as „authoritarians‟. These varying perceptions are rooted in the
underlying conceptual differences between them: the „nationalists‟ consider the federal polity as
the „nation‟ and the „regionalists‟ view the regions as nations. The former indirectly deny
collective rights and the latter directly endorse collective rights.

The second type of state-renouncing nationalism surfaces in the context of ethnification and
minoritization. Ethnicity is a product of dissociation between culture and territory (see Oommen
1997). Ethnies are constrained to renounce exclusive states for themselves because they are
territorially dispersed; they lack a spatial anchorage.

Ethnies are of several backgrounds - refugees and exiles who flee to freedom or safety and
immigrants who seek better pastures. Once in the new habitat, often a search for roots begins;
they become aware of the need to maintain their cultural specificities, particularly religion and
language. This search becomes acute if they are persecuted and discriminated against at the point
of arrival and/or the conditions for nurturing cultural specificities become adverse.

The Sindhi Hindus who left their ancestral homeland are dispersed all over urban India. Their
vociferous demand for according constitutional recognition to the Sindhi language persisted for
two decades till it was conceded in 1967. This collective cultural right is about the only device to
maintain this diasporic nationalism, although third generation Sindhi migrants have practically
forgotten the language (see Daswani 1996). That is, constitutional protection of cultural rights is
no guarantee for sustenance of national identity. The story is exactly the opposite in the case of
Mohajirs, the Urdu-speaking Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from northern India. Through
their political alignment with the largest and the most powerful nationality of Pakistan, the
Punjabis, and due to its presumed linkage with Islam in the Indian subcontinent, Urdu became the
official language of Pakistan. This facilitated not only the preservation of the cultural identity of
Urdu speakers but also their domination. Yet they remain an ethnie in Pakistan, which is evident
from the fact that these immigrants were initially labelled as Pahangirs or Hindustanies, a clear
connotation of their outsider status. To escape this stigmatization they adopted the label „Muhajir‟,
invoking its association with the prophetic tradition of hijrat (Ahmed 1988: 33-4). That is,
dominant status in itself will not „nationalize‟ a group if it is territorially dispersed. Even the

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Muhajir claim as the „fifth nationality‟ of Pakistan (the other four being Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi
and Pushtoon) is not conceded by the Pakistani state or mainstream society.

The case of „Bihari Muslims‟, the Hindi-speaking Muslims from North India, in Bangladesh is a
third case of ethnie in South Asia. As the Urdu-speaking Muslims, the Bihari Muslims too
thought that their Muslim-ness was a sufficient condition to comfortably graft them on to the
Eastern wing of Pakistan. Although their deterritorialization was a disability right from the
beginning, their religion provided a partial compensation. But with the transformation of East
Pakistan into Bangladesh, linguistic identity gained salience and the intensity of the Bihari
Muslims' ethnification increased. Not only were they uprooted from their ancestral homeland in
India but they are also being uprooted from their adopted homeland (Bangladesh). This clearly
points to the need to uphold collective rights in the case of minority ethnic collectivities.

Finally, we come to those who continue to live in their ancestral homeland but underwent instant
minoritization due to the redrawing of state boundaries. Consequent to the division of territory
and immigration of population, those Muslims who remained in India and those Sikhs and Hindus
who remained in Pakistan became minorities instantly. It is important to note here that, in so far
as the dislocation happened within the national territory, not only was there no ethnification but
there was no minoritization either. For example, although the Punjabi Muslims and Punjabi Sikhs
exchanged their residence, as long as they remained within Punjab, Indian or Pakistan, they could
retain their nationality and dominance. Thus, those Sikhs who came from the Pakistan-Punjab and
remained in the Indian-Punjab were not culturally uprooted like the Sikhs who went to other parts
of India, where they became refugees, outsiders and ethnies. Similarly, the Hindu Bengalis from
East Pakistan who settled down in West Bengal did not face the kind of cultural stigmatization as
did those Bengalis who settled outside Bengal. Once again, if the settlers become a majority in
their adopted homeland, as in the case of Bengalis in Tripura in India, they can shed their
minority and ethnic status and become nationals.

CONCLUSION

I must conclude this chapter by indicating the domain assumptions and the rationale which inform
the arguments presented. The assumptions are: (1) even in the most homogeneous societies class
distinctions emerge and persist and are perhaps unavoidable. In contrast, discrimination,
oppression and exploitation based on race, language, religion, gender and so on are avoidable. (2)

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The dignified co-existence of a plurality of nations within a federal state is possible and even
desirable. (3) A democratic polity can be constituted only if the people participate in the decision-
making process, for which their mother tongue should be fostered. In a multilingual state this can
be achieved only by constituting language-based administrative units to effect substantial
decentralization of the decision-making process. (4) A nation does not necessarily aspire to a
sovereign state of its own.

Now for the rationale. Although a wide variety of factors provides the bases for constituting
polities, the most frequent ones are race, religion and language, or often a combination of these
factors. While races or physical types and geographical spaces were originally closely linked,
conquests, colonization and immigration have drastically changed the situation. Today, a large
number of polities are multiracial. Similarly, notwithstanding the fact that particular religions had
their origin in specific parts of the world due to conquest, proselyti-zation and immigration, the
original association between religion and territory has become irrelevant except as a symbolic
association.

Generally speaking, there is a close association between language and territory. When groups
migrate and settle in new linguistic regions they may have to learn the language of the new
habitat, whereas they need not change their religion and, of course, they cannot change their race.
That is, the reshuffling of populations does not go counter to the need for developing a common
language, an imperative for communication.

This, however, does not imply that each linguistic group (nation) should have an exclusive
sovereign state for itself. One can visualize several substantial linguistic groups co-existing
within the territory of a state.

I have identified seven different conceptualizations of nation and nationalism in twentieth-century

South Asia. Arguing that the utility of a concept depends on its appropriateness to capture the
complex empirical reality, it has been suggested that South Asian states can best be
conceptualized as collectives of nations coexisting within politically federal states. After
identifying different types of new nationalisms in South Asia it is demonstrated that secession of
minority nations from a multinational state is often a response to assimilation advocated by the
majority nation with hegemonic tendencies. To cope with the situation an adequate level of
political and cultural autonomy should be bestowed on national minorities. In the case of ethnic

658
minorities, as they are territorially dispersed, there is only limited possibility of conceding
political autonomy but it is possible to provide cultural rights to protect their identity. In the cases
of both national and ethnic minorities conceding collective rights is often an adequate substitute
for a sovereign state.

NOTES

1 The South Asian countries referred to are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka, all members of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). The
seventh member, the Maldives, the Atoll state, is left out because the relevant information is not
accessible. The data referred to here are drawn from the World Development Report 2000/2001
and the Human Development Report 2001.

2 Of the six counties listed in Table 36.1 the Buddhist Kingdom of Bhutan was a protected British
Colony and the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal was not colonized. Anti-colonial movements which
occasioned the crystallization of postcolonial states were absent in them. Sri Lanka was a British
colony but the anti-colonial mobilization was not a mass movement. For the above reasons the
discussion in this section is confined to the Indian subcontinent - Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.
This is a substantially condensed version of an earlier paper of mine (see Oommen 2000: 1–18).

3 This section draws from Oommen (2004: 52–62), but is considerably condensed.

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Figure 36.1 Types of New Nationalisms in South Asia and their main features

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Khazanov, Anatoly. "Nations and Nationalism in Central Asia." Pp. 438-459

Central Asia has always been an ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse region. Periodic
invasions and infiltrations of nomads complicated and often disrupted ethnic integration in its
sedentary areas. Processes of assimilation lasted for centuries there and often had many local and
temporal peculiarities (Khazanov 1992: 73ff.; Subtelny 1994: 45ff.). In pre-revolutionary Central
Asia, prevailing identities were religious, political, regional and tribal, to some extent ethnic, but
in no way national. Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbeks (in the nineteenth and in the early
twentieth centuries, this term was mainly applied to the descendants of those who migrated to
Central Asia proper from Dasht-i Qipchaq steppes during the Shaybani Khan conquest, in the
sixteenth century), and some other ethnic groups retained a segmentary kinship and descent-based
organization.

Thus, the Uzbeks of Dasht-i Qipchaq origin were subdivided into different tribes, clans and sub-
clans that maintained their separateness and were often rivals with one another. Their ethnic self-
identification may be at best characterized as a hierarchical one. An individual thought of himself
primarily as a Mangut, a Kungrat, or a Keneges, that is, as a member of an individual tribe; and
only secondarily and in specific situations did he acknowledge that he was also an Uzbek. The
same can be said about Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen.

The urban and sedentary population of Central Asia was known variously as Tajiks or Sarts. For
the most part the direct descendants of the indigenous, sedentary, Iranian-speaking population in
Central Asia were called Tajiks. However, up to the first half of the twentieth century, the term
„Tajik‟ sometimes also had strong economic and social connotations. In some regions it was
applied to any sedentary population, even the Uzbek-speaking one. This was a continuation of the
old tradition according to which any Muslim population in Central Asia, Iran and even in several
Caucasus regions, which had been non-tribal and sedentary for a long period of time, was called
Tajiks.

Another numerous sedentary group was the Sarts. They were similar to the Tajiks in their
economic activities and way of life, however most of them spoke Uzbek. They were either
Turkicized descendants of the Iranian-speaking population of the Central Asian oases, or
detribalized descendants of Turkic migrants who had settled there before the arrival of the Dasht-i

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Qipchaq Uzbeks. The Sarts did not consider themselves even nominally to be Uzbeks. Both
groups lacked kinship-based segmentary organization. The Tajiks had a rather weak sense of
ethnic identity; the Sarts lacked it completely and did not perceive themselves as a distinct ethnic
group. In addition, Turkic-Tajik bilingualism was quite widespread in many sedentary regions of
Central Asia (Fragner 1994: 15ff.).

Thus, the ethnic map of pre-revolutionary Central Asia lacked modern nations with clear self-
consciousness and self-identification. Ethnic borders in the region never coincided either with
political-administrative or with cultural-linguistic ones, and as a rule ethnicity was not perceived
in terms of language, territory, polity or even common historical experience. Only in the late
nineteenth and in the early twentieth century did some members of small educated strata under
the influence of the Young Turk movement in Ottoman Turkey begin to promote identities that
transcended narrow tribal and regional boundaries. But to a large extent the new identities were
not national but rather pan-Turkic, pan-Turkestani, or pan-Islamist. Nevertheless, the communists
boldly initiated a project of ethnic engineering and nation-building out of this diverse and
fragmented material in line with the nineteenth-century European model.

THE SOVIET PERIOD

The construction of the Central Asian nations was mainly the outcome of the Soviet nationalities
policy, and inasmuch as it was based on ethno-territorial and primordialist principles, the new
nations in the region, just as elsewhere in the USSR, were designed as ethnic ones. Each republic
had to have a titular ethnic nation pivotal to its very creation. In Central Asia, this policy included
political delimitation and creation of Soviet republics with titular nations, ascriptive ethnic
identities, manipulative census and ethnic registration policies, forced assimilation of some
smaller ethnic groups into the titular ones (called „ethnic consolidation‟ or „coalescence‟ in the
official Soviet parlance), corresponding educational, cultural, linguistic and social policies, and
many other measures. As a result, in Uzbekistan, the Sarts had already disappeared as an
officially recognized separate category by 1924 (Ilkhamov 2004a: 296ff), while later many Tajiks
were pressured to register themselves as Uzbeks. In Tajikistan, a campaign of forced assimilation
of the Pamiri ethnic groups had been pursued, although the latter spoke languages quite different
from Tajik and have many significant cultural differences. In principle, this policy, amongst other
goals, was aimed at obliteration of sub-national divisions.

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Ethno-territorial delimitation of the region took significant time, from 1920 through 1936, and
was complicated by many factors, such as the fluidity and uncertainty of many ethnic identities,
economic rationality, external and internal political considerations, conflicting interests and
rivalries of indigenous politicians, and so on. Nevertheless, in general, the Soviet policy was quite
successful (Roy 2000: VIIff.). To some extent, it resulted in interiorization of the very notion of a
nation in the minds, attitudes and behavior of members. In this regard, just as in cases of many
other nations worldwide, education, mass media, the promotion of national histories, and last but
not least, functional administrative structures and institutions played an important cementing role.
Territorialization of new nations, institutionalization of ethnic identities as an important criterion
for social and political advancement in the Central Asian republics, and cultural standardization
were but some of the measures aimed at shaping new allegiances.

Each nation was provided with quasi-state structures and political apparatus, and, thus, with a
model of the ethnonation-state. Each nation was provided with its own officially designated and
standardized literary language based on dialects at the maximum linguistic distance from other
related languages, which substituted for previous overarching literary languages, like Farsi and
Chagatai (Turki, called Old Uzbek in the Soviet period to conceal the historical roots of the
modern Uzbek language).

The Soviet scholarship was preoccupied with ethnogenesis, that is, the origins of contemporary
ethnic nations. It was perceived as an almost teleological, spontaneous, essentialist and timeless
process which had been going on since the most ancient times. Correspondingly, each Central
Asian nation was provided with its own version of ethnic history, or rather mythistorical past,
since, not infrequently, these histories smacked of mythologies. The uniqueness, separateness and
allegedly primordialist character of the Central Asian nations was overstated, while their
commonalities and a history of the region in general were played down. This was a difficult
endeavor, especially with regard to Uzbeks and Tajiks, who for a long time shared the same
territories and states, and, to a large extent, the same cultural heritage. Moscow retained ultimate
control over the writing and re-writing of national histories and the selection of national heroes,
since by no means should these be antagonistic to the Russians and to the official Russian/Soviet
narrative (Smith et al. 1998: 71). However, it was much more condescending to the fierce
competition between narratives of individual Central Asian republics, which, not infrequently,
acquired a certain nationalistic dimension. National historiographies invented in the Soviet period
were aimed at forging new identities and led to the compartmentalization of the ethnic and

664
cultural history of the region. At the same time, they tended to stress an ethnic and cultural
continuity between ancient and medieval populations of the region and the newly created nations,
thus justifying the Soviet nationalities policy as the culmination of long historical processes.

Still, a congruence of political and ethno-linguistic borders has never been achieved in Central
Asia, first, because of significant ethnic mixture and intermingling, mosaic settling patterns and
widespread bilingualism which was characteristic of its many regions; and second, because of a
certain arbitrariness of national delineation in the region. Many Tajik-populated regions were
included into Uzbekistan, while some Uzbek-populated regions were included into Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, the Soviets brought to the region a significant number of
Russians and other Slavs, as well as many exiled peoples and groups, which further complicated
its ethnic composition. By 1989, the titular nation constituted 72 per cent of the whole population
in Turkmenistan; 71.4 per cent in Uzbekistan; 62.3 per cent in Tajikistan; 52.4 per cent in
Kyrgyzstan; and 39.7 per cent in Kazakhstan.

Subnational identities

The consolidation of Central Asian nations should also not be overestimated. Ethnonational
identities in the region were of a clearly hierarchical character. An individual considered him-or
herself a member of a given ethnic nation via-à-vis other ones, but within the individual's nation,
local, regional and/or kin- and descent-based clanal and tribal identities retained significant
meaning and played an important role in his or her loyalties. Whether all these identity groupings
go back directly to the pre-revolutionary period, and to what extent some of them were reordered
in the Soviet period (Roy 1997: 137) are still open questions that demand special scholarly
attention. These groupings are not infrequently (but erroneously) called by the umbrella term
„clans‟, which obscures their real varieties and differences. In any case, they remained very much
alive and conspicuous in the public consciousness, attitudes and behavior: from personal relations
and marriage arrangements, to the ways of social and political advancement and career promotion;
and, especially, to the in-fighting within the political elites in Central Asian republics. However,
the ordinary population, which was denied any participation in political life and was poorly
protected by the state, also tended to rely on traditional institutions, such as kin, descent and other
groups, and on their old rules of mutual aid and reciprocity.

665
In Tajikistan, the notion of a single Tajik nation remained in flux, while localized cultural and
regional identities remained very strong. These differences were conspicuous even in the intra-
ethnic division of labor. The natives of the northern Leninabad province, primarily from Khujant
(formerly Leninabad) and to a lesser degree from Kanibadam, had come to dominate the
Communist Party apparatus and government in the late 1930s; descendants of migrants from
Samarkand and Bukhara, as well as people from Garm and the Pamirs, made up a significant part
of the intellectual elite; natives of Kuliab and Badakhshan regions represented a majority in the
law enforcement bodies; and Garm natives were entrenched in trade and the shadow economy
(Bushkov and Mikulski 1993: 26).

In Kazakhstan, the importance of belonging to a certain zhuz („horde‟ in the past, something
similar to a tribal confederation), as well as to a certain tribe and clan, was well known by all
Kazakhs. Although there was an unwritten rule about maintaining a certain balance between
members of different zhuzes among the republican nomenklatura, those who were in power
tended to recruit, support and promote people of their own zhuz (Dzanguzhin 1993: 179).
Members of the Middle zhuz were overrepresented in the first generation of the indigenous
communist leadership, however all these people were exterminated during Stalin's purges. After
Almaty became the capital of the republic, members of the Elder zhuz began to gradually increase
their number in the governance and administration. Since the 1960s, members of the Elder zhuz
and their allies from the Junior zhuz became overrepresented in the power structures, while the
intellectual and cultural elites to a large extent remain constituted of members of the Middle zhuz.
in Kyrgyzstan, the struggle for power between northern and southern tribes was characteristic of
most of the Soviet period. From the 1930s through the 1950s, the majority of the leading
positions were occupied by the southern Kyrgyz from the Kypchak tribe; then the balance of
power began to change in favor of the northern Sary-Bagysh and Solto tribes (Filonyk 1994: 158).
When Akaev, a member of Sary-Bagysh, became president in October 2000, his election was
connected with struggles not only between reformists and conservatives, but even more so
between northern and southern Kyrgyz (Ponomarev 1989: 9-10).

In Turkmenistan, tribal loyalties remained a major factor of social life. One witnessed a constant
competition for lucrative positions between members of different tribes, especially the largest
ones: Teke, Saryk, Goklen, Salyr, Yomut and Ersari. It became common for the first secretaries
of the republican Communist Party immediately after their appointment by Moscow to put their
tribesmen in prominent and important positions in the government, administration and even in the

666
scientific and cultural establishments in the capital of the republic Ashghabad. At the same time,
regional party organizations sometimes resembled tribal fiefdoms. An ordinary Turkmen who
settled in the territory of an alien tribe had no prospects for social and economic advancement. In
everyday life he felt the scornful attitude of his neighbors. Marriages between members of
different tribes were very rare (Demidov 2002: 9ff.).

In Uzbekistan, regional identities rooted in different historical experiences, ethno-cultural

traditions and socio-economic conditions remained very strong. They were reflected in the
struggle for leading positions in the republican party organization and government. The period
from 1937 until 1957 was marked by the dominance of the Tashkent and Fergana factions, while
members of the Samarkand, Bukhara and other factions were relegated to positions of secondary
significance. In about 1957, the balance of power changed, and the central and western factions
became the main source of leading cadres. In the early 1980s, the Tashkent and Fergana factions
restored their supremacy within the republic's political elite, but in 1989 another shift brought to
power the Samarkand faction (Carlisle 1991).

Thus, the Soviet nationality policy was very contradictory. While having constructed ethnic
nations, it simultaneously was very suspicious of their nationalism. While aimed at the
modernization of the new nations, it dismissed the very concept of nationalism as a concomitant
product of modernity. These inconsistencies and their consequences became fully revealed in the
post-Soviet period.

THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD

After independence, communist ideology as the legitimation of power was thrown overboard and
was replaced with the ideology of ethnic nationalism, indigenization and ethnonation-state
building (Koroteyeva and Makarova 1998; Adams 1999; Kuru 2002: 73f.; Manz 2002; Olcott
2002: 58ff.). Propagated by the ruling elites and many in the intellectual and cultural elites, it is
considered instrumental to the societal consolidation of the majority population. Actually, it helps
the political elites to neutralize, or to convert to their cause, some strata of the indigenous
populations.

Despite individual variations, the disjunction between ethnic identities, the notion of civil
nationhood and citizenship is evident in all Central Asian states. From the very beginning they

667
rejected a double-citizenship option for their Russian minorities (Turkmenistan abolished double-
citizenship in 1993), but simultaneously they granted citizenship to all their residents. In principle,
this implied legal equality in terms of rights and duties. However, the new states did not embark
on a venture of civic nation-building, which in any case seems impossible at the moment. If one
assumes that the concept of civic nation implies more than simple membership in a political
community, but is connected with the acceptance of shared values, norms, rituals, symbols and,
last but not least, historical narratives and myths, which are linked with a notion of patria and are
acceptable to the multi-ethnic majority, one should conclude that the gulf between dominant
ethnic nations and those who have turned out to be minorities is too big to be bridged in the near
future. This is especially evident with regard to Russians and other Europeans.

Occasional lip-service notwithstanding, civic nationhood is not on the agenda of the new Central
Asian states, since they are not interested in, nor capable of, unifying integration. Following
Brubaker (1996: 76ff), they can be characterized as nationalizing states, for example as the states
of and for particular nations, yet not actualized to a sufficient degree. In such states citizenship is
divorced from the membership in the nation, since the latter is perceived as an ethnic one. In one
way or another, the constitutions of all Central Asian states imply the priority rights of dominant
nations on the territories of corresponding countries, which are claimed to be their homelands.
Kazakhstan grants citizenship to all ethnic Kazakhs from abroad, but denies it to co-ethnics of its
minorities. Special clauses in constitutions of Central Asian countries stipulate that their
presidents should be fluent in the state languages, which practically guarantees that they should
be members of ethnic majorities. Besides this, the nationalizing policies include overt or covert
measures aimed at assertion of the dominance of the titular nations in the governance,
administration, educational and cultural spheres, judiciary and law enforcement agencies, and in
the economy. In all privatization schemes an advantage is given to members of titular nations.

Language policy

The policy of linguistic Russification promoted in the Soviet Union was detrimental to the
development of indigenous languages. One of its consequences is that the minorities of European
origin, as a rule, do not speak local languages. Even a significant number of members of
indigenous political and cultural elites, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have an
insufficient command of their languages. After independence, all Central Asian countries adopted
special language laws granting the status of state languages to titular ones with the further aim of

668
making them the sole languages of governance and administration. One should also mention the
replacement of many Russian loan words with Turkic and Farsi terminology. However, the
practical implementation of the language laws turned out to be more difficult than had been
anticipated, and it was slowed down. Across the region, Russian remains necessary for many
daily interactions and retains a strong position in inter-ethnic contacts, business, science and
professions. This is evident not only in the most Russified countries of the region, Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan, but also in such countries as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Still, the lack of
proficiency in indigenous languages further limits the possibilities of employment in the state
sector for the members of ethnic minorities.

To further distance themselves from the Russian language, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have
adopted the use of Latin script instead of Cyrillic, though at the moment Cyrillic is still widely
used in Uzbekistan (Kosmarskii 2003). Latin scripts as opposed to Cyrillic ones serve as markers
of new post-Soviet identities.

National historiographies

National historiographies continue to serve political causes, nowadays those of the new states
(Bregel 1996). While reiterating many concepts developed in the Soviet period, especially with
regard to ethnogenesis, they have become not only nationalistic but also explicitly statist (Uyama
2003: 51). They contain the same substitution of histories of titular nations for histories of
corresponding countries and territories based on arbitrary manipulation of archaeological data and
written sources. The origin of contemporary nations is perceived as an almost teleological process.
The nationalist components of the somewhat revised historiographies of the Soviet period have
become much more conspicuous and are propagated without any constraint. They include the
following.

Autochthonism The example of Central Asian states confirms the significance of notions of
territory and homeland in the formation of national identities. In the Soviet Union, the
autochthonous theory had first been developed in the 1940s. It claimed that all ancient and
medieval inhabitants of corresponding republics were the ancestors of their contemporary titular
nations or participated in their ethnogenesis. Nowadays, the Kazakh, Turkmen and Uzbek
nationalist narratives appropriate Iranian-speaking populations that in the distant past peopled the
territories of the new states. In addition, autochthonism is used to confirm the historical rights of

669
ethnonations on territories of their states and whenever it is considered expedient to deny these
rights to ethnic minorities. Thus, in 2000, Kyrgyzstan celebrated with great pomp the supposed
three thousandth anniversary of the city of Osh. This was done in a way that presented the city as
an indivisible part of Kyrgyz history and culture and to bolster Kyrgyz legitimacy over the mostly
Uzbek territory.

The search for glorious ancestors This also existed in historiographies of the Soviet period, and
was supposed to boost national pride. Since independence, the privatization and valorization of
particular historical periods, states and historical and cultural personalities continue unrestrained,
and wherever it is considered expedient, the concept of autochthonism is supplemented by
concepts of political and ethnic continuity. Not infrequently, ancient and medieval states and
peoples are claimed as predecessors and ancestors of the new states and nations even in cases
when they emerged in quite distant territories. This approach makes possible the spatial and
temporal extension of national histories and makes them more glorious. Tajik nationalist narrative,
for example, tends to blur the differences between the Iranian-speaking populations of Central
Asia and of other regions, such as Iran and Afghanistan. This allows Tajiks to claim the cultural
and other achievements of virtually all Iranian peoples as Tajik ones, and to refer to many famous
Farsi-language writers, like Rudaki, Firdawsi, Nizami, Sa'adi, Hafez and Iqbal, as Tajiks even if
they never lived in Central Asia. Tajiks are presented as legitimate heirs to 2500 years of Iranian
civilization in both its Persian and Central Asian varieties. In the same fold, the Sogdians, one of
the major peoples in ancient and early medieval Central Asia, are defined as the direct ancestors
of Tajiks, and the Samanid state (819-992) is perceived as a Tajik state; its 1100-year anniversary
was celebrated in the country in 1999. Tajik scholars continue to compete with Uzbek ones for
the right to claim the philosopher and physician Avicenna (10-11th centuries) as their own,
although he wrote mainly in Arabic.

In 2003, Kyrgyzstan celebrated the 2200-year anniversary of Kyrgyz statehood, which allegedly
emerged in Inner Asia in 201 BC. Likewise, some historians call the Kyrgyz polity of the Yenisei,
in the early medieval period, the „Great Kyrgyz empire‟. A famous writer of the eleventh century,
Yusuf Balasuguni, is called a Kyrgyz only on the grounds that he was born in the city of
Balagasun, situated on the territory of contemporary Kyrgyzstan.

In the Kazakh historiography, the concept of Turkism (not to be confused with pan-Turkism in its
Turkish meaning) has become very popular. The early medieval Turkic empire that had emerged

670
on the territory of contemporary Mongolia and its cultural heritage, as well as some other Turkic
polities, are perceived as direct predecessors of the Kazakh state.

In Uzbekistan, all famous personalities who ever lived on its contemporary territory are
appropriated as the „great ancestors of the Uzbek people‟. Timur has become a national hero and
a „great Uzbek statesman‟, and huge monuments to him have been built in Samarkand and
Tashkent. Remarkably, the latter replaced the demolished monument to Karl Marx.

In this regard, however, nobody can compete with Turkmenistan. Its dictator boldly claims in his
book, Rukhnama - which is obligatory reading for all of his subjects - that the Turkmen nation has
existed already for five thousand years, and that the Parthian, Hsiung-nu, Karakhanid and many
other states were actually Turkmen ones (Turkmenbashi 2002: 86, 165, 190, 207ff.).

Victimization New historiographies have embraced the rhetoric of postcolonialism and

victimization, which should foster a sense of unity among the nation. A lot of attention is paid to
real or perceived historical injustices for which the Russians, as the embodiment of Tsarist and
Soviet rule, are mainly blamed. In Uzbekistan, the „Museum of the Victims of Repression‟ (tsarist
and Soviet) was opened in 2001, and in Kazakhstan, along with several monuments, the „Museum
of the Victims of Soviet Oppression‟ was opened in 2003 in Almaty, in the building that once
housed the KGB. While the tsarist period is depicted in black colors everywhere in the region, the
overall negative attitude to the Soviet period is remarkably characteristic of the most authoritarian
countries in the region, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In other countries this attitude is more
nuanced and ambiguous. In Kazakhstan, the forced collectivization and sedentarization of
nomads in the early 1930s, and the famine that followed, during which some 1.7 million people
perished, are included in the master narrative, while the Virgin Lands campaign of the 1950s is
also often criticized.

Everywhere revolts and resistance movements against Tsarist and Soviet rule, condemned as
reactionary in the Soviet historiography (for example, the Khan Kenesary rebellion in Kazakhstan
in 1837-1847; the 1879 battle of Geok Tepe, in Turkmenistan; the Andijan uprising, in 1898; the
uprisings of 1916; and the Basmach movement, in the early Soviet period) are hailed now as anti-
colonial movements. Intellectuals of the pre-revolutionary and early Soviet periods, like Jadids or
the members of the Alash Orda movement, executed in the 1930s as „bourgeois nationalists‟, are
rehabilitated and glorified.

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Other characteristics Ethnic and national iconography are salient and important because they are
both inclusive and exclusive, marking „us‟ from „them‟ very clearly and on a regular basis.
Independence has brought to the fore the manufacture of state symbols, which allegedly reflect
the ethnic iconography of dominant nations. The flag of Kazakhstan is blue, a color associated
with early medieval Turks, and contains a traditional Kazakh ornamentation at the side. The roof
of a yurta, a nomadic felt tent, appears on the flag of Kyrgyzstan. Sometimes new symbolism also
includes Islamic elements (Bohr 1998: 145, 160-1), for example the green parts and crescents of
the national flags of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Islam and Islamic heritage are
recognized as a part of national identities, but by no means as the main one. The widespread
celebration of historical anniversaries is also quite common and is playing an important role in
the legitimation of contemporary political regimes. One is also witnessing the restoration or
substitution of indigenous toponyms for the Russian and Soviet ones, celebration of new holidays,
as well as some traditional ones, like Navrus (Adams 1999: 364ff.), which were forbidden in the
Soviet period, and indigenization of political and administrative terminolgy.

Subnational identities

The somewhat modernized tribalism/regionalism still plays an important role in the political
process and contributes to structural weakness of Central Asian states. Exploited by the ruling
elites, it helps to play down social and economic differences in the interests of local loyalties and
makes more difficult the emergence of a liberal national consensus. It is difficult to mobilize
citizens on the basis of nation-wide appeals or organizations, when most of them are involved in
personal patron-client relationships and in conditions when their allegiance goes first to various
sub-national groupings. Power is confined to rather small elites which are not sufficiently
consolidated and lack a nation-wide support base.

During the entire independence period, Tajikistan has experienced a power struggle between
Khujant, Garm, Kuliab, Badakhshan, Gissar and other factions. At times, the struggle was so
fierce that it resulted in civil war. This war is sometimes perceived as the struggle between ex-
communists and secularists, on the one hand, and Islamists, on the other. However, it can be
better explained as the struggle of regional factions that for various reasons have chosen different
political orientations and political garments (Bushkov and Mikulski 1996; Djalili et al. 1997;
Niiazi 1997; Zviagelskaya 1997). Thus, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan was comprised
mainly of inhabitants of Garm and Karategin. Eventually, the Kuliab-Khujant-Gissar alliance,

672
with the assistance of Russia and Uzbekistan, defeated the Garm-Karategin-Pamir alliance. At the
moment, the leading positions in the country belong to the Kuliab faction, despite the fact that
Kuliab is one of the poorest and the most backward regions in the country. This situation is much
resented by other factions, especially the Khujant one, to the extent that one may wonder if the
Kuliab faction would be able to remain in power without Moscow's military support.

In Kazakhstan, according to a 1995 opinion poll, 39 per cent of the respondents believed that
belonging to a particular zhuz was important in getting a job or a promotion (Olcott 2002: 185).
Just like in the late Soviet period, the dominant positions in the country's leadership are occupied
by members of the Elder zhuz, who still have to share power with members of the Junior zhuz,
since the country's main oil deposits are located on the territory of the latter. At the same time,
most of the opposition consists of members of the Middle zhuz (Masanov 1996: 46ff; Khliupin
1998: 7ff.).

In Kyrgyzstan, President Akaev increasingly relied on the support of his own and his wife's
tribesmen, while members of the tribes located in Chuisk, Naryn, Osh and Dzhelal-Abad regions
were dissatisfied with their shares of power and national wealth (Anderson 1999: 39-42). In his
ousting from power in 2005, tribal loyalties retained their importance for all factions involved.

In Turkmenistan, even the national flag contains five carpet designs that are characteristic of the
main tribes in the country. President Niiazov belongs to the most numerous Teke tribe, from
which, especially from its Akhal subdivision, he recruits many of his subordinates (Dudarev 1998:
169; Akbarzadeh 1999: 282-3; Kadyrov 2001: 6ff.). Remarkably, even some members of the
opposition to Niiazov perceived democratization of their country only in terms of the substitution
of a federation of tribes for the current hegemony of one tribe (Kadyrov 2001: 22).

In Uzbekistan, President Karimov rules with the support of the Samarkand faction and its allies
from the Tashkent faction, while the members of the Fergana, Bukhara, Khwarazm and Surkash
(Surkhan-Daria and Kashkar-Daria regions) factions are pushed aside to less prominent positions
(Petrov 1998: 97).

The tenacity of subnational identities and allegiances is sometimes explained as a usual center-
periphery competition (Ilkhamov 2004b; Jones Luong 2004). However, in Central Asia it should
be better perceived not only as a struggle of peripheral political elites for their share of scare

673
resources and spoils, but also for dominant positions in the center. It is worth noting that, contrary
to some other regions of the world, there are no secessionist or autonomist movements amongst
sub-national groups of titular ethnic nations in Central Asia. Instead, their members are involved
in power struggles within the ethnic nation-states' borders. In any case, the salience of subnational
groupings and identities is detrimental not only for the emergence of civil society, but even to
consolidation of ethno-nations. The majority of indigenous populations take for granted a social
hierarchy passed off as a traditional one. Individuals who are not included into kin, clanal, tribal
and regional networks, which perpetuate the authoritarian model of power, are doomed to a kind
of social vacuum.

Ethnic minorities

Nationalizing policies, as well as economic crisis in the region, have resulted in a significant out-
migration of members of ethnic minorities, which has contributed to a certain homogenization of
the ethnic composition of the new states. Out-migration was most significant amongst the
Russians and other Slavs, Germans, Meskhetian Turks and Jews, while the members of other
dispersed groups, like Tatars and Koreans, and especially indigenous Central Asian ethnic groups,
do not tend to emigrate. By 1989, Russians constituted 37.6 per cent of the whole population of
Kazakhstan, 21.4 per cent of Kyrgyzstan, 9.5 per cent of Turkmenistan, 8.3 per cent of
Uzbekistan, and 7.6 per cent of Tajikistan. Their number decreased in Uzbekistan by 2000 to 4.0
per cent; in Turkmenistan by 1995 to 6.7 per cent; in Kazakhstan by 1997 to 32.2 per cent; in
Kyrgyzstan by 1997 to 15.3 per cent; and in Tajikistan by 1996 to but 3.2 per cent.

Still, ethnic minorities remain quite numerous in most Central Asian countries. With the
exception of Tajiks in Uzbekistan, so far the Central Asian regimes are not pursuing a policy of
assimilation of ethnic minorities in any consistent way. However, nationalizing policy and
ethnicization of political discourse puts ethnic minorities at a disadvantage in all Central Asian
countries. This is especially resented by Russians who were used to the status of the dominant
nation in the whole Soviet Union, and considered all its territory as their vast homeland; hence
their widespread grievances about discrimination, circumscribed social mobility, injustice,
violations of human rights, colonial ingratitude, and so forth.

Still, the response of ethnic minorities is rather muted, and mainly is limited to the cultural sphere.
So far, the autocratic rulers in the region have successfully prevented attempts at political

674
mobilization of ethnic minorities, which were rather weak in any case. Ethnic clashes between
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and Tajiks, in Kyrgyzstan in 1989 and in 1990, were of
spontaneous character, and were sparked mainly not by political but by economic issues. In the
1990s, a poorly organized separatist and irredentist movement was noticeable amongst some
Russians in the northern parts of Kazakhstan, however it lacked the support of the Russian
government and was easily suppressed. During the perestroika period some Tajiks in Uzbekistan
stepped up their cultural and educational demands, but the government responded negatively, and
it seems that at the moment these demands lack mass support from the bilingual Tajik minority.
There is little room for irredentist movements in any case, since all Central Asian countries
support the principle of inviolability of state borders.

CONCLUSION

A widespread but far from always precise term „nation-state‟ can be applied to the new states in
Central Asia only with reservation. It is still more a project than reality. There is no consistent
policy of assimilation or acculturation of ethnic minorities. Nationalizing and homogenizing
policies pursued by political classes are aimed not at their incorporation into a civic nation, but at
asserting the dominant positions of titular ethnic nations. In this regard, the new states may be
characterized as ethnocracies, and this factor contributes to their stable instability.

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Brown, David. "Contending Nationalisms in South-East Asia." Pp. 461-72

The contemporary politics of South-East Asian nationalism cannot be characterized in terms of

any overarching trend. There are real differences in the degree and character of nationhood in, for
1
example, the corporatist cohesion of Singapore, the authoritarian stalemate of Burma and the
„post-authoritarian‟ instabilities of Indonesia. Moreover, some nation-states are apparently being
strengthened by globalization, others weakened; some characterized by increased ethnic conflict,
others by its easing; some consistently authoritarian, others intermittently democratic.

The comparative evaluation of South-East Asian nationalisms is, however, problematized by

conceptual ambiguities. 2 When national identities are seen as the outcome of a long modernizing
process of national integration, Vietnam, Burma and Thailand might be seen as developing into
nations over several centuries (Tarling 1998), but both there and elsewhere, nationhood in
contemporary South-East Asia remains vitiated by religious and linguistic diversities (Connor
1979; Engelbert and Schneider 2000), and by the asymmetries of political and economic
clientelist networks (Neher 1987). Alternatively, national identities can be seen as reactive
responses to external pressures, so as to invite the view that colonialism not only created nations
3
by imposing centralized and unified territorial states on South-East Asia, but also reactively
generated the anti-colonial nationalist movements which imbued the populations of these states
with strong national loyalties (Neher 1994). According to some observers, the external forces of
globalization have subsequently weakened the nationalist autonomy and legitimacy of some
South-East Asian nation-states, notably Indonesia (Beeson 2002, 2003). National identities are
also sometimes seen as crucially dependent on ideas of equal citizenship, so that it is the
shallowness of democratization transitions in this region which is identified as the key inhibiting
influence on the growth of national identities (Henders 2004). 4 But there is a fourth approach, the
one adopted in this chapter, which sees national identity not as a reflection of societal structures,
but rather as a contingent and variable ideological construction. National identities are seen to
vary because they arise out of the interplay between civic and ethnic myths of nationhood which
are deployed in the course of political interactions, by both state and non-state actors. This
implies that while there are no linear trends in national identity common to all countries in the
region, there are nevertheless some consistent patterns to the variations in their national cohesion.

678
In the rapidly changing societies of South-East Asia, politics cannot be understood as solely the
pursuit of material self-interests. It also reflects the search for cultural and ideological resolutions
to the insecurities engendered by the varying impacts of globalization, which foster prosperity for
some and impoverishment for others. This is reflected not just in the economic gulf in per capita
GNPs between, for example, Singapore and Cambodia (US$30,170 and US$260 for 1998, cited
in Funston 2001), but also in the social gulf, evident throughout the region, between swid-den
agriculturists under threat from „development‟ and new urban middle classes seeking security in
consumerism. In such circumstances, globalization, far from promoting the cosmopolitan
homogeneity of South-East Asia, is likely „to generate difference, uniqueness and cultural
specificity‟ (Kahn 1998: 9). Nationalism can then be seen as an ideology which attaches to such
specificities so as to ameliorate the anomic impact of disruptive social change. Nationalism, in its
various forms, offers myths of moral and cognitive certainty as to the causes of contemporary
disruptions and the prescriptive visions of community towards which politics can mobilize.

National identities in South-East Asia offer such ideological security to citizens in the form of
three visions, denoted here as „ethno-cultural‟, „civic‟ and „multiculturalist‟. These terms are not
used to refer to descriptions of contemporary political or social structures, but rather to the
distinct ideals of national development towards which populations can be mobilized by political
elites. Ethnocultural nationalism depicts the modern nation-state as built on a high-status ethnic
core, and offers a promise of security through assimilationist development towards ethnocultural
sameness. Civic nationalism portrays the nation-state as developing towards a community
governed by ethnically blind norms, so as to offer security in the vision of progress towards equal
citizenship. Finally, when the nation-state is imagined in multiculturalist terms, it offers security
in the vision of an ethnically balanced polity, promising just autonomy and resources to each of
its component ethnic communities. So long as either or all of these visions of the nation-state
retain widespread mobilizing and legitimatory power, then current inequities can be seen as
resolvable through national development. Moreover, the three visions can become so intertwined
in state symbolism and in the nationalist imaginings of civil society, that the tensions between
them remain inchoate, thus promoting the political cohesion of the nation-state.

This has not, however, been the case in South-East Asia. The contentious politics of its
nationalisms derives in part from the tensioned interplay between civic, ethno-cultural and
multiculturalist nationalist visions; and in part from the politics arising out of the internal
dynamics of each of these visions

679
THE ETHNIC DIMENSION OF NATIONALIST POLITICS

The political dynamics of nationalism in South-East Asia can be traced in large part to the type of
nation-building strategies promoted by state elites during or after decolonization. The dominant
tendency throughout Asia was for state elites to portray the emergent nation-state as being built,
in historical or status terms, upon an ethnic core, thus labelling and peripheralizing other
linguistic, racial or religious communities as „ethnic minorities‟ (Young 1976).

In many parts of South-East Asia, there is little convergence of linguistic, religious, racial,
ancestral homeland, and contemporary homeland boundaries, so that many writers on the region
resist the concept of „ethnicity‟ for fear of imposing a primordialist cement on the subtleties and
fluidities of communal identities (Steinberg 1987). At the same time, however, it is widely
recognized that the colonial regimes sought to legitimate themselves by constructing ethnic
categories, making alliances with minorities such as Christian Karens in Burma and Moluccans in
Indonesia, and sometimes also depicting the new „artificial‟ state as the successor to pre-colonial
kingdoms, as in Burma and Vietnam. The resultant majority-minority politics puts South-East
Asian nationalist elites under some pressure to adopt ethnicity as a way of mobilizing majority
support against the colonialists (Anderson 1998).

When state elites have sought to use such ethnic mobilization for nation-building purposes, to
construct the nation as built on an ethnic core, this has in turn influenced the construction of an
„ethnic minority‟ consciousness amongst religious, racial or linguistic minorities. Moreover, even
in the Indonesian case where the anti-colonial struggle did not employ ethnicity as its mobilizing
tool, subsequent separatist minorities have nevertheless legitimated themselves by depicting the
state as an agency of ethnic core (in this case Javanese) domination. The result has been a
nationalist politics of recurrent ethnic core-minority tensions.

There are variations in the extent of the ethno-cultural nationalist tendency in South-East Asia,
and thence in the degree to which the ethnic cores have been overtly favoured in public policies
and in state symbolism. Moreover, the identity of the ethnic core is never uncontested. Thus, for
example, in the case of the Philippines, the categories of Tagalog-speakers, Christians, lowland
Malays and the central and southern Luzon region all have claims to be the core of the nation.
However, because of the crucial importance of language for nation-building, it has in most cases
5
been the largest linguistic community which has been identified as the nation's ethnic core. In

680
some cases, as with the ethnic Thai, Burman, Lao and Malay communities, the ethno-cultural
basis for nation-building was signalled directly in the name adopted for the state. Even where the
name of the country (or as in Indonesia, also the choice of national language) did not specify the
ethnic core, it has been evident, for example in school history curricula, in the recruitment
profiles of administrative and military personnel, or in the cultural status-hierarchy promoted by
the state, that Tagalog-speakers in the Philippines, Javanese in Indonesia, Khmer in Cambodia
and Kinh in Vietnam were to be regarded as the core of the modern nation. In some cases the
identity of the nation's ethnic core has been promoted in religious terms, as with the Buddhism of
the Khmer, the Burmans and the Thai and the Islam of the Malays. In several countries, the ethnic
core has been the linguistic group predominant in the fertile lowland regions, which has
subsequently become the focal region for economic development, with ethnic minority
communities occupying the more geographically and economically peripheral upland areas. In
such cases, in Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, the bias of state policies in favour
of the ethnic core has remained partly implicit, portrayed as a response to market forces, a
reflection of disparities in access to education, or a consequence of the urban-rural divide. The
corollary of this has been that the states' depictions of indigenous linguistic minorities occupying
the upland areas as culturally primitive, economically backward, or politically subversive, has
seemed to stem as much from their geographically determined marginalization from the focal
points of capitalism and commerce, or their location in border zones, as from any explicit ethnic
discrimination on the part of the state. By the same token, ethnic discrimination has sometimes
been most overt in those cases where the ethnic core and the ethnic minorities have shared the
same urbanized locations. Such ethnic discrimination was institutionalized in Malaysia from 1970
onwards in the New Economic Policy of affirmative action in favour of Bumiputra („sons of the
soil‟, mostly Malay, but also Kadazan, Iban and others of eastern Malaysia), so as to disadvantage
the „migrant‟ Indian and Chinese minorities (and also the indigenous Orang Asli) 6 . In Cambodia,
discrimination against the predominantly urbanized Vietnamese minority was explicit in the 1954
citizenship laws, and in the anti-communist pogroms of the early 1970s and the Pol Pot period.

Ethno-cultural nationalism has been least evident in Singapore and East Timor. In the case of East
Timor, which achieved independence, after an armed struggle, in 2002, most observers saw
national unity as developing more on the basis of perceptions of a common enemy (Indonesia),
and the spread of a common religion (Catholic), than on the idea of a Tetun Dili ethno-linguistic
core (Kingsbury 2001). In Singapore it is indeed the case that the Malay minority (14 per cent)
are depicted in the constitution as having a „special position‟, with Malay as a national language.

681
But since the mid-1960s the Singaporean government has downplayed this element of national
identity, not least because its main political constituency has been amongst the Chinese majority
(78 per cent). During the 1980s and 1990s, there were indeed some signs of a shift towards a
Chinese focus for national identity, with the state promotion of Mandarin and Confucianism, and
then the advocacy of an East Asian-oriented „Asian Values‟ nationalist ideology. But the PAP
government has taken some care to ensure that state policies and national symbolism do not
appear to favour either the socio-economically and numerically dominant Chinese, or the socio-
economically disadvantaged Malay minority. The PAP leaders are aware of the political dangers
inherent in favouring either a Malay minority in a predominantly Chinese country, or a Chinese
majority in a predominantly Malay region.

In those countries where state elites have constructed the nation in the language and symbolism of
the ethnic core/ethnic minority distinction, the result has been that identity constructions of ethno-
linguistic or ethno-reli-gious categories and disparities have attained hegemony in public
discourse, and have been cemented predominantly in the terminology of „race‟. This has
promoted the ethnic assimilationist enterprise in those cases where governments have depicted
the ethnic minorities as sharing the same racial stock as the ethnic core. Thus the SLORC regime
in Burma claims that all ethnic communities are descended from a common racial stock, and thus
are amenable to assimilation, if not for the interference of „fanatical racists, ideological insurgents,
and so-called religious insurgents‟ (Government of Burma, Ministry of Information 1992, quoted
in Lambrecht 2004: 155). In Laos and Cambodia (and to a degree in Thailand), ethnic minorities
have been pressured into assimilation with the „culturally superior‟ ethnic cores, by being
officially classified as Lau Theung (upland Lao) and Lau Sung (highland Lao) in Laos, or as
7
Khmer Loeu (upland Khmer) and Khmer Islam in Cambodia. But in other cases, the
construction of ethnicity in terms of race has functioned precisely to inhibit assimilation. In
Malaysia, the depiction of ethnicity in racial terms has been employed so as to push „Indians‟ and
„Chinese‟ into an acceptance of their low status as citizens on the margin of a Malay-focused
nation, and to emphasize the structural nature of the socio-economic and political disparities
which accompany racially defined status. Thus even though intra-ethnic disparities of wealth and
income have coexisted with inter-ethnic disparities (Roslan 2004), it has been the latter that have
been politically salient, with economic disparities almost universally portrayed and perceived,
until recently, in terms of an imbalance between Malay poverty and Chinese or Indian wealth.

682
Many ethnic minority communities have perceived their lower status as deriving from
discrimination by a state seen as the agent of the ethnic core. But ethnic minority responses to this
have varied, in part reflecting their diverse positions as decentralized aboriginal communities, as
homeland communities with a history of political cohesion and autonomy, or as communities of
migrant origin (Lande 1999).

Where assimilationist policies have been applied to migrant communities, as with the Sino-Thais
or the Chinese Indonesians, they have met with more success than when applied to „hill tribe‟
minorities (such as the Hmong in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam), where they have been „usually
ineffective and often destructive‟ (Duncan 2004: 6). Migrant communities that have been pushed
to accept low status as „second class citizens‟ have generally been acquiescent. Chinese and
Indian communities in Malaysia have indeed periodically responded to their marginalization in
ethnic riots, but by and large the state has been successful in its strategy of co-opting their
political and economic elites so as to promote ethnic minority acquiescence to ethnic core
dominance. 8 When subjected to persecutions in Cambodia, the Vietnamese have remained more
the victims than the perpetrators of ethnic violence.

It has been the impact of ethno-cultural nationalism upon previously autonomous homeland
ethnic minorities which has been most disruptive of national unity in South-East Asia. State
interventions into ethnic minority homeland regions in many cases involved the disruption of
traditional authority structures, as ethnic minority elites were replaced by governmental officials
recruited from the ethnic cores; and as social cohesion was disrupted by the progressive
impositions of new fiscal, administrative and educational structures, as well as by migrations of
labour. Such attempts to expand state control over peripheral ethnic minority regions have
frequently had a reactive impact, provoking some amongst the dislocated elites and disrupted
communities into ethnic nationalist rebellion. These have occurred, for example, among the
Patani Malays in Thailand; the Mindanao Moros in the Philippines; the Karen, Shan, Kachin,
Chin and others in Burma; the Papuans and Acehnese in Indonesia: and the Hmong in Laos. In
many cases these rebellions could trace their roots both to pre-colonial disputes, and to unrest in
the early colonial period directed against the expanding influence of the modern state. During the
global „ethnic revival‟ period from the late 1960s, they began legitimating their calls for political
autonomy within or outside the existing nation-states, on overtly ethnic nationalist grounds
(Christie 1996). In all cases, the governing regimes responded to such outbursts of inter-ethnic
violence and separatist ethno-regional rebellion with the use of coercion. Characteristically, the

683
coercive capacity of states has been sufficient to contain rebellions, or at least to impose a
military stalemate, but not to fully dislodge the militants so as to restore effective state control of
the disputed ethnic minority regions.

Popular support for such movements has fluctuated, as ethnic minority populations such as those
in Aceh, Patani or Muslim Mindanao have been subjected to divergent pressures from the
developmental promises of the nation-state, the autonomy promises of their separatist elites and
the coercive pressures from militants on both sides. The resultant trauma and stalemate of these
confrontations breed the anxieties and insecurities on which the nationalisms of militants feed.
The conflicts thus persist and become entrenched, not just because of the socio-economic and
power disparities associated with the ethno-cultural dimension of the nation-state, but also
because of the ideological absolutisms, the nationalist fanaticisms, in which politics becomes
simplified as a struggle between two stereotyped communities, the virtuous „Us‟ and the
demonized „Other‟. This was evident, for example, when the confusion underlying tensions
between migrants and locals in Ambon became reconstructed, during 1999, into the moral clarity
of an Islamic jihad against subversive separatism, versus a Christian crusade against Islamic „evil
oppressors‟ and the „absolute tyranny‟ of the Indonesian state (Turner 2002:2, 5). Visions of
ethnic minority separatism thus remain salient in nationalist ideologies, both as the internal
threats against which the imperative of national unity can be asserted by state elites, and also as
the legitimatory banner for the ethnic nationalist militants who continue the struggles against the
alien state. 9

Such military and ideological stalemate, which has kept several of these South-East Asian
separatist disputes going since the 1960s (and in the case of Karen separatism in Burma since the
late 1940s), can however be broken. The perceptions of alienated or marginalized ethnic
minorities that the state is the agency of an ethnic core, can be tackled by changes in constitutions,
state symbolism or government policies, which employ more ethnically neutral language or
reduce ethnic biases in favour of the core. This was attempted in Malaysia by the replacement of
the overtly pro-Bumiputra New Economic Policy by the National Development Policy in 2000,
and is one interpretation of Cambodia's „ethnically blind‟ 1993 Constitution (Ovesen and Trankell
2004: 252-3).

However, the political capacity of South-East Asian governments to move away from
assimilationist policies has varied. It has depended not just on their administrative capabilities,

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but also, more fundamentally, upon their ideological ability to reconstruct the nation-state in
terms other than that of ethnic core versus ethnic minorities. Indeed, most South-East Asian
countries, with the exception of Burma, have had some degree of success in ameliorating inter-
ethnic confrontations by deploying visions of the nation-state as a civic community transcending
ethnic differences. Ethnic minority perceptions of state bias in favour of the ethnic core remain
politically salient and unresolved, but they are not the only focal point of nationalist politics.

THE CIVIC DIMENSION OF NATIONALIST POLITICS

Throughout South-East Asia, ethno-cultural constructions of the nation have been accompanied,
since the decolonization period, by civic nationalism: the idea that the state constitutes a
community of sovereign citizens whose status as „one people‟ ought not to depend upon their
ethnic identities, but should derive from the common patriotic loyalties of those permanently
residing within its territorial boundaries. In no country has citizenship been restricted to the ethnic
core, and in all countries some areas of public life have functioned on the basis of ethnically
neutral legal norms. The language of civic nationalism is indeed sometimes employed as rhetoric
to camouflage ethnic dominance, but even where that has been the case, its influence has
nevertheless been more than cosmetic. It ameliorates ethnic tensions by ensuring that at least
some members of ethnic minority communities come to see the state as not just an agent of ethnic
core domination, but rather as a potential engine of progress towards ethnically blind
development and social justice. Even if such beliefs are regarded as misguided or naive, their
impact is to act as a kind of buffer between proponents of ethnic core domination and proponents
of reactive ethnic minority rights.

The civic vision of the egalitarian citizenship community has manifested itself in different forms.
The predominantly authoritarian bent of most South-East Asian governments has been reflected
in their depictions of the nation-state as an artefact of colonialism, forged through nationalist
struggle, whose unique collective identity must be repeatedly defended against external threats,
and also against the internal fissiparous impacts of individual rights claims, minority vested
interests and ethnic rivalries. The nation is thus portrayed in monistic terms as a singular people
sharing a common developmental destiny. This kind of collectivist civic nationalism thus serves
to legitimate the claim by authoritarian-inclined governments that they are the sole articulators of
the will of the unified nation. 10

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This has been the dominant construction of the nation-state employed by Singapore's PAP
government, initially promoted in the 1960s to inculcate a siege mentality of „survivalism‟ as a
small, resource-poor island in a hostile region. Subsequently the regime promoted a civic
nationalism which focused on developing a patriotic pride in the state's economic transformation.
In this civic nationalism it is the uniqueness of the Singaporean collectivity rather than the
equality of the individual citizens which is stressed, so that individuals are called on to accede to
the inequities of a „meritocratic‟ hierarchy, inter-ethnic socio-economic disparities, and
authoritarian suppression of individual liberties, as the price individuals must pay for collectivist
development (Chua 1995).

Most South-East Asian authoritarian regimes have promoted such collectivist civic nationalist
visions by intertwining them with ideas of ethno-cultural nationalism, in order to enhance their
legitimacy amongst citizens of ethnic minority origin uneasy with the dominance of the ethnic
core. Thus, in the case of Thailand, the various authoritarian regimes of the „bureaucratic polity‟
legitimated themselves by employing ethnic Thai structures of the monarchy, Buddhism and the
„Standard Thai‟ language as symbols of the civic unity of the modern territorial state. In Suharto's
Indonesia, the ideology of Panca Sila translated Javanese ethnic values into a universalistic civic
language. In the case of Malaysia, Mahathir began his Prime Ministership in 1981 as the defender
of Malay-centric ethno-cultural nationalism. But he modified this by moving in a civic direction
as he began tentatively to wind back Malay dependence on ethnically based state patronage and
to adopt some aspects of the neoliberal agenda for globalization. He sought to modify the Malay-
centric view of Malaysia by articulating a more civic vision of a „united Malaysian nation‟,
Bangsa Malaysia, in which Malays and non-Malays were developing „a sense of common and
shared destiny‟ (Mahathir 1991, quoted in Cheah 2002: 221).

But such collectivist-authoritarian civic nationalisms breed their own reactions. The rapid
economic development of some of the South-East Asian countries has promoted the growth of
new middle classes and civil societies which have been increasingly active in making diverse
demands - for increased freedoms from state intervention in some areas, but also for increased
access to state patronage or government subsidies in others. States which have stressed that they
are the sole legitimate articulators of the will of the nation, are thus challenged by civil society
claims that the nation is pluralistic rather than monistic, and that the focus of the nation is not the
central institutions of the state, but rather the vibrancy of civil society (Rodan 1997). The

686
resultant contentions between collectivist and pluralist proponents of civic nationalist visions can
push the issue of ethnic conflict towards the political margins.

In Malaysia, the clash between the two strands of civic nationalism took political centre stage in
the 1990s, so that the issue of Malay priority in relation to the Chinese and Indians ceased to
dominate politics. Mahathir's sacking of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim provoked a
conflict in which their divergent liberal and collectivist civic visions for Malaysia's development,
mobilized large segments of Malaysian society so as to cut across ethnic lines. In Thailand, the
progress of democratization, evident since the 1973 Bangkok student protests, began to generate a
„new nationalism in Thailand … geared towards assisting reformed Thai capital‟s venture into the
global economy' (Connors 2003: 239). This took a pluralist form as the centralized „bureaucratic
polity‟ was modified into a potentially more pluralistic and decentralized „bourgeois
parliamentary political system' (Anderson 1998) with a strengthened civil society. However, it
also opened the door for provincial elites to take part in „money politics‟ and political clientelism,
and thence to ally under the „democratic authoritarian‟ umbrella of Prime Minister Thaksin's
populist nationalism (Pongsudhirak 2003). In the Philippines, the civic nationalist vision has been
promoted by President Aroyo's articulated goal of a „strong republic‟ whose effective
governmental and administrative institutions would be better able to combat corruption and
terrorism; but the salience of this vision remains vitiated by the unresolved tensions between the
„People Power‟ nationalism of mass demonstrations advocating such reforms, and the continued
patronage influence of the interlocking dynasties which constitute the Philippines' national
oligarchy (Anderson 1998). The result, in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, is not a
transition from an authoritarian-collectivist to a liberal-pluralist national identity, but rather an
unresolved tension between these divergent ideas of the civic nation.

It is not only the dual character of the civic vision which influences contemporary nationalist
politics, but also its volatility. The appeal of civic nationalism depends primarily upon the extent
to which members of ethnic core and ethnic minority communities share a faith that the elites and
institutions of the state have the capacity to lead civil society towards the promised
developmental social justice. The extent of this faith varies not just with fluctuations in national
economic performance, but also with variations in the ideological skills of state elites in
mobilizing civic nationalism in response to external enemies or internal threats. The volatility of
civic nationalism can be seen in the Philippines, where widespread disillusionment and cynicism
with political corruption and with the incapacity of the state to promote development and social

687
justice coexist with sudden bursts of optimistic „People Power‟ mobilization behind leaders
(notably Aquino in 1986, then both for and against Estrada in 2002) who promise a strong state
capable of rebuilding civic national unity.

This variability of civic nationalism is significant for nationalist politics since fluctuations in the
strength of the civic buffer between majority-focused ethno-cultural nationalism, and the
proponents of ethnic minority rights claims, mean that ethnic tensions can intensify or ameliorate
in response to variations in popular perceptions of the developmental or social justice capacities
of an incumbent regime or individual leader. When the civic nationalist buffer does weaken, in
response to a loss of faith by citizens in the ability of state elites to manage the economy or to
defend the nation from threats, then the prospect of an escalation of ethnic conflict can prompt
both state elites and civil society activists to search for a different construction of the nation, in
which contending ethnic demands might be accommodated.

THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM

During the decolonization period the ethnic pluralism of South-East Asia was widely depicted,
both by governments and by academic observers, as a serious threat to national unity which might
limit the opportunities for stable democratization, thus justifying the imposition of centralized
authoritarian rule. Such warnings were apparently justified by the incidence of ethnic riots and
ethno-regional rebellions in the 1950s and 1960s. The idea that ethnically plural societies can
only be held together by authoritarian means is still argued, when convenient, by South-East
Asian state elites. But since the 1980s, the counterargument has been increasingly articulated that
political stability might be best promoted by the accommodation of ethnic differences - by a shift
from policies of ethnic assimilation or domination, towards the making of concessions to ethnic
minorities (Myers 1996). One implication has been a modification of the construction of the
nation by state elites, so that ethnic minorities, including migrant communities, have increasingly
been portrayed, not as merely peripheral to the ethno-culturally defined nation-state, but more as
component parts of a multicultural nation-state. The extent of consequential policy change has
varied, but in most countries multiculturalism is more than „meaningless rhetoric‟, while
remaining insufficiently influential to counteract entrenched ethno-culturalist patterns.

In Thailand, for example, a „resurgence of expressions of ethnic culture and identity‟ (Jory 2000:
18) is manifested in the „rediscovery‟ by Sino-Thais of their Chinese names and cultures, the

688
celebration of hill tribe cultures as a component of Thailand's culture and a source of tourist
revenues, the increased acceptance of Lao and Khmer languages, and the administrative
decentralization and political pluralism which have accompanied democratization. It has also
been reflected in the shift from centralized assimilation to decentralized accommodation in
relation to the Patani Muslims. During the 1990s these latter reforms led to the significantly
increased recruitment of Malay Muslims to both appointed and elected governmental/ political
positions, the reduction of Muslim-Thai economic disparities, and the teaching of Malay and the
celebration of Islam in Patani schools. The result, during the 1990s, was a „de-radicalization‟ of
Malay-Muslim separatism (Wan Mahmood 1999).

The multiculturalist vision of the nation comes in two variants. In its collectivist form,
multiculturalism implies a corporatist state strategy towards ethnic pluralism, whereby the state
provides limited ethnic autonomy through institutional and ideological structures which are
determined by the state, and designed so as to promote the cooptation of ethnic elites and ethnic
demands. In its liberal form, it implies the decentralization of power and resources to ethnic
minorities through internally self-governing institutions or territorial regions. Thus the politics of
multiculturalist nationalism focuses upon the unresolved tensions between these two
manifestations of multicultural nationalism; state attempts at corporatist control of ethnicity, and
the attempts by ethnic minority elites and by multiculturalist influences within civil society at a
restructuring of governmental power and social status in favour of ethnic minorities.

The fact that state policies to promote the status and autonomy of ethnic minorities are thus open
to interpretation as genuine concessions or as „fraudulent‟ co-optations means that moves to
institutionalize a more multiculturalist national identity have rarely succeeded in resolving ethnic
conflicts, and remain politically problematical.

The Philippines has probably made most concessions in a multiculturalist direction, so as to offer
significant autonomy both to the Igorot and to the Mindanau Muslims. The offer of territorial
autonomy to Mindanao came only after the state-sponsored migration of Catholics had produced
a situation in which Muslims formed a minority in most parts of Mindanao. This fact, together
with the inefficiencies of the autonomous Mindanao administration under Nur Misuari, and the
interventions of Jemaah Islamiah in giving support to Islamic militants, have combined to ensure
that the Moro problem remains unresolved. In the case of Burma, cease fires with ethnic
rebellions were achieved by concessions which most observers have considered to be cosmetic,

689
and „many of these agreements are essentially elite pacts between the military junta and minor
despots, drug dealers, and bandits‟ (Lambrecht 2004: 167).

In Singapore, the multiculturalist element in national identity took a rather different corporatist
form, with the formation from the late 1980s onwards of ethnic associations for the Malay, Indian,
Chinese and Eurasion communities, which have functioned to co-opt ethnic elites, to monitor
ethnic cultures and to distribute ethnic welfare funds. In Indonesia it was manifested in the
administrative decentralization measures of 1999 and in particular in the offers of „special
autonomy‟ to Aceh and Papua. In both these latter cases, „autonomy‟ was greeted with suspicion
by the ethnic minority nationalists. In Aceh for example, the GAM nationalist movement had
become so radicalized by the state-sponsored violence towards them of the TNI armed forces that
they rejected the regional autonomy measure and the subsequent peace deal as „a trick by the
Javanese state‟. They rejected the autonomy compromise, not in favour of full independence, but
in favour of a return to violence, in part because „GAM leaders believe deeply in an ethos of
blood sacrifice‟ (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: x).

In Thailand, the impact of government accommodations to the Patani Malay-Muslims in easing

support for secessionism was counteracted by an upsurge of violence, variously attributed to
„bandits‟ or to Jemaah Islamiah, culminating in the carnage of April 2004. This appears to have
fuelled a revival of Malay-Muslim perceptions of the Thailand state as an agency of Central Thai
domination.

Constructions of national identity by state elites in South-East Asia have often been modified,
since the 1970s, so as to reassure ethnic minorities that they are component parts of a multi-ethnic
nation united by the vision of inter-ethnic social justice. But as in other parts of the world, the
promotion of multicultural nationalism has been recently undermined by the issue of Islamic
terrorism, with governments now frequently portraying social discontent or political opposition in
Islamic ethnic communities as politically subversive, allegedly playing into the hands of, or
instigated by, domestic or foreign Islamic terrorists.

RESULTANT VARIATIONS IN NATIONALIST POLITICS

The core issue in the nationalist politics of South-East Asia thus remains the tension between the
construction of the nation around the idea of an ethnic core and the construction of ethnic

690
minority communities as thereby unjustly marginalized. If ethnic majorities and minorities alike
share a faith that the state is moving towards civic nationalist goals, then this tension can be
ameliorated. But in South-East Asia the volatility of this civic nationalist „buffer‟ engenders a
variability in its nationalist politics, which was evident, for example, in the diverse impacts of the
1997-8 economic crisis. In Indonesia, where faith in the Indonesian civic nationalist project had
been undermined by the corrupt and coercive practices of the Suharto regime (Anderson 1999),
the economic crisis meant that the demands for democratization which led to the downfall of
Suharto, initially offered only a weak civic buffer to the clash between divergent ethnic
nationalist visions of democracy. The demands of the students calling for the overthrow of
Suharto, for a liberal civic nationalism of equal individual rights, proved less powerful as a basis
for political mobilization between 1998 and 2003 than did the assertions of „majority rights‟
demands for the reform of the state in diverse Islamic directions, and of „minority rights‟
demands for ethno-regional separatism. The resultant politics of ethno-religious and ethno-
linguistic conflict seemed as if it threatened Indonesian national integrity. But by 2004, an
upsurge of widespread support for the election of „SBY‟ (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) as
President was interpreted by some observers as a renewal of faith in the capacities of an as yet
unsullied leader, „a man of integrity and competence, neither overly religious nor anti-Muslim‟
(Della-Giacoma 2004: 14), who could revive the civic Indonesian project.

In Thailand economic crisis had a catalytic effect on the development of civic nationalism,
immediately facilitating the pluralist provisions of the 1997 Constitution, and subsequently
facilitating the concentration of power of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai („Thais love Thailand‟) party
in 2001. Both the liberal and the collectivist elements in this civic democracy served to strengthen
the buffer between contentions of ethnic nationalism (Reynolds 2002). In Malaysia the economic
crisis was employed by Mahathir to strengthen his authoritarian-collectivist civic nationalism
against the liberal civic nationalism articulated by Anwar, thereby shifting the focus of politics in
a civic direction. Previous Prime Ministers of Malaysia, initially wedded to Malay-dominance
policies, had tried to become more „inclusive‟ (Cheah 2002), but Mahathir was able to use the
situations offered by the economic crisis so as to take this civic shift further than his predecessors,
and to do so without suffering a Malay backlash.

The strength of nation-states in South-East Asian states does not depend, as is sometimes
suggested, simply on the economic performance legitimacy of their governments. The 1997-8
economic crisis had varying impacts on the nationalist cohesion of different countries and the

691
nationalist legitimacy of different regimes. The explanation for this lies only partly in the
variations of governmental economic strategy.

CONCLUSIONS

The picture of unpatterned diversity in the cohesion and character of South-East nation-states is
modified once we see the common nationalist tensions which structure their contemporary
politics. Ethnocentric constructions of the nation-states remain sufficiently strong to fuel ethnic
minority resentments, which take varying political forms. At the same time, authoritarian-
collectivist assertions of civic nationalism continue to challenge liberal-pluralist constructions of
the nation. The result is that any „tendency‟ towards more democratically multiculturalist
constructions of the nation remains incipient; blocked in Burma by the reassertions of an
authoritarian and ethno-culturalist regime, unresolved in „transitional‟ Indonesia, contested in the
weak state of the Philippines, partial in the case of Malaysia, contained by the PAP regime in
Singapore. in a South-East Asia of incipient or emergent NICs, national identities are indeed
undergoing change. But this change should not be conceptualized as any linear „transition‟ from
ethno-cultural, through civic, to multiculturalist national identities; or from authoritarian to
democratic nation-states. Rather, we see a politics of nationalist contestation; a contestation
which is still partly about the territorial boundaries of the nation, but which increasingly focuses
on the tensions between civic, ethno-cultural and multiculturalist constructions of national
identity. It is indeed the weakness or strength of the state which is central to an understanding of
nationalism in South-East Asia. But it is not the administrative or economic weaknesses of states
which directly threaten national unity, so much as ideological limitations in the state management
of this nationalist contestation.

NOTES

1 The Burmese language name for the country is „Myanmar‟. In 1989 the military government
decreed that this term also be used as the English term for the country This was interpreted by
some as an assertion of Burman ethnic dominance over the ethnic minorities.

2 Evident, but unresolved, in the various chapters of Leifer (2000).

692
3 Thailand was not colonized, but both its boundaries and its state structures were directly
influenced by colonialism.

4 On the impacts of democratization in Thailand, see Connors (2003).

5 Percentage figures are misleading, in part because of variations in the treatment of the dialect-
language distinction. Thus, for example, estimates of the Lao in Laos vary between 30 and 70 per
cent, depending on whether diverse lowland T'ai-speaking groups are conflated. in Indonesia, the
national language is not that of the ethnic core. The Javanese are the largest ethno-linguistic
group, but Malay was adopted as the national language because it had been used by the Dutch as
the language of administration. In the Philippines, Tagalog is the most widely used language, but
some estimates list Cebuano as a larger ethno-linguistic group (24 per cent) than the Tagalog (21
per cent). In tiny Brunei, it is the language of the ethnic Bruneis which has become the lingua
franca; nevertheless it is Islam which is the central core for nation-building.

6 While the state does indeed seek to assimilate Orang Asli into Malay culture, they are
nevertheless excluded from Bumiputra status, and its patronage benefits (Endicott and Dentan
2004).

7 In Laos this official classification schema was dropped in 2002. In Thailand, governments have
until recently referred to non-Chinese ethnic minorities primarily in regional terms – as the
communities of central, north, north-eastern and southern Thailand.

8 But the unease underlying Chinese acquiescence is indicated, for example, in Glad (1998).

9 For an examination of this process of nationalist ideologization in the Acehnese case, see
Brown (2004).

10 Liah Greenfeld (1992) employs the distinction between „collectivistic-authoritarian‟ and

„individualistic-libertarian' nationalisms, which is adapted here.

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Sugimoto, Yoshio. "Nation and Nationalism in Contemporary Japan." Pp. 473-87

The Japanese term for nation, kuni, denotes three different levels of community. At the most local
level, kuni refers to the villages or towns from which one's family originated. For many
contemporary metropolitan dwellers, their respective kuni refers to the place where their
ancestors used to reside, their parents or grandparents still live, and where their ancestral family
tomb is located. They return there during the New Year holidays or summer bon vacation when
their ancestors' souls are believed to be present. Such people consider these villages and towns as
their spiritual homes and therefore hold them dear to their hearts. The folk communities of these
areas, with their collective memories of rice paddies, creeks, mountains and other bucolic
imagery, create and sustain a sense of homeland for those connected to them. Kuni in this sense is
a folk community comprised of people that share a „we-feeling‟ based on common ancestral
origin, cultural practice and linguistic heritage.

At the intermediate level, kuni also stands for the regional units that originated in the seventh
century when the imperial clan secured control of a significant amount of the Japanese
archipelago and established a government system based on three tiers of administration. Under
this system, kuni was the highest regional unit, followed by a middle level unit called gun (or kori)
and the smallest unit ri (or sato). Toward the end of the Tokugawa feudal period, there existed
some 68 kuni units. These served as the basis of the prefectural units later created by the Meiji
government at the time of modern state-building in the middle of the nineteenth century. At this
level, even today kuni can refer to a region defined by a common system of customs, practices
and beliefs. For instance, the Japan Alps region in and near Nagano prefecture is Shimano no kuni
(or Shinsh ü). Kagoshima prefecture more or less corresponds to Satsuma no kuni. Regional
identities are often expressed in such local products and events as Echigo rice (produced in the
Echigo region, present-day Niigata prefecture), Iyo oranges (Ehime prefecture) and Awa dancing
(Tokushima prefecture). Japan, then, is made up of these sub-nations.

As a largest unit, kuni means Nihon (or Nippon), the Japanese national entity, though it is not a
constant but a variable. Its territorial boundaries have contracted and expanded over centuries. In
ancient Japan, with the gradual unification of Nihon under the imperial household in the eighth
century onwards, the Japanese nation as kuni denoted the territory that we today call the Kinki
region, with Kyoto as its capital and geographic centre. While the „nation‟ of Japan expanded to

696
cover the three main islands of the Japanese archipelago - Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku - over
time, Hokkaido, where the Ainu retained their own culture, remained outside Nihon until the
latter half of the nineteenth century when the Tokyo government confiscated the Ainu's land and
officially incorporated it into the Japanese territory. In the first half of the twentieth century,
Nihon expanded into Asia as a result of the Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula, the
colonization of Taiwan and the military occupation of parts of China and South-East Asia before
and during World War II. The Ryukyu Islands, situated in the south-west of Kyushu, had their
own kingdom and polity for centuries and were closely connected with the Asian continent and
the Pacific islands until incorporated as Okinawa prefecture in the Japanese state structure in the
late nineteenth century. After Japan's defeat in World War II, Okinawa was occupied by the
United States until its return to Japan in 1972. Thus, the Nihon we know today as a nation with 47
prefectural units stretching from Hokkaido to Okinawa is a post-1972 phenomenon. The Japanese
nation as kuni has, over time, inflated and deflated in size and has never been a fixed and
historically frozen entity.

Given Nihon s territorial fluidity, the definition of who Nihonjin (the Japanese nationals) are has
also vacillated over time. Korean residents in Japan, for example, were classified as having
Japanese citizenship until 1952 when they were reclassified as non-Japanese at the conclusion of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Furthermore, different individuals use different criteria to define
„Japanese‟, including citizenship, biological pedigree, language competence, place of residence,
place of socialization and so forth. Table 39.1 illustrates the variability of how Nihonjin are
defined, depending on which yardsticks are applied and in what way. If one does not simply rely
on citizenship criteria, many questions arise. Should soccer players, like Santos and Ramos, who
have obtained Japanese passports be regarded as more Japanese than expatriate Japanese who
have forfeited Japanese citizenship? What about the children of expatriate Japanese who have
grown up abroad, and for whom English is their first language? What about Japanese Latin
Americans who have come to live in Japan? To answer these questions, one can be exclusive and
argue that those who satisfy all the criteria (those who have a plus in each column) are real
Japanese. Conversely, one can be inclusive and maintain that those who meet at least one
criterion (those who have at least one plus in the columns) can be classified as Japanese. Of
course, there are many middle positions in between these two poles. These considerations
sensitize us to the larger question as to who has the right to decide who is and is not „Japanese‟.

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Such variability in the definition of Japan and the Japanese problematizes various forms of
Japanese national identity. This chapter attempts to sketch aspects of contemporary Japan's
nationalism by focusing on: (1) the context in which Japanese self-definition has involved duality
throughout the modernization processes; (2) the extent to which the paradigm of ethnic
nationalism prevailed in post-war Japan, taking both racial and cultural forms; (3) the way in
which a new paradigm of national integration has emerged as a consequence of the globalization
of the Japanese economy and the multiculturalization of the population; and (4) the demographic
patterns in which different groups consume competing national perspectives in the population.

DUALITY OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Nationalism in contemporary Japan is a product of its historical legacy and embodies

contradictory elements because its modernity has been built upon apparently mutually competing
forces. Japan was a late-developing country with colonial ambitions and participated in the
international competition of capitalism and colonialism after early developers such as Britain, the
United States and France had already made considerable inroads into the global market. Japan has
established itself as the most advanced economy outside the so-called „West‟. 1 The nation relied
substantially on both technological and cultural input from Western countries throughout its
modernization process. With its defeat in World War II, the country was occupied by the United
States for several years and still remains under the military umbrella of the United States.
Meanwhile, its leadership has made every attempt to maintain and develop what it deemed to be
Japanese civilization and culture and to avoid full-scale Westernization. Thus, Japan has been
both in the East and in the West, both at the centre and at the periphery, and both post-modern
and pre-modern. The geopolitical and socio-economic location of Japan as a „peripheral centre‟
(Arnason 2002) makes it an interesting testing ground for theories of nationalism.

Table 39.1 Various types of‘Japanese

698
Specific examples Nationality „Pure Language Place Current
(citizenship) Japanese competence of residence
genes‟ birth

Most Japanese + + + + +

Korean residents - - + + +
in Japan

Japanese + + + + -
businessmen
posted overseas

Ainu and + - + + +
naturalized
foreigners

First-generation - + + + -
overseas who
forfeited Japanese

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citizenship

Children of -/+ + +/- +/- -

Japanese overseas
settlers

Immigrant - - -/+ - +
workers in Japan

Third-generation - + -/+ - +
Japanese
Brazilians
working in Japan

Some returnee + + - + +
children

Some children of + + - - -
overseas settlers

700
Children of mixed + +/- + +/- +
marriage who live
in Japan

Third-generation - + - - -
overseas Japanese
who cannot speak
Japanese

Naturalized - - + + -
foreigners who
were born in
Japan but
returned to their
home country

Most overseas - - + - -/+

Japan specialists

Source: Adapted from Sugimoto (2003: 186)

701
When the Meiji Restoration of 1868 began the process of modernization and industrialization, the
nation's elite put into circulation the two key nationalist slogans made up of dualistic concepts
that clearly reflected their orientation. One of these slogans was wakon yosai (Japanese spirit and
Western technology), which tacitly conceded that Western countries were ahead of Japan in the
material, scientific and productive sphere, but stressed that Japan was superior in the cultural,
spiritual and mental domain (Kawamura 1994: 15-17). It was argued that these non-material
qualities represented the essence of Japan that should not be contaminated even if the nation
embraced Western technology. The separation of these fields enabled Japan to compete with
advanced countries in the area of universal technology, while also maintaining a grip on its
domestic culture.

The second slogan, datsua nyuo (quit Asia and join Europe), cast Asian countries as negative and
underdeveloped entities that Japan should dissociate itself from and European countries as
positive and advanced models that Japan needed to follow and eventually surpass. This attitude
formed the basis of Japan's Orientalism - or auto-Orientalism as some authors have termed it (Lie
2000). Over time, this view made the nation's elite highly conscious of its location in the
international pecking order vis-à-vis the United States and European countries and at the same
time served to justify the racial prejudice harboured by some Japanese against people in the Asian
region (Tsurumi 1982), which ultimately resulted in Japan's military aggression against East and
South-East Asia in the first half of the twentieth century.

Japan's ambivalent, conflicted relationship with both Asia and the West manifested itself
throughout its modernization process. Even while acknowledging its desire to „catch up‟ to
Europe before and during World War II when Japanese military aggression in Asia was in
progress, an anti-Western nationalist discourse in Japan maintained that this was a war against
Western imperialism to „liberate‟ Asian countries under white colonial rule (William 2000;
Wilson 2002). Though the argument simply served to justify Japan's own colonial ambitions, it
was highly persuasive at the time because of the duality, the Janus-faced nature of Japanese
nationhood. Even today this argument has its followers. For instance, the Japanese Society for
History Textbook Reform, a vocal historical revisionist group formed in 1997 to produce new
textbooks, regards the prevailing narratives of Japanese history as too negative and „masochistic‟
under the influence of two sets of external worldviews - Western ideology and Marxist
propaganda. More broadly, the question of how to „transcend Western modernity‟ has been a

702
thorny issue for a nation that attained a high degree of development without becoming fully
modern in the Western sense.

In more recent years, some analysts have drawn links between the „Japanese dilemma‟ and the
postcolonial discourse in Asia and beyond. In the „world system of knowledge‟, the Japanese
intellectual community is at the periphery, with its European and American counterparts
continuing to occupy the central position. The de-centralists argue that, despite Japan's economic
and technological dominance around the world, the imbalance remains in North America's and
Western Europe's favour in terms of intellectual exchange (Asquith 1999; Alatas 2001;
Kuwayama 2004). For example, a large quantity of Western books and articles are translated into
Japanese every year, but only a small number of Japanese publications are translated into English
and other influential European languages. The Japanese balance of payments in intellectual
commodities in the social sciences and humanities has consistently shown an excess of imports
against a deficit of exports. To a considerable degree, such imbalance is attributable to the
dominance of English as the lingua franca of international communication, the outworking of
what some call „English-language imperialism‟, in which the native speakers of English have a
distinctive advantage over non-natives. This de-centralist argument resonates with postcolonialist
discourse to the extent that Japan shares with Asian, African and Latin American states cultural,
psychological and mental subordination to their past colonial powers, although Japan's position is
more complex than most because, in a broad sense, it has been both colonizer and colonized.

After Japan's crushing defeat in World War II, the duality of Japanese nationalism took a
convoluted form, portraying the Japanese not as aggressors but as victims. The belligerent
militarist ideology of the pre-war and wartime period found little popular support. In its place,
however, moral support for various kinds of victims (for example, of the atomic bombs in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Tokyo Air Raid) shaped the nation's sense of togetherness.
„Victim nationalism‟, as it were, has galvanized collective self-pity and self-sympathy without
fully considering the victims of Japan's overseas acts of aggression. In the current political scene,
two different cases illustrate this. First, despite repeated protests by Korean and Chinese
governments, high-ranking Japanese politicians (including Prime Ministers and Cabinet members)
regularly visit the Yasukuni Shrine - a memorial to the nation's war dead (including Class A war
criminals from World War II) - because they know that such visits strike a chord with their
electorates. Second, news of the North Korean government's abduction of Japanese civilians in
the 1980s and 1990s for intelligence purposes stimulated mass support for the victims and the

703
popular demonization of North Koreans in the 2000s. This is in sharp contrast to the ambivalence
and hostility of the Japanese public's response to the claims of „comfort women‟, the large
number of mainly young Korean women abducted by the Japanese military during World War II
to serve as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers on the frontline (see Tanaka 2002; Ueno 2004). So
long as Japan remains a central power in the periphery, this type of duality and imbalance in
national consciousness is likely to continue to survive.

PREVALENCE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM

Japan's nationalism - both state-led and popular - has tended to advance its argument in ethno-
racial terms and to use the notion of Nihon minzoku as its central pillar. Minzoku, which literally
means a „folk tribe‟, represents a mixture of race and ethnicity and embodies a racial group with a
supposedly common biological extraction and ancestral lineage which shares an internally
homogeneous culture. Nihon minzoku, therefore, is an imagined Japanese race that forms
Japanese nationhood, cultivates Japanese ethnicity and relishes Japanese culture, making
nationhood (N), ethnicity (E) and culture (C) almost synonymous and interchangeable. Based on
this N = E = C equation (Sugimoto 2003), Japan's nationalism has often had an overtone of racial
exclusiveness that crystallizes in the notion of Nihon minzoku. At the same time, the Japanese
modern nation-state has been envisaged as kokka, a „national house‟ in which Nihon minzoku live
inside as a family to the exclusion of foreigners who are supposed to live outside the „house‟. The
family metaphor is consistent with the assumption of racial homogeneity.

Racial nationalism

The racially oriented nationalism of this sort prevails both at the state and popular levels.
Prominent politicians have often kindled controversies by invoking the images of Japanese racial
superiority. In 1986, then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone publicly avowed that the Japanese
had a higher level of intelligence than Americans and attributed the difference to Japanese racial
purity as opposed to America's racial heterogeneity. In 2000, Takao Koyama, then LDP member
of the House of Councillors, stated in the Japanese parliament that „nations (kokka), peoples
(kokumin) and races (minzoku) have their own DNA He was arguing that the Constitution that
was imposed on Japan by the American Occupation Forces right after World War II needed to be
revised to „become compat ible with Japan's DNA. 2 In the same year, Tokyo's Governor, Shintar
- Ishihara, publicly attributed a series of vicious crimes in the capital to the sangokujin (third-

704
country people, a derogatory term for Koreans, Chinese and other Asian residents in Japan), and
suggested that they might riot in the event of a natural disaster. 3 These sorts of views, which in
most advanced countries would only be advocated by the extreme racist Right, are, in Japan,
expressed by powerful mainstream politicians. This reflects the extent to which racial nationalism
remains a potent force in contemporary Japan and the degree of its political appeal at the
grassroots level.

A nationwide time-series survey conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics and

spanning half a century includes a problematic but intriguing question: „In a word, do you think
the Japanese are superior or inferior to Westerners?‟ The fact that a reputable survey research
centre has continued to ask such a question over five decades is in itself indicative of the extent to
which race consciousness prevails in Japan. The survey results, shown in Table 39.2, suggest
among other things that national self-esteem fluctuates in accordance with the nation's economic
performance. In the 1950s, when Japan was still suffering from wartime devastation, more
Japanese felt inferior to Westerners. With the start of the high-growth economy in the 1960s,
however, the Japanese regained national confidence and a sense of ethnic superiority. The pattern
culminated in the 1980s when the so-called bubble economy reached its peak. After the Japanese
economy stagnated and entered recession in the 1990s, such self-glorification gradually declined,
though a clear majority still felt superior to „Westerners‟. One can also observe that the
proportion of the Japanese population

who perceive no difference between the two groups has steadily increased over time. The trend is
consistent with a decline in support for the thesis that the Japanese are racially unique. This forms
a backdrop against which the racial criteria are gradually losing ground in Japan's national
identity debate, a point which we will take up later.

Even so, Japan's institutional and legal structure continues to sustain the nation's racial ideology.
The Nationality Law constitutes the bedrock of Japan's state nationalism. First, this law
emphasizes blood relations as the foundation of citizenship acquisition and thereby reinforces
Japan's self-image as an ethnically homogeneous nation. It stipulates that one can automatically
qualify as a Japanese national at birth if at least one parent possesses Japanese nationality. Even if
born in Japan, the children of foreign nationals cannot obtain Japanese citizenship without their
formal applications being approved by the Ministry of Justice. Secondly, the Nationality Law
disallows dual citizenship on the grounds that it is a dangerous arrangement that would threaten

705
national cohesion. Approximately half of the thirty-odd member states of the OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) accepts dual citizenship in one form
or another. Most of the G8 (Group of Eight) nations, made up of superpower economies, allow
their citizens to hold citizenships in other countries with some qualifications. Germany used to be
an exception but now belongs to the majority group after the German parliament passed
legislation that permits Turkish citizens to also become German nationals. This has left Japan as
the only G8 country unwilling to authorize dual citizenship.

For this reason, many Koreans living in Japan - even though a majority of them have resided
there for four or five generations - do so without Japanese citizenship. This, despite the fact that
their first language is Japanese and that they are culturally more familiar with Japan than with
Korea. Both South and North Korea share Japan's genetic approach to citizenship and as such
reject dual citizenship, which puts Korean residents in Japan in a kind of double bind.

Cultural nationalism: Nihonjinron

As racism has become increasingly unacceptable internationally, ethnically oriented nationalism

has shifted its focus from the hard racial dimension to a softer cultural one. The cultural mode of
nationalism manifested itself widely in post-war Japan in the form of the so-called Nihonjinron, a
genre of writings that literally means a theory of what it is to be Japanese and has established
itself as a field of its own with many bestsellers and perennial sellers in the publishing industry.
Most Nihonjinron literature emphasizes the uniqueness of Japanese psychology and culture,
stresses the exclusive superiority of the Japanese and gives its readers a sense of national pride
and self-esteem. The ideology of wakon yosai (Japanese spirit and Western technology) was
reinforced in numerous well-received books and articles written in this genre from the late 1960s
to the late 1980s. This, of course, was a period of Japan's spectacular economic advancement in
the international market, when overt political and militaristic nationalism was still taboo after the
defeat in World War II.

While the specific substance of Nihonjinron is wide-ranging, the genre is defined by a few
common features (Dale 1986; Mouer and Sugimoto 1986; Yoshino 1992; Befu 2001). The first is
the essentialist assumption that the Japanese are homogeneous and have a common set of cultural
characteristics and value orientations, regardless of their class, gender, age, region, occupation
and other sociological variables. Internal variation, diversity and stratification are either

706
unrecognized or ignored, with stereotypes being Nihonjinrons stock in trade. Secondly, the
literature is either explicitly or tacitly predicated upon the proposition that the uniformity of the
Japanese is derived from their racial commonality. Some advocates go so far as to argue that the
Japanese think and behave in the same way because they share a common bloodstream. Others
contend that the Japanese can understand each other with ease because they share the same
ethnicity. Thirdly, Nihonjinron use the so-called West as the yardstick against which Japan is
favourably compared. The West - the United States in particular - has been the significant „Other‟
for Nihonjinron analysts, which reflects the fact that Japan's cultural leaders have long been
preoccupied with the nation's standing vis-à-vis other industrialized countries. The datsua nyuo
and „catch-up and overtake‟ mentality that dominated the thinking of the pre-war Japanese elite
has remained a deep-rooted sentiment among post-war cultural nationalists. Fourthly,
methodologically, Nihonjinron writers have used arbitrarily chosen anecdotes, key words and
phrases and personal experiences as evidence for their claims and thereby made their publications
a form of popular entertainment rather than serious scholarly writings. As mass consumption
goods, Nihonjinron have penetrated into many sections of Japanese society and have become the
dominant way that the Japanese interpret and understand themselves and their culture. Fifthly,
these widely held views within Japan have contributed to the international stereotype of Japanese
national identity. While the Nihonjinron industry has recently declined with Japan's economic
stagnation, its main claims still remain influential and entrenched.

Isomorphism between mainstream and dissenting discourses

Dissenting groups typically build their counterarguments against mainstream institutions and
values with the same logical structure as that of Nihonjinron. The essentialist isomorphism
between groups at the centre and those at the periphery is evident. For example, minority groups
in Japan, as elsewhere, tend to define their minority culture in static and homogeneous terms.
When Korean residents in Japan endeavour to maintain what they see as Korean culture, their
framework resembles that of Nihonjinron to the extent that they take it for granted that there
exists a uniform and unchanging Korean national culture. New migrants to Japan are also inclined
to preserve a sense of their respective „national culture‟ and thereby become cultural nationalists
in a way similar to the majority Japanese who glorify Japanese tradition, cultural uniqueness and
national ethos.

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It is also the case that cultural nationalism àla Nihonjinron has been so pervasive in Japan that it
has been embraced not only by the political right but also by the left (Oguma 2002). In the 1950s
and 1960s, the Japan Communist Party adopted minzoku dokuritsu (independence of the Japanese
race from the United States) as an official slogan. Many Japanese public intellectuals who write
harsh critiques of Japanese society often deliver what might be called ethno-criticism, whereby
they develop theories of the „patterns‟, „deep structure‟ and „underlying tones‟ shared by all
Japanese regardless of their positions and locations in society and throughout Japanese history.
Though the substance of their argument may be opposed to the complacent self-glorification of
Nihonjinron, ultimately ethno-criticism only mirrors its ethnocentrism by perpetuating the
assumption of the ethnic uniformity of the Japanese.

The isomorphic correspondence stems from the fundamental dilemma that exists between
essentialism and de-centrism. When one portrays Japan as being a culturally peripheral nation in
the international community, one is on the slippery slope of essentialising Japan. When variations
within Japan are emphasized, however, the reality of Eurocentrism in the global context tends to
be diluted. Similarly, Korean residents in Japan, who advocate the maintenance of their Korean
ethnic culture, often unwillingly affirm the notion that cultures are uniform and homogeneous
entities. However, when they stress the internal diversity of Korean culture, they tend to attenuate
it, making it difficult to collectively impact the might of Japan's majority culture. In other words,
there exists a negative correlation between intra-societal and inter-societal cultural relativism.

„Developmental state‟ as efficient disseminating mechanism

The Japanese state has been well equipped to propagate state nationalism with its highly
centralized and efficient structure of ideological dissemination, at the core of which sits the state
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy constitutes one side of the so-called iron triangle of the
establishment - the other two sides being parliament and big businesses - and formulates long-
term state policies and programmes, often subjecting individual corporate interests in the private
sector to the imperatives of what it deems to be the national interest. This type of polity, referred
to as the „developmental state‟ (Johnson 1996), contrasts with that of Western capitalism in which
the market dominates with few state interventions. Japan represents the prototype of Asian
developmental states in which „plan rationality‟ takes precedence over „market rationality‟. Under
this system, state-programmed ideology can be disseminated and penetrate into the everyday life
of the Japanese with relative ease (Garon 1998; McVeigh 2003).

708
For instance, in the sphere of education, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology oversees the entire school system from primary through secondary to tertiary levels.
All textbooks used in government elementary and middle schools must be authorized by the
Ministry, and teachers are required to follow its official curriculum guidelines. At the community
level, households are organized compulsorily into neighbourhood associations known as ch ó
naikai, which serve, among other things, as the information dissemination channels for
governmental programmes and instructions. NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), public
broadcasters funded primarily by compulsory fees paid by all TV and radio owners, have
nationwide networks and have played a crucial role not only in the standardization of the
Japanese language and but also in the propagation of establishmentarian ideas (Krauss 2000)
since their foundation eight decades ago. Faced with the acceleration of globalization, however,
this centralized system of efficient ideology dissemination appears to be undergoing a profound
change.

PARADIGM SHIFT TO MULTICULTURAL NATIONAL INTEGRATION

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Japanese state is split over the usefulness of
ethnic nationalism as the major tool for national integration in the future. Japan's domestic reality
is more multi-ethnic than ever as a consequence of the influx of migrants into Japan. This is
attributable not only to the transnationalization of the economy but also to the twin processes of a
declining birth rate and increased longevity, which has made Japan a rapidly ageing society.
Japanese society is now unable to maintain itself without accepting a large number of foreign
migrants. Official statistics show that the total number of foreign nationals in Japan exceeds 1.3
million, 4 in addition to which about a quarter million undocumented foreigners reside in various
parts of the country. More significantly, some 5 per cent of marriages in Japan are now between
Japanese and non-Japanese nationals. 5

In the area of popular culture, Korean movie stars and singers have attained unprecedented
popularity in Japan, which suggests that a considerable segment of Japanese society is
increasingly oriented to multiculturalism. Japanese animation films have succeeded in the export
market by their makers „de-odorizing‟ their Japanese flavour (Iwabuchi 2002) and adopting a
more transcultural format. In Japanese spectator sports, professional soccer and baseball clubs are
already multiracial. In the supposedly traditional national sport of sumo (Japanese wrestling),

709
Mongolians, Hawaiians and East Europeans have dominated the top ranks to the dismay of old
nationalist fans.

Given that this trend is irreversible, if the Japanese state is to continue to unite the population via
some form of nationalism, it is faced with the challenge of generating a narrative that can both
accommodate the reality of increasing ethnic hybridity while still embracing a notion of national
homogeneity. To the extent that nationalism is a mechanism to reconcile the incongruence
between state and society, it makes sense that an increasing number of Japanese national leaders
has made every attempt to hijack a new form of nationalism to maintain their interest. In contrast
to the hitherto predominant framework which can be called „monocultural nationalism‟, the
emerging and increasingly prevalent paradigm can be labelled „multicultural nationalism‟. Table
39.3 contrasts both the demographic/ structural basis and the ideological components of the two
types. The multicultural discourse appears to be based on at least three features.

One ingredient concerns the extent to which citizenship rather than ethnicity is placed at the core
of Japanese identity. Loyalty to Japanese nationhood is measured in terms of whether one has
Japanese citizenship regardless of one's ethnic background. Multicultural national assimilation is
ostensibly based more on legal-rational principles than ethnic ones.

The growing emphasis on citizenship blurs the lines of demarcation between ethnic majority and
minority groups. Minorities such as old-comer Koreans who have permanent residency status
have gradually moved into the mainstream of Japanese society, while newcomer foreigners have
come to occupy its fringe. Some ten thousand individuals acquire Japanese citizenship every year,
including resident Koreans whose older generations have long refused to do so. Meanwhile, the
golden rule of not allowing dual citizenship remains intact and leaves no grey areas between
Japanese citizenship holders and others. The Japanese state continues to impose very strict border
control over refugees and accepts only a tiny number of them despite its ratification of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In the cultural sphere, symbols that glorify
Japanese sovereignty and citizenship have been increasingly reinforced. The governmental
machinery, for instance, forces schools to make their students sing the national anthem and hoist
the national flag on ceremonial occasions, a practice that used to be voluntary and discretional.
School teachers who do not follow the government instructions now face disciplinary measures.

710
Table 39.3 Competing orientations of two types of nationalism in Japan

Criteria Monocultural nationalism Multicultural nationalism

Ethnic variety in the Claim for mono-ethnic society Acceptance of multi-

nation ethnic reality

Domestic use of cultural Glorification of nostalgic symbols Enforcement of state

symbols symbols

Cultural symbols for Exotic and „traditional‟ Universal and „trans-

foreign consumption Japanese‟

Monarchy Patriarchal imperial system Acceptance of a female

head of state

Territorial issues Rallying points Consideration for

711
 economic relations

Foreign workers to be Preferential treatment of the Priority placed upon

recruited descendants of overseas Japanese skilled workers

Naturalization as Obstruct as much as possible Encourage to sustain the

Japanese economy

State structure Developmental state State under deregulation

and privatization

Trade Protectionist but export-oriented Free trade

trade

While it is difficult to make cross-national comparisons regarding the extent to which people
commit themselves to their citizenship, one measure might be the proportion of emigrants who
acquire citizenship of the country in which they permanently settle. Australian data suggest that
the percentage of those Japanese migrants who apply for Australian citizenship is distinctively
lower than that of any other ethnic group (Sato 2001: 159). Such attachment to Japanese
citizenship might well prove to be the bedrock of continuing Japanese multicultural nationalist
sentiments into the future.

712
The second ingredient relates to the way in which national sovereignty is emphasized. Advocates
of this orientation argue that Japan should become an „ordinary nation‟, one equipped with a fully
fledged, legitimated military congruent with its economic and technological power. To this end,
they urgently seek amendments of the existing constitution so as to transform the Self Defence
Forces into a fully legitimatized national military. Despite constitutional sensitivities, Japan's
leadership has now sent peace keeping forces overseas and thereby attempted to assume the status
of strategically capable sovereign nation. This blend of nationalists believe that, for the sake of its
national self-esteem, Japan should acquire a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United
Nations.

While all forms of nationalism identify territorial issues as the cornerstone of nationhood, it is
notable that multicultural nationalists are concerned with them primarily from economic rather
than ethnic perspectives to defend the fishing rights, oil fields and other natural resources around
the disputed territories in question. Vis-à-vis Russia, the Japanese government has long claimed
that four islands off the eastern coast of Hokkaido - Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu -
which are currently deemed to be Russian, rightfully belong to Japan. As such it argues for their
early return to Japanese sovereignty. Japan is also entangled in a territorial dispute over
Takeshima, a set of reefs off the coast of Shimane Prefecture. Koreans call them Tokdo and Seoul
claims sovereignty over them, whilst Tokyo argues that South Korea's occupation of them is
illegal. Another territorial conflict exists among Japan, China and Taiwan over the Senkaku
Islands (Tiaoyutai or Tiauyutai Islands in Chinese) near the main island of Okinawa. The three-
way dispute provokes nationalist sentiment on all sides, even though the islands in question are
small and uninhabited. In all these cases, while territorial issues provide rallying points for
monocultural nationalists, their multicultural counterparts tend to deal with them more softly so
as not to adversely affect economic relations between the countries involved.

The third feature is ostensibly paradoxical: multicultural nationalism requires internationalist

symbols to consolidate itself. International cooperation, cultural exchange programmes and sister-
city arrangements tend to sharpen rather than attenuate national consciousness. International
sporting events, international exhibitions and even international tourism foster a sense of „Us
versus Them‟, our nation versus their nation, and national identity versus otherness. Even
English-language education in Japanese schools is compatible with multicultural nationalism to
the degree to which it exaggerates differences between Japanese and English and attributes these
differences to the „national character‟ of the Japanese. It is no coincidence that the Japanese

713
government and cultural leaders began promoting kokusaika (the internationalization) of Japanese
society in the 1980s when multicultural nationalism was beginning to emerge. Inter-nationism
and multicultural nationalism are interdependent concepts bound together by the powerful
imagery that the world is divided into many sovereign nation states, each with its own internal
citizenship arrangements.

It is important to emphasize here that the multicultural national integration scheme has not
replaced the monocultural type. Rather, they coexist and not only compete with each other but
also mutually support each other. For instance, both types accept the notion that the emperor
symbolizes national unity and integrity, though the monocultural framework would adhere to the
conventional patriarchal system of successions and the multicultural one would contemplate the
possibility of a female head of state. Both orientations promote Japanese cultural symbols
internationally, although the monocultural type tends to rely on nostalgic, „traditional‟ and exotic
representations (such as the Japanese tea ceremony, flower arrangements and noh plays) and the
multicultural type is inclined to sell universal, „transcultural‟ and „translocational‟ images (such
as certain types of animations, youth music and comic stories).

DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALIST ORIENTATIONS 6

Different orientations to nationalism derive from different demographic bases. To examine the
consumption patterns of various perspectives, it would be helpful to consider two dimensions of
the globalization process - the market and the state. The first concerns the extent to which a given
group accepts or rejects the penetration of global, neoliberal market forces from the hegemonic
centres of the world, particularly the United States, into their domestic environment. The second
dimension relates to the extent to which a given group accepts or rejects national unity under the
state apparatus.

Criss-crossing these two axes, Figure 39.1 demonstrates four rival discourses that prevail in
different sectors of Japan, namely: (1) global cosmopolitans, who regard the process of
globalization as civilizing and the erosion of both the state and nationhood as desirable; (2)
multicultural nationalists, who promote interactions and intercommunications with other nation-
states while defending domestic national unity and state-based integration; (3) monocultural
nationalists, who advocate a strong state and the essence of„Japaneseness‟ and criticize
globalization as Americanization and Westernization; and (4) communitarian localists, who see

714
the penetration of the global market into the community as destructive, yet favour the reduction of
state control and the disintegration of national identity. These four analytical categories, whose
characteristics are exhibited in Table 39.4, are of course ideal types.

As in other developed countries, global cosmopolitans abound in the sectors that have reaped the
benefits of globalization. High-ranking employees of Japan's multinational enterprises travel the
world and often, for a short period, become business expatriates in foreign countries and thereby
acquire a global market-oriented perspective that rejoices in consumerism and detests the
interventions of national government agencies and officials (see Ohmae 1999). These
cosmopolitans are generally well educated, enjoy high incomes and communicate well in English.
Some have extravagant lifestyles at home and abroad and engage in fraternal conversations with
their overseas counterparts, with whom they share analogous educational backgrounds and
similar hobbies, such as golf and tennis. Cosmopolitans promote global arrangements designed to
weaken the control of national bureaucrats over the affairs of sovereign states. Those in the IT
industry and in import and export businesses also tend to develop this type of value orientation
because of their daily exposure to the world beyond their national boundaries.

Multicultural nationalists differ from global cosmopolitans in defending, sometimes even wishing
to expand, the integrative power of the state and Japan's sense of national unity. They do this,
however, while accepting the necessity for Japan to increase cross-border economic transactions
and cross-cultural interactions more generally. Their internationalization paradigm differs from
that of the globalization promoted by cosmopolitans in that it envisions a future in which
mutually exclusive and internally cohesive nation-states interact with each other. Hence, in this
paradigm it is assumed that the governance structure of the international system of competing
nation-states will remain unchallenged, with the internal regulatory power of each state remaining
intact. The collaboration of the main agents of consumer capitalism and the machinery of the state
would, in their model, be ensured. If profit motives are predominant amongst cosmopolitans,
„national interests‟ remain uppermost in the minds of multicultural nationalists.

„Adaptive‟ politicians and „enlightened‟ bureaucrats in Japan tend to take this stance. As the
guardians of the Japanese nation-state, they seek to adjust the state structure in response to
changing external economic circumstances without undermining their governing control over it.
The „enlightened‟ urban middle class, employed mainly by large corporations, also tend to adopt
the multicultural nationalist position. They are all too aware that Japan's economy is firmly

715
intertwined with the outside world, a situation that requires smooth international relations. Even
so, their lives are so intricately connected with the national systems of employment, welfare,
education and taxation that they never dream of abandoning their commitment to Japan's
nationhood.

Table 39.4 Some characteristics of four types in Japan

Comparative Global Multicultural Monocultural Communitarian

Criteria cosmopolitans nationalists nationalists localists

Market + + - -

State - + + -

Benefits from Full Great Little Negative

multinationals

Linkage with Some Close Close Limited

the political
establishment

716
Relations with Borderlessness Co-existence Japanization Glocalization
other
countries

Foreign Accept as many Accept skilled Limit foreign Defend the

migrants migrants as the workers only migration as rights and the
domestic to make the much as quality of life of
economy national possible to migrants
requires economy retain national
competitive stability

Citizenship Global National Exclusively Equal rights

citizenship; citizenship national between
dual citizenship (status quo) citizenship citizens and
non-citizens;
voting rights for
permanent
residents

Some visible Executives of Many Farmers; self- NGOs and

groups multinational mainstream employed NPOs; citizens'
corporations; mass media; independent movements;
IT urban middle business some ethnic
professionals; class; large people; new minorities;
international corporations, history housewife

717
 sports people; cultural textbook activists
technocrats; exchange movement;
overseas promoters; „petit
sojourners adaptive nationalist‟
government youngsters
officials

Monocultural nationalist sentiments are most prevalent among the agricultural and small,
independent business sectors, both of which find it necessary to safeguard their vested interests
against the penetration of international market forces. In one public opinion survey after another,
farmers and self-employed small business people demonstrate strong nationalist leanings of this
type. Like their counterparts elsewhere, Japanese farmers and their families feel vulnerable to
agricultural produce, meat products, dairy commodities and other cost-competitive imports.
Obviously it is in the interest of these farmers for the Japanese government to adopt protectionist
policies, to provide them with farm subsidies and to further raise import taxes on agricultural
goods. For small self-supporting businesses, globalization represents the threat of multinationals
and big business organizations making inroads into, and eventually taking over, the limited
markets that they serve. Small shop managers, subsidiary and subcontracting manufacturers,
family business owners and other petty independent, self-supporting proprietors have networks of
self-protection. Shops at shoten-gai (shopping streets) provide solid voting blocs of support for
particular politicians and thereby exercise considerable political clout.

Communitarian localists comprise a variety of community groups that have found themselves
subjected to the adverse effects of global market forces, yet remain opposed to an expansion of
government power. Many of these groups take part in what are broadly called citizens'
movements, which are organized by individual volunteers concerned about specific issues in their
local community. Such issues include environmental destruction, residential degradation, ethnic
prejudice, gender discrimination and many others that impart upon the everyday lives of citizens
at the community level. These citizen groups emphasize quality of life, voluntary cooperation and
the spontaneity of grassroots activities. Civic, localist thinking is common among students,
housewives, senior citizens and some sections of the casual workforce - groups that are distant
from the power centres of the state and are not directly connected with the capitalist order of

718
production and distribution. They tend to view the activities of both market-oriented companies
and power-oriented state machineries as detrimental to human communities and natural
environments alike. Many of these localists identify themselves not so much with the Japanese
nation state as with kuni at community and regional levels, as discussed at the beginning of this
chapter.

The benefits and costs of globalization are variously distributed among different classes and other
social groupings and this creates a diversity of views about the desirability, as well as the form, of
Japan's nationhood. With neither nationalism nor anti-nationalism monopolizing the public
discourse, national integration or disintegration in Japan rests upon the shifting balance between
rival groups and a set of complex dynamics of their competing perspectives.

NOTES

1 To the extent that „Japan‟ and the „West‟ are cultural constructs, we would almost always have
to put these terms in brackets, though we generally try not to do so to avoid unnecessary
cumbersomeness.

2 Asahi Shimbun morning edition, 28 March 2000.

3 Asahi Shimbun evening edition, 10 April 2000.

4 2000 national census.

5 Statistics of population dynamics compiled by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in
2003.

6 An earlier version of this section appeared in Sugimoto (2005).

719
Figure 39.1 Four-fold typology of competing orientations to the state and the market

720
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Gries, Peter. "China and Chinese Nationalism." Pp. 488-99

On 4 August 2003, construction workers in China's north-eastern city of Qiqihar uncovered and
mistakenly ruptured five drums of mustard gas left behind from the wartime Japanese occupation.
Dozens were injured and one man died. Chinese newspapers carried gory photos of the injured
and their chemical burns, and the popular reaction to the news was fast and furious. Chinese
Internet chat-rooms were filled with anti-Japanese invective. A million signatures were rapidly
gathered on an Internet petition demanding that the Japanese government thoroughly resolve the
chemical weapons issue. The petition was hand-delivered to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing on
4 September as Chinese and Japanese diplomats were negotiating compensation for the victims of
the Qiqihar accident. Petition organizer and cyber-nationalist Lu Yunfei later said that he sought
to „put pressure on the Japanese government‟. 1

The popular Chinese reaction to the Qiqihar incident was no aberration; indeed, it stood in the
middle of a long summer and fall of anti-Japanese activity in China (see Gries 2005). In June,
Internet activists organized the first ever Mainland Chinese trip to the contested Diaoyu/Senkaku
2
Islands east of China. In July, nationalists organized a Web-based petition to deny Japan a
Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail link contract. In August, rather than celebrate the 25th
anniversary of the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Chinese and Japanese
diplomats spent much of the month doing damage control after the Qiqihar mustard gas incident.
In September, the disclosure of a sex party involving hundreds of Japanese businessmen and
Chinese prostitutes in the southeast city of Zhu Hai sparked another flurry of anti-Japanese
invective on the Internet. And in October, a risquéskit by three Japanese students and one of their
teachers at Northwestern University in Xian led to a 7,000-strong demonstration on campus and
nationwide condemnation. Anti-Japanese activity seemed to be everywhere: as Hong Kong's Sing
Pao Daily (2003) put it in December: „Chinese feelings of hatred for the Japanese are rising
without interruption.‟

The events of 2003 should be understood in the broader context of the swelling tide of popular
nationalism that began in mid-1990s China. In 1996 came the publication of the best-selling book
China Can Say No and a host of copycat anti-American and anti-Japanese diatribes. With Hong
Kong's „return to the motherland‟ from Britain in 1997, Chinese eagerly anticipated the „erasing
of the national humiliation‟. The furious popular reaction to the US bombing of the Chinese

722
embassy in Belgrade in 1999, taken with the firebombing of the US consul's residence in
Chengdu and a near siege of the US Embassy in Beijing, revealed that feelings of humiliation
persisted. And the two weeks of US-China „apology diplomacy‟ following the 2001 plane
collision between a US EP-3 and a Chinese F-8 demonstrated that nationalism remained a major
determinant of Chinese (and US) foreign policy. As we have seen, 2003 witnessed a flurry of
anti-Japanese activities that led some pundits to declare 2003 the year of„Internet nationalism‟
(Guoji xianqu daobao 2003). At the turn of the twenty-first century, a new nationalism has
emerged in China.

NATION AND NATIONALISM IN CHINA

How should this new nationalism in China be understood? Is Chinese nationalism a threat to the
West and to China's neighbors? Or is it a natural product of China's developmental experience?

The dominant Western view of Chinese nationalism today is that it is „party propaganda‟,
constructed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to legitimize its rule. With the crisis of
communism, the Party elite is seen as fomenting nationalism to maintain its grip on power.
Thomas Christensen (1996: 37) expressed this dominant view succinctly in an influential Foreign
Affairs article: „Since the Chinese Communist Party is no longer communist, it must be even
more Chinese.‟

This „party propaganda‟ view of Chinese nationalism is not wrong - the CCP clearly seeks to use
nationalism - but, as even the brief discussion above of the Qiqihar incident reveals, it is far from
complete (see Gries 2004). By focusing exclusively on the CCP and its „state‟ or „official‟
nationalism, the orthodox view fails to capture the independent role that the Chinese people (like
Lu Yunfei) are increasingly playing in nationalist politics. A genuinely bottom-up and popular
nationalism has emerged in China - one that, as the 1999 Belgrade bombing and 2003 Qiqihar
protests reveal, the CCP has its hands full just containing.

The view of Chinese nationalism as „propaganda‟ is also rationalist and thus fails to explain the
passions so clearly evident in Chinese nationalist politics today. Chinese nationalism is not just
about the instrumental pursuit of China's national interest; it is also about what it means to be
„Chinese‟ today. Indeed, sense and sensibility often conflict, as when the popular anti-Japanese

723
protests of 2003 contributed to a deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations, jeopardizing China's
interest in maintaining stable relations with a vital trade partner.

In short, the „party propaganda‟ view of Chinese nationalism today fails to capture the role of
popular passions in Chinese nationalist politics.

WHERE DO THESE POPULAR PASSIONS COME FROM?

This chapter argues that to understand Chinese nationalism today, one must engage Chinese
understandings of their identity, and that national identities are constituted in large part through
stories told about the national past. Historian F. W Mote (1999: xv) has argued that „ignorance of
China‟s cultural tradition and historical experience is an absolute barrier to comprehending China
today'. I agree. To comprehend Chinese nationalism today, however, even more important than
understanding the Chinese past itself is an understanding of how Chinese themselves narrate their
national past. Narratives are the stories that we tell about our pasts. These stories, personality
psychologists have argued, infuse our identities with unity, meaning and purpose (McAdams
1996; Singer and Salovey 1993). We cannot, therefore, radically change them at will.
Sociologists Anthony Giddens and Margaret Somers maintain that narratives infuse identities
with meaning. Giddens (1991: 5) argues that narratives provide the individual with „ontological
security‟: „The reflexive project of the self … consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet
continually revised, biographical narratives.‟ Somers (1994: 618) contrasts „representational
narratives‟ (selective descriptions of events) with more foundational „ontological narratives‟: „the
stories that social actors use to make sense of - indeed, to act in - their lives. [They] define who
we are.‟ The storied nature of social life, in short, infuses our identities with meaning. „Identities,‟
Stuart Hall notes, „are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position
ourselves in, the narratives of the past‟ (see Olick and Robbins 1998: 122).

Following Elie Kedourie (1993 [1960]: 141), who noted that nationalism „is very much a matter
of one‟s self-view, of one's estimation of oneself and one's place in the world,' this chapter takes a
social psychological approach to nationalism. Specifically, it follows social identity theorists (SIT)
in defining national identity as the aspect of an individual's self-concept that derives from his or
her perceived membership in a national group (see Tajfel 1981: 255). Nationalism is here
understood as the commitment to protect and enhance national identity.

724
The chapter begins by exploring three „pasts‟ central to constructions of Chinese nationalism
today: the „5,000 Years‟, the „100 Years‟ and the „Ten Years‟. These pasts together help
constitute what it means to be „Chinese‟ at the dawn of the twenty-first century. It then seeks to
move beyond the elite instrumentalism of the party propaganda view by exploring the roles that
the Chinese people and their passions play in Chinese nationalism today.

THE 5,000 YEARS: THE BURDENS OF ‘CIVILIZATION’

Pride in the superiority of China's „5,000 years of Civilization‟ is central to nationalism in China
today. Xiao Gongqing (1994), an outspoken neo-conservative intellectual, advocated the use of a
nationalism derived from Confucianism to fill the ideological void opened by the collapse of
communism. The mid-1990s, indeed, witnessed a revival of interest in Confucianism. The CCP,
which only 20 years earlier in 1974 had launched a campaign to „Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize
Confucius‟, ironically became an active sponsor of Confucian studies. President Jaing Zemin
himself attended the 1994 celebration of Confucius's 2,545th birthday (Guo Yingjie 2004: 35).

Popular nationalist writings also frequently evince pride in China's „Civilization‟. The cover of a
1997 Beijing Youth Weekly, for instance, has „Chinese Defeat Kasparov!‟ splashed across a
picture of the downcast Russian chess grand master. Two of the six members of the IBM research
group that programmed Deep Blue, it turns out, were Chinese-Americans. „It was the genius of
these two Chinese‟, one article asserts, „that allowed Deep Blue to defeat Mr. Kasparov‟. Entitled
„We Have the Best Brains‟, the article concludes that „we should be proud of the legacy of “5,000
years of civilization” that our ancestors have left for us‟ (Beijing qingnian zhoukan 1997: 30).
Blood and culture are frequently fused in Chinese discourse of „Civilization‟.

The 5,000 Years are more frequently deployed, however, to construct Chinese superiority over a
threatening United States - not lowly Russia. For instance, in the 1996 diatribe Surpassing the
USA, authors Xi Yongjun and Ma Zaizhun amuse themselves with „a few theatrical and rather
comical juxtapositions‟. They begin with clichés. China is the world's richest spiritual civilization,
America the most advanced material civilization; China is the collectivist capital, America an
individualist's heaven. Xi and Ma then become playful and self-indulgent: America has but two
hundred years of history, while China's Tongrentang Pharmacy alone is 388 years old; the
American Declaration of Independence was a handwritten document of but four thousand words,
while China's „great‟ „Four Books‟ was printed on the world's first press and contains over three

725
billion characters (Xi Yongjun and Ma Zaizhun 1996: 3-4). The authors clearly intend to establish
Chinese superiority at America's expense.

Just as many in the West use the „Orient‟ to define themselves, many in the East clearly deploy
the „Occident‟ to the same ends. The text on the back cover of the „Sino-American Contest‟, a
special 1996 issue of the provincial Chinese magazine Love Our China, for instance, begins with
some contrasts: „China has 5,000 years of civilized history … while America has only 200 years
of history.' It then turns to insults: „Facing an ancient Eastern colossus, America is at most a
child.‟ „Emotion-cues‟, sociologist Candace Clark (1990: 314) reminds us, „can be used to
manipulate, reminding and counter-reminding each other of judgments of the proper place.‟ By
„altercasting‟ America as a child, China can play the superior elder (see Weinstein and
Deutschberger 1963). Following Edward Said's discussion of „Orientalism‟, such Chinese uses of
the West have been labeled „Occidentalism‟, a „deeply rooted practice [in China] of alluding to
the Occident as a contrasting Other in order to define whatever one believes to be distinctively
“Chinese”‟ (Chen Xiaomei 1995: 39).

The 5,000 Years are also central to the dream of a „prosperous country and a strong army‟, which
still inspires Chinese nationalists over a century after it was first promoted by late Qing-dynasty
reformers. People's Liberation Army writer Jin Hui (1995: 186-7) writes that „For over one
hundred years, generation after generation of Chinese have been dreaming that since we were
once strong, although we are now backwards we will certainly become strong again.‟ The
„unlimited cherishing of past greatness‟, Jin laments, is tied to overconfi-dence that „in the future,
we will certainly be “first under heaven”‟. Such „illusions‟, Jin Hui warns, are „even worse than
spiritual opiates.‟

The burdens of Civilization can certainly lead to self-delusions, as Jin argues; they can also lead
to racism. In 1995, for example, Vice Chair of the National People's Congress Tian Jiyun
declared that „The IQs of the Chinese ethnicity, the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, are very
high (Sautman 1997: 79). „Confucian nationalism‟ is not an oxymoron: Confucianism allows for
the reinforcement of cultural boundaries when barbarians do not accept Chinese values. The
„universal‟ „all under heaven‟ can and often has become a closed political community (Duara
1995). Historian Lei Yi (1997: 49-50) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing has
used the phrase „ “Sinocentric” cultural nationalism‟ to describe such views. The Confucian
world was not „one big happy family‟, but extremely Sinocentric, involving a „fierce racism,

726
rejection of other cultures … and cultural superiority'. In China, cultural and ethnic nationalism
are frequently intertwined.

THE 100 YEARS: A ‘CENTURY OF HUMILIATION’

Narratives about the „Century of Humiliation‟ frame the ways that Chinese interact with the West
today. This period begins with China's defeat in the First Opium War and the British acquisition
of Hong Kong in 1842. The period was marked by major wars between China and the Western
powers or Japan: the two Opium Wars of 1840-42 and 1856-60, the Sino-Japanese „Jiawu‟ War
of 1894-95, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the „War of Resistance against Japan‟ of 1931/1937-
1945. 3 Many educated Chinese today are painfully aware of the „unequal treaties‟ signed with the
British at Nanjing in 1842 and the Japanese at Shimoneseki in 1895. Unilateral concessions
forced on the Chinese in these treaties, such as indemnities, extraterritoriality and foreign
settlements in the treaty ports, are still perceived as humiliating losses of sovereignty. Other
symbols of the period still resonate with today's nationalists. The stone ruins of the Old Summer
Palace outside Beijing, looted and burned by Europeans in 1860, are a reminder of the „rape‟ of
China. Lin Zexu, a famous Chinese crusader against opium and British aggression, still stands for
Chinese courage and virtue.

The Century of Humiliation is neither an objective past that works insidiously in the present nor a
mere „invention‟ of present-day nationalist entrepreneurs. Instead, the Century is a continuously
reworked narrative about the national past central to the contested and evolving meaning of being
„Chinese‟ today.

Furthermore, the Century is a traumatic and foundational moment because it fundamentally

challenged Chinese views of the world. In Chinese eyes, earlier invaders became Chinese, while
barbarians beyond the border paid humble tribute to „Civilization‟. Both practices reinforced a
view of Chinese civilization as universal and superior. Early encounters with „big noses‟, from
Marco Polo to pre-nineteenth-century European and American traders and missionaries, did not
challenge this view. „Our ancient neighbors‟, writes one young Chinese nationalist, „found glory
in drawing close to Chinese civilization‟ (Li Fang 1996: 23). The violent nineteenth-century
encounter with the „West‟ was different. The Central Kingdom was not only defeated militarily,
but was also confronted by a civilization with universalist pretensions of its own. „The Western
impact‟, writes Tu Weiming (1991: 2),„fundamentally dislodged Chinese intellectuals from their

727
Confucian haven … [creating a] sense of impotence, frustration, and humiliation.‟ The „Western
devils‟ had a civilization of their own that challenged the universality and superiority of
Confucian civilization. The traumatic confrontation between East and West fundamentally
destabilized Chinese views of the world and their place within it. „Trauma brings about a lapse or
rupture in memory that breaks continuity with the past,‟ writes historian Dominick LaCapra
(1998: 9) in a discussion of the Holocaust. „It unsettles narcissistic investments and desired self-
images‟. Just as the trauma of the Holocaust led many in the postwar West to re-examine their
tradition (see Horkheimer and Adorno 2002 [1944]), the Century threatened a Chinese identity
based upon the idea of a universal and superior civilization. „The Israelis‟ vision of the Holocaust
has shaped their idea of themselves,' Tom Segev (1993: 11) writes, „just as their changing sense
of self has altered their view of the Holocaust and their understanding of its meaning.‟ Since
stories about the past both limit and define our national identities in the present, the same is true
of the Chinese and the Century of Humiliation; Chinese visions of the Century have shaped their
sense of self, and these changes to Chinese identity have altered their views of the Century.

Today, Chinese struggles to come to terms with this period of trauma are reflected in the
emergence of new narratives about the Century. Under Mao, China's pre-„Liberation‟ (1949)
sufferings were blamed on the feudalism of the Qing Dynasty and Western imperialism, and the
anti-feudal, anti-imperialist masses were valorized for throwing off their chains and repelling
foreign invaders. This „heroic‟ or „victor‟ national narrative first served the requirements of
Communist revolutionaries seeking to mobilize popular support in the 1930s and 1940s, and later
served the nation-building goals of the People's Republic in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. One
1950s movie about the First Opium War, for instance, changed its title from The Opium War to
Lin Zexu to glorify Chinese heroism. New China needed heroes.

During the 1990s, however, the official Maoist „victor narrative‟ was joined by a new and popular
„victimization narrative‟ that blames „the West‟, including Japan, for China's suffering. This „new‟
storyline actually renews the focus on victimization in pre-Mao Republican-era writings on the
Century (Cohen 2002: 17). Indeed, the trope of China as a raped woman, common in Republican
China but unpopular during the Maoist period, has re-emerged. In Republican China, playwrights
like Xiao Jun used rape in nationalist plays such as Village in August, in which Japanese soldiers
rape a patriotic peasant woman (see Lydia Liu 1994). The return of the „rape of China‟ theme
may be seen in such bestsellers as Chinese-American Iris Chang's The Rape of Nanking (1997).
This book helped transform the 1937 Nanjing massacre into a „rape‟.

728
The contrast between „victor‟ and „victim‟ national narratives is nicely captured in two Chinese
movies about the First Opium War of 1840-42. Lin Zexu (1959), mentioned above, is a story of
the Chinese people's heroic anti-imperialist struggle. Named Lin Zexu to highlight resistance, it
does not focus solely on Commissioner Lin, but emphasizes his close relations with a peasant
couple who seek vengeance against Eliot, the evil British trader who had killed the peasant
woman's father. Lin and the Chinese people are one in an upbeat tale of popular defiance. Opium
War (1997), by contrast, is an unmitigatedly dark and depressing tragedy of the past (see Karl
2001). It is only at the very end of the movie, with the image of a stone lion and the message that
„On July 1,1997 the Chinese government recovered sovereignty over Hong Kong,‟ that China is
redeemed. Director Xie Jin's vision of the past is one of opium addicts and humiliation; his vision
of the present and future is one of mighty lions awakening to exact their revenge. A victim in the
past, China will be a victim no longer.

The year 1997 seems to have been a pivotal moment in the re-emergence of the victimization
narrative in China. The countdown to Hong Kong's „Return to the Motherland‟ in the spring and
summer of 1997 created a strong desire to „wipe away‟ the „National Humiliation‟. And in the fall
of 1997, 60th anniversary commemorations of the Nanjing massacre, as well as Iris Chang's book
about it, directed Chinese attention to their past suffering as never before. Anticipating closure on
the „Humiliation‟, many Chinese paradoxically reopened a long-festering wound. For many
Chinese nationalists, this painful encounter with past trauma was expressed in the language of
victimization.

The China of 1997 may thus prove to be comparable to 1961 Israel, when Eichmann's trial
precipitated a dramatic shift in Israeli attitudes towards the Holocaust. The repression of
Holocaust memories in the name of the nation-building (creating a „New Israel‟) that prevailed in
the late 1940s and 1950s gave way to a new identification with victimization in the 1960s. The
early post-war Israeli rejection of victimhood is reflected in the evolution of Holocaust Day,
which was established only in 1953 and did not become a mandatory national holiday until 1959
(see Zerubavel 1995). Early Holocaust Day commemorations emphasized the „martyrs and heroes‟
of the ghetto resistance, not the victims of the concentration camps who were memorialized in
later tributes. China is now undergoing a similar process, as long-suppressed memories of past
suffering resurface. Chinese nationalism since the 1990s cannot be understood without taking
note of this new encounter with the traumas of the past.

729
Despite the new focus on „victimization‟, heroic narratives about the Century of Humiliation have
not disappeared. Narratives of „China as victor‟ and „China as victim‟ co-exist in Chinese
nationalism today. The Century is arguably both what psychologist Vamik Volkan calls a „chosen
glory‟ and what he calls a „chosen trauma‟ (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). The publisher's preface
to a series of books entitled „Do not forget the history of national humiliation‟ is typical,
describing the Century as both a „history of the struggle of the indomitable Chinese people
against imperialism‟, and a „tragic history of suffering, beatings, and extraordinary humiliations‟.
Many Chinese nationalists, it seems, are eager to capitalize on the moral authority of their past
suffering. But there is a downside to the new „victimization narrative‟. It entails confronting
vulnerability and weakness. The enduring need for heroism and a „victor narrative‟ serves, it
seems, to allay the fears of those who are not yet ready to directly confront the trauma of the 100
Years.

THE TEN YEARS: MAOIST MELANCHOLY, RED GUARD ENVY

The „Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution‟, later known as the „Ten Years of Chaos‟, engulfed
China from 1966 to 1976, when Mao Zedong died. Mobilized by Mao to attack his enemies in the
Party bureaucracy, young Red Guards both denounced and violently attacked their teachers, local
Party officials, their parents, and each other.

The thirty-something „fourth generation‟ of young Chinese nationalists today grew up after the
Cultural Revolution in the relative prosperity of China under reform. The Ten Years of Chaos has
nonetheless left an indelible imprint upon them. Ironically, the fourth generation appears to find
the new victimization narrative of Chinese suffering at the hands of Western imperialists
appealing precisely because they, unlike their elders, have never suffered. The first generation of
revolutionaries endured the hardships of the anti-fascist and civil wars of the 1930s and 1940s.
The second generation suffered during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward
of the late 1950s. And the third generation of Red Guards was sent down to the countryside
during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s. The fourth generation of PRC youth,
by contrast, grew up with relative material prosperity under Reform in the 1980s and 1990s. 4 In
their 1997 psycho-autobiography The Spirit of the Fourth Generation, Song Qiang and several of
his co-authors of the 1996 nationalist diatribes China Can Say No and China Can Still Say No are
envious of the third generation who, „proud of their hardships‟, can celebrate them at Cultural
Revolution restaurants like Heitudi (The Black Earth) in Beijing, nostalgically eating fried corn

730
bread, recalling the good old, bad old days. They then ask, „Are we an unimportant generation?‟
In a section entitled „How Much Longer Must We be Silent?‟, they lament that „We in our thirties
are without a shadow or a sound … it seems that we will perish in silence‟ (Song Qiang et al.
1997: 206, 202). Many of this generation, it seems, have a strong desire to make their mark. And
they seek to do so through nationalism.

In the 1990s, young conservatives compared Beijing Spring 1989 to the Cultural Revolution to
justify the government clampdown on June 4th. The specter of chaos was brandished to assert the
need for national unity and authoritarian CCP rule. More broadly, many fourth generation
nationalists today have selfconsciously defined themselves against the „Liberal „80s‟. Sociologist
Karl Mannheim (1952) long ago argued that the formative events of youth mark each generation
(see also Halbwachs 1980). Late-1980s experiences like the pro-Western „River Elegy‟ television
sensation and Beijing Spring 1989 came at a pivotal time in the lives of Chinese nationalists now
in their thirties. Today's nationalists frequently dismiss the 1980s as a period of dangerous
„romanticism‟ and „radicalism‟; they then depict themselves as „realistic‟ and „pragmatic‟
defenders of stability and order (see Xu Ben 2001).

Even as they condemn the Ten Years of Chaos, however, many Chinese nationalists are both
nostalgic for Mao and have embraced the Red Guard style. 5 The Mao craze of the mid-1990s was
motivated in part by a pronounced nostalgia for Mao's tough, stand-tall image (see Barmé1996).
Many young Chinese nationalists did not have the patience for Deng Xiaoping's economics-first
strategy of „biding one‟s time'. Instead, they were wistful for the days of Mao's tough talk and
violent confrontation with the US in Korea and Vietnam.

The Red Guard style of take-no-prisoners nationalism in China today is well exemplified by the
popular reactions to the „Zhao Wei wears the Imperial Japanese flag‟ and „Jiang Wen goes to
Yasukuni‟ affairs that occurred in late 2001 and the summer of 2002.

The September 2001 issue of the state-run Fashion magazine features a picture of Chinese
model/actress Zhao Wei wearing a short dress with an Imperial Japanese flag imprinted upon it.
On 3 December 2001 a Hunan newspaper ran an exposé on the photo, igniting widespread
Internet condemnation and national coverage (Zhang Datian 2001). During the week of 3-10
December, over 6,000 mostly angry messages about the Zhao Wei affair were posted on the
popular website Sina.com (Japan Economic Newswire 2001). And words were linked with action:

731
protestors used bricks and bottles to smash Zhao's house in Wuhu City in Anhui Province (Straits
Times 2001).

On 10 December Zhao Wei made a public apology, which was first circulated on the Internet, and
later broadcast on national television. Zhao declared that she had learned „an excellent lesson‟
about this period of history. „In the future, I will be more careful about what I say and do … and
work hard to improve myself (Beijing qingnianbao 2001).

Some Chinese nationalists, however, refused to accept Zhao Wei's apology. At a New Year's Eve
event held at Changsha on 28 December, an enraged man rushed up on stage, pushed Zhao over
and smeared excrement on her dress.

During most of the controversy, Zhao Wei herself was in Xinjiang filming Warriors of Heaven
and Earth. Coincidentally, the film's male protagonist, played by actor/director Jiang Wen,
became the subject of another Japan controversy the following summer. On 27 June 2002 a
Tianjin newspaper ran an exposéthat Jiang had been to Yasukuni Shrine several times (Beijing
chenbao 2002). Yasukuni is a shrine in Tokyo where Japanese go to honor their war dead,
including executed war criminals from World War II. When Japanese politicians go there to
worship, Chinese nationalists view it as a sign of Japanese militarism and Japan's continuing lack
of repentance for wartime aggressions against China. Some Chinese thus took offense at Jiang's
Yasukuni trip. In the view of many Chinese nationalists, Jiang's „nationalist integrity‟ was now
suspect (Shen Xiaoma 2002).

Many in China's cultural elite, however, boldly and publicly defended Jiang. They argued that
Jiang had gone to Yasukuni to do research for his film Devils on the Doorstep, and that „visiting‟
Yasukuni was a far cry from „worshipping‟ there. Author Shi Tiesheng declared that „a director
trying to understand the crimes of militarism is not the same as standing on the side of militarism‟.
Director Tian Zhuangzhuang similarly insisted that „Jiang Wen is an artist with a clear sense of
right and wrong, and an extremely strong sense of racial responsibility‟ (see Chen Yifei 2002).
Director Feng Xiaogang, „indignant‟ at the anti-Jiang media coverage, claimed that it was using
Gang of Four (read: Cultural Revolution) style methods: „The shadow of the extreme “left”
persists in the thinking and behavior of many people today‟ (Yu Shaowen 2002).

732
I agree with Feng. A winner-takes-all, show-no-mercy style reminiscent of the Cultural
Revolution is prevalent in Chinese nationalist discourse today. Many cyber-nationalists exhibit a
ferocious, Red Guard style: words and deeds that seek to literally silence one's opponents, from
physically assaulting both Zhao Wei's house and her body to accusations of treason against Jiang
Wen to widespread death threats against Chinese liberals.

POPULAR PASSIONS AND THE FATE OF THE NATION

Over the past quarter century, the constructivist and rational choice revolutions that have swept
the social sciences have synergized in studies of nationalism. Nationalist elites, Benedict
Anderson (1993 [1983]) and Eric Hobsbawm (1983) have taught us, construct nations and their
traditions.

By focusing on the writing of nationalist histories, this new approach has successfully combated
the „pastism‟ of earlier scholarship that held that deep-rooted animosities from the past
predetermine present-day nationalist conflict. But the over-correction of the problem of „pastism‟
has generated a new problem: „presentism‟, an extreme constructivism that leaves readers with
the impression that the past is a blank slate that nationalists can rewrite at will. In „presentist‟
scholarship, the weight of the past is lost.

In this chapter I have argued that the 5,000 Years, the 100 Years and the Ten Years do not
predetermine present-day nationalist politics - and that they are not easily malleable tools in the
hands of nationalist historians either. Instead, I have argued that because narratives about these
national pasts infuse Chinese identity with unity, meaning and purpose, while they can and do
change, they can only do so slowly through a process of contestation - such as the challenge that
the new „victimization‟ narrative about the Century of Humiliation poses to the Mao-era „victor‟
narrative. These stories, in the end, both constrain and are constrained by current nationalist
practice. Past and present are interdependent; neither completely dominates the other.

Today's rationalist, constructivist nationalism theory has thus shifted attention from the past to the
present; it has also shifted attention from the people and their passions up to the elites and their
instrumental politics. Early Western approaches to nationalism emphasized its mass basis. At the
turn of the nineteenth century, sociologist Emile Durkheim (1966 [1899]) argued that uprooted
and „anomic‟ individuals are drawn to the feeling of community provided by nationalist

733
movements. In the middle of the century, major nationalism theorists continued in Durkheim's
sociological tradition, arguing that nationalism fills the „unnatural‟ religious void modernization
creates in the hearts of the people (Kohn 1944; Hayes 1960). Today's focus, however, is on elite
uses of nationalism. To be sure, „subaltern studies‟ approaches to nationalism have shifted
attention from the colonizers to the colonized as the subjects of Third World history. But
postcolonial scholarship has nonetheless remained largely elitist in its focus: Indian intellectuals,
for example, producing alternatives to the British vision of „India‟ (see Kaviraj 1992; Chatterjee
1993). G. C. Spivak's (1988) lament that „the subaltern cannot speak‟ is reflective of a general
postmodern emphasis on the elite production and mass consumption of discourse.

To understand Chinese nationalism today, we must redirect our gaze back from the high politics
of CCP propaganda to the messy realities of the lived experiences of the Chinese people and their
emotions. The CCP is losing its control over nationalist discourse. Under Mao, the Party claimed
that because it led the revolutionary masses, the Party and the nation were fused into an
inseparable whole. Only communists, in other words, could be genuine Chinese nationalists.
Under Deng and especially under Jiang, however, the CCP's nationalist claims are increasingly
falling on deaf ears. Popular nationalists now regularly speak of the „Motherland‟ and the
„Chinese race‟ without reference to the Party. And this separation of the Party-state from the
nation is not occurring only in marginal popular publications. PLA writer Jin Hui, mentioned
above, published Wailing at the Heavens in 1995 as part of an official series commemorating the
50th anniversary of the War of Resistance. The book underwent rigorous editing at the People's
Liberation Army Literature and Arts Press, and General Zhang Zhen wrote the preface, further
granting the book official status. General Zhang cites Deng Xiaoping on how „Only socialism can
save China‟ to make the standard official nationalism argument that „In modern China, patriotism
is tied to socialism.‟ In the book itself, however, Jin Hui (1995: 465) unties that knot,
underscoring the „separation of the Chinese concepts of state and motherland‟, and arguing that
„there are “two Chinas”: the Chinese people‟s “motherland”, and the rulers' “state”'. Jin's analysis
radically undermines the idea that China is dominated by a monolithic „Party-state‟ with complete
control over nationalist discourse.

Because the anti-foreign tenor of popular nationalism is largely the same as that of state
nationalism, Western analysts have too frequently dismissed popular nationalists as puppets in the
hands of the Communist elite. This view is a grave mistake. In China today, popular networks are
challenging the state's hegemony over nationalism, threatening to rupture the Chinese nation-state.

734
And this is occurring at a time when, given the bankruptcy of communist ideology, nationalism
has become even more central to state legitimation. Both the Party and the people are recognizing
that the people are playing a greater role in nationalist politics.

The „party propaganda‟ view of Chinese nationalism not only excludes the Chinese people; it also
excludes the emotions. Like all peoples, the Chinese are motivated by a complex interplay of both
sense and sensibility. Despite compelling neurological evidence to the contrary, there is a strong
tendency in the West to view emotion and reason as locked into a zero-sum relationship in which
any gain for one is a loss for the other (see Unger 1975: 55; Damasio 1994). In other words,
becoming more emotional entails becoming less rational, and vice versa. Studies of Chinese
nationalism are no exception, pitting reason against the emotions. Optimistic pundits tend to
downplay the role of the passions in Chinese nationalism. They acknowledge the role of Chinese
national feelings, but then assert that the rational pursuit of China's national interest will win the
day. More pessimistic pundits, by contrast, lament that reason is impotent when confronted with
the passions. Arguments over the nature and future direction of Chinese nationalism thus often
tell us more about the optimism or pessimism of their Western proponents - whether they follow
in the „rational‟ or „irrational‟ liberal traditions - than they do about China.

Human motivation is complex, including elements of both reason and emotion. I therefore
suggest that the newly emergent sub-fields of the sociology and psychology of emotion have
much to teach us about nationalist practice. For instance, anger is an emotion that is (obviously)
central to nationalist practice - yet rarely treated in the literature on nationalism. Anger seeks to
restore status after it has been taken away unfairly. In Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience
and Revolt, Barrington Moore (1978: 17) argues that „vengeance means retaliation. It also means
a reassertion of human dignity or worth, after injury or damage. Both are basic sentiments behind
moral anger and the sense of injustice.' Where Moore highlights the emotional, J. M. Barbalet
(1998: 136) stresses the instrumental: „Vengefulness is an emotion of power relations. It functions
to correct imbalanced or disjointed power relationships. Vengefulness is concerned with restoring
social actors to their rightful place in relationships.‟ Anger expressed through vengeance can thus
simultaneously have both emotional and instrumental dimensions.

Indeed, Chinese nationalists frequently speak of injustice. The Chinese who threw bricks at the
US Embassy in Beijing after the bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 were
impelled by an ethical anger that sought to right a wrong. They were genuinely angry - not, as the

735
Western pundits generally suggested, playthings in the hands of communist propagandists who
manipulated them. Chinese protestors sought retributive justice: to restore China's proper place in
international society (see Gries 2001).

Popular passions, in sum, are a vital but understudied element in Chinese nationalism today.
Indeed, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is well aware that popular nationalists now
command a large following, and is actively seeking to appease them. For instance, during the
protests about the 1999 Belgrade bombing and the 2001 spy plane collision, popular nationalists
severely restricted the range of political options open to those who make decisions about the
Party's foreign policy. John Keefe (2001), who was special assistant to US Ambassador to China
Joseph Prueher during the April 2001 spy plane incident, later related that, during the negotiations
in Beijing, American diplomats „saw a Chinese government acutely sensitive to Chinese public
opinion‟. Such sensi tivities are only likely to increase. Western policymakers ignore how this
new factor affects Chinese foreign policy at their own peril.

NOTES

1 Guoji xianqu daobao (2003). Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Chinese are my
own.

2 I put „Diaoyu‟ first not to take China's side in the dispute, but simply because I approach the
issue from a Chinese perspective.

3 The Japanese invaded and colonized Manchuria following the Mukden Incident of 1931.
However, the invasion of the rest of China did not begin until after the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident of 1937. Chinese from the north-east invariably cite 1931 as the onset of the war; others
frequently cite 1937.

4 Note that this categorization of Chinese youth generations conflicts with the delineation of
generations of political leadership. To distance himself from Mao, leader of the „First Generation‟,
Deng declared himself leader of the „Second Generation‟, despite the fact that they both
participated in the Long March and the War of Resistance. Hence Jiang is of the „Third
Generation‟, and Hu Jintao now leads the new „Fourth Generation‟ of technocratic leadership.
See Li Cheng (2001).

736
5 A few members of the „New Left‟ of nationalist intellectuals in China were an exception,
having actually sought to affirm the Cultural Revolution. See Guo Yingjie (2004: 32).

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Pappe, Ilan. "Arab Nationalism." Pp. 500-12

Two conflicting narratives compete in the historiography of Arab nationalism. Each is worthy of
our attention as together they form a comprehensive perspective on the complex subject this
chapter seeks to introduce. The two points of view are reflected in the first of the three paradoxes
Benedict Anderson relates to nationalism: „the objective modernity of nations to the historian‟s
eyes vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of the nationalists' (Anderson 1991: 5).

The first narrative was told from within the movement and it is a simple tale of the awakening of
a dormant primordial ethnic beauty by princes, some of them foreign, in the late nineteenth-
century Arab world. The second narrative is mainly academic and it challenged, from within and
without, the national narrative. In this version, nationalism in general appears as a pure modern
phenomenon and one that was activated in the Arab world by the growing involvement of
European powers in the past two centuries.

The two views - discussed in the first part of this chapter - had two features in common. First,
they attempted to present nationalism in the Arab world as an emotional expression of identity
and a common political aspiration of exclusiveness. And secondly, they described it as a foreign
commodity bought by the local elite and disseminated later to the society as a whole. In recent
years both these assertions were questioned and novel approaches to the subject developed. The
fresh research - to which we devote the last part of this chapter - pointed to a profusion of
„national‟ manifestations in the Arab world, almost to the point of defeating the attempt here to
include within one general category all these complex revelations of what passes for Arab
nationalism'. The contemporary research is equally doubtful about the „Western‟ nature of the
phenomenon and attributes to it originality and uniqueness that fitted the world in which it was
born. The debate thus is still open and the spectacle of nationalism in the world at large and in the
Middle East in particular still eludes those of us insisting on finding out what it is all about.

THE CONVENTIONAL TALE: A SLEEPING BEAUTY AND A FOREIGN PRINCE

The first encounters of the Arab world with Europe varied in time and place, but one particular
engagement stands out as more traumatic than others: Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. In
the hegemonic narratives of Middle Eastern historiographies - appearing as late as the 1960s - the
French landing marked the beginning of the modern era in the Arab world. The contact exposed

740
Europe as a superior political and economic power and it sent the local elite into an almost
perpetual search for the ample response to this formidable threat and challenge.

The French bridgehead expanded and as a result new realities unfolded on the ground throughout
the nineteenth century. The area as a whole was now caught in a transitional phase between a
disappearing old Ottoman world and an emerging new European one. Soon after Napoleon's
arrival, North Africa was devoured by greedy European powers, hungry for markets and
territories, whereas the Eastern Middle East remained still within the realm of Ottoman rule; but
there too the Arab territories were gradually exposed to the growing political, economic and
cultural involvement of the ambitious European states and interests.

Nationalism came at this meeting point between East and West. It was a primordial ethnic sense
of identity that was awakened by modernity and its agents in the area. Until the second half of the
twentieth century one particular narrative of this tale predominated the scene. It was written in the
1930s by a senior official in the Educational Department in Mandatory Palestine, George
Antonious, and appeared in his book entitled The Arab Awakening (Antonious 1945). His version
fitted the conventional narratives of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe, attributing the
existence of national identities to ancient roots. Modern nationalism was thus the revival of an
antique ethnic identicalness and the reformulation of past affiliations as a powerful political force
able to liberate people and build states. Antonious's narrative is still the one used in many
textbooks even today, although it has been altered through criticism and additional historical
revelations (some of which are discussed later in this chapter).

It is through Antonious that English readers learned that Arab nationalism was an ideological
movement engulfing the Arab world as a whole: calling for the creation of one Arab polity from
the western end of North Africa to the eastern borders of Iraq, and from the southern Turkish
borders to the southern tip of the Sudan. This aspiration was voiced by intellectuals and activists
for the first time in the second half of the nineteenth century. At that time in history, both
European colonialism and Ottoman imperialism shared control over the Arab lands (the former
ruling North Africa, the latter the Middle East). Realization of that dream meant therefore
liberation from both. Nationalism consequently was articulated as an anti-colonialist dream, as
well as an anti-Ottoman sentiment.

741
Not surprisingly, in the eastern Middle East, the orientation was anti-Ottomanist, more than anti-
European. In Antonious's version, the leaders of the movement were in fact seeking a strategic
alliance with the anti-Ottoman powers of Europe, notably Britain and Russia. There were several
power bases for this ideological innovation. The most important one was the hub of Protestant
and Catholic institutions of higher education that became the Alma Mater for the first generation
of Arab nationalists. In these institutions the notion of nationalism was preached by Western
missionaries, who acted as college teachers, stressing in their curriculum the bondage between the
Arabic language and the collective identity. Among these teachers one group is outstanding:
American Protestant missionaries who founded among other establishments the two American
universities in Beirut and Cairo. They will continue to star as the princes who had awoken the
sleeping national beauty: they appear as such in Antonious's work of course, but also in the
writings of professional historians who accepted the pivotal role he accorded to them (Hourani
1962; Tibi 1997: 110-30). Another more marginal group is that of Russian Orthodox missionaries
who also helped to Arabize' the Christian communities in the Arab world in order to weaken the
hold of the Greek churches in the area (Hopwood 1969). It is interesting that Antonious did not
attribute such sinister motives to the American missionaries - in his tale, they were genuinely
helping the Arabs in the cause of self-determination and in the name of liberation.

The missionaries' role in the midst of a basically Muslim society accorded to the formative stages
of Arab nationalism, in Antonious's narrative, a very secular flavour. Not surprisingly in this
version, nationalism attracted first and foremost the Christian minorities; but the Muslim elite
soon joined in. The tyranny of the last effective Ottoman Sultan (Abdul Hamid II, 1876-1908)
brought both sects together in an anti-Ottoman struggle. This process was intensified after the
Young Turks revolution in 1908/9. The new rulers in Istanbul wished to Turkify all the
inhabitants of the Empire, the majority of which were Arabs, annulling the previous Ottoman
pretence to unite Arabs and Turks under the banner of Islam. Arab nationalism emerged as a
reasonable response to the challenge of Turkification.

In the wake of the missionary work, secret national Arab societies came forth after the revolution
in Istanbul. Their earlier demands were quite modest: they wished Turkey to share their
enthusiasm for the revitalized role they found for the teaching of Arabic. They called for a
comprehensive educational reform, with a strong linguistic stress on Arabic - one which was
partially accepted by the government in Istanbul, hoping to control what it could not defeat. But
soon more ambitious claims were voiced: introducing a vision of fuller Arab autonomy and later

742
on, even independence. In 1913, the first Arab national conference, convening in Paris (for fear of
Turkish persecution), tried in vain to negotiate some sort of an Austro-Hungarian model with the
Turkish government. After these manoeuvres failed, the road was opened for a tacit alliance
between the Arab national societies and Turkey's enemies in the impending world war, namely
Britain and Russia.

Britain had already been involved in the second power base of Arab nationalism: the Hejaz. There,
the leading notable family of the holiest city, Mecca, the Hashemites, revolted too against the
secular Turkifying new government. For that purpose, they enlisted the assistance of the
legendary T. E. Lawrence who brought them in touch with the British legation in Egypt (under
British control since 1882).

Egypt, our third centre of activity, was crucial not only because the British were there as potential
allies, but also since their presence in the land of the Nile generated a local national movement
that contributed to the overall rise of nationalism in the Arab world. Although the Egyptian
movement centred more on liberating Egypt, rather then uniting the Arab world, it was similar
enough to empower the pan-Arabist movement elsewhere.

North Africa as a whole should have been the fourth power base, but Antonious did not cover that
area. There, Algerian nationalism was in the making ever since the country was occupied by
France in 1830. As in Egypt, the focus was not on pan-Arabism, but the leaders of the movement
cherished in public the clarion call for Arab unity in a political form that was yet to be decided: a
kingdom, as the Hejazi people wanted it, or a republic, which better fitted the Algerian aspirations.

In between the wars, and particularly after World War II, the difference between the Algerian
variant and the rest of the Arab world became starker. The assimilationist policies of the French
in Algeria, especially during the reign of Jacque Soustelle as Governor-General, necessitated a
forceful anti-colonialist response. The British Empire in the Middle East, on the other hand, was
not based on assimilation and hence it provoked a different variation of nationalism:
contemplative, cooperative to a point and seeking all the time the golden mean between the more
militant elements from within and the colonialists from without (Thomas 2000).

Therefore, when Britain did not deliver independence the disappointment was momentous. The
British promised much, but gave very little in Antonious's estimation. The fact that Arab

743
nationalist groups such as the Hashemites and others helped the Allies in World War I against
Turkey was rewarded only by semi-independence in some parts of the Arab world (Iraq and
Jordan) while others were given to the French (such as Syria and Lebanon, in addition to the
North African colonies). 1 But for Antonious, writing from Jerusalem, Albion became outrightly
perfidious in its policy in Palestine. It crossed the line with the Balfour Declaration made in
November 1917. Antonious predicted, and in hindsight quite rightly so, that opposition to
Zionism, no less then colonialism and Turkish secularism, would become a rallying force among
those with a vision of pan-Arabism. Antonious's book leaves the impression that without Zionism,
greedy French colonialism and British opportunism, a liberal democratic nationalism could have
developed in the Arab world.

THE ARAB AWAKENING RECONSIDERED

Antonious's tale, much as other formative official narratives, came under the scrutiny of a more
cynical, at times even hostile, research. The historiography of Arab nationalism was radically
transformed, with the rest of Middle Eastern studies, and became academic and professionalized.
This was also true about the general inquiry into the nature and development of nationalism
(Smith 2001). Already in the mid-twentieth century, critical voices were heard against the
association of nationalism with primordial roots and simple processes of modernization. The
fresh approach conceptualized nationalism as an inevitable historical elitist expression of
modernization. Nationalism was an instrument in the hands of a political elite and a functional
substitute for pre-modern categories. Max Weber, the first of those theorists, contexualized
nationalism within a specific period of time: a historical event with clear beginnings, and maybe
even a predictable end. Within this span of time, it was a theory that served the ideological and
material interests of a political and intellectual elite, which was fully cognizant of the artificial
nature of the new dogma they invented for their benefit (Weber 1948: 171-80).

Others followed suit. Eli Kedourie, for example, credited this elite not only with the inception of
a theory but also with the making of states. In his view the formation of new states constructed
national identities, and not vice versa as the national narratives themselves argued. Not only was
it not an organic process, it was a cruel, at times manipulative, case of imposing on a given
society a hegemonic identity - obliterating on the way particularistic identities - which served best
the elite's interests. His most famous example was the Austro-Hungarian Empire whose primary
asset, its strong political structure, was only subsequently supplemented with invented Austrian

744
and Hungarian nationalisms, as part of a larger strategy of state control. In short, for Kedourie,
nationalism, an elite affair superimposed from above, was closely connected to an oppressive
modern state apparatus (Kedourie 1960).

Ernest Gellner went even further in his critique, brushing aside any talk of national awakenings.
He stated: „Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations
where they do not exist‟ (Gellner 1983: 48). National „awakening‟ - a totally fictional version of
history in his eyes - was possible only with the progress attributed to education and
industrialization. Critical to this process was the modernization and sys-temization of language,
the basis for constructing new geopolitical realities from which national movements rose. He too
recognized the utility of the concept in abolishing old forces - such as the European aristocracy -
and in building new ones - such as the urban middle class.

In the wake of this critical inquiry, historians of the area adopted a culinary view towards the
making of national identities in the Arab world: nationalism became a dish cooked at a certain
period and the research could determine which ingredients were included and which were not,
and why. Antonious's work itself was scrutinized in such a manner, enabling the historians to
reveal how his tale was concocted. They felt Antonious exaggerated intentionally the anti-
Ottoman nature of Arab nationalism and its pro-European inclination. It seemed that the first
generation of Arab nationalist thinkers and activists wished in fact to operate within the pax
Ottomana they knew and respected; indeed, they seemed to be more Ottomanist reformers than
Arabists (al-Azmeh 2000: 73). They sought more autonomy but not full cession from the
Ottoman world. Even the Turkification enterprise of the Young Turks was slow in stirring a
desire in them for total independence.

As for the early nationalist thought and its relationship with European sources, here an intrigue
ensued over the ideological origins of the dogma that is still relevant today. Antonious was
suspected as overemphasizing the liberal democratic character in order to legitimize Arab
nationalism in the eyes of Britain and France, and to a certain extent he succeeded in doing so. It
is possible therefore that he ignored certain features and over-stressed others. While, the
historians who viewed the subject 30 years later concurred that the ideas were borrowed from
Europe, many of them felt it was rather a romantic variant of European nationalism - authoritarian
and illiberal - that appealed to the early generation of Arab nationalist thinkers. This ideological

745
inclination led eventually to the rise of non-democratic and despotic regimes in the Arab world
(the late Eli Kedourie leading the way in this direction).

This view was challenged by historians who attempted a less reductionist approach to the subject.
These historians rejected the exclusive role accorded to romantic nationalism in the making of the
present political set-up in the Arab world. They pointed to additional, more important, factors
such as the Western economic exploitation of the local economy and the political suppression of
liberal nationalism by the European powers. The wider perspective also revealed a far more
complex web of influences on the local national thinkers, not all of them European or Western,
and yet many of them humanist and modern. The European sources were digested locally and in
many ways became original contributions and what they indicated was great respect for Europe's
liberal philosophies and democratic inclinations, but abhorrence of its repressive policies in the
Arab world. These policies empowered those who coveted power at all cost, nepotism, corruption
and tyranny, and this is where we are today. However, the more promising past could still return
(American policies, replacing Europe and the Soviet Union ever since the early 1970s, seemed
from this perspective to play a similar role in pushing the area away from democratic nationalism
for the sake of imperialism - even it is done in the name of democracy - the late Albert Hourani
best representing this orientation).

How far the local version was loyal to the original was a subject for scholarly debate. The
discussion focused on the writing of the Syrian philosopher and educator Sati al-Husri - one of
the movement's founding fathers at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, most scholars
attribute to him the inception of the idea and he appears to be the first coherent articulator of the
ideology.

Al-Husri made a distinction between German (that is romantic) and French (that is liberal)
nationalisms. He rejected the latter variant and derided it as void of any historical and cultural
references, but was intrigued enough by it to conduct an imaginary dialogue with Ernest Renan,
negating the Frenchman's wish to include in the nation anyone who shared the same civic
obligations and social solidarity. The German version, in his view, was preferable since it located
at the centre of the identity a collective cultural past and a shared classical language.

Al-Husri accepted the Germanic perception of the nation as a predetermined entity but discarded
race as a unifying factor. For him, the core identity of the nation was social and dynamic;

746
constantly changing with time and place. Two social forces played the crucial role in shaping the
collective identity of the people who lived in the Middle East ever since the seventh century:
Arab civilization and Islam. They were bonded together by the sacredness of the Arabic language
in the Islamic religion. It was in fact the language even more than the religion that moulded the
national identity of the Arabs (Suleiman 2003). Was this interpretation a mere variant of the
Germanic version of nationalism or was it an original thought that proved the authentic nature of
Arab nationalism? Questions of this kind were now occupying the scholarly agenda in the
generation that followed Antonious's pioneering work (Naffa 1987; Choueiri 2000: 120-5).

On the sidelines of this debate, other historians noted additional influences such as those of
Communist and Socialist political thought. Here too the debate was intriguingly the same: was
the Arab left mirroring European radicalism or did it construct its own brands of socialism and
communism (Halliday 1999)? Some historians found the Gramscian prism the most useful one
for explaining the interplay between class and nationalism in the Arab world; others viewed the
process by relying on the energetic field of political economy and development studies (Beinin
and Lockman 1988; Davis 2004; Owen 2004). Maybe quite understandably, the outstanding case
study for many was Mandatory Palestine (1920-48), where Communism was in vain nourished as
a viable alternative to national interpretation of reality and was preached as a vehicle for peace
and reconciliation. 2

THE LITMUS PAPER OF ARAB NATIONALISM: THE PALESTINE QUESTION

One of the less debatable points in the historiography of Arab nationalism is the centrality of the
Palestine question within the pan-Arabist agenda, however its roots are described or evaluated.
This was not originally so, but developed incrementally with the ongoing conflict in Palestine.
The significant turning point was the 1936 rebellion which transformed pan-Arabist sentiment
from an intellectual and political position into a popular, at times populist, movement. But the
genuine solidarity movement was expropriated by more cynical politicians, mainly ambitious
military officers, who attempted to take over nation-states and succeeded in doing so in several
Arab countries. It began with Baqr Sidqi in Iraq in 1936 who was followed by Husni Zaim in
1949 Syria and culminated in the 1952 Egyptian Free officers' revolution. All these groups, and
those who followed in Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and the Sudan, were attracted to the pan-
Arabist ideology, calling for the unification of all the Arab states within one united, socialist,
secular and authoritarian state. The principal means, indeed the litmus paper, for examining the

747
commitment of the many contenders to lead this historical move was the question of Palestine.
More traditional Arab states were also drawn to the Palestine pan-Arabist arena and the result was
a dangerous illusion that developed in Palestine that the Arab world in its entirety was standing
behind the Palestinian struggle and would save the people in the Holy Land from the Zionist
threat. The issue of Palestine was so powerful that it served as a catalyst for the formation of a
pan-Arabist regional organization in 1944, the Arab League. This outfit promised to enrol the
Arab world as a whole to the last battles in the war against colonialism in Algeria and Palestine. It
was less needed in the former case, but it was badly wanted in the latter. The League promised
the Palestinians it would master the military might of the Arab world, in the name of pan-
Arabism, to prevent a Jewish takeover.

Disillusionment came tragically and bitterly in 1948 when the Palestinians were expelled from
their lands, their villages and towns were destroyed and the people dispersed into diasporic
communities and refugee camps. The Palestinian movement rose from the ashes with the
formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and infused the pan-Arabist rhetoric with new
life, and with it the commitment to the Palestinian cause. But it was more than just a discursive
feature: it became a vital force that induced Egypt and Syria to embark unwittingly on an
brinkmanship policy vis-à-vis Israel that ended in their defeat in June 1967, which put an end to
any such attempts in the future.

A real anti-colonialist war of course was fought only in North Africa, and particularly in Algeria.
The different colonial experience vis-à-vis a settler community of Europeans was parallel to the
Palestinian case. Both situations nurtured the Arab imagination and painted the discourses of
nationalism with radical language and images. But the inertia on the ground was not favouring
pan movements of any kind. Within the nation-states developed in the aftermath of World War II
the local national identity solidified at the expanse of the regional one.

WATANIYYA VERSUS QAWMIYYA

In between the two world wars the national workshop produced all kinds of possible variations on
the theme of nationalism. Socialist thinkers were moving in one direction, Islamists in another
and in the middle liberal and less democratic groups and personalities were struggling for
dominance. With the end of World War II, many of these groups fused together into liberation

748
movements that hastened the withdrawal of the European powers from the Middle East. The
question was now not how to defeat the common enemy but who would succeed him.

The post-colonial era began with the consolidation of individual Arab nation-states replacing the
old Ottoman and colonial regimes. Within this new set up, pan-Arabism was reconstructed. It was
no more a cradle ideology but rather an alternative vision for the post-World War II reality. Those
who subscribed to the ideology claimed now that Arab societies would benefit and thrive if their
dreams of independence were to transcend the borders of individual nation-states. Some of the
new elites employed the renovated version of pan-Arabism as a means for safeguarding their rule,
others wished to distance themselves from it, fearing it would be used to destabilize their hold
over their countries.

A very dramatic manifestation of the pan-Arabist aspiration was the creation of the Arab League,
mentioned earlier, a regional organization founded by Egypt's and Iraq's leaders at the end of
1944, admittedly for more mundane and pragmatic reasons, but nonetheless one that planted (in
retrospect false) hopes of unity and progress. The two leading countries were still part of pax-
Britannica in the area, and it stands to reason that the respective prime ministers believed,
erroneously, that they could build on British aid to implement the dream of Arab unity, even in a
federated loose form (Dawn 2000: 41-62).

The Arab League was considered the ultimate symbol of Arab nationalism but 60 years later no
one inside or outside the Arab world claimed it succeeded even modestly in implementing or
fulfilling the pan-Arabist aspirations. It nonetheless remained the principal stage for voicing the
rhetoric of pan-Arabism and will probably continue to be so, at least as long as the Palestine
question persists in dominating the regional agenda. In the formal realms of life, in this period,
Arab nationalism as a modern ideology slowly disintegrated into local national ideologies,
although well into the 1960s the discourse of pan-Arabism was heard loud and clear in Cairo and
Damascus (Dawisha 2002).

The two competing affiliations - the regional versus the local - produced two very different terms
in Arabic for nationalism: qawmiyya, representing the pan-Arabist identity, and wataniyya, the
local one. One way for the more radical and committed pan-Arabists to deal with the schism of
qawmiyya-wataniyya was to accord to their own country a leading role in bringing about Arab
unity.

749
The most interesting protagonist of this kind of pan-Arabism was Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Before
1956 he showed limited interest in the topic. After the Suez Crisis, he advocated a unity under his
leadership based on a socialist and secularist ideology coupled with a strong commitment to
advance the cause of Palestine and the struggle against Western imperialism and its allies in the
area (whom he named „reactionary regimes‟). The endeavour was short-lived and ended with
defeat on the battlefield against Israel in 1967. Until this policy collapsed, Nasser inspired many
in the Arab world to follow suit. In some cases, such as Jordan in 1957 and Lebanon in 1958,
Nasser's radicalism was thwarted by direct Western military intervention. In others, coups and
revolutions brought to power equally committed pan-Arabists, in Syria and Iraq in 1958, in the
newly liberated ex-colonies in the Maghreb through the 1950s and 1960s, and finally in the
Yemen in the 1970s.

This kind of struggle necessitated an alliance between radical Arab nationalism and the Soviet
Union, embroiling the area in the Cold War. Nonetheless, Nasser insisted, and obtained,
ideological independence despite the strategic alliance. Thus came into play his Arab Socialism',
a brand of pan-Arabism based on a local variant of socialism, a unity around Egypt and assuming
a significant role in the Asian-African bloc of states; its closest potential ideological allies were
also bitter enemies: communism, political Islam and the Ba'ath party in Syria and Iraq.

The latter was probably the most significant contender. The Ba'ath party - formerly the Ba'ath
Arab socialist party - was founded by middle-class educators in the early 1940s. Two of them,
Salah al-Din al-Bitar and Michel Aflaq, chose Damascus as the centre for their political activity.
By 1947, they convened their first official congress and promulgated a constitution. A year later
the Ba'ath had branches all over the Eastern Middle East, but it was mainly in Syria and Iraq that
they became a force to reckon with 3 .

Ideologically, the Ba'ath was quite close to Nasser's kind of nationalism. It also had a socialist
orientation (in fact it merged with the Syrian socialist party in 1952) and placed Arab unity as a
primary objective. It was therefore natural that the two rivals/partners to the idea would attempt to
work together and thus emerged the United Arab Republic - a union between Syria and Egypt -
that lasted for three years (1958-61). Egyptian dominance in that unity was not just ideological,
but also political and economic and hence this was a short-lived experience. It was followed by
less promising developments when in Syria and Iraq local nationalist orientations, in the guise of

750
pan-Arabist ideologies, brought to power an authoritarian president, Hafiz al-Asad, in Syria, and
a tyrannical ruler, Saddam Husayn, in Iraq 4 .

Nasser was better in rousing the masses than building political institutions. And yet the
nationalism that enveloped him led to land reform for the peasantry, women's rights polices,
better trade unionism and social welfare. One can also credit him, if one is so inclined, with
resisting religious influence in the legal system and shunning dogmatic communism (Aburish
2005).

The discourse of pan-Arabism lingered on until 1967, when Nasser's Egyptian army was defeated
with other Arab armies by Israel in the June war. But its demise was already in the making before
this calamity, due to inter-Arab cold and actual wars. The concept of a single Arab state
stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf as the best means of struggling against
colonialism, imperialism and Zionism, attracted the more radical states but was deemed as a
threat by the conservative ones. Probably more important was the noticeable failure of leaders to
translate rhetoric on the only issue of pan-Arab consensus - the need to liberate Palestine - with
action. This failure was already evident in 1948 and once again in the 1967 defeat (Khalidi et al.
1993).

In the aftermath of the 1967 defeat - a blow not only to Nasser's prestige, but also to his prophecy
of pan-Arabism - the notion of qawmiyya was losing ground. It still appeared in the rhetoric of
Iraq and Syria's leaders, who found it useful in cementing with Ba'athi ideology their
authoritarian regimes. Competing political forces which themselves were pushing for a pan-
Arabist vision, such as the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, were banned and outlawed. In other
places, the idea was reduced to attempts, most of which were abortive, to create federations and
co-federations. The more successful ones were economic and reflected commercial strategies
more than a shared ideology.

In the less pragmatic spheres, the intellectual and ideological debates about nationalism continued
also in the post-1967 period. But the focus moved from the axis of wataniyya-qawmiyya to the
more complex and confusing impact political Islam had on the lives of many people in the Arab
world.

POLITICAL ISLAM AND NATIONALISM

751
As long as nationalism was researched within the framework of a modernization process,
secularization and nationalization seemed to go hand in hand. This is probably why George
Antonious tended to sideline the role played by Muslim thinkers in his narrative. This under-
emphasis was reversed by a later generation of historians who stressed the importance of
reformist Islamists in propagating the notion of an Arab nation going back to the seventh century,
when a new Islamic polity emerged in the Arabian peninsula. The polity became successive
empires in the name of Islam which were for most of the time predominantly Arab in their
ethnicity. The way forward for Arab prosperity was thus through the revival of the old bond
between religion and ethnicity.

A central figure among these thinkers was the Egyptian religious reformer Muhammad Abduh
(1849-1905), who together with his teacher and associate Jamal al-Din al-Afghani clarified from
their position in the university of al-Azhar the need to reform Islam so as to make it both a
compass to a modern society and an effective tool in the struggle against colonialism. They had
colleagues and followers sharing similar views around the Sunni Arab world at that time. They
were what Sami Zubaida calls „cosmopolitans‟: namely, an elite circle of intellectuals, aristocrats
and politicians who directed their efforts very much within these milieus (Zubaida 1999: 15-33),
dreaming of a pristine Muslim and Arab past and its revival as superior to the West and yet
willing to borrow from the European market of ideas.

When Christian and Muslim endeavours fused into a joint enterprise of forming a pan-Arabist
consciousness and movement, great care was taken not to use Islam as the signifier of Arabism so
as not to prejudice the non-Muslim minorities in the Arab world. The common base lay in a
shared cultural heritage centred around the language and dating back to pre-Islamic Arabism.

This all changed when in the 1970s political Islam rose as a significant actor on the regional
scene. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the origins of the phenomenon, suffice it to
say that this, very generally speaking, was both a personal and a collective response to the failure
of secular nationalism to deliver any of its promises for social welfare and economic prosperity.
Politically too the balance sheet of secular nationalism was not very impressive but the failure
here was attributed to the overwhelming Western, and mainly American, aggression and
interventionist policies (and particularly, the US support for Israel and the conservative absolute
Arab monarchies).

752
From within the perspective of political Islam, Arab nationalism turned from a project of
modernization into a movement trying to redeem the Arab world from the evils of such a project.
But that proved quite impossible in the globalized world of the end of the previous century. The
wish of political Islamic movements to show resilience against invasion by foreign ideas and
norms has, in a way, also transformed into a national variant of nationalism. The agenda from left
and right (Islamic) polars of the political fields was much more national than religious. The power
of nationalism is such that even the most phenomenal Islamic party in the Arab world, the
Hizbullah in Lebanon, has been Lebanonized and is propagating less an Islamic ideology and
much more the old list of aspirations and dreams of the early pan-Arabists (Wain 1999). At the
end of the twentieth century, nationalism became the language of opposition, religious or not, to
the ruling elites and their supporters in the West.

The one case which may not fit the above assertion is North Africa, where there seems to be a
clearer transition from the nationalist discourse to the Islamist one (unlike the case of Hizbullah).
The realization of leading figures in the nationalist movement there that nationalism was after all
a Western-inspired ideology and at heart anti-Islamic, formulated a view that located Islam as an
authentic holistic framework within which the society can act. And thus many who were
mesmerized in North Africa by the nationalist fervour of Nasser and the Ba'ath, turned to this
more pure form of Islamism in the 1970s. Time will tell whether they have indeed constructed an
a-national identity for people in North Africa and beyond (Burgat 1997).

PRESENT AND FUTURE AGENDAS OF RESEARCH

The new realities on the ground dictated different interests in, and a different understanding of the
essence of, nationalism in the Arab world. Nationalism was still very much alive, although much
less clearer as subject matter for scholarly research. No less important in transforming the
perception of the phenomenon was a new wave of critical deconstruction in the 1980s of
nationalism in general.

We learned from the previous critique that nationalism was an ideological construct that could
push tyranny as much as it propelled democracy. This cognition was expanded by a more Marxist
point of view. Eric Hobsbawm combined a Marxist outlook with Weberian functionalism and
explained the birth of nations as a direct outcome of capitalist ambitions in European societies to
control units, large enough to secure the financial gains of its bourgeois elite. In the process this

753
elite engaged in the „human engineering of the society‟, which required complimentary self-
images and degrading images of the other in order to nationalize past and present realities
(Hobsbawm 1990: 14-25). From this perspective, according to Hobsbawm, national
historiography is thus emplotted, in the words of Hayden White (White 1974: 277-303). The plot
is spun with selection and re-composition of past events and symbols, as new „national‟ traditions
are „invented‟.

A very original contribution to our understanding of what nationalism can be all about was its
association to human imaginings, as proposed by Benedict Anderson. His notion of „imagined
communities‟ directed attention to the discursive forms through which nations imagine
themselves rather than the structural and objective constituents of the nation. In his eyes
nationalism was a product that was sold not as a whole, but as a modular commodity that would
fit different geographical locations and historical periods. But like all the other modernists,
Anderson remarks that when this product was disseminated it was done with engineering,
manipulation and the invention of historical stories to serve the few in the name of the many.
However, by suggesting that nations, nationness and nationalism were „cultural artifacts of a
particular kind‟, Anderson sought to repudiate previous objectivist conceptions of the nation, thus
emphasizing its universality as a phenomenon and the „irremediable particularity of its concrete
manifestation‟ (Anderson 1991: 8). This last reference in particular appealed to two historians
who looked at Egypt in between the two world wars and reconstructed what they felt was the
developing national imagination of certain classes in the society: an imagination that fluctuated
between wataniyya and qawmiyya identifications (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986).

This discussion around the constructedness of national identity has been further explored by
Edward Said, Homi Bhaba, Partha Chaterji and other members of the subaltern postcolonial
school of inquiry, questioning not only the „invented traditions‟ of national identity but the very
systems of cultural representation involved in producing them. In all of their works they have
sought to identify the exclusionary practices endemic to the formation of national identity (Said
1983; Chartaji 1986; Bhabha 1990). Like Anderson, they moved the discussion away from the
socio-historical and political roots of nationalism to its discursive contours, especially the
heterogeneity that nationalism tries to subsume. As we shall see, this too had an impact on the
historiography of Arab nationalism towards the end of the twentieth century.

754
To some, national identity whether imagined, engineered or manipulated, is a recent human
invention born out of the integration of conflicting ethnic or cultural identities or the
disintegration of such identities. It is a modern invention of an axis of inclusion and exclusion
that is not organic or natural thus requiring the artificial identification of those who belong to the
nation and, more importantly, those who are excluded from it. In the process, constituting an
„other‟ of this national identity becomes critical for the formation of the national self. It demands
the subordination of other identities - communal, religious, ethnic and so forth. This subjection
defines the parameters of„otherness‟ and the degree to which it is constituted as a source of
menace to the prevalent or hegemonic identity. In this context and as Michel Foucault argues, in
the field of knowledge constructed by nationalism the „other‟, the „enemy‟ occupies exclusively
the negative pole of that field (Foucault 1980). With the passage of time this part of the
theoretical input was much more relevant for understanding the making of the Jewish identity in
Israel than for explaining the formations of such identities in the Arab world, but this too, as is
demonstrated towards the end of the article, enriched the historiography of the local cases.

Various anthologies and collections of recent years on Arab nationalism reflected the theoretical
shifts and new orientations (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997). I will touch upon only some of the
new themes explored in these works. The first is a recognition of the modular and dynamic nature
of the national identity. Arab nationalism seemed to resolve not only into wattaniyya constituents
but also to even smaller particularistic elements. These reformulations were not linear and were
often affected by regional, sectarian and religious impacts; defeating the attempt from above to
create a cohesive national identity. Iraq is the most known and recent case, but also in more
homogeneous countries such as Palestine similar processes took place. The dispersion,
occupation and exile in 1948 produced a multiplicity of experiences that prevented the national
cohesiveness so needed for survival (Budeiri 1997; Simon 1997).

The second feature of the updated research, in the wake of the subaltern and postcolonial school,
is the perception of nationalism in the Arab world as an identity forged not only by external
factors but also by internal dynamics; nationalism in the Arab world as not just a Western
phenomenon but rather as a local form of identification with distinct characteristics, dating back
to the pre-Westernization period. Here too some promising beginnings were made in the case
study of Palestine - understandably so, for as the only Arab national movement still struggling for
independence and self-determination it provided a kind of laboratory in the making of
nationalism in pre-state conditions. As a recent historical survey into the making of Palestinian

755
identity shows, the initial need to identify nationally was motivated by the challenge of external
attempts to conquer the land and colonize it (a very frequent phenomenon in modern times);
however, in more tranquil times, such a pressure to identify or to rally around a collective identity
was not called for, and the communal energy was channelled into building local solidarity often
accompanied by a sense of pride in a history of a continuous presence on such a coveted land.
This too could be defined as nationalism, or at least proto-nationalism (Pappe 2003: 31-62).

Thirdly, the forces that shaped and reshaped a national identification and imagination thus were
recent and distant, foreign and local. But moreover they were expressed in a geographical and
chronological variety. Their manifestations differed also from one group to another and thus
developed a recognition of the need to delve deeper into the reception of nationalism among the
non-elite groups and not just be content with the chattering classes' articulation of the sentiment
and ideology.

Such a perspective produced intriguing research into the trajectory of the ideas in the formative
years of Arab nationalism from the thinkers through the officials and officers into the common
people during the time of World War I (Haddad 1994: 201-22).

Within this orientation, feminist historiography developed as well trying to fathom how women
reacted and acted toward the new ideology. In Egypt, for instance, as Beth Baron has shown,
nationalism was symbolized as a feminine figure which catered to the wider public in Egypt, but
also served a feminist agenda. Women in the 1930s unveiled themselves and demanded
„modernization‟ as part of the overall national objective of independence from British occupation
(Baron 1991: 275-91); 50 years later women would veil themselves as part of a demand to
liberate Egypt from Americanism and its cultural invasion.

Feminist perspectives on nationalism are one item on the future agenda to be further explored.
Others are the more discursive analyses of what Homi Bhabah called the power of the nation to
narrate, where national amnesia in the Arab world, especially about the Ottoman times, seems to
be a favourite topic (Piterberg 1997: 104-24).

And finally, a very recent avenue was attempted by research echoing interdisciplinary studies
elsewhere: a thorough examination of the way nationalism appears within popular and official
cultures. National anthems, novels and poems, and lately films and TV series, were deconstructed

756
as forms of indoctrination, representation or manipulation by the powers that be in their attempt
to sustain the nation as an imaginary father or mother of the society.

Quite naturally, much attention has been devoted to television and its relationship with
nationalism. Seen from this perspective, television is the great national educator and homogenizer.
Egyptian TV in particular, seen all over the Arab world, has undergone intriguing changes of
emphasis in this respect. In the 1980s it reflected, even battled against, Islamic fanaticism and
dogmatism. And yet this agenda failed to reflect the wide support for political Islam within the
society at large. The dialectical relationship between the society and its electronic media
produced, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a more mixed agenda - infused with
religious texts and sensitivities, affecting significantly the line-ups in the local and regional
television shows and programs (Abu-Lughod 1996: 269-82).

Indeed, nationalism in the Arab world became more than just a cultural fact but a mass cultural
signifier of the public space through the printed press and much more so through electronic media.
To such an extent that we may witness the resurrection of the dying notion of pan-Arab
nationalism through the satellite networks; most notably through al-Jazeera - the self declared
symbol of Arab nationalism (Deen 2004).

We began with pan-Arabism as an intellectual exercise for few a officials and thinkers and we
ended with the possible return of pan-Arabism either through political Islam or supranational
communicational giants such as al-Jazeera. The American occupation of Iraq, the continued
conflict in Palestine, the fluctuating power of political Islam and the socio-economic predicament
that refuses to disappear, promise that the national interpretation of reality will continue to
dominate life in the Arab world. As before, the research on nationalism in general and the
developments on the ground will continue to affect the dynamic and uncertain field of
historiographical inquiry in the future.

NOTES

1 Admittedly with a pledge through the League of Nations for independence one day, but this
seemed vague and insincere.

757
2 Zacharly Lockman showed in his research the challenges of class solidarity to the national
agenda and the violent clash between the two, when narrow political and economic interests
motivate the local elite to crash any alternative identification and solidarity. This contributed in
the case of Palestine to the escalation of the conflict (Lockman 1996).

3 The regime in Syria today is, and in Iraq until 2003 was, loyal ostensibly to the Ba'ath ideology.

4 Muhlberger and Mansfield (1991) give the impression that the creation of local national
identities was a degeneration.

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Neuberger, Benyamin. "African Nationalism." Pp. 513-26

African nationalism is rooted in the Americas. Born as a pan-black ideology and movement, it
was then called pan-Negroism. It was a diaspora nationalism and as such had similarities to and
affinities with Jewish diaspora nationalism („Zionism‟) (on these affinities, see Neuberger
1985,1986b). It was a typical minority nationalism, a nationalism of a „numerical minority‟ (as in
the United States) or a „sociological minority‟ (as in the Caribbean) against domination by
another racial group, against oppression, discrimination, exclusion and racism (on the concepts of
minority and diaspora nationalism, see Smith 1971). Race was central: pan-Negroism was based
on black identity, black unity and black solidarity, and on a deep intellectual and emotional
connection between the African diaspora and the African homeland (on the importance of race,
see Neuberger 1975).

This racial (as different from racist) pan-Africanism emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth
century and in the early years of the twentieth century. In the United States it was a bitter reaction
to the disappointment felt by black intellectuals in the aftermath of the Civil War. Instead of
emancipation, came a whole array of discriminatory legislation, de-facto dis-enfranchisement in
the South, the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and a spreading lynch „justice‟. Many of the black
ideologues hailed from the Caribbean islands - from independent Haiti, from the British colonies
of Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados, from the French territories of Guadeloupe and Martinique,
from American-held St Thomas and from British Guiana in northern Latin America. The
Caribbean islands had a legacy of harsh slavery as they operated a plantation economy based on
slavery and also functioned as intermediaries and markets in the slave trade. As early as 1804,
Toussaint l'Ouverture led a successful slave rebellion, which led to Haiti's independence that
same year. European colonialism in the Caribbean preceded colonialism in Africa by centuries,
giving rise to anti-racist and anti-colonial ideologies at a time when Africa had hardly yet become
colonized. The same is true with regard to the United States in the nineteenth century. (On the
history of pan-Africanism, see Esedebe 1994; Fredrickson 1995; Geiss 1974; Langley 1973;
Neuberger 1977.)

The founding fathers of African nationalism are Edward Blyden from St Thomas, Marcus Garvey
from Jamaica, Henry Sylvester Williams and George Padmore from Trinidad, Frantz Fanon and
Aimé Césaire from Martinique, Ras Makonnen from Guiana and Burghardt Du Bois (whose

760
father was Haitian) from the United States. Blyden migrated to Africa in the late nineteenth
century, became a well-known educator in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and Liberia's Foreign
Minister. Fanon participated in the Algerian struggle for independence and, in 1957, became an
adviser to President Kwame Nkrumah in independent Ghana, as did Ras Makonnen and George
Padmore. Du Bois too spent his last years in Ghana at the invitation of Nkrumah in order to edit
an Encyclopedia Africana (see Blyden 1967 [1889]; Du Bois 1964 [1903], 1965 [1947]; Garvey
1963, 1980; Lynch 1971; Padmore 1956; Van Deburg 1997).

All the founding fathers viewed their nationalism as an antithesis to slavery, racism, degradation
and oppression, while simultaneously emphasizing their rich historical legacy. They thus rejected
the racist-colonialist claim that they had no meaningful history. Theirs was a pride in their
African origins, in the African Personality'. They repudiated the race theories that flourished in
Europe and America and depicted all Negroes (as blacks were then called) as „savage, primitive,
lazy and inferior‟. To counter such allegations, they frequently referred to a bygone black
paradise, to a black pharaonic Egypt, to a historical black Ethiopia, to a black Jesus and a black
Christianity (Diop 1959). The nineteenth-century Haitian scholar Joseph-Antenor Firmin
countered Arthur de Gobineau's racist classic Essai sur l'inégalitiédes races humaines (Gobineau
1967 [1853-55]) with the publication in Paris in 1885 of De l'égalitédes races humaines (Firmin
1985 [1885]).

The American pan-Africanists saw Africa as „our homeland‟ and the „land of our fathers‟. There
was an underlying assumption in their writings that the standing and fate of the black diaspora
were inextricably linked with Africa's prestige, that is with its culture, folklore, history and its
historic states (such as Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ashanti, Congo and Zimbabwe).
„Bad‟ and „good‟ news from Africa had a tremendous impact on the pan-Africanists of the New
World. They were very much aware of the large-scale massacre of Congolese in the Belgian „Free
State‟, of the genocide perpetrated by the Germans against the Herero in German South-West
Africa (today's Namibia), of the ongoing slavery and slave-trade in Zanzibar (today part of
Tanzania), of the institution of forced labour in the Portuguese and French colonies and of the
harsh racist legislation in all settler colonies. They were exhilarated by the foundation of Liberia
(the „Land of the Free‟) and Sierra Leone (whose capital was named „Freetown‟) by freed slaves,
by the resistance against colonial conquest and domination in South Africa, the Gold Coast
(today's Ghana), Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) and German East Africa (today's Tanzania), and
by the Ethiopian victory against the invading Italians at Adowa in 1896.

761
The attitude of the American pan-Africanists towards Africa was embodied in two major
orientations. One current, whose most famous representative was Du Bois, regarded Africa as a
historical homeland, a spiritual and cultural centre and an inspiration to the diaspora. The other
aspired to an independent Africa as a power centre of all blacks in Africa and in the diaspora. The
latter, whose major representatives were Blyden in the late nineteenth century and Garvey in the
1920s and 1930s, adhered to the idea of a „return to Africa‟ („Black Zionism‟). Garvey's
movement, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), was populist-nationalist and
spoke of the need to create a „Negro Empire‟.

American pan-Africanism, which failed completely in America (at least in its „Black Zionist‟
version), had a profound impact on Africa. The rising African intelligentsia adopted the ideas of
independence, power, Black Empire, black unity and resistance to white domination, in particular
in South and West Africa. Black nationalist ideas were also exported to Africa by black British
soldiers from the Caribbean serving in Africa. Another pathway was via black American
missionaries, who founded „Ethiopian‟, African' and „Zionist‟ churches, and introduced ideas
about black Christianity, black churches and black government. Noted leaders of African
nationalism - John Chilembwe and, later on, Hastings Banda from Nyassaland (today's Malawi),
Nkrumah from the Gold Coast and Nnamdi Azikiwe, Eyo Ita and Obafemi Awolowo from
Nigeria - studied in the United States at black universities (Lincoln University, Howard
University) and absorbed the pan-African ideas (Awolowo 1960;Azikiwe 1968 [1937]; Nkrumah
1962, 1963; Shepperson and Price (on Chilembwe) 1958).

In 1900 a worldwide pan-African movement was founded. Its first congresses - 1900 and 1921 in
London, 1919 in Paris, 1923 in Lisbon and 1927 in New York - were dominated by the black
Americans. However, in the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945, the Africans
(Nkrumah, Banda, Jomo Kenyatta) became prominent, although an important American
delegation (Du Bois, Padmore, Amy Garvey, Ras Makonnen) still participated. In Manchester the
first demands for national self-determination, freedom, democracy and independence were voiced,
while the old, pre-World War II goals of protection, mandate and trusteeship were rejected. (On
the Pan-African congresses, see Geiss 1974; Langley 1973; Thompson 1969).

FROM PRIMARY RESISTANCE TO PROTO-NATIONALISM

762
African nationalism stems both from the Americas and from Africa. Though the American
contribution was of great ideological importance, early resistance to colonial conquest and
colonial rule prepared the ground for the emergence of Africa-rooted African nationalism. If
nationalism is understood simply as opposition to foreign rule, this implies it developed in the
early days of colonial rule (Hodgkin 1956). If, however, nationalism is seen as a „modern‟
ideology aiming at self-determination, nation-states, sovereignty, national unity, modernization
and cultural roots, and if it is a movement led by modern, educated leaders leading modern mass-
movements, parties or guerilla groups, then the stirrings of early anti-colonial wars are pre-
nationalist. They are nevertheless important for the later emergence of full-scale nationalism.

The early anti-colonial wars in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century establish a
continuity of resistance from the early days of colonialism to independence in the 1960s. In fact,
many territories were occupied by unequal treaties with traditional rulers, and in many colonies
there were, alongside rebellion and resistance, long periods of tranquility, passivity and even
collaboration. Colonial powers very much exploited the diversity and enmity of various African
groups within the colony by a policy of divide et impera. Nevertheless, at one time or the other,
most colonial territories saw revolts and resistance, which African nationalism would later on be
able to build on.

Anti-colonial resistance in the late nineteenth century is called „primary resistance‟, that is,
resistance of local ethnic or sub-ethnic groups, led by traditional rulers and chiefs, against the
colonial conquest. Such were, for example, the Swahili resistance to the German conquest of the
East African coast, the Ashanti Wars against the British and the Kingdom of Dahomey's war
against the French. Later on came the „early rebellions‟ against an established colonial
administration and its abuses. These were usually large-scale rebellions, encompassed a variety of
traditional and ethnic groups and were led by new leaders, „charismatic prophets‟ who had no
traditional status, but were not „modern‟ in the sense of having been Western-educated. These
rebellions broke out for a variety of reasons - insults by racist colonial officials, abuse of the
native religion, forced labour (e.g. the Shona and Ndebele rebellion in Rhodesia and the Maji-
Maji in German East Africa), taxation on heads, women or huts (e.g. the Hut Tax War in Sierra
Leone), opposition to disarmament (e.g. the Basuto Gun War), land expropriation and the seizure
of cattle (e.g. the Herero Revolt in German South-West Africa) and cruel treatment by the
colonial administration and their local collaborators.

763
Primary resistance and early rebellions were a source of pride and inspiration for future
nationalists. They proved that Africans had not been merely „partitioned‟; they had fought and
resisted, had shown courage in the face of a modern army and had not surrendered easily. They
had sometimes even been victorious - the Ethiopians defeated the Italian army at Adowa (1896),
the Hehe of East Africa wiped out an entire German Expeditionary Force and the Basuto's Gun
War prevented Basutoland (today's Lesotho) from being annexed to South Africa and settled by
whites. The victories, still emphasized in today's African historiography and narratives,
demonstrate that Africans did have military skills and organizational capabilities and, contrary to
colonial race theory and prejudice, were in no sense inferior. (On the primary resistance and early
rebellion and their connection to modern nationalism, see Ranger 1968.)

The period between the world wars is a period of proto-nationalism, or evolutionary nationalism.
Proto-nationalism did not have the characteristics of a fully fledged nationalism, but had prepared
the ground for its emergence later on. By the end of World War I most rebellions had been
crushed by force and the colonies had been „pacified‟. In the 1920s and 1930s another
development took place, which prepared the ground for the emergence of a post-World War II
full-scale anti-colonial nationalism. Modern African social, cultural and political organizations
were founded by members of the new African intelligentsia. In the colonial capitals and urban
centres of most colonies, unions, congresses, parties, veterans' associations, school graduate clubs
and cultural circles emerged. Their demands were modest - more equality, more representation in
legislative bodies, more openings for Africans in the middle and upper levels of the public service,
the abolition of discriminatory laws. There were no demands for independence or decolonization.
It had not yet become full-scale modern nationalism. It was, however, „proto-nationalism‟, first
because the demands were partially „national‟, secondly because some of the leaders would later
on lead the nationalist struggle and, finally, because there was some organizational continuity
between the proto-nationalist organizations and the future nationalist movements (Geiss 1974).

CULTURAL NATIONALISM

Culture is important for a people's identity and, as such, plays an important part in many
nationalisms. It was especially important in African nationalism. The African renaissance had to
overcome colonial notions of Africa's inferiority, primitiveness and lack of meaningful culture.
While some Africans imitated everything European and Western, thus internalizing psychological
colonialism which claimed Africa was „different and unequal‟ or „different and inferior‟, the

764
nationalists countered this with Africa is different and equal', and sometimes with „different and
superior‟. One such voice of cultural nationalism was found in négritu á e, a movement led by
Aimé Césaire of Martinique and Léopold Senghor of Senegal. In the 1930s they already
underscored the beauty of African music, folklore, painting, sculpture, dance and poetry. While
colonialists saw Africa as savage and primitive, the proponents of négritu áe pointed out that this
so-called „primitiveness‟ was in reality an expression of humanity, harmony, spontaneity, love,
intuition, vitality, warmth, simplicity and reflected the African's closeness to the other, to
tradition, nature, land and homeland. The African cultural nationalists recognized Europe's
advantage in military skills, technology and rationality, but they stressed African hospitality and
solidarity, the African attitude toward the aged, and the egalitarian, cooperative and „democratic‟
character of African society. (On cultural nationalism, see AMSAC 1962; Césaire 1971 [1947];
Diop 1959, 1962; Hymans 1971; Senghor 1945, 1990.)

LIBERAL IDEAS, MODERNIZATION AND ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONALISM

In the 1930s and 1940s liberal-democratic ideas about human rights and liberties, about national
self-determination, the rule of law and the equality of peoples and races, and about tolerance and
justice gradually percolated into Africa. Africa's new elites absorbed these ideas at British, French
and American universities, through their contacts with French socialists and British Labour
leaders, and through the teachings of liberal-minded missionaries in Africa. Nkrumah, Azikiwe,
Tanganyika's Julius Nyerere, Kenyatta and his fellow Kenyan Tom Mboya, Senghor, Patrice
Lumumba and Joseph Kasavuvu from the Belgian Congo, Banda, Uganda's Milton Obote,
Northern Rhodesia's Kenneth Kaunda, Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique and South Africa's
Nelson Mandela all fought against Western colonialism in the name of Western liberal values.
They demanded that the West realize its own goals and values, but this time in Africa and for
Africans. (On the introduction of liberal ideas, see Avineri 1963; Braganca and Wallerstein 1982;
Hanna 1964; Hodgkin 1956; Kedourie 1970; Mutiso and Rohio 1975; Neuberger 1986a; Taylor
2002.)

The liberal ideas of freedom did not grow in a vacuum. Socio-economic change - such as
urbanization, modern transportation, the spread of Western education, growing literacy,
commodity agriculture replacing subsistence agriculture, international trade, the rapid rise of
Christianity and Islam, the establishment of workers' unions, student organizations, ethnic
associations and political parties - prepared the ground for the rise of nationalism.

765
In Africa's new colonial towns - in Dakar, Abidjan, Accra, Lagos, Leopoldville (today's
Kinshasa), Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, Kampala and Luanda - a „national‟ consciousness, cross-
cutting ethnic loyalties, grew among the new urban elites. Associations based on class, profession
or education, developed a „national‟ orientation and identity. Racial segregation in the colonial
capitals, the visible juxtaposition of white suburbs and African slums created the conditions for
nationalist mobilization.

Modern transportation made it possible for leaders from different regions and ethnic groups to
meet, and for urban party activists to reach the countryside. Information and ideas were
transmitted via radio and newspapers in colonial and African languages.

Modernization created a small, but sociologically and politically important, working class
employed in mines and ports, on railways and in the colonial administration. Their wages were
low and they worked alongside white workers whose wages were much higher. All employers
and managers were white. The rise of an African working class led to the establishment of unions
that made the connection between their miserable living conditions and colonialism, and played a
pivotal role in anti-colonial nationalism.

The nationalist parties were also a product of modernization since parties cannot exist without
educated leaders, a politicized public, a modern press and modern transportation and
communication. Anti-colonial nationalism, as represented by parties like the African National
Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the Tanganyika
African National Union (TANU), the West African Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
(RDA), the Union Camerounaise (UC) and the Union Nationale Congolaise (UNC), would be
unthinkable without the socio-economic modernization of the 1930s and 1940s. (On the
connection between modernization and the rise of nationalism, see Aluko 1974; Birmingham
1995; Coleman 1971; Falola 2001; Hodgkin 1956; Joseph 1977; Mazrui and Tidy 1984; Sklar
1994; Wallerstein 1966; Young 1970.)

Full scale anti-colonial nationalism erupted in Africa after World War II, when hundreds of
thousand of Africans had fought on the Allied side in the name of liberty and self-determination,
had perceived the gap between the proclamation of the Allies and colonial reality, seen the whites
slaughtering each other, and the British and French need of African and Indian troops.

766
The 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester indicated a turning point. There was deep
disillusionment with pan-Negroism. In the United States the struggle against oppression and for
equality increasingly became a struggle for civic rights in America itself. Pan-Negroism became
anti-colonial nationalism - more African, less based on race and culture (compared to racial pan-
Africanism and négritude), fiercely anti-colonial and more political and territorial. The ultimate
aim was liberation, though in the 1940s and 1950s, it still remained unclear whether the focus was
on Africa', on the „colonial peoples‟, on regions like West Africa, East Africa or Central Africa,
or on particular territories like Uganda or Nigeria.

Reformist proto-nationalism gave way to movements which arose all over Africa and demanded
not only liberation, independence, self-determination and autonomy, but also democracy,
„freedom now‟, majority rule, „one man one vote‟ and human rights. The movement also had
socio-economic goals - modernization, industrialization and education. Its aims were future-
oriented rather than to revert to a traditional pre-colonial Africa, as had been the aim of primary
resistance and early rebellion. Modern anti-colonial nationalism was led by Western-educated
Africans (journalists, teachers, social scientists and union leaders), not by chiefs, emirs and
sultans. It was a modern, polycentric nationalism (see Smith 1971), which wanted to integrate
Africa into the family of nations, to assure her a respectable place on the world stage, and to close
the gap between the „have‟ nations of the North and the „have not‟ nations of the South. Its
language was no longer moderate, gradualist and evolutionary, but harshly anti-imperialist, anti-
colonialist, opposed to exploitation and calling for mobilization and struggle.

The means were either a determined political struggle - demonstrations, rallies, general strikes,
electoral competition and the mobilization of outside support in the colonial countries or the UN -
or a violent struggle, that is, guerrilla warfare. In some countries (such as Tanganyika, Uganda,
Nyassaland, the Belgian Congo or the Ivory Coast), the struggle was mainly political; in others
(such as French Cameroun, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Southern Rhodesia), it was to
a large extent a bloody war for liberation. In still other territories, like South Africa, Kenya and
Namibia, the struggle was mixed, led either by one major anti-colonial movement (South Africa)
or by competing and sometimes complementary political and violent anti-colonial movements
(Kenya). (On modern anti-colonialism, see Birmingham 1995,1998; Hanna 1964; Hodgkin 1956;
Maddox and Welliver 1993; Neuberger 1986a; Nkrumah 1962, 1963; Nyerere 1966; Young 1970.)

767
Anti-colonial nationalism started as an elite-nationalism of a small circle of intellectuals. It then
spread to the wider urban population - mainly white-collar and blue-collar workers in the civil
service, the nascent industries, the ports, the railways and the mines. It finally became mass-
nationalism when the peasantry was mobilized. (On the way nationalism spreads, see Hroch
1985.) The success of anti-colonial nationalism cannot be called into question. In 1957 the first
African colony (the Gold Coast) became independent. In the 1960s almost all British, French,
Italian (Somalia), Belgian (Congo, Rwanda, Burundi) and Spanish (Equatorial Guinea) colonies
achieved independence, to be joined in the 1970s by all Portuguese territories (Angola,
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principe). Finally, in the 1980s and
1990s, the last bastions of European rule (Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa and South
Africa) succumbed to the anti-colonial onslaught.

SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM AND ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONALISM

The October Revolution in Russia (1917) has made communism a major force in the twentieth
century. An in-depth analysis of anti-colonial nationalism in Africa should not disregard its direct
and indirect impact, which has accelerated Europe's withdrawal from Africa. An entire generation
of educated Africans who aspired to national liberation was deeply affected by Marxist-Leninist
ideas about the connection between colonialism and capitalism, about the exploitative economic
nature of colonialism, about its being a product of the capitalist system. Lenin's Imperialism - the
Highest Stage of Capitalism had a profound influence (Lenin 1939 [1917]). Lenin argued that
imperialism was based on the concentration of capital, the fusion of industrial and financial
capital, the export of capital to underdeveloped countries, the formation of international
monopolies and the partition of the world among the capitalist powers. In the early years of the
Soviet Union, anti-capitalism became identified with hostility towards the West, that is with
hostility towards Western companies that operated in Tsarist Russia and towards the „imperialist‟
powers that intervened in the Russian Civil War. Chinese Communism also perceived capitalism
and Western imperialism - which directly or indirectly ruled China via spheres of influence and
capitulations - as two sides of the same coin.

The communist revolutions in China, Vietnam and Cuba may be seen as anti-Western nationalism,
as opposition to foreign rule by imperial powers and capitalist companies. African anti-colonial
nationalism was profoundly influenced by developments in the Soviet Union, China, Eastern
Europe, Vietnam and Cuba. African nationalists also associated colonial rule with capitalist

768
exploitation by Western companies and European settlers. Capitalism was identified as a
worldwide system based on the extraction of primary products from Africa and the exploitation of
cheap African labour. In the eyes of the anti-colonial nationalists, colonialism was almost
identical with Western capitalism, and anti-colonial nationalism was mostly anti-Western and
anti-capitalist.

The communists saw the West as the common enemy of the Soviet Union, of all Communist
parties around the world and of the colonized peoples. For a short period, some of the early pan-
Africanists, like Du Bois, Padmore and Césaire, were members of the Communist Party (in the
United States, Great Britain and France). Other founding fathers of African nationalism, like
Nkrumah and Kenyatta, had loose connections with communist circles during their studies in
England. In the post-World War II era, a close cooperation developed in French West Africa
between the French Communist Party (PCF) and the major nationalist party, the Rassemblement
Démocratique Africain (RDA), led by Félix Houphouet-Boigny from the Ivory Coast and Modibo
Keita from the French Soudan (today's Mali).

The image of the Soviet Union as a state that had, within a very short period of time, crushed
capitalism, contained Western intervention, instituted agrarian reform and had become a leading
industrial and military force, raised the admiration of African nationalists. In the 1940s, 1950s
and 1960s, capitalism was seen as an unsuitable model for rapid modernization as it had taken the
West generations to industrialize and modernize. At the time, African nationalists were unaware
of Stalinist oppression and terror, and their image of Soviet and Chinese progress was highly
flawed.

The leaders of Africa's anti-colonial movements accepted any assistance for their struggle. The
Soviet Union and the communist parties in the West strongly supported this struggle because it
weakened their Western enemy. The linkage between communism and anti-colonial nationalism
in Asia accelerated the process of decolonization in Africa. The relatively swift decolonization of
Western and Eastern Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s aimed at preventing protracted
guerrilla warfare and communist-nationalist fusion à la Vietnam. In the Portuguese colonies,
from which Portugal refused to withdraw until 1974, the anti-colonial struggle became very much
radicalized by guerrilla movements led by Marxists and supported by the Soviet Union, China
and Cuba. The same held for the Southern African territories under white settler domination,
namely South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and South-West Africa.

769
Different social groups in Africa identified with anti-Western nationalism and anti-capitalism.
Peasants, integrated into the colonial money economy and growing cash crops for export,
resented their dependence on impersonal market mechanisms, which determined the price of
ground-nuts, coffee, cocoa and cotton and had a great impact on their well-being. They were very
much aware of their exploitation by Europeans because the gap between what they were paid for
primary commodities and what the foreign companies earned by selling the products in Paris,
London or Brussels was enormous.

Africans were often dependent on Arab or Indian money-lenders, whom they considered to be
part of the hated colonial system. In addition, colonialism introduced private ownership of land in
areas that had hitherto only known communal ownership; this created a class of landlords,
resulting in populist resentment amongst the peasantry that could be mobilized by the new
nationalist parties and movements.

Artisans and small-scale retail traders, for whom modernization and colonialism meant
competition by foreign imports and foreign trade networks, joined the nationalists. So did the
workers. Their employers in ports, mines, industries and railways were either the colonial
government or the European foreign companies. The labourers were uprooted from their villages,
from the traditional order and from the safety net of the larger family. They lived in slums, felt
isolated and alienated, their wages were meagre, and the contrasting wealth of the Europeans was
all too visible. They developed growing feelings of hatred against white rule and white capitalists.
This could easily be mobilized by the nationalist intellectuals and translated into ideas about the
need for a radically different social order. (On the mobilization of the different social groups, see
Kautsky 1976.)

Most anti-colonial nationalists did not want to imitate the Soviet or Chinese model. They wanted
a socialism of their own, a national variety they called „African Socialism‟. African Socialism
emphasized its unique African character, and can therefore be considered a form of nationalism.
It rejected some of the main tenets of European Marxism, such as class struggle, hostility towards
religion and historical materialism. Despite the fact that African Socialists also accepted the
capitalist explanation of colonialism, they did not - as opposed to the orthodox Marxists - believe
in the power of economics to shape politics.

770
African Socialists also argued that pre-colonial Africa was socialist and that Socialism had
therefore not been imported from elsewhere. Socialism simply meant a return to the roots, the
reinstatement of a traditional society based on solidarity, communality and equality. Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania called this African Socialism Ujamaa (familyhood) in order to stress its
African roots. The way African socialists looked at pre-colonial African society was very similar
to that of the cultural nationalists, such as the proponents of négritude. (On African Socialism, see
Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Nyerere 1968; Senghor 1964.)

During the anti-colonial struggle almost all African leaders identified with one or the other
variety of socialism. Very few believed in capitalism. African socialists and nationalists strove
not only for independence, but also for a socio-economic revolution based on accelerated
industrialization, a centralized economy and state planning. In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s very
few believed in a laissez-faire market economy. However, African Socialism failed to effect a
socio-economic transformation. This is one of the reasons why the later anti-colonial movements
in the Portuguese colonies and in Southern Africa veered towards radicalism - radical nationalism,
radical socialism and guerrilla warfare.

RADICAL NATIONALISM

Radical nationalism developed in the Portuguese colonies and the white settler territories of
Southern Africa, which refused to join the decolonization process prevalent in most of West, East
and Central Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. Portuguese colonialism dismissed moderate demands
for reform and outlawed all political organizations and parties and continued with its harsh
oppressive policies and forced labour. In defiance of African nationalism and liberal public
opinion in the West, a harsh Apartheid regime was imposed on South and South-West Africa. In
1965, a white settler government issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern
Rhodesia. It is no coincidence that most territories that did not gain independence in the 1960s
and 1970s were white settler colonies where African land was expropriated on a large scale and
where the settlers imposed a policy of oppression and racial segregation. In most of these
territories, armed struggle became the mode of operation of the national liberation movement.

Radical nationalism was deeply influenced by the writings of Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist from
Martinique who participated in the Algerian war of independence. In his famous books Les
Damnés de la terre (The Wretched of the Earth) and Peau noire, masques blancs (Black Skin,

771
White Masks), Fanon argued for violent struggle as the only weapon of the colonized to meet the
challenge of violent colonialism. In his view only violence could mobilize the colonized masses,
integrate the intellectuals and the masses, undo the colonial divide and rule, and restore dignity by
creating a „new man‟: active, creative, courageous and modern. He called not only for
independence, but also for the total destruction of the colonial order. He rejected as a „colonialist
invention‟ and a „corrupting compromise‟ any decolonization initiated by colonial powers and
accepted by moderate nationalism.

The radical movements - the ANC and PAC in South Africa, ZANU and ZAPU in Rhodesia,
FRELIMO in Mozambique, the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and the FNLA, MPLA
and UNITA in Angola - first tried the political option, but after its rejection by the colonial
governments, they opted for armed struggle. This frequently occurred after colonial massacres
(1945 in Setif/Algeria; 1960-61 in Mueda and Xinavane/Mozambique; 1960 in Sharpville/ South
Africa; 1959 in Pijiguiti/ Guinea-Bissau).

The guerrilla movements aimed at achieving independence and liberation, and also wanted to do
away with all the attributes of postcolonial neo-colonialism - the capitalist system, dependence on
the West, the presence of foreign companies and the rule of African oligarchies. Their rhetoric
was harshly anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, a populist hailing of the masses and the revolution.
(On radical nationalism, see Cabral 1969; Fanon 1952, 1961; Henriksen 1983; Joseph 1977;
Mondlane 1969; Neuberger 1990; Nkrumah 1968,1969,1970.)

CONTINENTAL PAN-AFRICANISM

Continental pan-Africanism is another variety of African nationalism. While racial pan-

Africanism (pan-Negroism) was still important in the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester
(1945), pan-Africanism became continental in the 1950s. It detached itself from the black
diaspora and now included Arab North Africa. The driving force behind this development was
Kwame Nkrumah, who became Ghana's first president in 1957. In a way, continental pan-
Africanism imitated Gamal Abdul Nasser's pan-Arabism, which had a strong appeal in the Arab
world in the 1950s and 1960s. Continental pan-Africanism was built on what was perceived as a
common colonial past of Arab and African Africa, and on a growing Afro-Asian solidarity, which
emerged after the first Afro-Asian summit in Bandung/Indonesia in 1955. These were the times
of a rising „neutralist‟ Third Bloc (later to include Latin America and become the Third World).

772
White Arabs were accepted by pan-Africans as fellow Africans and non-Europeans, and as part of
the „colonial peoples‟. Nasser's strong support of African independence movements, which had
their base in Cairo, whence they could broadcast in African languages, strengthened African-Arab
ties. So did the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62), which became a symbol of anti-
colonial struggle, heroism and pride.

In Africa Must Unite, Nkrumah proposed the creation of a United States of Africa, a strong united
African state similar to the USA and the Soviet Union (Nkrumah 1963). He thought this was the
only way to liberate the whole of Africa, to create development and prosperity through a common
market, to have an African say in world affairs and to avoid the weakness caused by
balkanization and fragmentation. Nkrumah and his supporters thought Africa's partition and
borders were artificial and would become redundant in the future United States of Africa.

In April 1958 Nkrumah convened the first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS), to
be attended by African Ghana, Liberia and Ethiopia, as well as Arab Egypt, Libya, Sudan,
Morocco and Tunisia. In December 1958 another important conference convened in Accra, the
All African Peoples' Conference (AAPC), which assembled representatives of governments,
parties and underground movements from all over Africa. In the 1960s, the CIAS and the AAPC
convened annually.

Nkrumah and other leaders also tried to fulfil the pan-African dream by uniting colonial
territories. In the late 1950s and the early 1960s the efforts to create unions of independent
African states included the Ghana-Guinea Union, the Association of Independent African States
(Ghana and Liberia), the Union of African States (Ghana, Guinea and Mali), the Mali Federation
(French Soudan and Senegal) and the East African Federation (Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda).
All these efforts ended in failure. The only fusions to succeed were the Republic of Somalia
(Italian Somalia and British Somaliland), which disintegrated in the 1990s, the unification of
French Cameroun and the British Southern Cameroons, the unification of British Togoland and
the Gold Coast within Ghana, the fusion of Nigeria and the Northern Cameroons, and the union
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which resulted in the creation of Tanzania in 1964. There were local,
historical, cultural and ethnic reasons for each of these successful mergers, but pan-Africanism
also played a role.

773
A United States of Africa failed because territorial nationalism proved to be stronger. The new
ruling elites did not want to give up their sovereignty and power; in addition, there were deep
cleavages between Arab Africa and Black Africa, between the Francophone and Anglophone
states and between the pro-Western and the pro-Soviet governments during the Cold War. Instead
of achieving a maximalist pan-Africanism, what was achieved was a minimalist-functionalist
version of pan-Africanism in the form of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in
1963 and transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2002. The OAU/AU is not one state, but a
loose international organization of states that remain independent and insist on the principles of
sovereign equality, non-interference and territorial integrity. The OAU was, nevertheless, very
successful in its struggle for the liberation of the Portuguese colonies, UDI-Rhodesia, South-West
Africa and Apartheid South Africa. Both the OAU and, later on, the AU effectively put an end to
some inter-African wars (e.g. Morocco-Algeria in the 1960s, Ethiopia-Eritrea in the 1990s) and to
civil wars (e.g. Mozambique in the 1980s). However, it failed in other cases (e.g. Nigeria-Biafra
in the 1960s, Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s, Rwanda in the 1990s). The OAU/AU also became an
organization for inter-African cooperation in economics, transportation, education and technology.
Similar functionalist organizations were established on the regional level, the most successful of
which are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which comprises both
Anglophone and Francophone states, and the Southern African Development and Cooperation
Council (SADC). (On continental and regional Pan-Africanism, see El-Ayouty and Zartman 1984;
Foltz 1965; Legum 1965; Mazrui and Tidy 1984; Neuberger 1977; Nyerere 1963; Welch 1966.)

TERRITORIAL NATIONALISM AND NATION-BUILDING

The failure of pan-Africanism has meant that nation-building has had to be accomplished by
territorial nationalism in each colony about to become an independent state. With few exceptions,
like Somalia, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, the populations in these states were multi-ethnic.
There was not one ethno-cultural nation in one single colony so that the newly independent states
were not nation-states. Anti-colonial nationalism in the various colonies was a „nationalism
without a nation, a nationalism that aimed at liberation, self-determination, unity, power, prestige
and finding roots, to create a new nation. The French, British and Italian nations came into being
in a similar way. Anti-colonial and postcolonial nationalism could build on a common colonial
history, which had lasted for 60-80 years, on a common European language (French, English,
Portuguese) among the territory‟s elites, on links established within the colony-turned-state
through commerce, transportation, communication and urbanization, and on a common anti-

774
colonial struggle. Many of the anti-colonial movements did indeed stress their loyalty to the
territory in its colonial boundaries by adopting the colony's name. They were named the Kenya
African National Union, the Tanganyika African National Union, the Zimbabwe African Peoples'
Union, the Nyassaland African Congress, the South West African Peoples' Organization
(SWAPO), the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire,
the Frente de Libertaçâo de Moçambique (FRELIMO), the Partido Africano da Independência da
Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and the Movimiento Popular para la Liberación de Angola
(MPLA). Most of them insisted on maintaining the „sanctity‟ of the colonial boundaries. In many
colonies and postcolonial states, major ethnic groups, such as the Kikuyu and Kalenjin in Kenya,
the Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria, the Wolof in Senegal and the Amhara in Ethiopia, had vested
interests in preserving the postcolonial status quo. (On the problematics of nation-building within
the colonies turned states, see Neuberger 1994,2000; Nzongola-Ntalaja 1993; Rotberg 1966;
Rothchild 1986, 1991; Rothchild and Oluronsola 1983; Yeros 1999.)

Various ways and means were adopted to forge new nations. Frequently, a common history was
invented by the creation of integrative common myths. Thus, the Mau-Mau rebellion, led by
ethnic-Kikuyu but opposed by many other ethnic groups, became an all-Kenya anti-colonial
struggle. The Maji-Maji Rebellion in German East Africa, the Ashanti Wars in the Gold Coast,
the Herero Revolt in German South-West Africa and the Zulu Wars in South Africa have become
„nationalized‟ in a similar way in today's Tanzania, Ghana, Namibia and South Africa
respectively. (On the use of history in nation-building, see Ajayi 1966; Anderson 1991; Kalinga
1998; Neuberger 1987.)

Another way to foster integration is by „nationalizing‟ the tradition and folklore of one or several
ethnic groups. In Banda's Malawi, for instance, Chewa culture and tradition were taught to be
truly Malawian (see Forster 1994). Another strategy of nation-building is through linguistic
integration: either by institutionalizing one indigenous language as national language (Swahili in
Tanzania, Somali in Somalia, Amharic in Ethiopia, Malagacy in Madagascar, Arabic in the Sudan,
Swati in Swaziland), or by strengthening a common European lingua franca (English in post-
Apartheid South Africa and Namibia, French in the Ivory Coast, Portuguese in Angola).
Sometimes, a common ideology was thought to be the right device for nation-building: Ujamaa
in Tanzania from the 1960s to the 1980s, Marxism-Leninism in Ethiopia in the 1980s, Islamism
in Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s, Christianity in Zambia in the 1990s and authenticité in
Mobutu's Zaire in the 1980s.

775
New centrally located inland capitals replacing colonial coastal capitals were another device of
nation-building adopted by Nigeria (Abuja), the Ivory Coast (Yamassoukro), Tanzania (Dodoma)
and Malawi (Lilongwe). Another deliberate step taken to enhance the population's pride in the
historical state was by Africanizing the name of the state or of its capital. The Gold Coast thus
changed its name to Ghana, the French Soudan to Mali, Southern Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,
Northern Rhodesia to Zambia and Upper Volta to Burkina Faso. The capitals Leopoldville and
Salisbury became Kinshasa and Harare. An additional nation-building strategy was to reduce
socio-economic gaps between regions and ethnic groups by heavily investing in the poor and
disadvantaged areas.

African nation-building rested on three basic strategies. One was the Jacobin strategy of
homogenizing the country through coercion and with the use of force. The effort by Ethiopia
under Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam to „amharize‟ the non-Amharas by suppressing
their languages and culture, and by discriminating against Muslims is one example. Other
examples of such Jacobin strategy are the wars waged by Sudan (1955-72, 1983-2002 and 2004)
to arabize and Islamize the Africans of Southern Sudan and Darfur; the slaughter of the Arabs and
Indians in Zanzibar (1964), the expulsion of the Indians from Uganda (1971) and the genocide
perpetrated in Rwanda (1994).

A second basic strategy is gradualist nation-building. In an attempt to mould one ethno-cultural

nation in the long run this strategy accepts pluralism in the short run while rejecting coercion and
force. This melting-pot strategy relies on integration by a common European or African language,
communication and the growth of a shared patriotism over time. It was favoured by regimes like
Nkrumah's Ghana, Nyerere's Tanzania and Banda's Malawi.

A third strategy aims to build an ethno-culturally heterogeneous, pluralist civic nation. Pluralism
may be either fully insitutionalized through federalism or regional autonomy (as it has been in
Nigeria since independence, in Ethiopia after 1991, and in Sudan between 1972 and 1983). It can
also be partially formalized through ethno-cultural provinces (as in Kenya) or provinces that are
at least in part ethno-cultural (as with the Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal in post-Apartheid
South Africa). One additional pluralist strategy is non-institutionalized pluralism, such as in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the Ivory Coast. (On the different strategies, see
Neuberger 1984, 2000.)

776
CONCLUSION

African nationalism has meant different things to different people over different periods of time:
pan-Negroism in the second half of the nineteenth century until World War II; primary resistance
and early rebellions against colonial rule in Africa from the 1880s to World War I; proto-
nationalism between the world wars; modern anti-colonial nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s;
radical nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s; territorial nationalism before independence and
nation-building in the post-colonial state. One could have added white settler nationalism in
South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, but the focus of this chapter has been on black African
nationalism.

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Grant, Susan-Mary. "A Nation before Nationalism: The Civic and Ethnic Construction of
America." Pp. 527-40

The modern debate over American nationalism is a truly trans-Atlantic one, as befits its origins in
nineteenth-century America when two individuals, one French and one American, argued for the
exceptional nature of America's national development. The French aristocrat Alexis de
Tocqueville, who published his assessment of Democracy in America in the 1830s, has been
described as „the initiator of the writings on American exceptionalism‟ (Kammen 1993; Lipset
1996: 17). His perspective was reinforced in 1893 when the historian Frederick Jackson Turner
argued at the Chicago World's Fair for the significance of the frontier in creating a unique
American identity, or what he saw as the „nationalizing tendency of the West‟. 1
Between them,
Tocqueville and Turner set the parameters for much of the modern debate over American
nationalism. Despite the fact that most of that debate has taken place without overt reference
either to Tocqueville or to Turner's famous frontier thesis, it remains the case that much of the
scholarly interest - perhaps more so the relative lack of interest - in American nationalism is
predicated on the proposition that Americans are unlike other peoples; that they are, in
fundamental ways, exceptional: their history, their development and their national identity set
them apart from, and perhaps even at odds with, other societies and nations. Seymour Martin
Lipset, revisiting his earlier analysis of „the first new nation‟, notes the widespread belief that
America is „qualitatively different‟ from other nations, a belief derived from America's
revolutionary origins, „the first colony, other than Iceland, to become independent‟. As such,
while other nations „define themselves by a common history as birthright communities‟,
Americans have had to look elsewhere for the bonds that would provide national cohesion.
Unable to lay claim to a common ancestry, a common history, shared cultural or political
traditions or even the land itself, American nationalism was from its inception, according to Hans
Kohn and others, „an ideological nationalism, the embodiment of an idea‟, an argument that
Richard Hofstadter summed up succinctly in his observation that America's fate was „not to have
ideologies but to be one‟ (Lipset 1979; 1996: 17-18; Kohn 1945 [1944]: 289; 1961 [1957]: 25;
Hofstadter in Lipset 1996: 18; Ravitch 1990: 3).

For some modern scholars, however, the first new nation is actually no nation at all.
Primordialists and perennialists argue that nations can only be constructed around „birthright
communities‟, and although they accept that societies developed on an ideological premise

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display national attributes, and may have constructed - as America very obviously has - many of
the outward trappings of patriotism, they do not consider that such communities are nations „in
the pristine sense of the word‟ (Connor 1978: 381; 2004: 37). America's immigrant origins may,
in part, explain the reluctance of some of the major nationalism scholars to engage with America.
Even modernists such as Benedict Anderson, having acknowledged that the American nation
represented a revolutionary - in all senses - break with the past, have little more to say about the
American case, a case further complicated by the element that scholars term Southern or
sometimes more specifically Confederate nationalism (Anderson 1992: 192-3). The South,
seemingly a nation within a nation because it was unable to break away from the United States
during the Civil War of 1861-65 is, as such, something of a stumbling block for those seeking to
identify an overarching American identity. Consequently, although American nationalism is
discussed by a variety of scholars from widely different academic disciplines ranging from
sociology through history to communication studies, there has been no recent, full-length study of
the American case, nor is it yet fully incorporated into the specific scholarship on nationalism.
Given the persistent fascination with the question of American national identity exhibited by
Europeans and Americans alike over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the lack
of such scholarship seems surprising, until one considers at what points American nationalism
actually has inspired scholarly interest, if not yet much extended debate. American nationalism
has exercised American scholars at those times when the nation faced a direct challenge, be it
from immigration or from the Civil War that seemed to replicate in some respects the nationalist
struggles of Europe, but it was not until America made itself felt as a force in Europe that the
academic world began to contemplate the nationalist dimensions and ambitions of the New World.

REVOLUTION

One of the earliest and still most valuable studies of American nationalism was provided by Kohn,
who explored the American case in comparative context - up to a point - in The Idea of
Nationalism, a work published during the Second World War. The fact that Kohn regarded that
conflict as „a consequence and climax of the age of nationalism … a struggle for its meaning‟
doubtless influenced his analysis of the „ideological‟ nationalism of the New World, an analysis
he developed in his 1957 study American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay. Kohn was the
first to propose the argument - later developed by Daniel Boorstin - that „the very slight
knowledge of actual conditions of life in [colonial] America contributed to their idealization; the
Americans of whom Europeans then dreamed were legendary figures rather than real human

781
beings. For that very reason‟, Kohn suggested, „they could become the embodiment of the
European ideals‟ (Kohn 1945 [1944]: x, 265). Some twenty years later, Boorstin pointed out that
this idealization of the unknown was not restricted to European perspectives on the New World,
but was an integral part of the development of American nationalism itself. America, he argued,
„was so fertile a repository of hopes because it was so attractive a locale for illusions‟. American
life, according to Boorstin, „was distinguished by its lack of clear boundaries‟, a situation that
encouraged, rather than in any way hampered, the nation's earliest enterprises, and influenced
both the form and the function of the emergent nation itself. From „a European point of view‟, he
observed, „the creation of the United States was topsy-turvy. Its very existence was a paradox‟.
Whereas nationalism in Europe was „self-conscious, elaborately articulated, and passionate‟,
American nationalism was „shaped by the fact that the nation had not been born in any ecstasy of
nationalist passion‟. The American nation, he argued, „would long profit from having been born
without ever having been conceived‟, a point reinforced by John Murrin's famous observation
that Americans had erected their constitutional roof before they put up national walls' (Boorstin
1988 [1965]: 401, 221-3; Murrin 1987: 347; Parish 1995: 220; Waldstreicher 1997: 112-13;
Butler 2001 [2000]).

Prior to the American Revolution, of course, there was no such thing as the American nation;
nationalism, however, was not lacking. The „nationality of American identity and consciousness
does not require an explanation', Liah Greenfeld asserts: „The English settlers came with a
national identity; it was a given … National identity in America thus preceded the formation not
only of the specific American identity … but of the institutional framework of the American
nation‟ (Greenfeld 1992: 402). Although historians concur that an aggrieved sense of their rights
as free-born Englishmen explains, at least in some part, the colonists' behaviour toward the
mother country, it is difficult to conceive of English nationalism sustaining a people that, on the
eve of independence, comprised „a polyglot of English, Scots, Germans, Dutch, Swiss, French
and Africans‟ (Butler 2001: 2). More plausible is Kohn's description of the „rising stream of
American nationalism‟ being influenced by a combination of English nationalism and the natural
rights' philosophy of the Enlightenment, but even as the colonies debated the question of
separation from Britain, this stream had hardly become a flood. „No sense of loyalty to America
filled the hearts of the colonists before the Revolution‟, Kohn observed, and it was unlikely that
any such loyalty could have existed in an environment in which a heterogeneous population
exhibited equally heterogeneous loyalties, either to Britain or, increasingly, to the states in which
they had made their home (Kohn 1945 [1944]: 276-7). That there was a growing sense of

782
difference, a difference that was in certain aspects American', is obvious, but to describe that
sense as nationalism is premature. Indeed, as Greenfeld notes, immediately prior to the
Revolution there were, in effect, 13 separate American nations, and afterwards „the
uncompromising commitment of Americans to the purified principles of civic nationalism … was
bound to hinder the formation of a consensus regarding the geo-political referent of American
national loyalty, leaving open the question of what was, or whether there was, the American
nation' (Greenfeld 1992: 423). As Edmund Morgan put it, the American „nation was the child, not
the father of the revolution‟ (Morgan 1977: 100).

In their focus on the popular rituals of the Early National period, scholars have explored the
development of America's national political culture, a process of legitimization not just for parties
but for the nation itself. Via public festivals - most notably the 4th of July and Washington's
birthday - the street celebrations surrounding these, and a burgeoning press, Americans expressed
themselves in what was an increasingly national voice (Newman 1997; Waldstreicher 1997;
Ratcliffe 2000). Although from the early nineteenth century onwards Americans extended the
franchise and evolved a mass political system, facilitated by widespread literacy and ever-
expanding communication systems, scholars who identify these developments as significant to
the construction of nations post-1870 fail to engage with America's earlier efforts in the direction
of modern nationhood (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1991). In part this may be
because, as Parish pointed out, the centralization that frequently accompanied such developments
in other nations was lacking in early America, nor were there many overt declarations of
confidence in the American nation, but rather the opposite. As Linda Kerber reminds us, the
prediction that the centre could not hold was, for much of the Early National period, „a standard
conversational gambit‟ (Parish 1995: 222). An equally widespread rhetorical gambit, from
George Washington to Abraham Lincoln, was an emphasis on the need for unity rather than on its
existence. Washington's famous Farewell Address reminded Americans that they were „Citizens,
by birth or choice, of a common country‟, and urged Americans to place national loyalties over
state distinctions. Lincoln, too, was not oblivious to the lack of ethnic ties in a nation of
immigrants, a lack that he believed voluntary acceptance of the principles contained in the
Declaration of Independence could replicate. Foreign observers and Americans alike were acutely
aware that such patriotism as existed in the Early Republic tended to be local in form and
function; it was the states, Tocqueville astutely observed, and not the Union, that Americans
„identified with the soil; with the right of property and the domestic affections; with the
recollections of the past, the labours of the present, and the hopes of the future‟. 2

783
The Revolution, it seemed, had produced a functioning federal Union, with many of the outward
trappings of nationalism but not yet the imagined community that made such nationalism a
cohesive and durable force. Although the years following the War of 1812 saw the growth of
what Dangerfield termed a „common tradition‟, it took the form of a new kind of introspective
nationalism that did not necessarily bode well for national cohesion. There is as yet little
consensus on the lineaments of antebellum American nationalism, and in some cases profound
disagreement over both its nature and its durability. Donald Ratcliffe, on the one hand, has
warned against too glib an assessment of the weakness of the federal Union prior to 1860, and the
concomitant argument that „an American nation, based on a true American nationalism,
developed only after‟ the Civil War. The development of what he terms „sectional nationalisms‟
was, he argues, predicated on a shared sense of Americanism', and on the feeling in the South that
„non-Southerners were twisting Americanism into something that contradicted traditional shared
values‟ (Ratcliffe 2000: 28). Carl Degler, on the other hand, has argued that the Civil War „was
not a struggle to save a failed Union, but to create a nation that until then had not come into being‟
(Degler 1990: 10). In part, the apparent contradiction between those who perceive a functioning
nationalism prior to the Civil War and those who focus more on the fault lines of the pre-war
Union stems from a different understanding of that Union and its relationship to American
nationalism: Ratcliffe's emphasis on the national ties that bound antebellum Americans draws for
its support on the political framework that the federal Union represented; Degler's description of
the Union as „more a means to achieve nationhood than a nation itself, more readily permits of an
evolutionary conception of American nationalism as a process predicated on the Union, not as a
fixed structure constructed on it (Degler 1990: 14; Parish 1995: 220,224: Nagel 1964). In some
ways, it depends on whether antebellum America is seen as a community of interests or a
community of sentiment. As a nation in which membership was, in theory at least, voluntary both
descriptions might equally apply, but it was nevertheless the case that when interests appeared to
clash, as they did over the issues of slavery and westward expansion after 1848, such sentiment as
existed proved insufficient to hold the Union together. With expansion came division, and
increasingly that division was sectional in form. As both North and South began to see in the
other a society antithetical to their own they set in motion a process described by Major L. Wilson
as „a pattern of creation by destruction‟, culminating in a civil war that, according to Kohn, „can
be well understood as a war for national independence with nationalism as its chief issue‟. As
Boorstin astutely observed, Americans had their nation first and paid the price afterwards'
(Dangerfield 1965: 3; Wilson 1974: 188; Kohn 1961 [1957]: 115; Boorstin 1988 [1965]: 401;
Foner 1970: 40-72; Taylor 1979 [1961]: 18-20 etpassim; Grant 2000a: 6,39-60; 2000b).

784
REBELLION

If the first secessionist war had created the American nation, the second threatened to destroy it.
The war's outcome resolved the „federal vagueness‟ that had proved both a blessing and a curse to
the antebellum Union, and the war itself became the focus for a rein-vigorated, but also
reconfigured, American nationalism that scholars are beginning to explore in greater depth
(Boorstin 1988 [1965]: 393, 400-1; Doyle 2002; Grant 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2000b; 2004;
Lawson 2002a, 2002b). The subject is not without its difficulties, however. The problem of the
Civil War's role in the development of American nationalism is twofold. First, as a direct
challenge to the legitimacy of the federal Union, the outbreak of that conflict revealed the
shortcomings of American nationalism as a cohesive force between the Revolution and the mid-
nineteenth century; at the same time, scholars argue that the Union's very ability to wage war at
all points to a strong sense of nationalism that was itself reinforced in the process of fighting for
the nation. Second, „The South‟ - or „the south,‟ depending on one's perspective - is rather an
awkward element in this equation whereby nationalist sentiment plus military victory equals
increased nationalist sentiment, since the Confederacy's defeat did not, obviously enough,
produce a sudden volte-face in favour of national rather than sectional sentiment among elements
of the southern population. Further, the juxtaposition of American and Southern nationalism
disguises the sectional nature of nationalism in nineteenth-century America, wholly ignores its
northern variant, and assumes - as indeed did some northerners - that the American nation was, or
ought to be, New England writ large. In part, too, the difficulty arises from the debate over
whether the Confederacy was, or was not, a nation in its own right, a debate that began in 1861
and has continued to this day. As early as 1862 William Gladstone, then British Chancellor of the
Exchequer, announced that „there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South
have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than
either, they have made a nation‟. This was a declaration too far for Foreign Secretary Lord
Russell, who rebuked Gladstone for going „beyond latitude … when you say that Jefferson Davis
had made a nation. Recognition would seem to follow, and for that step I think the Cabinet is not
prepared‟. 3 Nevertheless, the possibility that the Confederacy might have been recognized as an
independent nation was real; that it never was in no way diminishes the efforts made to achieve
that end.

Leaving aside the tangled Constitutional issues over which Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, not to
mention the various interested foreign powers, wrangled at the time, scholars have by and large

785
accepted that there was such a thing as „Southern nationalism‟, whether or not its existence was
predicated on, or was productive of, a clearly defined Southern nation. Indeed, in contrast to its
northern, or American, variant, Southern nationalism has received a disproportionate share of
scholarly attention. Again, Kohn was one of the first contemporary scholars to explore the subject,
and although he considered that antebellum „Southerners were fully imbued with the common
feeling of the American nationalism of the period‟, he also described Southern ideology as a
„nascent true nationalism, distinct from the original American nationalism‟. The impulse behind
secession, according to Kohn, was nationalism, in the sense of its being an „emotional impulse‟
that transmuted Southern state loyalties into a unified whole (Kohn 1961 [1957]: 101, 116).
Although Henry Timrod, the „Poet Laureate of the Confederacy‟, described the South as a „nation
among nations‟ at the point of its separation from the Union, scholars have differed over the
4
extent to which nationalism was the cause, rather than a product, of the war itself. Despite its
title, Avery O. Craven's study of the South between 1848 and the outbreak of the war did not
uncover much evidence of a distinct Southern national identity prior to 1861, but David Potter
argued that this period clearly saw the „group loyalties‟ of Southerners begin to draw away from
the Union. John McCardell, similarly, identified the „idea of a Southern nation‟ in relation to
Southern politics, education, religion, literature and, of course, the pro-slavery argument even
earlier, in the 1830s. Southernism, Potter argued, „instead of working sectionally within a
framework of nationalism, tended to take on the character of nationalism itself and to break down
the existing pattern of nationalism‟ in America at that time (Craven 1953; Potter 1968: 61;
McCardell 1979; Niebuhr and Heimert 1963: 39-41).

Southern and Confederate nationalism are not, of course, synonymous, and no such thing as „The
South‟ chose to secede from the Union in the winter of 1860/61; the various states that did secede
did so individually „and piecemeal raked together their Confederacy as an aftermath (Ratcliffe
2000: 30). Having done so, however, Southerners did then clearly seek to establish the validity of
their nation at both local and international level and invoked not just the precedent of the
American but also that of the French Revolution in support of their claims. As Drew Gilpin Faust
has noted, Confederates „cast their struggle for independence as the equivalent of successful
nationalist movements‟, and explored the Dutch, Italian, Polish and Greek examples for parallels
with their own experience, parallels that scholars are just beginning to pursue in the context of the
modern debate on nationalism (Faust 1988: 11; McPherson 1999; Doyle 2002). Confederate
nationalism itself was for a long time indistinguishable in the scholarship from support for the
Souths military effort during the war - and by extrapolation support for slavery - and

786
consequently has been disparaged on the moral grounds of repugnance for the Souths „peculiar
institution‟ and on the practical basis of the Souths defeat, a defeat that some have ascribed to a
dearth of national sentiment. The title of Paul Escott's 1978 study said it all: After Secession:
Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism. Escott saw Davis himself as the
fatal flaw in the Confederate nation-building process, a man who alienated rather than involved
his people. This argument, when juxtaposed with the great number of studies that portray Lincoln
- as both man and later symbol - as crucial to the Union's version of American nationalism,
identifies leadership as a crucial factor in national construction. One group of scholars who
explored the reasons for Southern defeat went further in their analysis of why the South lost,
arguing that „the Confederacy functioned as a nation only in a technical, organizational sense, and
not in a mystical or spiritual sense. An inadequately developed sense of nationalism‟, they assert,
„hampered Southerners in their quest for independence‟. In the end, they conclude, Confederate
„nationalism was insufficient to maintain its war effort‟ and, therefore, not a true nationalist
ideology at all. Whilst it is recognized that „Confederate nationalists surely existed‟, Confederate
nationalism is dismissed as „more a dream than anything else‟ (Beringer et al. 1986: 66-7, 77).

The argument that military defeat revealed a fatal flaw in Confederate nationalist sentiment,
however, relies entirely on hindsight. The Civil War's outcome validated northern nationalist
claims, and placed the Confederacy firmly and forever in the „Lost Cause‟ camp. The nationalism
of the Union triumphed, and so historians too frequently reason that the northern variant of
American nationalism had always been the stronger and more valid. From the perspective of the
time, however, the war's outcome was by no means certain, and in any case the failure of the
South to break away from the Union does not in itself prove that Confederate nationalism was
fundamentally weak - only that it was, ultimately, unsuccessful. Neither does it prove that
American nationalism as promulgated by the North was, by comparison, strong. More recent
research has succeeded in showing that Confederate nationalism was rather more than a pipe
dream and that the ideology that sustained the South's attempt at secession had both form and
substance. Yet, crucially, these studies continue to examine the Confederacy almost in isolation.
Lacking the wider context of the Union's search for national meaning, they continue to present
the Confederacy very much as a world, and a nation, apart (Faust 1988; Gallagher 1997).
Certainly this is what the Confederacy very much hoped to be, but despite its best efforts the
battle for Confederate nationalism was conducted both in the context of and in ironic parallel with
a similar process in the North. The Confederate struggle towards national definition was tightly
bound up with the Union's defence of the Civil War and its reformulation of American

787
nationalism during the war years. Each relied, in fundamental ways, on the other. Conflict -
ideological as well as military - between the Union and the Confederacy helped each side to
construct and then defend its relative position. The Union victory ensured that its particular
interpretation of American nationalism would dominate, but this new nationalism was both
forged and, to a degree, tainted by the challenge offered to the Union by the South. In short, the
experience of the Civil War operated on the construction and refinement of both Union/
American and Confederate nationalism in much the same way.

In their analysis of Confederate nationalism, scholars have come close to suggesting that, in the
American case, nationalism is simply successful sectionalism, and in drawing comparisons with
the Revolution - comparisons that were common currency during the Civil War itself - seek to
show that America is in some ways „a nation of rebels‟, which is a romantic but essentially
flawed interpretation of the nation-building process in America (Carp 2002). Not that
contemporary comparisons with the Revolution were off the mark; they were all too close to it.
„Through identification with the War of American Independence,‟ Faust points out,
„Confederates … intended to claim American nationalism as their own, to give themselves at
once an identity and a history‟ (Faust 1988: 14; Grant 1998: 171; Kammen 1991: 64-6 Mitchell
1988: 1-2; 1993: 144). Yet this was in no sense a purely southern preoccupation: both sides were
completely immersed in the ideology and symbolism of the Revolution, with the result that it was
held up as defence and justification for both the act of secession and the military response against
this. Both sides argued that they were upholding the ambitions of the revolutionary generation
and sticking to the letter, and the sentiment, of both the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence. In constructing a separate Confederate Constitution, Southerners did little more
than imitate the Constitution of 1787, and in their declarations of the causes of secession the
various states similarly drew on the Declaration of Independence. There were, of course, telling
differences between the original documents and the revised Confederate versions. Most obviously,
the idealistic desire „to form a more perfect union‟ contained in the Preamble to the original
Constitution became, in the Confederate version, a rather prosaic intention „to form a permanent
federal government‟. Nevertheless, this reliance on America's founding documents as support for
both Union and Confederacy reveals that it was not only Southerners who sought to present
themselves as „the authentic heirs of the Founding Fathers, the true defenders of the ark of the
covenant‟ (Parish 1993: 113).

788
The ideological issues accompanying the war forced the North to move toward a redefinition of
nationalism that both justified its actions in the face of the challenge offered by the Confederacy
and offered a basis for postwar reconstruction of the American nation. The centrality of the
Revolution, to American as well as Confederate and Union nationalism, meant that the Union had
to find some way of showing that the original Revolution had been the result of„a legitimate
nationalistic impulse‟ which bore no relation whatsoever to the act of secession that had prompted
the Civil War. Northerners had, in short, to show that „the American Revolution was over and
that revolutionary ideology had no further application to American society‟ (Fredrickson 1968
[1965]: 133, 135). Fredrickson has shown how, in the process of addressing this problem,
Northern conservative intellectuals shifted the boundaries of American nationalism. The Union,
they asserted, merited support not because it represented the hope of liberty for the world but
because it provided the rather more tangible and traditional basis of American national power.
Further, since their arguments in support of loyalty to the Union were directly linked to their
support of the Federal war effort, the logical conclusion of their deliberations was to show that
„the ultimate America to which allegiance was due was not some vague and improbable
democratic utopia but the organized and disciplined North that was going to war before their eyes‟
(Fredrickson 1968 [1965]: 150). Other scholars have begun to probe the ways in which national
sentiment was inculcated in the North both prior to and during the Civil War, but purely in terms
of the historiography, the North has a fair amount of catching up still to do (Grant 2000a and b;
Lawson 2002). Until this happens, the debate over American nationalism during the Civil War
will continue to be one-sided and incomplete.

RACE

It can be argued that the Civil War „even more than the end of British colonial rule, represents the
true foundational moment in American political development‟, but this new foundation was rather
different from the voluntaristic nationalism of Washington and Lincoln (Bensel 1990: 10). Both
more robust in its insistence on loyalty to the nation-state and more effective in ensuring that
loyalty the Civil War ultimately „compromised the voluntary principle at the root of the American
nation by the resort to compulsion in order to save the Union‟ (Parish 1995:226; Bensel 1990:11).
The development of what Bensel describes as a new kind of „imperialistic nationalism‟ was, he
argues, a necessary one for a nation facing a choice not „between one nation and two but between
one nation and many‟. Prior to secession, he suggests, nationalism was of „comparative
unimportance‟ to America, separated - and therefore protected from - the intrusion of foreign

789
states (Bensel 1990: 62-3). The challenge offered by Southern separatists to the nation forced not
just a reassertion of American nationalism but also a reappraisal of it. When the radical politician
Charles Sumner addressed the question Are We a Nation?' two years after the war's end he did
not hesitate to answer in the affirmative: „Even if among us in the earlier day there was no
occasion for the word Nation‟, he observed, „there is now. A Nation‟, he confidently asserted, „is
born‟. But Sumner noted that although the word nation „was originally applied to a race or people
of common descent and language‟ in its modern incarnation it referred to a common government.
„Originally ethnological‟, he observed, „it is now political … the essential condition is one
sovereignty, involving of course one citizenship'. 5 As a radical, Sumner's vision of America was
one of a nation of equals, but it was not a vision shared by all. In the second year of the Civil War,
the leading black spokesman Frederick Douglass invoked birthright and voluntarism in his claim
for American citizenship: „I am an American citizen. In birth, in sentiment, in ideas, in hopes, in
aspirations, and responsibilities‟, he declared. „I am an American citizen‟, he repeated, „I am not
only a citizen by birth and lineage. I am such by choice‟. 6 The fact that Douglass felt compelled
to state his case so forcibly tells its own story.

Douglass's claims on behalf of African Americans were realized up to a point. The 1863
Emancipation Proclamation, followed by the Thirteenth Amendment, abolished slavery, leaving
the way clear for the civic nationalism of America to be, as Sumner described it, truly inclusive of
all citizens regardless of colour. The persistence of de facto segregation, however, undermined
both the ideal and the nationalism constructed around it. North and South had reached a new
national consensus by the dawn of the twentieth century but it was, in many ways, a white, male
consensus, predicated on a combination of nostalgia for the past and deep-rooted opposition to an
integrated society (Silber 1993; Blight 2001). The history of the American Century' is, in many
respects, a combined story of ideological and ethnic entrenchment, set against a background of
the debate over nationalism in the context of the various immigration acts passed since World
War I, two of which - the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and the National Origins Act of 1924 -
represented clear attempts to control the nation's ethnic composition. By the 1960s, a decade
which saw a new and more open immigration act come into force, the Civil Rights Movement
became the most obvious outward expression of the challenge to America's racial order in a
period where segregation - both official and unofficial - highlighted the imbalance between
American ideals and the nation's reality. When America sent troops not once but twice into
Europe in support of a liberty that was denied its citizens at home, incarcerated some 71,000
Japanese-Americans during World War II whilst another 12,000 were actually serving in the

790
nation's armed forces and failed to protect its black citizens from the brutality of racial violence
that exploded on the streets of Chicago, New Jersey and the Deep South, it was, at best, sending
out mixed signals about who belonged in the nation and what the American citizen might expect
from the state.

The twentieth century was, perhaps, the period in which America paid most dearly for having its
nation before fully realizing its nationalism. The challenges American nationalism faced in that
period were the logical outcome of its development. Anthony Smith has described America as the
„model for the plural concept of the nation. The historic dominance of its white Puritan Anglo-
Saxon culture and language, coupled with its messianic myths of origin and foundation', he
argues, „have provided a firm ethnic base for its subsequent experiment in cultural pluralism‟
(Smith 1995: 107-8). Yet so far from providing a firm base, it can be argued that the American
national edifice was built on sand. America's civic nationalism was, from the outset, constructed
along clearly demarcated ethnic lines. Skin colour proved the means to inclusion for many
immigrant groups and exclusion for both indigenous and imported non-white peoples. Even
before the colonies broke away from Great Britain, ethnic divisions had begun to supplant class
divisions in a society where racial slavery was becoming the norm (Morgan 1975: 269-70; Foner
1999 [1998]: 37-9). As Patricia Hill Collins describes the process, „whiteness, whether propertied
whites or indentured servants, became defined in opposition to and elevated above the non-white
status assigned to indigenous peoples and enslaved Africans. This core racial triangle among
white settlers, indigenous peoples, and enslaved Africans‟, she argues, „became foundational to
the new US nation-state‟. This „racial triangle‟, she asserts, „neither disappeared nor radically
transformed‟ but both lies at the heart of and „describes a template for conceptualizing US
national identity‟ (Collins 2001: 7, 9; Kim 2004: 994). Indeed, from the colonial period through
to the Revolution itself, European interest in America as a new kind of nation - and Americans as
a new kind of people - was countered by American determination to be a nation in the European
mould. America's civic ambitions were, from the start, couched in distinctly ethnic language.
Hector St John de Crèvecoeur's famous enquiry, „What, then, is the American, this new man?‟
was of far greater interest to Europeans than to the fledgling Americans of the revolutionary era.
Although Crèvecoeur's work sold well and widely throughout Europe, in America itself it met
7
with lukewarm interest. So far from seeing themselves as a new kind of people, America's
founding fathers invoked a primordialist construction for their nation, one distinctly at odds with
the reality of its population and its politics. John Jay made the case for American nationalism
clearly and succinctly in The Federalist Papers of 1788 when he argued that the erstwhile

791
colonists had for „all general purposes been one people … As a nation we have made peace and
war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances,
and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states‟.
However, when he then went on to assert „that Providence has been pleased to give this one
connected country to one united people - a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking
the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government,
very similar in their manners and customs‟ he was describing a nation that did not, neither at the
time of writing nor since, exist. 8

Jay's conceptualization of the new nation as, in effect, a birthright community comprising the
descendants of a single immigrant - British and white - group was codified two years later in the
1790 Naturalization Law, which offered citizenship to „free white persons‟, and reinforced in the
mid-nineteenth century by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's ruling in denial of black citizenship
rights in the 1857 Dred Scott case. Ever since, and despite the passage of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the tension between the nation's civic ideals and its ethnic
social and political constructions has challenged, compromised and, some argue, actually defined
American nationalism. Beyond the study of its historical development during the Revolution or
the Civil War, if American nationalism is discussed at all today it tends to be in the context of
politically charged debates over multiculturalism, pluralism, affirmative action, and the rise of
what Carol Swain has identified as „the new white nationalism‟. Challenging the „tri-umphalist
narratives‟, that not only „involve a creative reimagining of US history‟ but, crucially, „function
as national mythology‟, this scholarship locates the problem of inequality within the context of
both the historic and the modern nationalist forces at work in America (Kim 2004: 989). More
effective at revealing American nationalism's shortcomings than in explaining its persistent
resonance even among groups who feel excluded from the nation-state, it sometimes collapses the
construction of the nation as state into the development of American nationalism as political and
emotional force. No one can dispute that from the colonial era onwards „American nation-
building was vitally dependent upon the forcible extraction of labour, land, and other resources
from coloured bodies‟, nor that „multiculturalism‟s sanguine story of voluntarism and consent'
masks a plethora of involuntary dispossession and destruction (Kim 2004: 994-5). Further, that
there was a great deal of hypocrisy involved in the Founding Fathers' espousal of liberty and
equality for all in a society increasingly reliant on racial slavery is obvious, but the approach
taken to what Collins has termed this „paradox of US national identity‟ differs considerably.
Some scholars stress that diversity - religious, cultural, ethnic - offers no barrier to inclusion in

792
the American nation, the first nation to make „diversity itself a source of national identity and
unity‟ (Fuchs in Malik 1996: 180). Stressing the strength and durability of what Eric Foner calls
„the story of American freedom‟ as central to the nation's sense of itself, these scholars regard
American ideals of freedom and equality as a persistent goal, never yet fully realized but
nevertheless the cornerstone of American nationalism (Foner 1999 [1998]; Beasley 2001: 171-3).
Others are less confident that American ideology can either survive or, indeed, that it ever had
much meaning in a nation in which racial inequality has been so persistent and so destructive.
From this perspective, the „mythology of American freedom‟ is interpreted less as a foundation
myth of American nationalism and more as a myth in the sense of a fable; a story of American
freedom, certainly, but a fictional one (Swain 2002).

CONCLUSION

In the early nineteenth century, many Europeans were, like Tocqueville, fascinated by - and many
not a little critical of - the republic that had emerged across the Atlantic. Their fascination was
shared by Americans themselves who were acutely conscious both of the criticism and of the
need to establish not just their nation, but a functioning sense of nationalism in this „age of
nationalities‟. By the end of that century, America had come through a Civil War that had
challenged the nation's very existence, celebrated its centennial and welcomed many hundreds of
thousands of new immigrants into a society already characterized by dramatic social,
demographic and economic change. When Turner turned his attention to the question of
American character, it was in part a response to this degree of change, but in part, too, an attempt
to assert Americanness in the face of the prevalent assumption that America was Europe
transplanted. „Our history is the study of European germs developing in an American
environment‟, he observed. „Too exclusive attention has been paid … to the Germanic origins,
too little to the American factors‟. 9 Americans themselves consistently debated the lineaments of
their nationalism, particularly in the context of the rising immigration toward the end of the
nineteenth century, but in the early twentieth century, scholarly interest waned in the aftermath of
World War I, a war that made nationalism appear a destructive and not a constructive force. It
was not until World War II, and America's growing international role, that the question of
American nationalism began to exercise Americans and Europeans in any kind of sustained way.
Americans themselves felt the need to assert their patriotism as part of the war effort; Europeans
sought to understand the nature of the nation that would come to dominate the American Century'.
Now, at the start of the twenty-first century, in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade

793
Center, and elsewhere on US soil, that prompted both an emotive upsurge of patriotism but also
its backlash, the question of American nationalism is more important than ever. However, long
before the horrific events of 9/11, the concern had been voiced that America's „best years as a
nation‟ were over. With American exceptionalism now described by one leading scholar as „a
double edged-sword', scholarly interest in the question of American nationalism, how it was
created and sustained, and what it means to Americans - and by extrapolation to the rest of the
world - is both necessary and long overdue (Lipset 1996: 17).

What debate there is over American nationalism continues to revolve around the concept of
America as an exceptional nation and Americans as an exceptional people held together not by
blood but by belief, a shared ideological consensus predicated on selective aspects of the
American social, religious and political historical experience from the original Puritans' „errand
into the wilderness‟ through the war for independence, the Civil War and the westward expansion
of the later nineteenth century. Although what Beasley describes as the „shared beliefs hypothesis‟
is viewed by some as „a hegemonic myth which has functioned historically to privilege some
voices and marginalize others‟, it continues to function as an epistemological tool in the study of
American nationalism, whether the focus of inquiry is historical, political or sociological. At its
heart lies the concept of America as the „redeemer nation‟, a concept, Tuveson argued, rooted in
millennialism, already present in the „nascent nationalism‟ of colonial America, articulated
politically at the point of separation from Europe, refined socially in the growing belief in
„Manifest Destiny‟ during the nineteenth century, and justified morally by the outcome of the
Civil War (Tuveson 1968: 101-2; Niebuhr and Heimert 1963: 10-11, 123-8; Cauthen 2004; Smith
1999, 2003: 137-40; Cherry 1997 [1971]; O'Brien 1988). This belief in America as, in Lincoln's
words, the „last, best hope of earth‟, was explored and challenged in the scholarship of the 1960s
that probed the lineaments of America's sense of nationalism at a time when American ideology,
juxtaposed against Soviet ideology, seemed if not always consistent in application at least clear-
cut in conception. The changes that American nationalism has gone through since are less well
understood because of America's absence from the major studies of nationalism, an absence that
is regrettable on several levels. The premise of American exceptionalism has never yet been fully
explored in the context of other nation's experiences, despite the fact that America clearly shares
many of the attributes of the modern nation as scholars define it. Where America may differ from
other nations is in the resolution, albeit sometimes an uneasy one, that it achieves between its
civic and ethnic elements and, perhaps, in its millennialist ideology. Although America's current
President, George W Bush, denies that Americans see themselves as „a chosen nation‟, his

794
emphasis on „the unfinished work of American freedom‟ reinforces the concept of American
religious purpose in a nation where the evolving interaction between the civic and the ethnic, the
10
religious and the secular may define not just America, but the future of nationalism itself.

NOTES

1 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1893), the full
text is available through the University of Virginia at: http:/ / xroads.virginia.edu/ ∼HYPER/
TURNER/ (accessed 30 January 2005).

2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (trans. Henry Reeve, ed. Phillips Bradley), 2
vols (1835, 1840), reprint New York: Vintage Books (1945), Vol.I, p. 28.

3 William Gladstone's speech at Newcastle, 7 October 1862, and Lord Russell's rejoinder in
Becker Sideman and Friedman (1962: 157).

4 Henry Timrod, Ethnogenesis quoted in Kohn (1961 [1957]: 127).

5 „Address of Hon. Charles Sumner before the New York young men‟s Republican union, at the
Cooper Institute, Tuesday evening, Nov. 19,1867' (New York, 1867), pp. 4–5.

6 Frederick Douglass, „The Black Man‟s Future in the Southern States,' address delivered in
Boston, Massachusetts, 5 February 1862, in Masur (1993: 109–11).

7 See St John de Crèvecoeur (1983 [1782]: pp. 69–70 and Introduction, p. 8).

8 John Jay, „Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence,‟ The Federalist Papers, No.
2 (1788). This can be found in the Penguin edition of The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick
(London: Penguin, 1988). pp. 91–2; however, The Federalist Papers can be accessed most easily
via the Avalon Project at Yale Law School: http:/ / www.yale.edu/ lawweb/ avalon/ federal/
fed02.htm (accessed 5 February 2005).

10 George W. Bush Inaugural Address, 2005, at http:/ / www.whitehouse.gov/ news/ releases/

2005/ 01/ print/ 20050120–1.html (accessed 15 February 2005).

795
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Domingues, José. "Nationalism in South and Central America." Pp. 541-54

The independence of the Iberian colonies in the New World was one of the elements that heralded
the advent of modernity. It is within this context, with of course its particularities south of the
Equator, that nation-building and nationalism in the Americas must be understood.

Modernity has „disembedded‟ people from their more circumscribed ways of existence and
entirely changed the space-time in which their lives develop. „Re-embeddings‟, at both the
individual and the collective level, are an answer to this new situation (Giddens 1990; Wagner
1995; Domingues 2006: ch. 4). By and large the nation-state has been, at least in Europe and the
Americas, the main frame in which such re-embeddings have been achieved. Modernity implied a
process of complexification of social life, cut across by a drive towards differentiation.
Nationalism provided a counter-trend: the de-differentiation of collective identity through the
homogenization of the nation that emerged thereby, giving birth to a novel focus for cathectic,
psychological investment. Since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however restricted,
formally and practically, citizenship has accompanied the formation of the nation-state in these
areas and the telos of social development, such as was built (and built itself) into the minds and
imaginaries of the peoples of these countries, was their incorporation into the nation as equally
free citizens. Citizenship, however, as a bundle of rights and (to a lesser extent) duties, and
implying de-differentiation too in its universalism, is excessively thin to provide for the
construction of identities. Re-embeddings therefore must be cast also in other dimensions, with
greater substance. In „societies‟ that aimed at homogeneity, through the steering-force of the state
(a point I will resume below), nationalism, in one way or another, has provided the means for
thicker individual and collective identities. It is less abstract than citizenship and stresses the
particularities, historical and cultural, that weld together a specific population (Domingues 2006:
ch. 7). Besides, although it is universalist and homogenizing, a fundamental ambiguity remains -
and is apparent in the cases in point - since differences do not totally disappear and race and class,
as well as gender, are hierarchized within what is in principle a homogeneous nation (Wade 2001).

While the atomism of liberal views was strong in Western societies and was somehow in tension
with the Romantic and all-inclusive perspective of nationalism, in the Americas colonized by the
Iberian kingdoms the prevalence of neo-Thomism as a Renaissance worldview in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries eased the path for the intervention of the state in the „civilizing‟ sense

799
of creating nations from the amalgam of rather different cultures and peoples. That doctrine lost
its proper vocabulary; nonetheless, its main conceptions outlived their explicit formulation and
were included in the new political ideologies that flourished after independence, helping the
processes of what I have once called „nation-building‟ (Morse 1982; Domingues 1993, 1995).

To this internal characterization we must add that nationalism must of course also be placed in the
context of international relations. It has an external, interactive aspect, in terms of identity-
building and (broadly conceived) interest definition. In this regard nationalism in South and
Central America shows great differences from that which arose in the „core‟ countries of the
global system. It took at once a defensive and liberating stance, as well as a developmentalist one,
which aimed at levelling out the situation of the diverse nations within the global system. At this
point we need to introduce a further distinction. Nationalism may assume aggressive forms and
search for domination over other nations, or at least hold an exclusionary view; this is often the
case of right-wing nationalism. However, it may also assume more benign forms, liberating
nations against foreign domination, evincing therefore an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist
character; this has often been the case of left-wing nationalism, whether or not of a socialist
persuasion. Right-wing, fascist and authoritarian nationalism - petit bourgeois in the 1930s and
later with the military dictatorships that plagued the area from the 1960s to the 1980s - did appear
in „Latin‟ America. However, the subcontinent has by and large been prone to the second type,
left-wing or centrist type of nationalism, increasingly incorporating the popular masses in its
promises of development and autonomy (Vilar 1971). In any case, both types of nationalism
appear as forms of re-embedding and identity construction, whose specific cultural and political
content depend on concrete social dynamics.

Therefore, nationalism has two features that can be analytically distinguished, although they are
concretely weaved together in social process. Nationalism must be placed within an interactive
context, that is, as a means to or an aspect of the construction of a collective subjectivity - the
nation - that interacts with other collective subjectivities, namely other nations and social systems.
And it has also an internal aspect which allows for the social integration (which should, in my
view, be grasped as a sense of belonging and recognition rather than via the functionalist notion
of an attachment to overall common values) of modern, complex „society‟, a particular type of
collective subjectivity, in its process of identity building (see Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 35ff.
70).

800
Finally, characterized by the heightened globalization which is one of the features of what can be
defined as the „third phase of modernity‟ (Domingues 2006: ch. 8), the present configuration of
the world has indeed brought about some renewal of nationalism in South and Central America.
Overall, nevertheless, a weakening of national identities (especially in those countries that
comprise large indigenous populations and have always had greater trouble in achieving a more
homogeneous nation-building) as well as a willingness to fit, in one way or another, into the
globalizing movement have been two features of present cultural and political dynamics. Greater
complexity and the pluralization of identities, as well as the rolling back of the state and the
problematic issue of strategies of development geared to overcome the subaltern position of such
countries in the global arena, have been the obverse of those twin social processes.

INDEPENDENCE AND NATION-BUILDING

The independence of South and Central American countries was achieved in the period from
1810 to 1825, although Cuba, for instance, became entirely emancipated from Spain as late as
1898, just to be closely controlled by the United States. Few countries in the world, therefore, had
to face up to processes of nation-building as early as they did. In this regard they were indeed
pioneers, as Anderson (1991: ch. 4; see also Vilar 1971) insightfully noted. 1 However, differently
in particular from England and France - and to a great extent to the United States too, though
slavery remained in this northern country - one can hardly speak of literacy and popular
participation in independencies and in the building of the ensuing nations. To be sure, there were
popular sectors, slaves and other small people that joined the independentist effort (especially,
though not only, in the regions that became Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay), but they were a
minority and in the aftermath of the downfall of the colonial empires were unable to exert any
sway upon the new polities. This in fact marks a distinction from Western Europe and gives a
particular, oligarchic face to these pristine nationalist movements.

Social integration at a higher level of complexity and as the means for the re-embedding of large
social strata was not achieved thereby. In fact, its predominantly agrarian character, the
continuous personal subordination of most of the population (also in the urban centres) through
either „feudal‟ forms or slavery, to landlord and bureaucrats, the confinement of most of the
population to specific space-time coordinates (though „traditional‟ domination would be a poor
term to describe the situation), did not imply the need for nationalism as a means to create
broader forms of solidarity. The emerging ruling classes and state groups (something at times

801
difficult to separate), who had thus far been excluded from the high ranks of the administration,
had indeed a need for new forms of identification and solidary links. Nationalism provided that.
However, to some extent the relational aspect of nationalism - which provides for identity and
interest definition vis-à-vis „external‟ collectivities - predominated at this stage. The struggle
against colonial powers by the criollos of Spanish America and their counterparts in Brazil led
the way and demanded forms of ideology which were able to buttress such a dangerous and
doubtful endeavour, that is, the struggle to free their regions from metropolitan domination. I do
not mean by this that there was an immediate profit to be gained from that effort, since for many
of the colonial freedom fighters the outcome was disastrous, entailing loss of property, physical
suffering and even death. From the very beginning, hence, nationalism exercised its tantalizing
power as both a social and a psychological force.

If there was a general drive behind the moves towards independence, the specific social
conditions were conducive to rather distinct results. The main contrast has to be made between
Brazil and the Spanish American colonies. The Portuguese colony kept its integrity while the
latter gave birth to a myriad of countries. Of all the explanations to this quite astonishing disparity
the most sound is that which points to the intellectual leadership of the two processes as being
fashioned in rather distinct ways (Carvalho 1982). The Portuguese colony was never allowed
local universities. All its intellectuals and bureaucrats were formed, until the creation of the new
country, in the University of Coimbra, and seem to have enjoyed a high level of collective
identification, which was maintained in the struggle against the former embracing kingdom.
Moreover, this was combined with the transmission of power in the newly independent colony to
the son of the king of Portugal, implying an obvious continuity in politics and administration,
giving birth, in 1822, to the Empire of Brazil. In contradistinction, the Spanish colonies found
their points of fracture and formation of newly independent countries around local universities,
which were responsible, during the late colonial period, for the education of intellectuals and
administrators. We must not be oblivious, though, to the violence of the process also in Brazil:
during the whole nineteenth century local elites and intellectuals organized movements to break
free - often through republican ideology - from the new Brazilian Empire, and were severely
repressed by the armies of the central government.

During the nineteenth century - which some historians have even deemed a lost one - there was
no dramatic change in this configuration. In any case capitalism developed, state bureaucracy was
strengthened, social complexity overall increased, urbanization and an incipient process of

802
individual and collective disembedding came about. On the new terrain that slowly emerged it
was possible for the appeal of nationalism to be more broadly felt. Military conflicts between the
new countries mobilized the population and raised the spectre of citizenship - though very
restricted - via participation in war; the opening of the electoral franchise to the majority of the
population, however, was accomplished only in the twentieth century. Frequent military and
territorial conflicts opposed especially Brazil and Argentina, as well as them both, plus Uruguay,
against Paraguay (a country where a more popular form of government and nationalism had taken
root), in the War of the Triple Alliance. Chile, Peru and Ecuador also had their wars for territory,
as did Chile and Argentina, while Mexico very early on had part of its immense land mass
conquered by its northern neighbour. And yet, by and large, nationalism remained a business of
the ruling collectivities. Nation-building did not expand to include the popular classes until at
least the 1920s. Moreover, since states were neither strong nor organized enough, they were not
actually capable of waging massive and sustained wars during this period, which meant that
nationalism did not find an especially relevant connection in this area of social life (Centeno
2002).

During the last two decades of the nineteenth and the first three of the twentieth century a crisis
brewed. It found distinct resolutions. Modernity was by and large, though in a sort of uneven
development, established in the subcontinent. Demands were to deepen it and often to
democratize social conditions. In all countries, with greater or less success, these years witnessed
the rising - albeit not always irresistible - tide of the popular masses.

MASS NATIONALISM, DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL LIBERATION

The advance of modernity, in the economy and in social life, had effects that reached the political
system in most South and Central American countries. Mexico opens the twentieth century south
of the Rio Grande with the first great revolution since the 1789 French upheaval. Mexico had
been governed by a strong and authoritarian, though legally based, political system, led by
Porfirio Dí
az, which modernized the country in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Many
interests were alienated by the regime, however, which also increasingly faced the opposition of
peasant communities in the north and the south. In 1910 revolution broke out, Dí
az was toppled
and a new period began for Mexico. This included, of course, the forging of a new nation, one in
which the popular masses, peasants and the emerging working classes would play a pivotal role.
Liberalism and the very revolutionary process, alongside the evocation of the mestizo (the

803
„cosmic race‟, such as proposed by Vasconcelos, an important Mexican intellectual), were placed
at the core of the new Mexican identity. While liberalism was not actually that relevant for the
political and social life of the country, in which an authoritarian, corporative and interventionist
state overwhelmingly steered social life, at times in a nationalistic and pro-autonomous industrial
development direction, mass participation and rights were taken as a pillar of government
legitimation (Córdova 1979; Hale 1997; Aguilar Rivera 2001: 203ff).

Argentina underwent a process which was in many respects similar, although important
differences must of course be stressed too. The 1910s brought universal suffrage (although
interrupted by some military coups later on) and the rise of the working classes. If Mexico was
overall a country of mixed races, especially Indians and Spanish descendants, urban Argentina
was mainly a country of immigrants (a process which actually conformed to the racist ideologies
that yearned for a white wave to ameliorate the racial make-up of the country). Thousands of
people arrived at the beginning of the century in Argentina from Spain and Italy, as well as, in
much smaller numbers, other countries. A universal and lay educational system played a key role,
unparalleled in any country in the subcontinent, with the exception perhaps of Uruguay, in the
homogenization of this mass of people into a single national identity. This implied social rights,
steady labour and literacy as the basis of national belonging (Sarlo 1999,2001). However, the
1940s and1950s were witness to the emergence of an entirely new situation: immigration
decreased and the masses from the countryside became the core of the Argentine working class.
National identity was lent a twist at this stage through the rise of Peronism, which abandoned the
more cosmopolitan outlook of previous socialist and anarchist movements of the immigrant
period, and assumed also an often more marked „anti-imperialist‟ attitude (Rock 1987: chs. 6-8).
Although time and again toppled by military coups, Peronism remained to a great extent a crucial
element of national identification in Argentina, either as a positive national overall feature, or as
signalling a never-ending crisis of nation-building.

Brazil underwent a rather more selective incorporation of the masses into the nation. The 1930s
marked the rise of a strong state, nationalist in the sense of struggling for autonomy within the
international system and in the economic domain. But the rural masses remained excluded from
political life and from social rights. The construction of a national identity was the task carried
out over the next decades. This was couched in terms of a mixed race - crystallized in the idea
of„racial democracy‟ - in which Indians and blacks enjoyed the same level of recognition as
whites (of course a phenomenon more imaginary than real and although the telos of development

804
entailed the whitening of the nation). A further important strand was the maintenance of the unity
of such a vast country, as during the earlier independence process, against the more federalist
views prevalent during the first years of the so-called „Old Republic‟ (1898-1930). Stringent
intellectual efforts were applied to this (Oliveira et al. 1982; Ortiz 1985,1988; Domingues 1993).
Democratic and military regimes alike sustained this project, although the relations with more
active popular participation and autonomy in the process obviously varied.

Other countries in the region followed similar paths, albeit within less successful modernization
processes (cf. Venezuela, Colombia, etc.). Others still had much more trouble in terms of nation-
building, due to the deep differentiation of the population and the difficulty in solving the
„problem of the indian‟. This was the case of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala.
Mexico had similar difficulties but within a more complex and larger social formation, and
through the revolution, it was somewhat more successful in coping with the issue. 2 Cultural and
political fragmentation were attacked, often through the attempt, sometimes with Marxist
inspiration, to treat the problem not in ethnic terms but rather framing it as a class and land issue
(see Mariátegui 1928). This actually worked to a great extent. As the incorporation of such
masses of „peasants‟ into the nation lagged behind, the 1970s started to see a new wave of ethnic
mobilization which meant the dilution of the Indian masses within the nation.

In most of these countries „national-popular‟ regimes were placed at the very kernel of nation-
building: they aimed at internal class compromises and external accommodation, even though
development was their assumed goal (Touraine 1988: Part III). Neither entirely above and
detached from nor merely responsive to „civil society‟, but rather entwined with it, the national-
popular state was crucial in the nationalist arrangements of the period. It tried to extend, with
varied reach and success, citizenship to the popular classes. Economic development - or
„developmentalism‟ - too, in order to break free or reduce dependency and heteronomy vis-à-vis
the world capitalist centres, always loomed large on its horizon (Cardoso and Faletto 1970). 3 The
need to craft a synthetic national identity, through a selection of cultural features, which would
bring out the „essence‟ of the Mexican, the Brazilian, the Peruvian, etc., or even that of the „Latin
American‟, as well as to devise and implement policies capable of integrating and autono-mizing
the re-founded nations, led intellectuals one way or another to rally around the national-popular
states (Domingues 2003 [1992]). In this regard there are parallels between the South and Central
American experience on the one hand, and the European cases on the other. But although there
were indeed right-wing nationalist perspectives and movements, expansionist and chauvinistic

805
(Oddone 1986; Rock 1993), most of the energy of nationalism was employed in more benign
ways across the region, contrary to what was too often the case in the old continent: „Latin‟
American popular masses rarely lent fascist and chauvinistic movements their support. Instead
national emancipation and development have been much more popular.

On the other hand, national liberation movements have been rare as well. They have been
concentrated in Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua) and gathered strength
mainly from the 1970s on (Touraine 1988: 331ff). They were not effective in the long run either.
Cuba is in this regard of course a special case. It could have followed the same route as Puerto
Rico, and, having achieved independence from Spain only at the turn of the century, become a
colony or even an associated protectorate of the United States. Social struggle and an anti-
imperialist programme became strongly linked in the Cuban revolution from 1959-60 onwards
and increasingly directed not only against the internal political system but also against the United
States. This rupture with national-popular regimes and projects was achieved only in Cuba in a
sustained way and furnished the hard core of the country's identity in the second half of century
(Vilar 1971; Touraine 1988: 347-58). The left, however, wavered strategically during the
twentieth century between alliances with those regimes and a more head-on confrontation with
„imperialism‟, although the link between social struggle, nation-building and national
autonomization and development can consistently be found in its programmes (Castañeda 1993).

Some conceptual conclusions can be derived from this brief exposition of the predicament of
nationalism in South and Central America in the twentieth century. Nations were not ever found
there in a ready-made way. To be sure, this is never the case, anywhere, but in this region it was
even more pronounced. There was a massive pre-Columbian population, millions of black slaves
were imported, European immigration, from several areas and in successive waves, played a
highly prominent role, and miscegenation, despite the deep-seated plague of racism, was far-
reaching. Altogether this demanded, after the dreams of ruling circles in the nineteenth century of
creating white nations faded, an enormous effort at integration and homogenization. Except for
the pre-Colombian populations, especially in the Andean and the Central American countries,
common national languages, Portuguese and Spanish, greatly facilitated the process, which
nonetheless required dedication from intellectuals, bureaucrats and the political leadership to be
accomplished. Nation-building, searched for and achieved with greater or less success by a state
which seems to have inherited the neo-Thomist, integrative outlook of the colonial state, was the
result rather than the starting point of the process. Hierarchies of race and class nevertheless

806
remained ambiguously omnipresent, with whites and white culture on top, with often a general
perspective of whitening of the population, racially and culturally, being envisioned (Wade 2001).

Military dictatorships in some measure interrupted this process. Anti-popular and anti-national
popular (Touraine 1988: 367-93), they have thought of the nation in much more geopolitical ways.
Their extreme anti-communism, their usually chauvinistic perspectives (also within the South
American context), their alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union and its „internal
allies‟, have crystallized in the Doctrines of National Security, according to which the internal,
divisive enemy was to be combated in the course of a situation of total warfare (Comblin 1977).
But this has never been able to play an integrative role. At most it worked to freeze conflict and
arrest the processes of social mobilization which nonetheless surfaced time and again across the
subcontinent. Moreover, an argument about nationalism in its relational aspect can be put forward,
which distinguishes South and Central America from Europe. It is true that armies have been
based on conscription (which has been a condition for citizenship in America) and wars broke out
and at times performed a part in the construction of the nation (Argentina versus Chile or
Paraguay or Brazil, Brazil versus Paraguay and the eternal threat of Argentina, Chile versus
Bolivia, Peru versus Ecuador, as well as Mexico against the United States and also the French,
who occupied the country and supported Maximiliano's Napoleonic Empire, defeated in 1867).
Military mobilization and participation in the army have not been particularly important elements
in the definition of individual belonging to the nation, though, perhaps because while in the
nineteenth century armies did not enlist the popular classes after independence, in the twentieth
century the armed forces were used precisely against popular mobilization for rights and
democracy.

In contradistinction, citizenship at large has played, as elsewhere, an important role as an answer

to social mobilization. 4 Electoral franchise and social rights did not everywhere reach all of the
population. But even where they did not, they remained as an individual and collective goal: to
belong to the nation was ultimately to be able to enjoy such rights. „Real abstractions‟ as they
necessarily are (since they consist of abstractly universal attributes of individuals and
simultaneously organize key institutions of social life), these rights were tersely coupled with the
concrete features of to a large extent state-created nations. This mixture of abstract and more
concrete individual and collective identity, in which rights and nation are fused and is typical of
the second phase of (state-organized) modernity (Domingues 2005: chs. 3-4 and 8-9), was, as it
necessarily is, combined with a particular form of relational pattern. As collectivities, South and

807
Central American nations have consistently striven for inclusion in the international system in a
situation of less dependency than they have actually enjoyed. This has barely been achieved. The
disembedding and re-embedding processes which are indicative of modernity and obtained
throughout the Americas, found here therefore a particular shape, way beyond their limited scope
during the nineteenth century and the peculiar liberal and agrarian contours of the first phase of
modernity in those undeveloped countries. Now as citizens and members of enlarged nations,
enjoying rights and an inclusive identity, Brazilians, Uruguayans, Mexicans, Peruvians, Bolivians,
still saw themselves as subordinated to foreign powers in the international systems, although no
longer submitted to a colonial situation. This remained a problem, except for those fractions of
the ruling collectivities which profited from the situation.

ROLLING BACK THE STATE, SOCIAL PLURALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

The last three decades of the twentieth century were characterized in South and Central America
by a crisis which bit as deep as it did elsewhere. Capitalism underwent a major crisis and
Keynesianism had its foundations contested. This meant a sweeping crisis for national, state-
based development policies which were particularly important in the previous period. I shall not
go here into whether or not classes and class identities have been less relevant in this continental
context than in Europe. The fact is, however, that working-class organizations and the national-
popular movements somehow connected to them were also hit by the crisis of the 1970s. This
was still more deeply felt with the demise of the Soviet Union and the East European real
socialist societies. Working-class projects and identities seemingly lost much of their plausibility
and viability all over the world and in particular in this region. Meanwhile capitalism started to
recover. New technologies and a more prominent role for network mechanisms of coordination
implied a new arrangement between state, market and other organizations. Social complexity, the
social division of labour and pluralism in all spheres of life took large strides. Globalization put
huge pressure on the national state. As an answer applied especially in South and Central
America, neoliberalism and „sound‟ economic policies were introduced, along with a far-reaching
redefinition of the role of the state, which was rolled back, at least in some crucial areas. This
could not but affect national societies that had had the state as a key factor for their organization.

In other words, a new phase, the third, of mixed articulation, started in South and Central
America, although apparently facing many more difficulties in finding viable paths and
alternatives of development for the region than has been the case, for instance, in Asia or the

808
United States and in certain areas of Europe. 5 How do nationalism and nations appear in this new
situation?

A number of issues must be singled out here. The first points to the rise of social pluralism,
derived from the greater complexity of social life, its heterogeneity, as well as from the incapacity
of national and class identities to perform the trick of generating inclusive and cohesive
solidarities and collective subjectivities. The transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes
has accompanied these social and economic changes. The second issue is of course the impact of
deepened globalization upon the nation-state and national identities. The combination of these
two factors leads us to a third problem: the rise of ethnic and racial identities that tend to break
the pattern of nation-building through the homogenization of society and culture, including
sometimes links with transnational movements and identities. Finally, the emergence of economic
blocs, especially the Mercosur, the integration of Mexico through NAFTA and more recently the
debate around ALCA imply new issues and roles for the state and national identities in the face of
increased globalization. I shall go on later to comment on some countries of special relevance
which can help illustrate these more general processes.

By and large, although the crisis of development was deeply felt across the subcontinent, the
processes which unfolded from the 1920s onwards, with different chronologies and paces in
distinct countries, put South and Central America decisively within the bounds of modernity, of
course with specific features, as anywhere else for that matter. As we have seen, disembedding
processes were part and parcel of such an unfolding, having been dealt with by an effort on the
part of the ruling collectivities to build cohesive national identities. The state was instrumental in
this regard. The success of such developments eventually found its limits in a society freed to a
great extent from personal forms of domination, wherein people enjoy open possibilities to
choose who they are, irrespective of the deep social stratification and the uneven resources each
social class, gender and racial or ethnic group has at their disposal to operate such choices. 6 The
crisis of working-class identities, strongly felt throughout the world, and the demise of socialism
as a project, especially after the terminal crisis of Soviet socialism and even the hopes sustained
vis-à-vis the Cuban revolution, made this openness of social identities more acute. Informal job
markets and theoretically controversial processes of class mutation added a further element to this
crisis. For nations and nationalism the main consequence of this combination of circumstances
was a weakening of the possibilities of continuation of national popular movements and regimes.

809
The resulting heterogeneity of social change does not allow for sweeping constructions of the
nation (Canclini 1989).

The democratic transition from military rule (or authoritarian regimes like the Mexican post-
revolutionary state) has at once contributed to this process of pluralization and helped to
overcome the possible fragmentation it may entail (Touraine 1988: Part V). Allowing for interests
to come more freely into a renewed public sphere, it has provided in some measure a mechanism
of social integration. On the other hand, this openness has provided room for the divergent
articulation of interests and identities. Racial - especially black - and ethnic identities - mainly
those of the descendants of large pre-Columbian populations, such as Maya or Quechua and
Amayra, among others; religious pluralism - with the spread of Protestantism and exoteric sects
alongside Catholicism and black and Indian religions; and a simple general perception of people
as the „poor‟: these seem to be the major axes of identification more recently. Citizenship has
once again been a main element in the construction of national identity; or at least the demand for
rights - civil, political and social - has been placed at the core of national democratic politics. A
struggle for recognition, which includes rights, but also the esteem due to particular ways of life
(cf. Honneth 1992), is evident in this trend as well. An answer to those demands has proved
harder than expected, though, in a continent with the highest levels of inequality to be found in
the whole world. Internal problems, class, cultural and political resistance have been responsible
for a protected answer to demands for recognition and citizenship. The way globalization reached
the subcontinent, however, has decisively contributed to this difficulty and yielded repeated crises
in South and Central America, insofar as national polities cannot be responsible to the population
due to the strains the financial system and organisms such the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank have superimposed on them. Dependency remains therefore a central issue in
a transformed situation, one in which alternatives seem scarcer while time and social constraints
look starker than ever thanks to the mere institutionalization of democratic regimes - which run
the risk of demoralization. In view of that, the relational aspect of nationalism may resurface in
terms of attempts to redress this subordination to global financial markets and apply
developmentalist policies, hopefully directed to adjust those countries to the requirements of the
7
third phase of modernity (see Haggard and Kaufman 1992).

Economic processes of integration have moved pari passu with other changes. Mercosur,
congregating Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, although undergoing periodic crises,
answers for almost half of the trade of the two main partners in the organization. Thus far it

810
remains, nonetheless, merely a commercial venture - politics and social integration, including
identity, lag far behind. The Andean Pact and other regional treaties are economically feebler,
although agreements between them and Mercosur have also worked to actualize a dream of many
„Latin American‟ intellectuals - the creation of a single country or at least of a strong alliance
between the countries of South and Central America (Domingues 1992; Sierra 2001). The
inclusion of Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has worked as a
counterbalance to that project of continental integration, since it represents the United States's
hegemony over the Mexican economy and possibly political processes (Canclini 1996b). The
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would be a step further in such a contested direction,
opening markets and nations in South and Central America to the impact of the economy and
finance of the United States, although protectionist interests in this latter country as well as
Brazilian and Argentine resistance and strategy have clouded the perspectives of a quicker
process of integration. 8

Of the countries that, during the twentieth century, enjoyed successful development processes, the
most dramatic situation of all is that of Argentina. A very rich country according to any
international standard, the last decade of the twentieth century set the stage for perhaps its deepest
crisis ever. The former notion of Argentine identity was reversed and now includes a faltering
public educational system, unemployment and sharp inequalities. There is no longer a strong and
relatively homogeneous working class which was the basis of Perón's support, especially when
youth is taken into account. The peso parity with the dollar, bizarrely enshrined in the constitution
by Menen, something that was supposed to mean the definite integration of the country in the so-
called „First World‟, proved to be the last straw in the national debacle, which culminated in the
demise of De la Rúa's presidency after massive street demonstrations. For a while it was as
though Argentina had no possible future and was doomed to descend into poverty and shame
(Sarlo 2001). On the one hand this seems to have been a crisis long prepared and hinges on the
location of the country in the new phase of modernity, beyond agrarian exports, light industry and
a welfare state based on the prosperity such an equation afforded. On the other hand, the strains
brought to bear by IMF policies and the demands of financial speculation precipitated and
deepened the crisis. Mercosur and the integration with the Brazilian economy are now
increasingly perceived as main elements in the recovery of the national economy but also as a
means to re-insert Argentina into „Latin‟ America and help recover a national project and the
nation's self-esteem.

811
Brazil, on the other hand, has consolidated the electoral aspects of its democracy. However, as a
rather plural society, its institutions have not been able to deal with the emergence of freer agents
and integrate them within a national project and fashion basic daily solidarity. Widespread
violence is a result of these shortcomings, which is antagonistic as well as an aspect of national
identity. Although formally available and politically relevant, citizenship has fallen short of
implying respect for civil rights and actual social rights. Such violence is the outcome of this lack
of integrative mechanisms and sense of belonging to the national community (Domingues 2004
[2002]). The project of becoming the leading country in the continent has been strongly resumed
and Mercosur constitutes one of its main instruments, although the tension generated by the
dependency of the country in relation to global financial markets and IMF policies remains a
limiting element in the development of a democratic and inclusive national identity, and is thus a
drawback with respect to contemporary forms of social integration of the country. A relatively
independent and particularly interesting process, closely connected to disembedding and re-
embedding mechanisms, is the re-emergence of the race issue, revolving around the inequalities
and discriminations suffered by the large population of African descent in the country. The notion
of „racial democracy‟ has come under heavy attack from the black movement (which tends to
adopt the United States white-black divide, against the „false consciousness‟ arguably inherent in
the praise of miscegenation), while plural black identities have mushroomed, without however
conflicting with the perspective of integration, via market and citizenship, into a more egalitarian
nation. This is connected in different ways with the peculiar location of Brazil within the broad
notion of the „Black Atlantic‟, implying links, formal or otherwise, with general political and
cultural trends that span that ocean connecting Africa, the Americas and Europe in a decentred
transnational collective subjectivity (Sansone 2003).

In contradistinction, having eventually started, since the 1990s, to democratize its post-
revolutionary, as a matter of fact one-party system and accepting therefore that it must deal with a
more heterogeneous society than ever, Mexico has grappled with its integration into the economic
space of North America. This has had an inevitably enormous impact on the national identity and
the nation's project, while at the same time the social fabric has become much more plural,
especially as regards the encompassing notion of the mestizo, which, although arguably stressing
the role of indigenous people in the construction of the nation, denied them autonomy and special
rights. Thus far much has been achieved concerning economic processes, although it is not clear
which sort of influence the United States will enjoy culturally, and much less how this will work
the other way round (Canclini 1996b, 1999; Aguilar Rivera 2001). An outcome of these two-

812
pronged, far-reaching changes has been the rise of ethnicity and especially of a peasant
movement with a strong ethnic basis in the extremely poor region of Chiapas, once the stage of
the pristine struggle of Emiliano Zapata during the Mexican Revolution. Fighting for the rights of
indigenous minorities and against economic integration with the United States, it has fiercely
denounced neoliberalism and resumed guerrilla tactics which seemed absolutely defunct in the
subcontinent. 9 While it has strong internal roots and resonance, this new brand of Zapatism has
been able to mobilize strong external support, configuring itself to some extent as a truly global
movement (Johnston and Laxers 2003).

If in Mexico we can already detect the presence of what specialists have been calling the „fourth
wave‟ of Indian mobilization in the subcontinent (Trejo 2000), in Bolivia and Ecuador this has
assumed dramatic contours. While a peasant class identity for a while was able to frame the
political mobilization of these Indian communities, a web of factors has altered the identity
response these modernized peasants have found to their predicament: the withdrawal of the state,
under neoliberal dictates, from steady support to small and communitarian agriculture, revision of
ejido (community land) law (in Mexico) as well as the action of groups influenced by Protestant
and Catholic liberation theology in the Andean region (including the teaching at school of ancient
languages). Former state corporatist and religious networks seem to have facilitated and been
drawn upon by the new indigenous leadership.

Bolivia is an interesting case that helps to bring to the fore the never-solved problems of
integration which afflicted those societies with massive pre-Columbian populations, whose rights
and specificities have been consistently overlooked since independence in the construction of
national identities and polities, along with the deleterious pressure of the IMF for neoliberal
policies of financial restriction and privatization. In a situation of crisis of the once-powerful
miners' movement and attempts by an already weak and composite government to privatize even
water supplies, an alliance of Indians-peasants, cocoa producers and the urban poor, which rejects
the traditional political party form though utilizing other structures of mobilization, ousted the
government and staged a semi-revolution with important symbolic consequences in „Indian‟
America. For the first time an autonomous ethnic leadership had been able to play decisive cards
in the Andean political game. With the election of Evo Morales to the Presidency in Bolivia in
December 2005 and other developments, it is clear that the movement's momentum will be
maintained.

813
Finally Cuba, the brightest star in the constellation of nationalisms and national liberation
movements in the whole subcontinent, has been undergoing a very tense ideological and cultural
transition. Advanced modernity, especially during the crisis that preceded its third phase, saw the
emergence of irredentist or secessionist nationalisms which offered grand narratives to substitute
in particular for the vanished socialist project and identities (Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 126-8).
But that crisis was also the stage for the spread of postmodernism and its defiance and mistrust of
grand narratives (regardless of being itself a bird of the same feather). Cuba is a country where
the protracted crisis of actual existing socialism has not been surpassed. Nationalism, a modern
idea itself and one closely entwined with the Cuban revolution and regime, may have been to
some extent engulfed by that crisis and has now to compete in a „soup of signs‟, a problem that is
bound to afflict above all, though not only, the intellectuals, for whom the issue has been a crucial
one since the days of the national poet and hero JoséMartí(killed in the war of independence
against Spain and one of the first to denounce the imperialist intentions of the United States over
„our America‟) (Davies 2000). What this means for a country whose economy has been faltering
since the Soviet Union disappeared and lives daily under the brutal pressure of the United States
government remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION

Nationalism is a curious phenomenon, which sociology has not easily explained nor even
unquestionably described. As a means to create identities and embed people in modern
relationships it has been very effective. Several cultural and political collectivities have been
involved, in a more sincere or instrumental way, with nationalism also as a means to generate
legitimacy for the state and find an appropriate place for their nations in the global system in
which, from the very beginning, they have been placed. The internal and relational aspects of
nationalism of course vary, although they always share this more abstract problematic.

The Spanish and Portuguese colonies of the New World were in the forefront of nation-building
and nationalism in the early hours of modernity. Only slowly, however, did the actual
incorporation and integration of rather heterogeneous masses to the nation take place in the
countries that emerged from independence. Citizenship has in particular played an important role
in this regard, despite or even due to the difficulties of making it come true. Having broken away
from their former colonial masters these nations found themselves in a world wherein their
position was one of subordination to foreign powers that enjoyed supremacy in the global

814
capitalist market and military superiority. They have tried, against inner circles that profit from
this situation, to overcome that uncomfortable position. The internal and relational aspects of
nationalism during the first and the second phases of modernity maintain therefore a considerable
level of continuity in South and Central America. These countries begin the twentieth-first
century facing similar problems, although the third phase of modernity imposes new dilemmas
and demands creative solutions, some of which seem not as yet to have been forthcoming. To
some extent the future of the subcontinent hinges on how these new problems and solutions will
eventually be tackled.

NOTES

1 However, it is worth noting that, against Anderson's strong theses, Lomnitz (2001) argues three
points: termi-nologically his work has mistakes; that his emphasis on „horizontal‟ comradeship
overlooks the articulation of nationalism with hierarchy; and that his view of self-sacrifice in the
name of the nation as a key feature is far-fetched. See Bethell (1987) for an overview of South
and Central American independencies.

2 For historical information, see Applebaum, Macpherson and Rosemblatt (2003).

3 The creation, in 1948, of Cepal (the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America)
played an extremely important role in this regard, making room for independent economic
thought which combined Keynesianism and a „structural‟ approach with the political goal of
generating conditions for autonomous economic and social development in the continent. The
dependency theory was its main left-wing offspring.

4 It is worth mentioning here one of the most influential interpretations of „Latin‟ American
modernization. Analysing the rise of national popular regimes, or „populism‟, Germani (1965:
92–5,136–43, 157, 161–2,245) uses functionalist ideas to state the role of nationalism in the
integration, through common values, of society: the transfer of loyalties from community to the
nation is rooted in the expansion of citizenship and full participation. However, the masses,
coming from a traditional background and open to manipulation by populist elites, due to the
resistance of traditional oligarchies to democratization, combined the demand for freedom with
an ersatz of participation and authoritarian nationalism. Of course, neither functionalism and its

815
view of integration, nor such understanding of national popular regimes, although Germani did
have some crucial insights, are supposed here.

5 Instead of denying any relevant change or speaking of something like postmodernism or

network society, I have elsewhere put forward the concept of a third phase of modernity, linking
this to a more complex combination of mechanisms of coordination (market, hierarchy and
network). After its first, basically liberal, and second, state-organized, phase – and the ensuing
crisis of the 1970s - modernity found new paths to unfold. The subcontinent is certainly not the
most advanced area in terms of the development of this third phase. Therefore, it suffers from its
backwardness in this respect, since former patterns are no longer efficient in terms of social
coordination and development. Problems rather than solutions beset its countries, which also
suffer the impact of processes that have gained momentum, often in other regions. Modernity has
been characterized overall by uneven processes of development, although a more general pattern,
implying the aforementioned third phase of modernity, can be globally identified today. See
Domingues (2006: esp. ch. 8). In national and ethnic terms its consequences have not, however,
been so dramatically deleterious here as in countries of Africa or Eastern Europe.

6 To be sure, clientelism and corporatism are important elements of the new social and political
situation. They must be seen as modern features of these societies rather than the survival of old
forms of political practice.

7 A further issue is the expanding military presence of the United States in the subcontinent,
especially in Central America, the Andean region and in relation to Colombia (see Herz, 2002).

8 A country that has been a pioneer in the practice of neoliberalism in the subcontinent since the
days of Pinochet's dictatorship, Chile has long since connected its economy to the United States.

9 With the exception of Colombia, where oligarchic domination, peasant poverty and coca
plantations have torn the country apart.

10 In Burt and Mauceri (2004) there is an interesting comparison between the Andean countries
(Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador), in particular regarding the ethnic question today.

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Beilharz, Peter, and Lloyd Cox. "Nations and Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand." Pp.
555-64

Australia and New Zealand present a fascinating case when it comes to nations and nationalism.
Both are evidently imperial artifacts, the results of the expansion of the British Empire into the
Southland in the eighteenth century. Both are examples of what is best described as settler
capitalism, agrarian-based primary commodity export economies with British superstructures
imposed from above. Both nations therefore displace indigenous peoples, though these
indigenous peoples also differ dramatically in culture and organizations across the Tasman
(indigenous peoples make up 14 per cent of New Zealanders and 2 per cent of Australians). Both
white cultures look alike, to the outsider, even if New Zealand looks more British. Both share
British state institutions, patterns of party organization and union organization. Both share
imperial commonwealth culture, from cricket to Fabianism. Yet the two experiences are also
dramatically different. Australia is a big country, more accurately a small country or society
connected by large distances. Only the southern lands of Australia are temperate. Two-thirds of
Australia is arid; its populace hugs the urban edge of the continent. All of New Zealand is green
and temperate. Its inhabitants are more widely spread over a much smaller space, though a
disproportionate number of them now live around Auckland. Australian history is more clearly
artificial, additionally, in the sense that its identity is more often local or regional, at least in terms
of everyday life.

The idea of Australia reaches back to Terra Australis Incognita before first settlement in 1788, but
its practical identity until Federation in 1901 (and after) is colonial, constituted by the colonial
cities of Melbourne, Sydney, Perth, Adelaide, Brisbane and Hobart. New Zealand, despite the
Dutch associations of the name, was later viewed from its Anglo beginnings as Arcadia. Yet the
parallel paths of the two nations are also constitutive of their identities. The older Greek image of
the antipodes leads on to the collective identity of Australia and New Zealand as Australasia
across the path of the nineteenth century. Australia and New Zealand certainly worked together as
part of a larger imperial labour market and labour movement, as well as a shared market for
finance and commerce. The earlier arguments for Australian federation, indeed, were arguments
for Australasian federation. The Australian Constitution, drafted for 1901, still contains within it a
clause leaving open New Zealand as a possible member of the Australian Commonwealth. So
these are stories at once both intertwined and distinct.

820
If these are parallel paths, but not quite parallel histories, then they are also stories of separate
nations, perhaps most emphatically after World War II, when nation-building proceeded apace as
national developmentalism and Fordism made their mark, even if more evidently in Australia
than New Zealand (McMichael 1994; Rolfe 1999). Into the 1990s, in the face of the new
globalization both experiences were described anew as historic settlements; what in the critical
literature was referred to as settler capitalism in the new world (Denoon 1987) was now reviewed
as the „Australian Settlement‟ by Paul Kelly (Kelly 1992), and with a different emphasis, the
„Pakeha Settlement‟ in New Zealand by James Belich (Belich 1996). In both cases, the image was
one of a white man's new world, protected from the ravages of the world system by institutions
like arbitration, and able to deliver prosperity on an agrarian production base. As Zygmunt
Bauman likes to remind us, you only notice something when it fails to work. And so, in these
historic cases, did the image of settlement become apparent when it was blown away by the new
wave of globalization.

AUSTRALIA

The myth of modern Australian history is that Australia's defining attribute is its nationalism. The
nation-state Australia is a twentieth-century phenomenon, and so is nationalism. Certainly the
nation-state becomes a powerful reality in Australia, but this is only strikingly so after World War
II, in the period when war, followed by nation-building, the post-war boom and decolonization all
coincide. What is more evident geographically speaking is that Australia is a land mass or
continent, a continent which in the eyes of the federation fathers a century ago was looking for a
nation (Ward 1977). Given its lack of a myth of national foundation, in war or revolution, given
its accidental and bureaucratic origins as a penal colony, to the afterlife of which its instigators
apparently gave little thought, it may actually be more useful to view Australia as an accidental
nation. If we begin from the premise that Australia was an accidental nation, then the
historiographical and widespread popular sense that Australia is a country of strong nationalism
becomes less persuasive. Nationalism in Australia might then be viewed as a more complex
phenomenon, politically contingent and periodically enforced upon citizens by their political
leaders for electoral reasons or beaten up by the media for sporting events, not least in times of
crisis, whether local or global.

To begin to think about the nation in Australia is difficult. To begin to think about Australia is
difficult, in terms of the standard liberal or Marxist sensibilities. First, from penal settlement in

821
1788, the state precedes capital. Second, in a particular cultural sense, labour precedes capital, as
bond labour becomes free with the end of transportation, and as capital remains in London,
whereas labour, as always, is geographically fixed (though it is also mobile across the Tasman).
The kind of nationalism which is then identified as central by historians into the twentieth century
is labour nationalism. After its Whig phase, Australian history-writing becomes labour history,
history from below as befits the image of the land and its popular inflection as „down-under‟.

The most powerful images of labour nationalism in the 1890s are imperial and racially exclusive
(McQueen 1970). The image of White Australia finds its enthusiasts across liberal and labour
ranks, and this is telling, for the identity of Australia and of Australian nationalism here is in its
original form racially defined. Everyday life and loyalty are colonial, defined by the reach of
concerns in regional shearing sheds or in the suburbs of Brisbane or the slums of Melbourne, but
national identity, when it is presenced, is primarily racial. Indeed, the first legislative act of the
new Federal Parliament was to introduce the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901. Australian
identity here, is white, Anglo, European, not of Asia, neither yellow nor black. The aura of
Australia, in this period, was that of A New Britannia in the Southern Seas. New Zealand, more
racially pure in its settler population, less tropical in its geographical extremities, still later
identified its dream as that of a Better Britain.

This is not to say that labour nationalism ruled, or that its content was absolutely shared by
Australia's political elite. For one thing, labour nationalism would also happily dispense at least in
principle with the aristocratic fops of the political elite. Its socialist dream was often of capitalism
without capitalists, as elsewhere in Europe and the New World; and its racism was often
moderated by the internationalism of labour and the idea of universal brotherhood. But its
mainstream, the labourism that was to dominate both the Left and popular culture, was racially
exclusivist.

Did the advocates of white Australia then see themselves as Australians? Yes, in this particular
register, facing outwards, towards the wider world and not only inwards, or on to the next day and
its bread. Yet the presence of imperial consciousness and the images of the New Britannia were
such as to qualify this sense irredeemably. In the context of a New Britannia, the citizen (male)
would be an Independent Australian Briton. This was confirmed by federation in 1901, the
ordinary impact of which is still subject to dispute. There were nation-builders leading up to this
event, though their identities were also colonial, for before federation there was no national

822
capital, and Canberra, an artificial invention built in the shadow of Washington, DC and garden
city planning, was a city that was never a colony. The city of Canberra thus became identified
with the twentieth-century project of nation-building in a way that made the two mutually
constitutive, at the same time confirming their distance from the everyday life of most citizens in
the older and commercial colonial cities. The next significant phase was marked by World War I.
In the absence of a foundational revolution, the imperial event at Gallipoli became symbolic of
Australian nationalism in the context of the imperial heritage. Here the figure of the bronzed,
laconic Aussie was born, or constructed. The figure of the ANZAC is expressive of the moment:
imperial, Britain in the European theatre of world war; Australian, marked by the pragmatism and
comradeship of the wide brown land; and bonded together with the Kiwis, the NZ part of
ANZAC.

The Australian state, and the colonial traditions which proceeded it, have long been connected
with the idea of colonial socialism, or state socialism (Reeves 1902; Eggleston 1932). Australia
and New Zealand together, and perhaps especially New Zealand, were viewed from the north as
the social laboratory of the New World. The institution of arbitration was constructed in traffic
across the Tasman; then in 1938 the Savage Labour government pioneered global developments
in welfare provision in New Zealand „from the cradle to the grave‟. Both the statist tradition and,
in a different sense, the practical socialism of the antipodes was confirmed, momentarily, in the
period of reconstruction after World War II. The significance of the war for the project of nation-
building in Australia cannot be underestimated. For it saw, for example, the first moment at
which taxation became a federal prerogative, presuming now that it was the nation rather than the
colonies (or then states) which was both the appropriate organizational unit of the state and the
desirable carrier of collective identity. If federation was the first serious political attempt to make
a nation-state, then post-war reconstruction was its practical sequel and extension in a world
where nation-building and rebuilding was now the shared global imperative. The national-
development phase of global capitalist development in Australia shared its impulses. Import
substitution was consolidated on a grand scale with the development of local Fordism and the
shift from car assembly to local car production (Davison 2004). The idea of a National Health
Service was mooted in Australia and defeated. The 1944 Federal Labor government referendum
on the widespread extension of state powers was defeated by the electorate. The Australian
National University was established in 1949, together with a Research School of Social Sciences
to guide it and Canberra. National demography became an academic priority and a developmental
object, via programmes of Southern European migration to build industry and its suburbs, and to

823
push programmes of national development like the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme in
New South Wales, a national development programme that could be compared to the Hoover
Dam in the United States.

The result of the post-war boom and programme of national development was the emergence in
the period of the so-called „Lucky Country‟ in the 1960s (Horne 1964). Here the image was of the
Australian nation as a consumptive more than productive culture, where primary export
commodity markets could maintain a strong and well-fed largely Anglo population and facilitate
its historic shift from the hope of a civic nation into the fun palace of a leisure nation. This was a
lazy nationalism, the product of widespread abundance; it remained racially exclusive, though
now increasingly European rather than strictly British. One result was that during the 1960s the
idea or at least the slogan of the White Australia Policy was abandoned, both by the Labor party
and by the state, though assimilation clearly ruled.

Into the 1970s both nation and nationalism took a social democratic turn, marked at government
level by the reformist Whitlam moment, 1972-75. This represented a new period of cultural
nationalism, perhaps reminiscent of Trudeau in Canada, together with a cosmopolitan inflexion.
The Whitlam government encouraged the development of a national literary canon, not least in
the form of film and television, as well as the valorization of cultural diversity. Against a
backdrop of accelerated globalization, shifts in diplomatic priorities from Europe and North
America to Asia, and immigration trends that diluted the demographic weight of „white‟ Australia,
the new doctrine and practice of „multiculturalism‟ progressively displaced pre-existing
unicultural narratives of nationhood in most official discourse. While certainly more tolerant of
cultural diversity within the nation than its ethnocentric predecessor, this new exercise in civic
nationalism was not without its detractors. Many critics of multiculturalism have argued that it
conceals the continuation of a hard Anglo ethnic core, dominated by a white Anglo-Celtic elite
that defines itself, and is defined by others, as non-ethnic (Hage 2000; Jakubowicz et al. 1984).
Elizabeth Povinelli (2002) has similarly argued that multiculturalism called upon Aboriginal
Australians to identify with an impossible ideal of „traditional‟ cultural authenticity, the logic of
which is both conformist and non-conflictual. However, although seeking to domesticate the
mobilizing power of ethnic identification and grievance within safe cultural parameters,
multiculturalism also opened up new spaces for political assertiveness. Indigenous peoples used
the new sense of the expanding political sphere or civil society to organize public presence, not
least in the form of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, a self-fabricated space located in the grounds in

824
front of Parliament House in Canberra. The image of the black nation could no longer be avoided
by the white mainstream.

By the 1980s, the Labor government returned to office, restyled now as the party of state, no
longer as the party of the labour movement. The long Labor Decade, 1983-96, saw Australia
Labor in tandem with New Zealand Labour anticipate Blair's subsequent New Labour in Britain
(Beilharz 1994). This represented the closure of the moment of the project of national
development, and the reformation of the nation-state in terms of the globalizing project. The
return to power of the conservatives, or Liberals under Howard since 1996, has seen the
maintenance and acceleration of the processes of economic globalization together with a formal
return to the politics of monoculturalism. In this way, the political achievement of Howard has
been to connect back to the populist core of the image of labour nationalism, to refigure this as a
middle-class „battler‟ ethic and to connect this to the political economy of deregulation.

NEW ZEALAND

Nationalism in New Zealand presents a series of striking contrasts and parallels with its
Australian counterpart. The contrasts are perhaps less obvious, especially to the outside observer,
but are critical to understanding the specific form, content and historical trajectory of New
Zealand nationalism and nationality. Their genesis can be traced to the decades following the
1860s land wars between the Maori and the colonial government, which generated mutually
determining pan-Maori and pakeha (white) New Zealand identities. These were the bases for, and
manifestations of, two opposing nationalist imaginaries that continue to shape contemporary New
Zealand politics. In the late nineteenth century, they both represented proto-nationalisms in search
of nations.

In 1854, Canterbury pioneer Thomas Cholmondeley wrote about American precedents for the
New Zealand nation, while Governor George Grey told Maori chiefs that one day „a great nation
will occupy these lands‟ (cited in Sinclair 1986: 1). It was not until the final decades of that
century that the idea took on a more coherent collective expression. If „nations‟ are formed not so
much by any identifiable empirical property as by nationalist claims themselves, as Craig
Calhoun (1997) has argued, then it is clear that Maori and pakeha nations became gradually
sharpening frames of reference during this period. What we might usefully call „Maorination‟
came first. The most obvious manifestations were the Kingitanga (King Movement) and

825
Kotahitanga (Maori Parliament) (Denoon and Mein-Smith 2000: 184-95). Born in the shadows of
and as responses to colonial dominance, both sought to encompass particularist tribal claims and
identities within a more inclusive „Maori‟ framework. Both sought to marry cultural autonomy
with political objectives, not least of which was the securing of Maori interests, leadership and
sovereignty (tino rangatira tanga) in the face of colonial rule, irrespective of tribal affiliation. It
is this coupling of culture and politics that marks them out as proto-nationalist. Their ultimate
collapse as viable institutions should not blind us to their proto-nationalist character, nor to their
enduring legacy for the Maori cultural and political renaissance of the 1970s. They also made a
crucial contribution to the formation of a white settler nationalism and identity, against which the
Maori were increasingly defined and, at least partially, marginalized.

Settler nationalism, and its twentieth-century progeny, has always been unclear about the status of
the Maori within its self-proclaimed nation. On the one hand, an assimilationist strain sought to
incorporate the Maori within narratives of national becoming. In this view, the 1840 Treaty of
Waitangi was a unique experiment in cooperation between an indigenous population and
European settlers, rather than the imperial fraud that radicals often present it as being. It expresses
a compact between, and a founding document of, two peoples who would go on to form one
nation. The early vote for the Maori (1876 for male Maori with individual property title), and
their physical survival and relative prosperity as compared to indigenous peoples elsewhere, are
presented as proof of the enlightened attitude of New Zealand's colonial administration and its
desire to incorporate Maori citizens within the new nation. Indeed, one of the arguments put
forward against joining the federation with the six other Australasian colonies was that the latter
could not be entrusted to uphold the rights of „our natives‟ given the savage treatment of their
own. On the other hand, white settler nationalism evinced a more straightforward exclusionary
vision. This vision was premised on a racialized view of the world, which condescendingly
viewed the Maori like aborigines, as a window into Europe's anthropological past - an
unassimilable „race‟ on a lower rung of the evolutionary ladder. The new nation would be a
nation of and for the white race, as made clear by New Zealand's Immigration Restriction Act of
1899. This excluded those who were not of British or Irish parentage and who could not pass an
English language test; this was a „white New Zealand‟ policy two years prior to the
implementation of its more infamous Australian counterpart. As Denoon and Mein-Smith note,
by the end of the nineteenth century in New Zealand, „the shared idea of “the people” had
coalesced and permeated public consciousness so that all who were non-white, non-Christian and
non-European in culture were labelled “unassimilable‟'' (2000: 211).

826
White settler nationalism was also ambivalent about New Zealand's relationship to Britain. As a
British colony peopled largely by English and Scottish settlers and their descendants,
notwithstanding the large Maori minority, „New Zealandness‟ elicited divided loyalties and
contending identities, often within the head and heart of the same settler. Britain remained the
mother country amongst early generations of white settlers, including those born in New Zealand.
For them, New Zealand promised a Britain of the South Seas, an improved arcadian model to be
sure, but one that was still organically tied to, loyal towards and dependent upon the home
country. For a time, New Zealand even sought to fashion itself in the imperial image of its British
parent, claiming an empire writ small in the South Pacific. Its direct colonial administration of the
Cook Islands, Samoa (after World War I) and other small Pacific Islands, and its continued
economic and political dominance of them to this day, represent important episodes in the
formation of white New Zealand nationalism. Needless to say, the history of New Zealand's
involvement in the South Pacific Islands was also crucial to the emergence of nationalism in the
latter, though that story is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Even when the demographic balance shifted in favour of a „native born‟ white New Zealand
populace in the 1880s, the image of the imperial centre as home continued for many pakehas.
New Zealanders generally viewed themselves as „better Britons‟, but Britons nonetheless, and
this would continue until at least World War I. But alongside, or perhaps more accurately within,
this „better Britonism‟, was growing a more explicitly separate New Zealand identity. This was
reflected in the emergence of a more politically assertive nationalist journalism, the formation
of„New Zealand natives associations‟ in the 1890s, and the establishment of numerous national
organizations. The New Zealand Farmers' Union, the New Zealand Rugby Union, the National
Council of Women, the first national political parties and trade unions, and many other national
organizations date from this period (Sinclair 1986: 3). They expressed a growing sense of
separateness from both Britain and, equally important, the other Australasian colonies.

From the standpoint of the present, it might seem inevitable and natural that New Zealand and
Australia should form two separate national states and identities. The 1,200 miles separating
Sydney from Auckland have themselves been identified as 1,200 good reasons for national
separateness, a distance which is magnified by the various cultural, geographic and historical
differences that national-centred historiography commonly emphasizes. But this is to read history
backwards. It involves a kind of retrospective nationalism which, through a sleight of hand,
transforms what was a historically contingent, could-have-been-otherwise process of national-

827
state formation into a historical necessity, a national destiny, or both. What existed prior to the
twentieth century was not Australia' and „New Zealand‟, but seven British colonies that bore a
pattern of family resemblance and, relative to the rest of the world, a high degree of economic,
political and cultural traffic between one another, which helped constitute a „Tasman‟ or
Australasian World'. This could just as well have been the basis for the emergence of one rather
than two national states and identities.

New Zealand's reasons for not joining the Australian Commonwealth in 1901 have been the
subject of extended historical debate (see Fairburn 1970; Sinclair 1987; Belich 2001).

It has been suggested by some that the main reasons are economic. The economic crises of the
1890s affected the other Australasian colonies far worse than they did New Zealand, whose
relative economic dynamism was said to be an incentive to remain apart. Some commentators
have concluded that New Zealand's intensified export trade to Britain since the advent of
refrigerated shipping in the 1880s had diminished the importance of access to Australian markets,
and thus diminished the economic incentives to federate. Finally, some nascent New Zealand
industries, along with the trade unions, which overwhelmingly opposed federation, were seen to
be fearful of competition within the new unitary market that would be formed by the Australian
Commonwealth. While such explanations offer important insights into why some constituencies
were against federation, they have difficulty in accounting for why these interests prevailed over
others that would have clearly benefited from federating, including the powerful farming lobby.
A more rounded explanation must take into account New Zealand settler nationalism itself, which
impeded and then was consolidated by federation. Apart from the emergence of a pan-Maori
identity, what were the other developments that moulded New Zealand's settler nationalism?

New Zealand's transport and communications infrastructure had been transformed from the 1870s,
under the stewardship of Julius Vogel. From then on, the rapid growth of a national railway
system, the multiplication and improvement of roads, and the proliferation of telegraph lines and
postal services, compressed time and space and linked distant localities within and between New
Zealand's two main islands. This not only accelerated provincial interdependencies and extended
the reach of the colonial state, it gave material and institutional substance to the imagined space
of an emerging nation - developments which Livingston (1996) has perceptively described as
„technological nationalism‟. Intensified economic and social interconnectedness was coupled with
accelerated political centralization. Up to the period of the land wars, political power and

828
administration had been dispersed across the main provincial centres. The debts incurred and
demanded by extended military campaigns undermined the autonomy of the provinces,
concentrating power in the hands of an expanding central state apparatus. This apparatus, in
conjunction with its imperial overseers, set about forging and perfecting legal and administrative
uniformity on every square inch of „its‟ territory - a stimulant to and index of institutional
nationalization. From the 1870s, the colonial state also imposed mandatory primary school
education for all children, a key instrument of national cultural homogenization in New Zealand
as elsewhere. While Gellner's (1983) claim that nationalism demands and begets the coincidence
of cultural and political boundaries is over-generalized, he was surely correct that relative cultural
uniformity improves the prospects of initial state formation and consolidation, and that education
is one of the key means by which this is accomplished. This was certainly the case in New
Zealand, with generations of school children learning a national catechism and mythology within
the classroom, thereby helping to form identities that they would carry with them for life.

The other two factors that were constitutive in the emergence of a white New Zealand
nationalism during this period, even though shared with Australia, were institutionalized class
compromise in the form of compulsory industrial arbitration, and New Zealand's involvement in
war. The 1894 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (IC&A) represented the key
achievement in a line of progressive legislation implemented by the Liberal government, which
gave New Zealand the seeds of a social security system and an international reputation as a social
laboratory. The IC&A Act provided a foundation for New Zealand's lengthy twentieth-century
attachment to economic nationalism, while also giving workers as citizens more of a stake in the
new state. The IC&A Act and other progressive legislation obscured cleavages of class beneath a
unifying veneer of community, providing apparent resolution to social antagonisms that remained
unresolved. The myth of egalitarianism and a classless society became incorporated into and
central features of the very fabric of New Zealand's dominant pakeha nationalism. As in Australia,
this myth was enhanced by New Zealand's involvement in war.

Jock Phillips (1996) has identified at least two ANZAC myths. The first is premised on an
imperial vision, and commemorates the sacrifices that New Zealanders (and Australians) as
„better Britons‟ made in defence of and as part of the British Empire. The second is less overtly
militaristic, more introspective and focused on the private horrors of individual soldiers whose
sacrifices were made on behalf of what was ultimately a foreign power. What both narratives
share is a sense of national becoming: in the first vision, New Zealand plays its part as a new

829
nation on the global stage, punching above its weight; in the second, New Zealand loses its pre-
national innocence, the blood its soldiers spilled a sacrificial rite of national passage. In the
immediate aftermath of the war it was the first vision that was dominant, as reflected in the
iconography of the shrines and monuments that mushroomed in New Zealand's towns, cities and
rural districts between 1918 and 1922. The ANZAC myth has subsequently been remade and its
meaning transformed for new generations, and these same monuments are now interpreted in line
with the second vision. They now provide tangible points of reference linking New Zealand's past,
present and future, thereby establishing the continuity necessary for the imagining of a national
subject.

New Zealand's post-war, nation-building project begins in the 1930s with the election of the first
Labour government, and more precisely with its enactment of the 1938 Social Security Act. The
Act contained a raft of progressive policies centred on state subsidization of health, housing and
education, which laid the main pillars of a recognizably modern welfare state. During and beyond
Labour's reign, which ended in 1949, these policies were extended and institutionalized. They
developed alongside and as an integral part of a programme of economic nationalism and import
substitution, which sought to relieve New Zealand of its heavy reliance on primary production
and the importation of manufactured products. Figures like the public servant and economic
historian W. B. Sutch (1966, 1972) provided a powerful intellectual rationale for the post-war
welfare consensus and its further extension, arguing that economic diversification and the
avoidance of foreign control could only be accomplished through tariffs and state intervention
into the economy. High consumer prices and heavy state regulation were the prices to be paid to
ensure national independence and a more equitable distribution of national income. For a time,
New Zealand's welfare state became a source of national pride and identity. Any child from the
1950s or 1960s could recite the frequently trumpeted fact that New Zealand enjoyed one of the
highest standards of living in the world. But this fact, and the complacent assumptions of the
dominant nationalist orthodoxy on which it rested, were beginning to be undermined by internal
and external challenges; a resurgent Maori nationalism on the one hand, and the corrosive effects
of intensified globalization on the other.

A Maori nationalist revival was initiated in the late 1960s and intensified over the following two
decades. It would, eventually, be realized in the ideology and political practice of „bi-culturalism‟,
which was in many ways to New Zealand what „multiculturalism‟ was to Australia.

830
In the wake of the Second World War large numbers of Maori had moved from rural to urban
areas, and were concentrated in areas of high poverty and relative deprivation. These would in
time become a focus for Maori grievances, and sites of cultural re-affirmation. In this context,
Donna Awatere's Maori Sovereignty (1984) provided both an articulate challenge to the white
nationalist orthodoxy, and a militant alternative vision framed by Maori self-determination. The
large land rights march in 1975, which spanned the length of the North Island in order to
publicize Maori grievances, confirmed the depth of Maori nationalist sentiment. It was followed
by a major confrontation at Auckland's Bastion Point in 1978, where hundreds of Maori who had
occupied some of the city's most exclusive real estate were physically evicted by a huge police
mobilization. The South African rugby tour of 1981, and the violence that ensued in its wake,
further radicalized Maori youth and sharpened feelings of national marginalization. Taken
together, these events contributed to the reinvigoration of a moribund Waitangi Tribunal that had
earlier been set up to address Maori land claims. The co-opting of prominent Maori activists into
its bureaucratic machine was simultaneously symptom and cause of the differentiation of Maori
nationalism between radical and reformist strains, itself a reflection of increased socio-economic
differentiation within the Maori population. This process accelerated after the fourth Labour
government came to power in 1984 and immediately set about transforming New Zealand's
political economy, allegedly in response to globalization.

The deregulation of the New Zealand economy, the corporatization and privatization of state-
owned industries, and the hollowing out of welfare provision and entitlement, have had their
corollary in a shifting national idiom and sensibility. The cult of individualism and the destructive
social logic of unfettered free markets have placed greater strains on the pretensions of
nationalism to be a unifying, levelling force. New Zealand's dominant nationalism in the 1980s
and 1990s took on all of the trappings of a cynical marketing exercise, packaged and repackaged
in Americas Cup extravaganzas and the commercialization of sport more generally. It also had
the odious effect of reanimating a far-right nationalist populism - in the form of Winston Peters's
anti-Asian, anti-immigrant New Zealand First party - which appeals directly to the fears and
prejudices of a constituency marginalized by globalization and neoliberal restructuring. In this it
mirrors the development of Pauline Hanson's One Nation party in Australia, though as in
Australia the larger dynamics indicate striking social division rather than severe political
polarization.

CONCLUSION

831
The emergence, maturation and transformation of New Zealand and Australian identity and
nationalism over the long century discussed in this chapter draw out one key fact: the essentially
contested nature of the ways that the categories New Zealand and Australia are imagined. This
struggle for control over imagination about community in its antipodean context is likely to
intensify over the coming years as the communities that they encompass diversify in response to
the rapidly changing rhythms of an increasingly globalized world. In both countries, this struggle
will also likely continue lock-step, given the respective strength and tradition of the parties to
struggle. In New Zealand, the contest will remain more clearly bicultural; in Australia, it will
likely be rather between images of an „old‟ and a „new‟ Australia (Beilharz 2004).

Looking back at these stories of the rise and renegotiation of antipodean nation-building, the
conceptual clarity of the idea of the nation-state and of nationalism blurs. These were accidental,
or incidental nations imposed, differently, both on indigenous peoples and on convict and settler
subjects, who were at best Britons with local accents and markings. The traffic across the Tasman
has meant that only more recently has the question of citizenship become more decisive, and yet
more indifferent, as more and more antipodeans travel out. As Bauman indicates, you only notice
what you have when it's gone. The Australasian experiment was state-dependent, and only latterly
more clearly nationalistic. Now it is deregulated, and its nationalisms are less well-rehearsed,
even if they are increasingly hostile towards one another. For those who remain, the vicissitudes
of settlement continue.

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