People v.

Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)

FACTS:

The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering People’s Restaurant. A
witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting, pulled his
hair, and poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned
with a gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind
and shot him six times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his
possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that
Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-
defense but he failed to prove Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder
qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of
possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime occurred in
1994) is applicable?

RULING:

No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an
aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable
to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.
People v. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

FACTS:

As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 ( Anti-Subversion Law) as
amended before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest was issued on July 1983 but was
unserved as he could not be found.
Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the subversion case.
When arrested, an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live ammunition was found in his
possession. On June 1990, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a
motion to quash the information invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he claims that
alleged possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was granted by RTC and CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700) should be applied retroactively to Tujan.

RULING:

Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively. The repeal by said law of RA 1700, as amended
was absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal.

Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by
a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. It is a
recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private
respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.
People v. Lacson, 382 SCRA 365 (2002)

FACTS:

Respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing
of eleven persons who were claimed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.

The said cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional
dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses.

Respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State
that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question.

According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively
applied so long as they favor the accused. He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run
on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the
State to fairly indict him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not procedural laws may be applied retroactively.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As
applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has
committed a crime is to be punished.

In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that:

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and
to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure.

*****Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
People v. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 309 (1990)

FACTS:

Fausta Gonzales, et al., were all found guilty of murder for killing Lloyd Peñacerrada. All of
them except for Custodio Sr., withdrew their appeal. The decision of the trial court was based on
the testimony of the witness Jose Huntoria. Huntoria said that appellant was also one of the
attackers of the deceased.

Appellant maintained that he was asleep at the moment. The trial court and Court of Appeals
rejected appellant’s defense of alibi.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant was guilty?

RULING:

The Supreme Court found Huntoria to be an unreliable witness. Huntoria admitted during cross-
examination that he cannot determine the group of people stabbing the deceased. He failed to
point definitely that appellant also did the crime. As stated in Article 3 and 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, for one to be criminally liable, an act should be committed. The SC found no
sufficient proof that appellant has acted.

Lastly, the SC found Huntoria was an interested witness as he was also the tenant of the
deceased. His testimony was sought to ingratiate himself with the deceased's family.
The SC found appellants guilt not proven by reasonable doubt thus acquitting him.
People v. Silvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil 353 (1931)

FACTS:

Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage. Romana cohabited
with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan.

On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn
complaint for adultery.

After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of
Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint. The two
accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in Masocol
(Atienza signed the promise).

On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the
justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case. The accused left Masocol and wen to live in
Santo Niño, in Paombong.

About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in
Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol. Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with
Romana, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas.

On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it. He said that that was the only way he could be revenged
upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and
Romana. Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him. Nicolas and
Antonia went to ask for help but were too late. The fire destroyed about 48 houses. Witnesses
saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire.

The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson. Martin was
convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena temporal).
Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice?

RULING:

No. Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who
does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to
commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous
actions.

In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an
agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are
simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or
nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that
being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art.
14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with
regard to which one has kept silent.

Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana
Silvestre, who is acquitted.

U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)

FACTS:

On December 16, 1907, there were five individuals, including Catalino Apostol, who went to the
house of Pedro Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul to inquire about their
missing carabaos.

After Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul said that they knew nothing about
it, Catalino Apostol told them to leave the house. However, they refused to do so. Thus, Catalino
set fire to the hut and the same was burnt down.

According to the trial court, the testimonies of the injured party provided sufficient evidence to
prove the responsibility of the accused.

Therefore, Catalino was proven to have committed the acts within the provisions of article 549 of
the Penal Code. He sentenced to sixteen years and one day of cadena temporal. And he ordered
to indemnify the value of the burnt hut worth 1 pesos.

Catalino then appealed to the court with the defense that there was absence of proof of intent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not proof of intent is needed?

RULING:

No. As provided in Art 1 Penal Code, Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are
always presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear.

In the case, there was no need to prove the intent of Catalino for committing the act. As intent is
largely a mental process, there is always a presumption of intent arising from overt acts.
US v. Catolico, 18 Phil 504 (1911)

FACTS:

The justice of peace of Cagayan had before him 16 separate civil cases initiated by Juan Canillas
for damages resulting from breach of contract. All cases were decided in favour of Canillas and
all defendants appealed the decision and deposited Php 16 and a bond of Php 50 as required by
law. It appears that the sureties of the bond were insolvent and new bonds were not presented on
the extension given. Canillas appealed. The justice of peace dismissed the appeals and ordered
the sm of money attached and delivered to Canillas in satisfaction of the judgment. The judge
was prosecuted for malversation of funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of felony.

RULING:

Judgment of conviction is reversed and defendant ordered to be discharged from custody.

The judge decided in good faith under the belief that he was acting judiciously and correctly. It
was a result of erroneous exercise of judicial function and not an intention to deprive any person
of his property feloniously. He acted that debts might be paid to those who they are legally and
justly due and not to enrich himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was a mistake not
a crime.
People v. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 (1993)

FACTS:

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver
of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local
election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC. He told Mrs.
Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will
temporarily take his place. When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in
Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving. After the car turned right
on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the
car beside the driver. Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to
"get money" from her. Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused.
But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more. The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000. Mrs.
Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check. Isabelo then turned the
car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
Pampanga. According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other
side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood
because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of
the car.

The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to
Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of
the car. He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer
had gotten a ride. He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across
the highway.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged.

RULING:

No. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the
time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money
from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.

For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors
was to deprive the offended party of her liberty.

In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of
another offense primarily intended by the offenders. This does not constitute kidnapping or
serious illegal detention.
People v. Delim, 396 SCRA 386 (2003)

FACTS:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding
the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of
Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for Modesto
is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999, Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged
into the house and poked a gun at Modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel
Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that Randy and Rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used
denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime charged in the information is kidnapping or murder?

RULING:

In determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts

recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling.
Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such
specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade
ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al. that for kidnapping to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party
of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor.

What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the
information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is
charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.

Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that
an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result
to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular
purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the
Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.
Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. Specific intent may be proved by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions
of the accused as established by the evidence on record. Specific intent is not synonymous with
motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a
particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the
prosecution need not prove the same.

As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt
and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime
charged such as murder. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the
specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the
accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom.
Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors
in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him
with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto
was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific
allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive
Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping.
Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.

***The Court found the accused guilty of homicide (not murder) for failure of the prosecution to
present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before
and when he was attacked and killed (thus, not treachery nor use of superior strength).
People v. Temblor, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)

FACTS:

On Dec. 30, 1980, at around 7:30 pm in Brgy. Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del Sur, Temblor
bought a half-pack of Hope cigarette from the store of Julius Cagampang. While the latter was
opening the pack, a gun shot was heard and Cagampang fell to the floor with a gunshot wound in
the head. The accused, together with another, barged into the room, demanding the firearms of the
victim. Before fleeing with the victim’s .38 caliber gun, Temblor filed tow more shots.

On Aug. 1981, during the mass surrender of dissidents, Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick
Carmona. On Nov. 26, 1981, he was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the public market and
detained at the municipal jail where he was seen by Victoria Cagampang, the victim’s widow and
was positively identified.

Temblor’s defense was an alibi: on the said date, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio
Perol in Brgy. Camagong.

ISSUE:

Whether or not motive is essential in convicting Temblor?

RULING:

Decision of lower court affirmed; civil indemnity increased to P30,000.

Motive is not essential when culprit has been identified. Fact that accused has knowledge of the
deceased’s firearm is sufficient enough for motive. The fleeing of the accused after killing and
taking Cagampang’s firearm implies admission of guilt.

Accused’s alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the witness who had no base
motive to accuse him of the crime. In order for alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough
for the appellant to be elsewhere when the crime was committed, but it must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Nasipit
is accessible to Talo-ao by jeep or tricycle for 15 to 20 minutes.